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**Towards 1997 and the reunification
of Hong Kong with China:
The views of Hong Kong women**

by

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Abstract of thesis entitled

**Towards 1997 and the Reunification of Hong Kong with China:
The Views of Hong Kong Women**

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On 1 July 1997 China will regain sovereignty over Hong Kong. To investigate this event, this exploratory study examined whether Chinese women in Hong Kong thought that the reunification of Hong Kong with China would bring about particular changes, and, if so, in which sectors of society change would be effected. The study also asked if the women viewed these changes as positive or negative, and whether various groups of women had different concerns. An effort was made to allow women to give their views in their own words so that this study could be their 'voice' about the social change that might occur in Hong Kong due to the process of decolonisation.

The first phase of this research involved 164 Hong Kong Chinese women. A questionnaire was devised with three sections: Section A gathered demographic data, Section B consisted of open-ended questions about the change of sovereignty, and Section C used a Likert-type scale to gauge strength of feeling. In the second phase of the study, four women, representing different socio-economic groups, participated in unstructured interviews.

The quantitative data from the questionnaire were analysed using crosstabulation, and content analysis done on the open-ended questions and unstructured interviews.

The main findings were that most respondents thought that major changes would occur in Hong Kong because of the reunification; that change would occur in particular sectors of Hong Kong society (the structure and personnel of government, legal system, human rights and freedoms, education system, welfare system, and that there would be an increase in corruption); and that changes in these areas would adversely affect their lives. The study also showed that the large majority of the women (85%) held either negative or ambivalent views about the reunification and that more highly educated women, women with higher status jobs, women enjoying a higher income, were more likely to be negative towards the reunification. Conversely, less educated women, from lower status positions, tended to be more positive.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the middle decades of this century approximately one hundred new states have emerged as western colonial empires have relinquished their sovereignty over their former colonies. But the political development of some formerly colonial territories has not followed the same path. Some have moved to "sovereignty in free association" (Lee and Bray 1995:359), for example, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands with America, and the Cook Islands with New Zealand, and some have been swallowed up by their larger neighbours (East Timor and Irian Jaya by Indonesia). At midnight on 30 June 1997 Britain will cede her sovereign rights over Hong Kong, one of its few remaining colonies, to China.

Although reunification implies perhaps a merging of equal parties, the reunification of Hong Kong and China is not one of equal partners entering an alliance on commensurate terms. Hung (1995:91) describes the transition of sovereignty in Hong Kong as "not only an enormous economic and political project, but a social and philosophic convergence of two cultural blocks centuries apart". The last Asian colony of the "world's oldest parliamentary democracy" (Bueno de Mesquita, Newman and Rabushka 1996:4), Hong Kong is a thriving and highly developed capitalist society made rich by the adoption of free-market policies and hard work on the part of the people who live there. Its citizens, protected by the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary, cherish a wide range of civil rights: freedom of speech, the freedom to travel as they will, a free press, and academic freedom. During the last fifteen years Hong Kong people have formed political parties and participated in western-style democratic elections.

While the economy of China, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, has grown enormously, economic development in Hong Kong has far outstripped that of China, leaving a wide gap between the two economies. Although some people in China have become wealthy, most people have not benefited from economic development. Found mainly in the rural areas, the bulk of the population (industrious as they are) still remain very poor.

What is more, although adopting capitalist economic practices, the Chinese regime continues to espouse socialist ideology and to conduct its affairs via the rule of man rather than the rule of law. Wood, Hunter and Ingleby (1995:47) argue that the nature of the rule of law is "stable, impartial, general, measured and ordered" and the

character of the rule of man "idiosyncratic, arbitrary or capricious"¹. Jayawickrama (1997 June 25:11) explains further: "China is "ruled by law", Hong Kong is not. Hong Kong is subject to the "Rule of Law"". In making this distinction, Jayawickrama (1997 June:11) underlines the fact that in Hong Kong there is a "law-making body elected by, and reflecting the will of, the people; a Judiciary independent of the other branches of government but competent to review both legislative and executive action; and a constitutionally entrenched statement of fundamental human rights". These elements, basic to the Rule of Law (and included in the Basic Law (Appendix B) in order to maintain the current system in Hong Kong after the reunification) do not characterise the system in China.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1996:21) adopt a similar argument and claim that, because of "different political histories", the law in Hong Kong and the law in China share no common ground. While the people of Hong Kong, via the rule of law (embedded as it is in constitutions and independent courts), are both accorded protection and can seek redress, the people of China are "often locked up without reason and released without reason" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:22). Further, redress through the legal system is not generally available.

In China, bribery, corruption, and favouritism are a part of life, and people value their 'connections' (*guanxi*) which make it possible to get things done and to procure goods and services that would otherwise be out of reach. In practice, ordinary citizens of China do not enjoy the civil rights that Hong Kong people appreciate. Freedom of speech, freedom to travel, press freedom and academic freedom are not part of life in China. Nor are the people able to participate directly in the choice of rulers.

Guiding the reunification is the Joint Declaration (Appendix A) signed by the British and Chinese on 24 September 1984. Enshrined in the Declaration is the stated intention of the Chinese to "resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997" and the British decree that it will "restore Hong Kong to the PRC with effect from 1 July 1997". The Declaration also embodies other promises which indicate the Chinese intention to maintain the current economic and social systems of Hong Kong "basically unchanged for 50 years after 1997", and that the territory will "be run by local inhabitants and not by officials sent from Beijing" (Ching

¹ It must be noted that such arguments, underpinned as they are by particular ideological constructs, obfuscate the ways in which particular notions within the rule of man (the underlying beliefs as to what constitutes the basis of an ordered society, for example) are encapsulated within the rule of law.

1985:33). Yahuda (1996:2), pointing out that the autonomy of self-administered independent areas allowed in imperial China was limited by Chinese law and official forbearance, and insisting that the autonomy of the treaty ports was established through military force, claims that the proposal that Hong Kong could remain an autonomous self-governing enclave under the sovereignty of socialist, communist-party-run, China is without precedent. Further, no communist state has voluntarily allowed that "such an enclave should come into existence" (Yahuda 1996:2).

The Joint Declaration derived not from an act of state that could be rescinded but was established via an international treaty with Britain and confirmed, as Yahuda (1996:2) notes, through a "kind of covenant with the local Chinese Hong Kong people in the shape of a Basic Law (Appendix B) that has been ratified by the sovereign body in Beijing, the National People's Congress (NPC)". The Joint Declaration which promulgates what Deng Xiaoping called a "one-country, two-system" concept for Hong Kong, promises autonomy to Hong Kong².

For many people in Hong Kong, however, because the concept of autonomy is understood differently in Hong Kong and China³, there are doubts about whether this promised autonomy will actually be accorded the territory. These doubts are fuelled by recent moves by the Chinese such as the setting up of a provisional legislature which, Beijing has indicated, will replace the current elected legislature immediately after the handover, and the recent rhetoric from Beijing leaders that certain things will, or will not, be allowed to be voiced in Hong Kong after 1997. Also worrying Hong Kong people is the fact that the rising stars of the communist elite favour a consolidation of economic progress rather than the fast pace of reform set by Deng Xiaoping. Naturally, the citizens of Hong Kong wonder whether the promises the Chinese have made in the Declaration will be honoured, whether other modifications on the part of the Chinese government will precipitate transformations in the political, economic and social structures of Hong Kong, and wonder what opinions they will be able to express after the handover. They worry too that the adoption of economic

² Although Hong Kong is permitted to preserve its capitalist way of life for fifty years, the Central government of China has responsibility for the defence and foreign affairs of Hong Kong. Other Special Administrative Regions of China which have been granted autonomy for "trade and investment" (Sung 1996:188), continue to remain under the "control of central communist authorities" (Yahuda 1996:2). For example, they are not allowed to administer themselves (unlike Hong Kong) and must remit taxes to the Central Government of China.

³ While, as Clark (1989:154) points out, autonomy to those in the west refers to "the liberty to live under one's own laws", to the Chinese the concept incorporates a "socialist insistence on the idea of autonomy within limits set by higher authorities. The adoption of the western concept of autonomy with regard to Hong Kong would mean that the Chinese leaders would have to restrict their practice of seeking to control and administer every aspect of life in Hong Kong as they currently do in China.

consolidation in China (rather than radical reform) will slow down the economy in Hong Kong and that, consequently, they will suffer economically. They ask if the way of life they currently enjoy will change? And, if so, in what ways?

Exactly what will happen in Hong Kong after June 1997 is the major question in Hong Kong. Some are optimistic, claiming that China would not want to jeopardise the economic wealth that flows via Hong Kong to China - that China would not want to 'kill the goose that lays the golden eggs'. Coupled with comments about good 'connections' with mainland people and claiming that Hong Kong is rightly part of China, some contend that British rule has meant that Britain has made enormous amounts of money that should rightly belong to Hong Kong, and that the potential of Hong Kong people has been thwarted. Conversely, other people are pessimistic, arguing that the leaders in Beijing do not understand Hong Kong society or its people, that corruption and bribery will become part of life in Hong Kong after 1997, and that the political, economic and social freedoms Hong Kong people enjoy will be swept away by Chinese rule. These concerns have led many to emigrate.

While it seems certain that changes will undoubtedly be wrought in the lives of everyone in Hong Kong, it is very difficult, from the pre-reunification perspective, to predict accurately what will happen. The concern in this thesis is with the women of Hong Kong: what do they think will happen, what do they think their lives will be like after reunification? Little has been done specifically on women's perceptions of the future in Hong Kong. While Wilkens (1993:8) explores the "relationships between gender, news exposure and fear of the future" and DeGolyer (1995) briefly mentions women in his paper entitled *Corruption and its Discontents: Perceptions of Corruption in Hong Kong*, neither elaborated on the wider range of issues about which women in Hong Kong, because of the impending reunification with China, may well have formed opinions. In seeking the opinions of women, my purpose is to present an understanding of the hopes and fears Hong Kong Chinese women have regarding their futures after reunification.

My particular interest regarding women and the opinions they form stems from certain observations made in the course of my studies. Like Haggis (1990:68), I am concerned that the focus of so many sociological observations, ordinary people going about their daily lives, are not seen as 'us' but, rather, as 'them'. Positioned as the 'other', ordinary people are thus excluded from the making of sociological knowledge. The subjectification of ordinary people and a subsequent lack of recognition of their "distinct presences and realities" (Haggis 1990:68) continues, I suggest, despite the

awareness of many sociologists (such as feminists, those interested in ethnographic research, and interactionists). A second, related, concern is that the voices of women are conspicuously absent in accounts of historical change.

Such omissions, the fact that women's voices are "not 'there' in the historical accounts and analyses" (Haggis 1990:68), has long been a concern of feminists. Keen to understand why and how women's experiences are obscured in the academic and intellectual discourses of western thought, feminists have explored the processes of exclusion and indicated both broad dimensions of exclusion (Rowbotham 1973; Taylor 1983), and explored particular areas of oppression (see, for example, Walby (1990) for an overview).

With regard to their theorising about the broad dimensions of women's exclusion, many feminists have drawn on the writings of de Beauvoir whose pioneering work, "The Second Sex", was first published in 1949. Stressing that the oppression of women hinges not so much upon the physical differences between women and men, but upon the social significance accorded any differences, de Beauvoir (1983:20) argues that the identification of women as the 'other' stems from an innate inclination of the human consciousness to identify that which is not the self as the 'other'. She claims that this identification, coupled with, firstly, an inherent tendency of human consciousness to seek to dominate and, secondly, women's reduced capacity to work (because of menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth (functions not accredited a social value because that are 'natural')), led to male supremacy.

While various arguments have been put forward over time about the wider sources of women's oppression⁴, other writers have looked at how women's invisibility is reinforced. Language, for example, has been identified as a critical factor in both the "nature and quality of women's conceptual presence in knowledge" (Haggis 1990:69). Not only, as Spender (1981) asserts, does the use of language such as 'man' and 'humanity' systematically obscure women's presence but, as Moller-Okin (1979) argues, basic western socio-political expressions (such as citizenship, for example) are predicated on the presumptive exclusion of women from 'civil society'.

⁴ While Firestone (1970) claims that the patriarchal system (via which women are subjugated) is both biological and pre-social, and Sacks (1974) argues that it is women's participation (or not) in public labour (which involves the production of goods for exchange) which defines them as social adults and thus determines their oppression, Hartman (1979) and Eisenstein (1981) understand the oppression of women as being subject to two systems, that of patriarchy and capitalism. However, while for Hartman (1979) the two systems are separate and semi-autonomous, Eisenstein (1981) argues that they are so interrelated as to be one. There has been criticism too of the work of de Beauvoir. See, for example, Tong (1989) and Mackenzie (1986).

Compounding this situation is the western emphasis on the events of 'public' life. This emphasis is related to the fact that, historically, women have been seen as located primarily within the private sphere where history was thought not to be made. Feminists, regarding the distinction made between the public and private as controversial, share a conviction that the failure to incorporate the understanding or explanation of experiences that occur within the private sphere (the realm in which much of women's experience occurs) into the public sphere means that significant areas of women's experiences are ignored. Such a split, it is argued, also ignores the experiences of men within the private realm.

As Haggis (1990:25) points out, "This 'public' focus is reflected in most research topics". Illustrating this, Delphy (1984) argues that the experiences of women who do not work outside the home are rendered invisible in studies of social stratification which classify people according to 'jobs'. Hekman (1990:95), claiming that Delphy's observation is "just one stance of a larger problem that informs the social scientific treatment of women", notes that "because women cannot be subjects they also cannot be actors in the social scene". One of the reasons that women are, and have been, thought not to be actors (and explains their subsequent absence in historical accounts) is that women's work in the private sphere supposedly did not, and does not, produce 'value' (in the Marxist sense). Because only labour in the 'public' sphere in such interpretations produces 'value', focus has been placed on this sphere in accounts of historical change. Further, where women have been excluded from the market (thought to be the site of 'economic' rationality), they have been viewed as non-rational and, therefore, supposedly incapable of making history⁵.

The criticism that feminists offer in regard to the position of women as the 'other' and their consequent subjugation, and the absence of women's 'voice' in accounts of historical change, provides the backdrop against which to set my questions regarding the social change that may perhaps occur when Hong Kong is reunified with China. Concerned to address what could be argued to be not so much an overt resolution to ignore women but rather a failure to recognise the key assumptions and practices of sociological inquiry⁶, this study focuses on Chinese women in Hong Kong who, already unequally positioned economically and socially to men, may be more affected by the changes the reunification may bring. Like Jones (1993:15), I do

⁵ For an overview of the feminist critique of rationality see Hekman (1994).

⁶ Sociology emerged at a time when, because they were relegated to the private sphere wherein work was accorded no 'value', women were not (as discussed above) accorded status as actors within the public sphere of economic rationality. Sociology is also, therefore, a modernist discipline and is, it can be argued, inexorably 'rationalistic'.

acknowledge the concerns of feminists such as Anzaldua (1987) and Spelman (1988) that white feminists abrogate the authority of women of colour when they speak on their behalf. As a white feminist this issue, for me, is a vexing one. On one hand, as a sociologist, I wish to address a topic in Hong Kong (the views of Hong Kong Chinese women on the reunification) which, I believe, is not being adequately looked at. On the other hand, mindful of Anzaldua's (1990: xix, xxi) claims that even when white feminists make an effort to acknowledge differences they, in their very efforts, "not only objectify these differences, but also change those differences with their own white, racialized, scrutinizing and alienating gaze", I acknowledge that the legitimacy of my study might be rejected *a priori*, because I am a white feminist. I do have to ask, however, whether skin colour does, as Jones (1993:15) notes, "signify, by itself, one's political position and establish the boundaries of one's feminism"⁷. While, even in asking this question I realise that some may suggest that I am seeking to diminish the indubitable disparities of privilege among women, I wish to state that I clearly recognise that racial privilege does both structure the production and dissemination of knowledge, and authorise particular feminist theories over others.

In conducting this research, I am aware of my position as a white feminist and endeavour to keep what I understand as the issues inherent within my position to the forefront of my mind. I hope, in order that Chinese women's views on the reunification be comprehensively explored, that this study will be but one 'voice' for the experiences of ordinary Hong Kong Chinese women during this time of transition to Chinese rule.

Having briefly outlined the situation facing Hong Kong, having mentioned, in a general sense, the misgivings that the people of the territory are voicing, and having stated that the prime focus of this thesis is to allow the voice of women to be heard in this time of unprecedented historical change in Hong Kong, I will, in Chapter Two, outline the imperialist practices which led to the annexation of Hong Kong and discuss the Chinese understanding of the treaties and the notion of sovereignty. How the Chinese have long regarded the treaties and how they understand the notion of sovereignty has naturally influenced moves, unsettling to many Chinese in Hong Kong, which the Chinese government has made in regard to the recovering of sovereignty over Hong Kong. I will then present an overview of both Hong Kong and China today, before discussing, in general terms, the position of women in Hong Kong and China. When comparing their own lives with the lives of women in China, Hong Kong

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One could ask the same question regarding other factors such as class, for example.

women may have reason to be concerned that reunification will mean a deterioration in their position in Hong Kong.

In Chapter Three the concerns that Hong Kong people express will be elaborated. Their concerns spring not only from the context of the immediate society of Hong Kong but from the wider influences on that society and therefore include the events and developments which occurred in Britain, Hong Kong and China both before the colonisation of Hong Kong, during that period, and those which have happened since that time. They reflect, too, the decisions taken, and the stances adopted, by the governments of Britain, China and Hong Kong. Although it is my intention to provide an historical background to enable the reader to understand the present, the events, developments, decisions taken and stances adopted will not be discussed in a strict chronological order. To do so would negate my main purpose, to present an understanding of the hopes and fears women hold, mediated as they are by societal influences.

In Chapter Four the research questions are presented and the research methodology discussed. The results of the survey are presented in Chapter Five, and the main themes of the unstructured interviews in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven includes the discussion of the findings and the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

HONG KONG: PAST AND PRESENT

It has often been said of Hong Kong that it is a 'borrowed place' and that 150 years of British sovereignty over the territory is 'borrowed time'. On June 30 1997 this 'borrowed time' will be over and China will regain its sovereign powers over Hong Kong. While the Chinese⁸ portray the return of Hong Kong to the motherland as removing the shame of the past and, thus, a joyful event, the reunification for the people of Hong Kong is a different affair, an event which raises questions about the continuance of life as they know it in the territory.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of the fears that Hong Kong people harbour as stemming only from the context of Hong Kong in the 1990s. Because events from the past continue to influence the present in Hong Kong, it is necessary to look at both past and present Hong Kong in order to understand more fully the fears that Hong Kong people express today. Therefore, it is pertinent that I first discuss the annexation of Hong Kong which came about because of expansionist practices on the part of the British government. I will then look at why the Chinese have always regarded the treaties through which Hong Kong was ceded to Britain as 'unequal', and discuss the concept of sovereignty as it is understood by the British and the Chinese. The different views held by Britain and China have greatly influenced the course of events in Hong Kong. An overview of Hong Kong and China today will be given, followed by a discussion about the position of women in both countries. My purpose in narrating and analysing this historical material, and its British and Chinese interpretations, is to bring greater understanding to the present.

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN POWERS

The fifteenth century saw the "tremendous overseas expansion" of European powers, which not only promoted the power of the states supporting this endeavour (and satisfied the personal ambitions of the men involved), but which in time drew "all parts of the world into an increasingly integrated political and economic whole" (Smith 1981:18). Buttressed by superior force, European powers sought not so much to

⁸ References made to '*the Chinese*' and '*the British*' are not intended to apply to all people of those countries.

plunder other countries (though this did happen), but rather to persuade the elites to adopt political and economic social structures which would facilitate international commerce.

In those endeavours Britain played a prominent role. During the century which followed their victory over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, British commercial interests had both greatly enlarged the strategic colonial outposts that they had acquired in the early 1600s, and "embarked upon a prolonged expansionist movement, fuelled by the commercial and industrial growth at home and aided by mercantile and naval supremacy on the oceans of the world" (Darwin 1988:5).

Smith (1981:15) suggests that the century between 1815 and 1914 can be seen as two periods during which different modes of influence were dominant in structuring the relationships between Britain and her colonies: the first economic, the second political. British policy during the first period, backed as it was by the supremacy of the British navy, and the energy that British commerce drew from its early involvement in the industrial revolution, can be characterised, Smith (1981:16) argues, by the "practice of concluding nondiscriminatory commercial agreements ... and by an opposition to territorial annexations". The second period (beginning during the last quarter of the nineteenth century), however, a time when Britain's comparative strength was declining, was inspired by political motives. Britain's former policy of anti-imperialism⁹ was replaced, because of particular circumstances (the fragility of particular regimes, the malleability of others), by a "deliberate new policy of preemptive annexations" (Smith 1981:17). In other words, increasingly active intervention in the form of colonisation replaced the formerly indirect influence of economics. Smith (1981:21-22) suggests that possible reasons for Britain's annexation of Hong Kong in the first period (when territorial gains were not normally considered important) were that penetration into China "with the assistance of local elites was less likely" and that the established political system in China at the time was disintegrating.

⁹ Anti-imperialists, rather than annexing land for colonies, sought to persuade local elites to participate in international trade. Smith (1981:16-17) suggests that this policy was shaped by the belief that "an international division of labor in production based on comparative advantages would work to create a better-integrated, richer, and more harmonious world". Presenting a particular picture of world order and relations between the nations, this policy hinged upon notions of progress and peace complimenting each other as the European powers co-operated with one another and drew towards them people from other countries.

The colonisation of Hong Kong

It was during the nineteenth century that the Chinese empire became vulnerable to the advances of Europeans. Portuguese, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, had been allowed (though no mention was made of a permanent annexation) to settle on the Macau peninsula. This trading base within the Pearl River estuary, "one of the most important commercial waterways in the world" (Welsh 1993:11), gave the Portuguese access (via the Pearl River) to Canton, the commercial capital of both Kwantung and Kwangsi (Guangdong and Guangxi) provinces. British commercial interests, anxious to extend their own trade in the East, and hoping to effect this extension via the aid of their old allies, the Portuguese, first called at Macau in mid-1637. Perhaps understandably, the Portuguese did not welcome British interest in the East and, though receiving the arrivals "civilly enough" (Welsh 1993:25), impeded British efforts to negotiate with the Chinese.

Although the British were eventually, in 1711, and following a turbulent change of dynasty, "permitted to establish a post in Canton" (Welsh 1993:26), restrictions placed by the Chinese on trade only hardened British resolve that what they needed was a permanent base from which to trade unhindered. Hong Kong, one of many islands lying within the estuary of the Pearl River, a bare 50 kilometres from Macau, was to become Britain's toe-hold in China. Formally ceded to Britain in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking, it was a base from which the British would realise the cession from China of the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860, and the lease of the New Territories in 1898.

The Nanking Treaty, the first of three involving the British in regard to the area today called Hong Kong (a number of islands and a portion of the peninsula extending south of Canton on the Chinese mainland), was the outcome of many years of British determination to establish trading headquarters on the Chinese mainland or as close to the mainland as possible. According to Bonavia (1985:19), while some writers claim that the cession of Hong Kong Island to the British was a direct result of China's defeat at the hands of the British in the first Opium War others, adopting a wider perspective, argue that a Sino-British conflict was almost inevitable given the increasing trade and the tensions between the Chinese authorities and British free traders.

Bonavia (1985) explores some of the areas of conflict between the Chinese and British. He insists that the growing trade between South China and Europe and America would have engendered an equivalent crisis because China held quite different views to Britain and Europe regarding the "importance of that occupation" (Bonavia

1985:19). While China was, at that time, a self-sufficient, agrarian nation, with an economy independent of international trade, the Chinese did trade (and had indeed traded for several centuries) with other nations. What they found repugnant about the trade with the Europeans, however, was that not only did they seek trade on equal terms with China and were reluctant to assume a submissive attitude in their dealings with the mandarins, but, because of superior military might, they posed a threat to Chinese security, property and morale.

The growing volume of trade also upset the Chinese, especially the burgeoning trade in opium which was exported to China in increasing quantities. Further, as Segal 1993:9) points out, the domestic economy of China was upset by the amount of money flowing out of the country to pay for the opium. Acknowledging the deleterious effects of the drug on both the citizenry and the economy of China (Tsai 1993:18), an imperial edict banning the import of opium was issued. Lin Zexu, the Viceroy of Hunan and Hubei provinces, was ordered to "stamp out the trade" (Bonavia 1985:21).

Foreign traders, forced to surrender their opium, were sequestered within their 'factories'. When the siege was lifted, the British merchants retreated from Canton, first to Macau and then to Hong Kong Island in August 1839. The culmination of these events was, first, skirmishes with Chinese war junks and, eventually, a more organised attack by Britain. The confrontations that followed ended with the signing, first, of the Convention of Chuanpi (in 1841) and, second, when that proved unsatisfactory to both sides, by the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. This treaty, through which the island of Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in perpetuity, also included "provisions for trading in five Chinese ports, plus compensation for the costs of the military expedition" (Shipp 1995:9). While the Treaty also included arrangements allowing for a degree of Chinese control on the trade between China and Hong Kong, these provisions, however, lapsed because of neglect on the part of the Chinese and because of Hong Kong's insistence on completely free trade (Morse 1971:563).

It should be noted that, although Hong Kong did not become a permanent base under "the protection of the British flag" (Cottrell 1993:7) until 1841, the East India Company and private British traders had established offices in Hong Kong in 1839 (Tsai 1994:11). These early beginnings were quickly consolidated after the signing of the Treaty and British eyes then turned to the Kowloon Peninsula barely half a mile away. Not only, it was believed, would the acquisition of this land provide space for expansion, but would also ensure security in regard to their shipping. An excuse for

another foray against the Chinese was provided by ongoing altercations stemming from the interpretation of the earlier treaties, a "dispute over China's right to search a ship flying a British flag in a Chinese Port" (Cottrell 1993:10), and a disagreement about the right of residence in Beijing of foreign ambassadors. The British, supported by French soldiers, occupied Tianjin and a treaty was agreed to by the Chinese.

The Chinese, however, retreated from this agreement. The vacillation on the part of the Chinese, Segal (1993:14-15) explains, stemmed partly from Chinese uncertainty about how to deal with such challenges from foreigners who appeared to have ambiguous relationships among themselves and hold differing attitudes towards China. The Chinese elite, no doubt guided by pragmatic considerations, finally sought the aid of the West against the internal threat it faced from Taiping revolutionaries; a compromise with foreigners neutral towards, or supportive of, the Chinese Government was a better option than complete subordination by the Taiping to whom control over most of southern China had been lost. However, although influenced by the practicalities of the situation, rather than by the ideology of the Beijing¹⁰ ruling elite, the Chinese officials dealing with the situation assumed that they "could somehow escape from the threat posed by European imperialism" (Segal 1993:14-15).

The British, led by Elgin, pressed on. Entering Beijing in October 1860 and burning the Summer Palace of the Emperor, Elgin secured imperial compliance to another treaty, the Convention of Peking. This treaty provided for the inclusion of Tianjin as a treaty port (the sixteenth) and ceded to the British Crown in perpetuity the three and half square miles from the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula up to what is now Boundary Street. Also included in the cession was Stonecutters' Island in the harbour. In January 1861 Britain officially took control of Kowloon and the boundary line was marked by a bamboo fence constructed by Chinese officials. As on Hong Kong Island earlier, the British had already established their presence.

Concerned by the efforts of other Europeans, Russians and, later, Americans, to seize a slice of the 'Chinese pie', the British became even more committed to the need to further reinforce Hong Kong. Although it was never stated against what, or whom, Hong Kong should be reinforced, the acquisition of more land was seen as necessary to this project. Consequently, the British Minister at Beijing, Sir Claude MacDonald, was instructed to start negotiations to lease land "north of Kowloon along

¹⁰ I have used the pinyin version of mainland Chinese names and places, except in historical contexts (e.g., Conventions of Peking, 1860 and 1898), where the reader will be more familiar with the Wade Giles rendition. Although it may seem awkward to refer to Beijing in the nineteenth century instead of Peking, the pinyin spelling has been accepted by most authorities as standard.

a line from Mirs Bay to Deep Bay, including control of the adjoining waters and the numerous islands in the vicinity" (Bonavia 1985:26). The Chinese, not wishing to be involved in further hostilities with Britain, agreed to a 99-year lease of the land abutting the Kowloon Peninsula. The Convention of Peking, signed in June 1898, added the New Territories and 235 islands to the land already held by Britain, a total of around 370 square miles of land. As Segal (1993:16) notes, however, the real reason for the Treaty is underscored by the inclusion of a statement which, while providing for continued use by Chinese ships, banned French and Russian ships from Kowloon harbour.

That imperial Britain agreed to a lease rather than an absolute cession may, according to Segal (1993:16), seem a "peculiar oversight". This unique situation in terms of British history stemmed, however, from a decision in London to settle for a lease rather than cession in order not to prompt imperial competitors into seeking corresponding status for their leases of Chinese property that was more valuable. Despite attempts during the early 1900s by Governor Clementi who sought outright cession, Britain was reluctant to upset China further by suggesting that the land leased via the Convention of Peking should, like the land yielded by China through earlier treaties, be ceded in perpetuity (Shipp 1995:11).

UNEQUAL TREATIES

The British government and traders regarded the Treaty of Nanking as "guaranteeing justice in trade and gaining for them the diplomatic equality with the Chinese government which they had long sought" (Kelly 1987:30) and no doubt regarded the subsequent treaties as legitimate. Cottrell (1993:16) argues that the British felt that, rather than expropriating a valuable possession from the Chinese emperor, they had altruistically given China "the priceless gifts of free trade and Christianity". Resistance on the part of the Chinese was dismissed as ignorance and incompetence. Hong Kong continued to be portrayed as a valuable and unique colony for which no apologies should be given.

The Chinese, however, from their perspective, gave, and continue to give, a different interpretation: the treaties are 'unequal'. The Treaty of Nanking, 1842, and the Convention of Peking, 1860, were negotiated under "direct threat of military force" (Kelly 1987:32); boundaries were not precisely delineated; China had to pay Britain restitution (an indemnity of six million dollars by annual instalments of one million was

stated in the Convention of Chuanbi); no monetary consideration was accorded China for the land lost (nor was any rent given for the land leased under later treaties); and the Hong Kong government imposed its own land laws and land reforms on people who had not been consulted about the ceding of their land to British control (Cottrell 1993:14-15). Even though the Convention of Peking, 1898, was negotiated without recourse to military force, the treaty, as Wesley-Smith (1980:3) points out, was drawn up by parties who were "not in a position of equal bargaining power". Furthermore, the benefits of this treaty only devolved to one party, the British.

The different explanations, claims Kelly (1987:30), stem from the world view held by each party during this historical period in which a new international economy, engendered in part by the Industrial Revolution, in part from the rise of nationalism, was developing. With reference to Dicks (1983), Kelly (1987:30) notes that underpinning this new system was the notion of a legal equality between states based on the concepts of sovereignty and independence. The European view that states were independent sovereign entities, even if comprehended, would have seemed illogical to the Chinese who understood the world system as a whole and, as such, subject to the "universal sovereignty of the Chinese Emperor as the Son of Heaven" (Kelly 1987:30).

Although the notion of unequal treaties is no longer considered a concept worthy of consideration by authors of treatises of international law (the very ones from whom the notion of unequal treaties originated) and although the "classification of a treaty as unequal does not necessarily mean it is invalid" (Wesley-Smith 1980:3), the Chinese, have continued to assert that the treaties are unequal, a view informed by Marxist concepts. Building on Leninism, Maoists suggest that imperialism (capitalist exploitation via the means of colonisation) was the means by which Western capitalist economies held off tendencies to deterioration (brought about by inherent contradictions within the capitalist system).

Britain, through the unequal treaties, annexed Hong Kong, declared it a free port (which, in Chinese understanding, meant limited law and order and repression of the working class by the free-enterprise-committed colonial regime) and protected these economic endeavours via navy and army support. One of many trading entrepôts established by imperialist Britain throughout the world in order to maintain the capitalist mode of production, the establishment and development of Hong Kong is portrayed by China as "a history of the installation of imperialist mechanisms for the exploitation of China" (Chan 1990:4-5).

Guided by this explanation, Maoists portray Hong Kong as a place where native Chinese, immigrants from China, who had had their traditional means of support taken from them by the "onset of the process of primitive accumulation" (Chan 1990:5), were ruthlessly exploited by the imperialists. Ding (1983:82) claiming that "the establishment of Hong Kong and its ensuing prosperity was built upon the sweat and carcasses of Chinese labouring masses", insists that Chinese in the territory, only able to work as coolies, artisans or shopkeepers, were exploited via the means of special taxes and faced harsher legal laws than did Europeans. This bipolar Marxist-informed view portrays the Chinese merchants as part of the imperialist establishment and, as such, underlings of the British (Chan 1990:6).

It was a view that time did little to ameliorate; as Cottrell (1993:18) points out, in 1939 Mao Zedong claimed that the Opium Wars were the first of twelve 'historical landmarks' in the 'struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys', and, even as late as 1976, towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, the British were portrayed in a tract entitled 'The Opium War' (printed for educational and general use in China), as pirates who pillaged and raped their way through every house in Tanghai when they took that city on 5 July, 1840. Clearly, for the Chinese government, the colonisation of Hong Kong, understood as an era of shame, remained (and remains now) a violation of Chinese sovereignty which has to be righted.

THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

Because the Chinese feel so strongly that the annexation of Hong Kong was a violation of Chinese sovereignty, it would be useful, at this point, to discuss the development of the concept of sovereignty and how the British and the Chinese understand this notion.

As Camilleri and Falk (1992:12) point out, the meaning of sovereignty has changed with time. Initially derived from a French term 'souverain' which referred to "supreme ruler not accountable to anyone, except perhaps to God" (Fowler and Bunck 1960:5), the term evolved during the imperial struggles of the Middle Ages and came to refer to "absolute political authority at home" and one that could "imply designs on territory abroad". Camilleri and Falk (1992:15) argue that the "emergence of the sovereign state became the necessary instrument of Europe's colonial expansion".

With the development of the globalisation process and the emergence of states, sovereignty came not only to apply to authority within the state, but to denote the

"independence of a state interacting in a system of states" (Fowler and Bunck (1960:5). This understanding encapsulated notions of reciprocity. As political institutions developed still further, and as representative democratic notions were adopted, the concept again evolved in meaning, now encapsulating ideas about "legitimacy, responsibility and international recognition" (Fowler and Bunck 1960:6).

In today's world, although the meaning of the term depends somewhat on the context in which it is used (Stankiewicz 1969, Osterud 1994), the doctrine of sovereignty with regard to the current international order is one which "endows state governments with absolute jurisdiction over a specified piece of real estate and exclusive authority over the individuals who reside upon it. It also grants formal equality to all states despite the real and vast disparities in their economic and military power" (Heiberg 1994:12)¹¹.

Sovereignty today, however, is more than this. It is an expression which denotes legal and political definition, the presence or absence of which demonstrates the standing of political bodies. It encompasses notions of privileges and accommodations: international obligations, the readiness of states to be accountable, a willingness to co-operate with other sovereign states (rather than act unilaterally), international legitimacy, and an association with particular rights and duties (Fowler and Bunck 1960:11-17).

While the British, being members of a European sovereign state, might well accept that modern sovereign states have both rights and privileges in regard to both their own citizens and other sovereign states, some theorists suggest that the Chinese think of the concept differently. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1996:56) note that for China the concept of sovereignty (as delineated in their legal writings) is "the supreme power of a state to decide independently its internal and external affairs in accordance with its own will". Hence, China's oft repeated comment that it will not tolerate international criticism of its handling of Hong Kong and, further, its responses to Western complaints of human rights violations in China and copyright infringements.

¹¹ Jackson (1990:21) argues that although the states which were former colonies have been "internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states: juridical statehood", a number have not yet "been authorized and empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by classical international law". It is said that these states reveal "limited empirical statehood" in that the citizens of such states do not enjoy the advantages associated with the independent state; the governments are politically and institutionally unable to uphold human rights or secure social and economic welfare for all citizens (Jackson 1990:21).

Segal (1993:77) claims that although for China, as for most states, "protecting and enhancing sovereignty is a key objective of the leadership", the sensitivity to matters regarding sovereignty that China displays stems from the fact that China was harshly treated by other countries for so long. Fowler and Bunck (1960:94-96), concurring with this opinion, point out that although the negotiations of the unequal treaties were carried out at a time when China's sovereign statehood had been recognised by the international community, China was not given the sovereign rights that the other parties to the treaties accorded other sovereign states, and, further, that China's attempts to obtain such rights (at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I) were ignored.

The Chinese, holding the view that sovereignty, unlimited, indivisible and non-negotiable, is vested in a single state, and never yielding to the belief that "sovereignty over Hong Kong was vested in the British Crown" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:56) long sought the recovery of sovereign rights over Hong Kong. Although before the 1980s the Chinese never adequately expressed what the re-exercise of sovereignty would mean for Hong Kong, their view was that sovereignty meant the "absolute right to exercise legislative and jurisdictional powers over the territory and its people" (Lane 1990:6); the British would leave and Hong Kong would be politically, legally and administratively reunified with the mainland. (The implications that this view would have on Hong Kong are discussed later.)

Arguing that Hong Kong was, and always will be a Chinese territory, the Chinese have viewed the return of Hong Kong to the mainland as an historically inevitable event and, underlining this view, they have obdurately refused to accept any suggestions from the British regarding a continuance of British rule, or, indeed, joint rule. Influenced by the notion of a waxing and waning Chinese empire over time, and by the knowledge that the power of Britain in the late twentieth century was receding and the power of China increasing, China has adopted a pragmatic stance, putting forward a short-term compromise in the form of a 'one country/two systems' notion which would allow Hong Kong to largely retain its capitalist system for fifty years and, blurring the frontier between Hong Kong and China, developing the Guangdong Special Economic Zone in order to make Hong Kong's reunification with the mainland less disturbing (Segal 1993:79).

As Segal (1993:80) also points out, however, the particular mix of pragmatism and implacability regarding sovereignty has a harder edge. For example, although Hong Kong people have argued that the modern People's Liberation Army (PLA) is

well able to defend Hong Kong from a position over the border, the Chinese have insisted that the PLA, seen in China as a symbol of sovereignty, will be stationed in Hong Kong after the handover.

HONG KONG TODAY

Hong Kong today, following the tremendous development since World War II, is now a vibrant modern city, a leading industrial, financial, trading and communications centre. It has a sound economy with a government which requires "less than one-fifth of the gross domestic product" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:19) to carry out the functions it is involved in, the provision of education, welfare, housing, hospitals and medical services, the maintenance of law and order, and so on. The provision of utilities such as water, the airport, postal services, transport services, the power companies and the telephone companies are run along commercial lines and do not require extra funding from the government coffers. For nine out of every ten years the government's budget is in surplus, yet the top tax rate for businesses is 16.5 percent and, for individuals, 15 percent.

A high rate of growth over an extended period, even during the 1970s when the world economy experienced the energy crisis and the deepest recession of the post-war years, has meant that, in Hong Kong, poverty has virtually been eliminated. With the "fruit of economic progress" trickling down to "all income classes" (Chau 1994:524), the proportion of income needed for food has decreased over time and people now have an increased amount to spend in other areas. Hong Kong people, generally, do not express any bitterness towards the very wealthy but, rather, harbour the belief that they too, through hard work, can also become wealthy.

There is free trade, no minimum wage (except for Philippina maids) and no preference given by the government to any particular individuals, businesses, or sectors. "Private enterprise on a bedrock of private property and the rule of law are", claim Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1996:20), "the defining hallmarks of economic life in Hong Kong". The rule of law, based as it is in constitutions, parliaments and the law courts (in stark contrast to the rule of man in China which has much to do with dictators, warlords and, in these later years, with the officials of the Communist Party) is regarded by the people of Hong Kong as vital for the protection of the rights of individuals and an important buttress to the prosperity of the territory.

While individuals in Hong Kong have the right to make money, to free speech, to travel, to assemble, to religious freedom, to a free press, to academic freedom, and the right to form political parties, run for office, to vote and to freely criticise government officials, these rights, despite the wording of the Chinese constitution, are denied to citizens of China. Such freedom, claim Hong Kong people, underpins Hong Kong's vitality and prosperity.

The people of Hong Kong, moreover, have forged a particular identity. Seeing themselves as "culturally different from their counterparts in China" (Cheng 1996:472), 'Hong Kong people' (the translation of the Cantonese term for themselves), most of whom grew up in Hong Kong sharing the same social institutions (education, housing estates, and social services) and the same social experiences (a western-biased local cultural, for example). Although with their own popular cultural figures and their own popular forms of entertainment (Hong Kong is known as the 'Hollywood of the East'), people in Hong Kong are equally at home with western movies, international cuisine, imported brand-name clothing and XO cognac. Displaying considerable pride in the achievements of Hong Kong, many regard the people of mainland China¹² as lacking in sophistication, culture and manners. Leaving aside the question as to whether or not there really are "culturally significant" differences between the people of Hong Kong and the people of China, it must be recognised that Hong Kong people, faced with the imposition of a "new cultural identity from without" (Cheng 1996:472) naturally feel anxious.

While for some in Hong Kong, businessmen in particular, the economic future is a matter of less concern in that the economic sector of Hong Kong is inextricably entwined with that of Southern China (though some do express their growing disquiet because of the perceived lack of "checks and balances in China" (Lau 1996 July 27:18)) many people fear that other domains, and practices, of Hong Kong may well experience change after the reunification. (The development of Hong Kong will be further explored in Chapter Three.)

¹² China, of course, consists of large groups of ethnically diverse people and, when Hong Kong people speak of 'people in mainland China', it is difficult to know exactly to whom they are referring. When asked to identify which people they were talking about when they referred to 'mainlanders', most of the women in this study said they were talking about people in neighbouring Guangzhou. Most people in Guangzhou are Cantonese as are most people in Hong Kong. While some of the women had been to tourist destinations such as Guilin and Kunming, and some even to Beijing, their knowledge of other ethnic groups was limited.

CHINA TODAY

Like Hong Kong, China has been changing and developing over the years and, in recent years, the pace of economic development, in particular, has been fast. Modern China is founded on the Marxist-Leninist thought of the revolutionary Mao Zedong who seized power in 1949 and proceeded to do away with existing social, economic and political institutions in order to establish a new China. In this new egalitarian China, where the collectivity was emphasised, all property would be held in common and there would be no exploitation or class conflict.

By the middle of the 1950s the entire economy was nationalised and the Great Leap Forward was implemented in order to collectivise the rural areas and, by 1960, the entire economy was run by the Communist Party. If the economy was disrupted and life in China difficult, worse was to come during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Closing the schools, Mao sent millions of Red Guards throughout the country to realise his dream of a socialist China¹³. In the class struggle which followed, Mao used his Red Guards to seek out any elements that were opposed to his policies, and many people, classed as landlords, reactionaries, counterrevolutionaries, or as members of the "national and petite bourgeoisie classes" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:36) were treated harshly or were killed.

Deng Xiaoping, replacing Mao's appointed successor Hua Guofeng, gained control in 1978 and initiated a series of pragmatic economic reforms¹⁴. The economy of China was opened up to the West and Special Economic Zones in the southern and coastal parts of China were established. In these areas a greater measure of economic freedom and experimentation in respect to investment and production incentives was allowed. The agriculture sector was reconstructed and, in so doing, free markets were created. Deng also initiated the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (with limited success due to a concern about unemployment), encouraged investment from overseas and joint-venture initiatives, returned confiscated property to former owners, and cut

¹³ Interestingly, Hung (1995:98) explains that Mao, when not in power, supported "individualism, pluralism and anti-conservative revolution", but once he had seized power, became a "self-styled 'absolute free man' who allowed only himself to practice poetic individualism and freedom". The reduction of everyone else in the country to 'nobodies' in the face of the 'magic' of Mao, came about, Hung (1995:98) argues, because, without religion, the Chinese had to rely on an "earthy wiseman to provide them with a harmonious social order, a holistic meaning of life and a sense of conniving identity and gratification". In such a social order everyday tasks are "elevated to existential importance of the highest order" stresses Hung (1995:98).

¹⁴ As Garnaut (1992:6) points out the concept of 'economic reform' has a particular meaning to the Chinese; it refers to the "set of policies and state-sanctioned institutional changes, including the 'opening to the outside world'".

tax 71 percent from 31.2 percent to 9.1 percent of the gross domestic product (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:36-37).

As Kelly (1987:120) points out, the basic change in China has been the "relaxation of the rigid control which the central government previously maintained over the general economy", a situation which reflected the ideological view that economic and political systems were inseparable and "equated ownership by the people with direct state management". A democratic state and political liberalism were not what Deng, less autocratic than Mao because he had to have majority support, had in mind when he introduced his initiatives.

Although there have been moves by certain elements, concerned about the risk to communist rule that a market economy would pose, to slow the passage of economic reform, China developed steadily under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Because of unemployment, unknown in China until after the upheaval of economic reform, China, in the 1980s adopted a strategy of employment-led growth. Consequently, urban employment increased by 3.5% per year and rural employment by 2.5% a year between 1978 and 1993 (Human Development Report 1996:94). The abandonment of capital-intensive production for labour-intensive manufacturing (coupled with open trade and export-led policies) has brought the rise in output and employment

Since 1980 the economy of China has grown at nine percent a year and the provinces, especially those near Macau, Taiwan and Hong Kong, have grown even more swiftly. New cities have been established, industrial parks built and other huge infrastructure projects undertaken. However, although some people have become wealthy, the gulf between the rich and poor remains as wide, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1996:35) maintain, as the gulf between "Shanghai and the rest of China during the first half of this century". Unlike Mao who often changed his mind about economic policies, Deng stayed the course and, although Hong Kong's optimism about a 'new' China was dampened by the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, the boom in Hong Kong continued.

During the 1990s, a time when Hong Kong became the "main economic base from which foreign and domestic investors participated in China's spectacular growth" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:39) and, as the foremost trading partner of China, the "pivot of China's economic links with the outside world" (Sung 1996:182), the economies of Hong Kong and China and, in particular Guangdong Province

(immediately over the border), became so integrated that economists, ignoring the actual political situation, began to proclaim that economic convergence was a fact.

