Making the Headlines: news media discourse on terrorism in New Zealand

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Abstract

Following the Christchurch terrorist attack in March 2019, the New Zealand Government published protocols governing news media reporting during terrorist and national security events (The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021). By establishing these protocols, the New Zealand Government acknowledged the role news media play in the wake of a national security event, including acts of terror. While most the New Zealand research relating to media coverage of contemporary terrorism has focused on the role social media plays, particularly in terms of online radicalization, the relationship between commercial news media and terrorism is underrepresented in the New Zealand context.

Through a qualitative examination of three New Zealand case studies – the 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior, the 2019 Christchurch attack, and the 2021 LynnMall attack - this research examines how New Zealand news media responded during these events. Using a hybrid thematic analysis approach that initially drew on inductive and then deductive thematic processes, the research identified and examined three key factors common to each of the case studies: how the news media represented the act of terrorism; how it represented the attacker(s); and the role the news media played in shaping the State's response.

It found that while the news media is generally considered to be an impartial actor in the reporting of terrorist attacks, it is neither neutral nor passive in these instances, providing a potential platform to amplify both the terrorist's and State's objectives. While causation is difficult to determine, this research concludes that New Zealand news media's engagement with terrorism has changed over time. Given the prominence of the media as one of the main conduits for public information, the media now plays a significant role in shaping public perceptions of terrorism in New Zealand, reinforcing the official Government narrative, and providing the means for the Government to generate the social licence needed to introduce reforms. By implication, news media should remain live to the political drivers at play behind official determinations of terrorism so as to remain impartial and report objectively as possible during times of high stress.

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1 Introduction

There has been increased interest in understanding the relationship between the media and terrorism over the last decade, including identifying mitigations to address the potential effects of media reporting on terrorist events on domestic populations (Innes et al 2018). This has become particularly pronounced in New Zealand since the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack. The prevalence of digital technology and the ease of access to both the internet and various communication apps across society has focused much of New Zealand's research onto the role social media plays in terrorism events, including during the Christchurch attack. Correspondingly, this research has resulted in a range of policy solutions specifically intended to address online concerns, including the joint New Zealand-France led 'Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist & Violent Extremist Content Online' (New Zealand Government, 2019). However, less research has been conducted into understanding the relationship between the traditional news media and terrorism in the New Zealand context.

This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between the New Zealand news media and three acts of terrorism conducted in New Zealand. The question is examined through a case-study analysis of media reporting during three of New Zealand's most recent and significant terrorist incidents: the 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour; the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attack; and the 2021 LynnMall supermarket attack, also in Auckland. It considers the relationship between Government, the public, and the media at the time of each event, and argues that the news media played a role in shaping public perceptions during all three cases, although this role varied. It further argues that the discourse news media created helped enable the Governments of the day to create the political and policy space needed to introduce respective counter-terrorist measures. However, the approaches taken by news media, including the levels of media acquiescence with Government in each case, were different. This resulted in discourses that played out differently within society, with various consequences in terms of social cohesion, threat evaluation, policy development, and community wellbeing, some of which may have enduring effects for many years to come. It concludes by arguing that the news media discourse is significantly shaped by the Government narrative and that the New Zealand news media is used by the Government as the primary vehicle for developing the necessary social licence[1] to introduce security reforms.

[1] For the purposes of this thesis, social license refers to the degree of acceptance by the public to for Government policies or reforms.

This thesis is structured in two parts. The first part addresses theory, examining the complexities around reaching a definition of terrorism and the challenges inherent in fostering an acceptable consensus or shared understanding. It also discusses the fundamental political considerations that underpin any discourse on terrorism, including those related to decisions to declare an event as an act of terror, or not. It also explores the theoretical relationship between the media and its audience through an examination of relevant communication theories in order to identify media theories as they relate to terrorism, and introduces the concepts of rhetoric and discourse as narrative tools. This part also discusses theoretical perspectives relating to the consequences of various media discourses during terrorist events, and considers the effect these discourses may have on public opinion.

The second part applies that theory to the New Zealand terrorism context. It includes details of the analytical framework applied to each of the three case studies with a specific focus on the thematic analysis approaches selected. The three case studies each address one 'terrorist' event from New Zealand. Each of these case studies examines the media discourse around each case study, with a specific focus on addressing three specific aspects:

1) how the media represented the act of terrorism itself;
2) how they represented the attacker(s) in each instance; and
3) the role the media played in shaping the State's response.

The findings from these case studies are consolidated in a concluding chapter that identifies common findings from across the three cases.

While this thesis is focused on the way in which news media represents acts of terror, and their relationship with the State response, it is worth remembering the remaining stakeholder in the equation - the general public - the principal audience in the case of news media. Communication theories debate the role played by the audience in the public-media relationship, defining them variously as either active or passive consumers, depending on the theory. These theories will be discussed later, but regardless of their status, the public remains an important consideration. While some authors regard the media as the battleground in the fight between the competing messages from Government and the 'terrorist' (Glazzard & Reed, 2021), the media is not the strategic objective of either. Both the Government and the terrorist fight to influence their audiences, with influence over the media discourse a critical first step. Simultaneously, the media is also in a battle with their competitors to secure their audience's attention and increase their reputation and/or market share through their coverage. Without the presence of the

public, neither the Government, nor the terrorist, nor the media would have an audience for their messages.

Yet there are multiple dichotomies in this. The terrorist seeks to advance their narrative in the public consciousness while simultaneously accepting they may harm innocent members of their own communities through the nature of their attacks. The Government seeks to protect the public and (maybe more cynically) to protect their political reputation by introducing measures that enhance safety and security but take away public freedoms and individual autonomy. And the news media seeks to keep people informed and live up to the ideals of journalism while simultaneously seeking to increase their audience's dependency on them as their primary source of information. In this sense, the news media is not a battleground. It is an active participant in the battle. Which side it takes, and how it reports the conflict, becomes a critical factor for the audience. And while it can be easy for the news media to become consumed by the emotion of the battle, or for academics to get lost in theory to explain why events play out as they do, it is worth always remembering that it is the audience – people living their lives with their families – who bear the brunt of terrorist events and the consequences of the counterterrorism policy.

2 *Framing the Research*

2.1 Introduction

In framing this research, the following review focused on existing literature across three related topics: definitions of terrorism; theories concerning the relationship between the media and terrorism; and communication theories. While acknowledging the approach to each of these topics does not constitute a literature review per se, understanding the existing perspectives, and the definitional and interrelated complexities, for each of these topics assisted with constructing the frame through which the later analysis of the case studies was conducted. This was particularly relevant for assisting analysis around Government and news media discourses and understanding why certain narratives were more prominent than others at times. Literature relating to each of the case studies was also reviewed, however to avoid confusion or conflation, the relevant material is discussed in the respective case study chapters.

2.2 Definitions of terrorism

Given the deeply political nature of terrorism, the term 'terrorism' can be understood by different people in different ways. Defining exactly what terrorism is can be challenging. The causes of terrorism can be situational, incredibly subjective, and rooted in highly politicised perspectives. As Martin (2013) notes, the complex political environment and the differing perspectives surrounding terrorism means academics and policy makers do not agree on a single definition for either terrorism or, by association, a terrorist act. Saul (2006) further argues that "it is fallacious to assert intuitively that terrorism is recognisable without difficulty."

Authors, such as Lutz & Lutz (2010) and Law (2010), have argued that, while the methods and tactics may have changed over the centuries, acts of terrorism have featured throughout history since earliest times. While not defined as such, early examples of terrorism can be found among the acts of resistance against the Roman Empire; by the Persians; by the Greeks; and by Genghis Khan and his successors during their campaigns across Asia (Wilkinson P. , 2012), (Martin G. , 2013). Terrorism was first identified as a specific term during the French Revolution of 1789 when it was ascribed to the 'Reign of Terror' conducted by Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobin revolutionaries in their campaign against the French aristocracy (Jenkins, 2003). Since then, the term has grown in popularity, particularly during the 21st century, often as a synonym for describing increasingly asymmetrical forms of conflict.

While undoubtedly a cliché, the issue with defining terrorism is succinctly captured by the phrase 'one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.' Put simply, a terrorist is branded as such – or not - because of individual and collective political perspectives and whether or not that individual or collective believes the political cause justifies the actions taken. Perspectives on terrorism vary depending on individual vantage points, and not everyone will share the same perspective. This is evident within the United Nations, where States who have been both victims of terrorism and those who have supported the ideology of terrorists, sit around the table as equal members. It is therefore hardly surprising that the United Nations has been unable to agree a formal shared definition of terrorism due to the competing political, religious, and ideological differences present within the organisation's membership. That is not to say that the body has not tried. Attempts remain underway to agree a definition as one of the goals of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (which has been under negotiation since 1996). However, until this is achieved the UN's approach has been to 'guide' member-states through the setting of benchmarks on specific issues.

There are many examples of where the United Nations has attempted to do this. In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution 49/60, which sought to introduce a series of measures to eliminate international terrorism. This resolution established a broad definition attempting to explain what a terrorist act was, but stopped short of defining terrorism itself. Section I, paragraph 3 of this resolution defines a terrorist act as:

> Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. (United Nations, 1995)

Further attempts to define terrorist acts exist in other UN resolutions. For example, Resolution 1566, which recalls terrorist acts as:

> …criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a

> political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. (United Nations, 2004)

In 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (UN Special Tribunal on Lebanon, 2011) found that "a definition *of 'transnational terrorism'* has existed within customary international law" since 2005. Their ruling identified three key elements:

(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act;
(ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it;
(iii) when the act involves a transnational element.

Despite the Special Tribunal's best efforts to establish a UN agreed definition for the first time, the ruling was heavily criticised, including for not reaching the threshold for legal best practice. The disagreement within the UN over this definition led Saul (2012) to conclude that "although the Tribunal sought to rely on regional instruments against terrorism as partial evidence of support for its findings, a correct reading of them in fact reveals that no agreement exists regarding a common definition of terrorism."

Unfortunately, the absence of an agreed definition within UN has led to increasing divergence as individual member-states have looked to advance their own definitions of terrorism - each one framed by their own circumstances and perspectives. While this has made it increasingly difficult to reach consensus, the United Nations has also identified that individual approaches have exacerbated the politicisation of the term 'terrorism' and increased the likelihood of misuse in politically charged rhetoric. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2021) states:

> The implications of the absence of a universal definition of terrorism for legal purposes are wide-ranging. One is that the lack of a definition may facilitate the politicization and misuse of the term "terrorism" to curb non-terrorist (or sometimes even non-criminal) activities. In turn, this can result in States, e.g., violating the rights of their own or other States' citizens, such as those of international human rights law, in the course of their counter-terrorism efforts. (UNDOC, 2021)

In the absence of an internationally agreed definition, most countries have established their own definitions. Many share common themes identified by the United Nations, but all are shaped by national experiences and perspectives.

The New Zealand Suppression of Terrorism Act (2002) defines a terrorist act as:

> An act…. intended to cause, in any 1 or more countries, [the death of, or other serious bodily injury to, 1 or more persons; a serious risk to the health or safety of a population; destruction or serious damage to, property of great value or importance, or major economic loss, or major environmental damage; serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure facility, if likely to endanger human life; introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to devastate the national economy of a country], and is carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause, and with the following intention:
>
> > (a) to induce terror in a civilian population; or
> >
> > (b) to unduly compel or to force a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act. (New Zealand Government, 2002)

A revision is proposed under the Counter-Terrorism Bill 29-1 (2021), which seeks to update the original definition by widening the purpose statement to allow for the inclusion of causes motivated by other than ideological, political, or religious ideologies to be considered as acts of terrorism. It also proposes to reduce the threshold for the two intent statements, replacing 'terror in a civilian population' with 'fear in a population,' and introducing the lower threshold of 'coerce' for the existing term, 'unduly compel.' (New Zealand Government, 2021a)

Australia has a similarly structured definition. Under Australian legislation, a terrorist act is an act, or a threat to act, that both:

(a) intends to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause, and
(b) causes one or more of the following:
    - death, serious harm or danger to a person
    - serious damage to property
    - a serious risk to the health or safety of the public

- serious interference with, disruption to, or destruction of critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network. (Attorney-General's Department, 2021)

Like New Zealand, Australia's definition contains a similar list of criteria that details the types of actions that constitute terrorism. However, unlike New Zealand the threshold for the level of coercion required is much lower, requiring only 'intimidation' rather higher thresholds around inducing either fear or terror.

Smith (2003) ascribes this difference to New Zealand's experiences with legitimate – but violent – protest in the past. These include the 1951 Waterfront Strikes and the 1981 Springbok Tour, both of which were raised as exemplars during the Parliamentary discussion surrounding the original legislation formulation. As a result, New Zealand decisionmakers explicitly excluded acts conducted during protests from the definition, and decided to maintain the threshold for consideration at a higher level (Smith J. E., 2003).

In the United States, there is no single agreed definition for terrorism. Definitions can vary between Government departments depending on their function and operating mandate. However, a relatively common definition can be found in the Homeland Security Act 2002. This defines terrorism as any activity that:

> (A) involves an act that— (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and
>
> (B) appears to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. (Department of Homeland Security, 2002)

While the definition contains many of the same themes found in other international definitions – specifically the violence of the act, the illegality of it, and the intent to cause fear – the US definition contains some of the lowest thresholds for an event to be considered terrorism of all the international definitions. To meet the first clause in the definition, and presuming the act itself is considered illegal, the risk threshold – that it is 'dangerous to human life' or 'potentially destructive' - provides significant leeway for subjective assessment. As long as the act is illegal, this clause requires the act to only be assessed as dangerous or *potentially* destructive in order to meet the threshold. Similarly, the threshold for intent is also relatively low. All three of the alternative conditions are prefixed by the phrase

'appears to be intended.' Therefore, an act must only reach the requirement of *appearing* to be intended to 'to intimidate…a civilian population,' or appearing to be intended to 'influence the policy of a government' for it to meet the intent threshold to be defined a terrorist act. The third alternative condition under this clause - 'to affect the conduct of a government' - does include a definition of the types of higher threshold events that are required to be met, but it is still subject to the same prefix as the other alternative conditions.

It is arguable that, while not considered an act of terrorism in New Zealand – or indeed a criminal act in any way - the damage to the Waihopai secure communication facility by protestors in 2010 (Watt, 2010) could have met both the threshold for both potential destructiveness and illegality under clause A, and for attempting to influence the policy of a government by coercion (by attempting to force the closure of the base) in clause B, for it to be considered an act of terrorism under the thresholds contained in the United States definition.

China's overarching definition of terrorism can be found in the 2015 Counter-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China. This law was passed during the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress and has been in effect since 2016. Article 3 of the law defines terrorism as:

> …appeals and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives. (Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress, 2015)

Like most other definitions, China includes the key elements of fear, violence, destructiveness, and intimidation in their definition. However, the definition also includes a unique – and somewhat loosely defined - reference to 'social panic' as the first of the effects caused by terrorist actions. The 2015 law redefines terminology in place from the 'Decision on Issues Related to Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work' issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 2011. In this document, terrorism was defined as:

> Activities that severely endanger society that have the goal of creating terror in society, endangering public security, or threatening state organs and international organizations and which, by the use of violence, sabotage, intimidation, and other methods, cause or are intended to cause human casualties, great loss to property, damage to public infrastructure, and chaos in

> the social order, as well as activities that incite, finance, or assist the implementation of the above activities through any other means. (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2011)

This earlier definition contained many similar themes to other international definitions, but did retain the subjective reference to 'chaos in the social order.' While Chinese authors, such as Zhou (2016), argue that the new law represents a comprehensive deradicalisation and rehabilitation strategy, western human rights organisations have expressed concerns the loose definition of social panic could permit the new law to be applied to a range of Chinese domestic issues. These include the programme of 'deradicalisation' in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, suppression of pro-independence protests in Hong Kong, and to any other dissenting groups across China and abroad (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Like western nations, the League of Arab States' definition of terrorism includes both fear and the intent to advance an agenda as constituent elements. However, the League does not make the same reference to an intent to coerce or influence found in western legislation. Instead, the League places an emphasis on the criminal nature of the act. *The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (1998)* contains the following definition:

> Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardise a national resources [sic]. (The League of Arab States, 1998)

Article 2 of the Convention further underlines this emphasis on criminality by explicitly delinking a range of offences from a legitimate political motivation. This Article states:

> "In the application of this Convention, none of the following offences [which includes a list of violent offences, including 'attacks' on prominent people, murder, sabotage, theft and the manufacture of munitions used in terrorist acts] shall be regarded as a political offence, even if committed for political motives (The League of Arab States, 1998).

However, as Jenkins (2003) argues, this focus on criminality can be problematic. For example, in reviewing the Convention, Amnesty International (2002) has expressed concern that the definition of terrorism used by the League is too vague:

> Such vagueness does not make clear to judges, legal experts and the public at large precisely what acts qualify as ''terrorism''. This increases the risk that some people may be charged or tried even though there is not enough evidence that they have committed a specific crime. (Amnesty International, 2002)

They argue that the lack of clarity in the definition could allow for members of the League to pursue criminal prosecution action against legitimate protesters on terrorism grounds. This is reinforced by Article 2, which Amnesty argues could be used to suppress dissent by criminalising politically motivated protest actions. Furthermore, the Convention allows for the possibility of the accused facing the death penalty if found guilty of a terrorism related offence, whereas lesser offences relating to civil disobedience or damage to property are not subject to the same penalty.

An additional political contradiction can be found further in Article 2, which also provides specific exemptions for acts of violence in certain conditions. These include:

> All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence. (The League of Arab States, 1998)

While this would appear to refer to ‘terrorism' as a tactic in times of invasion or in self-defence, the clause could also be interpreted to justify acts of terrorism against, for example, Israel (when perceived as a foreign occupier) or against western nations (as a threat to Islamic self-determination). It is somewhat ironic therefore that, despite the efforts of the Convention emphasise criminality over political motivations, the resulting document is, in itself, deeply political.

In the absence of an agreed international definition, Law (2010) suggests that terrorism should be defined in far more pragmatic terms. He argues that “terrorism is not an ideology and does not exist as a specific worldview, a system of thought or a political programme.” He suggests that terrorism is, “a tactic, a means to an end” rather than a concept or structured belief system, like communism or fascism (Law, 2010).

Despite the variance, it is possible to derive common themes running through many of the definitions. Perhaps the simplest starting point is to examine the physical manifestations of terrorism. At the macro-level, Martin (2013) argues that many widely accepted definitions of terrorism – at least definitions of terrorism shared by the liberal democracies of the Global North - have a range of common features. These include:

- The illegality of the act, particularly the illegal use of force;
- The use of sub-national actors;
- The political driver behind the act;
- The use of unconventional tactics, techniques, and methods (arguably the types of weapons used and the manner by which they are deployed could also be considered within this category);
- The deliberate targeting of vulnerable, or 'soft' groups;
- The intent to affect or influence a specific audience through the use of fear, noting that the target of the terrorist act is not necessarily the same group the act is trying to influence. (Martin G. , 2013)

However, a closer examination of each of these features in turn suggests that, while many international definitions refer to them, defining each factor remains highly subjective and deeply political. It is also worth noting that the definitions from which this analysis derives were developed by those seeking to address the consequences of terrorism rather than from the perspective of those resorting to the act. Therefore, all the definitions reflect the needs of the state in enabling the framework they require to be able to act against the terrorists.

While none of the definitions exampled above recognise any national status of terrorist groups, all the definitions imply that acts of terror are carried out *to* the state *by* sub-national actors. It also portrays the state as a passive actor, or a victim, in the conduct of a terrorist act. Authors, such as Lutz and Lutz (2010), argue that portraying terrorism in this manner does not adequately account for acts falling under the broad definition of 'state terrorism' (Lutz, B & Lutz, J, 2010). Perspectives vary on whether state terrorism should be considered as a form of terrorism – as do attempts to define exactly what it is – but, as Blakeley (2009) argues, state terrorism contains many of the same characteristics as non-state terrorism, specifically the targeting of vulnerable parts of the population, the use of fear, and the intention to coerce the population and cause behaviour change. The scale of the harm caused in cases of state terrorism far outstrip those of non-state events, however.

A focus on sub-national state actors in national definitions is understandable. States have a vested interest in ensuring the actions they take against their own populations fall outside their framework for terrorism. As the example of the Chinese definition shows through the loose definition of social panic, states are unlikely to shape their definitions – or their legislation – in a way that could compromise their position or threaten any actions they intend to take against their population under their own, self-defined, counter-terrorism activities. However, linking states to state terrorism is difficult. Most states can operate within legitimate legal frameworks, however tenuous. For example, by placing the blame on rogue elements within the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw) when accused of a Rohingya genocide, or by using Interahamwe militia groups working under Government orders to carry out the Rwanda genocide. Blakeley (2009) acknowledges that state terrorist events usually require the use of sub-national actors to carry out the application of violence, but sub-national actors in cases such as these operate both on behalf of and in conjunction with state actors. Arguably, these sub-national groups could not operate in the way they do without either the tacit support or, at least, the active non-involvement of a national-level actor. This suggests that acts of terrorism are not solely the exclusive preserve of non-state actors.

The most challenging of the general features of terrorism is the recognition of a political driver. A political driver is essential if the leap is to made from an act being a purely criminal action to being a terrorist attack. However, motivations for engaging in terrorism are varied and complex, with a range of academics identifying a broad spectrum of socio-economic and political factors they argue establish the environment for terrorism. Crenshaw (1981) argues these can be divided into two sets of factors, "preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism." Similarly, Martin (2013) suggests there are three broad categories which foster terrorist behaviour: one relating to a perception of injustice (such as ETA in Spain, or lone wolf attacks); one relating to terrorism as a military tactic (as in cases of revolution where a power differential exists between the state and the revolutionaries); and one around the use of terrorism as a deliberate, moral choice in order to achieve a wider political aim (such as in cases of state terrorism and genocide).

Other authors have refined these broad categories to identify specific factors and influences. For example, Krieger & Meierrieks (2011) argue that political governance is a key driver, suggesting there is, "solid evidence that transnational terrorism is more likely to emerge in highly populated, non-democratic and instable countries" and that, "the institutional order seems to trump the economic

one." (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). Bird, Blomberg and Hess (2008) share this view, but argue that social-economic factors are also relevant. They identified that countries that "tended to be poor and undemocratic and not effectively engaged in globalisation" fostered greater numbers of terrorists (Bird, G, et al, 2008). However, neither of these arguments adequately explain the growth in domestic, home-grown terrorist groups, like the 2011 lone wolf attack by Norwegian Anders Breivik, or Australian Brenton Tarrant in Christchurch, who were raised, by-and-large, in stable, democratic and relatively wealthy countries.

While the identification of potential preconditions and precipitants helps explain why someone may be more predisposed to becoming involved in acts of terror, they do not adequately explain why some people cross the line from dissent to destruction. As Crenshaw (1981) points out, "many individuals are potential terrorists, but few actually make that commitment." Similarly, Newman (2006) concludes, "analyzing [sic] a wide range of samples is not conducive to generalized conclusions regarding the relationship between social conditions and terrorism. Thus, neither permissive nor direct root causes are alone effective in explaining or predicting terrorism."

However, the determination of the political driver sits with the terrorised rather than with the terrorist. As Saul (2006) points out, "the term 'terrorism' has been erratically deployed to describe all manner of evils, such as the nuclear 'balance of terror', rape by 'sex terrorists', and the Spanish inquisition. It has also been used to describe things that are not evils at all." Similarly, Wilkinson (2012) suggests that, "some commentators in the media, some politicians and members of the public continue to use 'terrorism' as a synonym for political violence in general, when in reality it is a special form of violence."

If identifying the drivers is so complex, why is there such an interest in ascribing a political driver to terrorism in the first place? Perhaps this question should be considered from the perspective of those conferring terrorist status. Without a political driver, acts of terror are relegated to being 'merely' criminal ones. It could be argued that criminal acts carry far less strategic significance than political ones, and that removing the political driver disempowers the terrorist by removing any sense of political legitimacy from the act (arguably as the Arab League definition intends). This may be advantageous for Governments wishing to downplay the significance of an event. However, the absence of a defined political driver also fails to adequately explain why the terrorist actor chose to take the actions they did leaving a knowledge void unfilled. In the case of home-grown terrorists, or long-term migrants to that country, this void could lead to suggestions the motivation for radicalisation came from a driver already existing within the state. By association, this could lead to suggestions their radicalisation was

something the state could have managed, or worse, was something the conditions in the state permitted to foster. Such conclusions would be hard to accept from both a moral and political perspective, so ascribing a political driver to acts of terror - particularly drivers that are considered abhorrent to the state concerned –help those in power at the time refocus the cause of the attack back onto the terrorist. As Eikenberry (2014) notes, "war can be declared on and waged against Al Qaeda, but it is not clear how one can usefully wage war against its actions." Political drivers can also be used to highlight the outsider status or *'otherness'* of the attacker (which, as I will demonstrate later, is a prominent feature in New Zealand cases), and enable the state to bring the full weight of their counter terrorism apparatus to bear on future terrorist threats.

The use of the term 'unconventional' also carries with it rhetorical significance. When applied positively, the term 'unconventional' has been used in the past to describe a range of novel innovations and developments, such as the formation of Ord Wingate's Chindits in World War Two and the subsequent development of special forces (Petersen, Reinhart, & Conger, 1963). However, in the terrorist context this term is generally given a negative connotation and is used to emphasise that the tactics and methods being used by the terrorist are out of the ordinary and therefore unacceptable.

Unconventional behaviour is behaviour that falls outside our perceived reality of society and is non-compliant with societal norms. Researchers have found that preschoolers can be prone to a cognitive bias called 'naïve realism' – or a belief that they see the world as it really is. This belief allows any unconventional perspectives and desires that challenge the prevailing naïve realism to be readily dismissed or marginalised (Houlbar, 2015). Adults are not immune from this bias.

Terrorism, by nature of the power differential between the attacker and the victim, relies on a range on unconventional tactics and methods to be effective. Conflicts involving terrorism are generally asymmetrical - either the terrorist is outgunned by the state, or in cases of state terrorism, the state brings their full power to bear on a more vulnerable population. However, as Eikenberry (2014) observes, the types of unconventional tactics and methods used by terrorists has proliferated since the end of the Cold War. While considering terrorist tactics as part of the wider term 'unconventional threats,' Eikenberry argues that the unconventional nature of the terrorist's actions is often conflated with identification of the group itself. This works to the detriment of the counter-terrorist planner. He argues, "agents and the ways and means available to those agents are often casually lumped together, which confuses efforts to identify the real foe." Furthermore, he argues, "the adjective unconventional is helpful in some instances in the normative sense, but may be unhelpful when implying out of the

ordinary. It is hard to imagine a world, for example, in which acts of terrorism against civilian populations were deemed conventional." (Eikenberry, 2014).

As mentioned above, acts of terror generally occur only when there is a significant power differential between the aggressor and the target. Targets of terrorism are usually non-combatants, unable to defend themselves against the threat posed by the terrorist. The random selection of targets and, in some cases the deliberate targeting of children, underscores this and helps make this factor the easiest to comprehend, (for example, Finnegan, 2019). However, the random targeting of vulnerable groups on its own does not always mean the act reaches the threshold to be determined as terrorism. Other political factors come into consideration. For example, while highly contentious, the British bombing of Dresden during the Second World War included the deliberate targeting of vulnerable groups - as well as meeting several other factors in contemporary definitions - yet is not generally acknowledged to be an act of terrorism.

The final consideration is the intent to affect or influence a specific audience through the use of fear. As Schmidt (2005) notes, "terror…is a state of mind," and "fear is a powerful tool in politics." Ganor (2008) has taken this argument further, suggesting that terrorism is a tactic employed by terrorists as part of a wider campaign of psychological warfare. He argues that the "the population becomes a tool in advancing the political agenda in the name of which terrorism is perpetrated," and that the terrorist's strategy seeks to "drive public opinion to pressure decision-makers to surrender to the terrorists' demands." From this perspective terrorism can be thought of as a psychological act. But fear is highly subjective, situational, and heavily influenced by previous experiences. Personal experience plays a large part in determining whether an individual is fearful of any given thing or situation, or not. However, research suggests that for most people, fear is learned through social conditioning and peer-learning rather than experience. This applies to people without direct experience of the adverse event (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). In the terrorism context, for most people the actual chance of being affected by a terrorist event is very small. However, despite the very small likelihood of an individual experiencing an event, it remains a major source of public fear (Van Der Does, Kantorowicz, Kuipers, & Liem, 2021). This makes it a key consideration in the terrorism debate, particularly regarding the factors that contribute to forming this perception.

Despite best efforts, the international community is no closer to forming a universally acceptable definition for terrorism. While it is easier to define terrorism by examining its effects and characteristics, it is less simple to reach as a strategic conceptualisation due to the range of deeply intrenched political

perspectives and variance in experiences. As discussed above, political considerations are the single most important factor in determining whether or not an event meets the threshold to be considered terrorism; and this threshold varies depending on the political motivations within any given country. Except for the targeting of vulnerable groups (which is tangible and can be observed), political considerations override most of the tactical characteristics discussed above. Laws can be changed to make an event illegal; sub-national actors do not always need to be used; political drivers can be fabricated; and tactics can be deemed unconventional. However, before any of these steps can be taken, the battle for the narrative must first be won. Fear, in terms of either its promotion or suppression, plays a significant part in this battle, and the news media has a role in this given their function as the primary conduit for information.

2.3 The relationship between the news media and terrorism

It is very difficult to forge a causational relationship between the news media and terrorism (White, 2020). The information landscape is more complex than just a binary relationship between the terrorist and the news media. There are more actors than just the news media and the terrorist to consider, including official sources, law-enforcement agencies, and civil society groups, as well as the public themselves. However, it would be equally incorrect to assume there is no contributory relationship at all. If the news media is considered the primary conduit for information – and setting aside the public as the primary consumer of media information – Martin (2013) argues there are two competing perspectives from which to view the media's relationship with terrorism: from the perspective of the Government, and from the perspective of the terrorist. These two perspectives are necessarily opposed to each other, with both parties in conflict for the news media's attention.

From a government perspective, the relationship between the news media and terrorism is an important consideration as it can affect policy and decision-making. As Lawrence Grossman (1986), a former President of NBC News, notes:

> the more the people know, the more the authorities feel impelled to act if only to overcome the appearance of impotence. Television coverage of a terrorist attack does tend to escalate the crisis. It can impel a frustrated government to act rather than appear weak and temporizing before millions of viewers. Or it can lead to paralysis out of fear that the whole world is watching. (Grossman, 1986, p. 1)

Heymann (1998) presents a similar argument. He notes that “terrorism…can cause enormous problems for democratic governments because of its impact on the psychology of great masses of citizens. Terrorist bombings, assassinations and hostage-taking have, in nations with a free press, the ability to hold the attention of vast populations.” This has implications for government and their policy responses. Governments can come under pressure through the news media to act in the wake of high-profile terrorist events. Paletz and Schmid (1992) have further argued that this can be the case even when the event itself does not directly affect the country concerned (as was the case for supporters of the United States in the case following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent deployments to Afghanistan), or when it may not necessarily be in the country’s best interests to act. Governments can also be challenged by the news media on specific political positions and responses - or lack of them - particularly when the news media adopts a discourse of victimhood that does not align with the Government’s own policies, or when communities are made to feel unsafe because of this (for example, Smith (2023)).

In domestic terms, democratic governments require permission space from within their own populations to be able to act against terrorists and to introduce measures they believe are required to mitigate or counter terrorism. Dragu (2011) argues this can be challenging, as any counter-terrorism intervention fundamentally becomes a trade-off between human rights on the one side (such as civil liberties, privacy, freedom of expression) and safety and security on the other. However, when successfully managed, such as during the New Zealand Government’s response to the Christchurch shooting, Governments can be rewarded with media-endorsed permission space for broad counter-terrorism reforms that would not be possible without public consensus (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020).

From the terrorist perspective, the news media is more than just a mechanism for transmitting their political message (Matusitz, 2013). The news media can also magnify the effect of the terrorist event, providing disproportionate coverage and thereby increasing the ‘effectiveness’ of any single event (White, 2020). Studies have also shown that news media coverage can also inspire subsequent copy-cat events (Elshimi, 2018). As Martin (2013) has noted, there are many contributory factors to consider, including the role the news media plays in publicising the terrorist’s cause and the value to the news media of the coverage provided by the terrorist event itself. The terrorist needs the news media to publicise their cause and maximise the effect of their actions, while the news media stands to benefit both reputationally and commercially from its coverage of terrorist events.

Perspectives relating to the nature of the relationship between the news media and terrorism vary. Barnhurst (1991) has argued that the news media's relationship with terrorism can also be viewed from two perspectives. From one perspective, the news media is an active player, promoting terrorism through its desire to cash-in on public interest and driven by commercial considerations. From this perspective, the media is complicit in both transmitting the terrorist's message and unconcerned about their coverage inciting similar attacks (Eid (2013), for example). From the other perspective, the news media are passive victims, motivated by their desire to impartially report the news, but unintentionally used as tools by the terrorist to amplify the terrorist's message. In contrast, Juergensmeyer (2013) has argued that terrorists seek to exploit their relationship with the news media regardless, tailoring their attacks to generate maximum media attention and feeding information that they know will be attractive to journalists. However, White (2020) has argued that most media approaches sit somewhere between Barnhurst's two extremes.

Matusitz (2013) has argued that the relationship is more complex than Barnhurst proposes. He notes that there is a complicated and interconnected symbiotic relationship between the news media and the terrorist, with both benefitting from the presence of the other. So symbiotic is this relationship that Laqueur (1999) has argued that some terrorist entities, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have historically been known to actively foster close relations with sympathetic media outlets (Laqueur, 1999).

However, French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (1998) offers a different perspective. In his book *The Making of Terrorism*, Wieviorka argues that there is no symbiotic relationship between the news media and terrorists (Wieviorka, 1998). Instead, Wieviorka argues that there are four unique relationships, or states, that define how terrorists and the media interact. He defines the first state as *pure indifference*, where "the terrorists neither seek to frighten a given population group beyond their intended victims nor to realise a propaganda coup through their acts." Wieviorka's second state is one of *relative indifference*. This state describes a status quo, where terrorists remain indifferent about making the headlines in sensational ways because they already have channels available to them through established media, churches, and universities for them to be able to raise their issues. The third state is one defined as a *media-oriented strategy*. In this state terrorists seek to manipulate the news media by using "a calculated manipulation of what they know of media operations." This state is the only one of the four in which terrorists seek to form an evolving relationship with the media, although the relationship is considered manipulative rather than symbiotic. His final state is described as a *total break.* In this state

terrorists view the news media as a hostile entity. Terrorists may seek to attack established media channels, or seek to replace them with their own media outlets and publications (Wieviorka, 1998, pp. 43-44).