Although the economic convergence of the two territories suited Deng Xiaoping, the proposals and comments from Governor Patten heightened fears of "Western bourgeois liberalism" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:40) and brought to the fore China's historically-based distrust of Britain. As Hung (1995:92) points out, although it has suited China to integrate economically with Hong Kong in order to bolster its own economic development, during the years since 1990 China, for whose leaders Hong Kong's cultural and philosophic values are abhorrent, has sought to force Hong Kong to "conform with China's values and philosophic constructs". Hence the often acrimonious and non-productive sessions of the Joint Liaison Committee charged with negotiating certain issues regarded as important to a smooth transition, and the often (from the British perspective) obstructionist stance of the Chinese. Negotiations, however, continued to take place as time whittled away the last days of colonial rule in Hong Kong.

As is mentioned at the beginning of this section, China has been modernising and developing, particularly since the late seventies. However, as reports from the United Nations Development Council make clear, China is not developed to the same extent as Hong Kong. The Human Development Report (1995) lists Hong Kong's Human Development rank as 24, and China's as 111. To illustrate this, the GNP per capita in 1992 for Hong Kong was US\$15,710, whereas in China it stood US\$480. Life expectancy in Hong Kong in 1992 was 78.6 years while for China it was 68.5 years. Adult literacy for Hong Kong in 1992 was 91.2% and 79.3% for China. Maternal mortality for Hong Kong in 1992 was 6 per 100,000 live births in the years 1980 to 1992; for China the rate was 95 per 100,000 live births. The child mortality rate for Hong Kong in 1992 was 7 per 1000 live births while in China the figure was 44 per 1000 live births.

Such gaps in the development status between Hong Kong and China raise concern in Hong Kong. As D. Cheung (1996:257) comments, no one knows if Hong Kong's current "important role in world trade and finance will continue" and if "Hong Kong's economic *status quo*" will be maintained after 1997. Indeed, during 1995 Hong Kong did experience a slowing in the economy¹⁵ (Ngo and Lau 1996:259).

¹⁵ This was due in part to the relocation of the manufacturing sector to China and because of structural changes within the Hong Kong economy.

Low-status manual workers, in particular, suffered most economically from the slow down.

Having experienced themselves, or having heard from their parents about life in Hong Kong during the 1950s and 1960s, Hong Kong people are concerned that any down-turn in the economy may herald a return to a harsher life, a life which many in China face every day. Their concerns that their living standards may drop are further fuelled by queries from some economists in regard to the stability of the Hong Kong dollar after 1997 and by predictions from Milton Friedman that not only will the Hong Kong dollar not survive for more than two years after the reunification but that Beijing will "covet the HK43 billion in foreign reserves" (Cheung, D. 1996:257-258).

Given the restrictions placed on all aspects of life in China, Hong Kong people (many of whom have fled China) also wonder whether the rights they currently enjoy will be curtailed after the reunification. There is much evidence to suggest that people in Hong Kong are worried about possible economic and political deterioration. In this study, therefore, women will be asked questions about both.

WOMEN IN HONG KONG AND CHINA

Having given an outline of Hong Kong and China today and having drawn attention to the difference in the level of development between the two societies, I will now discuss the position of women in Hong Kong society and explore the discourses which influence their positions. In so doing, I will contrast their position to the current position of women in China¹⁶ because it is with these women that Hong Kong women often compare themselves and their lives. The discussion, of necessity, must include a very brief overview of the Confucian dictates via which women were positioned within society in the period before communist and capitalist ideology re-shaped women's understanding of themselves in the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong respectively. There are, of course, suggestions that Confucian tenets continue to influence the position of women in both China and Hong Kong.

¹⁶ While I refer to 'the women in China' I do acknowledge that such categorisation does obscure the fact that Chinese women are divided by factors such as ethnicity, class, age and generation. However, although I recognise these divisions, I suggest that, because of the persuasiveness of Confucian and Communist rhetoric across China, these ideologies have played an important role in shaping the identity of many Chinese women. As Croll (1995:4) points out with regard to her research with women from many different parts of China, "although no single voice can be said to be the 'authentic' or 'representative' voice of female experience in any one period or location, there is an interesting congruence in the gendered moments recalled by these female narrators although their accounts may be separated by time and space".

The Confucian classics, as Croll (1995:12) points out, "cosmologically enshrined those most basic of equations - of yin and yang, of earth and heaven, of moon and sun and of night and day - with female and male" and, although originally thought of as complementary, such oppositions were soon arranged "in a series of hierarchical relationships juxtaposing superiority with secondariness, authority with obeisance and activity with passivity". Because these edicts were founded upon a cosmological basis which abrogated debate about their naturalness, universality and immutability, the difference between genders was seen as part of the cosmic order. Such complementarity and hierarchy were accepted as necessary for the maintenance of harmony which was believed to be a fundamental value.¹⁷

Women in China, positioned both as the 'other' and as 'second', were seen as belongings of families rather than as belonging to families and, as such, were expected to be obedient to their fathers before marriage, to their husbands after marriage, and to their sons after their husband's deaths (Stockman, Bonney and Xuewen 1995:143). Destined from birth to be married into another family which would "benefit from their labor and reproductive capacity" (Pearson 1997:92), girls were liable to "spatial and physical prohibitions emphasizing constraint and confinement", interdictions which emphasised the need to 'conceal' the female body (Croll 1995:19).

As girls grew up they were subject to increasing constraints regarding their behaviour which both affected and ensured the confinement and silencing of women. Footbinding, a most painful procedure, was an obvious process through which silencing and concealment were secured. As a practice (subsequent to sequestration within their own households and increasing segregation from the men of the household) it was first associated with wealth and status and practised among the upper classes, but it eventually became a prerequisite for an advantageous marriage for women of other classes. Only girls from the very poor and from particular ethnic communities were spared this disabling process. After marriage too, the constraints continued. Confined to the household of the husband, a woman could not only be divorced for a number of reasons (including talking too much) but, until she had produced a son, was without any status in her new family (Pearson 1990:115).

¹⁷ Dr Julie Tao, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, City University of Hong Kong in a recent lecture (May 1997) entitled *Confucian Ethics and Feminist Ethics: Parallels and Differences*, made the point that the basic tenets of Confucianism were interpreted and promulgated by men with respect to their own interests.

The state support for the ideology informing the position of women in Chinese society changed with the seizure of power by Mao Zedong and some of the most popular revolutionary slogans of that time referred to women 'holding up half the sky'. As Croll (1995:70) points out, "If Confucian precepts recognized and reaffirmed gender difference and hierarchy, the Communist Party set out to reduce gender difference and hierarchy in the interests of equality and sameness". Strategies to "eliminate 'feudalistic' residuals and pave the way for a greater social revolution" (Chiao 1992:150) included the abolition of titles specific to gender and generation, the adoption of androgynous titles, the adoption of unisex dress (the blue Mao trousers and jacket), and new representations of women on billboards and in magazines (now bold and assertive whereas before they had been positioned within the courtyard, embroidering or painting). As Jaschok (1994:173) points out, although the Communist Party brought about change for women, its legitimacy insisted on a non-negotiable path to sexual equality and silenced women who could have brought more women-centred experiences to the debate about gender inequality. The reform period beginning in the late 1970s has brought yet another change. Instead of the ubiquitous woman in blue, a plurality of images has emerged in response to the unprecedented opportunities now available to women in China as the country moves towards a market economy.

Seeking changes in the status of women which he believed would facilitate the transformation of Chinese societal relations (Pearson 1997:93) Mao often commented that "the revolution could not be accomplished without the aid of China's women (Wolf 1985:33). In line with one of the prime goals of the Revolution, the liberation of women from the "weight of the 'four mountains': feudalism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy" (Pearson 1997:92), the 1950 Marriage Law gave women the right to seek divorce (which they did in large numbers) and the right to equality in all sections of society - politics, economics, and the cultural, social and family spheres. To effect this end, in 1992, China enacted the Law for the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests. This law, however, some women's groups argue, has not been effective because officials have disregarded it.

Pearson and Leung (1995:4) maintain that, in Hong Kong, gender equality is "intricately related to and sustained by several distinct features of the society". Firstly, as a Chinese society, Confucian precepts, as discussed in relation to women in mainland China, position women second. Hong Kong is also a British colony and as such, was influenced by the discourses surrounding Victorian colonialism which had common elements with Confucianism, a strong emphasis on family, tradition and self-

help. With women placed firmly within the home and men at the helm, everyone was accorded a place within the patriarchal Victorian colonial hierarchy (Jones 1994:116).

The values of these ideologies were underlined by both Ch'ing (traditional Chinese) law and English law. Women were unable to divorce their husbands and, if divorced by their husbands, were denied any rights to their children or to property they had brought to the marriage. Wives were expected to be faithful and produce a heir and widows were expected to remain chaste. Both systems of law also protected the "system of male-only inheritance and with it all the checks on a woman's behaviour which might endanger the legitimacy of a male heir" (Jones 1994:117).

To legitimate their rule in a society in which the large majority of the population were Chinese, the colonial government co-opted the Chinese elite into the administrative structure of the government and adopted a deliberate policy of non-interference in regard to the Chinese community's way of life. Such colonial political strategies which aided the oppression of women is evident in the continuance of the Mui tsai system¹⁸, concubinage¹⁹ (both practices continued well into the twentieth century), as well as the inheritance system in the New Territories²⁰ which only in recent times has been changed (Pearson and Leung 1995:6).

The third discourse influencing the position of women in Hong Kong society is capitalism. Although it might be suggested that in Hong Kong where 83% of women aged 20-24 and 69% of women aged 25-34 are in paid employment outside the home (Hong Kong 1991 Population Census:50), certain principles attributed to capitalism (individualism, achievement and equal opportunities) may work to reduce gender inequality, it is clear, however, as Pearson and Leung (1995:6) argue, that the patriarchal system already operating was, and continues to be, complemented by ideological rhetoric from Hong Kong's own "brand of industrial capitalism". In Hong

¹⁸ The Mui tsai system (mui tsai literally meaning 'little younger sister') was, as Jaschok and Miers (1994:11) point out, a system in which young girls for whom their parents were paid money, were adopted into other families in which they were often treated not as adopted children but as domestic servants. Suffering social stigma because their families had sold them they had no kin and, therefore, in a society wherein identity is conferred by family, no 'face'.

¹⁹ Concubines, with a lower status than a legal wife, were sexual partners whose offspring was legitimate. Concubines were not given property when moving to the household of their consort and neither were betrothal gifts given to the families of the concubines (Watson 1991:236-237).

²⁰ As Jones (1995:178) points out, women from the New Territories were denied the right to inherit land or an interest in land (for example, rent or profit). This did not just apply to indigenous women living in the New Territories, but to all women in that area. This law was finally, and only after great pressure from women's groups, amended on 24 June 1994. Indigenous women still do not enjoy the legal right that indigenous men have to build a house under the 'small house' policy.. This policy allows indigenous men village land on which to build a house. Women continue to be economically disadvantaged by this policy.

Kong, for example, family-owned enterprises were a prominent feature of Hong Kong's industrial development and female relatives in such firms occupied low-status and low-paid positions. Further, as in other capitalist countries, women in Hong Kong were, and are, used as a cheap and flexible labour force. As T. Wong (1995:54) makes clear, the gender-based division of labour in Hong Kong means that most women are concentrated into a "few specific industries, and within those industries into a few specific occupations, and, further, into the lower-ranking, lower-status levels of those occupations".

So positioned through the discourses of Confucianism, colonialism and capitalism, women's equality with men in Hong Kong has never, until the recent passing of the legislation regarding discrimination, been the focus of a government policy²¹. Only in 1971 was the Marriage Reform Ordinance and related ordinances enacted, and legislation which "established monogamy as the only legal form of marriage" and authorised a "woman's right to inheritance" (Pearson 1997:93). Paid maternity leave became mandatory only in 1981 with the enactment of the Employment (Amendment) (No.2) Bill and, in 1994, after many demands from women's groups, the government finally expunged the law which prevented women in the New Territories from inheriting land (Jones 1995:177). Further, as mentioned above, and only after agitation from various pressure groups, the government in 1997 enacted laws with regard to sex discrimination.

Although it can be argued that women, wherever they live in the world, are not treated as equal with men in regard to the "law in books nor the law in action" (Jones 1994:112), it might be presumed that women in Hong Kong, because they live in a British colony, would enjoy the same degree of protection and recourse to redress under the law as women in Britain. This, in fact, is not so. As Jones (1994:118) points out, the "imperial assimilation of Chinese culture" led to long-term consequences, particularly for women and, even today, "Hong Kong lags ... far behind English law in matters relating to women" (Jones 1994:129). This lag, Jones (1994:128-129) suggests, may be explained in part by the dominance of a discourse which encapsulates dichotomous ideas of what it is to be 'Chinese' or 'non-Chinese' and, within the former category, particular ideas of what it means to be a 'man' or a

²¹ Although these changes were related to the wider process of reform that occurred from the 1960s onwards (reform that helped maintain government legitimacy in Hong Kong), changes that benefited women only came about, as Pearson (1997:93) argues, after "considerable pressure from women's groups" in the territory.

'woman'²². (As discussed above Chinese women are positioned via this discourse as subservient and compliant.)

While it may seem that some headway has been made in recent times in Hong Kong, there are still many laws on the statute books of the territory which disadvantage women: laws which "insist that a man cannot be guilty of raping his own wife", and laws which stipulate that a father's permission, not the mother's, must be sought by people under the age of majority who wish to marry (Jones 1995:167). That these continue to exist reflects the public/private distinction that is made, a distinction which is regarded positively in that it limits intervention by the state in the lives of individuals but negative in that it allows the power of the male to go unregulated, thus leaving women unprotected. The law, through its silence, thus "sustains and constitutes patriarchal power within the household" (Jones 1995:168).

Although it may seem that women in China enjoy more legal protection and a better status, in fact, women in Hong Kong fare better. For example, although the replacement of the 1950 Marriage Law²³ with the 1980 Marriage Law did provide more protection for women, judges in China, because they work within an inadequate legal system, either rely on policy or, in the last resort, "on socialist morality" (Ocko 1991:327). Lacking adequate protection, women in China still find themselves forced into marriage, being beaten or denied "intellectual or social lives outside the family" (Ocko 1991:337)²⁴. They also face restraints as to the number of children they may have, even to the extent of facing forced abortions should they get pregnant a second time. Interestingly, Ocko (1991:337) suggests that the Chinese themselves would refuse to see any connection between the "excesses and the ethos of the present regime, which of course they would deny is patriarchal" and would, instead, insist that such excesses can be blamed on "remnants of 'feudal thinking' that have not been

²² This lag can also be explained, in part, as due to the reluctance on the part of the Hong Kong government to introduce new legislation that would benefit women.

²³ The 1950 Marriage Law, reflecting contradictions apparent in the wider society, contained provisions that both embodied "principles of freedom of choice and gender equality" yet, because of its socialist (or Maoist) construction, "cast the family as a 'cell of society'" (Meijer 1971:77-78). The New Right, in the West, do this also. For example, the political rhetoric of Thatcherism emphasised the importance of the family.

²⁴ This is not to say that women in Hong Kong are not beaten or face other indignities. Although the Hong Kong government claims that the "problem of domestic violence has actually abated" in the territory, the refuges for battered women cannot cater for all the women who need shelter (Choi 1993:389). Further, a 1992 study showed that Hong Kong women experience about the same levels of sexual harassment as women in Western countries. Although women have formal rights through which they can seek justice, or secure social lives outside the family, in reality (for all sorts of reasons) these can be hard for women, wherever they are in the world, to secure in full.

completely expunged"²⁵. In Hong Kong, where the British legal system prevails, women are more protected.

In the areas of education and work, as Pearson (1997:94-97) points out, there are marked differences between China and Hong Kong. In China, a son's education is of a higher priority than a daughter's. From 1978 onwards, all children in Hong Kong have received nine years' compulsory and free education and, over the past thirty years, the trend has been towards a more equal gender participation at all levels of formal education. At the universities, the gender participation gap has been steadily closing over the last decade (Choi 1995:102). It must be pointed out, however, that in certain courses one particular gender is seen to dominate, a factor which has a bearing on future career paths.

Of the huge labour force of China, 38% is female. Rosen (1987:5-12) points out that, although the liberation of women and economic development are portrayed as being part of the same parcel, they are often in conflict. In the past, women have been less preferred as workers because of their reproductive capacities and household responsibilities. In the industrial sector, women have been denied "bonuses, overtime pay, and promotions that are men's normal lot" and, because of their household commitment, denied the time to stay for "afterwork meetings that will upgrade their skills or their political influence" (Wolf 1985:39).

Not only disadvantaged while in work, women suffer greater disadvantages when economic restructuring occurs. Commenting that any moves made by countries towards free-market economies "potentially have profound and wide-ranging effects on the lives of women and girls", Sparr (1994:20) argues that, when economic restructuring does occur, "women were more likely to be unemployed than men".

In this time of transition from a planned to a market economy, women in China are further disadvantaged as a woman academic from China has commented in a recent private communication. She writes that:

Women's employment used to be the major criterion in determining the level of women's liberation. For nearly 40 years, the policy of encouraging women to join the labour forces has been pursued. But now, this road is said to have reached a dead end. About 70% of workers squeezed out of the labour force in the current optimization are women.

²⁵

It can be argued, of course, that it is both.

She writes further, "Some women's organizations have urged the government for favourable policies for women; others disagree on the ground that it would only make them weaker and more dependent". Yet others, she writes, suggest that women should be helped to "become more self-confident and competent through education so that they can stand up to new challenges in life". My correspondent supports the latter strategy, but says that "the prospects are not so encouraging when hundreds of thousands of girls in the countryside are being forced [for socio-economic reasons] to drop out of school by their parents"²⁶.

Participation in the labour force by Hong Kong women has not only risen from 36.8 percent in 1971 to 49.5 percent in 1991, but the gap in earnings between males and females has "been reduced by about 10 percent from 1976 and 1986" (Wong, T. 1995:61 (see also Suen 1995:311). Figures from the 1991 census, however, reveal that the "overall earning ratio was 0.75:1 (female to male) (Pearson 1997:95). It must be noted, however, that the differential in regard to participation by male and females in university and technical college courses is seen in the labour market. Choi (1995:107), arguing that "capitalist development does not displace gender differentiation", points out that young women already constrained in the educational attainment by factors such as "their father's education, the number of siblings, and their father's socio-economic status", later find that attaining the same level of education as men does not allow them the same career chances. Agreeing that "substantial differences in the returns to education remain", Suen (1995:316) further stresses that women still tend to be found in low paying jobs compared to men and that, on average, they earn less than men in the same jobs. That they are, Lee (1996:304) argues, is due to "sexist ideology" which positions women in the home, supports employer's beliefs that women have no commitment to their employment, and leads to the creation of barriers in regard to "more interesting and better paid jobs"²⁷.

There is one group of women in Hong Kong which, in recent years, has fared particularly badly. Like the women in China who have faced unemployment under the optimisation measures, women in Hong Kong who work in the industrial sector have found themselves facing unemployment as factories relocate to neighbouring Guangdong. Unable to move with the businesses because of their family and household commitments, these older women are not often able, because of their lack of

²⁶ For reasons of confidentiality the writer's name will not be mentioned.

²⁷ As is revealed by the debates about the 'family wage' in nineteenth century Britain, keeping women in low paying jobs confers certain benefits to both employers and the patriarchally-structured labour force.

education and lack of skills, to find employment in the expanding service industry of Hong Kong, an industry, furthermore, which prefers youth and beauty.

The moving of businesses from Hong Kong to Guangdong creates disadvantages for women on the Guangdong side of the border also. Although giving women in Guangdong the chance of employment, exploitation of young women is rife. Offered low wages, and no welfare protection or insurance schemes, these women are risking their health (and often their lives) because of lax or non-existent industrial safety regulations (Pearson 1997:96-97).

While it is clear that gender gaps remain with regard to education and employment, women in Hong Kong do experience a higher participation rate and enjoy a higher status than women in China in the public realm.

How women fare in the private realm²⁸ in China and Hong Kong will now be considered. There are some claims that industrialisation and the participation of women in the public realm leads to a reformulation of traditional male/female roles and a rise in women's equality within marriage and the family setting. Watson (1991:350), pointing out that the tradition of brides leaving their own home to live with the family of their husband continues to a great extent in China (the figure is estimated to be more than eighty percent in the rural areas), argues that the view that women in China are 'excess baggage' still has relevance in China today, particularly in rural areas where most of the population still live. This view, stresses Watson (1991:150), is emphasised by the "continuing practice of female infanticide"²⁹ and the markets in women" (Watson 1991:150). Croll (1995:165) writing of the 'missing girls', notes that, although some female infants are 'hidden' (either temporarily or permanently) by parents perhaps eager to have a son, pre-selective abortion is the most likely explanation for the imbalanced sex ratios found in China today³⁰. (Demographers outside China estimate that the imbalance has become so great that, by the end of the century, the figure of 'missing girls' will be around seventy million). There are also reports of abandonment, child

²⁸ While I acknowledge that the 'private realm' has a very definite meaning in Maoist tradition, I am referring, in this instance, to the distinction that western feminists make between the private realm of family and the public realm of public life outside the family.

²⁹ The practice of infanticide can also be related to 'public' sphere economic factors as well as patriarchy.

³⁰ Croll (1995:167) points out that, although "government policy forbids" the use of ultrasound machines for "ante-natal sex determination", the widespread availability of these machines "makes real the possibility of misuse by officials open to bribes, the levy of fees to finance an otherwise under-funded local health service and the promotion of many forms of private and semi-private medical practices to supplement incomes an attractive option".

sale, and premature death³¹ of female children in China today. What is interesting, as Croll (1995:167) discusses, is that the imbalance is only seen as a problem in regard to the social instability that might occur when men are not able, in the future, to find a bride; how women's "self-perceptions, self-images and self-esteem" might be affected has not been seen as a problem.

In Chapter Two, after a discussion about European mercantile expansion and the annexation of Hong, I described the Chinese understanding of the treaties by which Hong Kong was established, as 'unequal', and discussed the different notions of sovereignty current in China and Britain. These particular understandings have greatly influenced the relationship between China and Britain over time, particularly during the negotiations held about the Joint Declaration and during the time between the signing of the Declaration and the reunification date. I also gave a brief overview of Hong Kong today, of China today, and of the position of women in both societies in order to demonstrate what Hong Kong women fear losing if China does not uphold its promises to Hong Kong people. In the next chapter I turn my attention to the development of institutions in Hong Kong about which concern is expressed.

³¹ These deaths occur because of malnutrition, neglect, maltreatment and a failure to seek medical care for female children when they are ill.

CHAPTER THREE THE FEARS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE

In this chapter I look more closely at the concerns that Hong Kong people express in regard to the reunification and, in so doing, I explore the development of a number of the main societal institutions of Hong Kong. A discussion of the wide-ranging fears that are expressed in Hong Kong will provide a backdrop against which the particular fears of women will be explored. The exploration of the development of societal institutions will allow the reader some understanding of the changing context of the lives of Hong Kong people: the conditions through which people have existed and the society in which they currently live. Achieving so much in such a short time, Hong Kong people do not wish to see their current way of life changed because of reunification with China. It must be borne in mind that most of the people of Hong Kong are either immigrants, or the children of immigrants. Some have fled from China and fear a return to the conditions of their former lives. Others, the children of these immigrants, not only hear their elders speak of life in China but, like their parents, appreciate the development that has occurred in Hong Kong over a relatively short time.

The fears that Hong Kong people express because they wish to continue living in a society which allows them certain rights and privileges have been heightened by the tensions that have been built up between Hong Kong and China both during the negotiations leading to the signing of the Joint Declaration and afterwards. Not only has China been seeking to exert its influence over Hong Kong before the handover date, but solutions to some important issues have yet to be negotiated.

While similar concerns are expressed by both sexes, some are of particular significance to women. Women's cognition of these will be discussed. It is important to remember that women, who tend to be positioned lower than men through Confucian, colonial and capitalist ideologies, may well feel more concerned about certain issues. As mentioned in Chapter One, p. 4, little research conducted in Hong Kong with regard to the handover has focused specifically on women. However, the few studies that have been undertaken do demonstrate a difference between the views of men and women. Wilkens (1993:4), looking at the "relationships between gender, news exposure and fear of the future", claims that not only are 61% of women, compared to 46% of men pessimistic about the transition to Chinese rule, but that this

difference holds across age and socio-economic background. DeGolyer (1995:14), briefly mentioning women, claims that women are more concerned about the handover, worry more about various issues and are "more likely to leave than men". Fung (1997 April 15:6), too, referring to a recent opinion poll which showed that local people are less happy about the reunification than they were two months ago, claims that there is a 17 point difference between how men and women feel. However, as will be obvious from the discussion in this chapter, often what women think of particular issues is not apparent because what research has been done merely solicits the opinion of people in general and does not seek or register the opinions of women in particular.

THE FEARS EXPRESSED BY HONG KONG PEOPLE

At midnight on 30 July 1997 Hong Kong will again become part of China and Hong Kong people are concerned that this impending change in sovereignty will bring with it changes in the institutions of their society, and, consequently, changes in their way of life. Firstly, certain fears arise because of the historical factors surrounding the annexation of Hong Kong. As discussed in Chapter Two, p. 14, the Chinese leaders have regarded, and today still regard, the treaties between Britain and China as unequal. This understanding, which has coloured China's attitudes and behaviour towards both Britain and Hong Kong, underlies the rhetoric directed toward Hong Kong and explains, in part, the difficulties experienced by the British during the negotiations about the future of Hong Kong. Not only has there been a feeling of great shame on the part of China in regard to the British annexation of Hong Kong, an 'historical mistake' which must be righted, but China, ignoring the fact that a great proportion of the people in Hong Kong are refugees from China and the fact that many of the Chinese in Hong Kong have enjoyed economic success, has portrayed Hong Kong people as being exploited by the British. Many people who fled Communist China and found sanctuary in Hong Kong naturally feel that the system they left behind is 'catching-up' with them.

Given the historical factors, there is a general unease that China will continue to be heavy-handed towards Hong Kong after it is reunified with China. Many Hong Kong people express concern with respect to the Chinese understanding of sovereignty and wonder whether China will honour the promises made regarding the 'one country/two systems' concept and allow Hong Kong autonomy they understand the term.

Apart from the historical factors and the Chinese understanding of certain concepts, there are particular developments in recent years which also underlie the fears that Hong Kong people express. Of particular concern are the announcement from China regarding the dismissal of the elected legislature and government by an appointed body, and the significant loss of people from the civil service, especially from the police force. Because of these factors, people in Hong Kong wonder if, in the future, there will be less government efficiency, and fear that the democratic process will be curtailed. They are also concerned that the human rights and freedoms they currently enjoy will be restricted. Some mention that Hong Kong's legal system might change, and that corruption and 'backdoorism' may become a way of life in Hong Kong. Further, there are concerns that the economy might not remain buoyant, that the education system might change, that everyone may have to learn Putonghua and that, because business people will be running Hong Kong, environmental matters may be of less concern. People wonder whether they should emigrate or stay.

Hong Kong people's perception of the way of life in China, how the Chinese government operates, and how they, as Hong Kongers, are different from people in the mainland, further heighten their uncertainties. The concerns noted above, and many others, are featured often in the newspapers and discussed in television programmes. Hong Kong is imbued with the discourse of reunification and the shared concerns related to the reunification.

Concern about a change of government

As already mentioned, people in Hong Kong express many fears regarding their future under Chinese sovereignty. One of the concerns expressed is the change in the government of Hong Kong. To understand the concern of Hong Kong people about this, it is necessary to look at the government and the political development of Hong Kong over the years.

The colonial government

Welsh (1993:147) notes that "Hong Kong became a Crown Colony, governed by a Charter, on 26 June 1843". A short and simple document, the Charter underlined, by "concentrating administrative powers in the position of Governor" (Kelly 1987:12), the fact that the colony was subject to the British government. Given wide discretionary

powers, the Governor was to appoint a Legislative Council and Executive Council. The power of the former, the members of which could be dismissed by the Governor at any time, was nil. The power of the latter, all servants of the Crown, was minimal: they met only when called to do so by the Governor and only discussed matters which the Governor tabled (Welsh 1993:147).

Scott (1989:42)) describes the colonial state of Hong Kong as a "minimal state with functions reduced to a level compatible with the maintenance of the society". These functions included the responsibility for law and order (both in Hong Kong and with regard to the maintenance of trade with China); the dispensing of justice; responsibility for health and sanitation; public works; very basic social services; the control of land availability; and revenue and taxation (Scott 1989:42). These features of the colonial Hong Kong government were clear from the beginning. Not only was Hong Kong to be a free port, but the role of the government was "to be restricted to the encouragement but not the control of enterprise" (Scott 1989:41). In other words, the interests of the merchants were the first priority of the government.

Political development of Hong Kong after World War II

Although after the end of the second World War Britain had considered giving the people of Hong Kong a "fuller and more responsible share in the management of their own affairs" (Young 1946 in Shipp 1995:13), and while it might have been expected that the Labour government of 1964 would have supported political advances, it was only in the 1970s, after the appointment of Governor MacLehose, that changes to the political system, albeit limited, were effected. While power continued to reside with the Governor, and people in the territory were still excluded from direct participation in government, a Community Involvement Plan which divided Hong Kong into seventy four areas was introduced (Shipp 1995:14). It can be argued that, in establishing this mechanism whereby grievances could be addressed, the Hong Kong government was, for the first time, both listening to, and consulting the people of Hong Kong.

The 'three-legged stool'

During the years 1971 to 1986 (in which there were two governors, MacLehose (1971 to 1982) and Youde (1982 to 1986)), changes were also wrought within the triangular relationship between Britain, China and Hong Kong, referred to as the 'three-legged

stool' (a phrase which China objected to as it implied that the three 'legs' were equal). Prior to the arrival of MacLehose, although China did not seek to challenge British rule and the British did not seek to initiate democratic reform "because of the China factor" (Tang and Ching 1994:149), it was clear to the British and Hong Kong governments that a better working relationship with China should be sought.

MacLehose, after his arrival, initiated moves in order to bring about part of his diplomatic agenda, a reconciliation of Hong Kong with the Chinese Communist Party (Cottrell 1993:36). Instigating a direct channel between the "Chinese representatives operating from within the New China News Agency³²" and the office of Political Adviser of the Hong Kong government (Cottrell 1993:37), MacLehose stopped the issuing of "daily intelligence reports on 'leftish' activities in Hong Kong", a practice which portrayed Communists as innately subversive. These moves, Cottrell (1993:37) claims, had a "significant psychological impact".

The new relationship brought an increase in confidence in both China and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong the changing political climate was immediately felt. The property market in Hong Kong became the investment target of Beijing-controlled companies, the Guangdong province became a special economic zone in which foreign companies were encouraged to invest in joint-venture enterprises and communications links between China and Hong Kong were resumed. Further, Beijing also saw Hong Kong as an important source of investment and expertise in its drive for economic modernisation and suggested that Hong Kong would play a substantial role supporting the programme of modernisation undertaken in China by providing, or helping China access, the money needed (Cottrell 1993:38-39).

The negotiations leading to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration

Against this background, conscious that a 'window of opportunity' had opened for them, and acknowledging that not only the people of Hong Kong (the business community in particular) but also foreign investors were concerned about the political future of the territory, the British government instructed MacLehose to raise the question of the future of Hong Kong with the Chinese Government. In March 1979,

³² This agency, which since 1990 has been under increasingly tight control by the central government in Beijing, is now responsible, Burns (1994:17) notes, for "managing the transition on a day-to-day basis for the Beijing government"

MacLehose discussed the matter with Deng Xiaoping³³ who made it clear to MacLehose that China would take back Hong Kong. While no date was specified, MacLehose was told to reassure investors in Hong Kong that they had no need to be concerned about the future. Although MacLehose duly conveyed the message about investing in Hong Kong from Deng Xiaoping to the territory, and reassured the territory that such a remark underlined a recognition of the Hong Kong's economic significance to China, he made no mention of the political future of the territory (Tang and Ching 1994:155)³⁴.

Although things were improving in China as Deng Xiaoping (unlike Mao before him) remained committed to the economic policies he had proposed and, although Hong Kong continued to prosper economically, Hong Kong people remained apprehensive about their future. Their concerns were not helped by the passage, in 1981, of the British Nationality Act which, re-categorising Hong Kong people as "British dependent territory citizens" (Tang and Ching 1994:156), effectively locked the doors of Britain against them. The arrival of Governor Youde in 1982 coincided with two other events which suggested that problems were looming. The first was a message from Deng Xiaoping to a Hong Kong left-wing party that China would be resuming sovereignty, but would leave the socio-economic system as it was. The second was the buying of a prime block of land for the new Bank of China headquarters in Central, Hong Kong, at a rate much less than the current market value. Furthermore, this block of land had a lease running only to 1995.

Another factor which upset experienced Hong Kong people was the announcement by Britain that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would, when she met the Chinese leaders in September 1982, raise the Hong Kong question. The raising of the question at such a high level was, it was believed, entirely contrary to Chinese custom which was to "seek out a go-between through whom the general theme could be discussed" (Patrikeeff 1989:122). Mrs Thatcher's role in the diplomatic encounter, particularly her adoption of a hard bargaining position³⁵ and what was seen as her

³³ This was during the first visit to Beijing of a Hong Kong governor since the communists established control in 1949.

³⁴ MacLehose had put to Deng Xiaoping an 'ingenious' plan (the notion that the Hong Kong Legislative Council would "unilaterally adopt legislation setting aside the 1997 deadline, without Britain laying formal and permanent claim to the land" (Tang and Ching 1994:151) hatched by the governments of Britain and Hong Kong to extend the status quo in Hong Kong. This did not find favour with the Chinese.

³⁵ Some suggest Mrs Thatcher took this line because the Chinese insisted on resuming sovereignty; some claim that prudent advice was ignored in the light of the Falklands victory; others claim her position was premeditated in order to force China to forgo its earlier position about taking Hong Kong 'when the time is ripe' and focus on a specific date); and yet others claim her hatred of Hong Kong and contempt for the successful business people in the territory underlaid her stance.

political naivety, brought further concern. China launched a press campaign against the Prime Minister and the notions she had raised. The hardened Chinese line, that the return of the colony was the prime objective of the Chinese rulers, dashed any hopes about a compromise that Hong Kong had thought might be found and the dollar and the stock market in Hong Kong fell drastically.

The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law

Finally, in 1984, after many rounds of talks, the continued fall in the Hong Kong stock and property markets, accusations and counter-accusations from both sides, and despite the fact that there were still obstacles³⁶ to overcome, the Sino-British Joint Declaration with its detailed ten-point statements was signed³⁷. In it was the stipulation that sovereignty over Hong Kong would be resumed by China at midnight on 30 June 1997, that Britain was responsible for the territory up until that moment, and that the two countries were committed to co-operate during that period on transition issues and land leases. Two important points enshrined in the Joint Declaration were that after 1997 Hong Kong is to be run by Hong Kong people and that the "legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections" (Joint Declaration, annex I, sect. 1 - see Appendix A).

After signing the Joint Declaration, the governments of Britain and Hong Kong began to establish a system of representative government which they, and the people of Hong Kong believed, Tang and Ching (1994:161) stress, was necessary "for the implementation of the Joint Declaration". In November 1985, almost a year after the Joint Declaration was signed, China, suspicious that representative government in Hong Kong might also mean independence, voiced its concern about the political reforms that were proposed and accused Britain of not abiding by the Joint Declaration. For China, the promises regarding a 'high degree of autonomy' and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' meant not universal franchise, but other "types of electoral arrangements" (M-k. Chan 1991:3). As Harris (1986:61) commented after a

Patrikeeff (1989:125) claims that Mrs Thatcher clearly demonstrated a lack of interest in or patience with Hong Kong politicians during her visits to the territory.

³⁶ One question concerned "how existing leases were to run beyond Britain's tenure in Hong Kong"; another was the nationality issue (Patrikeeff 1989:129). Even after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984 these two remained to be resolved.

³⁷ The British government had assured the people of Hong Kong, through full page newspaper advertisements, that they would have a say in their own future and, indeed, invited them to send written and signed submissions. However, it was also made clear that no changes could be made to the document and that submissions would not be destroyed afterwards. The whole exercise was clearly futile (Patrikeeff 1989:134).

private exchange with a Chinese official, "China wanted to hatch its own chicken, and did not want to receive a half-boiled egg in 1997". China, insisting that any reform in the political arena had to converge with the Basic Law (for which they had responsibility for drafting) and, overriding Britain's reluctance to have any Chinese involvement in the formulation of political reforms, forced the British to include the reforms on the agenda of the Joint Liaison Group³⁸.

Although the British government had to accept that the process of democratisation had to be a slower affair than it wanted, the four years between 1982 and 1986 saw an increase in political participation in Hong Kong and the emergence of new political groups. No direct elections to the Legislative Council, however, were held. In 1986 China announced that it planned to build a nuclear plant at Daya Bay fifty kilometres from Hong Kong. Although, on this matter, China and Britain were in agreement, strong opposition was voiced by the general public of Hong Kong. Tang and Ching (1994:163) liken the issue of Daya Bay to that of direct elections in Hong Kong; both issues "polarized the community, resulted in rapid mobilization of public opinion, involved a decision by the Chinese government that ran counter to public opinion in Hong Kong, and led to public apathy when the people realized that their views were not properly taken into account".

In 1987 following the arrival of Sir David Wilson the new Governor of Hong Kong, a green paper on political development in Hong Kong was released³⁹. The notion, created by statements in the paper, that some seats would be directly elected in 1988, "building up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997", was swiftly debunked by China⁴⁰ (Ching 1994:173). Subsequently, after a parliamentary debate in Hong Kong at which Martin Lee and other key democrats were not present, it was announced by the Hong Kong government that the small number of direct elections originally slated for 1988 would be deferred until 1991. This decision, Ching (1994:175) maintains, meant that the Hong Kong government was, without admitting it, "acceding to China's demand to subordinate its political reforms to the Basic Law, which was scheduled to be promulgated in 1990" (Ching 1994:175). What really upset

³⁸ The Joint Liaison Group consists of officially appointed Chinese and British delegates charged with negotiating issues which straddle the handover.

³⁹ This paper followed a white paper in 1984 in which it was stated that functional constituencies and electoral colleges would be set up in 1985 as the first step towards representative government, and that a small number of directly elected seats would be introduced in 1988 and be increased slowly up until 1997 (Ching 1994:173).

⁴⁰ A trip to London in January 1988 by the Delegation for Democracy organised by Martin Lee, later leader of the Democratic Party, failed to persuade the British government to resist Chinese pressure to "subordinate its political reforms to the Basic Law, which was scheduled to be promulgated in 1990" (Ching 1994:175).

Hong Kong people about the whole matter, and changed their perception of both the administration in Hong Kong and the British government, was that Britain not only gave into Chinese pressure but, further, ascribed the reasons for doing so to public opinion in Hong Kong.

No sooner had the Joint Declaration been signed than the Chinese began to appoint a committee, twenty three members of which were Hong Kong people. Its purpose was to begin the task of drafting the Basic Law⁴¹ (Appendix B), even though it was not due to come into effect until 1997. This move surprised the British and Hong Kong governments because they had presumed they would have time to make political reforms before the Basic Law was drafted. The Chinese, however, believed China's commitment to be a preservation of the systems that existed in 1984 when they signed the Joint Declaration. They had not intended that the British could do what they liked with Hong Kong up until June 1997 and the early drafting of the Basic Law was, as Ching (1994:176) notes, "an important instrument in China's repertoire, designed to ensure that whatever changes took place in Hong Kong before 1997 would conform with what Beijing wanted for the territory after 1997". Although some contentious elements in the first draft which Hong Kong found disturbing were amended, the political structure proposed for Hong Kong by China aroused the ire of many Hong Kong people, particularly democrats. The critical element was a legislature of fifty-five seats and only fifteen to be filled directly, with this number of directly elected seats to be gradually increased.

Before the second draft was fully discussed, the death on 15 April 1989 of Hu Yaobang, a former leader who had been dismissed because of his tolerant actions towards student demonstration in 1986, prompted a "new wave of pro-democracy demonstrations" (Ching 1994:178)⁴². The large numbers of Hong Kong people (up to a million on some occasions) on the streets of the territory showing their support for the people of Beijing reflected the discontent, resentment and frustration they felt about the situation in Hong Kong. If the feeling that the pace of democratisation

⁴¹ The Basic Law would provide a constitutional foundation for the "establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1997" and set out the "legal principles and policies for the administration of Hong Kong after 1997 in accordance with the Joint Declaration" (Tang and Ching 1994:162).

⁴² Lau et al. (1991:184) claim that, rather than understanding a democratic government to be one that consists of elected representatives (as in western democratic theoretical tradition), respondents to a survey in Hong Kong held "rather peculiar" notions. A democratic government, to 44.2% of the respondents, was one that was "willing to consult public opinion", to 19.7%, one that could "lead the people", and, to 8.1%, one that "treated the people in a fatherly way". Only 14.9% regarded a democratic government as one that was elected by the people.

should be hastened in Hong Kong was heightened, the Tiananmen Square massacre that followed the students uprising in Beijing brought outrage and panic⁴³.

The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group meetings in June 1989 were cancelled by the British who had begun to change their stance on two important issues, democracy and nationality. Calling for China to take steps to bolster confidence in the territory the British put forward their own proposals to this end: a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong⁴⁴; a faster pace of democratisation; and a nationality scheme⁴⁵ designed to "give key people in Hong Kong the confidence to remain until and, it was hoped, beyond 1997" (Ching 1994:181)⁴⁶. To underline these proposals Britain sought international support for their position on Hong Kong.

Finally, in late February 1990, after four and a half years of negotiation and interruptions of various sorts⁴⁷, and following a last minute agreement about electoral

⁴³ It also, as Lee (1994:276) notes, "marked a turning point in the development of the political organizations in Hong Kong". Following the establishment of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (under the leadership of Martin Lee and Szeto Wah) soon after the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square came the first significant political group to be formed in Hong Kong, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK). The United Democrats, under the same leadership as the Hong Kong Alliance, were labelled 'anti-China' by Beijing. Other political groups too were established: the Business and Professional Federation and the Liberal Democratic Federation (both representing conservative business groups); and The New Hong Kong Alliance, Citizens' Forum, the Association for Stabilizing Hong Kong, and the New Territories Association (pro-China groups). The Heung Yee Kuk, a conservative group which had muted the influence of the democrats in the New Territories, aligned itself with the pro-China camp (Lee 1994:280). By 1990-1, the leaders of these major political groups, with their public image established during the political campaigns of 1989, started to grapple with the question of how to "re-establish a dialogue with China" (Lee 1994:260). Whether the democrats would be accorded the support in the 1991 elections that they had been given by the general public in the 1989 campaigns remained a question.

⁴⁴ When the Bill of Rights came into effect in 1991 (it was not entrenched, and is therefore able to be repealed like any other local ordinance), China declared that it "reserved the right to review all Hong Kong laws, including the Bill of Rights, after 1997 and repeal them if they were found to be incompatible with the Basic Law" (Ching 1994:184).

⁴⁵ The British Nationalist Scheme offered British nationality to fifty thousand people - civil servants would account for one third and the rest would be people from the private sector. China denounced this scheme as a violation of the Joint Declaration and declared that it would refuse to recognise such passport holders as foreign nationals, that they would not have access to protection from the British consulate after 1997, and that the Basic Law would incorporate a provision to ensure that the percentage of legislators holding foreign passports or the right to reside in foreign countries would be limited to twenty percent (Ching 1994:183-184).

⁴⁶ These three measures all proved to be hollow and Hong Kong people were disillusioned as they saw that they could not rely on Britain to protect them after June 1997 (Ching 1994:184).

⁴⁷ These included the resignation of two members and the refusal by two others (Martin Lee and Szeto Wah) to continue serving while Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun remained in power.

arrangements in Hong Kong, the drafting process of the Basic Law⁴⁸ came to an end. Despite the adoption of the final draft of the Basic Law in February 1990, other events had arisen which aggravated the tension on both sides. The Hong Kong government's decision to allow Yang Yang (a Chinese swimmer who said he belonged to a pro-democracy group and faced persecution in China) to leave the territory for the United States upset China⁴⁹. So too did the announcement by Governor Wilson in October 1989 regarding the infrastructure projects (the new airport on Lantau Island (with supporting rail system, highway and town) and the new port for container shipping. China stated that it refused to endorse the projects until it was fully versed as to what the projects entailed⁵⁰. The Chinese request that the Hong Kong government provide it with consultants' reports about the project proved to be the route via which the Chinese government insinuated its way into the decision-making process in Hong Kong even though 1997 was some years away. That it expected to be party to all major decisions involving Hong Kong before 1997 was made explicit in April 1990.

Even at this time the Chinese government refused to accept the status of OMELCO (the Executive and Legislative Councils) which, it stressed, was part of imperialist Britain's plan to develop Hong Kong into a "near-independent state" (Lee 1993:82). Depicting the democrats also as part of the same plot, the Chinese argued that only Beijing could fairly represent the interests of Hong Kong people⁵¹.

In September 1991, the first ever direct elections were held in Hong Kong, with approximately forty percent of the electorate casting votes. The Democrats, taking advantage of the two-seat constituencies, were very successful and won sixteen

⁴⁸ The contents of the Basic Law made it clear that Britain's stated intention to hasten the pace of political development had not been carried through - there would be only eighteen directly elected seats in the 1991 elections, twenty in 1995 and twenty-two seats in 1997 (Ching 1994:182).

⁴⁹ China, claiming that there was an (as yet unpublished) "series of agreements" (Ching 1994:183) which obliged Hong Kong to repatriate all overstayers back to China, then refused to take back overstayers from Hong Kong. Not only was Hong Kong concerned that China's decision (if known by people in China) would result in a flood of illegal immigrants, but China too was worried that Guangdong Province would be flooded by unemployed immigrants on their way to Hong Kong. Even the resolution of this dispute precipitated a new dispute - Hong Kong's claim that "no concessions had been made to arrive at the agreement" (Ching 1994:183) provoked a strong response from China to the effect that the British were lying.