Wilkinson (1997) has challenged Wieviorka's assessment. He argues that the relationship between the media and the terrorist is fundamentally one of communications, stating that "when one says 'terrorism' in a democratic society, one also says 'media'" (Wilkinson P. , 1997, p. 54). He further argues that, "the recent history of terrorism in many democratic countries vividly demonstrates that terrorists do thrive on the oxygen of publicity, and it is foolish to deny this" (Ibid, p. 56). Wilkinson concludes by arguing that voluntary restraint and self-regulation by the media are the best policy options for responding to terrorist attempts to manipulate the media, but that more needs to be done to ensure that self-restraint measures and both appropriate and effective (Wilkinson P. , 1997, pp. 61-63) .

Wilkinson's perspectives regarding the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the news media are echoed by Schmid (1989). Schmid argues that the use of terrorists by the news media is as crucial as the use of the news media by the terrorists (Schmid A. P., 1989, p. 539). Citing a study of the 1985 TWA #847 hostage case in which 153 passengers and crew were held by Islamic Jihad hijackers, Schmid notes that media outlets in the US dedicated two-thirds of their total news coverage to the hostage taking (Wilkinson P. , 1997, p. 548). The coverage was received overwhelmingly positively by their audience, with 89% of participants in a poll applauding the news media's coverage of the event (Grossman, 1986). However, Wilkinson notes that a small proportion of society accused the media of over-sensationalising and exploiting the coverage through the manipulation of emotions, particularly fear. The effects were tangible, with an estimated 1.8 million Americans changing their international travel plans in the wake of the hostage taking based on their media-informed perceptions of the terrorist risk abroad (Wilkinson P. , 1997, p. 557).

The ideal of journalism is to report the news independently, responsibly, truthfully, and with freedom (Perkins, 2002). However, that is sometimes easier said than done. Pressed by tight deadlines, commercial considerations, and growing competition for attention, in practice this ideal is hard to achieve. Editorial drivers to find an angle or be first to break a big story have led to what authors such as Macnamara (2014) have described to as the "discourse of spin" (knowingly presenting biased reporting designed to attract audience attention) and the "discourse of victimhood" (deliberately highlighting the victim status of a particular group and the hands of another with the intent of generating sympathy)

used by news media as tools to promote their stories. As Martin (2013) argues, “there is an urge within the media to immediately create a mood or a dramatized atmosphere when reporting the news.”

Schmid (1989) has examined the news media’s motivations for covering terrorist events. In a project titled *‘Media on Terrorism’* Schmid conducted interviews with editors of major media networks in the United States (Schmid A. P., 1989). He found that editors were attracted to terrorism-related stories for three reasons. The first was because they ‘arouse public alarm.’ Terrorist acts were seen as ruthless, cruel, and indiscriminate. The unpredictability of the act was seen as an affront to basic values. The second driver revolved around the ‘dramatic and theatrical excitement’ of the event. Readers could “readily identify with the victims,” allowing the news media to play on concerns the incident could happen to anyone. The third driver involved the political consequences of an event. Editors viewed terrorism as creating a political crisis, signalling dissention, and exposing security lapses. Ultimately, they saw terrorism as a means to potentially undermine democracy or dictatorships (Schmid A. P., 1989, p. 554).

Martin (2013) has also suggested that the news triage process leads editors to focus and report on incidents of terrorist violence with only an incomplete understanding of the terrorist environment. He argues that, “dramatic news events such as terrorist incidents often reflect the personal, political, and cultural biases of editors and reporters and contains a great deal of emotional human-interest content.” This gives rise to the risk of misperceptions, misinterpretations, and occasionally dishonestly, within media reporting – often with real-world consequences. In 2005, the American magazine Newsweek published an article claiming that US soldiers at Guantanamo Bay (at the time a highly controversial detainment facility being operated by the US military since the 9/11 terrorist attack) had flushed a copy of the Qur’an down a toilet. The article caused widespread, and very violent, anti-American protests among Muslims worldwide and flamed anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the US. After repeated strenuous denials by the US Government, Newsweek retracted its article finally admitting their editorial processes had not been robust and that they had published the story without proper confirmation (Serrano, & Daniszewski, 2005; Schmitt, 2005).

Kampf (2014) argues that the media’s relationship with terrorism has evolved over time. He argues that changing representation of terrorist acts, and their definition, as well as the evolution of advanced communication technologies has changed the media relationship with terrorism. He argues that the emergence of advanced broadcast technologies, especially related to television, heralded the arrival of increased ‘breaking-news’ media coverage, stating that “the new rules of the game were set: if terrorists

strike, the media were there to report (p. 3). He argues that the media's direct access to images of dead and injured victims and to the immediate reactions of shocked witnesses increased the terrorist's interest in using the media to disseminate messages of fear and demoralisation. He argues that the presence of live feeds during events disempowers the role of traditional editors and removes a potential safeguard that could mitigate the dissemination of terrorist messages. Coverage is streamed live and direct to consumers allowing, as Kampf argues, the terrorist to "enter public discourse via the front door" (p. 6). Furthermore, he argues that the airing of 'emotional reasoning' through the media's seeking out of the views of those most directly affected by the incident puts pressure on decisionmakers to act in a populist manner. This therefore limits space for a wider "discussion that would take into account the long-term implications of the terrorists attack," which may act to the longer-term detriment of the targeted population (p. 4).

Archetti (2015) supports Kampf's basic premise arguing that "few really understand the reality of the digital-age information environment" (Archetti, 2015, p. 49). She argues that the lack of understanding leads to a conflation of strategic communication approaches that leads to an assumption that "the information space in the digital age is far simpler and more linear than it actually is" (p. 50). Governments must only counter the narrative to defeat the terrorist. She further argues that "strategic communication approaches to counterterrorism tend to demonize the Internet and social media needlessly" (Archetti, 2015, p. 50), turning the online environment into the place where terrorists are spawned, radicalised, and recruited. This is despite, as Archetti argues, "it is always humans (governments, citizens and extremists among them) who use technology as a tool to advance their own goals and that audiences, as already indicted, actively select and embrace–rather than merely absorb–messages they are interested in" (p. 50).

2.4 Communication theories, the media and terrorism

Theoretical perspectives around media and communication theory have changed considerably since they were first contrived, particularly in response to changes in technology and within society itself (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). These theories have portrayed the audience with varying degrees of agency, and attributed the media with greater or lesser direct influence. Developments in technology have also shaped theory. Initial concepts first developed in the era of newspapers, then radio, and later television, are now being reconsidered in the light on the internet and social media. This has included debate on whether new theoretical frameworks now need to be developed to address more modern modes of communication (Fawkes & Gregory, 2000). However, regardless of the technological

mechanics, communication theories can be useful for explaining why the media adopts certain approaches when engaging with its audience.

From World War One through to the end of the 1930s, early media theory research was deeply concerned about the media's ability to influence populations. Fearful of new theories like Sigmund Freud's theory of psychoanalysis (which suggested human behaviour was influenced at a subconscious and subliminal level), early theorists posited that the media could mould behaviour at will (McQuail D. , 2005), and that they were responsible for promoting personally and socially destructive behaviours though the routine reporting on crime and violence (DeFleur, 2010). Early research by social scientists, such as Harold Lasswell, led to the belief that people were highly susceptible to media messaging and that the irrational nature of humankind gave the media a powerful and immediate level of influence over populations (Davis & Baron, 1981). This gave rise to the 'Direct Effects' school of communication theory. Contemporary theorists attributed considerable power to the media, arguing that the media organisations were able to insert their messages directly into their audience with impunity. This led to the development of theoretical concepts like the Hypodermic needle theory, the Magic Bullet theory, and the transmission belt theory. In all these theories, the media was granted the power. Audiences were considered as passive actors, "defenseless against and at the mercy of the capricious stimuli of the media." (Donsbach, 2008)

Direct effects theory has now been largely discarded in favour of more contemporary theories. As David Gauntlett (1998) notes, Direct Effects theories examined social problems exclusively from the perspective of the media's influence. They omitted to consider any other factors that could have contributed to the development, or perception, of those problems. He also illustrates the inherent paradox contained in the theory: if the researchers were exposed to the same media influences as the general population, how was it that they remained unaffected and objective in their research? (Gauntlett, 1998)

Direct Effects theory was challenged during the 1940s by Paul Lazarfeld. Following research into voting patterns, Lazarfeld concluded that while the media had some influencing ability, it was unable to influence most people's strongly-held attitudes or beliefs. (Lazarfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944) Lazarfeld's work would late inform form Joseph Klapper's 'Limited effects theory' developed in the 1960s. Lazarfeld's research identified that people used selective exposure to protect themselves from media influence. He further identified that 'Opinion Leaders' (influencers in modern parlance) held considerably more influence on individual beliefs and opinions than the media did. Lazarfeld's theory

argued that media messages are processed through a series of 'players,' or gatekeepers, who stand between the media and their audience. These players filter and reinterpret the message before transmitting it on until it eventually reaches the consumer. The interpreted message was thought to carry greater sway on individual perspectives than the original message did. He also argued that individual perceptions and baseline options had already formed by the time an individual reached adulthood. These deep-seated beliefs, reinforced by social norms, were therefore independent of subsequent media influence and could not be influenced by media alone. He concluded that media could only play a role in reinforcing existing opinions or reinforcing confirmation bias, but did not form or change pre-existing perspectives. (Katz, E. & Lazarfeld, P.F., Roper E., 2017).

Authors such as Takeshita (2006) have criticised Lazarfeld's theory for its focus on the elite, 'Type-A' audience at the time who were least open to changing pre-existing perspectives and most likely to experience a reinforcement effect. However, while recognising the theory's limitations, authors such as Hanson (2009) have argued that Lazarfeld's theory presented a successful challenge to the prevailing direct effects model and was responsible for influencing a host of subsequent media theories, including the two-step flow of communication theory (Katz, 1957). It was also instrumental in introducing the idea that the audience was not a passive actor in their relationship with the media.

In contrast to the limited effects theory, and echoing earlier direct effects theories, 'Agenda-setting theory' argues that the news media has the ability to influence public opinion by over (or under) emphasising the importance placed on an issue. The theory was initially developed following a study of the 1968 United States' Presidential election conducted by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, although the concept was first articulated by Walter Lippmann in the 1920s (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In their study, McCombs and Shaw identified a strong correlation between the priorities of residents in an area called Chapel Hill in North Carolina and the issues being reported by local news media. They concluded that the media both controls perceptions of reality and gives importance to particular topics. Agenda-setting theory argues that not only has the media the ability to influence audience perceptions on an issue, but they also have the ability to influence *what* the audience should think about, *how* to think about it, and consequently, what to think (McCombs. & Shaw, 1993).

McCombs and Shaw later developed their 'Chapel Hill' study into a wider theory comprising seven facets: basic agenda setting; attribute agenda setting; network agenda setting; understanding the strength of agenda-setting effects; consequences of agenda-setting; origins of the media agenda; and agenda melding, the merging civic and valued reference community agendas with personal views

(McCombs & Shaw, 1993; McCombs, et al, 2014). While this paper considers agenda-setting theory through a media lens, agenda-setting theory has also been applied in the political and policymaking context to examine how media and public narratives influence the agenda-setting of political figures (for example, Rogers & Dearing, 1988). Agenda-setting theory has since evolved to attempt to combine the passive-consumer 'effects orientation' of earlier theoretical approaches with the active-consumer 'information seeking' and 'uses and gratifications' approaches to explain how the direct approaches of the media interact with other societal and consumer drivers. (McCombs, et al, 2014).

The main criticisms of agenda-setting theory are that it is hard to objectively measure given the theory addresses inner beliefs and the extent they are influenced over time. The theory is also considered inapplicable to individuals have already made up their minds. In this case, the audience has their views reinforced by what they see in the media leading to confirmation bias. Other critics, such as Haarsager (1991) argue that an inverse agenda-setting also exists whereby public opinion shapes the media agenda rather than the other way around. Social media, and in particular the trend of measuring hits on media websites as means to verify levels of public interest on particular topics, are examples of inverse agenda-setting (Weimann & Brosius, 2017; Nair & Sharma, 2017).

'Uses and Gratification theory' was devised by Elihu Katz and Jay G. Blumler in 1974 to challenge previously accepted limited effects approach. Unlike earlier theories, Katz and Blumler considered the consumer to be an active participant in their own decision about which media to engage with. The active participation of the audience enabled people to play a role in determining which media coverage to consume depending on their needs and preferences. (Katz, E., et al, 1974). According to Uses and Gratification theory, consumers have five main reasons for their choices: the need for information and education; to develop a sense of personal identity through association with the media material; the need for entertainment; to inform integration and social interaction; and, escapism from the challenges faced day-to-day (McQuail D. , 2010).

Uses and Gratification theory has been heavily criticised since it was first published for a range of weaknesses, including its oversimplification and lack of a systematic method (for example, Elliot, 1974) and the risk of fallacies in the self-reported nature of reporting (for example, Swanson, 2006). While the theory was developed with relation to 'media' in the broadest sense rather than the news media specifically, authors such as Thomas Ruggiero (2000) have argued that the theory still has relevance, "providing a cutting edge theoretical approach in the initial stages of each new mass communications medium: newspapers, radio and television, and now the internet."

'Media system dependency theory' can trace its origins to a paper presented by Sandra Ball-Rokeach in 1974. This paper, titled "the information perspective" introduced the argument that the media should be perceived as an information system and that the effects of the media needed to be considered in a wider societal context (Ball-Rokeach, 2010). The theory, eventually developed by Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur in 1976, argues that the ability of the media to influence its audience is dependent on the relationship the audience has with the media. In the simplest terms, the more the audience depends on the media for their information, the greater the influence the media has on that individual. The theory identifies three key relationships in this model: the relationship between the media and the audience; the relationship between the media and society - which frames the societal context for engagement with the media; and the relationship between society and the audience - which explains the influence society has on audience information needs, norms and values (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976).

Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur argue that the cognitive and behavioural consequences of media use are dependent on the contemporary societal context and the individual's needs within that context (for example, Ball-Rokeach, 1985). This dependency is also subject to the individual's need to understand the world around them, the need to act meaningfully in that world, and the need to escape when overwhelmed. The theory further argues that media power increases during times of stress, such as during a conflict or natural disaster, when the audience need of information is heightened (for example, Hindman, 2004; Lowery, 2004). However, the formation of dependency is also reliant on society containing large numbers of centralised or advanced media functions, and one that normalises public engagement with the media for information (Ball-Rokeach, S. J. & DeFleur M.L., 1979).

Critics of the theory, such as Baran and Davis (2008), have argued that the theory is difficult to measure and lacks a framework for comparative analysis between studies. They also argue that definitions governing the meaning and power of dependency are too vague, and that the theory does not consider the long-term effects of any dependency. The theory does not also consider the effects of online media platforms, where the relative freedom of the internet allows for consumers to consider multiple information sources and potentially avoid capture. However, subsequent evolutions of the theory argue that the principles remain relevant in an online environment, albeit at a more individualistic level (for example, Ball-Rokeach & Jung, 2009; Ha, et al, 2013).

In addition to the theories governing the *relationship* between the media, society and audience are those mass communication theories that seek to explain the *effects* the media has on the audience, particularly in terms of the social construction of reality.

While not specifically media related, Albert Banura's work on 'Social cognitive theory' attempts to provide an overarching understanding of how societal forces influence individuals and groups (Bandura A. , 2001; Bandura A. , 2003). Social cognitive theory emphasises that learning occurs within a social context in which people are both influencers of, and influenced by, their environment. Individuals learn in an organic manner through their interactions within their society, gradually forming their understanding of the world around them. Social cognitive theory includes a core assumption that individuals learn behaviours through the observation of others. This includes learning about the consequences of their actions, and establishing boundaries for what is and isn't acceptable within their particular societal group (Nickerson, 2023).

Social cognitive theory has relevance in studies concerning the relationship between the media and acts of terrorism given the centrality of the media as the primary means for gathering information in high stress situations for most people. Bandura (2008) has argued that the media plays a key role in modelling the ideals of behaviour to a wide audience and that individuals and groups learn this behaviour through their media consumption. However, authors such as Nabi & Clark (2008) have argued that the media's influence on negative social behaviours is limited due to the media selection choices of the individuals concerned. Their research found that individuals with experience of a behaviour being portrayed (such as high levels of promiscuity) were less likely to be influenced by the portrayal, while those without any experience had a greater expectation they would experience this behaviour in the future. Given the limited exposure most people have to terrorist events, this argument may also have relevance in the context of terrorism. Seen through a social cognitive theory lens, people observing a terrorist event would learn how to react based on what they saw. People observing fear or panic via the media in the wake of a terrorist event would be more likely to expect to experience the same in the future than those who had actually experienced an event. The converse would also apply, with people observing a calm and considered response expecting the same in the future.

Some theorists believe that our reaction to specific language is also shaped by preconditioning and societal norms. Not everyone perceives the same words in the same ways. 1966 literary theorist Kenneth Burke introduced the term, "terministic screens," as a means to explain why people perceive the same words differently (Burke, 1966). Burke views the world through a social constructivist lens,

much like other proponents of social cognitive theory. He argues that these screens act as a heuristic tool, filtering the messaging that our brain interacts with, creating meaning and defining our actions (Derksen, 2021). They are therefore the mechanisms through which language is interpreted at an individual level, and therefore important in shaping how individuals perceive the reality around them (Stob, 2008). As an example, the term 'jihadi' would invoke a different cognitive response among most 'western' communities than it would among Muslim communities familiar with its actual meaning (Beyer, 2023). Recent criticism of the BBC's coverage of the Israel-Gaza conflict is also an example of this. Government and public anger at the BBC's unwillingness to refer to Hamas as terrorist prompted the BBC to explain their position in an article that highlighted the highly political nature of particular words, and their principles to remain neutral despite the politicisation of particular issues (Simpson J. , 2023; BBC, 2023). However, as Hanif (2020) points out, this policy does not extend to representing the views of others, citing the use of 'terror' in articles relating to attacks in Christchurch, Sri Lanka and El Paso.

The 'Spiral of Silence' theory was first introduced by Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1972, and published as a book in 1980 (Noelle-Neumann E. , 1991). Building on agenda-setting theory, and drawing on studies of the 1965 and 1972 West German General Elections, Noelle-Neumann found that in a close election race, 3-4% of voters shifted their vote towards the consensus perception of who was likely to win. She concluded that perspectives purporting to reflect the consensus public opinion influences the willingness of individuals to express their own views, particularly if their view is contrary to the purported public opinion. Individuals with contrary views, particularly those at the extreme margins, are more likely to remain silent. The decision to remain silent then magnifies the majority consensus message, reinforcing the perception there is a consensus public opinion. The cycle then repeats, with the perception of a stronger accepted public opinion suppressing other contrary views. Their silence in turn magnifies the perception of an even stronger consensus public opinion, and so on until the purported public opinion is realised (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Noelle-Neumann, 2013). The media plays a key role in this process by focusing reporting on the majority opinion, thereby further influencing the willingness of individuals with other views to speak out (Miller K. , 2005). Some media take this role one step further by criticising (or even mocking) marginal perspectives through their editorials, opinion pieces and selection of expert opinion. This can include articles that highlight the threat of different views to society, or by dismissing alternative perspectives as disinformation. Recent examples of this have been observed in New Zealand around COVID-19 and climate change (for example, Palmer, 2021; Brown, 2022a), however the phenomenon is by no way unique to New Zealand.

'Cultivation Theory' was developed by George Gerber in the 1960s in response to prevailing beliefs that the media had a limited effect on its audience. It was developed as a causal argument to demonstrate the effect television programming (specifically exposure to violence on television) "cultivates, or causes conceptions of social reality in people's minds" (Jensen, 2020). Cultivation theory argues that mass communication, particularly television, serves as a socialising agent by repeatedly exposing the audience to images over a period of time that has a distorting effect on the audience's perspective of reality (Scharrer & Blackburn, 2018). This can lead to the audience perceiving an issue to be more (or less) threatening to them than it is. The mainstreaming of the cultivated reality among heavy viewers has been found to result in perspectives that "the world is a more dangerous place than it actually is, that immigrants are ruining their country, that teen crime is at record levels, that all poor families are on welfare, that illegitimate births are skyrocketing, and so forth" (Jensen, 2020).

Research by Shah et al (2020) looking at altruism among people who experience man-made disasters through a cultivation theory lens found that a high exposure to disaster related news significantly correlated to an increase in an individual's perceived fear of being a victim of the same event, even if they did not personally experience the initial event. There are similarities here with social cognitive theory. Their research also supported previous studies conducted by authors such as Britto, et al (2011) and Jackson & Gray (2010) that found that a heightened sense of fear around natural disasters led to an increased sense of empathy among the survey group to the affected population and an increased desire to help.

Similar research into perspectives of crime through a cultivation theory lens has found people who have greater exposure to the media are more fearful of becoming victims of crime in the future and are therefore more supportive of punitive criminal justice policies (Dolliver, et al., (2018)). The conclusions of this research, that "that people have a tendency to process news coverage of crime into fear", and that subsequent "legislation may not actually protect those who are fearful of crime, they may, however, serve to decrease their fear" (Dolliver, et al, 2018). There are clear similarities between these conclusions and reactions in a terrorism context.

2.5 Rhetoric and the use of language

Media influence is also shaped by the selection and use of specific language. The selection of words matters. Language can be used to transmit information, but it can also be used to shape individual perspectives of reality, particularly when there is a degree of distance between an event and the

audience. As Derksen (2021) notes, rhetorical devices used by the media have ”the capacity to enrage or engage us…united or divide us.”

Rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, traces its origins to ancient discourse from the earliest days of philosophical thought. It draws on the observations of a range of well known (and all male!) classical scholars, including Socrates, Plato, Aritstotle and Cicero (Porrovecchio & Condit, 2016). Scholars of rhetoric seek to understand how orators and writers influence their audiences, particularly during significant events, through the selection and use of rhetorical devices applied to create their narrative. Rhetoric is commonly associated with speeches and text designed to illicit a reaction from an audience through the manipulation of structure, sound or patterns of meaning (Somers, 2019).

Aristotle argued that are three non-exclusive lines of argumentative rhetoric:

- The logical appeal (*logos*). Which focuses on the use of logic and evidence to convince an audience of the argument. This is often considered the most important rational line of argumentative rhetoric;
- The ethical appeal (*ethos*). Which seeks to draw on the personal credibility of the rhetor to reinforce the argument. Examples may include the use of famous people to sell products, or highlighting the professional status or background of an individual delivering a particular message;
- The emotional appeal (*pathos*). Which seeks to use emotion to create a bond with the audience. Given the power of emotion in decision making, emotional appeals can be the most influential line of rhetorical argument (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015).

Successful speakers or writers seek to use a blend of all three approaches, variously leveraging the influence each line of argument brings to the case. However, the success of rhetorical devices is situational. Furthermore, as Rapp (2023) notes, the emotional disposition of the audience plays an important role in the success or otherwise of various rhetorical approaches. This is particularly evident in times of high stress where emotions are running high (Kim & Cameron, 2011). Researchers have suggested that, in these types of situations, emotional appeals have been the most effective rhetorical line of argument, resulting in more widely disseminated messaging and greater reaction among audiences (Zhao & Zhan, 2019).

One such example of a rhetorical device often used in the emotional appeal is the appeal to fear, also called *argumentum ad metum or argumentum in terrorem*. Fear appeals are an attempt by the orator to

leverage actual or perceived fears to carry their argument. Tannenbaum, et al. (2015) have described them as "persuasive messages that attempt to arouse fear by emphasizing the potential danger and harm that will befall individuals if they do not adopt the messages' recommendations." Appeals to fear are often found in marketing or advertising strategies and can be used as an effective (if somewhat coercive) rhetorical tool to generate positive effects on the audience. Examples can be found in many public health and road safety initiatives where messages that 'smoking kills,' or around elevated rates of prostate cancer in men, can have a beneficial effect on society by lowering the numbers of people smoking or increasing the numbers of men seeing their doctor for medical check-ups (Simpson J. K., 2017). However, an appeal to fear is a form of logical fallacy under the argumentum ad baculum (argument to the club or stick) category of fallacy. This category of fallacy works by magnifying the consequence of the proposition so that the alternative is a less fearful outcome and applying it in general terms (Walton, 1996). For example, for most people dying from smoking or prostate cancer is more fearful than not smoking or getting a check-up. Therefore, a message that smoking kills is intended to use the fear of dying to provoke people to stop smoking (hence the idea of using a club or stick to influence them). However, it remains a logical fallacy as, while undoubtedly bad, smoking does not kill *all* smokers, and not *all* men will get prostate cancer.

The appeal to fear also finds fertile ground in times of high stress, including during terrorist events (Zhao & Zhan, 2019). Used judiciously, appeals to fear can increase public safety by heightening awareness of potential threats and encouraging the public to take increased personal safety measures. However, this form of appeal is also vulnerable to exploitation by a range of actors to further wider political or commercial interests. Research has identified that Government responses disseminated through the media can have a positive effect on fear responses around terrorist events (Ghalib, Utama, Madjid, & Widodo, 2023), but they have also shown that Government is not averse to exploiting appeals to fear to further wider political objectives. Research from Australia into terrorism related speeches delivered by then Prime Minister John Howard identified appeals to fear rhetoric in 24 of 27 speeches delivered between September 2001 and November 2007 (De Castella, McGarty, & Musgrove, 2009). The form of these appeals varied depending on the situation and context at the time the speech was delivered. However, appeals to fear were particularly identified in speeches intended to highlight Australia's lack of capacity to cope with terrorism. Researchers concluded that fear-arousing rhetoric was being selectively deployed to support Prime Minister Howard's political objectives, including shaping public willingness to accept heightened counter-terrorism measures.

Abuse of the appeal to fear can lead to significant societal consequences, particularly when the appeal helps fuel prejudice, racism, or extreme views. This can have consequences for social cohesion, inequality, and economic development (Gould & Klor, 2014). Research from the United Kingdom found that appeals to fear in media reporting around acts of violence directed against the public were nine times more likely to associate terrorism with being Muslim (Hanif, 2020). Similarly, authors, such as Miller and Sack (2010), have argued that appeals to fear in Canada were used by politicians and the media to create a fallacious argument associating Islam and terrorism. They concluded that, "there is no doubt the Toronto 18 case, and the way the media covered it, contributed to a heightened state of public alarm about terrorism and Muslims" (Miller & Sack, 2010).

Studies into the November 2016 Paris attacks have also found that spikes in newspaper reporting on terrorist events correlated with an increase in the number of hate crimes directed against Muslims two to three days after the articles were published (Ivandic, Kirchmaier, & Machin, 2019). They also found that race-based attacks continued for some weeks after the initial event, but never returned to the same level as the period preceding the attack. The researchers noted that, by 2018, there were four times more hate attacks than ten years earlier. Similar evidence has been found in UK-based attacks. Research into the July 2005 London bombing and the 11 September 2011 terrorist attack found significant increases in hate crimes directed against Asians and Arabs in the wake of both events. As in the Paris study, the number of attacks decayed over time, but remained higher than pre-attack levels one year later. The authors concluded that appeals to fear through the media played a significant role in linking terrorism to the Asian and Arab communities (Hanes & Machin, 2014).

Heightened distrust of one particular group in the wake of terrorist events can also have consequences for communities not directly related to the event. Research from Scotland in the United Kingdom have found young Sikhs, Hindus, other South Asians, Black, and Caribbean young people, are regularly mistaken for being Muslim. Those interviewed reported being frequently exposed to anti-Muslim hostility and prejudice, and having to develop de-escalation skills to avoid some encounters becoming dangerous (Hopkins, Peter, Botterill, Sanghera, & Arshad, 2017). Similarly, in the United States, since 9/11 there has been an increase in number of murders, assaults and hate crimes directed against the Sikh community. Sikhs have been targeted by attackers who have been unable (or unwilling) to differentiate between the turbans worn by the Sikh community with those shown in news media articles reporting on the Taliban. (Kaplan, 2015; Kaur, 2021; Stack & Asma-Sadeque, 2022).

Appeals to fear can also contribute to the fear becoming a reality. Research by Thompson (2021) identified a significant relationship between right-wing populism and the growth of Islamic extremism in the UK caused, in part, by the portrayal of Muslims in the media. Thompson argues that "right-wing populism, along with counter-terrorism policy and the media, construct an anti-Muslim narrative, which fosters discrimination and, ultimately, leads to the social exclusion of Muslim suspect communities, a known cause of radicalisation" (Thompson, 2021). Thompson also suggests that this process of marginalisation, coupled with the presence of a pervasive 'anti' narrative, should be considered among the myriad of complex factors contributing to the development of home-grown terrorist threats. The relationship between right-wing populism and Islamic extremism is considered symbiotic where, once present in society, the growth in one feeds the other. Central to this is the role of the news media in either perpetuating or defusing tensions through the manner of their reporting.

Similar findings have been identified in research conducted by Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010). Through a series of interviews with British Muslims, the researchers found that standard media reporting of international terrorist events (largely in Afghanistan and Iraq) may unintentionally contribute to the radicalisation of individuals unconnected to the event itself. Hoskins and O'Loughlin concluded that "news depicting Muslim suffering activates and reinforces frustrations and grievances, whether the source is a mainstream media outlet or Al-Qaeda's media wing." This was particularly the case if the viewer happened to share a common ethnic heritage or religious background with those on screen. In these cases, they found some members of the audience became triggered to protect those they perceived as the victims in the articles. These audience members perceived their government's counter-terrorism actions as the cause of the suffering and therefore their government as the 'aggressor.' This in turn heightened mistrust in their own Government's counter-terrorism policy and increased sympathy to some of the terrorist's rhetoric. While these particular studies focused on terrorism in the context of Islamic extremism from the UK perspective, examples of the same dynamics can be found in other terrorist contexts and national contexts. These include in other emotionally charged non-terrorism related situations in New Zealand, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic (Derksen, 2021) or in reactions to the 2023 Israel-Gaza conflict (Radio New Zealand, 2023).

However, the media's use of language is not limited to rhetorical devices alone. Discourse refers to the way language is used to construct meaning through the use of argument narration, description and exposition (Bonnot, 2023). In the modern era, the media has replaced more traditional means used by people and communities to understanding the world. As Talbot (2007) observes, there are very few

people, if any, that are now unaffected by media discourse. Authors such as Mateus (2021) have similarly argued that “media practices are, in themselves, a form of persuasive, discursive activity” and that, “the modern functioning of persuasive discourse cannot be separated from modern mass media.” The manner of the media’s discourse, including the way it brings together a range of rhetorical devices, can play a highly influential role in shaping public perceptions around terrorism, counter-terrorist responses and diaspora communities (Ekstrom, Marianna, & Thornborrow, 2022). As Talbot (2007) further notes, “Since discourse plays a vital role in constituting people's realities, the implications for the power and influence of media discourse are clear.”

This has been evident in the manner of media discourse around terrorism over the last twenty years. Through the first decade of the current millennium much of the academic, media and political discourse framed terrorism in terms of middle-eastern terrorism (Jarvis, 2022). This was understandable in the context of the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the more contemporary discourse has shifted to focus on far-right terrorism and violent extremism, shaped by the 2011 attack in Norway and the 2019 attack in Christchurch. Notwithstanding the issues discussed above, Jarvis (2022) argues that these discourses have played an important role in focusing effort on the most immediate issues to hand, but have also created blind-spots, biases and assumptions within society that have become hard to remove.

3 Methodology

3.1 Selection of case studies

While New Zealand has had limited experience with terrorism, it has had domestic experience of terrorist-style political violence. New Zealand's history is peppered with sporadic, one-off incidents of political violence, many of which carry the same hallmarks as more traditional perspectives of terrorism but which do not share the same designation. Examples include the 1951 Huntley rail bridge bombing (although the perpetrators and motivations were never identified); thirteen bomb attacks against military bases and government facilities by anti-war protestors during the Viet Nam war; and the attempted bombing of the Wanganui Computer Centre on 18 November 1982 by punk-anarchist Neil Roberts (Campbell, n.d.). Other incidents such as the 1962 Dunedin parcel bomb, which killed Auckland lawyer James Ward, and the 1984 Trades Hall suitcase bomb, which killed the building's caretaker, Ernie Abbott, carried the hallmarks of terrorism, but like the Huntley bombing, those responsible were never found (New Zealand Police, 2019). Protests against the 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour also included threats to manufacture shoebox bombs as part of bomb hoaxes used by activists intended to disrupt the tour (New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, 2011).

These incidents are linked by two common factors. Firstly, they were (most likely) conducted by domestic actors born in, or from, New Zealand. This cannot be conclusively confirmed as not all the attackers were identified; however, the localised nature of the events in which the attacker was not identified would support such a hypothesis. Secondly, largely due to the complex relationship with protest activity in New Zealand, none of the attacks were officially deemed terrorism.

In selecting the case studies for this thesis, I decided that the act needed to be considered as being one of terrorism, either by Government or by academics, for the incident to be considered. The terrorism determination was considered important as it enabled a comparison of events from within the same political framing. For this reason, none of the cases above were considered for this study. Instead, three other, high-profile cases were identified, all of which were defined as terrorism either at the time, or in the immediate aftermath. These were:

- the 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour;
- the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attack, and
- the 2021 LynnMall supermarket attack, also in Auckland.

3.2 Approach to finding literature

News media articles provided the main source of primary material for the case studies. From a practical perspective, media coverage for all three case studies was available online, however the availability and ease of access to material varied. In the case of the Rainbow Warrior, most of the articles gathered were scans of newspaper articles that appeared in the *New Zealand Herald* or in international newspapers. Some more contemporary articles providing a retrospective of the newspaper's coverage in 1985 proved a particularly useful resource, as did Greenpeace's own records. In the case of Christchurch and LynnMall, the sources were primarily online news articles written specifically for the internet, although some newsprint articles were considered.

Rather than replicate existing work, this thesis also sought to draw from existing studies examining media coverage during these events. No such studies was identified for either the Rainbow Warrior bombing or the LynnMall attack, however a comprehensive study by Every-Palmer et al (2020) was identified in the case of the Christchurch shootings. This study examined 958 separate media reports published in five major New Zealand media outlets (the New Zealand Herald, the *Dominion Post*, the *Otago Daily Times,* the *Sunday Star Times*, and *the Press*) in the three months following the attack (Every-Palmer S. , Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 277). The findings of this study proved valuable for informing the Christchurch case study.

3.3 Limitations

In the process of developing the methodology, the following limitations were identified:

- The requirement for primary sources to be available online narrowed the scope of available data and prevented any consideration of differences between online and newsprint reporting.
- A reliance on online sources also introduced limitation around the use of particular search engines and questions around the comprehensiveness of the results they returned. This was a particular limitation for the Christchurch case study given the narrower focus, as international media articles were returned with a greater frequency than New Zealand based articles.
- Articles not written in English were excluded. This was identified as a limitation given the impact of all three events on diaspora communities and differences in perspective internationally. The exclusion of non-English articles limited the range of perspectives considered for the case studies and increased the risk of overemphasising the white, European perspective of events.