⁵⁰ Only in June 1991, after twenty months of protracted negotiations, was the agreement (which now included the conditions imposed by the Chinese) for the airport finally initialled.

⁵¹ This strategy was used increasingly by the Chinese, as was demonstrated by the debate surrounding the funding of the new airport. Rousing a sense of nationalism among Hong Kong people by persuading them that a conspiracy was afoot - that the British government was going to leave behind a financial debt for the future SAR government - the Chinese side strung out the talks on the airport until such a time that the British had to make certain provisions (by providing, for example, a certain level of financial reserve for the post 1997 government) in order to make any headway towards an agreement at all.

seats, and immediately called on Governor Wilson to reflect public opinion and appoint mainly democrats to public bodies, including the Executive Council. No pro-China candidate was successful but China, ignoring the fact that the United Democrat leaders were also the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance for the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, a group China had denounced as subversive, merely stated that the low voter participation was an indication that people in Hong Kong were not interested in democracy and that those who were elected did not have a proper mandate (Ching 1994:188-189).

During the last months of Governor Wilson's term of office before he departed in July 1992, the only other major accord announced by the Joint Liaison Group was that regarding the Court of Final Appeal (see Chapter Three, p. 57). Contentious issues such as the use of military land, the proposal to corporatise Radio Television Hong Kong, and financing arrangements for the new airport at Chek Lap Kok were all discussed, but no agreement was reached. The participation of Hong Kong on international bodies was also discussed, but China made it immediately clear that because Hong Kong (and Taiwan) were not sovereign countries such participation was out of the question (Ching 1994:193-194).

The last five years of British rule and the moves by China to set up the a Provisional Legislature

On 9 July 1992, six days after Governor Wilson's departure, Christopher Patten, a senior British politician, arrived in the territory as the new (and last) Governor of Hong Kong. Following his arrival tensions between China and Hong Kong continued to rise and certain issues continued to be the target for Chinese criticism⁵². In early October 1992, without having consulted the Chinese, Patten announced his proposals for political reform - a "series of measures to broaden the voting base for the next Legislative Council elections in 1995"⁵³ (Cottrell 1993:192).

⁵² The financing of the new airport, for example, for which China's endorsement was vital with regard to attracting investors. China's procrastination prompted Martin Lee, the leader of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, to comment in the New York Times (3 June 1992:4) that he thought that the Chinese were "making use of the airport to show the British who's the master" (Shipp 1995:101). Shipp (1995:100) concurs, arguing that Beijing's continuing criticism of the airport was seen by most observers in Hong Kong as an effort to "undermine Britain's insistence on increasing democracy for the territory".

⁵³ Out of sixty legislative seats, ten would be appointed by the governor, the residents of Hong Kong would vote for twenty seats, and thirty seats would be 'functional constituency' seats and, as such, would be decided by votes from all residents who were working. Patten also proposed that the voting age be lowered to eighteen, and that all seats on district and municipal boards be filled by a direct vote rather than by appointment (Shipp 1995:103).

China, stridently opposing the scheme, levelled personal insults at Patten, calling him both a 'clown' and a 'criminal for a thousand years'. Mindful of their abandonment in 1984 of the 'protocol' to the Joint Declaration which would have allowed Beijing tighter control of Hong Kong during the period of transition, and now concerned that their fears about subversion and the sabotaging of the handover by the British were about to be realised, China argued strongly that, because the proposals put forward by Patten breached this understanding, they should be withdrawn forthwith. China also argued strongly against Patten's plans to improve welfare and social services in Hong Kong.

More strongly worded statements from senior Chinese leaders to Hong Kong followed and, in October 1992, Lu Ping (head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office) warned that a 'second stove'⁵⁴, a provisional legislature consisting of "pro-Beijing community leaders in the territory" which would "advise on the planning of the transfer of power" (Cheng 1995:1), would be established by the Chinese. This proposal which, it was realised, would threaten the legitimacy and efficacy of the British administration in Hong Kong, further raised fears that the 'through train'⁵⁵ arrangements made to straddle the transfer of power, would be derailed altogether.

In November 1992 came the announcement that contracts, agreements and leases signed by the government of Hong Kong, but not approved by Beijing, would have no validity after 30 June 1997. Not only was the future of the airport and other major projects plus some businesses in jeopardy, but investors reacted to this statement negatively and the Hang Seng Index dropped to under 5000 points, a drop of more than 1000 (Roberti 1994:296). The Chinese continued their attempts to undermine business confidence in Hong Kong and made it clear to the Hong Kong business community that it was unwise to oppose Beijing⁵⁶. Further, in the same month, the Chinese suggested that, should Patten continue with his plans, the Joint Declaration would be abandoned (Roberti 1994:296). The stock market plunged again.

⁵⁴ The 'second stove', claims Ching (1993:35) was "interpreted by many" as the "setting up of a shadow government".

⁵⁵ The concept 'through train' which "entered Hong Kong's political vocabulary during the drafting of the Basic Law in the late 1980s" (Lo, C-k. 1995:25) was used to refer to the proposal that current members of the Legislative Council would continue to serve as members of the first legislature of Hong Kong after the reunification without new elections.

⁵⁶ In December 1992, China questioned the legal status of Container Terminal Nine, a move which delayed construction of much needed facilities to the extent that shipping companies were forced to seek other alternatives (some even in China itself), and, later the same month, Jardine Matheson (one of the long term British trading companies in Hong Kong) faced criticism from China for supporting Patten's plans.

In February 1993 Chinese officials met in Guangzhou and decided to go ahead with their plans to form a shadow government, a preparatory committee which would handle the transition to Chinese rule. In March 1993, despite an endorsement from the Executive Council for the democratic reform proposals (supporting the endorsement from the Legislative Council) and at a time when convergence with China was becoming more obvious⁵⁷, Patten informed the Legislative Council that the publication and debate about his proposals would be delayed because of "plans by China and Britain to resume negotiations on the transition of Hong Kong to Chinese rule" (Shipp 1995:111).

Because the talks between Britain and China had not started by mid March 1993, Patten published his reform legislation. Beijing reacted angrily and the stock market in Hong Kong again dropped. By late March the Chinese were refusing to meet with Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, and were calling for Britain to remove Patten as governor of Hong Kong. However, in April 1993, at the end of six months of diplomatic tension, it was announced that talks between the two sides were to begin again (Shipp 1995:113)⁵⁸. In the same month the Chinese President, Li Peng, announced that China would establish an advisory committee for Hong Kong in 1993 rather than in 1996 as originally suggested.

After acknowledging in October 1993 that he had failed in his lengthy effort to secure approval from China for an augmentation of democracy in Hong Kong, Patten formally, in December, submitted legislation to widen democratic participation in Hong Kong. Suggesting that Patten should forget his proposals for democracy in Hong Kong, the Chinese warned that China would overturn the 1995 elections when sovereignty was resumed by the Chinese in mid 1997.

Patten was undeterred and continued to push for democracy. Encouraged by Legislative Council support for the first phase of electoral reforms, Patten, in February 1994, initiated his second phase - "providing for direct and indirect elections (by constituencies) for all legislators in 1995" (Shipp 1995:118). Optimism amongst the business community in Hong Kong was high and, buoyed by overseas buying and a rise in property prices, the Hang Seng index soared to over 12,000 points (nearly double

⁵⁷ The Bank of China had been approved to issue bank notes from May 1994, the bauhinia, Hong Kong's official flower was gracing some coins instead of Queen Elizabeth, and Mandarin was being introduced to schools and heard on twice-daily television news programmes.

⁵⁸ Douglas Hurd's July 1993 meeting with Qian Qichen, the Chinese Foreign Minister, was their first diplomatic meeting since September 1992. At around the same time, Hurd also met with Jiang Zemin, the Chinese president, and in that meeting gained approval from China to start the reclamation work on a project connected to the new airport in Hong Kong.

that of its level in March 1993). By the end of March 1994, however, the Index had dropped back to 8,412 - its lowest level since October 1993 and concern about the economic situation in Hong Kong, especially the rising property prices, was expressed by China.

During the early months of 1994, China also announced that the advisory committee for Hong Kong, the Preliminary Working Committee (PWC)⁵⁹, would begin its work in 1994 with a "study of public institutions in Hong Kong, including the legislature, with a goal of reshaping them for the period after 1 July 1997" (Shipp 1995:121). This move by the Chinese prompted some political commentators to suggest that China's study of local institutions was, in effect, the "beginning of a unilateral takeover of Hong Kong" ("The Future is Here" 1994:19). Reports of intimidation by China of Hong Kong media groups, especially the arrest of a Hong Kong journalist in Beijing, the "admissions of self-censorship on the part of local journalists", and the rising pressure on the media to avoid subjects that might upset Beijing and lead to consequences after 1997 (for example the decision of Hong Kong's Television Broadcasts Ltd (TVB) not to show a BBC documentary about Chairman Mao) invoked criticism from Patten who argued that a free press was as important to the Hong Kong way of life as an independent judiciary and elected legislature (Shipp 1995:121).

Patten's political reform proposals passed through the Legislative Council in June 1994 and, in the same month (perhaps aided by the Hong Kong government's funding arrangements for the reprovisioning of the sites that China would keep), an agreement was reached between Britain and China about the military sites in Hong Kong. Although other agreements were imminent (the container terminal project and the financial package for the new airport), and a promise had been given to negotiate with Britain regarding the status of the Hong Kong SAR passports, the National People's Congress announced, in September 1994, that it had passed a resolution to abrogate any political structure founded on the reform proposals put forward by Patten. Proposals regarding the provisional legislature were also put forward (Cheng 1995:2).

While both sides realised that, with regard to the political system and 'through train' arrangements, co-operation was now extremely difficult, there was, nonetheless, concern that cooperation regarding other issues continue⁶⁰. There was some

⁵⁹ The committee consisted of fifty-seven members, thirty of them from Hong Kong.

⁶⁰ Certain factors have also brought about a "softening of their respective positions" (Cheng 1995:4): the disassociating from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) negotiations of human rights by the

expectation that Governor Patten's policy speech in October 1994 might include proposals to "improve the atmosphere and re-establish a dialogue for cooperation between Beijing and London on Hong Kong" (Cheng 1995:5). In the event, his speech included no such overtures and, further, his comments that the Preliminary Working Committee was merely an advisory arm of the National People's Congress, and that, therefore, there could be no "formal relationship between the PWC and the Hong Kong government" (Cheng 1995:5) engendered more negative comments from Beijing. It also triggered the announcement from Beijing that the current Legislature would be disbanded as of 1 July 1997 and that an appointed body would act as the Legislature in its place. Such a legislature, China argued, was necessary in order to secure a smooth transfer of sovereignty, and "would be in place until new elections were held in 1998" (Fung and Cheung 1996 October 4:6).

The Provisional Legislature

Subsequently China set up a Preparatory Committee of one hundred and fifty members in order to establish a Selection Committee of four hundred Hong Kong residents whose task, in turn, was to choose the Hong Kong chief executive-designate (nomination for this opened in August 1996) and the future Legislature. Although choosing the chief executive-designate would be the task of the Selection Committee, control of the selection of the chief executive-designate would be in the hands of the "10-member presidium of the Preparatory Committee, half of whom are mainland officials" (Lau 1996 July 27:18). That such control would be an important element in the whole process of the choosing of the proposed Selection Committee, and the selection of the chief executive-designate, was underlined by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's comment "We must have ironclad control over at least 201 seats", a comment which was relayed to Hong Kong people via an article in the *South China Morning Post* (Lam 1996a July 24:15). In Hong Kong, people perhaps did not need to be told about the control that would be exercised: as Emily Lau (1996 July 27:18), an independent member of the Legislative Council commented, "After all, it is general knowledge China would not allow the election to take place unless it already knew the result".

It was further announced by China (No 1996 August 1:4) that not only would the top tier of the current three tiers of political structure be disbanded in 1997, but

Clinton administration; and the gradual shift by countries such as Australia and Canada from a position of strong support for Hong Kong policy as they realised the potential of the China market.

that there would be changes in the bottom two levels as well in that municipal and district boards would gain an extra twenty-five percent of temporarily appointed members after the handover. Under Governor Patten's political reform package all seats on district boards had been filled via direct elections in 1995, a move which had also engendered strong criticism from China. Although it was announced that, unlike those in the Legislative Council, councillors at the district level could remain in office, no mention was made as to whether or not Democratic Party members who were councillors or District Board members would be excluded from these bodies.

While some Hong Kong people welcomed the chance to join the Selection Committee, others were reluctant. The Democrats who (as discussed in Chapter Three, p. 44) had been extremely successful in the 1991 direct elections for the lower two tiers of government in Hong Kong, were opposed to the setting up of the Provisional Legislature⁶¹. What upset some people also was that Hong Kong people were asked to foot the bill for the Provisional Legislature, and for the chief executive-designate and his team of officials (Choy and Li 1996 October 7:4). The Democrats formally ruled in the middle of August 1996 that their members would not be allowed to join the Selection Committee⁶² (Won and Hon 1996:4) and the government, too, announced that senior civil servants (directorate officers, administrative officers, police officers and information officers) could not serve on the Selection Committee (Ng and Hon 1996:1).

By the middle of September 1996 the secretariat of the Preparatory Committee had received 5,883 applications for seats on the four-hundred-member Selection Committee (Cheung 1996 September 15:2) and several prominent Hong Kong people had emerged as contenders for the position of chief executive-designate. Even as early as the third week of July 1996 it was reported that shipping magnate Tung Chee-hwa

⁶¹ Democratic Party Leader Martin Lee argued that, although many people seemed "prepared to accept the establishment of the interim body as a *fait accompli*" (Won 1996 August 5:4), the setting up of such a body contravened the Joint Declaration (in which it was promised that Hong Kong would have a legislature constituted by elections) and he urged Hong Kong people to oppose it.

⁶² Interestingly, a poll conducted for the South China Morning Post revealed that, while many respondents believed that the Preparatory Committee would appoint a Selection Committee "broadly representative of the Hong Kong community", they wanted the "Democratic Party to change its mind and agree to join the Section Committee to ensure greater possibility of their wishes being taken into account" (Chan 1996b August 26:1). This poll also revealed that most of the respondents were not aware that the Provisional Legislature would also be chosen by the Selection Committee. Another article in the South China Morning Post a few days later reported that a Beijing official had announced that "Beijing will not talk to the Democrats if they remain in a pro-democracy alliance". The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China has been denounced by China as subversive and Martin Lee, a prominent member of both the Democrats and the Alliance, has been the target of particularly derogatory comments from Beijing (Yeung (1996 August 31:4)

(although he did not officially register as a candidate for the post of chief executive-designate until the end of August 1996) was the candidate favoured by President Jiang Zemin and his Chinese Communist Party mainstream faction. Mr Tung, supported by Henry Fok Ying-tung, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and a man who enjoys, it is reported, "the status of 'state leader' in China" (Lam 1996a July 24:15), has admitted that, over eleven years ago, China had "helped save his family's shipping business by backing a US\$120 million (HK\$927 million) syndicated fund", a fund which was led by tycoon Mr Fok (Yeung and Choy 1996 October 24:1). Mr Tung, however, denies that the matter is related to his bid to be selected as the chief executive-designate. The Chinese Communist Party elite also wanted Chief Secretary, Anson Chan Fang On-sang, to continue in her position after June 1997.

From the above discussion about political development in Hong Kong certain facts become clear. For most of Britain's reign over Hong Kong, the people were given no say in regard to who governed them, or the form of that government. When Britain finally did introduce political reforms, China objected and set up a Provisional Legislature of China-approved individuals to govern in the place of the elected body. The abandonment of the 'through train' arrangements, particularly the imminent dismissal of the elected legislature has upset many people in Hong Kong. While people hope that China will keep its promise that elections can be held in Hong Kong in 1998, the loss of direct voting rights in the interim is seen as a retrograde step by the people who were denied a say in government for such a long time.

There are certain facts about the Joint Declaration also that worry people in Hong Kong. A treaty between two sovereign states under international law, the Joint Declaration is registered with the United Nations. However, although the British claim that the provisions of the treaty are binding in international law (before and after 1 July 1997), disputes over this treaty cannot be adjudicated in the International Court of Justice because, not only does the Joint Declaration not contain provisions for this to happen, but China does not accept the International Court of Justice's compulsory jurisdiction. Britain, clearly, once sovereignty is transferred, has no mechanism by which it can enforce the provisions of the Declaration.

Similarly, there are concerns about the Basic Law formulated by China. The Basic Law is not an international treaty but a law enacted by the National People's Congress in China in April 1990. Traditionally this Congress rubber-stamps the policies of China's state leaders. In June 1990 it was announced that the text of the

Basic Law had been translated into English and that if there was any discrepancy, the Chinese version would prevail. This decision which, in effect, gave Chinese officials full authority to interpret the meaning of the Basic Law, abrogates the authority given to equal authenticity by the 1984 Joint Declaration. Further, as a law, the Basic Law can be amended or replaced at any time by the enactment of another law by the National People's Congress.

Because the constitution of China states that supreme authority abides with the Central People's Government, lower levels of government, such as the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government will be, cannot "contravene China's constitution or its national laws" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:57-58). Any law enacted in Hong Kong which the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decides contravenes the Basic Law, or the national law of China, can be rejected. What is rather bizarre about the whole situation is that although Article 5 of China's constitution states that public ownership of the means of production is the "basis of the socialist economic system" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:58), and even though there is no provision within the Chinese constitution which allows for the exemption of any region (including Hong Kong) from the requirements of the national constitution, China, via the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, has agreed that Hong Kong's capitalist system can continue for another fifty years. While the present leadership in China is content to ignore the inconsistency between the Chinese constitution and the Basic Law of Hong Kong this is, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1996:58) point out, a "matter of policy only, and policies are easy to change".

Expressing their doubts about the Provisional Legislature, and concerned about the form of future electoral arrangements and that only people of whom China approves will be allowed to contest seats in any future elections, people in Hong Kong wonder if China will honour its promises with respect to the 'one country/two systems' concept and allow Hong Kong autonomy. Worried about the change of government and the possible constitution of future governments, people are concerned that there will be less democracy and a curtailment of human rights and other freedoms. The non-representation by Democrats in the Provisional Legislature and their possible exclusion from any future legislature adds to their misgivings. Further, although some people in Hong Kong appreciate the 'connections' Mr Tung, the chief executive-designate, has with Beijing, others are concerned that these connections also include 'obligations'.

Women, like men, are concerned about the change of government and the implications of this change for other aspects of life in Hong Kong. They worry not only about the impact on their own lives, but are also concerned about how their children's lives will be lived. Further, as in other countries, women in Hong Kong have found the road to political equality with men a long and difficult process. Although the political reforms introduced since the 1970s have opened up opportunities for women to participate in the political sphere, and even though there are some prominent women in the upper tiers of government, women are generally under-represented in government in Hong Kong. Like most Hong Kong people women in the territory do not favour mass mobilisation and collective action, and their representation even on the "statutory and non-statutory boards and committees" in Hong Kong is "under 25 per cent" (Lui 1995:141).

While factors such as compulsory education, the gradual acceptance that rewards should be accorded on the basis of merit, and the increasing involvement of women in social and economic activities may strengthen their desire to participate in the political sphere, Lui (1995:159) doubts whether women's path to future political equality with men, in a society in which the "social and political systems ... are biased in favour of an elite disproportionately represented by men" and which "does not uphold the philosophy of equal respect for everyone" (Lui 1995:160), especially when it is not yet known if China will uphold the spirit of the United Nations Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as it applies to Hong Kong, may well continue to be difficult.

Concern about a loss of civil service personnel

During the time leading up to the reunification the loss of people from the civil service, particularly from the police force, has raised concern among people in Hong Kong. They wonder, too, if events which may unfold because of the change in legislature will encourage more people to leave the civil service following the handover.

Traditionally, Hong Kong was run by civil servants who were expected to act in accordance with what they learned through the various consultative bodies. The 1966 and 1967 disturbances, however, underlined the fact that the civil service could not adequately handle the complex problems which Hong Kong faced. Although the reforms that were introduced did not enhance the government's ability to formulate social policy, they (including the adoption of a policy of localisation which resulted in the "opening [of] more middle-level ranks to local Chinese" (Cheung, A. 1996:73), did

pave the way for subsequent changes⁶³ in the mid-1980s (Chan 1995:21-27) which also brought about change in the role of civil servants.

Not only were civil servant coming to terms with their changed role but they, like other people in Hong Kong during the run-up to reunification, were starting to feel anxious about the handover. An announcement from China concerning the civil service fuelled their concerns. While the 1984 Joint Declaration had required a "localized civil service by the changeover of sovereignty in 1997" (Cheung, A. 1996:73), China had assured civil servants that they could continue their employment after the 1 July 1997 and expatriates that they could continue in the civil service (even though those in high level jobs had been required to accept demotion⁶⁴). The announcement, however, that those holding positions at the 'principal official' level (Secretary level and above) would need to be "Chinese nationals, who were permanent residents of Hong Kong SAR" and have "no right of abode in any foreign countries" (Lee 1995:41), raised concern. The request from Beijing that the files on civil servants be given to China did not make Hong Kong civil servants feel any less easy.

Because of a lack of confidence engendered mainly by the collapse of the 'through train', but also because of "internal institutional changes" (Cheung 1995:68-74), there was already high wastage in the civil service and the latest announcement only served to deepen the feeling that the civil service would become not only less experienced, but more politically correct. As A. Cheung (1996:78) comments, it became increasingly obvious that the Chinese government was "determined to impose tight political order and control on Hong Kong upon the territory's return to China".

Because of the numbers of experienced people leaving the civil service, concern has been voiced as to a possible fall in government efficiency. This would affect all government offices, but it is with regard to the police that people express most

⁶³ These changes include the nomination of 'non-official' (as opposed to 'official' civil servants) members to the Executive and Legislative Councils, the introduction of elections and party politics, China's seeking (particularly since the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984) to have a say in regard to policies or measures that will continue to have an effect in the post-1997 era, the Chinese refusal to acknowledge the government of Hong Kong and concomitant insistence on dealing directly with the British government, Britain's increased (perhaps stemming from the last point) control in matters which, formerly, had fallen within the jurisdiction of Hong Kong civil servants, the restructuring that has occurred in the economy of Hong Kong and the economic integration that is increasingly taking place between Hong Kong and China, the major changes which have occurred in the international scene, in particular the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

⁶⁴ Although, by 1994, expatriate staff accounted for only 1.2 percent of the civil service, most were in senior posts. Many, rather than accept demotion, decided to opt for early retirement or leave. A significant number of local civil servants, many of whom had British passports (or passports from other countries) also either opted for early retirement, or changed their employment (Lee 1995:43).

concern. With only a smaller pool of experienced police officers, for example, public disorder could reach dangerous levels, at which point, it is argued, China would bring in the People's Liberation Army to restore order. Such a scenario brings the Tiananmen Square massacre to the minds of Hong Kong people. The very thought of the People's Liberation Army raised questions in the minds of Hong Kong people as to what role the army would play in Hong Kong (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:133)⁶⁵.

There are also concerns expressed that civil servants may find themselves in difficult positions when they are required to deal with their counterparts on the mainland after the handover. Because of the different way of conducting business in China, Hong Kong civil servants may be forced to reciprocate, thus compromising their position and, perhaps, their integrity.

Concern about changes in the legal system

Not only is it feared that a change in the government and the loss of civil service personnel will impact adversely on the lives of Hong Kong people, but so too do people fear that changes in the system of law could make life in Hong Kong difficult. Following a brief overview of the legal system in Hong Kong, I discuss, in more detail, the problems that Hong Kong people feel may arise following reunification.

Scott (1989:43) claims that early Hong Kong was a "lawless place, a haven for pirates, vagabonds, down and out seamen, gamblers, thugs, whores and unscrupulous merchants". Unlike Welsh (1994:166) who maintains that the British were even-handed in their dispensation of justice, Scott (1989:48-49) argues that justice in Hong Kong during the 1800s was neither fair nor impartial because, not only were the magistrates untrained, but there was no separation of administration and judiciary at lower levels. A lack of interpreters impeded procedure, further exacerbating the situation. Acquittals in court were seen more as good luck rather than as stemming from due process, and penalties for convictions were inconsistently implemented.

Because it was fundamentally necessary for the continuance of trade, public order was quickly dealt with (Tsai 1993:47). Other crimes, however, continued unabated, mainly because the first police force (regular soldiers considered unfit for

⁶⁵ Because it will take over already existing military bases in Hong the PLA will hold a "land portfolio worth billions of dollars" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:133). Further, the PLA has over twenty thousand companies in China, some of which are 'illegal' and other which are legitimate. Many Hong Kong people wonder if the PLA will endeavour to 'set up shop' in Hong Kong also.

military duty), poorly paid for doing a dangerous and low status job, were subject to temptation in the way of bribes from vice and gambling dens (Scott 1989:45). While, gradually, more money was allocated to policing and improvements were made, time also brought a measure of co-operation between different dialect groups and, with this co-operation, an increasing degree of public order and elementary self-government in the form of kai-fong (neighbourhood associations) and temple committees⁶⁶.

The legal system was re-organised at the beginning of the century and has remained much the same since that time. Inherited in part from Britain, and in part shaped by local conditions and the necessities of the moment, the law in Hong Kong "closely parallels other common law jurisdictions" (O'Grady 1989:187) and shares with these the tendency to embody the law in legislation. As in other countries, laws are formulated and promulgated through the legislative process.

However, the common law system of Hong Kong, even after nearly 150 years of practice, has remained somewhat alien to most people who live in Hong Kong. Until the end of the 1980s, all the statutes were written only in English and, until the early 1990s, English was the language used in the courts. All Chinese being tried, or giving evidence in court, had to rely on an interpreter. Also alien to the Chinese mind have been the practices of the court, and the concepts on which the law was laid, for example, the right to remain silent, that an individual was innocent until proven guilty (Ng 1993:17).

Since the signing of the Joint Declaration (see Appendix A), attempts have been made to localise the process of law by translating the statutes that currently exist, the adoption of bilingual legislation, and the use of Cantonese in the courts themselves. However, these changes have proved problematic because of the difficulties in accurately translating English legal texts into the Chinese language and because many of the judges and barristers working in the territory are not Chinese and do not speak Cantonese or other Chinese dialects. The recruitment of Chinese to the judiciary has

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It is interesting to note that, as long as public order was maintained, the British left the local Chinese to their own devices and never sought to assimilate them. This attitude stemmed predominantly from the fact that Hong Kong, like every other British colony, was "governed according to local conditions" (Tsai 1993:38), with the governing elite changing "administrative policy according to changing times and circumstances". Allowed considerable licence by Britain, the governor and government officials in Hong Kong decided that the Chinese would be governed by village elders according to Chinese law (though this would be regulated by a British magistrate), and other people according to British Police Law. Consequently, two communities, European and Chinese, were formed in different parts of the town.

also proved difficult as many local Chinese are reluctant to commit themselves to a career on the bench because of the political uncertainty looming in Hong Kong⁶⁷.

As Rafferty (1991:21) notes, the British "legal tradition of open courts and common law" underpins the whole way of life in Hong Kong. Citizens of Hong Kong are generally free to live their lives without interference from the government and need not, unlike people in China, be concerned that giving offence to any official or dignitary, for example, will bring the arm of the law down upon them. Furthermore, such freedom negates the Chinese practice of *guanxi* (connections) and the favouritism seen in China where the offspring or cronies of the leaders get good jobs or special favours and where enemies are stripped of their money and position.

As the change of sovereignty nears, controversy has arisen regarding changes that might be made to the legal system of Hong Kong after the reunification⁶⁸. Currently the legal system reflects the 'rule of law' (see Chapter One, pp. 1-2) and the courts of Hong Kong are not only independent of the Legislature but the decisions that are made in the courts are "subject to review and reversal by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:62). After reunification, however, the role of the courts, and their composition, will be different. While there have been arguments about how many judges from other common-law jurisdictions will be allowed to sit on any appeal panel, even more concern has been expressed by the replacement of access to the British Privy Council with a local Court of Final Appeal. Even though Britain and China together settled this issue in mid 1995, the bar association and most of the legislators who were directly elected have opposed this move.

The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal is to be set up only after the reunification and some concern has been voiced as to whether this Court will, in fact, be established and, if it is, what degree of interference it will be subject to from the Chinese. This concern has been heightened by the suggestion from China that it will set up another body and accord it the power to review decisions made by the Court of Final Appeal, and to give the "final say on the interpretation of the Basic Law" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:63).

⁶⁷ Another factor affecting the recruitment of local Chinese to the judiciary, as Hsu (1992:64) points out, is that accruing "wealth is more important than holding public office. In other words, private practice offers a better financial return than sitting on the bench.

⁶⁸ Clark (1989:169) argues that China "intends to keep its hands on the main levers of power: viz., the power to interpret, the power to amend and the power to appoint the Chief Executive in an executive dominant system".

Further, not only has concern been voiced that, because China is preparing to dissolve the Legislative Council and replace it, Hong Kong faces a legal vacuum following the handover (Gittings and Chan 1996 August 25:1), but the Legal Department has lost sixty-five officers at the grade of Crown Council (these officers had an average of more than twelve years' experience each after they had qualified) between the years 1993 and 1995 (Chan 1996a August 14:5), a loss deemed significant⁶⁹.

Another concern is that China has announced that, despite the provision in the Basic Law that was meant to guarantee judicial tenure, the new Hong Kong SAR government, advised by a judicial commission, would be responsible for the appointment of judges after 1 July 1997. The straightforward application of the one country/two systems notion to the legal system in Hong Kong is muddled also by a number of legal issues. For example, questions have been asked as to whether or not the judgements made in Hong Kong courts will be enforceable in China and vice versa, and whether or not Hong Kong will be required, in the case of serious crimes like subversion, to extradite Hong Kong people to China. This is of concern because the penalty for subversion in China is death.

Moreover, although it had been decided that the maintenance of public order would be a matter only for the Hong Kong government, the National People's Congress belatedly invested its Standing Committee with the power to override decisions of the Hong Kong government after June 1997 and to invoke Chinese martial law to deal with any dissent which may arise. The invoking of martial law is another concept which is alien to the law of Hong Kong (Jayawickrama 1993:49).

Another matter which is of concern is Article 158 of the Basic Law which states that the "power of interpretation of that law is vested in the Standing Committee of the NPC" (Jayawickrama 1993:49). That the Standing Committee of China, in which the constitution is a political manifesto rather than a legal document, should be given the power to interpret the law (rather than the courts as is current in Hong Kong) is seen as a "deliberate attempt to subject the HKSAR, in common with the other regions of China, to the control of the high organ of the Chinese state power". Not only would the integrity of the judiciary of Hong Kong be compromised, but the principle of an independent judiciary would be eroded.

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As Wong (1996 July 21:11) points out, there has been an exodus of executive officers as well as experienced people from the police force, Social Welfare Department, Education Department, Information Services.

Quite apart from the concerns shared by both sexes about the effects that possible changes in the system of law could have on their lives, one wonders if the society of Hong Kong, seen as somewhat conservative and authoritarian, will itself change in the years following reunification. There has been some concern expressed in Hong Kong that sentencing after the reunification will be harsher than before, and that the death sentence may be reintroduced to the territory. Such concerns are heightened by Amnesty International's claim that 3,500 people in China have been executed as a direct result of the recent Chinese 'Strike Hard' anti-crime campaign and that the "list of execution offences was becoming broader and broader" ("Strike Hard executions" 1997:8). When they hear too of the Chinese authorities seizing people such as Chinese born Australian businessman, Joseph Peng, who was, reportedly, abducted from Macau by officials from Shenzhen and taken to China to face charges of corruption in relation to an alleged business fraud ("Peng to face 17-year jail sentence" 1995:1), they wonder how safe people will be on the streets of Hong Kong after the reunification. Reports, also, of Chinese authorities abducting Hong Kong sailors in Hong Kong waters (April 1995) further raised their concern.

As mentioned in Chapter Two although women in China enjoy more protection under the law as it is written than women in Hong Kong, this is not so in practice. Women in Hong Kong do fare better. However, laws still remain on the statute books of Hong Kong which disadvantage women in relation to men and leave women unprotected. Whether these laws will eventually be changed to ameliorate the position of women, or whether women in Hong Kong will, with time, find themselves in the same position as women in China is yet to be answered.

Concern about human rights

With such uncertainty surrounding the system of law, there have been questions asked as to whether people in Hong Kong will have the same protection and rights under the law that they currently enjoy. One of the promises made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration was that the laws currently in use in Hong Kong (this includes the Common Law) would remain basically the same⁷⁰. This promise, enshrined in the Basic Law (the operation of which will, Hsu (1996:67) notes, "decide the fate of the Common Law system in Hong Kong after 30 June 1997"), gives to people in Hong Kong the "freedom to advocate and espouse any political philosophy", and the freedom

⁷⁰ Hsu (1996:65) reports that "An overwhelming majority of the Chinese population believe that the Common Law judicial system should be retained in Hong Kong after 30 June 1997".

of speech which, in itself includes not only the expression of ideas, those which may be received favourably or otherwise, but also their distribution via "leaflets or through participation in demonstrations and processions" (Jayawickrama 1993:46-47)).

However, following the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing in June 1989, the Chinese stated that agitation for political change or for political philosophies other than what is practised in China will not be tolerated. Nor will subversive activities (the supportive actions taken by Hong Kong people during the Tiananmen Square drama were labelled subversive by Beijing). As Jayawickrama (1993:47) stresses, subversion, a "fundamental principle of contemporary Chinese socialist law", is a concept which is totally alien to Hong Kong's current legal system, and he warns that the introduction of this principle into the law of Hong Kong after 1997 will mean that political rights and the freedom of speech that inhabitants currently enjoy will be strictly curtailed after this date⁷¹. The clause regarding anti-subversion was inserted - for the first time - in the final draft of the Basic Law which was published in April 1990. This action underlines a statement included in the Joint Declaration (Article 39) which, although promising that the freedoms and rights that Hong Kong people currently enjoy will continue after the reunification, also states that these rights and freedoms will not be curtailed "*unless as prescribed by law*" (emphasis in the original) (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:65). This means that the new Hong Kong Legislature which, it is argued, will be anxious to please Beijing, can restrict the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong citizens⁷².

⁷¹ Although there has been ongoing dialogue between the Chinese and the Swiss about human rights, and although the Chinese have drafted a proposal on human rights which was adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union as the basis for a resolution, Beijing is frequently criticised by international human rights groups. Beijing has, over the years, developed an "arsenal of ripostes ranging from charging interference in its internal affairs to saying that 'Asian values' meant that human rights were not universally applicable" ("World economic order" 1996:10), statements which only serve to underline its particular understanding of human rights.

With regard to Hong Kong, although China did send officials to a United Nations hearing in Geneva which scrutinised Hong Kong's human rights record, China has commented that, as it is not a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (treaties which, currently, apply to Hong Kong), it is not obliged to abide by the provisions therein, nor report to the United Nations on Hong Kong's human rights record in the future.

⁷² Unlike the western understanding of rights and freedoms as being inherent within the individual and worthy of protection by the law, the Chinese Marxist-Leninist informed understanding is that they are collective and are granted by the state (by the Communist Party). The Communist Party, seen as the agent of the people, has the "responsibility to safeguard the fruits of the revolution which overthrew the old class system by constantly fighting off reactionary ideas and forces" (Loh 1996:90). Thus, in the communist political system in which the law (the interpretation of which hinges upon party policy) is seen as an instrument of the state, rights in the interest of the collective, are subject to restriction by the law. As Loh (1996:91) also points out, also, the leaders of China may well, on their part, be concerned that the "Hong Kong way of life, if unrestrained, will encourage mainland citizens to demand more civil and political rights for themselves in the not-too-distant future".

The British government, partly in response to criticism from the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, and partly in order to quell the concern regarding the protection of civil liberties and human rights which was arising not only because of the events at Tiananmen Square, but also because (as discussed above) of the publication of the Basic Law⁷³, announced that it was considering a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong. Enacted in June 1991 (with twenty-three articles annexed from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the Bill of Rights, not entrenched in Hong Kong constitutional law, remains merely an "ordinance enacted by the Legislative Council" (Hsu 1992:113). Not only has the enactment of the Bill of Rights been criticised by certain groups within the territory, but China (via the Preliminary Working Committee) has indicated its intention to "modify the Bill of Rights on the grounds that it allegedly contravenes the Basic Law" and to reintroduce the six ordinances that the government in Hong Kong recently deleted from the statutes in order to deal with "subversive and riotous challenges" (Yahuda 1996:80). One of the groups voicing opposition to the Bill of Rights was the Heung Yee Kuk, a "wholly male voice" representing the "wealthy landowning elite" (Jones 1995:172) which argued against sexual equality in order to maintain male-line inheritance in the New Territories as stated in traditional Chinese law (see Chapter Two, p. 27). Insisting that allowing women to have an "equal voice and/or to inherit New Territories land" would bring about the destruction of village life, the Heung Yee Kuk argued for a continuance of the situation wherein women of the New Territories could be "evicted from homes and land (in which they had made a lifetime's investment) by sons, cousins, or grandsons" (Jones 1995:172).

It is interesting to note that Hsu (1996:67) argues that, although the British and Chinese insist that the Joint Declaration is an international treaty⁷⁴, the constitution of China (like that of Britain) "does not give "any self-executing" authority to international agreement". Furthermore, because it is stated in the Joint Declaration that the Basic Law of Hong Kong shall be executed in accordance with the constitution of China, the government in Beijing as the sovereign power has wide discretionary powers in the enactment of the Basic Law in Hong Kong. Beijing has insisted from the beginning that the drafting of the Basic Law has been a matter only for China as the sovereign power, and Hsu (1996:67) claims that if Britain were to raise the matter of breaches in the Joint Declaration internationally after 30 June 1997,

⁷³ Bearing a strong resemblance to the Chinese Constitution (and ignoring the fact that Hong Kong is not a "socialist state marching under strict regimentation towards the ideological goal of communism" (Jayawickrama 1993:54), Chapter III of the Basic Law delineates the rights and duties of a citizen of Hong Kong.

⁷⁴ It has been registered as such with the United Nations.

China would merely state that the Joint Declaration was not an international agreement and was, because state consent is needed for international law to have any force within a sovereign state⁷⁵, therefore not a matter for discussion internationally.

There has been much concern voiced in Hong Kong regarding rights and freedoms, and newspaper articles have added to this concern. For example, attention has been called to the paucity of laws in regard to press freedom in China by the calls from a leading Chinese dissident that the national legislature pass laws to guarantee press freedom and to "break the Government's monopoly on news" (Lam 1996b August 1:10). The confidence of Hong Kong people has also been eroded by comments from China about the need for self-discipline by the press and by claims that the New China News Agency (NCCA) keeps files on journalists and has placed them into three categories⁷⁶. Another incident which worried people in Hong Kong was the closing down of a Giordano store in Beijing by China after the owner of the chain criticised Deng Xiaoping in his magazine 'Next'.

There have also been articles that have focused the attention of Hong Kong people on religious freedom. There has been a substantial religious revival taking place within China over the past fifteen years ("Human Rights" 1996:8) about which the government is demonstrating increasing concern. Not only have Buddhist priests in Tibet suffered harsh punishment and jail terms, but members of Christian underground churches or 'house' churches, have been repeatedly harassed, detained or fined by the police. In the countryside too, Christian cults have been targeted and, ironically, it is also reported that a Chinese police circular stated that such groups "may be too strong to eradicate" (Kwan 1996 August 29:8).

Concern about corruption

As reunification nears, people in Hong Kong are voicing their fears that corruption may again become a serious problem in Hong Kong. To understand why Hong Kong people voice this concern, it is necessary to present an historical perspective.

⁷⁵ Clark (1989:156), points out that the significance of the Chinese notion of sovereignty (defined as a "nation's inherent supreme power of control and which is not limited by nor can it be interfered with by other nations"), means that sovereignty for the Chinese is a primary political reality and, as such, is "elevated over the maintenance of Hong Kong's stability and prosperity".

⁷⁶ Those over whom China has control, fence-sitters, and those who speak freely and must be intimidated into toeing the line (Sciutto 1997:131).

Although, from the beginning, a military garrison was stationed in Hong Kong to "protect the interests of British traders", establishing law and order in Hong Kong was not easy given the nature of its early inhabitants, "pirates, vagabonds, down-and-out seamen, gamblers, thugs, whores and unscrupulous merchants" (Scott 1989:43). Not only were the first policemen of poor health and dubious character (soldiers unfit for ordinary duty), but, because police salaries were very low, there was a great temptation to supplement them.

Because there was inadequate policing in Hong Kong and because the colonial administration chose not to see its own shortcomings, corruption became a persistent feature in government and other spheres of Hong Kong (Scott 1989:42). As early as 1858, corruption in the civil service was investigated but no effective measures against it were introduced. Following an increase in police pay and the appointment of a cadet officer as head of the police force in the 1870s the ability of the police to "maintain law and order" slowly improved (Scott 1989:44) but the problem of corruption in the police force continued. During the 1960s and early 1970s, however, there was a "sharp rise in public disquiet" (Patrikeef 1989:69) about the problem. The Godber affair of 1973 brought things to a head and MacLehose initiated a commission of inquiry. The findings of this inquiry prompted the setting up (in 1974) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The operations of the ICAC did curb the excesses and it was thought in the 1980s that corruption, as DeGolyer (1995:3) notes, "if not wholly rooted out, [was] at least sufficiently pruned back and disorganized that it could not threaten good government and business in Hong Kong". In 1993 and 1994, however, there was a big increase in corruption cases in both the public and private sectors with even the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club being involved (Lo 1994:25). Not only, by 1995, was there a "140% increase in arrests of police officers accused of corruption over those in 1994" (DeGolyer 1995:3), but corruption reappeared in syndicate form in Hong Kong⁷⁷. That corruption in Hong Kong has worsened during the run-up to 1997 is referred to by Lo (1996:166) as "the 'fast-buck' psychology of HongKongers": many people are anxious to make as much money as possible before 1997 and have resorted to illegal means to do so.

Responding to the challenges, the ICAC has taken further steps to curb corruption and, while such moves can be seen as progressive, internal managerial, legal and political problems in the ICAC have also surfaced. The revelation of such problems has led to a quest to "strike a balance between preserving the ICAC's power

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This fulfilled Lethbridge's (1985) prediction that corruption would increase in the run up to reunification in 1997.

on one hand and enhancing its political accountability on the other" (Lo 1994:36). Lo (1994:37) further argues that, although such a balance may be struck in Hong Kong, if the Beijing government and mainland officials do not support Hong Kong in this endeavour, fear about corruption after 1997 can only increase.

Not only do people in Hong Kong worry that an increase in corruption will impact negatively on their day-to-day life, but that it will also have a detrimental impact on the fabric of society. DeGolyer (1995:3) stresses that, although the casual relationship is problematic, corruption in a society can contribute not only to social unrest (as seen in Hong Kong in 1966 and 1967) but also to the collapse of government. Should corruption undermine the future SAR government there is a concern that Hong Kong people may again take to the streets in protest. If they do the Beijing government which in June 1989 killed many of its own citizens "over what was in large part a protest against government corruption" (DeGolyer 1995:3) may well invoke Chinese martial law and use the People's Liberation Army to deal with any dissent in Hong Kong (see Chapter Three, p. 58).

A factor which also raises concern in Hong Kong today is the "rampant corruption in China" (Lo 1994:25) and the fact that many Hong Kong companies which have invested in China, or have moved their operations there, view corruption as a "necessary instrument" for the facilitation of business dealings with mainland authorities.

The concern of Hong Kong people is further reinforced by what they hear from relatives, friends or contacts in China, or from what they read in newspaper reports⁷⁸. During the last few months various such articles have appeared:⁷⁹ a report that a six year old boy drowned because men sitting nearby playing cards, and other people passing by, would not go to his rescue unless they were paid to do so ("Boy drowns" 1996:10); a report that twelve men drowned after their fishing boat floundered because officials, rejecting pleas from other cadres, refused to send help unless colleagues of the fishermen paid cash to do so (So 1996:9); and a report that corrupt cadres are selling their passports to organised crime gangs who use them to smuggle people out of China (Schloss 1996 August 21:6). Also augmenting the notion that the people of China are corrupt, a report from China claimed that thirty-four thousand cases had

⁷⁸ De Golyer (1995:5) reports 88% of people polled indicated that they had noticed, or had been told by contacts in China, about corrupt practices.

⁷⁹ While it could be argued that such events might also happen in Hong Kong I would suggest that, because Hong Kong has a lively and generally free press which covers a wide spectrum of view points, both political and social, it is likely that some newspaper, at least, would have reported them. However, after eight years in Hong Kong, I have yet to see similar reports about Hong Kong people.

been dealt with as part of the Chinese government's 'Strike Hard' anti-corruption campaign during the first six months of 1997 ("Anti-corruption drive" 1996:9).

A 1994 survey revealed that 57% of the respondents considered corruption to be a common problem in Hong Kong and 73% thought that corruption "would gradually worsen with the approach of 1997" (Lo, T-w. 1995:87). Later research by DeGolyer (1995:14) reports that although a similar percentage of men and women (51% and 49%) answered 'yes' to the question "Do you think that corruption problems like those in China will appear in Hong Kong after 1997", women were less likely to answer 'no' (men 63%, women 37%).

Concern about the economy of Hong Kong

The story of Hong Kong's economic development is a fascinating one and can rightly be called an economic miracle. As Chan (1990:325) points out, Hong Kong's metamorphosis from an entrepot into a "modern commercial and industrial society as well as a highly sophisticated financial centre" was brought about by its only natural resource, its people, and the expertise and capital that people (including entrepreneurs, experienced workers and managers, and professionals) fleeing China had brought with them.