Secondary sources and research that examined reactions from an international perspective played a role in mitigating this bias.

- A lack of a suitable media collection and analysis tool limited the amount of primary source material that could be collected. This was a particular limitation in the case of Christchurch case study. However, the study by Every-Palmer, et al (2020) was helpful in this regard.

3.4 Analytical framework and approach

According to Braun & Clarke (2006), qualitative analysis methods can be roughly divided into two groups. The first broad grouping consists of those methods that are tied to, or stem from, a particular theoretical position. In simple terms, these methodologies are considered the more easily recognised as analytical tools. Some of these methods, such as conversation analysis (e.g., Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008) and interpretative phenomenological analysis (e.g., Smith, Flowers, & Michael, 2009), provide established frameworks to guide the researcher through the analytical process. Others, such as grounded theory (e.g., Morse, et al., 2021), discourse analysis (e.g., Paltridge, 2012), and narrative analysis (e.g., Riessman, 1993), allow for the researcher to vary their methodology, as long as the process remains within the bounds of the broader parental framework. (Braun & Clarke, pp. 77-78). The rigour and more formulaic structure of the methodologies in this group provide both greater academic rigour and consistency when comparing similar data sets.

The second broad grouping comprises those methods that are "essentially independent of theory and epistemology," including thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 78). Although dismissed in some sectors as experimental, advocates of this second grouping value the flexibility and freedom of their methods. Despite the flexibility offered by this group, according to Roulston (2001, p. 280), thematic analysis is arguably the most common approach taken to the analysis of data in the social sciences. Braun & Clarke (p.78) argue that many researchers use techniques that fall into this grouping when conducting their analysis, but either misrepresent their methodology as another more established methodology, or present their methods in broad, undefined terms, such as simply referring to their methods as 'qualitative analysis.'

Having considered these two groups, a thematic analysis approach was considered most appropriate for this thesis. Thematic analysis provides a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006, and Boyatzis, 1998), although as Boyatzis (pp. 4-5) notes, the methodology can also serve to help interpret various aspects of the research topic for the researcher. By not being bound to any specific theoretical paradigm, thematic analysis provides the researcher the freedom to

consider both essentialist (or realist) methods – those that examine the ways events are the result of existing discourses within society – and 'contextual' methods – those that consider both the ways individuals take meaning from their experiences and the broader societal context that shapes these meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Like other qualitative analytical methodologies, thematic analysis contains a degree of subjectivity. As Taylor & Ussher (2001, p. 310) note, "the process, in terms of data collection and analysis, is unavoidably informed by the researchers' disclosures, comments and choice of questions and by their preconceptions and their personal, theoretical and political orientations." While many researchers believe they play a passive role in simply 'discovering' the themes emerging from their data sets, this perspective inadequately recognises the active role the researcher plays in identifying patterns or themes through their selection of themes of trends that are of interest to them (Taylor & Ussher, 2001).

As Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, (1997, pp. 205-6) argue, the identification of themes "can be misinterpreted to mean that themes 'reside' in the data, and if we just look hard enough they will 'emerge' like Venus on the half shell. If themes 'reside' anywhere, they reside in our heads from our thinking about our data and creating links as we understand them." Even advocates of thematic analysis like Braun and Clarke (p. 81) note that "researcher judgement is necessary to determine what a theme is." Furthermore, as researchers can self-define the prevalence of a theme, and/or the frequency of occurrences under a theme, through the quantifiable language they ascribe to the data, (for example: some, the majority, a number of…), the determination of the relative importance of a theme lies firmly in the hands of the researcher (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 81).

Given the method's emphasis on data which limits – to a degree – the ability of the researcher to predetermine thematic outcomes, inductive thematic analysis provides a means of mitigating inherence or unconscious bias on the part of the researcher that deductive approaches do not. However, as Braun & Clarke (2006) note, "researchers cannot free themselves of their theoretical and epistemological commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum," even when using inductive approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 83).

The thematic analytical approach was applied in accordance with the six-step process identified by Braun & Clarke (2006). These steps were taken as a guideline. During the process it was identified that it was necessary to occasionally review and retrace steps in order to refine later themes as further information was revealed. Braun & Clarke (2006) suggest these steps are:

1. **Familiarising yourself with the data**. This include preparing the transcripts of any verbal sources.

2. **Generating initial codes**. As Boyatzis (1998) explains, generating the initial analytical codes is the crux of thematic analysis and the most important step to get right. The exact structure for the coding will be influenced by whether the researcher is following a data or theory driven approach. Pre-existing templates (like those proposed by Crabtree & Miller (1992)) can provide overarching frameworks, but coding for as many patterns as possible enhances the overall analysis.

3. **Searching for themes.** During this phase the researcher conducts initial analysis to identify potential candidate themes. Analytical tools that aid collation, such as mind-maps and word clouds can help provide granularity, with the results clustered into main themes and supporting sub-themes, as well as those currently without a theme.

4. **Reviewing themes.** The researcher revisits the candidate themes and assesses which of the candidates has the robustness of data to remain valid. Themes can be placed in a hierarchy at this stage. A second, more macro, review in this phase seeks to determine whether or not the valid themes that have been identified accurately reflect the broader situation. This is a fluid phase during which the researcher is expected to have to recode some of the source material and redefine their initial themes in order to test the robustness of emerging thematic areas.

5. **Defining and naming themes.** Once a satisfactory thematic map has been identified, the researcher defines the essence of each of the themes they have identified. The important element from this phase is identifying what is interesting about the theme and why rather than just paraphrasing the content of the theme. Themes are described both in isolation and in relation to their relevance to each other. Describing the theme within the context of the wider situation is also important to ensure there is not too much overlap and to provide meaningful points for analysis.

6. **Writing up the findings**. In this phase the report is written in a coherent and logical manner. The intent is to present what can be a complex mosaic of themes into a concise and easy to follow narrative. (Braun & Clarke, 2006)

Both deductive and inductive analytical approaches were also considered. Deductive, or theoretical, processes tend to be more explicitly researcher-driven. There is greater researcher influence in shaping

the data to support the research topic or area of interest. As a result, deductive approaches offer less rich analysis overall, but instead enable the researcher to conduct more detailed and focused analysis on a specific area. Deductive processes are also more exposed to researcher interests - and therefore bias (Aronson, 1994). Inductive – or bottom up – methodologies are data-driven approaches that do not predetermine the themes that will eventually emerge from the analysis. Inductive processes are instead directed by the information contained within the data set and do not consider the research question or the questions asked during data collection in shaping the analysis or framing the themes (Thomas, 2006).

A hybrid approach was also considered. As Fereday & Muir-Cochrane (2006) demonstrate, hybrid approaches are possible by combining inductive approaches with structured templates proposed by authors such as Crabtree & Miller (1992).

Ultimately a blended approach was adopted. An inductive approach was initially adopted to allow the primary source material to drive the analysis using the thematic analysis framework provided by Braun & Clarke (2006). This was later refined through a deductive approach, where necessary, to focus the research onto the three key research areas, specifically around the how the media interacted in the representation of the act of terrorism itself; the representation of the attacker(s) in each instance; and the role the media played in shaping the State's response.

3.5 Case Study: The Rainbow Warrior

Twenty-four articles were examined over the initial two-month period following the bombing covering the period 10 July to 29 August 1985. Selected articles published later were also reviewed to examine longer-term changes to either the themes reported or the narratives around the event at the time.

All the articles examined were published in either print media or via international newsfeeds. The majority of the articles examined appeared in New Zealand based newspapers, with some articles drawn from publications in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia to contrast New Zealand reporting with international responses. Although partly driven by practical access considerations, a particular focus was placed on articles appearing in the *New Zealand Herald*, the Auckland-based newspaper located closest to the bombing. French media articles were not considered as part of this study, other than reflecting on accounts presented in existing studies or in consolidated formats. A summary of the articles considered can be found at Appendix 1.

3.6 Case Study: Christchurch

Unlike the case of the Rainbow Warrior and LynnMall, a pool of academic literature exists that specifically examines the media's coverage of events around the Christchurch attacks. A comprehensive study conducted by Every-Palmer et al (2020), identified 958 separate media reports published in five major New Zealand media outlets (the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Dominion Post*, the *Otago Daily Times*, the *Sunday Star Times*, and the *Press*) in the three months following the attack (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 277). Of these articles, 749 were identified as having the mosque shootings as a central focus. There were more articles on the shooting than any other event in 2019, including when considering coverage of the 2019 cricket and rugby world cups combined (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 277).

Given detailed research into New Zealand media coverage already exists, this case study did not seek to replicate existing literature. Instead, the research focused on articles published online on the 15 April 2019 - the day of the shooting itself – and 16 April. A narrower focus was adopted to enable a more detailed evaluation of media actions around the immediate event and to help isolate the discourse within the first 24-48 hours from the longer-term narratives that developed in the weeks and months following the attack. This was intended to help provide a means of comparison between the initial reporting and the results identified from the meta data analysis in the study by Every-Palmer, et al (2020).

To achieve this, a representative sample of twenty randomly selected articles published on 15 or 16 April 2019 were analysed using deductive analysis methodology to specifically focus on the media representation of the act, the attacker, and the state response. In keeping with the narrower focus, the case study considered articles that were published in the *New Zealand Herald* (4), *Radio New Zealand* (5), and *Stuff* (7), representing the three largest news networks covering events in New Zealand. Despite being more easily available online, international news articles were only peripherally considered in order to keep the focus on the New Zealand media response, however one article published by the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation* and three by *The Guardian* were analysed for comparative purposes. Existing research into international media responses was also considered. A summary of the articles considered can be found at Appendix 2.

3.7 Case Study: LynnMall

This case study examined twenty-nine articles published over the period 3-9 September 2021 relating to the LynnMall attack. Additional reporting published in the subsequent six months was also reviewed to help identify the duration of media coverage around the case and the later effects it had in New Zealand. The articles considered were all from New Zealand media sources, although New Zealand-based articles summarising international media reporting of the attack were also included. All were online publications. A summary of the articles considered can be found at Appendix 3.

4 Case Study One: The Rainbow Warrior

4.1 Summary of the incident

Just before midnight on 10 July 1985, two bombs attached to the hull of the Greenpeace flagship ship, Rainbow Warrior, exploded as she was moored at Waitemata Harbour in the Port of Auckland, New Zealand. The first, detonating at 11.38pm, crippled the ship. As crew went to investigate the damage, a second charge exploded causing massive flooding. One crew member, Portuguese-Dutch photographer Fernando Pereira, became trapped in his cabin as he attempted to retrieve his camera equipment and drowned (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2020). The other ten crew members aboard either safely abandoned the ship or were thrown into the water by the explosions. The Rainbow Warrior sank four minutes after the second explosion, leaving parts of its upperworks visible above the waterline (New Zealand Herald, 1985a).

The subsequent Police investigation revealed that the explosions had been caused by limpet mines planted by a team of French agents from the French foreign intelligence agency, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure [Directorate-General for External Security, or DGSE] (New Zealand Herald, 1985j, p. 20). The agents, operating under instructions from the French Government, had infiltrated New Zealand in order to disable the ship and prevent it sailing at the head of a flotilla of yachts protesting French nuclear testing at the Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean (The Australian, 2005). At the time of the attack France was a friendly nation to New Zealand (New Zealand Herald, 1985k).

Two of the agents, Major Alain Mafart and Captain Dominique Prieur - posing as Swiss newlyweds Sophie and Alain Turenge - were arrested following numerous tip-offs from the New Zealand public (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2020; New Zealand Herald, 1985c). The other members of the team all escaped New Zealand. Three agents, Chief Petty Officer Roland Verge, Petty Officer Jean-Michel Bartelo, and Petty Officer Gérard Andries, who had transported the bombs to New Zealand, escaped to Norfolk Island on the yacht *Ouvéa* where they were later arrested, but released under Australian law and escaped aboard the French submarine *Rubis* (Murphy, 1985). Divers Jean Camas and Jean-Luc Kister, Zodiac pilot Gérard Royal, and operation commander Louis-Pierre Dillais also escaped (Willsher, 2015).

Mafart and Prieur were both convicted of manslaughter in Wellington on 22 November 1985 and sentenced to ten years in prison (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2020). After significant French pressure, which included economic sanctions (Templeton, 2006), the two agents were transferred to French custody on 23 July 1986 and exiled to the island of Hao in French Polynesia for a three-year

sentence (de Arechaga, Keith, & Bredin, 1990). Prieur was granted leave to return to France on 6 May 1988 when she became pregnant. She returned to a hero's welcome and never returned to Hao Island. Mafart returned to Paris on 14 December 1987 after complaining of stomach illness. He did not return to Hao Island either, instead enrolling in a two-year staff course at the École de Guerre in Paris. He was promoted to Colonel in 1993 (Thakur, 1986).

Despite attempts by the French Government to deny involvement – and indeed to initially condemn the attack (The Age, 1985) – growing international pressure forced France to commission a public enquiry. The subsequent official French investigation resulted in the 'Tricot Report,' named after the head of the enquiry, Bernard Tricot. This report confirmed DGSE agents had been present in Auckland and that they were spying on the Rainbow Warrior and her crew, but concluded that they were not responsible for any bombing or acts of sabotage (Los Angeles Times, 1985; Veitch, 2010; New Zealand Press Association & Reuters, 1985, 28 August). The report was met with instant dismissal and widespread incredulity, including among the French media. French journalists became increasingly dismissive of the official account, with the French newspaper *Liberation* carrying the headline "Tricot lave plus blanc" ['Tricot washes whiter'], in a quip referring to the dual meaning of the word Tricot (or sweater) in French (Thakur, 1986).

In the face of growing public disbelief and political pressure, French Defence Minister Charles Hernu was forced to resign on 20 September (Dobbs, 1985). Admiral Pierre Lacoste was also dismissed as head of France's foreign intelligence service (Bernstein, 1985). By 22 September, ongoing investigations by French media left French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius with no choice by to admit that DGSE agents had sunk the Rainbow Warrior (King M. , 1988, pp. 200-202), and to confirm they had been working under official orders of the French Government (New York Times, 1985; United Nations, 1986; Veitch, 2010). The operation had been officially sanctioned under the codename Operation Satanic (Robie, 2007, p. 50).

4.2 Case Study overview

As part of the inductive process, a number of themes were identified that did not fit into the three specific focus areas relating to the event, perpetrators, and state response, all of which are discussed later.

First of these was an observation that many of the articles did not identify the journalist responsible for writing it. Eleven of the articles reviewed contained no specific attribution. A further six attributed the

article to a news wire service, such as Reuters, Associated Press, or the New Zealand Press Association (Reuters, 1985; New Zealand Press Association, 1985a; Associated Press, 1985a; Associated Press, 1985b; New Zealand Press Association & Reuters, 1985; New Zealand Press Association, 1985b), and an additional two were attributed to a generic 'Police Reporters' team (Police Reporters, 1985a; Police Reporters, 1985b). Of the remaining articles, four appeared in New Zealand newspapers, with attributions made to three individual journalists (Lagan & NZPA, 1985; Mangnall, 1985a; Mangnall, 1985b; Murphy, 1985).

The media stories around the attack also helped build a discourse of stoicism and steadfastness among the public rather than fear. Most of the articles focused on factual developments within the police investigation. Media interviews were also generally limited to politicians and senior police officers involved in the case rather than canvassing general public perspectives. There were few articles that sought public opinion or reflected the public response to the bombing. Those articles that did contain interviews with the public discussed the contributions they had made to the case or focused on insights that were relevant to the investigation (Police Reporters, 1985a). Apart from one article appearing in the UK Financial Times on 13 July (Hayward, 1985) the articles were generally factual. They contained little in the way of emotion or expressive prose found in more recent reporting, and contained few references suggesting people were fearful. Terms relating to 'terror' among the population did not appear at all unless included as part of a quote from an interview, although one article referred to the crew as "shaken" (New Zealand Herald, 1985a), and one referred to the attack as "frightening" (New Zealand Press Association, 1985b).

Of the articles that did contain elements reporting public reaction, most focused on the effects of the attack on Greenpeace and the crew. These articles focused on the crew's immediate experience, their initial reactions, and their stoicism in the face of adversity (The Age, 1985; New Zealand Herald, 1985a; Mangnall, 1985a; New Zealand Herald, 1985e). A few later articles focused on the response from the public in terms of fundraising and support, particularly at the time of the raising and re-scuttling of the ship (New Zealand Herald, 1985i). These articles were presented in terms of strength and resilience in the face of a stronger adversary, particularly highlighting the crew's intention to continue their protest activity (New Zealand Herald, 1985e).

4.3 Media interaction with the act as terrorism

While there is a significant body of literature that now refers to the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior as New Zealand's first international terrorist incident (Greener-Barcham, 2002, p. 515; Robie, 2007, p. 52), there were very few explicit references to the bombing as a terrorist incident in the media articles at the time of the attack. Of the 24 articles examined in July-August period, only five contained explicit references to the bombing as terrorism. All of these appeared in the days immediately following the bombing with four published on 12 July and one on 13 July. Three of these articles appeared in New Zealand newspapers (Lagan & NZPA, 1985; New Zealand Press Association, 1985a; New Zealand Herald, 1985b), and two were published internationally (Hayward, 1985; The Age, 1985).