The indigenous population, estimated to be around four thousand (Tsai 1994:10) before the arrival of the British, had increased to approximately 1.6 million in 1939 ("Britain and Hong Kong" 1992:14). Although during the Japanese occupation (World War II) the population had dropped to around 600,000, most returned after the end of the war bringing the population to 1.8 million by 1947. In 1951 the population had again risen to just over 2 million following the arrival of many mainland Chinese seeking to escape the Chinese civil war. In May 1953 the Hong Kong government introduced measures which finally brought about a decrease in the flow of immigrants who flocked over the border and joined the many others living in squatter huts on the hillsides of the territory. By the end of 1956, the population stood at 2.5 million (Young 1994:131) and, five years later (1961), at just over 3.1 million (Chan 1989:14). The current population figure is approximately 6.4 million. While, in recent decades, the number of people leaving Hong Kong has risen, the number of expatriates in Hong Kong has increased as the territory has developed its reputation as a business and financial centre. Today, while 98% of the population is Chinese, Hong Kong is

also home to over four hundred thousand nationals from other countries, 130,000 of whom are Philippina women who work as maids (Siu 1996:336).

Economic development after World War II

After achieving their long-held mission, the establishment of a firm footing on Chinese soil, the British set about developing their acquisition. Although, undoubtedly, development did occur in Hong Kong in the first part of the twentieth century, it is the development that occurred following the end of World War II that I wish to focus on. During the early stages of the Pacific War Britain briefly considered returning the territory of Hong Kong to China (Tang 1994:109). However, the possibility was not raised again after 1945. Spurred to action by the news of Japan's imminent acceptance of defeat, the British government surmounted the difficulties that China and America raised in regard to the resumption of British sovereignty over Hong Kong and made arrangements for British representatives to accept Japan's surrender on 16 September 1945 (Chan 1990:322)⁸⁰.

Economic recovery started to quicken following the end of World War II, and when it became obvious (despite earlier fears) that China was not going to demand the immediate return of the territory, British commercial interests (although abandoning any thought of reviving their pre-war role in China) dictated the adoption of a pragmatic China policy by the British government. The attempt to "develop a working relationship with the Chinese Communist authorities and to steer Hong Kong away from trouble with China" (Tang 1994:121) was, however, in the era of cold war politics, thwarted by Britain's alliance with America⁸¹.

⁸⁰ Britain's successful return to the territory did not, however, solve the long-standing question as to what to do with Hong Kong in the future and this question was to remain a sensitive issue in the Sino-British relationship. When the Nationalist regime in China collapsed at the end of 1948 and the Communists seized power, it seemed even more unlikely that Britain would be permitted to retain Hong Kong after June 1997 (Tang 1994:114). The new Chinese government in Beijing, however, instructed its agents in Hong Kong not to actively challenge the British administration in Hong Kong. With reference to the words of Mao Zedong, the agents were informed that "Hong Kong was an issue created by the legacy of international relations history, and that the timing and conditions for its liberation would be determined by future history" (Tang 1994:117).

⁸¹ Hardly had economic recovery started to quicken following the end of World War II when, drawn into confrontation with the Communist bloc, Britain was forced to play a "full part in the cold war" (Tang 1994:118). This was a difficult role to play in the light of British policies towards Hong Kong, shaped as they were not only by political and strategic considerations, but by commercial considerations also (Tang 1994:118). In endeavouring to ensure the viability of immediate British commercial interests following the return of an economically recovered Britain to the China market in the future, Britain faced a dilemma: it both needed China's continued acquiescence for a continued British presence in Hong Kong, yet also had to make a firm stand in order to protect British interests in Hong Kong (Tang 1994:119-120).

Although Beijing did not attempt to destabilise Hong Kong because of Britain's stance in regard to the cold war or because of its involvement in the Korean War, Hong Kong's role as an entrepot suffered severely when the United Nations initiated the trade embargo against China in 1951. Not only was the embargo extremely serious for the colony economically, but it came at a time when a massive influx of refugees was pouring in from China. Hong Kong, nevertheless, although not in control of its own historical destiny, and although no longer able to act as an intermediary for goods passing in and out of China, transformed itself from a trading centre into a manufacturing centre, gearing its endeavours, as Patrikeeff (1989:38) notes, to "more independent forms of trade and new markets".

Industrial and commercial development

The establishment of Hong Kong as the first of what would later be called the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) was brought about not only because of the pressure of market forces, but because of abundant labour, which also provided a ready local market, low wages, low taxes, low inflation, inexpensive food from China plus an environment of minimal government intervention. Encouraged by such factors, as Cheng (1977:39) points out, capital from foreign investors flowed into Hong Kong. The response was "an expansion of industrial output, largely export-orientated" (Kelly 1987:57) which, in turn, fuelled Hong Kong's economic growth⁸².

First seeking to make enough money just to live and, when their livelihood was secure, to better their financial positions, people in Hong Kong after World War II found work in the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector which was, initially, centred on textiles, clothing, footwear and plastics. Most of the small-scale light manufacturing businesses were, in the 1950s, as Segal (1993:24) notes, "small family

Matters were not helped by the dispute over the ownership of aircraft between the CNAC (China National Aviation Corporation) and CATC (Central Air Transport Corporation), a dispute which, involving the Communist, Nationalist, and United States governments, demonstrated that Britain was ready to ignore the interests of Hong Kong if these interests conflicted with others the British government decided were of a higher priority.

Nor were they helped by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, a war which saw British and Chinese troops facing each other across the battlefield (Tang 1994:121-122). Britain, its hopes for diplomatic ties dashed, and labelled an 'enemy of China', was concerned that Hong Kong was liable to attack by the huge numbers of Chinese Communist soldiers that British intelligence sources estimated were in nearby Guangdong. It was only in 1954 following the Geneva Conference that China (the Communists by this time had firmly established their political control) and Britain established formal diplomatic relations.

⁸² Initially Hong Kong exported to poorer countries but gradually, with the aid of organisations specifically set up to prepare the territory for incorporation into the global market economy, more developed countries (including Europe and the United States) became the focus for exports.

enterprises using self-generated capital" which often employed relatives. Although exploitation in these small (often unregistered) sweat shops was rife, the people of Hong Kong worked hard and, during the years 1950-1960, the proportion of Hong Kong's domestic product being exported jumped from fifteen percent to seventy percent (Shipp 1995:14).

To protect the workers in Hong Kong's burgeoning industrial sector, MacLehose's government introduced a plethora of regulatory and protective labour legislation in the years 1967 to 1976 pertaining to employment conditions, benefits and protection, health and safety, industrial conflict and disputes, and enactments in regard to the organisation of trade unions and industrial relations (Ng 1994:482).

As well as underlining the government's intention to foster social justice and an equitable share of resources, these regulations were also designed to negate Hong Kong's long-standing reputation as a centre of 'sweat-shop' labour in order to present a better position in regard to the export of textiles and negotiations about tariffs. Further, they were also formulated to show overseas critics that there was a political will in Hong Kong to bring local conditions into line with labour standards in other countries at the same stage of economic development and with International Labour Conventions. Although such legislation did improve the lot of many Hong Kong workers, these measures were, argues Ng (1994:459), more pragmatic and ideological than a move to formulate a complete labour policy.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, electrical and electronic equipment, toys, clocks and watches, and jewellery became the important industrial products and exports of these items have increased with time. Interestingly, Welsh (1993:492) suggests that the "most visible sign that Hong Kong was ceasing to be a British Colony and becoming a Chinese society" stemmed from "spontaneous commercial change" rather than from the actions of the government. The Shanghainese who had fled their home in 1949 had, by the mid-1970s, begun to emerge as the leading figures in the business world in Hong Kong. Different from earlier Chinese business men in that they did not seek to forge close links with the colonial government, they went directly to the heads of both the Chinese and British governments. Furthermore, a "sharp rise in productivity in 1976" (Patrikeeff 1989:70) heralded the rise of a burgeoning middle-class which, young and western-educated, did not accept, as earlier generations perhaps had, colonial beliefs and sentiments. The "new breed of local entrepreneur" (Patrikeeff 1989:79) which sprang from this new class, successfully linked "Western banking and Chinese industry".

Paralleling the expansion of Chinese businesses in Hong Kong came a significant increase in investment in Hong Kong from China as mainland companies, encouraged by Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms which began in 1978, "took advantage of the opportunities offered by capitalism" (Welsh 1993:494). By the early 1990s, Welsh (1993:495) claims, mainland companies accounted for "some 10 per cent of all capital investment in Hong Kong".

Other changes, too, occurred. As Ng (1995:197) points out, Hong Kong has been going through a process of structural transformation since the mid-1980s, and a major change in the face of industry in Hong Kong has been the shift to China of manufacturing businesses founded in Hong Kong. This move, plus other factors such as internationalisation, has created a "labour aristocracy"⁵³ while, at the same time, brought about a de-skilling and marginalisation of other workers (Ng 1995:197). While, in 1971 secondary industry employed forty-seven percent of the workforce, this had declined to twenty-eight percent in 1991.

The effect on Hong Kong of the move of industry to China and consequent marginalisation of workers has been rising unemployment (although still low by western standards). Tang (1995:60), with reference to the de-industrialisation that has occurred in Hong Kong claims that "women workers have been among the hardest-hit" and find it difficult to get further re-employment because of a lack of skills and age-discrimination. This has occurred at a time when the government, previously reluctant to allow imported labour into Hong Kong, has allowed several categories of workers in to take up employment: expatriate professional and technical experts, managers and administrators (19,202 in 1993); domestic helpers (130,000, mainly from the Philippines); skilled craftsmen, technicians and experienced operatives; Chinese mainland professionals; and construction workers for the new airport and other infrastructure projects (in 1994, 27,000 people) (Ng 1995:201-202).

Wong (1994:535) argues that, although the role of manufactured goods in the economy will shrink because of the relocations and changes, the "development of supporting industries", the "upgrading of traditional industries" and the "exploration of new industries" will be important directions for Hong Kong in the decades ahead (Wong 1994:553).

⁵³ Well educated and highly qualified white-collar workers whose flexible skills are compatible with the current labour market.

Hong Kong as a financial centre

Complementing the development of Hong Kong as a manufacturing and commercial base in the years following World War II, was the development of Hong Kong as a financial centre. Between the years 1935 and 1972 (except for the Japanese occupation) Hong Kong was on "the sterling exchange standard" (Jao 1994:560). Various problems, however, led to a move by the banking sector to allow the Hong Kong dollar to float. This meant, in principle, that Hong Kong could follow an "independent monetary policy by fixing the growth of money supply" (Jao 1994:562). However, because of various factors⁸⁴, the exercise of this policy was impossible (Jao 1994:562).

When first floated, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated, but from March 1977 onwards, it started to depreciate, a situation aggravated in 1982 by the uncertainty regarding Hong Kong's future following an announcement from the Chinese that they intended resuming sovereignty over the territory. The negotiations between China and Britain which followed this announcement resulted in a free fall of the Hong Kong dollar. On 24 September 1982, known afterwards as 'Black Saturday', the Hong Kong dollar plunged to its lowest ever level against the US dollar precipitating a crisis in confidence. Moreover, because land and property prices collapsed in the confidence crisis, the government experienced a fiscal deficit for three successive years.

The Hong Kong government, faced with the fact that the whole financial system could collapse at any moment, implemented certain strategies to stabilise the currency, including pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the American dollar, measures which not only brought Hong Kong back from the brink of financial collapse but allowed Hong Kong to withstand other economic and non-economic shocks later, for example, the 1989 Beijing military handling of the Tiananmen Square situation, (Jao 1994:564).

As is obvious from the above discussion, the development of Hong Kong as a major industrial, commercial and financial centre has taken place within a remarkably short time span and a large majority of the population has witnessed this development.

⁸⁴

Several factors led to the exercise of this policy being prevented when the currency was weak (as it was in March 1977): the institutional structure of Hong Kong was without a "well-developed government securities market to conduct open market operations"; a central bank to "fix and announce a rediscount rate; requirements that commercial banks and other depository organisations must keep reserves with the Exchange Fund"; an interest cartel operated amongst licensed banks; and the note-issuing mechanism was altered in "such a way as to undermine the previous *ex ante* forex constraint on the currency" (Jao 1994:562).

Those that have not witnessed this at first hand have heard about the hardships that their parents and grandparents endured as the development of Hong Kong took place. Understandably, Hong Kong people wish to see a continuance in the momentum of economic development and they are concerned when they hear that the communist elite favour a consolidation, rather than a continuance, of the fast pace of economic reform introduced by Deng Xiaoping in China. Such consolidation, they fear, will slow down the economy in Hong Kong and bring hardship to people in the territory.

While many businessmen (particularly those in the Provisional Legislature) confidently state that the prosperity of Hong Kong will continue, others do not share this outlook. Hong Kong's richest man, Li Ka-Shing, has moved his assets out of the territory. Not only are around fifty percent of the companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange domiciled overseas, but many big firms too have moved their offices out of Hong Kong. For example, Texas Instruments has moved from Hong Kong to Taipei, and Merill Lynch and J.P. Morgan have moved to Singapore (Reyes 1996 July 19:33-37). Not only does the movement of businesses out of the territory worry Hong Kong people but concern is expressed that if the rule of law in Hong Kong is not upheld, the 'level playing field' upon which Hong Kong's economic vitality hinges will become a thing of the past. If this happens, not only will more businesses leave Hong Kong but investors will look elsewhere to place their money. Other concerns centre on the future status of the Hong Kong dollar⁸⁵, how pensions will be paid out⁸⁶, and whether the property market will eventually collapse⁸⁷ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:129-135).

If the economy does suffer people in Hong Kong will lose their jobs. It has been Hong Kong women, in particular, who have suffered as manufacturing companies have moved their production bases to neighbouring Guangdong. Without skills relevant to today's marketplace, they have been unable to find new jobs. Women, often bringing in a salary necessary to the maintenance of their families, are concerned that it will be they who will lose their jobs before men if a worsening economy dictates

⁸⁵ As discussed earlier, the Hong Kong dollar has had a volatile history. Also, the renminbi is not fully convertible and is not backed by hard assets. People in Hong Kong wonder if having two currencies will mean an unstable monetary system (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:129). They also fear that any move (or rumour of a move) to annex Hong Kong's foreign reserves might give China an excuse to link the Hong Kong dollar to the renminbi, a move which would "de facto unify the two currencies" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:130).

⁸⁶ Hong Kong people remember how the people of Shanghai lost their pensions when the communists seized that city in 1948. Concerned that they will be given state bonds and not money after 1997, a significant number of Hong Kong people have resigned or retired prior to the reunification (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:133).

⁸⁷ The ownership of apartments accounts for much personal wealth in Hong Kong (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:133-135).

a further cutback in jobs. They are also concerned that their children will not be able to find jobs when their education is finished.

Concern about the education system and the provision of social welfare

Before discussing the concerns that Hong Kong people and, in particular, Hong Kong women, have regarding possible changes to the education system of Hong Kong and the provision of social welfare, it would be useful to first look at the living conditions of early Hong Kong which, because they were virtually ignored by the government, led to social unrest in the early 1960s and riots in 1966 and 1967. These riots forced the government to acknowledge that it had a role to play in the provision of particular services for the population of Hong Kong.

Living conditions in early Hong Kong

Although early Hong Kong was a most unhealthy place (soon after its annexation an outbreak of fever, possibly malaria, caused many deaths), poor sanitation exacerbated the situation. It was only after thousands succumbed to the bubonic plague in the years 1894 to 1901 that things improved and, even then, as Scott (1989:50) points out, the government, in order not to invite censure from merchants and property owners, was reluctant to spend the money that would be necessary to clear substandard housing and to put in proper sewerage and drainage systems (Scott 1989:50). A second factor hindering government action was a fear that the imposition of western standards of sanitation on the Chinese population would change the Chinese way of life and engender resentment (Scott 1989:54). Another factor was that permission from the British government was needed before public works could be undertaken.

The Hong Kong government relied (again in order to save money and escape the censure of merchants) on missionaries to provide social services. However, because the missionaries were unable to address all the demands made upon them, an organisation called the Tung Wah was eventually established to raise money for a hospital for the Chinese. Not only serving a medical function, the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals had important political significance in that the accepted leaders of the Tung Wah "became the accepted leaders of their community, gaining status and face through their positions on the hospital's board and through the size of their donations to its activities" (Scott 1989:51). In a society where, before, there had been no higher class

group which could act as a bridge between the Chinese masses and the British, this gap was now filled. Forging links with the government, it could broach the opinions and grievances of the Chinese elite to the colonial administrators.

The debate about sanitation, improved arrangements for clean water, and better houses, lasting as it did for decades, underlines the influence that the leaders of the Chinese community and, in particular, the merchants, had on the colonial government. Unable to implement effective measures unilaterally, the government allowed the situation to drift and deteriorate until explicit crises specified urgent action.

For example, the long ignored issue of the necessity for public housing was brought to the forefront of the collective government mind after a devastating fire, not the first, which swept through the squatter's quarters in Shek Kip Mei on Christmas night in 1953. The government, faced with the urgent needs of thousands of Chinese (53,000 lost their homes) being forced to sleep in the streets, was forced to abandon its former non-interventionist policy and to formulate a more positive response in regard to the housing needs of Hong Kong people. Establishing the Resettlement Department the government, undertaking efforts to control squatters, built resettlement estates of temporary housing and, following the clearing of the debris from the fire site, erected the first public housing blocks on the site of the Shek Kip Mei fire ("Foundation Ceremony" 1954:1), thus initiating a programme which continues today.

The 1966 and 1967 riots

Although a small measure of responsibility for the provision of particular services was accepted by the government, life for many people in Hong Kong continued to be difficult, even during the immediate post-war period, when many found work in the growing industrial sector. Huge numbers of people were forced by circumstances to live in squatter camps on the hillsides around Hong Kong and what welfare there was came primarily from traditional Chinese family connections, from local organisations such as the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, and from missionaries.

Such a non-interventionist approach reflected the philosophy of *laissez-faire* which typified the government and society of Hong Kong; the colonial government demonstrated little political interest in improving the lives of the common people. There was also an external socio-political factor operating; people flowed into Hong Kong in times of turmoil in China and, when things had settled, this flow was reversed.

It is hard to determine, as Chiu (1994:341) points out, whether the government considered it imprudent to invest in facilities for such a transient population or whether the transience provided the government with an excuse for not intervening.

By the mid-1960s, because of the increasing economic prosperity, living standards were rising. However, while most people no longer faced dire poverty, the period from 1967 to 1982, became, as Chow (1994:326) points out, "one of the turbulent periods in Hong Kong". With the Cultural Revolution taking place on the mainland fears were revived in Hong Kong that the unrest could damage Hong Kong itself. The riots that occurred in Hong Kong during May and December 1967 were "directly related to the unrest in China" (Segal 1993:26); bolstered by the Cultural Revolution, some pro-China people in Hong Kong demanded an end to British rule. Others in the territory, however, were less interested in exchanging the "benign colonialism of Britain for the harsher and more radical variant in China" (Segal 1993:26).

The other riots that took place in Hong Kong were not related to the unrest in China. Sparked by a small rise in the Star Ferry fares and, initially involving labour disputes, then demonstrations and violence on the streets, plus attempts to weaken police morale and the articulation of anti-European sentiments, these riots, although attributed to "locally organized hooliganism" by a public enquiry (Cottrell 1993:28), arose predominantly from a dissatisfaction with domestic conditions. DeGolyer (1995:3) suggests that the endemic corruption in Hong Kong also attributed, in part, to people's dissatisfaction (see Chapter 3, p. 65).

Although the government was aided by Beijing's obvious disinclination (at a time when the Chinese government was preoccupied with more serious matters in China) to offer decisive help to the 'leftists' who were endeavouring to intimidate the non-Communist citizens of Hong Kong, strong measures had to be taken to quell the disturbances. Not only did the riots force an appraisal of the Chinese migrant situation but, Kwan (1989:137) argues, they highlighted other facts: that Hong Kong was "no longer a simple society" but one with inherent "contradictions and conflicts"; and that the youth, in a society in which the family system was crumbling, were becoming more aggressive and less submissive to authority.

Illuminating the weaknesses of the system, the riots not only prompted the government to look at how it listened to, and communicated with, the public, but also focused attention on the fact that, although it had initiated a comprehensive housing

programme⁸⁸, it had not done enough to provide educational and social amenities (Bonavia 1985:34). What is more, the riots revealed that the reasons given for inaction on the part of the state were inadequate, that the new industrial society required a reform of government structure and function, that there was great resentment regarding the arrogance associated with the colonial civil service office, and that there was an urgent need for a "new political order and a new basis for legitimacy" (Scott 1989:81). The riots, Scott (1989:81) contends, were a "watershed in Hong Kong's political history" and spelt the "end of the unreformed colonial state". The riots also made obvious the nature of the relationship between Hong Kong and China, particularly Hong Kong's vulnerability to political influences in China, both favourable and otherwise⁸⁹.

The Four Pillars

Although the government was impelled to appreciate the various facts the riots had highlighted, it took the appointment of Lord MacLehose as Governor, a career diplomat rather than from the ranks of the Colonial Office, in November 1971, to add impetus to the good intentions of the government. MacLehose was the first diplomat with a socialist background sent to Hong Kong and, guided by notions of justice and equality, ideological concepts which were shaping British social welfare policy development at this time, he announced that public housing, social welfare services, medical services, and education should be thought of as the "four pillars in building a better society" (Chow 1994:328).

Housing

Although the 1966 and 1967 riots had added impetus to the government building

⁸⁸ A disastrous fire in Shek Kip Mei on Christmas Day Eve in 1953 resulted in 53,000 people losing their homes spurred the government into abandoning its former non-interventionist policy and to formulate a more positive response in regard to the housing needs of Hong Kong people. Establishing the Resettlement Department, the government, undertaking efforts to control the squatters, built resettlement estates of temporary housing and, following the clearing of the debris, erected the first public housing blocks on the site of the Shek Kip Mei fire ("Foundation Laid" 1954).

⁸⁹ While these disturbances caused particular problems in Hong Kong (the Hong Kong dollar, responding to the disturbances, dropped considerably and local brokers ceased trading on the stock market so as to circumvent panic selling, the price of property dropped sharply, and there were water shortages and food shortages), it was shown that internal disturbances could be contained, but only if China adopted a neutral or hesitant stance towards subversive elements (Bonavia 1985:37-46).

programme⁹⁰, the government (in 1973), realising that a "long term policy for public housing" (Ng 1981:70) was necessary, set up the Housing Authority and, initiating a ten year public housing programme (the New Town Programme), began constructing new estates complete with schools, shopping complexes and provision for welfare and community services. It also undertook the redevelopment of the older housing estates and introduced "subsidized owner-occupier housing" (Chiu 1994:343). Formulating new policies to meet the changing needs of a fast evolving society, the Hong Kong government continued to build new homes (the housing stock rose from 1.26 million to 1.84 million units in the years 1984 to 1994), and in recent years, has emphasised both home ownership and private sector participation in the provision of housing⁹¹. There remains however, a shortage of public housing in Hong Kong.

Social welfare

Recognising that the welfare provided by the traditional sources (the missionaries and the Tung Wah group) that Hong Kong people had been forced to rely upon was inadequate, and that "the development of social services would help to yield more economic returns" (Kwan 1989:144), the government introduced a "cash public assistance scheme to guarantee a basic subsistence living" (Kwan 1989:137) and established the social Welfare Planning Committee whose task it was to produce a new White Paper for Social Development (to replace the former piece-meal interventions). It also started to fund the voluntary agencies and non-government welfare organisations, most of whom, established in the two decades following the war, were subsidiaries of overseas bodies⁹². Covering areas such as social security, family welfare services, community services, rehabilitation services, services for offenders, services for young people and services for the elderly, social welfare spending has increased markedly since the early seventies, rising from HK\$50.6 million in 1971-72 (1984-85 Government Budget Report) to HK\$12.9 billion in 1995-6 (Leung 1995:362).

⁹⁰ By the end of 1970, "more than a million people were living in low-cost housing estates, and close to 50 percent of Hong Kong's total population was housed in government or government-subsidized dwellings" (Young 1994:132).

⁹¹ By the end of March 1994 half Hong Kong's population (approximately three million) were living in housing estates and, not only had the "overall living conditions in public housing" been improved, but the rents (although having risen to HK\$30 per sq.m. in 1994 from a 1984 figure of HK\$10 per sq.m.) people pay compared with their income level remains low (Fong 1995:297). Committed to continuing its role in housing, the government, in 1994, established the Housing Branch, the role of which is to formulate policies and strategies regarding the provision of both public and private housing, as well as co-ordinating the implementation of the housing policies and programmes of the government (Fong 1995:311).

⁹² While many of these agencies (now funded) continued to run old services, others began to run new social service initiatives, as 'agents' of the government or, adopting what Chow (1994:326) refers to as "confrontational approaches", evolved into 'pressure groups' and developed new projects.

Although, unlike other governments of welfare countries in the West, the Hong Kong government has not sought ways to reduce welfare spending in recent years, some social commentators claim that government intervention in welfare is, compared to other countries, "still extremely limited" (Leung 1995:378). The government of Hong Kong, however, supported by the conservative business community, has continually stated that, despite the "enormous economic achievements over a period of more than two decades" (Wong, C-k. 1995:205), Hong Kong will not be allowed to develop into a welfare state such as those in the West.

Public health and medical services

It was not only in the areas of housing and social service provision that the Hong Kong government inaugurated new initiatives in the 1970s. Public health and medical services were rapidly developed. New government hospitals (charging only minimal fees) were built, free public health clinics opened and medical manpower increased, drug-programme centres opened, and a huge immunisation programme was initiated, the results of which were a greatly reduced incidence of tuberculosis, smallpox, cholera, diphtheria and typhoid (Chan 1989:29). These initiatives, as did the better nutrition accorded by rising prosperity, the move to public housing which incorporated piped water, washing and toilet facilities and a modern system of rubbish disposal, greatly improved the health standards of the population.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of important studies were conducted in order to reform the health care system and, in 1990, the Hospital Authority was established, the role of which was to run the government and government-subsidised hospitals "on the basis of devolved management and common terms and conditions for staff of both types of hospitals" (Cheung 1994:354). Today the health of Hong Kong people compares very favourably with the health of people in the rest of the developed world, and China, even though only 4 percent of GDP is spent on health. Hong Kong people have an average life expectancy only exceeded by people in Japan (81 for women, 75 for men) and has a low infant mortality rate (4.7 per 1000 births in 1993) (Lee and Cheung 1995:61).

Education

Education, the fourth 'pillar' of society, also saw reforms. Free and compulsory education for all children between six and fourteen years of age was introduced at the primary level in 1971 and then extended to junior secondary level in 1978, a move

which meant the building of new institutions and the training of more teachers. As a result, by 1982, just over 60 percent of the population was completing secondary education (Fan 1995:72). Supporting the expansion of existing tertiary facilities and new universities, built to accommodate the increased numbers of tertiary students - 56,000 in 1996 (Tracey 1997 April 5:11), was an increase in funding from the government, from over HK\$1.7 billion in 1972-73 to over HK\$25 billion 1993-94 (Fan 1995:84).

It is accepted in Hong Kong today that the government will play a role in the provision of housing, health services and social welfare, and there are fears expressed that, because China does not provide the same level of care for its people, spending on health services and on the provision of social welfare in Hong Kong after the reunification of social welfare may drop or, at the least, be kept at the current level. Westwood, Mehrain and Cheung (1995:93) note that there are already "gender differences in the provision and effects of health and welfare practices and policies in the territory" and that over eighty percent of people receiving single parent family allowances are women. If funding is curtailed, or cut, the present gender differences will exacerbate the disadvantages women currently experience and those supporting families on single parent family allowances will face even bigger struggles raising their families.

One factor affecting health in Hong Kong as it has become more populated and industrialised is pollution, including air, water, waste and noise pollution. The ever increasing levels of pollution⁹³ have become a matter of great concern to people living in the territory and while the government has greatly increased spending on environmental protection programmes (Lee and Cheung 1995:101-109), there is concern that after the handover, protection of the environment will not be given the same consideration as it is now.

In regard to possible changes in the education system, concern is expressed regarding the teaching of socialist ideology to children and in respect to China's understanding of Chinese history being taught in the schools. Beijing has suggested that history books will have to be rewritten. The Tiananmen Square Massacre, for example, will be redefined as a minor event (Tiananmen Square Incident). Such an

⁹³ Smith (1996 December 27:1) points out that, as the concentration of air pollutants soar (the pollutants which the Environmental Protection Department believes are responsible for respiratory disease and deaths have risen fourteen percent over the last five years), not only were more people facing death from respiratory diseases, but "Thousands more people were [being] forced into hospital".

understanding, some people feel, presents a distorted view, ignoring the black patches of Chinese history. Further, as a vehicle for perpetuating existing gendered structures, ideologies and values, education influenced by Chinese discourses by which women in China experience less equality than women in Hong Kong, may well, some feel, impact adversely on women in the territory. It is felt also, should things go badly wrong in Hong Kong economically, resources will again dictate that the education of sons is of more importance than the education of daughters.

Concern about language

Language, by which people not only communicate with others, but express both their individuality and identity, is another area of some concern in Hong Kong.

Cantonese⁹⁴ has been used by most of the people in Hong Kong but, because the territory was a British colony, the official language was English. Although, beginning in the early 1950s, some government letters were written in Chinese (in response to those written in the same language), there were increased calls during this decade and the next, (initially from left-wing students and later from community organisations and Legislative and Urban Councillors (Scott 1989:111), that Cantonese also become an official language of Hong Kong. In 1974, although it would continue to be reluctant to use Cantonese, the government, via the Official Languages Act, agreed to these demands.

Paralleling the government reluctance to use Chinese on a day-to-day basis for correspondence, government officials felt that students should undertake some of their schooling in English in order to ensure a reasonable functional standard of English (given Hong Kong's position as an international financial and trading centre). By 1978, however, there were calls from pressure groups for an even greater role for Cantonese in schools (Shipp 1995:15)⁹⁵.

⁹⁴ Cantonese is one of many often mutually incomprehensible dialects used in the various regions. In written Chinese, however, standard characters are used for all dialects.

⁹⁵ Despite the insistence of English language usage in most secondary schools (there is a small percentage of totally Chinese-medium schools), what is, officially, an English-medium education system is, in reality, "a system in which much of the reading and some of the writing done by students is accomplished in English, but much spoken communication occurs in Cantonese or mixed Cantonese-English" (Pennington and Yue 1993:2). This mix of languages is also seen in the wider societal context. For most social contexts Cantonese (the mother tongue of the majority of the people) is used, while English is used for business and official purposes. As Luke and Richards (1982:55) point out, although Hong Kong is considered a bilingual society, it is better conceived of as a society in which English is used as an "auxiliary language", that is, a language used in rather restricted domains.

In recent years, not only have increasing numbers of people started to learn Mandarin (Putonghua), or sought to improve their proficiency in this language, but there has been considerable discussion regarding the standard of both English and Chinese in Hong Kong. Recent reports about increasing numbers of students "flunking English and Chinese language tests, with the most dramatic failures in Chinese" (Kwok 1996b December 19:4) have served to further highlight the problem of language use and language teaching in the territory.

While some are keen to learn Putonghua and eager to see the continuance of English as an official language, other people are concerned that the learning of Putonghua will become mandatory after the handover⁹⁶. Women with children, in particular, are concerned that their children, already overburdened by homework, will have to spend even more time at their studies. Further, some people have stated that they either do not want to learn Putonghua, or that they have not time to do so.

QUESTIONS ARISING

It is clear, from the above discussion, that Hong Kong people are concerned about many aspects of their lives and do feel that the reunification may bring changes that will not enhance their lives. While many concerns are expressed, some of particular importance to women, the critical question that arises is whether China can be trusted to carry out the promises it has made via the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Clearly, the people of Hong Kong are concerned that the promises will not be honoured and that, consequently, their way of life will change.

Because they were dismayed that events were going the way they were, disturbed at the interference of Beijing in the political development of Hong Kong, and concerned that their way of life might change after the reunification, large numbers of people emigrated. Skeldon (1994b:30-31) notes that emigration from Hong Kong, around twenty thousand per year between the years 1980-1986, soared to a peak of sixty-two thousand in 1990. It must be noted, however, that although many left, many have returned after securing their foreign passports, their insurance for the future⁹⁷.

⁹⁶ Mao Zedong, understanding the "importance of language as a unifying principle" promoted Mandarin by "renaming it putonghua which means ordinary speech" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1996:127).

⁹⁷ Although the government estimates that approximately twelve percent of those who emigrated between 1982 and 1992 returned, "no reliable quantitative estimates are possible" Skeldon (1994b:39) notes, because some (while going through the immigration process at the point of entry) say that they are returning migrants, and others return on their new foreign passports. What is

Although, as Skeldon (1994a) and Emmons (1991) argue, a simplistic analysis about the reasons for emigrating should not be adopted, in that non-political factors do have some influence, Skeldon (1994b:31-32) does point out that those emigrating include "some of the best educated, well trained, and highly skilled of Hong Kong's population" and that, further, while most emigrants are not extremely wealthy, "many have considerable wealth". Lau, Kuan and Wan (1991:179), too, point out that, of the people stating their intention to leave, "there were striking differences among socio-economic groups": those who were younger, had higher education levels, and higher occupation and income status had a higher emigration propensity. Research by Ng and Cheng (1994) and Salaff and Wong (1994) supports these claims.

However, while many people have emigrated and although the Hong Kong government expects a surge in emigration (up to fifty-three thousand has been suggested as a possible figure) during the months leading up to the reunification (Schloss 1996, September 12:1), the large majority remain. As the reunification edges closer, these people are constantly considering what their lives might be like after the handover.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Having discussed the historical factors, the development of Hong Kong, the moves China has made in regard to Hong Kong following the collapse of the 'through train' arrangements, and the fears that people in Hong Kong express in regard to their future, one of the questions that arises in my mind is how the position of women in Hong Kong, already disadvantaged in relation to men via the values, discourses and practices prevalent in Hong Kong society, will be further influenced after the inclusion of Hong Kong into a system in which women are even more disadvantaged.

However, because I feel it is difficult, at this point, to predict what influence socialist ideology will have upon the position of women in Hong Kong given the fact that China has promised Hong Kong 'autonomy' for the next fifty years⁹⁸, and especially given the fact that China has adopted capitalist economic practices and is changing rapidly, I will address the second question of interest to me, what changes do women in Hong Kong think will occur in the political, economic and social realms of

interesting, also, as Lau et al. (1991:180) point out, is that the majority of people in Hong Kong are sympathetic to those who emigrated because they were afraid of the return of Hong Kong to China (only 21% indicated disapproval).

⁹⁸

It is also difficult to predict what form socialist ideology might take in the future in China.

Hong Kong after the reunification. It is changes in these sectors which could have an impact, and perhaps immediate impact, upon women's lives.

My concern with the feelings of the women of Hong Kong stems not only from the fact that women in the territory are already socially and economically disadvantaged in relation to men (and thus may well suffer disproportionately should things go badly wrong after reunification), but, as mentioned in Chapter 1, from the fact that women's voices are noticeably absent in accounts of historical change; positioned as the 'other', women have not been accorded the right to participate in the making of sociological knowledge. What Hong Kong Chinese women thought of the transformation of Hong Kong into a British colony was not heard. While there are valuable and interesting accounts of Hong Kong Chinese women's lives in industrialising Hong Kong⁹⁹, women's views about the changes taking place in their lives are rarely heard. It is important, therefore, to record the voice of Hong Kong Chinese women in regard to the reunification of Hong Kong with China.

To this end, I pose these four key questions: first, do women in Hong Kong think reunification with China will bring changes to Hong Kong? Second, if so, in which sectors of society do women think change will occur? Third, do they view these changes positively or negatively? Fourth, do different categories of women think differently?

In the next chapter, the methodology used to obtain responses to these questions is presented.

⁹⁹

See, for example, J.W. Salaff's 1981 book, "Working daughters of Hong Kong".

CHAPTER FOUR METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I discuss, in turn, the aims and objective of the study, respondents, research design, questionnaire and procedures.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The aims of this research are, first, to gain an understanding about the views Hong Kong Chinese women hold in regard to the political, economic and social changes which may occur when Hong Kong reunifies with China, and their evaluations of those changes, and secondly, to gain some insight as to whether different categories of women in Hong Kong hold different views. The objective of the study is to give Hong Kong women a voice; although the voice of Hong Kong women has been included in a number of opinion polls with men, the particular views of Hong Kong women, as has happened in other former colonies which have undergone the decolonisation process, have barely been heard.

RESPONDENTS

The subjects were, initially, women I encountered in my everyday life: women who clean the complex in which I live, women from restaurants and shops I use, academic and non-academic staff colleagues of my husband, women from the travel agency I use, and women from the complex in which I live. I told these women about my research and asked them if they would like to participate. Very few refused. These women then told their families and friends about my research and my pool of respondents widened. The venue of my appointments with the women varied considerably. Sometimes they came to my home, on several occasions I went to theirs, sometimes I met them at a restaurant, a park or some other convenient place.

While some respondents phoned me themselves to make an appointment, others were introduced (either in person or on the phone) by their friends. Some gave their phone numbers to their friend (initial respondent) requesting that I ring them. Some who could not speak adequate English made appointments through those (usually an initial respondent) who could. How representative the respondents were

compared with women in general in Hong Kong will be discussed at the beginning of Chapter Five.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data collection consisted of two phases. In phase 1, a questionnaire was constructed and administered to all 164 subjects. (See Appendix C for the English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire.) A Chinese interpreter and translator was available to assist as required. In phase 2, unstructured interviews were undertaken with a small number of subjects. These subjects had participated in phase 1.

A survey method was chosen for phase 1 rather than other research methods for various reasons. Firstly, in order to be able to give both a descriptive and explanatory analysis, I wanted to try to establish a broad outline of women's responses to reunification against which to set the particular case studies. Secondly, as one of the few techniques through which people's attitudes and beliefs can be learned, surveys, as Smith (1991:237) points out, have certain advantages. As a direct method of research which makes possible the collection of sizeable amounts of data at a reasonably low cost in a short period of time and allows the characteristics of a large population to be described, survey research does not incorporate the disadvantages of indirect methods. For instance, the use of methods such as Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Tests and Blacky Pictures to assess attitudes and beliefs not only invades people's privacy, but often show "deceptive, deprecatory or exploitive attitudes towards participants".

A third important strength of surveys is their "data structuredness" (Smith 1991:237). Noting that the validity and reliability of data produced by indirect tests for attitudes and beliefs is "typically discouragingly low", Smith (1991:237) claims that the standardised data produced by structured research methods such as surveys is "amenable to statistical analysis". As Babbie (1989:255) notes, standardised questions have an inherent strength in respect to measurement in general in that the researcher must ask all the subjects exactly the same questions and, further, must "impute the same intent to all respondents giving a particular response".

There are, of course, disadvantages to survey methods. Although reliability, because all subjects are presented with a standardised stimulus, may be a strength of

surveys, validity, because of the artificial nature of the survey format, can be weak. Because also the requirement for standardisation means that the answer categories given may not adequately represent the views of any particular women, some women may be precluded from giving an appropriate answer. It was for this reason I included open-ended questions in the questionnaire.

Phase 2, the unstructured interviews, was undertaken because the flexibility offered by such interviews allows fruitful lines of inquiry to be pursued during the interview itself. However, it is important to be aware that, without a list of questions to follow, certain problems present themselves. In order that the interviewer, rather than the respondent, structure the interview, it is necessary for the interviewer to be aware of the problem of inclusion (how much they feel included in, or excluded from the interview), control (how 'in control' or 'out of control' they feel during the interview) and affection (what their feelings are towards the respondent) (Banaka 1971:21-30). As Smith (1991:277) points out, unless these problems are dealt with, often in the form of a question "Do I have the right to ask respondents about their private lives or personal opinions?", the interviewer's uneasiness (which reveals moral or ethical issues) is made obvious to the respondent via verbal and nonverbal cues. Because, naturally, such cues can affect the respondent's willingness to participate in the interview, interviewers must endeavour to become familiar with their own emotional selves.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire consisted of three sections: Section A, which focused on demographic information, Section B, with open-ended questions and Section C, which employed a Likert-type scale to elicit the views of the respondents. The content of the questions and statements is discussed immediately below.

Section A

The questions in Section A asked about age, education, identity, housing, length of residence in Hong Kong, passports, whether they had the right to land as an immigrant (in another country or countries), whether they had a paid job outside the home and, if they did, what this job was and what the monthly salary was. I also asked whether they were married or had a partner and, if so, which country their husbands or partners

were born in, what passport(s) he held, and whether or not he currently had a paid job. Questions were also formulated in order to elicit information about the total household income, whether the women had children, whether the women were members of a political party, whether they identified with a particular politician, whether they were members of religious or spiritual groups and, if they were, which groups. I also asked whether or not they had plans to live overseas. Creative responses were sought before asking women to indicate their agreement or disagreement with particular statements in order to avoid planting particular notions in the minds of respondents.

Question 8c sought information about the monthly salary earned by the women who were working. Because only the data from the full census of 1991 (a full census is only done every ten years in Hong Kong) were available, the categories of salary were decided upon using information from Table 21 "Working Population by Monthly Income from Main Employment" (Hong Kong 1991 Population Census 1991a:55). I used the categories employed in this table and added the average annual rate of inflation for each year, to arrive at realistic salary levels. In recent years most employees have received annual wage increases which have approximated the annual rate of inflation.

Question 10 sought information about the total household income. I used the same approach as for Question 8c using Table 25 "Domestic Households by Monthly Household Income" (Hong Kong 1991a Population Census 1991:60).

For Question 15 (*Do you plan to leave Hong Kong to live overseas in the future?*) I rejected the simple options of 'yes' and 'no' because I sought a fuller picture of women's feelings guiding the choices they might make.

Section B

Section B included six open-ended questions to elicit the views of Hong Kong women in their own words. I wanted the women to tell me how Hong Kong might change after reunification in a general sense and, if they thought there would be changes, how these changes in the larger society would bring about change in their personal lives. In order to obtain a fuller picture of their feelings, I invited the women to share both their worries and their optimistic thoughts about the reunification. I also asked each woman what she would like to see happen in Hong Kong and what she envisaged her life

might be like in ten years time. The last question invited the women to share anything else they wished to about their thoughts on the reunification.

Section C

Section C consisted of a series of statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree). Formulated to reveal the attitudinal profile (tendency towards negative or positive feelings) of the women towards the imminent reunification of Hong Kong and China, Section C included statements pertaining to three different areas: politics, law and order, civil and human rights (which included statements such as *It will be possible to successfully run the "one country, two systems" idea outlined in the Joint Declaration*), business and economy (*The prosperity of Hong Kong will continue after Hong Kong and China unite*) and women, family and children (*It would upset me if Hong Kong teachers had to incorporate socialist ideology into their lessons after 1997*). The statements reflected comments made by Hong Kong politicians, political commentators, and media reporters from across the political spectrum, socially-aware academics writing on the issue of Hong Kong and reunification, and women in Hong Kong I had spoken to. I was careful to solicit the views of women of all ages and from all sectors of society, including women from very low socio-economic groups. Sometimes the views were expressed directly to me in English, sometimes through a friend acting as interpreter.

There was a total of 30 statements, 16 of which were worded positively (1,3,4,7,8,9,11,12,13,15,16,17,22,25,27,29) to reveal negative attitudes towards reunification and 14 negatively (2,5,6,10,14,18,19,20,23,24,26,28,30) to reveal positive attitudes towards reunification. For scoring purposes, the positively worded statements were counted as 1 (Strongly agree) as 1, 2 as 2, 3 as 3, 4 as 4, and 5 (Strongly Disagree) as 5. For the negatively worded statements this scoring was reversed: 1 became 5, 2 became 4, 3 became 3, 4 became 2, and 5 became 1. A composite index of each respondent's view was derived by summing the score on the five scales across the thirty questions. The higher the score on the index, the more negative towards the reunification the respondent was assumed to be.

In this study I have chosen to use a Likert scale to measure attitude (Likert 1932). The Likert method is based on the assumption that an overall score based on responses to the many items reflecting a particular variable under consideration provides a reasonable good measure of the variable (Babbie 1989:405). As Rubin

(1983:91) points out, this type of scale, "the most common form of attitudinal scale used today", seems "more logical to the people filling out the scale" (than, say, a Thurstone scale) and is "based on an underlying psychological model of how the human mind operates".

Fishbein and Ajzen (1975:108) note that "There is abundant evidence that standard attitude scales are highly reliable, yielding comparable results when administered on different occasions". Shaw and Wright (1967) and Robinson and Shaver (1969) have also reported very high reliabilities for a large variety of scales, including Likert scales. In addition, the convergent validity of Likert scales with other scales of attitude is well established (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975:109).

In using a Likert scale, I am aware that absolute measures are difficult to obtain, especially when gauging public opinion on social issues (Rubin 1983:102). However, such a measure is a useful tool when used in conjunction with qualitative data arising from interviews.

When the questionnaire, and the information sheet and consent form were completed they were translated into the Chinese language (Appendix C). To ensure a consistency in translation, the translation of the Chinese version was double checked by a translation expert at a language department of a local university.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

I will now discuss the procedures for the research: the Pilot Study, administering the questionnaire, and the unstructured interviews.

The pilot study for the questionnaire

When a pilot study of the questionnaire (in this study Section C contained 40 statements) was undertaken with 10 women certain problems became apparent. For example, Question 8, *Do you currently have a paid job outside the home?*, translated into Chinese as *Do you currently have a paid job outside your home country?* (The wording was changed in the Chinese version for the questionnaire used in the actual research.) Four women found two of the statements in Section C ambiguous in both the English and Chinese versions (these were deleted in the final questionnaire), and

two statements were deleted because all but two woman in the pilot study opted for the same answer. Six statements used in the pilot study were discarded because they were similar to six other statements on the same topic which discriminated more between the top and bottom quantile of respondents. Such item analysis is, as Smith stresses, useful for reliability and validity purposes (Smith 1991:226).

Two other problems became apparent when three women could not understand Statements 1 and 13 of Section C in the English version. When told the statement in Chinese (or, in one case, when she read the Chinese version) all three understood clearly. This made me aware that, although I might assume from an initial conversation with a woman, that her English was such that she would understand the questionnaire, I could be incorrect.

The second problem stems from the first. One woman, after telling me that she did not understand Statements 1 and 13, and after I had endeavoured to explain the statements to her, was told the Chinese version of the statements by my interpreter. Although she then understood the statements she clearly resented being told the statements in the Chinese language. This alerted me to the fact that a degree of sensitivity was needed because of the importance the Chinese accord to the concept of 'face'. Goffman (1955:213) defined the term 'face' as the "positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact". For Goffman, social interaction is a performance in which individuals choose specific 'lines', statements people make to express themselves, to encourage an image of themselves they believe is appropriate to the situation they find themselves in, so that an agreeable assessment from others is forthcoming.

Although, as Bond and Hwang (1986:245), point out, the concept is not specific to Chinese people, because Chinese society is hierarchically structured and an individual's status within it is somewhat fixed, the concept of 'face' takes on a particular importance. A loss of 'face' brings with it not only feelings of embarrassment and shame but, in Chinese society with its separation of family (as the basic social unit) from 'outsiders', can reflect badly on the family (and, indeed, ancestors) as well. On the other hand, a gaining of 'face', enhances the status of the family. With regard to my research it was important that women did not 'lose' face by an insensitive suggestion on my part that they must respond to questions in the Chinese language rather than in English; such a suggestion from me could be interpreted that I thought that their proficiency in English inadequate.

Therefore, when discussing the research with prospective respondents, I explained that there were two versions of the questionnaire (English and Chinese) and, when indicating that they could themselves choose which language they would like to be interviewed in, I used words (and made sure my interpreter used the equivalent wording in Chinese) which indicated that I had no interest in making a judgement about their level of English. When interviewing them in English, I had both versions clearly within their view so they could, if they wished, look at the Chinese version to aid their clarification.

When I made the decision that women who wished to participate, but did not have the time for an interview, could fill in the questionnaire themselves, the women were told that there were two versions of the questionnaire, that they could answer in whichever language they felt they wanted to and that they could, if they chose, take both the English and Chinese versions. Further, in order to make my Chinese participants feel at ease when I met them, I observed the societal niceties by asking them about their families and indulging in other social 'chit chat' before embarking on the 'business' side of our meeting.

I acknowledge also that 'face' could have influenced the answers that some women gave when answering the questionnaire. However, because women were obviously willing and, in many cases, rang me to inform me they wished to be interviewed, my feeling is that the women who participated did so because they wished their personal views to be heard; what was said to me was what women genuinely believed.

Administering the questionnaire

In the beginning my intention had been to interview (with my interpreter if needed) sixty Chinese Hong Kong women personally. Many of the women I approached, however, although very eager to participate, found it very difficult, because of their very busy lives, to set a time for an appointment. After a number had asked me if they could take the questionnaire, fill it in and return it, I decided to give out twenty questionnaire sheets, instructing the women to contact me if they encountered any problems.

Within a week, at the most, all had been returned¹⁰⁰. All were fully filled in. Apart from one woman who contacted me with a query about one question, none of the others had encountered any problems in completing the questionnaires. While I acknowledge that this method does not assume absolute comprehension of every question by every woman, it is reasonable to assume that the women did easily comprehend the questions because they were invited to contact me if there were problems and only one did, and because not only were English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire available but they had been carefully vetted by a translation expert to ensure that misunderstandings due to lack of language proficiency would be minimised.

I had anticipated that women filling in the questionnaire themselves would provide cursory answers for Section B which consisted of open-ended questions; many, however, wrote a great deal and some filled two sides of A4 paper. At this point (I had interviewed twenty-two women and twenty had filled in the questionnaire themselves) I took a random sample of ten from each group (interviewed and self-administered) counted both the number of words, and concepts addressed, in Section B. Minimal differences were demonstrated in that both groups wrote a similar number of words in reply, a comparable number (8/9) in each group mentioned both the same major areas as possible sites of change, and similar number (6/7) mentioned other possible areas in which change might occur¹⁰¹.

In view of this, I decided to continue allowing women who wished to participate, but who could not meet for an appointment (I did endeavour, subtly, to coax women to participate in interviews, but many genuinely could not find the time), to take a questionnaire form and fill it in themselves. By the time I had completed the sixty interviews, I had received back one hundred and four self-filled questionnaires. Four women who sought questionnaires did not complete them, and handed them back citing lack of time as the reason they had been unable to even start the process of filling them in. These four were excluded from the survey.

While I acknowledge that the two different methods of research (interviews and self-filled questionnaires) that were used in this study could have affected the

¹⁰⁰ Because I arranged to meet each woman to both personally hand over, and retrieve, the questionnaire, the problem of non-response (as happens with postal questionnaires) was avoided. These arrangements also allowed the women to ask any questions that occurred to them and to offer further comments.

¹⁰¹ Because everyone in Hong Kong is immersed in the discourse surrounding the reunification via the media and everyday conversation, the women could reply when asked in what areas they thought change might occur, whether they felt any changes in the wider society would bring about change in their own lives, and whether they viewed possible changes negatively or positively. They could also give an opinion on all the issues mentioned in Section C of the questionnaire.

response of participants, I argue that because minimal differences were found in the number of words written and the number of concepts addressed, and because I endeavoured to reduce any differences that might occur because of the different research methods (by talking with each of the women before and after they had filled in the Chinese or English versions of the questionnaire and encouraging questions from them if they encountered difficulties), the final outcome of this particular research cannot be unduly biased by the methods used. I must stress also that the very eager desire shown by Hong Kong Chinese women to participate in this research was a mitigating factor in my decision to allow all women who wished to participate. I do appreciate though that if other methods of research had been used (qualitative, ethnographic or participant/observer methods for example), the findings may well have been different in detail, but I believe that the broad picture would have remained much the same.

Because I appreciate Fink and Kosecoff's (1985:19) concerns that the filling in of questionnaires by respondents precludes the chance to ask for explanations and to seek information regarding the reactions of respondents, the women in my study who filled in the questionnaires themselves were each asked, when handing back the questionnaire, if there was anything they wished to comment on, or add. They were also made aware, via both the information sheet and consent form, that they could, at any time, examine and amend their answers, add further comments, and indicate any part of the form they did not wish to be used. Five women added further comments, all within a few days of being interviewed or filling in the questionnaire.

Jones (1993:15) notes her concern that speaking on behalf of women from another ethnic group can invalidate their authority (see Chapter 1), and Easterday, Papademas, Schorr and Valentine (1982:62) address the problems that a female researcher can face in her research, arguing (with reference to Golde 1970 and Powdermaker 1966) that the differences of status between interviewer and interviewee can impede rapport. So too can differences in class. Apart from the fact that it is necessary that the middle-class researcher remain aware, as Lorde (1984) stresses, of the differences that do exist between women of different races, classes and ages, and take these differences into account in analyses made in regard to the lives of others, it can be difficult, Gans (1982:57) argues, for middle-class researchers to access information from working or lower-class people. Advising the researcher to be honest about their intentions Gans (1982:57) claims, however, that if working-class people do decide to be interviewed they usually enjoy the experience because it provides "variety in their lives".

I appreciate these concerns and endeavoured to be sensitive to these issues during my research, by reassuring the women of my interest and respect and by being honest about my intentions. During my interaction with the women participating in the study, I encountered no hesitancy, or wariness on the part of the respondents, only an eagerness both to speak and have their views as women recorded. A number of women expressed both surprise and pleasure that my study concerned only the views of women. Some others, not only pleased to be interviewed after I had explained the purpose of my research, were clearly happy to come to my home if only to see, as one woman said, "how the foreigner lives".

Fowler and Mangione (1990:18-19), claiming that "*Exploratory research* usually is not done best using standardized interviews" (emphasis in the original), stress that a standardised interview yields answers only to the particular questions asked. While I recognise that such research can mean that some areas and nuances would be neglected, I was guided somewhat in my choice of what standardized statements to use (Section C) by the comments made in the newspapers, by comments women themselves had made to me over the last few years and by academics writing on the Hong Kong situation. To further ensure that areas of importance to women in Hong Kong were not neglected, I included open-ended questions in the questionnaire (Section B).

I acknowledge that certain factors can affect participant response: the appearance and demeanour of an interviewer, unfamiliarity with the questionnaire, failure to follow the exact wording of the questions, a failure to interpret correctly, a failure to record the responses exactly, and non-neutral probing (Babbie 1989:245-248). Further (and with regard to the unstructured interviews), it would be naive, as Dey (1993:15) argues, to "discount the role played by the researcher as participant observer or unstructured interviewer in eliciting and shaping the data they obtain". If, for example, I had indicated to the respondents that I believed that China would fully honour its promises to Hong Kong and that minimal change would be experienced in the Hong Kong way of life, the women would have regarded me as naive and would have been reluctant to share their misgivings with me. While the results may well still have shown some negativity, I do not believe I would have tapped the depth of opinion that the women harboured.

With such strictures in mind, I endeavoured to present the same to each interviewee, to be fully familiar with the questionnaire, to present to them a neutral attitude in regard to the reunification, to follow the exact wording of the questions, to

attempt to interpret correctly what the respondents were saying (or writing), to record responses exactly and to use only neutral probing when it was necessary. Concerning the unstructured interviews I sought to adopt a similar demeanour with each respondent. With my interpreter (she has a degree in translation and interpretation) I discussed the issues which could affect response.

Unstructured interviews

Cognisant that sociologists and other researchers have, for some time, been aware of the "limitations of single method studies" (Burgess 1982:163), and aware that feminists, in particular, have also proffered critical comments in regard to quantitative methodology (Stanley and Wise 1990), I have, even though this was an exploratory study, used both quantitative and qualitative research methods: questionnaires and self-administered surveys in order to discover if different categories of women held different opinions, and unstructured interviews in order to further explore the issues which arose from the open-ended questions which comprised Section B of the questionnaire.

The unstructured in-depth interviews, undertaken following the completion of the initial interviews and self-administered questionnaires, involved volunteers from the women who had participated in the first part of this study. From the volunteers I randomly chose one woman from each of the four total household income brackets (under HK\$15,000, HK\$15,000-29,999, HK\$30,000-49,999, and over HK\$50,000, the categories into which the wider range of responses was collapsed for analysis of the data). I selected total household income brackets rather than other groupings of the women (age, born or not born in Hong Kong, for example) because, at this stage of the research, it was evident that economic factors did have some influence on the views that women held.

However, given the size of the sample (4), the unstructured interviews were not undertaken in order to give a representative description of the views held by the women of the four economic groups, but rather to further illustrate the range of views held by women in Hong Kong and to allow some understanding as to why they held the views they did.

Babbie (1989:270) comments that an "unstructured interview is an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of

inquiry but not a specific set of questions that must be asked in particular words and in a particular order". My objective for this part of the study was, firstly, to allow the women to tell me in more detail about the areas of concern to them that were raised in the first part of the study so as to broaden my understanding of how they felt, secondly, to explore why women held the views they did and, thirdly, to ask the women how they understood the status of women in Hong Kong society.

In order to deepen my understanding about the issues of concern to women, I first asked them a general question about how they felt about the reunification and invited them to tell me about their feelings. To facilitate my exploration as to why they held these views, I asked them general questions regarding their contacts with people from China, whether or not they had actually been to China themselves, and asked them if they read any newspapers. I asked a general question first so as not to allow the factors mentioned in my more specific questions to colour their general response.

Regarding my interest as to their feelings about the status of women in Hong Kong, I asked them to explain to me what they thought that status was. Apart from the questions through which I sought particular information, any subsequent questions that I asked arose from the comments made by the women during the course of the interview. During these interviews I encouraged the women to do most of the talking and avoided questions which would elicit a brief yes or no answer. The results of the unstructured interviews are reported in Chapter Six.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Section A

For the purposes of analysis some response categories in some questions of Section A were collapsed. The responses of question 1 regarding age were collapsed into three categories: under 30 years of age, between 30 and 39, over 40 years of age. This was done to allow reasonable cell sizes for each category. Questions 6 and 7 were also collapsed together: having a passport or the right to land as an immigrant in a foreign country meant that women had the possibility of leaving Hong Kong.

Question 8b (*What kind of work do you do?*) invited the women to tell me what occupation they were employed in. For the purposes of analysis I categorised the different jobs stated by the women into occupational groups (Table 4.1) guided by

Table C6 "Working Population by Occupation and Sex" (Hong Kong 1991 Population Census 1991b:112) of the Hong Kong 1991 Population Census Main Tables.

Table 4.1: Occupational Groups

Group	Occupational Groups
1	managers and administrators
2	professionals (including accountants, nurses, teachers and lecturers, social workers, and secretaries whose duties included administrative tasks)
3	associate professionals (nurse aides, social work assistants, and tutors)
4	clerks, receptionists, typists and customer service workers
5	service workers and shop sales workers
6	'elementary' occupations (cleaning ladies and sports centre attendants)
7	women not working outside the home

Source: Hong Kong 1991 Population Census

For question 8c regarding personal monthly income, the categories were collapsed into five brackets: under HK\$7,000, between HK\$7,000 and HK\$9,999, between HK\$10,000 and HK\$14,999, between HK\$15,000 and HK\$29,999, and over HK\$30,000. (Should the figures seem relatively high, it may be noted that per capita income per inhabitant in Hong Kong in 1996 was US\$23,000, while the figure for people in New Zealand was US\$16,215 ("The Bottom Line" 1996:56). Similarly for question 10 regarding total monthly family income, the categories were collapsed, again into five income brackets: under HK\$15,000, between HK\$15,000 and HK\$29,999, between HK\$30,000 and HK\$49,999, over HK\$50,000, and a bracket for respondents whose total household income was not known to them.

The response categories in question 15, *Do you plan to leave Hong Kong to live overseas in the future?* were also collapsed for the purposes of an initial analysis (and then looked at individually to give a broader picture as to women's feelings about the possibility of leaving). The first, third and sixth options were grouped together (as indicating the women wanted to leave), four and five were grouped together, and two was left as an individual category.

Section B

Each question in this section was analysed separately. For question 1 (*In a general sense, how will Hong Kong change after reunification?*) it was first noted how many women thought there would be changes, how many said there would be no changes, and how many said they had no idea whether or not Hong Kong would change after reunification. The areas in which the women thought Hong Kong would change were then listed and the number of women listing each recorded. For question 2 (*On a personal level, do you have any particular fears or worries as to how your life may change because of changes in the larger society?*) the number of women responding "Yes", "No" and "Don't know", was noted, and the personal fears or worries (and how many women acknowledged each) listed. The number of responses ("Yes", "No", "Don't know") were counted for question 3 (*Are you optimistic about any aspect(s) of the reunification?*), as were the number of yes/no answers (this ambivalence will be discussed later). A content analysis was used in looking at the responses to questions 2 and 3 at together in order to calculate how many women held positive views of the reunification, how many negative views and how many neutral/ambivalent views.

The responses to question 4 (*What would you like to see happen in Hong Kong?*) were listed and the number of women opting for each response recorded. For question 5 (*What will your life be like in ten years' time?*) the numbers opting for "Can't predict", "The same", "Better", "Worse" and, "Haven't thought about it", were noted as were predicted future events. Question 6 invited women to share anything else they wanted to about their thoughts on reunification. I hoped that the comments written in response to this question would more fully elucidate the earlier questions in this section.

Section C

The data from Section C (and Section A) were analysed using crosstabulation (SPSS 1988) for the purposes of comparing groups of respondents. The scores ranged from 60 to 131 (out of a possible 30 to 150) and the respondents were divided into three groups on the basis of the scores - 60 to 90 (Positive view towards reunification), 91 to 104 (Neutral view towards reunification), and 105 to 131 (Negative view towards reunification). The positive, neutral and negative categories split almost neatly into three groups, the positive group consisting of 54 women, the neutral group of 55 women and the negative group of 55 women. It may be noted that, although the

groups are designated positive, neutral and negative, this does not mean that the positive group was strongly positive. In fact, it was relatively positive only when compared with the other two groups.

Further, because some of the statements in Section C pertained to responses women made to some questions in Section B, these statements were looked at separately and the numbers of women agreeing or disagreeing tallied. (As mentioned above (p. 86), the creative response was sought first in order to avoid contamination of response.)

CHAPTER FIVE

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

Although both men and women in Hong Kong are very concerned about the impact of reunification on their lives, this research was undertaken to explore what worries Hong Kong women in particular had and to find out whether certain categories of women were more worried than others. The four key questions I was concerned with were: whether women in Hong Kong felt that reunification with China would bring changes to Hong Kong; in which sectors of society women felt that change would occur; how they evaluated these changes; and whether different categories of women felt differently. Women were also encouraged to explain why their particular worries were of concern and what factors had generated such unease. In this chapter the results of the questionnaire which sought an understanding of the worries of women are presented. First I discuss the characteristics of the subjects; next I focus on the views held by Hong Kong women.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUBJECTS

The questions in Section A of the questionnaire revealed the characteristics of the 164 Hong Kong Chinese women who participated in this study. These characteristics will be reported in Tables 5.1 to 5.12 as life spent in Hong Kong, age, self identification, religious group, level of education, type of occupation, personal income, marital status, total family income, type of accommodation, possibility of leaving, and wish to leave Hong Kong. A chronological ordering sequence was adopted because such a sequence follows the lifespan of the women.

Although I did not set out to devise a representative sample, it would be pertinent here to discuss how representative, or not, my sample was of women in Hong Kong as a whole. Although I had representatives of a wide range of women in Hong Kong, a certain type of woman tended to be over-represented: relatively highly educated, young and single women from a professional background earning a comparatively high income.

To illustrate, whereas 18% of women are in the 30-39 age group in Hong Kong, in my sample 37% were in this category. With regard to the level of education,

in my study 1% had not attended school, 8% had attended primary school, 62% had attended secondary school and 22% had completed university, whereas, in Hong Kong generally 19% had not attended school (as discussed in Chapter Two, p.26, compulsory and free education was only introduced in 1978 in Hong Kong), 24% had attended primary school, 48% had attended secondary school and 4% had completed university (Hong Kong 1991 Population Census).

With respect to marital status, 47% of my respondents had never married and 49% were married; for Hong Kong women overall the figures are 29% and 60% respectively (Westwood, Mehra and Cheung 1995:74). My sample, too, is biased towards women in higher status jobs: compared to women in general in Hong Kong, 16% of my respondents were in professional occupations (3% for Hong Kong women overall), 38% were clerks (29% overall) and only 8% were in elementary occupations (22% overall).

Women in the study also tended to come from higher personal income groups: while in Hong Kong 50% of women earn under HK\$7,000 per month, 9% earn between HK\$15,000 and HK\$29,000, and 2.5% earn over HK\$30,000, only 24% of my respondents earned under HK\$7,000, 19% earned between HK\$15,000 and HK\$29,999, and 10% over HK\$30,000. My respondents also tended to come from families whose total income was higher: in Hong Kong 50% of families have a total income of less than HK\$15,000 and, for 7%, the total income is more than HK\$50,000. For the women in my study, 22% came from families whose total income was under HK\$15,000 and 17% came from families whose total income was more than HK\$50,000 (Hong Kong 1991b Population Census).

Table 5.1 shows the proportion of respondents who had always lived in Hong Kong and who had lived outside.

Table 5.1: Have you always lived in Hong Kong?

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	143	87
No	21	13
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Of the 21 women who had resided outside Hong Kong, eight had emigrated to Hong Kong from China. The length of time spent in China varied considerably - from

one year to 54 years. A number had lived in other countries, typically Australia, the United States, Canada and Britain.

Table 5.2 indicates that the women ranged in age between 18 and 69. Attempts to draw in more women aged fifty and over were not successful. Several women in their sixties, after either reading, or having the information sheet read to them (two, like a number of women this age, could not read¹⁰²), declined to be interviewed. One said: *I know nothing about the politics of 1997*. Yet another told me she would have to have her son present *to tell me what to say*.

Table 5.2: Age range

Age	Frequency	Percentage
< 20	7	4
20-29	59	36
30-39	61	37
40-49	26	16
50-59	9	6
> 60	2	1
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Subjects were asked whether they regarded themselves as Hong Konger first and as Chinese second, Chinese first and Hong Kongers second, or in some other way (Table 5.3). Of the ten who identified themselves differently, there was an array of responses: two women felt both identifications were appropriate to them: one said that *I am ethnically a Chinese but, because I was born in Hong Kong I am a Hong Kong person*, the other wrote *Between Hong Kong and Chinese - no first or second*.

Two women reported that their identification depended on the context. One said that *If I am overseas, I am Chinese, but if I am among Chinese, then I am a Hong Konger*, the second wrote that how she identified herself depended on what sort of question people asked her; one woman holding an Australian passport (she had lived in Australia for three years) replied that she did not have a clear identity. *I'm not sure if I'm Australian or Chinese - I have an attachment to Chinese culture and an*

¹⁰² As discussed in Chapter Two, compulsory and free education was only introduced in 1971 at primary level and 1978 at secondary level in Hong Kong and, in China, a son's education remains a higher priority than the education of a daughter.

attachment to the place where I have the other passport, but I do not like the Chinese government or their political arrangements. A poll undertaken by the Hong Kong Transition Project at the Baptist University in Hong Kong claims that, in February 1997, two thirds of people surveyed identified themselves as either Hong Kong Chinese or Hong Konger (Crowell and Cheung 1997:30).

Table 5.3: Self identification

Identification	Frequency	Percentage
Hong Konger	116	71
Chinese	38	23
Other	10	6
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.4: Do you belong to a religious or spiritual group?

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	52	32
No	112	68
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.4 shows those belonging to a religious group or spiritual group. In the present study 68% indicated they had no religious or spiritual beliefs; of the 43% who answered positively, 5% said they were Buddhists and 27% said they were Christians. In Hui's (1991:104) study of religion in Hong Kong the figures were 58%, 7% and 12% respectively. Although only 12% of the general population claimed to be Christian the percentage was much higher in my sample (27%). This may be because, as previously noted, the sample tended to have relatively more highly educated respondents. As Hui (1991:106) points out, "About 30% of those with a postgraduate (Master's) degree were Roman Catholics, and an equal number were Protestants. These two religions appeal to the more educated more than the other religions".

The level of education reached is noted in Table 5.5. Twenty-four of the women do not work outside the home whereas 140 do. Of the latter, 138 work full time, two work part-time (one as a household assistant and the other as a tutor).

Table 5.5: Level of education

Education	Frequency	Percentages
None	1	1
Primary	13	8
Secondary	103	62
Technical	11	7
University	36	22
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.6: Type of occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Manager/ Administration	4	2
Professional	26	16
Associate professional	8	5
Clerk/Recep- tionist/Typist	62	38
Service/ Shop/Sales	26	16
Elementary	14	8
No paid job	24	15
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.6 shows those working grouped as administrators/managers; professionals (this group included accountants, nurses, teachers, lecturers, social workers and trained secretaries with administrative duties); associate-professionals (nurse aides, social work assistants, tutors); clerks (of various sorts), receptionists and typists; shop assistants and sales staff; and elementary occupations (sports centre attendants or cleaning women). Of the women not working outside the home, six were students and three described themselves as women temporarily out of work and looking for employment. In the words of one: *I left my job because I didn't like it but I am going for interviews for another at the moment.*

Table 5.7: Personal monthly income

Income in HK\$	Frequency	Percentage
< 2000	20	12
2000-2999	2	1
3000-3999	2	1
4000-4999	4	3
5000-5999	4	3
6000-6999	6	4
7000-7999	10	6
8000-8999	18	10
9000-9999	12	7
10000-14999	40	24
15000-19999	17	10
20000-24999	11	7
25000-29999	3	2
30000-39999	9	6
> 40000	6	4
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

As can be expected, the monthly salary of those working outside the home varied considerably, from under HK2,000 to over HK\$40,000 (Table 5.7).

Table 5.8: Marital status

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
Never married	77	47
Separated	2	1
Divorced	4	2
Widowed	1	1
Now married	80	49
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.8 indicates marital status. As mentioned above, overall, 29% of women in Hong Kong have never married (in my sample 47% have never married) and

60% were married (in my sample 49% were married). Interestingly, there has been a trend to later marriage - the average age for marriage for women in Hong Kong is 28 years (up from 23 years in 1971). This is the highest in the Asian region (Berfield 1997 June 27:34).

Table 5.9: Total family monthly income

Income in HK\$	Frequency	Percentage
< 4000	1	1
4000-4999	0	0
5000-5999	1	1
6000-6999	2	1
7000-7999	1	1
8000-8999	3	2
9000-9999	1	1
10000-14999	21	15
15000-19999	20	14
20000-24999	17	11
25000-29999	18	12
30000-39999	23	16
40000-49999	12	8
> 50000	25	17
Total responses	145	100

Source: Survey 1997

From Table 5.9, it can be seen that total monthly household income (which included income from sources such as salaries, stocks, shares, educational allowances and housing allowances) also varied considerably. The total family income of women was sought because many of the respondents were single, students, or married women not working outside the home. The lack of, or low personal income, in these cases clearly did not represent their actual living standard.

Type of accommodation ranged from personally-owned or family-owned property, rented public housing, rented private housing to 'other' (Table 5.10). Of the seven who designated their housing differently ('other'), four lived in government or university housing, one *lived behind a shop* (accommodation which neither she nor her family owned nor for which they paid rent), and two indicated that they lived in

housing estates (but omitted to indicate whether these were private or public housing estates). While 43% of Hong Kong people overall live in accommodation they own, and 53% in rented accommodation (Hong Kong 1991 Population Census), 51% of my sample lived in accommodation they owned and 45% in rented accommodation.

Table 5.10: Type of accommodation

Type	Frequency	Percentage
Own	83	51
Rented public	57	35
Rented private	17	10
Other	7	4
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Next, Table 5.11 reports the numbers holding a foreign passport or the right to land. Thirty-two women held either a foreign passport or the right to land as an immigrant in another country outside Hong Kong, typically Britain (13), Canada (7), America (6).

Table 5.11: Possibility of leaving (foreign passport or right to land)

Passport	Frequency	Percentage
No foreign passport	132	80
Foreign passport/ right to land	32	20
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.12 focuses on whether respondents wished to leave Hong Kong. Of those who did not know, 27 said they were waiting to see what would happen in Hong Kong and 22 said they had not thought about it. Of those who said they wished to leave, 35 indicated they would like to leave but could not, five had applications pending for entry to another country, and seven said they were definitely leaving.

Table 5.12: Do you wish to leave Hong Kong?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	47	29
Don't know	49	30
No	68	41
Total responses	164	100

Source: Survey 1997

HOW HONG KONG WILL CHANGE AFTER THE REUNIFICATION

Having discussed the characteristics of the women who participated in this study, I will now present the data from Section B of the Questionnaire. The main findings of this section were that most women thought that change would occur as a result of the reunification and that most women held a negative view of the reunification.

Areas of Change

One hundred and thirty eight respondents said they thought there would be changes in Hong Kong (Table 5.13). Women expressed their belief that change would occur in a wide range of areas in Hong Kong. However, before discussing the comments that were made, I first wish to reiterate my earlier comment (Chapter Four, p. 86) that the creative responses were sought first (before an answer was required to the statements of Section C) in order not to influence the responses women might make. There were, however, a number of statements in Section C (Table 5.14) which related to some of the responses made in Section B. When discussing the areas of concern mentioned in response to Section B, I will also mention the level of agreement or disagreement indicated by the responses made to the pertinent statements in Section C. Any differences in response could stem from the fact that women may have been reluctant to indicate their views about particular issues (corruption, for example) until they either felt more at ease with me following the discussion surrounding Section B, or until they were asked about a specific issue and knew I sought a direct answer.

Table 5.13: How will Hong Kong change after reunification?

I think there will be changes in:	Frequency	Percentage
government structure and personnel	49	36
degree of freedom (less)	48	35
the education system	38	28
system of law	34	25
welfare (less)	32	23
business and the economy	22	16
all aspects	18	13
the use of Mandarin (greater)	18	13
the level of corruption (greater)	16	12
the enforcement of law (stricter)	15	11
the level of 'backdoorism' (greater)	7	5
government efficiency (lower)	5	4
Total responses	302	221

N= 138. Note that some women gave more than one response.
Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.14 indicates the statements in Section C which generated a stronger overall reaction than others.

Table 5.14 The six items evoking the strongest response

Item	Response	Ranking	Item Detail
S. 21	Agree	1	There will be an increase in corrupt business practices after 1997.
S. 14	Agree	2	I will feel worried when I encounter PLA personnel on the streets of Hong Kong after 1997.
S. 15	Disagree	3	After 1997 the press in Hong Kong will continue to enjoy freedom of expression.
S. 12	Disagree	4	There is no reason to believe that corruption in the civil service will increase after 1997.
S. 29	Disagree	5	I have confidence that the Chinese government will keep any promise it has made to Hong Kong.
S. 28	Agree	6	It would upset me if Hong Kong teachers had to incorporate socialist ideology into their lessons after 1997.

Source: Survey 1997

Thus, most women feel that there will be an increase in corrupt business practices after 1997 and they will be worried when they see PLA personnel on the streets. Most also believe that the press in Hong Kong will not enjoy freedom of expression after 1997 and that corruption in the civil service will increase. Further, most do not think that China will keep its promises to Hong Kong and they feel upset about the thought of socialist ideology being taught in Hong Kong schools.

I now turn to a discussion of when and to what degree the respondents felt change would occur, and the areas in which they thought change would occur (Questions 1, 2 and 3 of Section B). Some women thought that the changes would be immediate, others thought they would occur slowly. Similarly, with regard to the degree of change, opinions differed. For example, one respondent, a woman in her fifties who runs a travel agency, felt that: *Although the Chinese government has repeatedly reassured Hong Kong people that there will not be changes for fifty years, I think that, with their influence on our policy, there must be some changes.* Another, a computer operator in her twenties, said: *After the reunification, Hong Kong will have to follow the Chinese way in every sense.*

There were several statements in Section C which pertained to the changes that women anticipated. With the statement *I am confident that China will allow Hong Kong people to run Hong Kong after 1997*, 43 (26%) agreed and 70 (43%) disagreed. (51 (31%) were ambivalent.) A secretary in her forties, indicating her disagreement, asserted that: *China will want to control everything so they will send some of their own people to Hong Kong to be the big bosses.* Another women, a women in her thirties who did not work outside the home, was: *not sure if Hong Kong would be run by Hong Kong people or not - but I hope so.*

With the statement *It will be possible to successfully run the 'one country/two systems' idea outlined by Deng*, 42 (26%) agreed and 57 (35%) disagreed. Although some felt, as one women said: *it could work if China is sensible and keeps out*, that 65 women (40%) could neither agree nor disagree could indicate, I suggest, that women are very unsure how Hong Kong will fit into the political structure of China after the reunification.

Eleven (7%) women agreed, 64 (40%) women neither agreed or disagreed and 89 (54%) women disagreed with Statement 29 *I have confidence that the Chinese government will keep any promise it has made to Hong Kong.* These figures, I argue, demonstrate the very real fears women in Hong Kong have; they do not trust the

political leaders of China. And again, when asked to respond to the statement *I will feel worried when I encounter PLA personnel [the symbol of Chinese sovereignty] on the streets of Hong Kong after 1997*, women revealed their misgivings. While only 16 (10%) indicated they would not be worried and 105 (64%) said they would, 43 (26%) of the women could neither agree nor disagree.

The respondents felt that change would occur in a wide spectrum of Hong Kong society. Because the Chinese government has established the Provisional Legislature (Chapter Three, p. 49) and because many people have left the civil service (Chapter Three, p. 54), the concerns expressed by women about change in the government structure and government personnel, plus a decrease in government efficiency are not surprising. With respect to the structure of the government, one respondent, a woman in her thirties, employed as a nurse, said: *There will be some changes in the structure of the government. For example, China will appoint their own people - someone whose thinking is very close to the Chinese government - into the Legco.* A sales administrator in her fifties, talking about government personnel, felt that: *If too many civil servants leave, especially in the police, we will not have law and order - maybe we will have riots like the 1960s. Also the government will not be efficient then.*

Fears about a change in government structure and personnel contributed to other fears, particularly the fear that the freedoms that Hong Kong people currently enjoy such as the freedom to assemble, the freedom to travel, religious freedom and freedom of speech will be curtailed (see Chapter Three, p. 59). Given the lack of freedoms in China and the proposed changes to the law in Hong Kong (Chapter Three, p. 55), the fears of women are unsurprising. As one woman in her twenties, employed as a secretary, noted: *I am worrying that Hong Kong will become a place with no freedom and no human rights.* Another, a woman in her thirties who does not have paid employment outside the home said: *I won't be able to enjoy international films that aren't censored. I won't have access to information, even on the internet. Political freedom will be less and there will not be free elections.*

The responses to statement 10 in Section C regarding the protection of human rights in Hong Kong after 1997 were interesting. To the statement that there would be no protection of human rights after 1997, 32 (20%) agreed, 45 (27%), 87 (53%) disagreed and 45 (27%) could neither agree or disagree. Talking to the women about their response revealed that, while they believed there would be *less* protection of human rights after 1997, they did not believe that there would be *no* protection at all.

As one woman said: *They don't always follow the law, but China has some laws about human rights.*

However, in respect to freedom of the press, 106 (65%) the women thought that after 1997 the press in Hong Kong would not continue to enjoy freedom of expression. A university lecturer in her forties said that: *After 1997 the press in Hong Kong will be controlled the same way as they are in China.* Twenty-eight (17%) thought the press would have freedom of expression and 30 (18%) neither agreed nor disagreed. One woman, a sales administrator in her fifties referred to the long tradition in Hong Kong of press freedom and commented that: *China will find it hard to keep the press totally quiet - they are used to reporting what they want to report.*

Another area in which women thought change would occur was the education system (see Chapter Three, pp. 77-78). While some were pessimistic about possible changes: *There won't be nine years compulsory education as there is now and some content of the text books will change to reflect history in China.* [This respondent, an accountant in her forties, was referring to a Chinese interpretation of history.] *For example, June 4th date will be changed - it will become a minor date. How will our children know what really happened?* Others, though, were more optimistic. A waitress in her forties told me: *In China the government concentrates on children and the government runs their schools very well. I think there will be the same focus here in Hong Kong after 1997.*

With the statement *It would upset me if Hong Kong teachers had to incorporate socialist ideology into their lessons after 1997*, 18 (11%) disagreed, 62 (38%) agreed and 62 (38%) neither agreed nor disagreed. A chemist in her forties (who had lived out of Hong Kong) stated that: *if Beijing insisted on this I would send my children to school overseas - I won't have them brainwashed.*

Possible changes in the legal system (Chapter Three, p. 55) gave rise to unease, and there were also concerns that there would be a stricter enforcement of the law after the reunification: *Not only will there be Chinese soldiers stationed in Hong Kong but there will be drastic changes in law enforcement. I think that they do not have a solid and complete law system in China. Hong Kong will be ruled by people, not by the law after the handover.* Several women insisted that capital punishment would be reintroduced in Hong Kong.

With statement 9 in Section C, *The rule of law as Hong Kong people experience it now, will continue in the post-1997 era*, 61 (37%) of women agreed and 43 (26%) of women disagreed. Sixty women (37%) neither agreed nor disagreed. Exploring women's opinions was interesting. Some of the women agreeing with the statement qualified it by adding that China would allow the rule of law to continue because, as one woman, an accountant, said: *China needs the money from Hong Kong and Hong Kong can't make money without the law*, and because, as another woman said: *China will have to let Hong Kong be like now because it wants Taiwan*. Yet another, a university lecturer in her thirties, said she: *could not think that China would be so draconian*. That 60 women (37%) were ambivalent reveals, I argue, the uncertainty that people in Hong Kong feel in regard to China keeping its promises to Hong Kong. Several women who were ambivalent said they were not sure what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997. A 34 year old nurse said that she did not know what to think: *I hope China will keep its promises but I don't know if it can*.

Some women thought that the welfare system would face change after the reunification (Chapter Three, p. 76). A shipping clerk in her twenties said: *In China there is no welfare system and I am afraid that China will make Hong Kong like China. That would be very bad as old people would have no money to live*. A number of the women who mentioned the welfare system were recent immigrants from China. A cleaning lady in her fifties, after telling me at length about the paucity of welfare provision in China, said that: *I'm getting older and older and I am often thinking about when I can't work - I am worried that China will make Hong Kong stop giving welfare to the people and that there will be no old age money for me when I can't work any more*.

Regarding the economy and business sectors (Chapter Three, pp. 65-69), while some women thought that: *There shouldn't be too many changes in terms of finance and economy as business people in both places - Hong Kong and China - will want Hong Kong to keep its status in the world's economy*, others thought: *foreign investment in Hong Kong will be affected and then the economy will become unstable. This will have a great influence on people's livelihood*.

Statements 17 and 20 in Section B pertained to economics. With statement 17 *The prosperity of Hong Kong will continue after Hong Kong and China unite*, 98 (60%) agreed and only 15 (9%) disagreed. Fifty one (31%) indicated neither agreement nor disagreement. What is interesting, however, is that only 33 (20%) women agreed with statement 20, *I am sure my personal standard of living will*

increase after 1997. Fifty five women (34%) disagreed with it and 76 (46%) revealed their uncertainty by neither agreeing nor disagreeing. One woman in the latter group, a saleswoman in her forties, said: *I don't know what to think - the business people say Hong Kong will be more and more prosperous - but I think they will get all the money - ordinary people - small potatoes like me probably won't get very much.* A clerical officer in her twenties disagreed with the statement, saying: *Hong Kong is like other countries - the rich get rich and the poor get poor. Hong Kong will make more money after 1997 but I don't have much now so I don't expect more either.*

A number of women thought that Putonghua (Mandarin) would be more widely used in education and in the community in general (Chapter Three, p. 79). One said: *I am afraid I will have to learn Putonghua.*

As revealed by the responses to statement 26 in Section C *It would be a good idea if, after 1997, China insisted that Mandarin be the medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong*, most women in Hong Kong did not want the education authorities to accept such a suggestion. Ninety five women (55%) disagreed with the statement, 41 (25%) neither agreed nor disagreed, and 28 (17%) of women agreed with the statement. A recent suggestion that only certain schools in Hong Kong should use English as the medium as instruction and that most should use Cantonese has caused an outcry among parents and, obviously, they would not be happy either, if China insisted that Mandarin be the medium of instruction. One woman, an administrator in her thirties, said: *it is really necessary for children to be educated in English if Hong Kong wants to keep its international status.*

Increased corruption after reunification was seen as a problem (Chapter Three, p. 62). A woman in her fifties, expressing concern not only about her own life but wondering how her children will cope in the future said: *There will be more corruption and people will tend to work in a more Chinese style. Guangxi - connections - will become very important. People will have to bribe to have an obstacle-free life.* Another commented that: *Backdoorism will become a way of life as it is in China.*

Although only 16 women specifically mentioned corruption and 7 'backdoorism' in response to questions in Section B, their responses to the two statements in Section C which pertained to corruption demonstrated their depth of concern. While only 31 (19%) of women agreed with the statement that *There is no reason to believe that corruption in the civil service will increase after 1997*, 91

women (55%) disagreed with the statement. Forty-two (26%) could neither agree nor disagree. Exploring their opinions with respondents was interesting. One woman, a nurse in her forties, and married to a policeman, said that she knew that: *many police are in trouble with gambling - this will be a bigger problem after 1997 because many people are greedy and want more money - they have to corrupt to do this*. Stating that: *being a policeman is a hard job*, she added that: *the police don't get enough money - if they did maybe they wouldn't gamble*. Another, a nurse aide in her thirties said that: *corruption is already a big problem in the civil service, especially in the police and I know it is going to get worse. My life will be difficult if I have to bribe the police like in China*.

In the business world, too, the majority of respondents (116 - 71%) thought that corruption would increase after 1997. Only 15 (9%) thought it would not increase and 33 (21%) revealed an ambivalent position. A saleswoman in her thirties said: *China has bad corruption - you can read in the papers and hear from friends - its getting worse and worse all the time in Hong Kong too - so I think it will get even worse after 1997*. Another, a waitress in her thirties, said that: *with the contacts these people [business people] must make with China they will learn more how to be corrupt*.

A concern about more immigrants was voiced by some of the respondents. An accountant in her late twenties commented: *A lot of Chinese people with higher education will come into Hong Kong and take jobs for cheaper salaries*.

Views held by Hong Kong women: positive or negative?

A content analysis of the data from Questions 2 and 3 revealed that 40% of the respondents held a negative view of the reunification, 45% held an ambivalent view and 15% a positive view. A university lecturer pessimistic about the future commented that: *the majority of Hong Kong Chinese have no choice to decide their fate. In 1984 we couldn't vote for our own future. The British government has betrayed us*. The ambivalent view that some women felt was expressed in a comment from one respondent, a clerk in her twenties: *The reunification is a good thing. Chinese should be unified. I am optimistic about the reunification, but I don't have too much faith in the Chinese government and the way they operate*.

Those who were optimistic often made comments which related to national or cultural identity, or to economic prosperity. For example, a woman of around twenty, working as a sales person said: *I think Hong Kong will be ruled by Hong Kong people so there won't be much difference. Hong Kong's economic development will be helped by the reunification. I am happy about the reunification.* Revealing anti-British sentiment, she continued: *Hong Kong Chinese should be ruled by Chinese - there is a place for the Chinese here, not the British.*

Other comments revealed that some women were thinking of the benefits that would accrue to China from the reunification: *I hope this will be a good start for the Chinese. The foreigners [non-Chinese] have already gained enough profits from the Chinese in Hong Kong during the colonial period. Now it is high time that the Chinese will lead the Chinese, like in Singapore, and develop on their own.*

Women's hopes for the reunification

When asked what they would like to see happen in Hong Kong (Question 4), although 71 women said they would have preferred that Hong Kong remain a British colony, and 13 said they wanted independence for Hong Kong, 83 women made comments that referred to particular aspects of Hong Kong society in which they held hopes for improvements after the reunification. Forty-nine wanted a more prosperous economy and eight said they wanted to see less unemployment and more job opportunities. An accounts clerk in her early twenties said: *I hope that the unemployment rate will drop and that Hong Kong will become more prosperous, since I know a lot of Hong Kong people who would like to improve their quality of life.*

Stability was a concern for 34 women. One of these, a student who was completing her degree and was already looking for employment hoped that that the 'one country/two systems' idea would work otherwise there would be instability. The comments of a university lecturer in her forties summarised the hopes of seven women who wanted to see more understanding between Hong Kong and China. She hoped that the Chinese would have *self respect and do their best to make a better future* and that Hong Kong would come to understand more about China and its history.

Some women wanted a democratic Hong Kong. A teacher in a secondary school said she wanted to see Hong Kong *more democratic, more opened, freer, more autonomous and more prosperous.* Some women hoped for a smooth transition, some

revealed their acceptance of the reunification. A telephone order clerk in her forties said she thought the reality of the reunification had to be accepted, but she hoped that Hong Kong people would be allowed to run the government after the handover.

Future vision

Because I was interested to know whether women in Hong Kong gave any thought to the goals they could attain in the years ahead of them I asked each woman, *What will your life be like in ten years' time?* (Question 5). Seventeen women said they could not predict what their life would be like; 14 said it would be the same as it was now; 9 said that they had not thought about what their life could be like, 9 said that they could not answer the question because they did not dare to think about it, 7 thought it would be better and 2 thought it would be worse than it was at the moment. The 106 other women, however, including 38 who stated positively what their life would be like without preceding their statement with the words *I hope*, presented a variety of goals for the time ahead of them. Several women presented several goals.

Twenty-six women predicted that they would be more prosperous (7 indicated this before mentioning any other aspect of their lives) and 6 mentioned that they would have a better job. A sales woman in her twenties said that she would get a better job and have more money.

For 28 women, stability, peace and happiness were important aspects they wished to experience in their lives. One woman in her thirties who had earlier in her interview said she was worried about religious freedom told me that in ten years' time she would be peaceful and happy. Six women mentioned travel as part of their future, seven women spoke of marriage and nine mentioned children. Four women mentioned they did not want marriage. One, an administrator in her thirties, commented that her mother wanted her to get married, but she did not think she ever would as she preferred her job.

Other goals for the future articulated by the women included doing further study, gaining more personal freedom, starting something new (although what it might be could not be imagined), emigrating, owning a business, having more leisure time and the possibility of enjoying better health.

Other thoughts about reunification

When asked if there was anything else they wanted to say about the reunification (Question 6), 77 women responded, most reiterating their negative feelings about the event. One said that the reunification was a rather painful historical problem. Another maintained that she did not believe the Chinese government's declaration that there would be no changes in Hong Kong for fifty years.

Some women felt helpless about the situation they were facing. A nurse in her thirties commented: *I won't like 1997 to happen and I dream that it won't - but it will.*

Another, a woman in her fifties who teaches at a secondary school said:

Sometimes I can't believe that reunification can come so soon. When it was first talked about it seemed a long way away. I'm not sure that I'm psychologically prepared for it though I have been talking and talking about it for a long time. I also feel as though I'm not in control of the situation - but I can't choose. My only choice is to emigrate.

Some comments demonstrated a pragmatic current within the lives of particular women: *Since Hong Kong is a part of China, the reunification is a must. The problem is, with the unstable Chinese government, people do not have too much confidence in it. However, with time, everything will be back to what it was like in the past.*

A small number of women felt happy about the reunification. A cleaning lady who works as an amah (maid) said she was happy about the reunification because *Hong Kong Chinese should be ruled only by Chinese and not the British.*

VIEWS HELD BY PARTICULAR GROUPS OF HONG KONG WOMEN

The data from Section C revealed that different groups of women in Hong Kong held different views of the reunification. Tables 5.15 to 5.27 show the factors which influence the opinion that women hold. These tables deal respectively with women's view of reunification by age, self identification, whether or not they belong to a religious or spiritual group, religion followed, level of education, whether or not they

are in paid employment outside the home, type of occupation, personal monthly salary, marital status, total family monthly income, type of accommodation, possibility of leaving and wish to leave. (In these tables, raw figures are given in the first row followed by percentages in the second.)

Table 5.15: View of reunification by age

Age	< 30	30-39	> 40	Row Total
Positive	18 27.3	19 31.1	15 40.5	52 31.7
Neutral	25 37.9	24 39.3	7 18.9	56 34.1
Negative	23 34.8	18 29.5	15 40.5	56 34.1
Column Total	66 40.2	61 37.2	37 22.6	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

To compare respondents' views towards reunification by age, the women were divided into three age groups: under 30, 30-39, and over 40. As can be seen from Table 5.15, those who are older seem more likely to be both more positive and more negative in regard to the views they hold. Reasons for this divergence will be explored later.