Most of these articles can be attributed to a series of media interviews given by the New Zealand Prime Minister and leading Police investigators on 11 July. In a front-page interview appearing in the Wellington-based Dominion newspaper on 12 July under the headline "Terrorists sank Warrior," Prime Minister David Lange told journalists that the bombing had, "the implication of political or terrorist overtones." (Lagan & NZPA, 1985). The same newspaper contained a sidebar article reporting on an interview with then New Zealand Police Commissioner, Ken Thompson, who told media that "We [New Zealand] have so far escaped anything which could be termed terrorism." He also noted that "the bombing showed New Zealand was not immune to terrorism of politically motivated crimes." (Lagan & NZPA, 1985). Detective Superintendent Allan Galbraith, the Auckland-based officer in-charge of the investigation, also provided comment, referring to the bombing as, "possibly murder and possibly terrorism……probably terrorism," (Lagan & NZPA, 1985). Similar commentary was picked up in Australia on 12 July with The Age newspaper leading with an article entitled, "Terrorism hunt follows Greenpeace blast" (The Age, 1985).

By contrast, the article by Hayward (1985), which was published in the UK's Financial Times, offered a more emotive perspective. Hayward, who was writing from Wellington for a British audience, presented a markedly different account under the headline, "New Zealand's First Taste of Terrorism: Sinking of Environmental group Greenpeace's vessel, Rainbow Warrior." His article drew associations between the bombing and other terrorist incidents familiar to UK audiences - such as the assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten by the IRA - and made explicit reference to the bombing as international terrorism and murder. Hayward also introduced commentary around the emotional response to the attack, referring to "public shock," and suggesting that the country has united behind the Prime Minister who is "speaking for the whole country." (Hayward, 1985).

However, despite the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Police, after the articles on 13 July, and through to the end of August, no further references to the bombing as terrorism were identified in this case study (although it is possible references may appear in other articles not identified through this work). Instead, a word aggregation search of subsequent media articles identified that media was considerably more likely to describe the attack in terms such as 'sabotage,' 'murder, 'arson,' or simply as "the bombing.' From late September onwards, periodic references to "international state-backed terrorism" started reappearing in the media (for example, Page & Templeton, 1985), largely as a result of a statement made by Prime Minister Lange on 23 September that described the incident as, "nothing more than a sordid act of international state-backed terrorism" (The Guardian, 1985). Yet despite Lange's political rhetoric, most newspapers remained focused on defining the attack as sabotage or in similar terms.

Although the initial media coverage did not engage with the bombing as a terrorist act at the time, references to the bombing as a terrorist incident started to increase in 1986 and have remained in the public discourse ever since. One source regularly cited in this regard is David Robie, who had travelled on the Rainbow Warrior as a freelance journalist (and later became an academic) just prior to the bombing (Radio New Zealand, 2020). His 1986 book, 'Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior' recounts his experiences in the months before the attack and his reflections during the events and has been highly influential in shaping subsequent scholarly perspectives (Robie, 2015). Robie is explicit in referring to the bombing as a terrorist event, later stating that, "It was an outrageous act of terrorism and the bombers knew very well, as they were getting information all the time, that there was a large crowd onboard the Rainbow Warrior that night and the chances were very high that there could have been a loss of life" (Robie, 2020).

The reason for this initial lack of uptake by the media both in New Zealand and internationally is unclear, particularly after the nature of the statements given by the Prime Minister and the Police had provided the foundation for media to continue to describe the bombing as terrorism. It could be argued that New Zealand's experience with 'terrorism' had been limited up until the bombing given the country's limited history of predominately domestic political violence to this point. However, the concept of international European terrorists carrying out bombings against western targets was not wholly unfamiliar to New Zealand media at the time. Hayward's (1985) explicit associations between the bombing and attacks by the IRA in the United Kingdom and the assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten demonstrate that at least some within the New Zealand media were familiar with international terrorism.

Nor would it be accurate to associate the lack of uptake in this regard with knowledge of the French Government's involvement or any possible pressure from officials to preserve diplomatic relations with France. Certainly, suspicions around the nationality of the bombers had started to form by 13 July (New Zealand Herald, 1985c), but knowledge of the nationality of the perpetrators would not necessarily have precluded the media from referring to the bombing as an act of terrorism. While suspected, the involvement of the French Government was not properly revealed until early August (for example, Manganall, 1985, 10 August). In the interim period, the French Embassy had explicitly denied French involvement, offered its condolences to those affected, and made commitments to assist New Zealand bring the perpetrators to justice (The Age, 1985). In the period immediately following the bombing neither the involvement of French agents nor the official sanction of a sovereign nation were known to the media. The relationship with France was not in particular question during the first few weeks following the bombing. This was to change later. New Zealand's Chief Justice, Ronald Davison, who presided over the trial of Mafart and Prieur, was to later state in his ruling that, "In my view this activity may well fall within the definition of terrorist activity." (Elagab, 1997). However, in the first few weeks this association was not known.

Official censorship can also be discounted. The Cabinet Committee on Terrorism of 17 July 1985, tasked with examining control of the media during a terrorist emergency, found that Government had "very limited powers to control information disseminated by the media during a terrorist emergency" (Webb, 2021). In any case, Prime Minister Lange had actively engaged with the media in the immediate aftermath of the bombing by explicitly using terrorism-related terms during his interview of 11 July (Lagan & NZPA, 1985). Instead, Battersby (2023) argues that the reason for the media's lack of uptake in engaging with the bombing as terrorism was due to self-regulation, largely influenced by New Zealand's previous experience with violent protest. As explained above, up to and including the bombing, New Zealand's experience of deliberate, politically motivated violence had been understood, and largely accepted, in the context of protest rather than terrorism. Battersby (2023) argues that "[i]f none of it [New Zealand's history of political violence] was perceived as 'terrorism', it was because New Zealanders seemed unwilling to recognise it as such." Webb (2021, p. 108) further notes that even post the bombing, members of the Lange Government remained cautious about the overly liberal use of the term terrorism, "due to concern that discourse would encompass domestic protest, especially since the 1981 Springbok Tour protests (which Labour generally supported) were still a recent memory." (Webb, 2021) One such example of this was later provided by then Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer during the third reading of the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill 1987, which had been created in

the aftermath of the bombing. In the debate preceding the Bill, Palmer was at pains to exclude domestic terrorism from the Act noting that "there should be no misunderstanding that the Bill is aimed at anything other than internationally motivated terrorism, because it is becoming increasingly evident that that is where the danger from terrorism lies." (New Zealand Government, 1987b, p. 10511).

Much of New Zealand's official response in 1985 was governed by the 1932 Public Safety Conservation Act and the 1983 Civil Defence Act, supported by Defence Act 1971. These Acts outlined the powers of the Government in times of crisis, including during civil unrest. However, as Webb (2021) notes, given New Zealand's terrorism legislation at the time had been heavily influenced by New Zealand's experience of domestic protest, none of the acts explicitly included a reference to terrorism or terrorist events. A definition for terrorism was added to the 1969 New Zealand Security Intelligence Act through the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act (1977), but this only referred to the conduct of activities by the NZSIS in relation to terrorism (New Zealand Government, 1977). As a result, at the time of the bombing, no legislation was in place to allow the Police to try the perpetrators as terrorists. In the absence of specific legislation, Mafart and Prieur were charged with murder, conspiring to commit arson and wilful damage (New Zealand Herald, 1985i). They were later to plead guilty to manslaughter. The later International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987, introduced in the wake of the bombing, was to expand the scope for terrorism related charges, but at the time there was no means to charge either of the agents with committing a terrorist act. (New Zealand Government, 1987a).

Smith (2003) further illustrates the enduring influence New Zealand's experience with violent protest has had on New Zealand's terrorism policy landscape. In a study examining the development of counter-terrorism legislation in New Zealand, Smith notes that both the 1951 Waterfront Strikes and the 1981 Springbok Tour continued to be raised as exemplars during the Parliamentary discussion surrounding the formulation of the New Zealand Suppression of Terrorism Act (2002). As a result, New Zealand decision makers explicitly excluded acts conducted during protests from New Zealand's definition of terrorism, as well as deciding to maintain the threshold for an act to be considered terrorism at a higher level than other international definitions (Smith J. E., 2003).

4.4 The media representation of the attacker(s)

The media representation of the attacks during the incident can be broken down into three phases. In the first phase, covering the initial few days following the bombing, the media relied on official sources and interviews to guide their narrative. There was no indication at that time as to who had been responsible. In these articles, the media refers to the attacker as terrorists, drawing on statements and interviews provided by the Government and senior officials. The articles included quotes from Prime Minister Lange who described the attackers as "skilled, ruthless, calculating people who would set out to murder others in this dispassionate way." (The Age, 1985; Lagan & NZPA, 1985; New Zealand Herald, 1985b). However, the tone of the media narrative remained professional, factual, and investigative with little media speculation outside that reported as part of the police case.

The second phase covers the period from when the police started to identify possible suspects through to when suspicion began to form about official state involvement. Suspicions the attackers had been foreign started to form by 13 July following indications from the police that they were investigating French nationals who had been on board the Rainbow Warrior (for example, New Zealand Herald, 1985c; Hayward, 1985). From this point onward, the media representation focused heavily on the foreign status of the bombers, most notably Mafart and Prieur, referring to them as 'French' or as 'foreigners' in all the subsequent articles relating to them. The media narrative represented the perpetrators in criminal terms, but as rational actors who had deliberately planned and carried out the attack. Some articles highlighted the 'underhanded' or 'devious' nature of the attackers, including by highlighting their use of "false declarations" and fake passports (New Zealand Herald, 1985g), and describing the way they had infiltrated the crew they had later attacked (Hayward, 1985).

This phase in particular, but also the other two to a less extent, provides an example of the media discourse of *othering*. Othering can be defined as the "construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group" (Brons, 2015). In the case of the Rainbow Warrior, the media played an active role in othering the attackers by consistently referencing their nationality in all their media articles. Suggestions the attackers were not from New Zealand appeared on 12 July, the day after the attack had occurred, and before any suspects had been identified (The Age, 1985). The same article confirmed police were "investigating the international passenger list" despite Greenpeace coordinator Steve Sawyer telling media that he had no idea who was responsible. It is unclear from the material available why the focus fell on foreign nationals so early. In the first few days there was no evidence to

suggest the attack had been conducted by foreign nationals, and why the media did not question the official narrative, despite New Zealand's previous – and entirely domestic – history of political violence. The foreign status of the attackers was again echoed on 13 July, with a specific reference to police investigations of a Frenchman understood to have been onboard the vessel on the evening the ship was attacked, and media reporting on reactions from the French Embassy (Hayward, 1985; New Zealand Herald, 1985d). From this point, all the articles relating to the attackers do so with a reference to their nationality or the fact they are 'foreign.' By 18 July, Prime Minister Lange told reporters that "I have knowledge of who did it," adding that it "did not involve New Zealanders." (The Toronto Star, 1985), thereby affirming the international status of the attackers.

While the nationality of the suspects was a point of fact and can partly explain the media's constant representation of the attackers, the othering process becomes more evident when contrasted with the media representation of the victim killed in the bombing, Portuguese-Dutch photographer Fernando Pereira. The media did not place the same emphasis on Pereira's foreign status as they did with the attackers. None of the articles examined in this case study referred to his nationality. All the media articles containing references to his name referred to him in the context of being associated with Greenpeace, or with the ship (The Age, 1985; New Zealand Herald, 1985i; Associated Press, 1985a). By doing so, the media downplayed any differences between the wider New Zealand public and Pereira, encouraging his inclusion within the majority group and tacitly drawing a distinction between the 'good foreigners' and the bad ones. A retrospective article published in the New Zealand Herald in 2016 further illustrates this point. In it, Pereira is referred to as "the Greenpeace photographer" (without reference to his nationality), whereas Mafart is explicitly referred to as "a French agent" (Soper, 2016).

The third phase in the media's representation of the terrorists can be defined by the point at which suspicions had started to form around the attackers' association with the French government around 10 August. At this point, the media rhetoric changed to represent the bombers as foreign agents (Page & Templeton, 1985) and/or "saboteurs" (Mangnall, 1985b; New Zealand Press Association & Reuters, 1985). They were afforded a more 'professional' status by the media. The discourse shifted away from the attackers as individual saboteurs, to a representation of the attackers as tools of France and therefore an attack by France on New Zealand (Page & Templeton, 1985). At this point the bombing became more than a story of individual resilience by a handful of Greenpeace crew to one of national resilience in the face of a stronger nation-state. It is this narrative that dominates today.

4.5 The role the media played in shaping the State's response

The bombing of the Rainbow Warrior was to become a landmark moment in both New Zealand's history and in the psyche of the New Zealand public (Wilson, 2010, pp. 58-59). Within a year, eight books recounting the bombing were in the process of being published (Szabo, 1991, p. 133). A new wave of nationalism swept the country provoked by the subsequent belligerent French neo-colonial response to the bombing, albeit with a distinctly Pakeha flavour (Belich, 2001, p. 439). As Wilson (2010) notes, "the upsurge of 'New Zealandness' provoked by French neo-colonial ambitions in the Pacific may be seen as analogous to the growth of 'Englishness" in Britain" (Wilson, 2010, p. 59).

The incident was to play a particularly significant role in highlighting New Zealand's opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific and shaping the country's later stance on nuclear issues. The New Zealand public's nascent position towards nuclear power was still forming in the months leading up to the bombing. Prime Minister Lange's Labour Government had taken first steps by banning the American nuclear-powered warship USS Buchanan from New Zealand ports in early 1985. Greenpeace was also actively engaged in anti-nuclear protest activities in the Pacific in the months before the attack (Hayward, 1985). Nuclear issues had put considerable strain on New Zealand-US relations and on the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty, 1951 (ANZUS), particularly following New Zealand's declaration as a nuclear-free zone in 1984 and subsequent refusal to accept visits by US nuclear submarines (Department of State, n.d.).

However, the media's coverage of the attack on the Rainbow Warrior widened the public's awareness on nuclear issues to more than nuclear power vis-à-vis US-New Zealand relations, intensified the public's attention on the topic, and helped to cement public support around the issue (Victoria University, 2015). Belich (2001, p. 439) argues that the attack marked the moment when "affronted new nationalism began to contest with traditionalism in the minds of the populist middle ground." Veitch (2010) further notes that "[r]ather than challenging the country's aspirations to be nuclear-free, the incident became the catalyst. What reinforced this nuclear-free stance was the realisation that the bombing was an act of state terrorism inflicted on New Zealand by an ally—an action that other allies did not condemn even though New Zealand sovereignty had been severely violated." Wilson (2010) similarly argues that, "[t]he Rainbow Warrior affair was pivotal in reinforcing the Labour Government's anti-nuclear policy, and in reshaping national allegiances away from the major powers, including Britain where reactions to the affair were diluted, and the USA, where support of the French sabotage was blatant, towards the Pacific" (Wilson, 2010, p. 64).

By the late 1980's New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was well entrenched. The relationship with the United States on nuclear issues had deteriorated to the point where, on 17 September 1986, the United States formally suspended its security obligations to New Zealand under the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty, 1951 (ANZUS) (Department of State, n.d.). This was followed by the passing of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, which codified New Zealand's nuclear-free status and prohibited any and all nuclear armed or powered ships from passing through New Zealand's waters (New Zealand Goverment, 1987). Such was the strength of feeling on nuclear issues following the bombing that later National Prime Minister Jim Bolger was unable to reverse New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies despite the National Government being a strong supporter of ANZUS and closer US relations (Wilson, 2010, p. 64).

4.6 Conclusion

The bombing of the Rainbow Warrior became a pivotal moment in New Zealand's history. For the most part, the media coverage of events remained impartial and professional, focusing the narrative on the case and relevant developments as they occurred. As such, the media did not drive the prevailing discourse, rather it reflected developments in the case in a largely factual and constructive manner. But the media was not entirely passive. The media's reticence to brand the bombing as an act of terrorism, despite government positioning that enabled them to do had they had wished, was particularly noteworthy, as was the conscious othering of the attackers from an early stage.

Of particular note was the way the news media discourse evolved as the police investigation developed. There was a resistance within the media, at least initially, to Government attempts to shape the narrative through agenda-setting or direct effects approaches. For the most part, the media tempered their use of human-focused reporting and did not focus on emotional reactions in the way later New Zealand terrorist events were to be portrayed. Instead, the discourse was one of stoicism and resilience, and of a small nation in the far corner of the world standing up to a larger aggressor. In this regard, the media discourse most closely reflected social cognitive theoretical approaches. However, as the shifting narrative evolved, particularly when the bombing became an international issue, agenda-setting efforts by the Government started to become more prominent in the media, joining the prevailing social cognitive rhetoric. The resulting discourse of resistance and resilience fuelled a growing nationalism among a population still working to find its independent feet, and imbued New Zealanders with a greater sense of political agency and righteousness on the world stage.

5 Case Study Two: Christchurch Mosques

5.1 Summary of the incident

At 1.40pm on 15 March 2019, Australian national Brenton Tarrant entered the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand and started shooting at the worshippers attending Friday prayers. It was the first of a series of attacks planned for that day. Twelve minutes later, at 1.52pm, Tarrant arrived at the Linwood Islamic Centre and opened fire on worshippers there, killing and wounding more. His vehicle was intercepted by Police as he attempted to drive to a third mosque in Ashburton and Tarrant was arrested. Police later found homemade incendiary devices in his car, which Tarrant intended to use to burn the mosques. By the end of his rampage, 51 people had been murdered and 50 more wounded (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 274).

On 26 March 2020, Tarrant appeared in court, pleading guilty to the murder of 51 worshippers and the attempted murder of an additional 40 people. He was also charged under New Zealand's terrorist legislation on charges of engaging in a terrorist act; the first time an individual had been convicted under the Act. Tarrant received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This was also the first such sentence in New Zealand. Some politicians sought to have Tarrant extradited to serve his sentence in Australia given his nationality and that the not inconsiderable cost of housing him would fall on New Zealand (Cheng, 2020). Despite the Australian Government indicating they were open to the request, Tarrant remains in New Zealand.

The subsequent Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019found that Tarrant had entered New Zealand in August 2017 with the intention of carrying out a terrorist attack (Royal Commission, 2020, pp. Part 4.1, 7.1). His attacks had been carefully planned with preparations beginning two-years beforehand. Tarrant had conducted research and surveillance on the mosques to understand their layouts and identify their busiest times. He had also arranged to join rifle clubs in New Zealand. Tarrant used legitimate means to legally obtain body armour and number of military-style assault rifles in New Zealand, which he had then illegally modified to increase their rate of fire and magazine capacity. These weapons were later adorned with far-right slogans, imagery, and names during his attack.

Tarrant had also arranged for GoPro footage of the attack to be broadcast live on social media via the Facebook social media platform. The footage was then downloaded to the alt-right site, 8chan. The Ukrainian far-right group, the Azov Movement, subsequently arranged for Tarrant's manifesto to be

distributed both electronically and in print (Shuster & Perrigo, 2021). Approximately 200 people are believed to have viewed the attack live. The ease of online access meant both social and official media circulated the footage more widely in the immediate aftermath, and before some countries were able to have the footage removed.

Tarrant's motivations for his attack were contained in a 74-page manifesto he had arranged to have emailed to a pre-arranged list of recipients minutes prior to the attack. This list included the Prime Minister and media outlets. The manifesto detailed Tarrant's association with white supremacism and alt-right extremism. In it, Tarrant claimed his attack was motivated as a response to Da'ish-inspired terrorist attacks in Europe; the outcome of the 2017 French Presidential election (particularly Marine Le Pen's loss in May 2017); and his observation of migrant numbers during his travels in France (Royal Commission, 2020, p. Part 3.5). However, the Royal Commission assessed that his radicalisation had occurred prior to this period. Tarrant had travelled extensively following the death of his father in 2010, with his mother noting that he had become more racist the more he had travelled (Royal Commission, 2020, p. Part 3.3.9). Subsequent investigations found that Tarrant was associated with the United Patriots Front, a far-right group based in Australia, and in 2017 had made financial contributions to Freedomain Radio, a Canadian far right podcast and YouTube channel, and the National Policy Institute, a US-based white supremacist think tank (Royal Commission, 2020, p. Part 3.3.16).

5.2 Case Study overview

Given the narrower focus of this case study, findings from of other existing thematic research into the media's coverage of the Christchurch shootings is relevant in order to provide a benchmark against which this research can compare. As previously noted, the research by Every-Palmer at al (2020) makes a significant contribution in this regard. Every-Palmer at al (2020) identified five broad themes from their research.

- The media made a moral choice not to name Tarrant. Of the 749 articles focused on the shooting, 53 (7.1%) made mention of Tarrant, with his name appearing in only two headlines (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 277). The study notes that the media had both access to his details the following day, and had received copies of his manifesto by email. However, Every-Palmer at al conclude that the media "repelled by the blatant solicitation of their attention, appears to have baulked at providing his with what he sought".

- The study found a strong focus on the victims, their families and communities, with 534 articles focused on this aspect.
- Thirdly, the media did not seek to create causal attribution. Every-Palmer at al considered this was and contrary to usual international media practice in mass-shooting events. Instead, the media was found to be supportive of agency efforts and full of praise for the emergency services. The leadership of the Prime Minister was identified for specific praise, in particular around the comments on the role of social media in disseminating Tarrant's livestream.
- Fourthly, a smaller number of articles (15) focused on ease by which the weapons had been obtained for the attack, leading to a wider discussion around reforms to gun laws covered in 41 articles.
- Finally, the role of social media featured prominently, with 66 articles dedicated to discussing the role platforms played in disseminating Tarrants beliefs and actions. There was a specific focus on Facebook, with 55 articles focused on criticising Facebook for acting too slowly around the livestream (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, pp. 278-279)

These findings will be considered in light of the findings from this case study to examine whether or not the media narrative in the immediate aftermath of the shooting is consistent with the meta-analysis.

5.3 Media interaction with the act as terrorism

New Zealand Government attempts to officially frame the shooting as an act of terrorism were made within hours of the attacks concluding. While the initial statement from the Government, made at 4pm, did not refer to the word terrorism - instead referring to the shooting as an "an act of extraordinary and unprecedented violence" (Ardern, 2019b) - by the evening media standup the narrative had changed. In a media interview conducted at 7.25pm on 15 March 2019, approximately six hours after the attack had started, Prime Minister Ardern told journalists that "[i]t is clear that this can only be described as a terrorist attack" (New Zealand Herald, 2019a; Radio New Zealand, 2019a; Ardern, 2019a). This determination was also to feature in subsequent media statements made in by the Prime Minister, including in an official statement made to Parliament four days later (Ardern, 2019c).

However, the articles reviewed for this case study show that the use of the term terrorism was not universal. Terrorism nomenclature was not immediately adopted by other officials or by the media. For example, in an interview with journalists also conducted on 15 March – the same day as the Prime Minister's address - Police Commissioner Mike Bush avoided referring to terrorism, telling gathered journalists he "would not call it a terrorist attack" but said "it did not get any more serious in this country" (New Zealand Herald, 2019a).

Similarly, media articles published on 15 March ahead of the Prime Minister's evening media conference referred to the attack in terms other than terrorism, instead referring to the murders in terms of "shootings" or "mass killing" (New Zealand Herald, 2019d; Australia Broadcasting Cooperation, 2019). An increase in the media's use of the term 'terrorism' was identified following the Prime Minister's evening media statement. However, articles published by all three of the main news networks in the hours following the statement placed the word in in quotation marks or included it as part of larger, direct quotes by either Prime Minister Ardern, New Zealand based experts or Australian Prime Minister Scott Robinson (Radio New Zealand, 2019a; Duff, 2019; New Zealand Herald, 2019b).

By the following day (16 March) New Zealand media networks were more definitive in designating the attack as terrorism, (Watkins, 2019; MacManus, 2019; Stuff, 2019a; New Zealand Herald, 2019c). This was also reflected in the reactions of international leaders, many of whom referred to the attack as terrorism in statements and messages issued overnight (Al Jazeera, 2019).

Further research is required to identify exactly why there was a delay in the media adopting terrorism nomenclature immediately and why this swung so significantly after the first 24-hours. It would be reasonable to hypothesise that both the confusion and chaos that surrounded the attacks at the time, and the evolving information landscape played a role. However, Rahman & Emadi (2018) have argued that institutional biases in the New Zealand media's representation of Islam and Muslims in the years leading up to the Christchurch shooting may have contributed to the media's framing of the murders and the public's perception towards the Muslim community at the time (Rahman & Emadi, 2018).

The adoption of terrorism-related language was much slower internationally. A study of British media in the immediate aftermath of the attack, including articles printed the next day, found that the UK media did not actively engage with the attack as a terrorist incident (Dundar, 2019, p. 69). In the UK and France, major news networks came under criticism, including from former staff, for referring to the attack as a 'shooting' and declining to use terrorism related language outside quotations (BBC, 2019a).

Critics pointed out the contradiction between the media's coverage of domestic incidents, which they had defined as terror attacks, and their coverage of the 'Christchurch shooting,' highlighting the double standards that were applied when Muslims, rather than Europeans, were the victims of political violence (Erozden, 2019).

Writing from an Australian perspective, Ellis & Muller (2019) have argued that the New Zealand media took a human-centred approach to their coverage, noting "a proximity filter was used by New Zealand media who identified the victims as part of their own community," and that this filter tempered the imagery that was broadcast. However, they also note that the same events were not treated with such a humanistic approach in Australia. Their research into the Australian media's coverage of events identified that the Australian media had no such reservations about broadcasting graphic content relating to the shooting. They concluded that the Australian media's geographical distance from the event itself was used as justification to show footage censured in New Zealand, arguing that "the events were seen as foreign by Australian journalists who used perceived distance as justification for extremely graphic content" (Ellis & Muller, 2019, p. 346). Similarly, some UK outlets briefly linked their articles to Tarrant's manifesto, and the BBC provided readers with its full name (Baumgartner, Bermejo, Ndulue, Zuckerman, & Donovan, 2019).

Regardless of when the media first formally adopted the term, the media discourse over the first two days was essentially a discourse of terrorism, albeit without the name. While, as Ellis & Muller (2019) note, the New Zealand media did stop short of broadcasting any images from the shooting itself, many of the early articles contained Images of blood-soaked victims, people fleeing in fear, security service responders and suspect arrests. Examples appeared in articles published by all three of the main media networks (New Zealand Herald, 2019a; Sherwood, 2019; Radio New Zealand, 2019c). These articles also contained a heavy concentration of videos and interviews with survivors, including some in hospital (New Zealand Herald, 2019a). Articles were written in a highly emotionally charged way, describing the fear, panic, and horror of those in the immediate proximity in great detail. Many also contained an embedded video file playing the latest video and photo imagery from Christchurch, or links to a live RSS feed providing up-to-date situation reports. One contained a link to footage entitled 'how events unfolded' which provided a blow-by-blow account of events that day (Stevenson & Anthony, 2019). Some articles also included links to mental health services. Collectively this coverage amounted to a representation of the event as a major terrorist attack, even if the media had yet to declare it so.

The meta-data research by Every-Palmer et al (2020) also identified a strong focus on victims (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 278). However, while the human-centred approach identified by Ellis & Muller (2019) may have become apparent in the days, weeks and months following the attack, this study found little evidence of a compassionate approach in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Images and accounts by victims and their families were used by the media as a means to build the elements of fear and shock apparent in a discourse of terrorism without a noticeable consideration of the needs, privacy or wellbeing of those directly involved. Those articles that did offer reunion or counselling services were tailored to address the needs of the observers of their coverage. There was a strong focus on the victims in the early reporting, but it was not focused *on* the victims.

5.4 The media representation of the attacker

The media representation of Tarrant in the first 48-hours can be defined in four broad themes relating to his political views, his role in the attack, his personality, and his identify.

Articles that focused on Tarrant's political views comprised a combination of factual statements relating to Tarrant's 'right-wing' politics, blended with official assessments of these as 'extremist' views (New Zealand Herald, 2019a). These descriptors were often accompanied by physical descriptions of Tarrant particularly referring to the 'military style' of the attack and the weapons used (Radio New Zealand, 2019d).

The New Zealand media did not include much coverage on Tarrant as a person, although one article did refer to an interview with residents from Tarrant's home town that described him as 'polite and well mannered' and described his work with children and as a volunteer (New Zealand Herald, 2019b). By contrast, British and Australian media networks who had reported similar, profile-type information were criticised by predominately Muslim media and academics for attempting to humanise Tarrant (Al Jazeera, 2019b). They pointed to the media's reluctance to call him a terrorist in particularly, noting that terms such as 'white supremacist, extremist, gunman, suspect and killer' were all used as substitutes by international media networks to define Tarrant, with only one media outlet, The Sun, electing to refer to Tarrant as terrorist (Baumgartner, Bermejo, Ndulue, Zuckerman, & Donovan, 2019). This research also identified one further article, published in the Guardian, that explicitly referred to Tarrant as the "alleged terrorist," (Martin & Roy, 2019). As discussed above, New Zealand media did not describe Tarrant as a terrorist in the first 24-hours.

Language relating to Tarrant as a lone wolf, or describing him in similar terms, had yet to appear in the media during the initial period of reporting as multiple suspects had been detained and it remained unclear if Tarrant was working alone (Radio New Zealand, 2019a).

Articles that considered Tarrant's personality represented him as a deliberate and considered adversary. This was supported by references to the attack being 'well planned" and by categorising his membership of gun-clubs as part of his deliberate preparation (Radio New Zealand, 2019a; Radio New Zealand, 2019b). Many of the articles referred to the existence of Tarrant's livestream footage and to his manifesto, but none of the New Zealand articles in this study included its contents, with some explicitly noting they refused to publish it (New Zealand Herald, 2019a). However, most articles commented on the wide circulation of both on social media (Radio New Zealand, 2019c). One article named the sites on which the livestream had been uploaded and provided a partial line-by-line description of the footage (Sherwood, 2019). While the New Zealand media's reluctance to engage with this material meant the New Zealand media did not directly disseminate either the manifesto or the livestream footage, the media also made no attempts to interfere with its dissemination. Instead, by making references to its existence, and providing descriptions of its content, the New Zealand media fed public interest while removing themselves from the accountability chain. In effect, they divested their ethical responsibility on to the consumer and on to the platforms on which the material was being circulated. Facebook alone reported that the video had been watched 4,000 times before they were able to have it removed. They also reported blocking a further 1.2 million copies at the point of upload and deleting 300,000 more (BBC, 2019b). It is highly unlikely that these viewers were all extremists associated with Tarrant, or people alerted to the material's presence without the media having prompted them to seek it out.

However, the most significant trend identified through this research was the media focus on Tarrant's identity. This can be broken down into two related groups, one involving his name, and one his nationality. After the event, the New Zealand media was to receive much praise domestically for choosing not to publish Tarrant's name. Every-Palmer, et al (2020) have identified this was a significant trend in their macro-assessment of New Zealand media articles following the shooting. They have suggested the lack of coverage was a significant factor in shaping the subsequent response, arguing that "the unprecedented reluctance by the New Zealand media to feature the shooter as a protagonist or even publish his name…helped promote a sense of collective responsibility for change" (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 274).

The media's decision not to mention Tarrant by name was heavily influenced by Prime Minister Ardern's refusal to name him as the attacker. In a statement to Parliament on 19 March, Prime Minister Ardern said:

> He sought many things from his act of terror, but one was notoriety, and that is why you will never hear me mention his name. He is a terrorist, he is a criminal, he is an extremist, but he will, when I speak, be nameless, and to others I implore you: speak the names of those who were lost rather than the name of the man who took them. He may have sought notoriety but we in New Zealand will give him nothing—not even his name (Ardern, 2019c).

However, this research shows that the media expressed no such reservations and had no such compunction about naming Tarrant in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, particularly the Prime Minister had made her statement above. Despite later supporting the Prime Minister's position, all three of the main news networks published articles on the 15 March that identified Tarrant by name as the attacker (Sherwood, 2019; New Zealand Herald, 2019b; Radio New Zealand, 2019e).

The refusal to name Tarrant was to become an important aspect of the Christchurch terrorist attack as it played a significant role in the later political discourse intended to both deny Tarrant agency and to 'other' him, and by association other right-wing extremists. At the same time, the Government's repeated attempts to represent the victims as New Zealanders (despite the fact that 24 victims, just under half, were foreign nationals) also formed part of this political discourse. Statements, such as, "[t]hey were New Zealanders. They are us" (Ardern, 2019c), "[t]hese New Zealanders had their lives ended, and all of us changed forever" (Bridges, 2019), and "this wasn't just something targeted at our Islamic community or just at Christchurch, as real as that is; it has happened to all New Zealanders, and all New Zealanders are grieving with them" (Bridges, 2019), were all rhetoric devices that played a role in reinforcing this narrative.

Mentions of Tarrant's nationality played a similar role in this regard. Tarrant was confirmed as an Australian citizen by the Australian Prime Minister within hours of the attack occurring. This was echoed by Prime Minister Ardern, and reported widely across New Zealand news networks (New Zealand Herald, 2019a). From the outset, all the articles reviewed for this case study that included a reference to the attacker also referred to his citizenship. While it is fair to note that references to Tarrant's nationality were a statement of fact, the manner by which it was used by the media help build a

narrative that presented Tarrant, and his actions, as something that had come from outside New Zealand, that was foreign to New Zealand. Prime Minister Ardern was the most explicit in this regard, stating "[y]es, the person who committed these acts was not from here. He was not raised here. He did not find his ideology here, but that is not to say that those very same views do not live here" (Ardern, 2019c).

5.5 The relationship between the media and the State's response

The media's relationship with the state in the case of Christchurch was one of enablement. As Kingdon (2014) argues, the window for significant policy change is brief (Kingdon, 2014). The Christchurch terror attack presented the Government with a significant policy window.

This case illustrates that the media placed a heavily reliance on interviews and statements made official sources, primarily from the Prime Minister, as their main source of information in the first few days (New Zealand Herald, 2019a; Radio New Zealand, 2019a; Radio New Zealand, 2019d). The focused interaction presented the New Zealand Government with an opportunity to leverage the media to build the social license needed to introduce later reforms. The articles published in this period show the media had some sympathy with the Prime Minister's message, with journalists describing her addresses as 'moving' and supporting her assessments on the scale of the threat (Radio New Zealand, 2019a). There was only one article reviewed for this case study, an opinion piece, that questioned the Government's warning systems and safety provisions for officials (Watkins, 2019).

From an early stage the New Zealand media played an enabling role in terms of relaying Government statements and supporting the official narrative. This is to be expected during time of crisis, particularly when the public turns to their leaders for guidance. However, the media went beyond solely relaying the official discourse to one where they actively engaged in policy outcomes.