A woman in her sixties who worked as a cleaner said that she had been glad to escape from China and was frightened that Hong Kong was to be reunified with China. She commented: *The Chinese government does terrible things to the people. Everything that happens in China frightens me. I left and now they are catching up with me. I thought I would be safe in Hong Kong.*

The views of women who are optimistic are represented by comments from a woman in her forties who, like the woman above, is also from China and works as a cleaner: *I think China will keep its promises to Hong Kong. China is changing now and wants to be more like Hong Kong - they will learn from us.*

Perhaps not surprisingly, those who identified themselves as Chinese first and Hong Kongers second are more positive and less negative towards reunification (Table 5.16).

Table 5.16: View of reunification by self identification

Identification	Hong Konger	Chinese	Other	Row Total
Positive	31 26.7	19 50.0	2 20.0	52 31.7
Neutral	42 36.2	11 28.9	3 30.0	56 34.1
Negative	43 37.1	8 21.1	5 50.0	56 34.1
Column Total	116 70.7	38 23.2	10 6.1	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

As mentioned in Chapter Two, p. 20, Hong Kong people have forged a particular identity of themselves. As one young woman in her very early twenties, a student, said: *I am a Hong Konger and I don't want to be Chinese.*

Table 5 17: View of reunification by belonging to religious/spiritual group

Response	Yes	No	Row Total
Positive	13 25.0	39 34.8	52 31.7
Neutral	17 32.7	39 34.8	56 34.1
Negative	22 42.3	34 30.4	56 34.1
Column Total	52 31.7	112 68.3	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

It appears from Table 5.17 that women who belong to a religious or spiritual group tend to be more negative than those who do not belong to such groups. The unease engendered in Hong Kong by the suppression of religion in China (discussed in Chapter Three, p. 62) is expressed by a Christian woman in her thirties:

I'm afraid that some activities will be forbidden. For example, religious gathering. In China people can only belong to registered churches which come under state control. I will be upset if this happens in Hong Kong because I am a Christian and my church is important for me. I don't want to belong to an underground church.

Table 5.18: View of reunification by religion

Religion	Buddhist	Christian	Row Total
Positive	3 42.9	10 22.2	13 25.0
Neutral	1 14.3	15 33.3	16 30.8
Negative	3 42.9	20 44.4	23 44.2
Column Total	7 13.5	45 86.5	52 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.18 indicates that women who are Christians hold less positive views than those who are Buddhist. Typical views of adherents of these two religions are illustrated by the following remarks: *I pray that the Chinese government will not make me stop being a Christian and Buddhist teachings is that all things change. I remember this when I think of Hong Kong. Perhaps if bad times come, later they will change.*

Table 5.19: View of reunification by level of education

Education	Primary	Secondary	Technical	University	Other	Row Total
Positive	6 46.2	37 35.9	3 27.3	6 16.7		52 31.7
Neutral	4 30.8	35 34.0	4 36.4	12 33.3	1 100.0	56 34.1
Negative	3 23.1	31 30.1	4 36.4	18 50.0		56 34.1
Column Total	13 7.9	103 62.8	11 6.7	36 22.0		164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.19 indicates view of reunification by level of education. The study showed that women who are more highly educated tend to hold less positive views about the reunification than women who are not as well educated.

A forty-year old administrator with a very responsible government job, echoing the comments of other women in both phases of this study who said they would emigrate if things went wrong in Hong Kong, said:

I am really concerned about life in Hong Kong after the reunification - for myself, for my husband, and for my children. My husband has his business. I have a good job - I wouldn't like to lose it - and I hope my children can do well. I would prefer not to emigrate, but I will if the life in Hong Kong is not good when the Chinese get to take us over.

Conversely, a woman in her thirties who is employed as an attendant in a sports centre, said: *Perhaps there may be some changes in Hong Kong but I am only a small potato and there won't be too many changes in my personal life.*

Table 5.20 presents the views of those in work compared with those not working. Although those in paid work tended to be evenly spread with regard to holding positive, neutral and negative views, most of those not in paid work (56%) held a neutral view. Many women expressed a concern that, after the reunification, people from mainland China would come into Hong Kong and take over the jobs of Hong Kong people. As one woman, a sales clerk in her late forties, said: *I might lose my job after 1997 because mainland people will come in and work for less money. In the future it might be harder too for young people to get jobs as mainland people will compete with them.*

Table 5.20: View of reunification by those in paid work compared with those not in paid work

Response	In work	Not in work	Row Total
Positive	47 33.3	5 21.7	52 31.7
Neutral	43 30.5	13 56.5	56 34.1
Negative	51 36.2	5 21.7	56 34.1
Column Total	141 86.0	23 14.0	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Women categorised as falling into the professional and associate-professional categories held more negative views regarding the reunification while women in service, shop sales, and elementary occupation categories held the least negative and more positive views (Table 5.21).

Table 5.21: View of reunification by type of occupation

Occupation	Man-agers/ Admin	Pro-fess- ionals	Assoc. prof ^o ionals	Clerks/ Recep/ Typists	Service /Shop/ Sales	Elem. Occup- ations	No job or Student	Row Total
Posi- tive	2 50.0	4 15.4	1 12.5	20 32.3	11 42.3	8 57.1	6 25.0	52 31.7
Neut- ral		11 42.3	3 37.5	22 35.5	6 23.1	2 14.3	12 50.0	56 34.1
Nega- tive	2 50.0	11 42.3	4 50.0	20 32.3	9 34.6	4 28.6	6 25.0	56 34.1
Col. Total	4 2.4	26 15.9	8 4.9	62 37.8	26 15.9	14 8.5	24 14.6	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

The director of a kindergarten, a professional woman in her forties said:
Basically Hong Kong people are the victims of the reunification. A twenty-year old woman working as a waitress commented: I am a small person so my life will not change too much.

Table 5.22: View of reunification by monthly personal salary

Salary in HK\$	<7000	7000- 9999	10000- 14999	15000- 29999	>30000	Row Total
Positive	13 34.2	16 40.0	14 35.0	8 25.8	1 6.7	52 31.7
Neutral	15 39.5	11 27.5	12 30.0	13 41.9	5 33.3	56 34.1
Negative	10 26.3	13 32.5	14 35.0	10 32.3	9 60.0	56 34.1
Column Total	38 23.2	40 24.4	40 24.4	31 18.9	15 9.1	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Table 5.22 reports on the View of reunification in relation to personal salary. Because the first column (women who earned less than HK\$7,000) included both students who were not, as yet, employed and women who had decided to not work when rearing their children, the figures in this column are somewhat misleading. The group of women falling into the HK\$7,000-9,999 column was more representative of lower earners. These women held more positive views towards reunification. Although the numbers in the highest income bracket were small, these women held the most negative views.

A personnel and administration officer in her thirties commented that: *After 1997 there will be some big changes in Hong Kong.* A woman in her fifties, who described herself as an Urban Council worker, said that: *I believe after 1997 Hong Kong will remain the same as it is now.*

Table 5.23: View of reunification by marital status

Marital status	Never married	Separated	Divorced	Widowed	Now married	Row Total
Positive	27 35.1	1 50.0	1 25.0	1 100.0	22 27.5	52 31.7
Neutral	19 24.7	1 50.0	1 25.0		35 43.8	56 34.1
Negative	31 40.3		2 50.0		23 28.8	56 34.1
Column Total	77 47.0	2 1.2	4 2.4	1 0.6	80 48.8	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Women who had never married tended to hold more positive and negative views than women who were now married (Table 5.23). While one unmarried woman in her twenties told me that: *Hong Kong will probably go communist*, a married woman in the same age group said: *Maybe there will not be drastic changes initially because the new government will want to stabilise the people of Hong Kong. It is very difficult to predict.*

Women who were from families with the highest total family income were the most negative, and those from the lowest total income families were the most positive towards reunification (Table 5.24).

One woman with a very high family income commented: *My husband is in business - he has his own companies and has a lot of business with China. But we do not like their politics and I think that life might be a bit different after 1997. A lot of my family live in Australia and, if life becomes uncomfortable for us here, we will go back there.*

Table 5.24: View of reunification by total monthly family income

Income in HK\$	< 15000	15000-29999	30000-49999	> 50000	Not known	Row Total
Positive	12 40.0	24 43.6	7 20.0	5 20.0	4 21.1	52 31.7
Neutral	10 33.3	18 32.7	16 45.7	7 28.0	5 26.3	56 34.1
Negative	8 26.7	13 23.6	12 34.3	13 52.0	10 52.6	56 34.1
Column Total	30 18.3	55 33.5	35 21.3	25 15.2	19 11.6	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

Another woman, working as a clerk in a shipping company, and with a low family income, said: *Maybe the talent of China will help Hong Kong to grow faster. The Chinese talent is valuable - they have many insights. Hong Kong maybe will be protected by a larger country nearby - Britain is far away.*

Table 5.25 presents the views of women in different types of accommodation. Although numbers are small, the table reveals that women who live in privately rented accommodation appear more likely to hold negative views.

Table 5.25: View of reunification by type of accommodation

Accommodation	Own	Renting public	Renting private	Other	Row Total
Positive	25 30.1	20 35.1	5 29.4	2 28.6	52 31.7
Neutral	31 37.3	19 33.3	3 17.6	3 42.9	56 34.1
Negative	27 32.5	18 31.6	9 52.9	2 28.6	56 34.1
Column Total	83 50.6	57 34.8	17 10.4	7 4.3	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

From Table 5.26, it can be seen that the number of women indicating that they had the possibility of leaving was small. Those with that possibility tended to be less positive and more negative. Those without the possibility tended to reveal a more even spread between positive, neutral and negative views.

Table 5.26: View of reunification by possibility of leaving (foreign passport or right to land)

Response	Able to leave	Not able to leave	Row Total
Positive	9 28.1	43 32.6	52 31.7
Neutral	10 31.3	46 34.8	56 34.1
Negative	13 40.6	43 32.6	56 34.1
Column Total	32 19.5	132 80.5	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

The negativity of those with the possibility of leaving is illustrated by a comment from a British passport holder: *I like Hong Kong the way it is and I can't see why the Chinese need Hong Kong. They get enough from us already.*

Perhaps not unexpectedly women who said they wished to leave were more negative towards reunification and those who said they wished to stay more positive (Table 5.27).

Table 5.27: View of reunification by wish to leave

Response	Wish to leave	Not sure	Wish to stay	Row Total
Positive	5 10.6	15 30.6	32 47.1	52 31.7
Neutral	19 40.4	17 34.7	20 29.4	56 34.1
Negative	23 48.9	17 34.7	16 23.5	56 34.1
Column Total	47 28.7	49 29.9	68 41.5	164 100.0

Source: Survey 1997

One potential emigrant maintained: *After the handover, the government will be under strict supervision by the Chinese government and there will be less democracy. I can't live like that so I will go. I am lucky because I have a Spanish passport - my husband comes from Spain.*

In Chapter Five I have given a description of the characteristics of the respondents, discussed the changes that the women felt would occur because of the reunification and noted that 85% of respondents hold a negative or, at least,

ambivalent view of the reunification. I have also demonstrated that certain groups of women - those of higher education levels, of particular occupations, and belonging to families who enjoy high total monthly family incomes - hold relatively more negative views of the reunification.

While the undertaking of a survey with 164 women has allowed generaliseable results, I intend to illustrate in Chapter Six, in four case studies, the "rich depiction and strategic comparison across cases" (Miles and Huberman 1994:41) which allows the reader to understand how the abstract variables actually operate in people's lived experiences. Such research overcomes, Miles and Huberman (1994:41) stress, the "abstraction inherent in quantitative studies".

CHAPTER SIX CASE STUDIES

The survey revealed that women of higher education levels, with higher status employment and higher total family incomes tended to be more negative towards the reunification of Hong Kong with China. The focus in this chapter, four case studies involving, as mentioned earlier, one randomly chosen woman from each total family income group, will reveal the various factors which operate in the lives of women in Hong Kong. As Miles and Huberman (1994:10) note, such research can demonstrate the "ways people in particular settings come to understand [and] account for" their lives. In discussing this, Miles and Huberman (1994:10) refer to "local groundedness" to explain that the data collected through such research reflects the proximity of a specific situation embedded in the local context. The experience of women in Hong Kong, already positioned within the context of their own society through the discourses of Confucianism, colonialism and capitalism, is of a society which, imbued with the discourses of reunification, is facing changes because of the ceding of British sovereignty.

The objectives of the unstructured interviews were to broaden my understanding of the issues which the women had talked about in the earlier part of the study, and to examine why women held the views they did (whether their views, for example, stemmed from their own experiences (from personal contact with people from mainland China, or from visits to China), or from hearing second hand (from other people or through the media) about the system in China and what happened within that system). Another objective was to hear women's views about the position of women in Hong Kong.

Although each woman interviewed was from a different total household income category, the views expressed were not intended to definitively represent the views of all women within any one economic category. In the event the respondents show the diversity of characteristics and views which exist within income categories.

Rather than asking specific questions about the main areas of concern that had been highlighted in the earlier interviews, I allowed the women to talk about what concerned them in particular and then asked them why they thought China might bring about change in these areas. No particular time frame was suggested and the interviews varied in length from one and a half hours to almost three hours. Because

the first woman to be interviewed spoke no English and the second limited English, the first two interviews were conducted with the help of the translator. The second two interviews were conducted in English. To protect the identity of the women I have given them fictitious names: Mei Ling, Fong, Candy and Agnes.

MEI LING

The first woman interviewed was Mei Ling, a woman in her early forties who has one child, a daughter of 16 who is still at school. Mei Ling and her husband divorced when the daughter was 6 years old. She lives with her daughter in a rented public housing authority flat that she was allocated whilst still living with her husband. Because of family circumstances, Mei Ling had to leave school at twelve and find employment. She worked in a garment factory. She does not like to talk of these days; even thinking about them makes her feel very sad. Within the lowest household income bracket (under HK\$14,000 per month), Mei Ling works as housekeeper in a hotel and earns around HK\$9,000 per month. Until several years ago she worked in a factory, but the factory moved to China and she, like other women in Hong Kong who have lost their jobs as the manufacturing industry has moved to neighbouring Guangdong (see Chapter Two, p. 32), has been unable find similar work. She finds the work in the hotel very hard (she gets very tired and has a constant backache) but says that, although she does not like the job, she says she has to do it to get money.

Mei Ling says that she finds life quite difficult as she has few people to help her in any way. Her daughter has a part-time job out of school hours and most of the money she earns goes into the household purse. All connection with Mei Ling's former husband has been severed and Mei Ling does not receive any financial contributions from him. She tells me this distancing is the wish of the ex-husband because he has remarried and has a new family. Mei Ling said that she prefers not to see her husband but that she would be happy if he gave some money for his daughter. The daughter does not see her father either and has not been told that he has remarried and has had more children.

Mei Ling's parents, who were born in China, are dead. Although some of her family have been in Hong Kong for several generations (her mother's grandparents were born here) she has many relatives in China. She also has friends living in China. Mei Ling has one sister, but this sister has financial problems and cannot help Mei Ling financially. She says her extended family in Hong Kong are not well off and that she

cannot ask them for help and that the family in China are very poor. She reports that she has a few good friends but that she does not like to accept help from them because she is unable to repay them.

Before discussing Mei Ling's thoughts about the reunification, it would be pertinent to outline briefly how typical, or atypical, Mei Ling is of the women within this income category. Like 40.5% of the women of her age category, she expressed a negative view of the reunification (40.5% positive). In respect to other factors, however, she fell into a minority percentage category: 23.1% of women who had attended primary school only held negative views (46.2% positive), 23.1% of women who lived in rented public housing were negative (35.1% positive), 28.6% of women who were employed in elementary occupations said they were negative (57.1% positive) and 26.7% of women with a total monthly family income of less than HK\$9000 said they were negative (40.0% positive).

Mei Ling started the interview by telling me that she was pessimistic about the reunification of Hong Kong and China: *It's not July 1997 yet but the Chinese government is already exercising their so-called right on Hong Kong people's freedom - so I am worried.* Like many of the women who participated in phase 1 of this study, Mei Ling felt that there would be changes in Hong Kong society and that, because she was *not used to the way things happen in China*, life in Hong Kong would be difficult for her after the reunification. Like other respondents she felt that the reunification would encourage an increase of bribery and corruption. (When asked how will Hong Kong change after reunification, 12% of the respondents mentioned that there would be increased corruption, and 5% said that the level of 'backdoorism' would increase.) Mei Ling does not believe the current country-wide anti-bribery campaign (mentioned in Chapter Three, pp. 64-65) in China has been effective. Mei Ling knows from her mainland Chinese friends and relatives and *by instinct* that mainland officials do not understand the *wishes and needs of Hong Kong people - they reveal by what they say that they don't know about Hong Kong.*

She feels that the Chinese elite do not want to accept that Hong Kong people are different or that the styles of life are so different. Hong Kong people are modern, active, and people in China are passive and relaxed. Mei Ling's opinions about Hong Kong people reflect Cheng's (1996) comments that Hong Kong people see themselves as different to people from the mainland (Chapter Two, p. 20). Like many of the women who participated in the study, Mei Ling does not believe China will keep the

promises it has made to Hong Kong. Saying that Deng Xiaoping made the promise regarding the one country/two systems notion a long time ago, Mei Ling added:

probably after he's dead other people, maybe the mainland Government and other people, will have different opinions about Hong Kong. By instinct I know that there is a big chance that when China takes over the right of Hong Kong probably Hong Kong people will have to follow their rules - China will impose its own rules on Hong Kong.

Further issues of concern for Mei Ling were that the Beijing government would take money away from Hong Kong and that there would be no control of immigration to Hong Kong from China. The result would be increased crime and a decrease in the number of jobs available for Hong Kong people. Mainlanders, Mei Ling asserted, would work for less money than people in Hong Kong would. Mei Ling felt that China was taking Hong Kong back because China wants *the profit, the money, and they want control - they want to control the people in Hong Kong - they want to control Hong Kong itself*. Mei Ling's comments about control echo those of other women who, in phase 2 of the study, said that they feared they would lose control over their own lives after reunification.

Mei Ling did accept that China was changing as it was modernising, but she felt that, although the standard of life in China would improve as the country underwent the process of modernisation, the changes would be very small and that most Chinese people would not *abandon their communist or socialist ideas completely*.

In phase 1 of this study, the respondents were asked if they belonged to a political party and if they identified with a particular politician. No respondents claimed to belong to a political party and only 17 said they identified with a particular politician. As discussed in Chapter Three (p. 53) political reforms introduced since the 1970s have allowed opportunities for women to participate in the political sphere. As Lui (1995:135) points out, although women register and vote at much the same levels as men, people in Hong Kong do not favour mass mobilisation and collective action and women in Hong Kong account for less than one quarter of the membership of the over two hundred statutory and non-statutory boards and committees in Hong Kong.

Although Mei Ling felt that the political system in Hong Kong would change because of the appointment of a Provisional Legislature, she said that she was not interested in politics herself. She conceded that different people thought differently: young people, she believed, regarded political freedom as more important than making

money, while business people felt making money and having a *stable and peaceful life* was more important. She felt that Hong Kong had benefited from the British presence in that Hong Kong would not have become so prosperous had it been ruled by China. She also felt that it was good that the British had brought in *all the westernised thinking for Hong Kong people so people are getting more and more conveyed to new ideas and things - so it's better than having people ruling from mainland China.*

Mei Ling reported that she did not like to think about the political situation in Hong Kong and that she tried not to worry about the changes that might come to Hong Kong after the reunification. As she said: *The changes affect all Hong Kong people - if I'm the only one who worries, this doesn't help.*

She commented that a lot of people had already left Hong Kong, but added that, although many professionals had gone to other countries, Hong Kong would train other people to take their place and that many were returning because they could not *maintain the same standard of life* elsewhere. Even if she did have qualifications which might enable her to emigrate, Mei Ling did not want to leave Hong Kong.

Interested to understand more of the context in which the views of women have been shaped, I asked the women about any contacts they might have with people living in China, if they had been to China, and whether they read the newspapers and watched television. Mei Ling said that she had *many friends and relatives in mainland China - so I have lots of contacts - and they tell me about all this* [life in China]. Mei Ling had also visited China. She had been to Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Guilin and said that while the people in Shenzhen and Guangzhou seemed, because of their proximity to Hong Kong, quite modern, the people in Guilin were different. Reflecting the distinction that Hong Kong people make between themselves and people in China she claimed that you could tell people were mainlanders because of their appearance. She also said that while they were *friendly, but not too friendly*, they were not very honest. Mei Ling reads a Chinese newspaper which she gets from her friend. What she reads worries her. She does not watch television very often as she does not have the time.

With regard to the position of women in Hong Kong society, Mei Ling claimed that women in Hong Kong were not equal with men. She qualified her statement by saying: *The kind of people I mingle with are from the grass roots - we are not middle class - and I think the women do not have a very high status - well-educated might have a different point of view but, as far as I can see, Hong Kong men do not give*

equality to Hong Kong women. Hong Kong men, she claimed, felt that allowing women equality meant that their own status would be lowered. That they felt like this was because Chinese men have the tradition of standing above women - so they think if they offer equality women will take over. She then added:

Chinese people are very narrow minded and they are very conservative compared to people in other countries. I don't think this is a religious tradition, but just beliefs. For the old generation, they think boys are better because they can carry on the family names and pray to the ancestors. I don't know about other people in Hong Kong and their beliefs, but I don't think that boys are better - I think girls are better in terms of taking care of the family because they are closer to their parents and they can really consider for their parents - so I am very happy I have a daughter.

Mei Ling concluded the interview by saying that after the reunification she would have to be careful what she said and to whom she spoke, but that she would still talk to me because she was pleased that I had asked women to speak. Although Mei Ling had said at the beginning of the interview that she was pessimistic about the reunification, her final comment was that *Hong Kong people should not worry too much because of the reunification of Hong Kong - China is part of our life. There will be changes, but both optimistic and pessimistic people have to accept the changes - so it is better for people to stay optimistic rather than be miserable.*

FONG

Fong is a married women in her early forties. She has two boys of 22 and 19 and lives in a rented public housing authority flat. She comes from a family whose household income is around HK\$22,000 per month (within the second bracket (HK\$15,000 - HK\$24,999). Fong, working as an amah (household help) for six different families on a part-time basis, makes around HK\$7,500 per month. Although, as required by the law of Hong Kong, her different employees have taken out insurance in case she is hurt while at work, she has no right to paid holidays. In Fong's case, however, her employees are mainly European and two of the women employing her have negotiated her employment with the other families and have ensured that she gets two paid holidays per year and that, if her working day with any family coincides with a public holiday in Hong Kong, that she need not work on that day and gets paid for that day. She prefers to work for Europeans because, she says, they treat her better. Fong travels one hour to get to work and one hour home at night. Her husband and sons are

in regular employment. Her husband captains a tug boat and both sons are doing apprenticeships.

Fong has two sisters and one brother, all of whom she sees frequently. One sister has continuous money worries and Fong is always giving her money. Ironically Fong's son is doing his apprenticeship with the husband of this sister and rarely gets paid for the work he does. A tally is being kept and he will be paid *sometime in the future*. Fong worries a lot about her mother as her mother has a kidney problem and Fong often has her mother to stay at her small flat. When the mother comes, the boys have to sleep in blankets on the floor of the main room.

Fong knew little about her origins. Her mother had been sold by her biological mother to one woman who then sold her on again to another woman during the Japanese invasion of China. She thought that her mother was probably around 67 or 68 years old but could not be sure of this because the last woman who had bought her mother had died before she (Fong) had been born. Her father was born in Hong Kong. All she knew of his parents was that they had come to Hong Kong on a boat. They too had died before Fong was born.

As a child Fong lived on a small boat in Aberdeen harbour with her mother and siblings. Her father worked as a steward on ocean liners and was rarely home. Fong's mother had a job carrying vegetables from the market to the stores and Fong, from an early age, had to help her. Fong had to leave school when she was thirteen. Her mother got her a job in a factory which made plastic toys and she remembers that she did not have a holiday for three years because if you did not go to work you did not get paid. Fong also has one brother who still lives at home with his parents. Fong thinks he will never marry.

Fong, like Mei Ling, is both typical and untypical, of women of her age, income group and education level. Although she, like 41% of women in her age group, is negative towards the reunification, she falls within the 23% of women who attended primary schooling only who are negative (around twice as many are positive). With regard to her employment she is atypical in that 57% of women in elementary occupations are positive (29% are negative). In respect of her total family income also, she falls within the 24% of women who hold negative views (43.6% hold positive views).

Like Mei Ling, Fong did not feel optimistic about the future of Hong Kong:

I don't have confidence for the future after 1997. I feel that the Chinese government has the need to show their authority to the Hong Kong Chinese people. Initially China will want to keep Hong Kong as a money-making concern but, as you know, other places in mainland China are developing too - a lot of wealthy Hong Kong people are investing their money in China, they are moving their money north - probably in the first few years Hong Kong will be kept as a money making place but, after, that, no.

Fong shared Mei Ling's scepticism also regarding the one country/two systems notion formulated by Deng Xiaoping. She did not feel that China would keep the promises made in the Joint Declaration and that, after the reunification, China would do as it wished. When she thinks about the political situation she feels *really upset and angry - the one country/two systems idea is only talking - probably after 1997 the Chinese government will do whatever they like and won't care about the corruption.*

There would be many changes in Hong Kong after the reunification Fong believed because *people of authority from China would override what Hong Kong people wanted for Hong Kong.* Further, China would take all the money reserves out of Hong Kong to spend elsewhere in China and allow mainlanders to come into Hong Kong and take jobs from Hong Kong people. She felt that there would also be a lot more illegal immigrants trying to get into the territory. Believing that China would control Hong Kong after the reunification, Fong felt that Hong Kong people would not have the same rights and freedoms as they currently enjoyed. Concern about a curtailment of rights and freedoms, given the proposed change to the political system, were mentioned by many women in phase 1 of this study.

Like Mei Ling Fong felt that China was changing but claimed that changes were only being wrought because China wanted to make more money. She did not think that there were *changes in the basic thinking. People are still sticking with the thinking of Mao Tse Tung and people like him and they are still exercising [behaving] like parents to Hong Kong.* Although she had believed, before the June 4th Tiananmen Square Massacre, that China was changing to capitalism *after the things I witnessed and their cruelty, I can't believe this now.*

Although Fong had supported the Democratic Fong after the 4th June Tiananmen Square Massacre, she, like many other women interviewed in this study, was not greatly interested in politics. She did not think that there would be elections in

Hong Kong after the handover. *That's just plain talk again - about voting and elections - even if we do have elections the ones that we can elect will have to be vetted by the Chinese government.* Echoing the thoughts of some respondents of phase 1 Fong stressed that she thought that Hong Kong people were *more interested in making money than having politics*. She felt too that, while local people were *very smart and work hard*, Hong Kong would not be what it is today without the British. She compared Hong Kong to places in China and stressed that Hong Kong people have whatever they want and live a free life. She noted too that the British also benefited from their involvement in Hong Kong.

Repeating again that she was pessimistic about the reunification, Fong said that she worried every day, especially about the future of her children. She said that neither of her sons liked China and that her eldest son, in particular, was *afraid of the mainland* because he was taken there as a small boy and he did not enjoy the experience. Fong, worried about the future, said: *I don't think I can control my future - we can't predict the future especially because some incidents can suddenly happen.*

Mentioning the many Hong Kong people who had emigrated, particularly after the June 4th Tiananmen Massacre, Fong spoke of her love for Hong Kong and her wish to stay in the territory. Although she could not afford to emigrate and had doubts about adapting to another environment, Fong felt that the large number of people leaving were *damaging Hong Kong*. *People who are capable of running things well are going and they are taking too much money with them.*

Fong's views of the reunification have clearly been shaped by the contacts she has had with people living in China, her trips to China, and from what she reads in the Hong Kong newspapers and sees on the television. Fong's two sisters-in-law both come from China and she has been to their homes in Shenzhen on many occasions. When mentioning one of her trip to a sister-in-law's family in China, Fong told me the story of a man she had met there whose brother had run foul of the law. Eager to save his brother from the long imprisonment he would certainly have received, *the man paid the authorities a lot of money - around HK20,000 - to free the brother*. She has also been to Guangzhou. Fong reads the South China Morning Post to practise her English. The things she reads make her more afraid of 1997. She also watches the news and some Chinese programmes on the television.

Referring to her pessimism about the reunification, Fong said:

I am negative because of what I have seen and heard of China. Because of my sister's connections in China I have had the opportunity of openly visiting China a lot in the past so I have my own opinions about the customs officers and the police in China and some of the experiences of my friends are not good concerning law enforcement in China.

Telling me two stories about friends who got into trouble in China and escaped by paying out large sums of money, Fong said that she thought that corruption was a serious problem in China and that, after reunification, it would become a big problem in Hong Kong. Many Hong Kong people, as mentioned in Chapter Three (p. 62) harbour this fear. Fong, several times, said that the stories she has heard and what she reads in the newspapers make her feel worried about the future. As she said: *I am worried but I can't do anything.*

Her feelings of helplessness were evident again when speaking of the position of women in Hong Kong. Fong said that although she felt that career women *had control over their lives*, lower-class woman (she identified herself as such) were *quite helpless* - they had *no status at all and they don't want to voice their opinion because they don't think that other people care about their opinion at all*. Reflecting the Confucian beliefs discussed in Chapter Two (p. 24), Fong said that a woman's position in Hong Kong society depended on her age: *Women at my age, when we were young, placed our husbands first in our priorities but, when we reach a certain age, we will place our children first, husband second and family third*. Hong Kong males, Fong claimed, were *very selfish* because of the traditions that shaped the upbringing of boys. Saying that some people in Hong Kong felt that *sons are more important than daughters*, Fong derided such thoughts as *old beliefs*. Saying that *Hong Kong males think that they need sons to carry on their names*, Fong stressed that such thinking stemmed more from tradition than from religious beliefs. Reiterating her dismissal of *old thinking*, Fong stressed that she had *a lot of arguments with my husband because of this and I am basically a person who wants equality and I think I am a reasonable person to have equality*. *A lot of Hong Kong women think that they will probably be better off being dumb than intelligent and they won't fight for their equality.*

Fong concluded her interview by saying that, although she felt little confidence about it, she would, after 1997, *just keep working and hope that everything isn't too bad.*

CANDY

Candy is a 24-year-old single woman who was born in China. She emigrated, with her mother, to join her father in Hong Kong ten years ago. Her father is Chinese, was born in Indonesia and met and married Candy's mother in China. When Candy arrived in Hong Kong she spoke no English and no Cantonese. She has recently completed a degree in English language, coming top of the course. Her mother owns a small business and Candy reported that her mother's business has its *ups and downs*. Her sister started work last year as an accountant.

Candy does not have much contact with her father as he now lives in Indonesia. Nor does she have contact with family or friends in China. Although her mother goes to China occasionally on business, Candy has not been back to the mainland since the family emigrated to Hong Kong. She reports that the family (mother and two daughters) live in a rented privately owned flat (*It's an old flat and not so expensive*) and that the total income of the household falls somewhere between HK40,000 and HK49,999. She says that making money is very important to her and that she knows the family fortunes would be very much better in the future when she and her sister have been working for several years.

Although Candy said, initially, that she was not apprehensive about the reunification, she later revealed her pessimism. In this respect she shared the same thoughts as 35% of respondents her age group (27% held positive views), like the 53% of women who lived in privately-rented housing and like the 62% of women who fell in the same total family income group as she did.

Like other respondents Candy thought that Hong Kong faced many changes. She did not, however, see drastic change for Hong Kong, but suggested that the changes would be made *slowly so Hong Kong people will not notice the difference*. The welfare system would change, law enforcement would be harsher (probably capital punishment would be reintroduced) and would no longer be nine years compulsory education, because the government in Beijing would not want to spend as much money on education as is now spent in Hong Kong. They would, however, want to *introduce something like politics to primary students - communist ideology*. Candy stressed that when she studied in primary school in China one of her subjects was political studies.

Of the notion of one country/two systems, Candy said: *if it worked that would be a big miracle I think*. The government of Hong Kong, she felt, would be *a puppet*

and everything will be controlled by the Chinese government. Stating that she believed that the future government of Hong Kong would consist of major business people, Candy warned that these people would have to please the central government: *You know all the kinds of tangled relationships in China - you have to be very careful not to offend - you have to do a little bit of 'shoe-polishing'.* Candy also felt that the law system would change. *We will gradually have the same law system as in China - they will make the modifications gradually and Hong Kong people may not realise this in the initial stages.*

Candy also saw the Chinese as expansionist. *They will be expanding a little bit at a time. I'm basically pessimistic about what is going to happen in the future, especially to Hong Kong.* Candy then expressed her anger saying:

Actually, I feel a little bit angry about the whole thing. I think it is bad luck that this is happening - we left China because we wanted to leave - its definitely bad luck - but you can do nothing about it. The British government is sacrificing Hong Kong [in order to] make a good relationship with China because China after all is such a big market for all sorts of things.

Reiterating her anger about China taking Hong Kong back, Candy claimed that the reasons China wanted Hong Kong back was because they want the money reserves of the territory, and because the Chinese government wants to show the world *that they have the strength to take what is theirs.* Candy felt that Hong Kong was just the *first step*, that China would then want Taiwan back and perhaps other areas such as those lost to Russia.

Interestingly, like some of the women in the survey who spoke of the benefits which would accrue to China because of reunification with Hong Kong, Candy said that, in ten or fifteen years time, some cities in China would be as developed as Hong Kong because of the help they would receive from the territory. Like Mei Ling and Fong, Candy did not think China would abandon its socialist thinking. *No, no no*, she said, *as long as the existing government is still there, there is no way things will change. I don't ever think China will change like the countries of Eastern Europe. Chinese people are different to these people.*

Regarding politics, while Candy initially said that she was a *little bit interested*, she then said she was not *too keen on politics* because she felt that politics, in every country, was basically *dirty and false*. Talking about the political system in China,

Candy claimed that the communists were very manipulative: *they know how to grab the opportunity - they know how to appeal to people's emotions*. She also felt that there were many mainland Chinese who would *rather have a corrupt system rather than having a very nice government* (a reference to the government in Hong Kong).

When talking about whether the concern she had about the reunification affected her everyday life, Candy outlined her initial reactions when she first arrived in Hong Kong saying: *When I first came to Hong Kong, I felt shocked, culture shocked basically. I knew nothing about English and I felt inferior*. While Candy maintains that she still feels inferior and as if *I don't belong to anywhere*, she also says that this does not worry her particularly. She then claimed that, because she is *such an adaptable person*, and can be *so accommodating*, when the:

Chinese people come to Hong Kong after the reunification I won't talk too much - I will just be buttoned up. Being a small potato - I'm only a young so-called normal Hong Kong citizen - so I don't think my life will be changed too much. If it does, then I will emigrate like others here have done already. I think that people have the right to go to other countries - they are just trying to make a better future for their children. I don't think their leaving is damaging for Hong Kong and I don't think it matters that they are taking money with them. It doesn't even matter that top people are going because they may not keep their position after 1997 so I think their going will not affect Hong Kong too much.

As in the other case study interviews, it was obvious that a number of factors influenced the formation of the views Candy held about the reunification. Although she has not returned to China since emigrating, she harbours negative feelings with regard to her early life there. That her mother's opinions have an impact too is obvious from Candy's comments about her mother being *very careful who she talks to and about what she says* when she is in China. Interestingly, and perhaps a comment which reveals the changes that are occurring in China, Candy mentioned also that her mother had told her that *some Chinese people are now more outspoken than Hong Kong people. Some people don't care - they just don't care any more*.

Candy's opinions are also influenced by what she reads in the South China Morning Post and the Hong Kong Standard. She reads these newspapers to improve her English and occasionally reads Chinese language newspapers. She prefers to watch laser disc films than to watch television. Stating that what she knows about China is *mainly from my childhood and from what my mother says*, Candy wonders if

everything bad that is written about China in the papers is true. She points out that *bad news comes from other countries too.*

Candy revealed very definite opinions about the status of women in both China and Hong Kong. Claiming both that women in Hong Kong were *not getting as many opportunities as women in mainland China*, and that women in the big cities of China enjoyed equality with men with regard to education and employment, Candy then spoke of women in the villages of China.

In the villages in China, I know that there is no equality whatever - men do what they want and everybody wants to have a son. A lot of people don't know why they want to have sons rather than daughters - let me tell you why. China is an agricultural society - if you have a boy you will have labour. If you have a girl, the girl will get married and move away from the family and that means you are getting a bad investment. If the boy gets married then you have an extra person for labour.

Maintaining that this was *a cultural thing not a religious thing - not really for worshipping the ancestors*, Candy stated that, although she did not believe that the Chinese were using scans to detect the sex of babies and then aborting female foetuses (see Chapter Two, p. 32), she 'knew' that girl babies were *killed after they were born because of pressure from some husbands or families*. She stressed that the women who had this experience were angry but that they accepted it because women in China are *very tolerant - to all kinds of things in their lives - probably they have been in the system for too long*. Hong Kong, she thought, would be forced to accept a one-child policy: *Gradually, I think China will bring this in - probably because the mainlanders might demand that Hong Kong people be treated the same as them. By that time Hong Kong people will be forced to accept whatever comes.*

Although she felt that some jobs might be difficult to get because of the inequality between men and women in Hong Kong society, a situation she gets *really, really mad about*, Candy hoped to get a good job in the future. She also hoped to get married, but felt that, if she did marry, her husband would not accord her equality within the marriage because *Hong Kong males are very egotistic, self-centred and are male chauvinists - yes, they are. They are very arrogant, very self-assured. I think they are too spoilt from an early stage of life by their mothers and by their fathers as well. So they don't want to consider too much about others*. Hong Kong men, she claims, think that a woman's responsibility is to *stay home and do housekeeping and give them children* and that a man's responsibility is to have a career. If a woman

wants a career, Candy says, Hong Kong men think: *I don't want you to go out to work because that means shame to me.* This attitude, Candy claims, is *awful - just awful.* *I will not accept this. I would just go out to work and he will have to fit in with me.*

Her last comment in the interview echoed words said earlier: *I will emigrate like other people here have if my life changes too much here.*

AGNES

Agnes, a thirty-six year old kindergarten supervisor, is also studying part-time at a local university. She is married and has two boys aged 14 and 12. The household she lives in has a total household income of over HK\$50,000. During the week she lives in a small flat on the housing estate which her husband manages. At the weekend the family goes to their home in the New Territories. Her husband has taken up his right to a block of land under the so-called 'small house' policy (a policy which allows male descendants of indigenous residents of the New Territories to build free-standing three-storey houses) and has built a three-storey house (containing three flats) there. His parents and uncle live in one flat, one is rented out to relatives and, at the weekends, Agnes and her family use the other flat. The family also have a three storey house in China (this has three flats in it), a house in England, and a half-share in another house in Canada. All these houses are rented out. They are now thinking about buying a house in Britain as the parents would like the boys to go there to study for the last two years of secondary school and university.

Agnes receives a lot of help from her mother who arrives at the flat every morning at seven a.m. The grandmother cooks the family's breakfast and prepares food for them to cook later in the day. She also does the housework. In turn Agnes helps her mother financially and also spends time with her on the weekends. Although Agnes and her husband are busy ferrying the boys to their various after-school activities, on Sunday mornings they, together with their boys, take both sets of parents, the uncle, and other relatives, out for Dim Sum lunch.

Agnes had gained the right of abode to Britain through the British Nationality Scheme, but told me she has positive feelings regarding the reunification. In this respect she was atypical of most women of her education level (56.% were negative), employment bracket (52% were negative) and total family income bracket (42.3% were negative). She said she was positive because she thought that *mainland China*

wants to have good economics to earn more money - Hong Kong's economy is very good - if China introduces a worse policy on Hong Kong then they both cannot earn more money.

Revealing her support for the viewpoint that the treaties were unfair (see Chapter Two, p. 14), Agnes said she also felt that China also wanted to get the land back that it had lost to Britain: *it is about China being stronger too. In the past China was very weak and the leaders signed an unfair commitment [the treaties which China insists are unfair] - the officials made an agreement with Britain that wasn't right. I think China now is stronger and it wants to get all the land back.*

Agnes thought there could be changes in Hong Kong after the reunification but that the possibility of change would depend on who became the leader of China after Deng Xiaoping. If Jiang Zemin became leader there would be little change and, if change was effected in Hong Kong, it would be gradual. While cautioning that if the next Chairman of China was not Jiang Zemin, *there will be no freedom and we will be treated like Chinese people*, Agnes added that: *Perhaps if Hong Kong people can support mainland China for their economics, then they will treat us well - it is all about money.*

Unlike Mei Ling, Fong and Candy, and many respondents in phase 1 of the study, Agnes revealed guarded optimism about the one country/two systems idea saying that she felt it would work at least *for a few years because China will want to get Taiwan. So China must behave well then Taiwan people will see that the one country/two systems idea can work OK - there is a plan.*

Deeper concerns were revealed, however, by Agnes's reiteration of her concerns about the next Chairman of China and her comment that, if someone other than Jiang Zemin was the Chairman, she could not *trust the leaders*. While she felt that although there was an understanding in Beijing about Hong Kong and the Hong Kong way of life, Agnes also believed that because the Chinese leaders *don't like the British - don't like the ideas of the British*, [they] *have their own policy and will do what they want for Hong Kong. For example, they are angry about the British passport scheme and will try to make that passport useless.* (This is a referral to the British nationality scheme (Chapter Three, p. 43) a measure introduced by Britain to encourage Chinese people to stay in Hong Kong after the handover.)

Like the other women, Agnes thought that although China was changing, socialist ideology would not be abandoned. She talked of her own visits to China both as a child and in recent times, and said that living standards in China had improved greatly. Like some other respondents (see Chapter Five, p. 115), and like Candy, Agnes referred to the benefits that would accrue to China after the reunification saying: *I think mainland China is growing stronger during these past ten years because of good Hong Kong economics - China has got stronger because of Hong Kong.*

Agnes, when discussing possible changes that might occur in her own life because of the reunification, did not mention (although she had mentioned this in the first interview) that she had applied for, and had been granted, the right of abode in the United Kingdom through the British Nationality Scheme. She did say, however, after mentioning that she felt that the people who had already emigrated had done so because they were *afraid of the policy of mainland China - that they will not keep their promises of what they say after 1997*, and after telling me a story about her uncle who had tried four times to leave China illegally and who, after much hardship, had managed to reach Hong Kong from where he emigrated to Canada, that she did not want to emigrate. She felt her life in Hong Kong was *very stable now* and that, should Jiang Zemin become the new leader of China, her life would be stable in the future. What is interesting is that, although Agnes claimed to be optimistic about the reunification she revealed her deeper unease by mentioning her concern about the future Chairman of China a number of times throughout the interview. Her concern for the future is also revealed by the fact that she had applied (and been accepted) for the right of abode in Britain through the British Nationality Scheme.

Like the other women, Agnes's feelings about the reunification are influenced by various factors. Although Agnes was born in Hong Kong, her mother was born in mainland China and often goes to visit her mother who, at nearly one hundred years old, still lives in mainland China. Although Agnes has been a few times to visit her grandmother, she does not go very often because *the way of living is not very good. Even though my uncle has given her money to build a house and to buy all the furniture for her house, it is still under condition compared to Hong Kong houses.* She has, however, been to China a number of times to *see the house my husband has built in Guangdong province. A three-storey house - he rents it out to some relatives.* She has also visited other areas in China and feels that *some people are poor and some people are very rich. Some people in Guangdong and other parts of China have much money - more money than us.*

Agnes does not have much time to read the newspaper as her current studies take up a lot of her time and she has to take her two boys to their different activities. She watches the news on the television and, comments that, *although a lot of people are worried about the future, she feels that if Mr Tung gets selected, it will be good.* [This is a reference to the setting up of a Provisional Legislature by China, see Chapter Three, p. 49]. Mr Tung, Agnes said, *gives a good appearance. He says if you don't like something then I want to talk to mainland China to make a good result. Then, if mainland China has something that they do not like about what Hong Kong people do, then he will explain it.* She feels, however, that if Mr Tung does not perform well *the Hong Kong people will do something unlawful - perhaps just a demonstration - either like the one when they go to the mainland office or one like the 1960s riots when some people died.* Agnes's reference to the riots underlines the fear voiced by others in Hong Kong that a decrease in the legitimacy of the future SAR government may lead to social unrest (see Chapter 3, p. 64).

Although Agnes voiced some negative things about China, she held a positive attitude towards the reunification. Not only did she claim to have a positive disposition but she said that she believed that *China will not do too many bad things because it wants Hong Kong and China to have a good economics and earn much money.* And, after all, Agnes said, *Hong Kong used to be part of China - it still belongs to China - this is a fact.*

Not only did Agnes hold positive views in regard to the reunification of Hong Kong with China but she, unlike Mei Ling, Fong and Candy believed that *Hong Kong women can be equal, or be more than equal. You can see Mrs Chan, the top in the government [Chief Secretary]. You can see some of the administrators - they are women.* Agnes was clearly unaware that, although women are better represented in many aspects of Hong Kong society than women elsewhere in Asia, there is still a gender imbalance in the labour market and in societal institutions (see Chapter 2, p. 31). However, when it was suggested to her that many people in Hong Kong might still prefer to have a son rather than daughter, she agreed saying: *yes, they prefer to have a son because a boy can get the land to build a house* (a reference to the 'small house' policy mentioned in Footnote 19, p. 27). She also mentioned that *boys will go to the grave for the ancestor worship.* Agnes thought it was better, however to have a daughter because, she claimed, *Girls love their mothers very much. When we are older then the daughters look after the mothers more than the sons. Because the man is very busy with his work the women have spare time and can look after the older people.*

Agnes stressed that, although she felt that *in some families the men like to be higher than the woman*, women in Hong Kong were both educated and were protected by law. She mentioned that if women were discriminated against by employers, for example, they had recourse to justice under the law, as did women whose husbands treated them badly.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the unstructured interviews were intended not so much to be representative of all the women in each particular economic group, but were conducted in order to allow further understanding of the views that the women held and why they held these views.

While the women interviewed were not completely typical of the majority of women within the particular economic groups, the unstructured interviews both reveal the many factors which influence the views women in Hong Kong hold and the diversity of opinion within each category of women. They also demonstrate that certain issues are of particular concern to women in Hong Kong. Firstly, like the majority of the women in phase 1, the four women all agreed that there would be changes in Hong Kong. Like some of the women in phase 1, Candy and Agnes thought these changes would come slowly. While Mei Ling, Fong and Candy were worried about the reunification, Agnes, unlike most women in her income group, was not worried.

Agnes did not voice any great scepticism (as did Mei Ling, Fong and Candy) about the 'one country/two systems' idea but, I suggest, did reveal her pessimism about the change of sovereignty several times by mentioning her belief that the future of the territory depending on who the *Chairman of China* was. She also, as mentioned above, revealed her pessimism by the fact that she had obtained the Right of Abode in Britain. While Mei Ling, Fong and Candy all believed that China wanted to take the money reserves from Hong Kong, Agnes thought that Hong Kong's robust economic system would be of benefit to China's development in the future. All four women revealed that they thought of mainland people as different from Hong Kong people.

The changes that the women thought would come to Hong Kong echoed those that women in phase 1 had stated. Interestingly, all four expressed their concern that China wanted to effect control over Hong Kong. All agreed that China was changing, but all believed that China would not abandon socialist ideology even though it was adopting a capitalist economic system. All four said that they believed British control of Hong Kong had helped the development of Hong Kong. None of the four was very

interested in politics and, apart from Candy who said she would emigrate should things go badly in Hong Kong, all said they wanted to stay in Hong Kong.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the reason for undertaking the case studies was to present a picture of how the various factors operating in the context of Hong Kong life impinged upon the lives of the women interviewed. The interviews, I suggest, does demonstrate how the women interviewed, positioned as they are within their society through the influences of Confucian, colonial and capitalist discourses, understand and account for their lives, particularly in this time of uncertainty through which the ideological rhetoric of reunification runs.

The final chapter discusses the findings further and presents a series of conclusions.

CHAPTER SEVEN DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results were presented in Chapter Five and the main themes of the Unstructured Interviews in Chapter Six. This chapter includes a discussion of the findings of this research and the conclusion.

At this point I would like to reiterate the research questions, namely: *Do women in Hong Kong think the reunification of Hong Kong with China will bring changes to Hong Kong? If so, in which sectors of society do women think change will occur? Do women view these changes positively or negatively? Do different categories of women think differently?* Before discussing the views that were revealed through this research, several factors in regard to the characteristics of the women who participated in the study will be mentioned. Firstly, it was difficult to get women over fifty to participate in this study. The women approached either said they did not know a lot about the politics surrounding 1997, or as one, in her mid-sixties and living on a government pension in a public housing estate, said: *I will have to have my son present to tell me what to say.*

The comments about not knowing a great deal about politics may well reflect the fact that many older women in Hong Kong did not have many, if any, years of formal schooling and may well therefore feel 'unqualified' to offer an opinion. Indeed, two of the women who declined to participate could not read. Free and universal education was only introduced at primary level in 1971 and at secondary level in 1978; before that time, the education of sons was a priority and daughters attended school only if the parents were relatively prosperous and if they held the view that girls should be educated. Of the women who participated in this research, one woman had not attended school at all, and a number (mainly aged between forty and fifty-nine) had had limited education.

Another reason for the reluctance of older women to participate in the research could be that they, understanding themselves to be of a lower status than men in Hong Kong society, harboured the feeling, voiced by Fong during the unstructured interviews that *they don't want to voice their opinion because they don't think that other people care about their opinion at all.* The comment about needing one's son to tell one what to say reveals that Confucian thinking about obeying one's father before

marriage, one's husband after marriage, and one's son after marriage (Chapter 2, p. 25), still holds sway in Hong Kong today among some women.

The few women who were reluctant to participate, however, were in stark contrast to the other women approached. Echoing the opinion of others, one woman told me: *I'm pleased that someone is listening to what women think and is going to write about it. I talk about the handover with my friends, but no-one outside has ever asked me what I think. This makes me happy, that you are listening.* Such a comment underlines the fact that many women in Hong Kong feel their opinions about the reunification are being neither requested nor even heard when they are voiced. Few accounts of the transition to Chinese rule focus specifically on women; most refer to Hong Kong people. Not only, therefore, is women's experience of the transition ignored, but transmuted, is taken to be that of men's. This underlines Haggis's (1990:68) claim that women's voices are not present in accounts of historical change and demonstrates that women, denied a 'subject' role, do not participate in the making of knowledge.

The second point I wish to mention is the representativeness of my sample. In this exploratory study I did not, as already mentioned in Chapter Five, set out select a representative sample. Even though I had representatives from a wide range of women in Hong Kong, there was a comparative over-representation of more highly educated women, in higher status employment and earning a higher income (see pp. 99-100). While the content analysis of questions 2 and 3 of Section B indicated that respondents overall tended to be more negative than positive, the negativity may be exaggerated because of their background. However, the tendency towards negativity by women of all ages and across all socio-economic groups was also found by both DeGolyer (1995) and Wilkens (1993).

DISCUSSION

I now turn to a discussion of the findings of this research. The responses to the first question in Section B of the Questionnaire (*In a general sense, how will Hong Kong change after reunification?*) address the first research question. The large majority of the respondents (138 out of 164 women) believed that the reunification with China would bring about changes in Hong Kong. As to the degree of change and pace of change, however, there was no consensus. Some women thought there would be drastic changes, others minimal changes, yet others declared that what change would

occur, and when, could not be predicted. Some thought change would occur immediately, others thought it would take place slowly. According to a few women the pace of change would be so slow that, in the words of one woman: *Hong Kong people won't notice, at first, what is happening*. The level of concern expressed by the respondents was underscored by their strong responses to particular statements in Section C (see Table 5.14, p. 108). Women felt strongly that the Chinese government would not keep the promises it has made to Hong Kong and that the sight of PLA soldiers in Hong Kong would upset them.

Where changes will occur

Question 1 in Section B of the questionnaire also addresses the second research question (*In which sectors do women think change will occur?*). The responses demonstrate that women in Hong Kong think that change will occur in particular sectors, or aspects, of Hong Kong society. The third research question was *Do women view these changes positively or negatively?* As noted in Chapter Five, 40% of respondent were clearly negative about these changes with 15% positive. I will now discuss the major areas in turn.

Structure of government and government personnel

Not only did most respondents believe that the structure of the government would be different after June 1997, but many mentioned changing government personnel. Although many women thought that Hong Kong would not have an elected government, some thought that there would be elections, but that there would be less democracy in that only Beijing-approved individuals would be allowed to run for office. Many felt that the Democrats would be excluded, and that the Hong Kong government would be strictly controlled by the Chinese government. Some respondents even felt that, sooner or later, Hong Kong would have a communist government. Regarding a possible change in personnel, respondents felt that the Beijing government would replace the present legislature and the important positions within the public service with its own people, either people from China, or pro-China people from Hong Kong. Of concern also, because of the numbers of people who had already left the civil service prior to the handover (Chapter 3, p. 54) was a possible drop in government efficiency, particularly in the police force.

Changes to government structure and personnel, the women felt, would have a destabilising effect on society. Some women felt that a non-elected legislature of pro-China or mainland Chinese would carry out the wishes of the Beijing government, and ignoring the plight of the ordinary people, would concentrate on business and making money. The exclusion of the Democrats (who, as discussed in Chapter 3, p. 44) did well in the 1991 direct elections) from the various tiers of government would mean that local people were not fully represented on these bodies. Some women were worried that the society would be so destabilised that riots like those in 1966 and 1967 (Chapter 3, p. 73) would break out.

That the respondents believed the shape, character and personnel of the government in Hong Kong after 1997 would be different was not unexpected given the announcement from China that, after reunification, the top tier of the current three tiers of political structure would be disbanded and that the bottom two levels would gain extra appointed members (see discussion in Chapter Three). Not only does the Chinese government understand the notion of autonomy differently from people in Hong Kong, but subsequent moves by China towards the setting up of a Provisional Legislature and the requirement that all the principal positions in the government be held by Chinese nationals, fuel the fears of women in Hong Kong.

It was not surprising, either, that the respondents thought there would be less democracy after the reunification. Not only is the first legislature appointed (many see this as a contravention of the Joint Declaration), but the process surrounding the appointment of legislators demonstrated the control which China had over the procedure. Further, China has labelled the Democrats (who were very successful in the first direct elections in 1991) and other liberal-minded individuals 'subversive'. China, demonstrating its distrust of people who advocate wider democracy in Hong Kong, has said that it will not communicate with the democrats if they remain in the pro-democracy alliance.

The notion that the government of Hong Kong would be strictly controlled by the Chinese government (a comment from one woman was that *The government in Hong will be a puppet and everything will be controlled by the Chinese government*) reflects the fear of control that a number of women in this study talked about. Approximately one third of the women indicated (in response to Statement 23 in Section C) that they felt they would have no control over their future after 1997 and just over one quarter did not know whether they would or not. Moreover, just over one third of women thought that people, as individuals, would matter less after 1997

(Statement 30). Exploring their answers with some of the women (43%) who opted for the ambivalent response demonstrated, yet again, that many are very uncertain about how the reunification will affect their lives. For example, one woman who had indicated the neutral option for both statements reported (in regard to the first statement) that: *I can't say because - in China people don't matter but in Hong Kong they do - so it really depends on how much China makes Hong Kong change*. To the second statement she said: *it's hard to know because we don't know yet what changes will happen in Hong Kong*.

Human rights and other freedoms

A concern of many respondents was the possible curtailment of the present rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by law (freedom of speech, freedom to travel, control of the media, freedom to assemble, religious freedom, human rights and political freedom - the right to stand for office and to vote). As Mei Ling said in her unstructured interview: *They will not let Hong Kong have freedom - especially freedom of speech - they will keep control*.

Although it is stated in the Joint Declaration that there will be no curtailment of current rights and freedom, the words that follow, "unless as prescribed by law" (Article 39, Joint Declaration), do raise concern. Several women commented that the Hong Kong SAR government, in order to please Beijing, may change the law in order to curtail the rights and freedoms Hong Kong currently enjoys¹⁰³. They remarked, too, that many of the new SAR Provisional Legislature are business people. These people, it was thought, will be more concerned about protecting their own business interests rather than caring for the interests of the common people.

Respondents are worried that a curtailment of rights and freedoms would mean that they (and their children) would not be able to voice their opinions, that they would not be able to practice their religion, and that they would not be able to travel abroad. They were concerned that a curtailment of information exchange with other countries would be economically detrimental to Hong Kong, and a lack of press freedom would render Hong Kong people ignorant of events occurring both in Hong Kong and in the wider world.

¹⁰³

It was reported in the South China Morning Post on 10 April 1997 that Tung Chee-hwa (the Chief Executive-designate) "yesterday unveiled controversial plans to restrict demonstrations and foreign funding of local political parties" (Yeung 1996a:1).

Again, the concern of respondents is not unexpected. China is seen as a country in which human rights are not a priority, and what laws China does have in regard to human rights are not always upheld by the authorities. As the articles in the newspapers in Hong Kong reveal, there has been harassment and imprisonment of religious leaders in China and some women, particularly Christians, fear that religious adherents in Hong Kong may suffer the same fate. Further, China has commented that, after June 1997, it will not allow subversive comments to be made in Hong Kong, that the press must practice 'self discipline'. As demonstrated by the strong response to the statement in Section C referring to the press (Table 5.13, p. 108), most women feel that the press in Hong Kong will be subdued after 1997. China has also made it clear that the Bill of Rights (Chapter 3) must be modified to allow it to 'converge' with the Chinese understanding of the Basic Law¹⁰⁴.

Education system and language

Many respondents thought the system of education would change; no longer would there be nine years' compulsory and free education, but the texts (particularly history texts) would be changed to reflect Chinese interpretations of history. That women would be concerned if school children were, as one woman commented: *brainwashed by socialist ideas* by their teachers, was underlined by the strong response women, as a whole, made to Statement 28 in Section C (see Table 5.13, p. 108).

Interestingly, although some women thought that any changes would be negative, there were those who envisaged positive changes. Some women thought that education would improve because they believed that many Chinese professors would move to Hong Kong to teach. Ironically, the reason given for the professors moving here in such numbers, was that they would receive higher remuneration in Hong Kong than they presently received in China¹⁰⁵. While a few of these respondents thought that the system of education in China was better, others expected a strengthening of the sense of nation from an education system which would incorporate more Chinese history and culture.

¹⁰⁴ The Preparatory Committee's legal sub-group announced on 19 January 1996 that China was "preparing to repeal 16 of Hong Kong's laws and modify nine others, including key provisions in the Bill of Rights" (No 1996:1). Democratic Party chairman, Martin Lee, in response, stated that "most of the existing legal protection for human rights and individual liberties in Hong Kong would be stripped away" ("Black day for rights" 1997:1).

¹⁰⁵ A senior professor in China currently receives around HK\$900 per month, while the comparable salary for a senior professor in Hong Kong is (without other benefits) around HK\$60-87,000 per month).

While there has been no comment from China that it plans to abrogate free and compulsory education (Chapter 3, pg. 77) (indeed, the Chief Executive-designate has stated that he wants to implement full day schooling in Hong Kong), women in Hong Kong do appreciate the advantages that the extension of compulsory education has allowed them. They have been able to enter university and, consequently, the professions in increasing numbers. (Upward mobility in some fields, however, is still difficult.) Gaining economic independence has allowed women independence in other areas of their lives and, naturally, they do not wish to lose this. As a nurse in her thirties said: *If I lost my job then I have no money and then my husband is the boss again. Chinese men like to be the boss and make the wife do everything he wants.*

Some school texts have already been changed to reflect history from the Chinese perspective. Women, from their comments, clearly believe that the Chinese perspective of history is a very narrow one. Commenting that: *people in China have very narrow views because they are not told much*, one woman, remarked that she would tell her children about the history she had learned in school in order broaden their understanding of the world.

When exploring the concerns that some women had about a possible insistence of Mandarin as the medium of instruction, it became clear that not only did they believe having to learn the language would impose more burdens on children who are already pressured, but that they did not wish Mandarin to replace English. Their insistence on the importance of English was related to economic factors; English is necessary both for the economic well-being of Hong Kong and the financial well-being of the individual.

Legal system

Another major area of concern mentioned by respondents was the legal system. It was felt that, after the reunification, Hong Kong would be ruled by people and not by law (Chapter 3) and that there would be a stricter enforcement of the law. Some of the respondents mentioned the uncertainties surrounding the court system of Hong Kong: the loss of many experienced people in recent years (Chapter 3) and that Court of Final Appeal was scheduled to open only after the handover. Also mentioned was the Chinese government's announcement that it had authorised its Standing committee to override decisions of the Hong Kong government if the need arose and to invoke

martial law to deal with dissent in the territory. As mentioned above, women indicated that the presence of the PLA would be upsetting. A student in her early twenties, clearly recalling the Tianenmen Square Massacre said: *if the students in Hong Kong did something too bad, then the Chinese government would get the PLA - maybe they would shoot us*. Some women were concerned that changes to the legal system would not only render people more vulnerable to prosecution but, should they fall foul of the law, deny them the right to a fair trial.

Many respondents related stories about the system of law and law enforcement in China and several voiced their concern at the prospect of the death penalty being reintroduced to Hong Kong. As one respondent said: *We will definitely soon have capital punishment in Hong Kong*. Stricter law enforcement, it was suggested, would make Hong Kong people realise, as one respondent said: *Beijing meant business*. That women felt there would be stricter law enforcement again demonstrates the fear that women have about the control they believe Beijing will exert over Hong Kong people. One respondent, echoing the words of others, stated that *they want to control Hong Kong and they want to control Hong Kong people*.

The concern that is expressed by women in Hong Kong, I suggest, stems from their perception of the legal system in China and how individuals fare in that system. Although, in principle, women in China are better protected by the law, in practice they are not. Women in Hong Kong do not wish to lose the gains they have made and they do not wish to be treated by the law as women in China are. Further, for one hundred and fifty years, they have lived in a society based on the rule of law. Appreciating the benefits of this, they do not wish to live in a regime in which the perceived whims of the Party hold sway over the lives of individuals.

Welfare system

The welfare system, too, was a sector in which women felt change would occur and many felt the provision of welfare would decrease after reunification. Some respondents pointed out that not only would a reduced welfare system leave some people in a difficult position financially, but that they would need to save harder for their old age. Women's concern about welfare could arise from the fact that the government was reluctant, until the 1970s, to provide funds for welfare provision, housing, education or public health and medical services. Many of the women interviewed (younger women often prefaced their stories with the words *my mother*

told me ..., or *my father told me...*) recounted how hard life was in was in Hong Kong before the government became involved in these areas. The provision of welfare is still, compared to other countries, very limited and the government of Hong Kong, supported by the conservative business community, has often stated that, although Hong Kong has become wealthy over the past several decades, it does not intend that large amounts of money be paid out for welfare.

The concern that women express arises also from their knowledge of the paucity of welfare provision in China. A number, too, mentioned feeling worried when China responded furiously to Governor Patten's announcement that he intended to increase spending on welfare. That China spent little on welfare was because, one woman stated: *people aren't worth much in China and the government doesn't want to spend too much on them*. There was concern also that immigrants would access the welfare provision of Hong Kong to such an extent that there would be little money left for Hong Kong people.

Increase in corruption

As in other research (Lo 1994, DeGolyer 1995) which has reported high levels of anxiety about corruption in Hong Kong after 1997 (see Chapter 3, pg. 62), this study also indicated respondents felt that corruption would increase after the handover. They, however, revealed a higher level of anxiety about corruption than that reported by DeGolyer (1995). What was interesting was that the statement in Section C of the Questionnaire regarding corruption in business evoked the strongest response of any statement from the women participating in this study and the statement relating to corruption in the public service elicited the third strongest response (see Table 5.13, p. 108).

Like the four women participating in the unstructured interviews, most of the respondents related stories about corruption in China. Discussing their fears, and using terms such as *bribery*, *backdoorism* and *shoe-polishing*, many women asserted that corruption would become a part of everyday life after 1997.

That women participating in this study felt that corruption would increase after the handover is not unexpected. Not only has it been reported that corruption has been increasing in Hong Kong since the beginning of the 1990s, but many of the respondents are aware that corruption is a serious problem in China. While women stated that their lives could be made difficult by corrupt practices, two different

opinions were voiced with regard to the fear that women feel when talking of the possibility of Hong Kong again becoming a place where bribes, for example, are commonplace. Some women of lower socio-economic status voiced the concern that, because they do not have useful connections and/or enough money to bribe people, they felt helpless; other women, of higher socio-economic status thought that their higher socio-economic status may attract unwanted attention from those who sought money. As one woman said: *if Hong Kong becomes like this [a corrupt place] then I will wear ordinary clothes - no jewellery - and be inconspicuous as possible*".

Business and the economy

While some of the respondents felt that Hong Kong would continue to prosper in the years to come, some women envisaged that changes in the government and law spheres could result in less foreign investment, companies pulling out of Hong Kong and a downturn in the economy generally. Concerns were voiced about an increase in the unemployment rate and a decrease in job opportunities. These problems, some thought, would be exacerbated by the large numbers of immigrants whom China would allow to enter Hong Kong, taking *jobs from Hong Kong people for less money*. Some women were particularly worried about the availability of jobs for young people. Others, concerned that changes in the legal system would undermine the 'level playing field' on which the prosperity of Hong Kong is said to rest, claimed that a depressed economy, due to both the withdrawal of business from Hong Kong and a reluctance of overseas companies to invest in Hong Kong, would mean that living standards would drop and, possibly, lead to a rise in crime. They claimed they would not feel safe if this happened.

The worries of these women have to be seen against the context of development in Hong Kong, something that has occurred within the lifetime of many of the respondents. They know, from their own experience, what life was like in Hong Kong before economic development transformed their lives and, naturally, they do not wish to see a return to such days.

Other areas of concern

Many women also suggested that there would be more illegal immigrants and that crime would become a problem as these people would need money to live. It was also

thought that increased unemployment (because of decreasing foreign investment, or a downturn in the economy) would bring a surge in crime.

Some women were worried that China would take all the money out of Hong Kong¹⁰⁶, and some reported that the presence of PLA troops (the symbol of Chinese sovereignty) in Hong Kong would make them feel uneasy¹⁰⁷. Also mentioned was the concern about seeing the removal of royal insignia, a worry that English street and place names would be replaced with Chinese names, a concern that people would become less well-mannered in the street and public transport systems, that *second wives*¹⁰⁸ would become an even bigger problem, and that immigrant children would flood Hong Kong.

When the context of Hong Kong life is examined, the various concerns that women express can be seen in perspective. For example, there have been a number of media reports about the involvement of illegal immigrants in crime and so, too, have there been reports about the logistics surrounding the removal of royal insignia at midnight on 31 July 1997. The problem of men taking second wives, too, is one that has received attention from the press in recent times.

Strengthening of national and cultural identity

A small number of women (15%) held a positive view of the reunification. Some of these saw the reunification as an opportunity for the strengthening of national or cultural identity in Hong Kong: *we will become more Chinese and learn about our heritage - this will make us stronger*. Others felt the reunification would enhance economic development in Hong Kong: *after reunification Hong Kong will get even more benefits and make even more money*. Some believed that China would benefit from the reunification in that *China and Hong Kong will be stronger if they are joined together*, and others that China will be able to *use the benefit of Hong Kong to become a leading and major country in the future*.

¹⁰⁶ The 1997-98 Budget of Hong Kong reported a surplus of HK\$31.7 billion. It was also estimated that "Total reserves would hit [HK]\$359 billion by the end of next March" (Yeung 1996b:1).

¹⁰⁷ It was reported in the South Morning Post on the 16 April 1997 that the first PLA troops are expected to arrive in the territory on 21 April 1997 (Fung and Clarke 1997:1).

¹⁰⁸ Second wives refers to the fact that a number of Hong Kong men have taken a second wife over the border in Shenzhen. A counselling service has been set up in Hong Kong for the Hong Kong wives.

One woman, in her fifties and not working outside the home, commented that although she was Hong Kong born, she felt that Hong Kong *belonged* to China. She was angry about what she described as the *mishandled* transition:

The British government, while trying to save their faces, protect their own benefits and refused to co-operate with the Chinese government. The British should be more generous; like a foster mother who will have to give up their foster child after years of care. For the child's future, the foster mother should try their best to praise the mother who gave birth to the child. She should also teach the foster child to love and to be loved instead of digging up the negative side of the event, like what the British government is doing and make Hong Kong people feel very upset about the reunification.

Women's thoughts on their hopes for Hong Kong and their own futures

Before discussing the different views particular groups of women held about the reunification (research question 4), the responses that subjects made to some of the other questions in Section B of the questionnaire will be discussed.

Question 4 (*What would you like to see happen in Hong Kong?*), invited women to express what they would like for Hong Kong. Interestingly, just under half the women said they wanted Hong Kong to remain a British colony, reflecting their fear of the negative changes they believed would come with reunification, and a small number wanted independence for Hong Kong: *I had hoped that Hong Kong would become independent, but it is only a dream.* Some women, saying they did not know what they would like to see happen, revealed their feelings of helplessness.

Over half the women sought improvements in particular sectors of Hong Kong society, in the economic sector (mainly so they could earn more money, an important factor to people in Hong Kong), the justice system, and in social welfare. Some wanted to see a continued freedom of speech and human rights, some wanted stability to continue in Hong Kong, some hoped that Hong Kong and China would be more understanding of each other, and some hoped for a smooth transition. As is obvious, some of the comments about improvements are underpinned by the fears that women hold in regard to the reunification.

What was interesting about the responses to question 5, which sought their views about their own futures, was that women rarely talked about their personal aspirations, even when specifically encouraged to do so. Most of the answers related to more money, better jobs, and more prosperity, and such answers were placed in the context of family. That most women in this study were reluctant or, more likely, did not think to focus on individual hopes for their futures, can, I suggest, be explained by what Bond and Hwang (1992:236) refer to as "Chinese collectivism". Unlike the "Western starting point of the anomic individual" (Bond and Hwang 1992:215), Chinese, guided by Confucian principles which govern social behaviour, understand themselves as "relational being[s], socially situated and defined within an interactive context". It is not surprising therefore, that Chinese women in Hong Kong, not only positioned second by Confucian precepts (as discussed in Chapter 2), act in accordance with the Confucian tenets in regard to relationships and therefore, see themselves as part of a group rather than as individuals with certain hopes.

While a few women did mention personal goals, (peace and happiness were the frequently mentioned), none could tell me what they would do to achieve these goals. They could, however, tell me what steps they might take to achieving better jobs and, consequently, more money. The few woman seeking more personal freedom, concerned about being dominated by the men they were married to, also could not tell me about the steps they might take to achieve this goal.

Question 6 which invited women to share any further thoughts with me about the reunification, was mainly seen as a chance for most to state further that they viewed the reunification in a negative light and how they felt helpless. The feeling of helplessness expressed by many of the respondents, does indicate, I believe, that women in Hong Kong feel their disadvantaged position in society strongly. However, a few demonstrated a pragmatic streak, saying that China was developing and that the reunification will be experienced by Hong Kong people as a whole - in other words they will not be alone during the experience.

The views that different groups of women hold

The data from Section C address the fourth research question, *do different categories of women think differently?* The data demonstrate that particular categories of women hold particular views.

Firstly, what views women held regarding the reunification did not seem to be greatly influenced by their age, except for those in the forty and above group (see Table 5.15). While Wilkens (1993) reported that older women were less afraid of the future than younger women (64% of younger women compared with 40% of women 50 and above expressed fear) this study found that not only did older hold more negative views in regard to the reunification than younger women (40% compared with 32% respectively), but that another 40% of women aged 40 and above also held positive views about the reunification. In other words, women of 40 and above were both more positive and more negative than younger women. Research has revealed that the "attitudes of older people change less than do those of younger people" (Myers 1990:256). Perhaps the younger women in this study have been more influenced by events leading up to the reunification (and are therefore more negative overall) while the older women are continuing to subscribe to attitudes formed earlier when reunification was still well ahead in the future. Their opinions, formed before the negotiations, the consequent acrimony, and the accusations and counter-accusations, might well have fallen more evenly into the positive and negative categories.

Another explanation could be that women of forty and over are less likely than younger women to see their lives as endlessly stretching ahead of them. A woman of fifty-three who held a positive attitude towards the reunification reported: *I'm old, and I'm not going to live forever, so they can't do much to me.*

Further, the women who identified themselves as Hong Kongers rather than Chinese held a more negative view towards the reunification. This supports research by others in Hong Kong (Cheng 1996, Hong and Chiu 1995). Like others who identify themselves as Hong Kongers, many of the women in this study reported that they felt anxious about the possibility of China imposing a new cultural identity upon them. While one young woman said: *If I have to dress and talk like a Chinese, then I will be a dork in Hong Kong*, another said: *I am happy being a Hong Kong person, and don't want to be a Chinese.*

Although women who said they belonged to a religious or spiritual group were more negative towards the reunification than those who did not belong to such groups (Table 5.17), what was interesting was that Christians demonstrated a more negative attitude towards the reunification than Buddhists (Table 5.18). One of the reasons could be that Christians see their various churches, the business of which is "evangelization and church growth" (Wu 1995:12), as more vulnerable than Buddhism. Buddhism has had a long history in China and Christianity, by comparison, is a

relatively new phenomenon. No doubt voicing the fear of other Christians, one woman stated that: *China doesn't like the church and they will try to control it in Hong Kong - like on the mainland. What do communists know about religion! - I think they are scared of Christians.*

Although Buddhists, too, have been targeted in China, not only do Buddhists not proselytise, but an important belief of Buddhism is impermanence or change. It may be that the respondents who are Buddhists feel that the current unacceptability of religion to the Chinese authorities is a temporary situation which, with time, will change. Indeed one respondent in the present study referred to this belief and said that she remembered this when she thought about the reunification: *Perhaps if bad times come, later they will change.*

The women who had spent some of their lives outside Hong Kong, most of whom hold overseas passports or have applied for, or been granted, the right to land in a foreign country, tend to hold more negative than positive views. Apart from the few women who have emigrated to Hong Kong from China, they tend also to be in their thirties or forties, have higher education levels, higher status employment, higher personal salaries and come from families which enjoy a higher family income. These findings support research by Lau et al. (1991:179) who claim that those most likely to emigrate are those with more education, higher status occupations and commensurate incomes. Salaff and Wong (1994:213-214) and Skeldon (1994a) also found that emigration was a class-based phenomenon. Like Lau et al.'s (1991) respondents, the women in this study who held negative views towards the reunification believed that there would be a reduction of civil rights and individual liberties, that their living standards would drop and that there would be deterioration of the legal system.

The reason why women of higher socio-economic status hold a more negative view of the reunification than other groups of women could be that this group of women, more highly represented in the professions compared to women in most other Asian countries, has more to lose should things go wrong in Hong Kong.

If the economic situation in Hong Kong worsened, these women may find themselves without employment. They may not then be able to service their mortgages and, subsequently, lose their homes. If, as part of the worsening economic situation, the property market bubble burst, not only would these women (and their families) undoubtedly lose a lot of money (much personal wealth in Hong Kong is tied up in apartments), but, further, if forced from their homes, they would have to wait many

years to be re-housed in public housing as there are already many thousands on the waiting list. Women, too, who live in privately-rented accommodation might not be able to continue paying for the accommodation they are in and, consequently, find themselves on the end of the long waiting list for public housing.

Although having transportable educational assets, the higher socio-economic group of women, if their monetary assets were lost, or if China decided to tie the Hong Kong dollar to the Renminbi instead of the American dollar as it is now, might find it difficult to migrate if they decide life in Hong Kong is untenable. If they did not already have passports allowing them entry to other countries, not only could they be excluded from business migration (because of a loss of assets, or because they could not transfer them out of Hong Kong) but, if they did gain entry to another country, they might find it difficult to begin a new life without adequate assets behind them. Most Chinese leaving Hong Kong expect to buy a house and new car when they arrive at their new country.

Apart from economic considerations, I suggest that the higher socio-economic groups of women may be afraid that a change of political control may not only make their lives more difficult on the personal level (indeed, women seemed more concerned losing their right to free speech and press freedom, for example, than economic factors) but may well reverse the gains that they have experienced in recent years. The change of sovereignty, for instance, could bring changes to the education sector. The extension of compulsory education to girls has led to a higher level of participation in higher education and, consequently, to higher status employment. The higher status employment and accompanying monetary reward has empowered women, not only in the public sphere but in the private sphere also. In the legal sphere also, a change of political status could well bring changes that adversely affect women. For example, a failure on the part of China to support the laws passed in regard to equality for women could see an ebbing of the gains Hong Kong women have made in this area.

Not only would the better-off in Hong Kong find it difficult from socio-economic and political perspectives, but also psychologically. The parents and grandparents of many women in the higher socio-economic groups (as indeed the immediate forebears of any women in Hong Kong) were immigrants from China. Starting with nothing and working long and hard, these people have pulled themselves up the economic and social ladders in Hong Kong. If the more prosperous, in particular, were to find themselves back where their forebears had started, they could

be psychologically damaged in a society which greatly respects those who have attained financial security and have transcended the ranks of manual workers.

While it is true that all women in Hong Kong could be affected if things went awry, I suggest that women of higher socio-economic status are not only aware that they could suffer materially, but because of their wider life experience, may be more aware of the gains women have made in other areas of life that could be lost. That such cognisance, can greatly influence attitudes is demonstrated by the comments from an accountant in her early fifties. Relating the story of her family's struggles in Hong Kong and their eventual success, she commented: *I wouldn't like to lose my money or my house, but, more than that, I think women could end up disadvantaged again - like in my mother's time.* She continued: *Many women in that time didn't go to school - their parents wouldn't allow it, or couldn't afford it - they were sent to work and they had to give their money to the family - they had to do what their father told them to do.* Elaborating further, the woman commented on the *mui tsai* system under which girls were sold to other families as servants and mentioned that, although her father couldn't afford a second wife, she knew several families in which there was more than one wife.

However, while women with less education and of lower socio-economic levels may not be quite as aware of the gains women have made in Hong Kong and perhaps, therefore, do not realise what women could lose, some revealed a pragmatic approach to life which could help them cope with the vicissitudes that bad times in Hong Kong might bring. One such respondent was a woman in her late forties, who, in the lowest socio-economic group and without assets, lives in a public housing flat. With only four years of formal schooling, she works as a cleaner in a factory. She is not interested in politics and, like other women of lower socio-economic status, was unafraid of the future after reunification. Although she said that she did not know *very much because she didn't go to school for very long*, she felt that, even if life got harder economically in Hong Kong after the reunification she would be able to manage because: *I have always been poor and when you have always been poor, then it is easier to be poor.* She considered that if those who were more affluent lost their money, they would find it: *very hard to live like a poor person in Hong Kong.*

Mei Ling, Fong, Candy and Agnes

The unstructured interviews, during which the context of the women's lives was

discussed, revealed the multiple factors that inform the various positions and views of women. Although the women were from different socio-economic groups, the unstructured interviews revealed that women held common beliefs about certain matters. For example, the four women claimed that China wanted Hong Kong for particular reasons - economic and territorial. Further, all four felt that China sought to control Hong Kong people and that China, although adopting capitalist economic practices, would not abandon socialist thinking. Their initial responses were interesting in that both Mei Ling and Fong said they were pessimistic about the reunification, even though, on the whole, women from lower socio-economic groups tended to be less pessimistic about the reunification. Further, Agnes was atypical of the higher socio-economic group in that she stated she was optimistic about the reunification. Candy was more typical of her socio-economic group. Although she initially said she was not apprehensive, it became obvious during the interview that she was both angry and pessimistic.

Mai Ling, Fong and Candy stated that the one country/two systems idea was not feasible (as one said: *If it worked that would be a big miracle I think*), and Agnes thought it would only work until China reunified with Taiwan and only if the *Chairman of China* was trustworthy. Although all four believed that China was changing, none thought that China would abandon socialist thinking.

None of the women was very interested in politics. All had visited China and all had relatives in China. The views the interviewees held towards China were shaped through their own experiences in China, through the stories they had heard from relatives or other people who had been in China (or were still in China), and from reading or watching media reports.

CONCLUSION

This study was influenced by two factors: my observation during the course of my studies that women are positioned as the 'other' and are excluded from the making of sociological and other academic knowledge and by my reading of Haggis's (1990) paper which argued that the voice of women is absent from accounts of historical change. While I acknowledge that change is occurring throughout the world, Hong Kong, as my place of residence, offers great scope as far as observing social change is concerned; this vibrant modern capitalist city, one of the few remaining colonies of

Britain, is being reunified with communist China rather than moving towards independence as most other former colonies have.

My aim in this study has been to give the Chinese women of Hong Kong a 'voice' in regard to their feelings about the reunification of Hong Kong and China. The study demonstrated that most women in Hong Kong believe that the reunification will bring about changes in Hong Kong society and in their own lives. Many perceive these changes negatively. It also showed that different categories of women think differently. Women who are more highly educated, are in professional or associate-professional employment, receive a higher personal salary and are from families of higher total family income are more negative towards reunification than other categories of women.

Most women believe the reunification with China will bring changes to Hong Kong. There was more concern voiced about political considerations than economic factors. It was thought that the structure of the government and government personnel will change, and so too will the systems of law, education, and welfare. Women strongly believe that, with such changes, not only could they lose the rights and freedom that are now guaranteed by law, but that the territory will face a rise in bribery and corruption, and an increasing emphasis on 'backdoorism' and personal and business connections.

Although most women did not think the business and financial sectors would face great changes, some respondents were concerned that unemployment would rise, that there would be fewer job opportunities and that more immigrants would arrive from China (who would take jobs and welfare money). Various emotions were expressed by the women regarding the possible changes: anger, anxiety, fear and helplessness. Overall, the women felt that these changes could destabilise society and that their personal lives would become less secure as typified by Agnes's comments on the possibility of future social unrest (see Chapter 6, p. 144). In view of Hong Kong's past history of social unrest at various times, most notably shown in the riots of 1966 and 1967 (Chapter 3, p. 73), such concern is understandable.

The Case Studies which show the context of the women's lives also demonstrate that although women from particular groups tend to hold certain views, not all women within any one group hold exactly the same opinions. As is demonstrated by the comments in the Case Studies (Chapter Six), women in Hong Kong feel that they are disadvantaged within Hong Kong society. Already positioned

'second' by Confucian tenets, their lower status is confirmed and reinforced by colonial and capitalist discourses. That women were so eager to participate reveals that not only are women's opinions not sought (perhaps one reason why many women thought their views were of no account), but also that women feel the coming changes could affect women more because of their position in Hong Kong society.

While most women were negative or, at least, ambivalent about the reunification, some were positive. Those who were positive (and some who expressed otherwise ambivalent views) focused either on the national or cultural identity of Hong Kong which, they believed, would be strengthened by the reunification, or on the mutual benefits, predominantly economic, for Hong Kong and China.

Undertaking this research has been both an enlightening and humbling experience. Not only did I learn a great deal about Hong Kong and its development, and about the position of women within Hong Kong society and their thoughts in respect to their futures, but I was touched by the willingness of women to share their often quite intimate thoughts. Such generous accommodation repeatedly reminded me that, in order to honour their trust, I must be sensitive to the feelings they shared, not transgress beyond boundaries if they were raised, and treat the opinions shared seriously and honestly.

There are various aspects of this study on which further research could be carried out. Firstly, the views Hong Kong women hold after June 1997 would be an interesting issue to explore. Secondly, although the decolonisation of the British empire has largely been completed, it would be fruitful to allow women in other societies undergoing great social change to tell their stories in their own words in order to present a less biased understanding of the process. While it could be suggested that women are expressing the ideas of men rather than their own thoughts, I argue that, even though both sexes influence each other, what women have said must be understood as their own thoughts and, as such, must be taken seriously. They must not, for whatever reason, be denied the right to be 'makers of knowledge'.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

The Joint Declaration

**Sino-British
JOINT DECLARATION**

Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the relations between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to declare as follows:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows:

- (1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
- (2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.

(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.

(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The Chief Executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in the Government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in Government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.

(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.

(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.

(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.

(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.

(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its cooperation in this connection.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of Government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint Declaration.

6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.

7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.

8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally binding.

Done in duplicate at Beijing on 19 December 1984 in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Appendix B

The Basic Law

BASIC LAW

Chapter I: General Principles

Article 1

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China.

Article 2

The National People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

Article 3

The executive authorities and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Law.

Article 4

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall safeguard the rights and freedoms of the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and of other persons in the Region in accordance with law.

Article 5

The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

Article 6

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall protect the right of private ownership of property in accordance with law.

Article 7

The land and natural resources within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be State property. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for their management, use and development and for their lease or grant to individuals, legal persons or organizations for use or development. The revenues derived therefrom shall be exclusively at the disposal of the Government of the Region.

Article 8

The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 9

In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language by the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 10

Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also use a regional flag and regional emblem. The regional flag of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a red flag with a bauhinia highlighted by five star-tipped stamens. The regional emblem of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a bauhinia in the centre highlighted by five star-tipped stamens and encircled by the words "Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China" in Chinese and "HONG KONG" in English.

Article 11

In accordance with Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the systems and policies practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including the social and economic systems, the system for safeguarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of its residents, the executive, legislative and judicial systems, and the relevant policies, shall be based on the provisions of this Law.

No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this Law.

Chapter II: Relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Article 12

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government.

Article 13

The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China shall establish an office in Hong Kong to deal with foreign affairs.

The Central People's Government authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs on its own in accordance with this Law.

Article 14

The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the defence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for the maintenance of public order in the Region.

Military forces stationed by the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for defence shall not interfere in the local affairs of the Region. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, when necessary, ask the Central People's Government for assistance from the garrison in the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief.

In addition to abiding by national laws, members of the garrison shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Expenditure for the garrison shall be borne by the Central People's Government.

Article 15

The Central People's Government shall appoint the Chief Executive and the principal officials of the executive authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Law.

Article 16

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive power. It shall, on its own, conduct the administrative affairs of the Region in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Law.

Article 17

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with legislative power.

Laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The reporting for record shall not affect the entry into force of such laws.

If the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, after consulting the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under it, considers that any law enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in conformity with the provisions of this Law regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Authorities or regarding the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, the Standing Committee may return the law in question but shall not amend it. Any law returned by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall immediately be invalidated. This invalidation shall not have retroactive effect, unless otherwise provided for in the laws of the Region.

Article 18

The laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region.

National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to this Law. The laws listed therein shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress may add to or delete from the list of laws in Annex III after consulting its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Government of the Region. Laws listed in Annex III to this Law shall be confined to those relating to defence and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region as specified by this Law.

In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the Government of the Region, decides that the Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People's Government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the Region.

Article 19

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the Central People's Government.

Article 20

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may enjoy other powers granted to it by the National People's Congress, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress or the Central People's Government.

Article 21

Chinese citizens who are residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be entitled to participate in the management of state affairs according to law.

In accordance with the assigned number of seats and the selection method specified by the National People's Congress, the Chinese citizens among the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall locally elect deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress to participate in the work of the highest organ of state power.

Article 22

No department of the Central People's Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law.

If there is a need for departments of the Central Government, or for provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government to set up offices in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, they must obtain the consent of the Government of the Region and the approval of the Central People's Government.

All offices set up in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by departments of the Central Government, or by provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the personnel of these offices shall abide by the laws of the Region.

For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government after consulting the Government of the Region.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish an office in Beijing.

Article 23

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

Chapter III: Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents

Article 24

Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong residents") shall include permanent residents and non-permanent residents.

The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:

- (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
- (2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
- (3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);
- (4) Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
- (5) Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of those residents listed in category (4) before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and
- (6) Persons other than those residents listed in categories (1) to (5), who, before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, had the right of abode in Hong Kong only.

The above-mentioned residents shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall be qualified to obtain, in accordance with the laws of the Region, permanent identity cards which state their right of abode.

The non-permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be persons who are qualified to obtain Hong Kong identity cards in accordance with the laws of the Region but have no right of abode.

Article 25

All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law.

Article 26

Permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have the right to vote and the right to stand for election in accordance with law.

Article 27

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.

Article 28

The freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable.

No Hong Kong resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident or deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person shall be prohibited. Torture of any resident or arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of the life of any resident shall be prohibited.

Article 29

The homes and other premises of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. Arbitrary or unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a resident's home or other premises shall be prohibited.

Article 30

The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents shall be protected by law. No department or individual may, on any grounds, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of communication of residents except that the relevant authorities may inspect communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into criminal offences.

Article 31

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of movement within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and freedom of emigration to other countries and regions. They shall have freedom to travel and to enter or leave the Region. Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Region without special authorization.

Article 32

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of conscience.

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of religious belief and freedom to preach and to conduct and participate in religious activities in public.

Article 33

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of choice of occupation.

Article 34

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom to engage in academic research literary and artistic creation, and other cultural activities.

Article 35

Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies. Hong Kong residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the acts of the executive authorities and their personnel.

Article 36

Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in accordance with law. The welfare benefits and retirement security of the labour force shall be protected by law.

Article 37

The freedom of marriage of Hong Kong residents and their right to raise a family freely shall be protected by law.

Article 38

Hong Kong residents shall enjoy the other rights and freedoms safeguarded by the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 39

The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.

Article 40

The lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the "New Territories" shall be protected by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 41

Persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region other than Hong Kong residents shall, in accordance with law, enjoy the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents prescribed in this Chapter.

Article 42

Hong Kong residents and other persons in Hong Kong shall have the obligation to abide by the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Section 1: The Chief Executive

Article 43

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the head of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall represent the Region. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People's Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

Article 44

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years of age who is a permanent resident of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country and has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 20 years.

Article 45

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government.

The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is prescribed in Annex I: "Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region".

Article 46

The term of office of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be five years. He or she may serve for not more than two consecutive terms.

Article 47

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be a person of integrity, dedicated to his or her duties. The Chief Executive on assuming office, shall declare his or her assets to the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. This declaration shall be put on record.

Article 48

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the following powers and functions:

- (1) To lead the Government of the Region;
- (2) To be responsible for the implementation of this Law and other laws which, in accordance with this Law, apply in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
- (3) To sign bills passed by the Legislative Council and to promulgate laws; To sign budgets passed by the Legislative Council and report the budgets and final accounts to the Central People's Government for the record;
- (4) To decide on Government policies and to issue executive orders;
- (5) To nominate and to report to the Central People's Government for appointment the following principal officials: Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Departments, Directors of Bureaux, Commissioner Against Corruption, Director of Audit, Commissioner of Police, Director of Immigration and Commissioner of Customs and Excise; and to recommend to the Central People's Government the removal of the above-mentioned officials;
- (6) To appoint or remove judges of the courts at all levels in accordance with legal procedures;
- (7) To appoint or remove holders of public office in accordance with legal procedures;
- (8) To implement the directives issued by the Central People's Government in respect of the relevant matters provided for in this Law;
- (9) To conduct, on behalf of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, external affairs and other affairs as authorized by the Central Authorities;
- (10) To approve the introduction of motions regarding revenues or expenditure to the Legislative Council;
- (11) To decide, in the light of security and vital public interests, whether Government officials or other personnel in charge of Government affairs should testify or give evidence before the Legislative Council or its committees;
- (12) To pardon persons convicted of criminal offences or commute their penalties; and
- (13) To handle petitions and complaints.

Article 49

If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region considers that a bill passed by the Legislative Council is not compatible with the overall interests of the Region, he or she may return it to the Legislative Council within three months for reconsideration. If the Legislative Council passes the original bill again by not less than a two-thirds majority of all the members, the Chief Executive must sign and

promulgate it within one month, or act in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of this Law.

Article 50

If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region refuses to sign a bill passed the second time by the Legislative Council, or the Legislative Council refuses to pass a budget or any other important bill introduced by the Government, and if consensus still cannot be reached after consultations, the Chief Executive may dissolve the Legislative Council.

The Chief Executive must consult the Executive Council before dissolving the Legislative Council. The Chief Executive may dissolve the Legislative Council only once in each term of his or her office.

Article 51

If the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region refuses to pass the budget introduced by the Government, the Chief Executive may apply to the Legislative Council for provisional appropriations. If appropriation of public funds cannot be approved because the Legislative Council has already been dissolved, the Chief Executive may, prior to the election of the new Legislative Council, approve provisional short-term appropriations according to the level of expenditure of the previous fiscal year.

Article 52

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must resign under any of the following circumstances:

- (1) When he or she loses the ability to discharge his or her duties as a result of serious illness or other reasons;
- (2) When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because he or she twice refuses to sign a bill passed by it, the new Legislative Council again passes by a two-thirds majority of all the members the original bill in dispute, but he or she still refuses to sign it; and
- (3) When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because it refuses to pass a budget or any other important bill, the new Legislative Council still refuses to pass the original bill in dispute.

Article 53

If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is not able to discharge his or her duties for a short period, such duties shall temporarily be assumed by the Administrative Secretary, Financial Secretary or Secretary of Justice in this order of precedence.

In the event that the office of Chief Executive becomes vacant, a Chief Executive shall be selected within six months in accordance with the provisions of Article 45 of this Law. During the period of vacancy, his or her duties

shall be assumed according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Article 54

The Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be an organ for assisting the Chief Executive in policy-making.

Article 55

Members of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be appointed by the Chief Executive from among the principal officials of the executive authorities, members of the Legislative Council and public figures. Their appointment or removal shall be decided by the Chief Executive. The term of office of members of the Executive Council shall not extend beyond the expiry of the term of office of the Chief Executive who appoints them.

Members of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country.

The Chief Executive may, as he or she deems necessary, invite other persons concerned to sit in on meetings of the Council.

Article 56

The Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be presided over by the Chief Executive.

Except for the appointment, removal and disciplining of officials and the adoption of measures in emergencies, the Chief Executive shall consult the Executive Council before making important policy decisions, introducing bills to the Legislative Council, making subordinate legislation, or dissolving the Legislative Council.

If the Chief Executive does not accept a majority opinion of the Executive Council, he or she shall put the specific reasons on record.

Article 57

A Commission Against Corruption shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive.

Article 58

A Commission of Audit shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive.

Section 2: The Executive Authorities

Article 59

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the executive authorities of the Region.

Article 60

The head of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Chief Executive of the Region. A Department of Administration, a Department of Finance, a Department of Justice, and various bureaux, divisions and commissions shall be established in the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 61

The principal officials of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country and have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 15 years.

Article 62

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the following powers and functions:

- (1) To formulate and implement policies;
- (2) To conduct administrative affairs;
- (3) To conduct external affairs as authorized by the Central People's Government under this Law;
- (4) To draw up and introduce budgets and final accounts;
- (5) To draft and introduce bills, motions and subordinate legislation; and
- (6) To designate officials to sit in on the meetings of the Legislative Council and to speak on behalf of the Government.

Article 63

The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions, free from any interference.

Article 64

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must abide by the law and be accountable to the Legislative Council of the Region: it shall implement laws passed by the Council and already in force; it shall present regular policy addresses to the Council; it shall answer questions raised by members of the Council; and it shall obtain approval from the Council for taxation and public expenditure.

Article 65

The previous system of establishing advisory bodies by the executive authorities shall be maintained.

Section 3: The Legislature

Article 66

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the legislature of the Region.

Article 67

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country. However, permanent residents of the Region who are not of Chinese nationality or who have the right of abode in foreign countries may also be elected members of the Legislative Council of the Region, provided that the proportion of such members does not exceed 20 per cent of the total membership of the Council.

Article 68

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election. The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage. The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and motions are prescribed in Annex II: "Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures".

Article 69

The term of office of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be four years, except the first term which shall be two years.

Article 70

If the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is dissolved by the Chief Executive in accordance with the provisions of this Law, it must, within three months, be reconstituted by election in accordance with Article 68 of this Law.

Article 71

The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be elected by and from among the members of the Legislative Council. The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years of age, who is a permanent resident of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country and has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 20 years.

Article 72

The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the following powers and functions:

- (1) To preside over meetings;
- (2) To decide on the agenda, giving priority to Government bills for inclusion in the agenda;

- (3) To decide on the time of meetings;
- (4) To call special sessions during the recess;
- (5) To call emergency sessions on the request of the Chief Executive; and
- (6) To exercise other powers and functions as prescribed in the rules of procedure of the Legislative Council.

Article 73

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the following powers and functions:

- (1) To enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures;
- (2) To examine and approve budgets introduced by the Government;
- (3) To approve taxation and public expenditure;
- (4) To receive and debate the policy addresses of the Chief Executive;
- (5) To raise questions on the work of the Government;
- (6) To debate any issue concerning public interests;
- (7) To endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court;
- (8) To receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents;
- (9) If a motion initiated jointly by one-fourth of all the members of the Legislative Council charges the Chief Executive with serious breach of law or dereliction of duty and if he or she refuses to resign, the Council may, after passing a motion for investigation, give a mandate to the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal to form and chair an independent investigation committee. The committee shall be responsible for carrying out the investigation and reporting its findings to the Council. If the committee considers the evidence sufficient to substantiate such charges, the Council may pass a motion of impeachment by a two-thirds majority of all its members and report it to the Central People's Government for decision; and
- (10) To summon, as required when exercising the above-mentioned powers and functions, persons concerned to testify or give evidence.

Article 74

Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may introduce bills in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the Government may be introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council. The written consent of the Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to Government policies are introduced.

Article 75

The quorum for the meeting of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be not less than one half of all its members. The rules of procedure of the Legislative Council shall be made by the Council on its own, provided that they do not contravene this Law.

Article 76

A bill passed by the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take effect only after it is signed and promulgated by the Chief Executive.

Article 77

Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be immune from legal action in respect of their statements at meetings of the Council.

Article 78

Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall not be subjected to arrest when attending or on their way to a meeting of the Council.

Article 79

The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall declare that a member of the Council is no longer qualified for the office under any of the following circumstances:

- (1) When he or she loses the ability to discharge his or her duties as a result of serious illness or other reasons;
- (2) When he or she, with no valid reason, is absent from meetings for three consecutive months without the consent of the President of the Legislative Council;
- (3) When he or she loses or renounces his or her status as a permanent resident of the Region;
- (4) When he or she accepts a Government appointment and becomes a public servant;
- (5) When he or she is bankrupt or fails to comply with a court order to repay debts;
- (6) When he or she is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one month or more for a criminal offence committed within or outside the Region and is relieved of his or her duties by a motion passed by two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Council present; and
- (7) When he or she is censured for misbehaviour or breach of oath by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Council present.

Section 4: The Judiciary

Article 80

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at all levels shall be the judiciary of the Region, exercising the judicial power of the Region.

Article 81

The Court of Final Appeal, the High Court, district courts, magistrates' courts and other special courts shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The High Court shall comprise the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance.

The judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 82

The power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region, which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal.

Article 83

The structure, powers and functions of the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at all levels shall be prescribed by law.

Article 84

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the Region as prescribed in Article 18 of this Law and may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions.

Article 85

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in the performance of their judicial functions.

Article 86

The principle of trial by jury previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained.

Article 87

In criminal or civil proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the principles previously applied in Hong Kong and the rights previously enjoyed by parties to proceedings shall be maintained.

Anyone who is lawfully arrested shall have the right to a fair trial by the judicial organs without delay and shall be presumed innocent until convicted by the judicial organs.

Article 88

Judges of the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sectors.

Article 89

A judge of a court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may only be removed for inability to discharge his or her duties, or for misbehaviour, by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal and consisting of not fewer than three local judges.

The Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be investigated only for inability to discharge his or her duties, or for misbehaviour, by a tribunal appointed by the Chief Executive and consisting of not fewer than five local judges and may be removed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the tribunal and in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Law.

Article 90

The Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country.

In the case of the appointment or removal of judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Chief Executive shall, in addition to following the procedures prescribed in Articles 88 and 89 of this Law, obtain the endorsement of the Legislative Council and report such appointment or removal to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.

Article 91

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the previous system of appointment and removal of members of the judiciary other than judges.

Article 92

Judges and other members of the judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be chosen on the basis of their judicial and professional qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions.

Article 93

Judges and other members of the judiciary serving in Hong Kong before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may all remain in employment and retain their seniority with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall pay to judges and other members of the judiciary who retire or leave the service in compliance with regulations, including those who have retired or left the service before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

Article 94

On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may make provisions for local lawyers and lawyers from outside Hong Kong to work and practise in the Region.

Article 95

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, through consultations and in accordance with law, maintain juridical relations with the judicial organs of other parts of the country, and they may render assistance to each other.

Article 96

With the assistance or authorization of the Central People's Government, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may make appropriate arrangements with foreign states for reciprocal juridical assistance.

Section 5: District Organizations

District organizations which are not organs of political power may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to be consulted by the Government of the Region on district administration and other affairs, or to be responsible for providing services in such fields as culture, recreation and environmental sanitation.

Article 98

The powers and functions of the district organizations and the method for their formation shall be prescribed by law.

Section 6: Public Servants

Article 99

Public servants serving in all Government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be permanent residents of the Region, except where otherwise provided for in Article 101 of this Law regarding public servants of foreign nationalities and except for those below a certain rank as prescribed by law.

Public servants must be dedicated to their duties and be responsible to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 100

Public servants serving in all Hong Kong Government departments, including the police department, before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, may all remain in employment and retain the seniority with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before.

Article 101

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public service in Hong Kong, or those holding permanent identity cards of the Region, to serve as public servants in Government departments at all levels, but only Chinese citizens among permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign country may fill the following posts: Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Departments, Directors of Bureaux, Commissioner Against Corruption, Director of Audit, Commissioner of Police, Director of Immigration and Commissioner of Customs and Excise. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to Government departments and, when required, may recruit qualified candidates from outside the Region to fill professional and technical posts in Government departments. These foreign nationals shall be employed only in their individual capacities and shall be responsible to the Government of the Region.

Article 102

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall pay to public servants who retire or who leave the service in compliance with regulations, including those who have retired or who have left the service in compliance with regulations before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

Article 103

The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis of their qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service, including special bodies for their appointment, pay and conditions of service, shall be maintained, except for any provision for privileged treatment of foreign nationals.

Article 104

When assuming office, the Chief Executive, principal officials, members of the Executive Council and of the Legislative Council, judges of the courts at all levels and other members of the judiciary in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must, in accordance with law, swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.

Chapter V: Economy

Section 1: Public Finance, Monetary Affairs, Trade, Industry and Commerce

Article 105

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, in accordance with law, protect the right of individuals and legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of property and their right to compensation for lawful deprivation of their property.

Such compensation shall correspond to the real value of the property concerned at the time and shall be freely convertible and paid without undue delay. The ownership of enterprises and the investments from outside the Region shall be protected by law.

Article 106

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have independent finances.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes, and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government.

The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 107

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow the principle of keeping expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic product.

Article 108

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall practise an independent taxation system.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, taking the low tax policy previously pursued in Hong Kong as reference, enact laws on its own concerning types of taxes, tax rates, tax reductions, allowances and exemptions, and other matters of taxation.

Article 109

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.

Article 110

The monetary and financial systems of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be prescribed by law. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate monetary and financial policies, safeguard the free operation of financial business and financial markets, and regulate and supervise them in accordance with law.

Article 111

The Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, shall continue to circulate.

The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The issue of Hong Kong currency must be backed by a 100 per cent reserve fund. The system regarding the issue of Hong Kong currency and the reserve fund system shall be prescribed by law.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may authorize designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency.

Article 112

No foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities, futures and the like shall continue.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall safeguard the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Region.

Article 113

The Exchange Fund of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be managed and controlled by the Government of the Region, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.

Article 114

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of a free port and shall not impose any tariff unless otherwise prescribed by law.

Article 115

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall pursue the policy of free trade and safeguard the free movement of goods, intangible assets and capital.

Article 116

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name "Hong Kong, China", participate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements, which are obtained or made by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or which were obtained or made and remain valid, shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Region.

Article 117

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may issue its own certificates of origin for products in accordance with prevailing rules of origin.

Article 118

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide an economic and legal environment for encouraging investments, technological progress and the development of new industries.

Article 119

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall formulate appropriate policies to promote and co-ordinate the development of various trades such as manufacturing, commerce, tourism, real estate, transport, public utilities, services, agriculture and fisheries, and pay regard to the protection of the environment.

Section 2: Land Leases

Article 120

All leases of land granted, decided upon or renewed before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases, shall continue to be recognized and protected under the law of the Region.

Article 121

As regards all leases of land granted or renewed where the original leases contain no right of renewal, during the period from 27 May 1985 to 30 June 1997, which extend beyond 30 June 1997 and expire not later than 30 June 2047, the lessee is not required to pay an additional

premium as from 1 July 1997, but an annual rate equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.

Article 122

In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 1 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, where the property is granted to, a lessee descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the previous rent shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that lessee or by one of his law successors in the male line.

Article 123

Where leases of land without a right of renewal expire after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, they shall be dealt with in accordance with laws and policies formulated by the Region on its own.

Section 3: Shipping

Article 124

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation, including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, define its specific functions and responsibilities in respect of shipping.

Article 125

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorized by the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates under its legislation, using the name "Hong Kong, China".

Article 126

With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the special permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access to the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Region.

Article 127

Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may continue to operate freely.

Section 4: Civil Aviation

Article 128

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide conditions and take measures for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation.

Article 129

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong Kong and keep its own aircraft register in accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft.

Access of foreign state aircraft to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall require the special permission of the Central People's Government.

Article 130

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated to it under the regional air navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Article 131

The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, make arrangements providing air services between the Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines incorporated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and other airlines of the People's Republic of China.

Article 132

All air service agreements providing air services between other parts of the People's Republic of China and other states and regions with stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other states and regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's Government.

In concluding the air service agreements referred to in the first paragraph of this Article, the Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and consult the Government of the Region.

Representatives of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as members of the

delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, participate in air service consultations conducted by the Central People's Government with foreign Governments concerning arrangements for such services referred to in the first paragraph of this Article.

Article 133

Acting under specific authorizations from the Central People's Government, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may:

- (1) renew or amend air service agreements and arrangements previously in force;
 - (2) negotiate and conclude new air service agreements providing routes for airlines incorporated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and providing rights for over-flights and technical stops; and
 - (3) negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements with foreign states or regions with which no air service agreements have been concluded.
- All scheduled air services to, from or through Hong Kong, which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of China shall be regulated by the air service agreements or provisional arrangements referred to in this Article.

Article 134

The Central People's Government shall give the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the authority to:

- (1) negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning the implementation of the air service agreements and provisional arrangements referred to in Article 133 of this Law;
- (2) issue licences to airlines incorporated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong;
- (3) designate such airlines under the air service agreements and provisional arrangements referred to in Article 133 of this Law; and
- (4) issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or through the mainland of China.

Article 135

Airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and businesses related to civil aviation functioning there prior to the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may continue to operate.

Chapter VI: Education, Science, Culture, Sports, Religion, Labour and Social Services

Section 1: Public Finance, Monetary Affairs, Trade, Industry and Commerce

Article 136

On the basis of the previous educational system, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of education, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational qualifications. Community organizations and individuals may, in accordance with law, run educational undertakings of various kinds in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 137

Educational institutions of all kinds may retain their autonomy and enjoy academic freedom. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Schools run by religious organizations may continue to provide religious education, including courses in religion. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of educational institutions and freedom to pursue their education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Article 138

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies to develop Western and traditional Chinese medicine and to improve medical and health services. Community organizations and individuals may provide various medical and health services in accordance with law.

Article 139

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on science and technology and protect by law achievements in scientific and technological research, patents, discoveries and inventions.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, decide on the scientific and technological standards and specifications applicable in Hong Kong.

Article 140

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on culture and protect by law the achievements and the lawful rights and interests of authors in their

literary and artistic creation.

Article 141

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall not restrict the freedom of religious belief, interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations or restrict religious activities which do not contravene the laws of the Region.

Religious organizations shall, in accordance with law, enjoy the rights to acquire, use, dispose of and inherit property and the right to receive financial assistance. Their previous property rights and interests shall be maintained and protected.

Religious organizations may, according to their previous practice, continue to run seminaries and other schools, hospitals and welfare institutions and to provide other social services.

Religious organizations and believers in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may maintain and develop their relations with religious organizations and believers elsewhere.

Article 142

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on the basis of maintaining the previous systems concerning the professions, formulate provisions on its own for assessing the qualifications for practice in the various professions. Persons with professional qualifications or qualifications for professional practice obtained prior to the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may retain their previous qualifications in accordance with the relevant regulations and codes of practice.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to recognize the professions and the professional organizations recognized prior to the establishment of the Region, and the organizations may, on their own, assess and confer professional qualifications.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as required by development in society and in consultation with the parties concerned, recognize new professions and professional organizations.

Article 143

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on sports. Non-Governmental sports organizations may continue to exist and develop in accordance with law.

Article 144

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the policies previously practised in Hong Kong in respect

subventions for non-Governmental organizations in fields such as education, medicine and health, culture, art, recreation, sports, social welfare and social work. Staff members previously serving in subvented organizations in Hong Kong may remain in their employment in accordance with the previous system.

Article 145

On the basis of the previous social welfare system, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and social needs.

Article 146

Voluntary organizations providing social services in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, on their own, decide their forms of service, provided that the law is not contravened.

Article 147

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall on its own formulate laws and policies relating to labour.

Article 148

The relationship between non-Governmental organizations in fields such as education, science, technology, culture, art, sports, the professions, medicine and health, labour, social welfare and social work as well as religious organizations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and their counterparts on the mainland shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual respect.

Article 149

Non-Governmental organizations in fields such as education, science, technology, culture, art, sports, the professions, medicine and health, labour, social welfare and social work as well as religious organizations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may maintain and develop relations with their counterparts in foreign countries and regions and with relevant international organizations. They may, as required, use the name "Hong Kong, China" in the relevant activities.

Chapter VII: External Affairs

Article 150

Representatives of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as members of delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, participate in negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Region conducted by the Central People's Government.

Article 151

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name "Hong Kong, China", maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields.

Article 152

Representatives of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as members of delegations of the People's Republic of China, participate in international organizations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the Region, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the international organization or conference concerned, and may express their views, using the name "Hong Kong, China".

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name "Hong Kong, China", participate in international organizations and conferences not limited to states.

The Central People's Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those international organizations of which the People's Republic of China is a member and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The Central People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity in those international organizations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.

Article 153

The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Region, and after seeking the views of the Government of the Region. International agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may continue to be implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorize or assist the Government of the Region to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Region of other relevant international agreements.

Article 154

The Central People's Government shall authorize the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to issue, in accordance with law, passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all Chinese citizens who hold permanent identity cards of the Region, and travel documents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all states and regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Region.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may apply immigration controls on entry into, stay in and departure from the Region by persons from foreign states and regions.

Article 155

The Central People's Government shall assist or authorize the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conclude visa abolition agreements with foreign states or regions.

Article 156

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official or semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries and shall report the establishment of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.

Article 157

The establishment of foreign consular and other official or semiofficial missions in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall require the approval of the Central People's Government.

Consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions established in Hong Kong by states which have no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be permitted either to remain or be changed to semi-official missions.

States not recognized by the People's Republic of China may only establish non-Governmental institutions in the Region.

Article 158

The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region. The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall before making their final judgments which are appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law.

Article 159

The power of amendment of this Law shall be vested in the National People's Congress.

The power to propose bills for amendments to this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Amendment bills of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be submitted to the National People's Congress by delegation of the Region to the National People's Congress after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress. Two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region, before a bill for amendment to this Law is put on the agenda of the National People's Congress, the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall study it and submit its views. No amendment to this Law shall contravene established basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.

Appendix C

The Questionnaire

- (i) The questionnaire (English)**
- (ii) The questionnaire (Chinese)**
- (iii) Information sheet (English)**
- (iv) Information sheet (Chinese)**
- (v) Consent form (English)**
- (vi) Consent form (Chinese)**

Appendix C(i)

The questionnaire (English)

QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION - I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW JUST A LITTLE BIT ABOUT YOU SO I CAN SEE HOW DIFFERENT GROUPS OF WOMEN IN HONG KONG FEEL ABOUT THE ISSUES SURROUNDING 1997 AND REUNIFICATION WITH CHINA.

Please tick the appropriate box



1. Which age group do you belong to?

- ☐ 19 or below
- ☐ 20 - 29
- ☐ 30 - 39
- ☐ 40 - 49
- ☐ 50 - 59
- ☐ 60 - 69
- ☐ 70 +

2. Where do you live?

- ☐ in a flat/house owned by you and/or your family
- ☐ in a rented public housing flat
- ☐ in a rented private flat
- ☐ other (please specify)

3. How many years of schooling did you have at

- ☐ primary school - ____ years
- ☐ secondary school - ____ years
- ☐ technical institute - ____ years
- ☐ university - ____ years

☐ other (please specify)

4. Do you regard yourself as:

- ☐ A HongKonger first and a Chinese second
- ☐ A Chinese first and a HongKonger second
- ☐ Some other identification - please state

5. Have you always lived in Hong Kong?

☐ yes

☐ no



If no:

a. How many years have you lived in Hong Kong?
____ years

b. Please list the other countries and how long you lived in them.

6. What passport/s do you hold?

- ☐ American
- ☐ Australian
- ☐ BDTC
- ☐ BNO
- ☐ British
- ☐ Canadian
- ☐ Chinese (P.R.C.)
- ☐ New Zealand
- ☐ Taiwanese
- ☐ other (please specify)

7. Do you have the right to land as an immigrant in any other country/ies?

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no

If yes:

Which country/ies?

8. Do you currently have a paid job?

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no

If yes:

a. is your employment

- ☐ full time
- ☐ part time

b. what kind of work do you do?

c. what is your monthly salary?

- ☐ less than \$2,000
- ☐ \$2,000 - \$2,999
- ☐ \$3,000 - \$3,999
- ☐ \$4,000 - \$4,999
- ☐ \$5,000 - \$5,999
- ☐ \$6,000 - \$6,999
- ☐ \$7,000 - \$7,999
- ☐ \$8,000 - \$8,999
- ☐ \$9,000 - \$9,999
- ☐ \$10,000 - \$14,999
- ☐ \$15,000 - \$19,999
- ☐ \$20,000 - \$24,999
- ☐ \$25,000 - \$29,999
- ☐ \$30,000 - \$39,999
- ☐ \$40,000 and over

9. Partnership Status

- ☐ single (never married)
- ☐ separated
- ☐ divorced
- ☐ widowed
- ☐ currently married/
partnered

If currently married/partnered:

a. In which country was your husband/partner born?

b. How many years has he lived in Hong Kong?

c. Which passports does he hold?

- ☐ American
☐ Australian
☐ BDTC
☐ BNO
☐ British
☐ Canadian
☐ Chinese (P.R.C.)
☐ Indian
☐ New Zealand
☐ Taiwanese
☐ Other (Please specify)

d. Does your husband/partner currently have a paid job?

- ☐ yes
☐ no

If yes:

i) what kind of work does he do?

10. What is the total household income? Please include income from sources other than salaries (such as stocks, shares, educational allowances, housing allowances etc.).

- ☐ less than \$4,000
☐ \$4,000 - \$4,999
☐ \$5,000 - \$5,999
☐ \$6,000 - \$6,999
☐ \$7,000 - \$7,999
☐ \$8,000 - \$8,999
☐ \$9,000 - \$9,999
☐ \$10,000 - \$14,999
☐ \$15,000 - \$19,999
☐ \$20,000 - \$24,999
☐ \$25,000 - \$29,999
☐ \$30,000 - \$39,999
☐ \$40,000 - \$49,999
☐ \$50,000 and over
☐ not known to me

11. Do you have children?

- ☐ yes
☐ no

If yes:

a. do you care for these children

- ☐ full time
☐ part time

b. what ages/sex are the children?

☐ Hindu
 ☐ Muslim
 ☐ Taoist
 ☐ Other (Please specify)

12. Are you a member of a political party?

☐ yes
 ☐ no

If yes:
 Which party do you support?

13. Do you identify with a particular politician?

☐ yes
 ☐ no

If yes:
 Which person do you identify with?

14. Are you a member of a religious or spiritual group?

☐ yes
 ☐ no

If yes:
 Which church or group?
☐ Buddhist
☐ Catholic
☐ Christian

15. Do you plan to leave Hong Kong to live overseas in the future?

☐ no, I would like to go but can't
☐ no, I do not wish to go
☐ don't know yet - I want to go, and have an application for another country pending
☐ don't know yet - I will wait and see what happens in Hong Kong
☐ don't know - haven't thought about it
☐ yes, I am leaving

If yes:
 a. when do you plan to leave?

 b. which country will you go to?

 c. do you really want to go?
☐ yes
☐ no

SECTION B: IN THIS SECTION I AM INTERESTED IN YOUR OWN THOUGHTS REGARDING REUNIFICATION WITH CHINA AND HOW THIS MAY BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN YOUR OWN LIFE.

1. In a general sense, how will Hong Kong change after reunification?

2. On a personal level, do you have any particular fears or worries as to how your life may change because of changes in the larger society?

3. Are you optimistic about any aspect(s) of the reunification?

4. What would you like to see happen in Hong Kong?

5. What will your life be like in ten years' time? (Economically, family-wise, job-wise).

6. Is there anything else you would like to share with me about your thoughts on reunification with China?

SECTION C: IN THIS SECTION I AM INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS TOWARDS CERTAIN ISSUES WITH REGARD TO 1997 AND REUNIFICATION WITH CHINA.

PLEASE INDICATE HOW MUCH YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH STATEMENT BY CIRCLING THE ANSWER WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR VIEWS. PLEASE REMEMBER, THERE IS NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWER - I AM INTERESTED IN YOUR HONEST OPINIONS.

A) POLITICS/LAW AND ORDER/CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS		Strongly Agree					Strongly Disagree				
		1	2	3	4	5					
1.	I think that people who say that Hong Kong will be politically unstable after 1997 do not need to worry.										
2.	I believe that sovereignty, rather than political stability, is the prime concern of the Chinese government.										
3.	It will be possible to successfully run the "one country, two systems" idea outlined in the Joint Declaration.										
4.	I am confident that China will allow Hong Kong people to run Hong Kong after 1997.										
5.	The appointment of Special Advisers is of benefit only to China.										
6.	I will be prepared to swear my loyalty to the government of the People's Republic of China on 1st July 1997.										
7.	Political freedom is more important than economic prosperity.										
8.	After reunification Hong Kong will continue to control how many people are allowed into the territory.										

		Strongly Agree					Strongly Disagree				
		1	2	3	4	5					
9.	The 'rule of law', as Hong Kong people experience it now, will continue in the post-1997 era.										
10.	I am worried that there will be no protection of human rights in Hong Kong after 1997.										
11.	The civil liberties that Hong Kong citizens now enjoy will continue to be guaranteed in Hong Kong after reunification with China.										
12.	There is no reason to believe that corruption in the civil service will increase after 1997.										
13.	When top Chinese officials tells civil servants "not to worry" about the post-1997 era, they should believe what is said.										
14.	I will feel worried when I encounter PLA personnel on the streets of Hong Kong after 1997.										
15.	After 1997 the press in Hong Kong will continue to enjoy freedom of expression.										
16.	Religious groups in Hong Kong will continue to have the right to worship without restriction after 1997.										
B) BUSINESS/ECONOMY											
17.	The prosperity of Hong Kong will continue after Hong Kong and China unite.										
18.	I think that sovereignty, not economic prosperity, is the most important thing for Beijing.										

		Strongly Agree				Strongly Disagree
19.	Being able to make money is more important to Hong Kong people than political freedom.	1	2	3	4	5
20.	I am sure that my personal standard of living will decrease after 1997.	1	2	3	4	5
21.	There will be an increase in corrupt business practices after 1997.	1	2	3	4	5
22.	After 1997 Hong Kong will be allowed to decide its own economic policies.	1	2	3	4	5
C) WOMEN/FAMILY/CHILDREN						
23.	I feel that, after 1997, I will have no control over my future.	1	2	3	4	5
24.	The post-1997 era is not a promising one for the children of Hong Kong.	1	2	3	4	5
25.	I believe that China will allow Hong Kong people to continue to have more than one child.	1	2	3	4	5
26.	It would be a good idea if, after 1997, China insisted that Mandarin be the medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	1	2	3	4	5
27.	It is important that Hong Kong children continue to learn English after 1997.	1	2	3	4	5
28.	It would upset me if Hong Kong teachers had to incorporate socialist ideology into their lessons after 1997.	1	2	3	4	5
29.	I have confidence that the Chinese government will keep any promise it has made to Hong Kong.	1	2	3	4	5
30.	People, as individuals, will matter less after 1997.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix C(ii)

The questionnaire (Chinese)

問 卷

4. 你覺得自己是:

- ☐ 香港人，其次才是中國人
☐ 中國人，其次才是香港人
☐ 其他國籍 - 請註明

甲部：背景資料

請回答以下個人資料部分，以助本人分析香港不同組別婦女對九七問題的反應。

請在適當的空格內加 ☒

1. 你屬於那類年齡組別?

- ☐ 19 或以下
☐ 20-29
☐ 30-39
☐ 40-49
☐ 50-59
☐ 60-69
☐ 70 +

2. 你住於何處?

- ☐ 一層樓/自置房屋/與家人同住
☐ 租住公共屋邨單位
☐ 租住私人樓
☐ 其他(請註明)

3. 你的教育程度

- ☐ 小學 _____ 年
☐ 中學 _____ 年
☐ 工業學院 _____ 年
☐ 大學 _____ 年
☐ 其他(請註明)

5. 你是否長居於香港?

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如若:

甲. 你在香港居住了多少年?

_____ 年

乙. 請列出你曾住過的國家及居住年期

6. 你拿什麼護照?

- ☐ 美國
 - ☐ 澳州
 - ☐ BDTC(英國屬土公民護照)
 - ☐ BNO(英國國民(海外)護照)
 - ☐ 英國
 - ☐ 加拿大
 - ☐ 中國(中華人民共和國)
 - ☐ 新西蘭
 - ☐ 台灣
 - ☐ 其他(請註明)
- _____

7. 你可否往另一個/或一個以上國家報到, 成為其新移民?

- ☐ 是
- ☐ 否

如是:
哪一個/或哪幾個國家?

8. 現時你是否有一份受薪工作?

- ☐ 是
- ☐ 否

如是:

甲. 你的工作是

- ☐ 全職
- ☐ 兼職

乙. 你做的是什麼工作?

丙. 你的月薪是:

- ☐ 少於\$2,000
- ☐ \$2,000-\$2,999
- ☐ \$3,000-\$3,999
- ☐ \$4,000-\$4,999
- ☐ \$5,000-\$5,999
- ☐ \$6,000-\$6,999
- ☐ \$7,000-\$7,999
- ☐ \$8,000-\$8,999
- ☐ \$9,000-\$9,999
- ☐ \$10,000-\$14,999
- ☐ \$15,000-\$19,999
- ☐ \$20,000-\$24,999
- ☐ \$25,000-\$29,999
- ☐ \$30,000-\$39,999
- ☐ \$40,000 或以上

9. 婚姻狀況

- ☐ 單身(從未結過婚)
- ☐ 分居
- ☐ 離婚
- ☐ 守寡
- ☐ 已結婚/同居

如現時已結婚/同居

甲. 你丈夫/伴侶出生於哪一個國家?

乙. 他居港多少年?

丙. 他所持的護照是

- ☐ 美國
☐ 澳洲
☐ BDTC(英國屬土公民護照)
☐ BNO(英國國民(海外)護照)
☐ 英國
☐ 加拿大
☐ 中國 (中華人民共和國)
☐ 印度
☐ 新西蘭
☐ 台灣
☐ 其他(請註明)

丁. 你的丈夫/伴侶目前是否有受薪工作?

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如是
i) 什麼類型的工作?

- ☐ \$7,000-\$7,999
☐ \$8,000-\$8,999
☐ \$9,000-\$9,999
☐ \$10,000-\$14,999
☐ \$15,000-\$19,999
☐ \$20,000-\$24,999
☐ \$25,000-\$29,999
☐ \$30,000-\$39,999
☐ \$40,000-\$49,999
☐ \$50,000 或以上
☐ 本人不清楚

11. 你有孩子嗎?

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如是:
甲. 你照顧孩子的時間是
☐ 全職
☐ 兼職
乙. 孩子的年紀/性別?

12. 你是否某政黨的會員?

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如是:
你支持那一政黨?

10. 全家的總收入多少? 請包括正職及所有收入 (例如股票、股份、教育津貼、房屋津貼, 等等)。

- ☐ 少於\$4,000
☐ \$4,000-\$4,999
☐ \$5,000-\$5,999
☐ \$6,000-\$6,999

15. 你有打算離開香港，將來在外國定居嗎？

- ☐ 不會，我想離開但不夠。
☐ 不會，我不打算走。
☐ 不知道 - 我想走，但申請仍未被其他國家批出。
☐ 知道 - 我會等待，靜觀香港的發展。
☐ 不知道 - 未有想過
☐ 是，我會離開

如是：

甲. 打算何時起程？

乙. 欲往哪一國家？

c. 你真的打算前往？

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

13. 你有認同某一政客嗎？

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如有：

你認同的人士是？

14. 你是否某一宗教或靈修組織會員？

- ☐ 是
☐ 否

如是：

那一間教會或團體？

- ☐ 佛教
☐ 天主教
☐ 基督教
☐ 印度教
☐ 回教
☐ 道教
☐ 其他(請註明)

乙部：在這部份，我有興趣知道你對回歸中國的想法，及中國統一對你個人生活的影響。

1. 一般來說，統一後香港會有何改變？

2. 在個人的層面來說，你有沒有恐懼或擔心香港社會的變遷會影響你個人生活？

3. 對於回歸中國，你是否抱樂觀態度？

4. 你希望香港有何改變？

5. 十年後，你自己的生活狀況如何？

6. 關於九七回歸中國問題，你有沒有其他想法與我分享？

丙部：在以下部分，本人想知道你對有關九七問題及香港回歸中國的一些問題的意見。

請圈出以下各題答案，表示同意與不同意。所有答案並沒有對錯之分，我只是非常有興趣知道你們個人的意見。

甲) 政治/法律與治安/公民權及人權	非常 同意				非常 不同意
1. 我想那些說香港在九七年後會政治動盪的人，實在毋須憂慮。	1	2	3	4	5
2. 我相信政權是中國政府的主要關注點，而不是政治穩定性。	1	2	3	4	5
3. 聯合聲明中，有關「一國兩制」的提議，是可能成功實行。	1	2	3	4	5
4. 我有信心，九七年以後中國會讓港人治港。	1	2	3	4	5
5. 委任特別顧問，只對中國有利。	1	2	3	4	5
6. 1997年7月1日，我願意宣誓向中華人民共和國政府效忠。	1	2	3	4	5
7. 政治自由比經濟繁榮更重要。	1	2	3	4	5
8. 主權移交中國以後，香港會繼續有權控制來港人士數目。	1	2	3	4	5
9. 香港人現時擁有的「法治精神」，九七年後將會繼續享有。	1	2	3	4	5
10. 我擔心九七年後，香港不會再保護人權。	1	2	3	4	5

	非常 同意				非常 不同意
11. 回歸中國以後，香港居民的個人自由會繼續受到保障。	1	2	3	4	5
12. 沒有理由相信公務員貪污會於九七年後增長。	1	2	3	4	5
13. 當中國高級官員告訴公務員「不用憂慮」九七後問題，他們應該相信。	1	2	3	4	5
14. 九七年後，在街上遇到解放軍人員，我會覺得憂慮。	1	2	3	4	5
15. 九七年後，香港報界仍會享有言論自由。	1	2	3	4	5
16. 宗教團體，於九七年後，會繼續有權崇拜，不受限制。	1	2	3	4	5

乙) 商業/經濟

17. 香港於回歸中國以後，仍會保持繁榮。	1	2	3	4	5
18. 我想，對北京來說，主權比經濟繁榮重要。	1	2	3	4	5
19. 對香港人來說，賺錢比政治自由更為重要。	1	2	3	4	5
20. 我肯定九七年後，我個人的生活水平會下降。	1	2	3	4	5
21. 九七年後，商界的貪污情況，會有增長。	1	2	3	4	5
22. 九七年以後，香港仍可以決定其經濟政策。	1	2	3	4	5

丙) 婦女/家庭/兒童

23. 我覺得九七年以後，我不能再主宰自己的將來。	1	2	3	4	5
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	非常 同意			非常 不同意		
24. 九七年以後的日子，對兒童來說，不大樂觀。	1	2	3	4	5	
25. 我相信中國政府會容許港人繼續生養過一個子。	1	2	3	4	5	
26. 九七年後，如中國堅持推行普通話成為教學語言，將會是一項好的提議。	1	2	3	4	5	
27. 九七年以後，香港學生一定要繼續學習英語。	1	2	3	4	5	
28. 九七年以後，如本港教師，在課堂中要教授社會主義思想，我會感到難過。	1	2	3	4	5	
29. 我對中國政府所作的承諾，很有信心。	1	2	3	4	5	
30. 於九七年後，人民作為個體來說，不會再受重視。	1	2	3	4	5	

Appendix C(iii)**Information sheet (English)**

INFORMATION SHEET

TOWARDS 1997 AND THE REUNIFICATION OF HONG KONG WITH CHINA: THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG WOMEN

The person conducting this research

This research project is being carried out by Julie Talbot who is a Masters' student at Massey University in New Zealand. She has lived in Hong Kong for seven years and is vitally interested in the lives of women in the territory.

If you have any questions about this study please contact Julie Talbot at -



The research is being supervised by Dr Mary Murray, Senior Lecturer in Sociology:

Sociology Department
Massey University
Private Bag 11-222
Palmerston North, New Zealand
Ph. (64) 635 69099

What the study is about

The study I will conduct concerns the views held by Chinese women in Hong Kong regarding the political, economic and social issues surrounding 1997 and the reunification of Hong Kong with China.

Although Britain is ceding its sovereignty over Hong Kong, the territory, unlike the approximately one hundred former colonies who have gained independence in the last fifty years, will be reunified with China which, although adopting capitalist economic practices, continues to espouse communist ideology. Although the Joint Declaration (signed by both Britain and China in September 1984) states that Hong Kong can, via a 'one-country, two-systems' formula, maintain its current practices for the next fifty years, recent developments suggest that Beijing is now reluctant to abide by the promises it was signatory to. The way of life, therefore, that Hong Kong people currently enjoy, may well be under threat.

The goal of this study is to explore what changes women think will occur in the larger society if Beijing implements its own interpretation of the Joint Declaration, how they think these changes will bring about changes in their own lives, and to ascertain whether particular groups of women hold similar views.

Following an initial interview of 45-60 minutes, a second unstructured interview will be conducted with some respondents to explore in more depth issues that arise in the initial interviews.

Objectives

This study seeks to determine what views are held by Chinese women in this time of uncertainty in Hong Kong, and to give women, so often ignored in the process of decolonisation, a voice.

What you will have to do

If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to meet with Julie Talbot (and her interpreter if needed) for an interview of about 45-60 minutes. This interview would take place at a time convenient to you. The answers you give will be written down by Julie Talbot. Information gathered from the research will be included in Julie Talbot's Masterate thesis. Information gathered from the research may also be used in academic articles.

The interview will include questions seeking demographic information, and your views about the changes that may occur in society and your personal lives. You will also be asked whether or not you agree with certain statements that have been written in the newspapers about possible changes that may occur.

You may be asked to participate in a second interview in which the issues will be explored in further depth. Whether or not you actually participate will be entirely up to yourself. This interview will be taped. Interpreters and transcribers will be signing a confidentiality contract.

Your rights/ Anonymity and confidentiality

If you participate in this study, you have the right to:

1. refuse to answer any particular question, and to withdraw from the study at any time;
2. ask any questions that occur to you about the study at any time;
3. discuss your views on the understanding that they are completely confidential to the researcher, to the interpreter if used, and to the transcriber, and on the understanding that no names or identifying characteristics will be used in any reports about the study;
4. examine and amend the transcript of the interview, to add further comments, and to indicate any part of the transcript that you do not wish to be used;
5. feel assured that all consent and interview forms, tape recordings and transcripts will be destroyed before 30th June 1997.

Signed _____ (Julie Talbot)

Appendix C(iv)**Information sheet (Chinese)**

背景資料

香港婦女對於九七問題及香港回歸中國的意見

研究員

是項研究由茱莉•陶德禮女士負責，她是新西蘭馬斯大學碩士學生。陶女士居港七年，對本港婦女方面的研究，極感興趣。

如閣下對此項研究有任何疑問，請與陶女士聯絡：

香港九龍塘達之路 88 號

德智苑第四座 0B 室

研究計劃由社會學高級講師瑪利•梅慧博士督導：

社會學系

馬斯大學

Private Bag 11-222

Palmerston North, 新西蘭

電話：(64) 635-69099

研究內容

本人於此項研究中，致力找出香港的中國婦女對於與九七及回歸有關的政治、經濟及社會問題的意見。

在過往五十年來，有大約 150 個英國殖民地相繼獨立。雖然英國將把香港主權交還中國，與其他已獨立的殖民地不同，中國行資本主義經濟路線，但仍是共產國家。根據聯合聲明(由中、英兩國於 1984 年 9 月簽署)，香港可以以「一國兩制」模式，保障五十年不變，不過從近期的發展看來，北京政府表現出不願意遵守協議訂定的承諾。香港人現有的生活方式可能受到威脅。

本研究計劃的目標是找出社會上婦女界對轉變中的香港的意見，例如北京一意孤行地解釋聯合聲明內容，婦女如何看待這些變動對她們生活的影響，又嘗試找出某些婦女組別是否有相同意見。

第一次訪問為時 50-60 分鐘，第二次訪面，形式較自由，受訪者會就第一次訪問中某些問題，作更深入探討。

目的

本研究的主要目的是讓中國婦女在這變動時期可以發表她們的意見，很多時，在非殖民化過程中，婦女們的意見，往往受到忽視。

你所要做的

如你願意參與是項研究，閣下將被邀請與茱莉•陶德禮女士會面(如有需要，她的傳譯助手也會出席)，訪問時間為 45-60 分鐘。時間儘量遷就閣下。訪問全部內容，由陶女士筆錄，用作她碩士論文資料或學報文章。

訪問內容包括個人資料，閣下對於變動對社會及你個人的影響。同時，訪問者也會徵詢你對報章上關於可能發生的改變的意見。

如有需要，閣下可能被邀請出席第二次訪問，對某些問題作更深入探討。出席與否，全由閣下決定。訪問進行時會作錄音，傳譯員及翻譯員會簽署保密協議。

閣下的權利/不記名及絕對保密

參與是項研究人士，有以下權利：

1. 拒絕回答某些問題，或於任何時間停止參與上述研究計劃；
2. 可於任何時間詢問有關該項研究的問題；
3. 討論個人意見，研究員、傳譯員及翻譯員絕對不會洩漏閣下的姓名或意見；
4. 細閱和更改訪問稿，增減意見，或指明某一部份不予以運用；
5. 1997 年 6 月 30 日前，保證所有同意書、訪問表格、錄音及譯稿一定銷毀。

簽署：_____ (茱莉•陶德禮)

Appendix C(v)

Consent form (English)

**TOWARDS 1997 AND THE REUNIFICATION OF HONG KONG WITH CHINA:
THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG WOMEN**

CONSENT FORM

I have read the Information sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I agree to participate and I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and to decline to answer any particular questions.

I agree/do not agree to the interview being audiotaped.

I understand that I have the right to ask for the audiotape to be turned off at any time during the interview.

I also understand that any interviews will be arranged at a time convenient to me.

Confidentiality will be assured via the following measures:

- (i) the interview forms and consent forms will not be held together, and will be held in a secure place;
- (ii) personal data and other information collected via the interviews will be used for statistical purposes only, that all findings will be reported as a group and that no names will be used;
- (iii) the interview tapes will only be listened to by Julie Talbot and her transcriber;
- (iv) the interpreter and transcriber will be required to sign an undertaking on confidentiality;
- (v) audio interview tapes will be destroyed before 30 June 1997. Please indicate whether you would like the tapes destroyed or returned to you. (Please tick appropriate box.)

Destroy

☐

Return

☐

I can examine, amend, and add further comments to the interview form, and indicate any part of the information given that I do not wish to be used.

I can, at any time, renegotiate this agreement with Julie Talbot.

I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information sheet.

I give permission to Julie Talbot to use the information gained during the research in any publication she may write.

Signed _____ (Respondent)

_____ (Researcher)

_____ (date)

Appendix C(vi)**Consent form (Chinese)**

香港婦女對九七問題及香港回歸中國的意見

同意書

本人已閱畢背景資料及明白此研究的細則。我同時明白到如將來有問題，可以隨時提出。

我同意參與，亦明白到自已已有權隨時退出或拒絕回答某些問題。

我同意/不同意訪問時錄音。

在訪問過程中，我知道可於任何時間要求把錄音機關掉。

而訪問時間，可以在最適合本人時進行。

經以下方法，受訪者資料可以保密：

1. 訪問表格及同意書不會放在同一地方，同時會收藏在一個安全地點；
2. 個人資料及通過訪問所取得的資料，只作統計用途，寫報告時，以一組別來討論，絕不會提及個人名字；
3. 錄音帶只容許陶女士及翻譯員聆聽；
4. 傳譯員及翻譯員要簽署保密書；
5. 1997年6月30日前，所有錄音帶將會被銷毀。

請註明你希望錄音帶銷毀或歸還與閣下。(請加“✓”)

銷毀 ☐

歸還 ☐

我可以細閱、更改或在訪問表上加意見，及指明某些部份的資料不可予以採用。

於任何時間，本人可以與陶女士再討論此協議書內容。

我同意按照背景資料所列出的條件參與是項研究。

陶女士可以運用研究資料作出版用途。

簽 署： _____ (受訪者)

_____ (研究員)

_____ (日期)

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