While the New Zealand media made a conscious decision to self-censor over the publication of Tarrant's livestream video and manifesto early on, notwithstanding the signposting and descriptive pieces discussed above, there was a degree of divergence from the official narrative in the first few days. This gap was to close as in the subsequent weeks and months. One example of this is in relation to the issue of publishing Tarrant's name. As shown, the media did show any reluctance to publish Tarrant's name once his identity was known until influenced by the Prime Minister's statement. This harmonisation of the discourse continued until, by the time of Tarrant's trial in May 2019, the New Zealand media had taken the unprecedented step of agreeing a protocol for covering his trial. The media's rationale for this

was that the media was serving as the “eyes and ears” of the New Zealand public and that the media was, “aware that the accused may attempt to use the trial as a platform to amplify white supremacist and/or terrorist views or ideology.” (Stuff, 2019b). This included “limiting any coverage of statements that actively champion white supremacist or terrorist ideology, and the details of the document released by the accused minutes before the attacks” (Stuff, 2019b). However, the media had not shown any such concerns in this regard in their early articles.

This finding is in keeping with the findings by Every-Palmer et al (2020). Their study also found that the media played a significant role in building the social licence needs for the New Zealand Government to introduce necessary reforms, particularly around gun ownership, and online responsibility. Previous attempts at gun reform in New Zealand had been largely unsuccessful up to this point. Reforms to the Arms Act had occurred following the 1992 Aramoana shooting, but subsequent efforts to introduce further reforms had failed to progress for a range of reasons (Huffadine, 2019). Every-Palmer et al (2020) argue that “media restraint in not sensationalizing the shooter, and instead focusing on wider systemic issues, may have contributed to providing public mandate for legislative change” (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 293). Questions about New Zealand’s gun ownership raised on the day of the shooting (Duff, 2019) were transformed into legislation under urgency. As Every-Palmer et al (2020) further note, “the first wave of gun law reform was passed in parliament within the first four weeks with 119 votes to one,” and that “media narratives were one factor that helped influence and sustain public support for gun control” (Every-Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, & Bell, 2020, p. 280).

Another area where the media was to enable Government policy was in action taken against social media organisations for their role in publishing and disseminating both the livestream and the manifesto. In her address to Parliament on 19 March, Prime Minister Ardern explicitly outlined her policy intent by stating “we cannot simply sit back and accept that these platforms just exist and that what is said on them is not the responsibility of the place where they are published. They are the publisher, not just the postman. There cannot be a case of all profit, no responsibility” (Ardern, 2019c). As Edmunds (2019) notes, the statement had an immediate impact with a number of New Zealand companies choosing to boycott Facebook by withdrawing advertising in response to criticisms of their role in disseminating the livestream (Edmunds, 2019). This line of policy effort was to later develop into the Christchurch Call, but the framing for this action occurred at an early stage through the media’s engagement with the official narrative.

Another area where the media played an enabling role for Government was in creating a discourse of safety and unity. In her statement on 15 March, the Prime Minister sought to distance New Zealanders from the shooting by drawing on New Zealand values, stating,

> For those of you who are watching at home tonight and questioning how this could have happened here, we, New Zealand, we are not a target because we are a safe harbour for those who hate, we were not chosen for this violence because we condone racism, because we are an enclave for extremism, we were chosen for the fact we represent none of these things. Because we represent diversity, kindness, compassion, a home for those who share our values, refuge for those who need it. (Ardern, 2019a)

The Prime Minister also sought to build unity by declaring that "they are us" while referring to the victims (Ardern, 2019a). The media played a central role in constructively representing this discourse, but only while simultaneously drawing attention to the extreme emotional reaction across New Zealand. As a result, the media helped magnify the threat the shooting represented to average New Zealanders through their intense focus on the human impact, while representing the Government, and the Prime Minister in particular, as the best means to provide safety and security.

5.6 Conclusion

The media approach to the Christchurch shooting contained similarities to the principles represented in agenda-setting communication theories, particularly in terms of the media's engagement with and promotion of the official narrative. So strong was the Government's agenda-setting influence, and in particular the Prime Minister's mana, that increasingly the New Zealand media chose to incorporate elements of the Government's narrative as part of their own response.

Elements of both spiral of silence and cultivation theories can also be identified. The media's presentation of the official narrative created a spiral of silence in which debate outside the parameters of the Government narrative, such as around the role of social media in the shooting, or the relevance of New Zealand's gun laws, was underrepresented or unchallenged in the media. Similarly, elements of cultivation theory can be identified. While an entirely rational response, the widespread and sustained focus on human suffering stories, coupled with the Prime Minister's empathetic approach, played a role in cultivating the public's response to high stress events. This resulted in a more empathetic reaction in general, but also creased a culture of fear and heightened public sensitivity. This was to play out in later high stress events, such as the LynnMall stabbings, as I will demonstrate later.

Much of the Prime Minister's rhetoric can be categorised as hegemonic discourse. Brecher & Devenney (2010) argue that the hegemonic discourse that shapes contemporary terrorism narratives "promote and enforce a linguistic regime" which creates antagonists who need to be defeated (Brecher & Devenney, 2010, pp. 1-2). By framing Tarrant as a foreign lone wolf, representative of an alt-right extremist perspective alien to New Zealand, the Prime Minister's discourse was central to creating a foreign adversary that needed to be defeated. The discourse played a key role in shaping the public's willingness to accept later policy reforms that were pushed through under urgency by the Government and intelligence agencies, including those relating to gun control, counter terrorism legislation and social media use. Terms such as 'social licence' were widely used to describe this permission space, with the discourse later adopted and echoed, uncritically, by the Royal Commission.

The Prime Minister's hegemonic discourse, and in particular her emphasis on Tarrant as a foreign lone wolf, was reassuring for the public in terms of their rationalisation process and in galvanising a cohesive response. However, the focused portrayal of both the attacker and his ideals as being foreign also downplayed the issue of similar sympathies existing in New Zealand and underplayed the level of inherent racism among the wider New Zealand population. Ghabra (2022) has argued the same. He argues that the Prime Minister's attempts to create unity actually helped highlight the divisions that existed between the Muslim community and the wider New Zealand public. He notes that, "Muslims are not treated as New Zealanders; therefore, claiming that "they are us" only obscures the oppression that Muslims and other marginalized communities have had to endure in a racist system." (Ghabra, 2022, pp. 6-7).

The media's close association with the official narrative was understandable given the scale of the event in New Zealand terms. The evolving narrative played out in the media represented a trade-off between a desire to provide societal support and cohesion versus the media's traditional role as a source of critical, independent thought. In this case, the media aligned with the official narrative. However, this was a learned rather than instinctive reaction. While having some reservations, the New Zealand media did not impose the same levels of self-censorship in the first two days of the attacks as they later did. During the first two days, the New Zealand media's response was more closely aligned with the international media reaction. However, as the narrative evolved, the media's own approach evolved, diverging from more sensational international media coverage. Over time, the New Zealand media became more active in promoting official agenda-setting narratives and in cultivating the public's

perception, before evolving further to exemplify these narratives, with consequences for how the media reacted to subsequent high-stress events.

6 Case Study Three: LynnMall Supermarket Attacks, Auckland

6.1 Summary of the incident

At Just after 3pm on 3 September 2021, Ahamed Samsudeen, a 32-year-old Sri Lankan refugee who had been residing in New Zealand since October 2011, entered the LynnMall Countdown supermarket in New Lynn, Auckland. He took a knife from one of the supermarket shelves and started attacking the other shoppers nearby. Eight people were injured, three critically and one seriously, before a police tactical team intervened. Sixty to ninety seconds following his refusal to surrender, Samsudeen was shot dead by Police (Radio New Zealand, 2021a).

It was the second supermarket stabbing attack to occur in New Zealand in less than a four-month period, following a similar stabbing attack at a Dunedin Countdown supermarket on 10 May 2021. In that incident, Luke James Lambert wounded four people with a knife, before he was subdued by customers and staff inside the supermarket (Brown, 2022b). The media coverage of the stabling was also to inspired a North Shore teenager to attempt to bring forward a planned attack against non-Muslims, however he was arrested on 8 September (Kapitan, 2022).

Samsudeen had had a complex relationship with the New Zealand Security Services in the years leading up to his attack. He had first come to the attention of New Zealand Police in March 2016 as a result if his growing interest in ISIS-related terrorism (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 29). Samsudeen's online activity was monitored by Police and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS following the discovery of objectionable material on his computer relating to ISIS and their terrorist activities, and he was designated an intelligence 'person of interest' in May 2016 (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 30).

In late 2016, the NZSIS assessed it was "highly likely Mr Samsudeen would attempt to travel offshore to fight alongside ISIL and gain martyrdom" (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 30). In May 2017, Samsudeen attempted to travel to Malaysia. Both the New Zealand Police and the NZSIS believed his travel was related to an attempt to reach Syria to allegedly fight for Islamic State. (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 30). He was arrested at Auckland Airport and remanded in custody charged with a range of offences, including 18 counts of possessing objectionable, terrorist-related material.

All the charges relating to objectionable material were later dropped (nine by Police, and nine after they were downgraded by the Classification Office from 'objectionable' to 'restricted' after appeal) and, in June 2018, Samsudeen was released on bail after pleading guilty to charges of knowingly distributing restricted material, using a document for pecuniary advantage, and failing to assist an officer in the execution of a search warrant. (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, pp. 30-31)

Samsudeen was again arrested in August 2018 on five further charges after purchasing a hunting knife, which agencies believed formed part of preparations to conduct a terrorist attack (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 32). He was sentenced to 12-months' supervision, but was returned to custody in September 2018 charged with further offending. His trial for the new offences was initially set for 20 July 2020, but then deferred to 17 May 2021 due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (The Office of the Chief Justice, 2021). In May 2021, he was convicted of two additional charges relating to the possession of ISIS related publications and a charge of assaulting corrections officers. As a condition of his release following his conviction on these charges, he was placed under a police supervision order. It was the New Zealand Police Special Tactics Group surveillance team responsible for carrying out this supervision order that responded to the attack in the LynnMall supermarket on 3 September 2021.

6.2 Case Study overview

Unique to this case study was the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly as the attack occurred during New Zealand's period of lockdown. Auckland in particular was under a level four lockdown, New Zealand's highest level of COVID-19 containment measures. (New Zealand Government, 2020). This context is relevant as it presented a unique set circumstances not found in other case studies. Freedom of movement was severely curtailed and there were limitations on where the public could visit. It also affected how people gained access to information. The pandemic led to a general increase in reliance on the news media, particularly internet-based news sources, for information during this period given the accessibility limitations around family and other societal sources (Van Aelst, et al., 2021; Eden, Johnson, Reinecke, & Grady, 2020).

Media was identified as an essential service in New Zealand. Journalists were exempt from lockdown requirements and free to continue their daily business (New Zealand Government, 2021b). This theoretically removed any impediment preventing media from covering the LynnMall attack, but the lockdown conditions continued to present challenges for the media's ability to speak to sources directly

and verify new material. As a result, many of the articles produced in the first few days of the attack were composites of ad hoc information provided by members of the public, official reporting, and expert opinion. There was a particularly strong focus on reporting the Government narrative in many of the early articles (Radio New Zealand, 2021a; Radio New Zealand, 2021b).

Given the constraints, for the first few days after the attack, some media networks shared their reporting with competitor networks. This resulted in the same (or slightly edited) articles appearing across multiple news networks on the same day. One such example of this is Radio New Zealand's reporting on community reactions in the days immediately following the attack. Articles written by journalist Liu Chen that reported on interviews with members of the local community and described their reactions to the attack were published by Radio New Zealand, New Zealand Herald and on Newshub on 5 and 6 September albeit with slight variations to the headlines (Chen, 2021a; Chen, 2021b, Chen, 2021c; Chen, 2021d).

As expected, the highest frequency of articles occurred in the first few days following the attack, with a particular concentration over the period 4-6 September. This was in part influenced by the sharing of articles across media networks during the first few days, leading to an inflated volume of material in this period. These initial articles provided incremental updates on the case, often containing hyperlinks to previously published material or containing recycled text, including the replication of material from previous reports. Reporting from day two onwards also contained an embedded link to a live RSS feed providing online readers with near real-time updates on events. This feed remained active until 18 September 2021.

However, from 6 September, the frequency of articles subsided, with subsequent articles shifting to focus on feature stories reporting on the experiences of people close to the attack and opinion pieces (Chen, 2021, 9 September; Todd, 2021; Bond, 2021, 6 September). The sharing of articles between media networks also became less common. From 6 September, the media attention shifted from the immediate case to focus on the Government response, with a particular focus on the efforts to expedite the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 and reactions from the various New Zealand political parties (Radio New Zealand, 2021h; Radio New Zealand, 2021i; Radio New Zealand, 2021m).

6.3 Media interaction with the act as terrorism

Samsudeen's attack was widely condemned by both political and societal groups alike. As in the case of the Rainbow Warrior, the Prime Minister moved quickly to denounce the LynnMall attack as a terrorist incident with Prime Minister Ardern describing the stabbing as a "terrorist attack carried out by a violent extremist" within hours of the attack occurring (Radio New Zealand, 2021a). However, unlike the Rainbow Warrior, the media were willing to adopt the Prime Minister's determination, restating the attack as a terrorist incident in all the subsequent media articles reviewed for this case study.

In all the articles examined, terrorism related language featured prominently. This included constant references to the attack as a 'terrorist attack', references to Samsudeen's 'extremism' and 'radicalisation' (Todd, 2021; Radio New Zealand, 2021a), and language illustrating the 'lone wolf' nature of his attack (Robson, 2021a; Dillane, 2021; Robson, 2021d; The New Zealand Herald, 2021c). Articles quoting elements from the Prime Minister's statement to media of 3 September, also included references to the attack being "ISIS-inspired" (Dillane, 2021; The New Zealand Herald, 2021c). Similarly, most articles referred to the effects of Samsudeen's attack in language relating to the emotional effects terrorism, with references to public 'fear,' 'terror.' 'nightmare' and, 'shock' appearing frequently, (for example, (Dillane, 2021; Robson, 2021c; Radio New Zealand, 2021b). Most media outlets were quick to maximise available imagery, with one article containing "chilling" video footage of people fleeing the shopping mall as shots were fired by the Police (New Zealand Herald, 2021). Similarly, both TVNZ's One News and Newshub at 6 showed "stark eyewitness images" of the attack in their evening bulletins, leading Mediawatch to acknowledge that some media outlets were skirting close to the ethical wind (Peacock, 2021).

The media's coverage frequently drew associations to the 2019 Christchurch attack, including through interviews with Christchurch survivors (Robson, 2021b; Radio New Zealand, 2021e; Bradley, 2021; New Zealand Herald, 2021a; New Zealand Herald, 2021b). These articles both tacitly and explicitly linked the two events for the public and enabled the media to draw on inferences where evidence may have been lacking. Many of the explicit articles were highly emotive, transposing the fear experienced by those affected in the Christchurch shooting onto those involved at LynnMall (New Zealand Herald, 2021b).

The media's willingness to engage with the attack as terrorism so quickly was heavily influenced by the fact Samsudeen had been killed while carrying out his attack. This made the LynnMall attack somewhat unique for New Zealand. Samsudeen's death had legal implications for media as New Zealand's privacy and defamation legislation does not extend post mortem. As Robert Stewart (2021), a media and

defamation lawyer who worked with New Zealand news media organisations to lift the suppression orders of the Lynn Mall terrorist noted, "[w]ith the Christchurch mosques shooting the man was still alive. Therefore, if someone had called him a terrorist before he had been charged, then they were potentially at risk of a defamation claim. With the LynnMall case, the terrorist had not been charged with any charges under the Terrorism Suppression Act, even though the Crown had tried. But the guy was shot dead by police, so once someone is dead, they have no cause of action for defamation" (Stewart, 2021). He further noted that, "if the media call someone a terrorist without them being convicted of one and it isn't framed as someone's opinion, there's also potentially contempt of court problems for the media outlet…There are severe penalties for media organisations and editors for being in contempt." (Stewart, 2021).

The significance of the lifted restrictions post mortem is particularly stark when juxtaposed with the caution shown around the earlier stabbing incident in Dunedin. There were multiple similarities between the two events. Both were conducted in very similar ways, with the same weapons, within the same societal and pandemic contexts, and within months of each other. However, in one the attacker was killed, removing the constraints on media reporting. In the other the attacker was arrested and a police investigation launched, requiring the media to observe judicial and media processes.

Furthermore, the terrorist determination made by the Prime Minister played an important role in shaping how the two cases were represented by the media. In the Dunedin case, the Prime Minister moved quickly to dismiss suggestions the attack was a terrorist incident, telling media that the attack was the result of a mental health event and that there was no evidence to suggest the attack was an act of terrorism (Livingstone, 2021, for example). As a result, the media focused on the criminal and mental health aspects of the case. Conversely, the Prime Minister took the opposite approach to the LynnMall attack, stating early that the attack was an act of terrorism (Radio New Zealand, 2021a).

6.4 The media representation of the attacker

Samsudeen's identity could not be released at the time of the attack as his name was under a court-ordered name suppression in place from 2018. Unlike in the Christchurch case, the Government was very keen to identify Samsudeen in the media. In stark contrast to the Government's efforts to avoid referring to Tarrant by name following the Christchurch attack, Prime Minister Ardern moved under urgency to seek to have Samsudeen's name suppression order lifted (Radio New Zealand, 2021c). The order was revoked on 4 September 2021 - a day after the incident - following an urgent request from the Government and leaving the family only 24 hours to prepare (Robson, 2021a). His name, along with

details contained in his police and refugee case files, were made public on 5 September (Robson, 2021c). The lifting of the name-suppression order was instrumental in shaping the media discourse around Samsudeen as it provided the media access to refugee, medical and criminal information, free of privacy and defamation constraints. These were all used by the media to inform their representation of Samsudeen.

As with the other case studies, the discourse of othering was prevalent throughout, with nationality featuring heavily in the media narrative. Even before the identity of the attacker had been released, the Prime Minister highlighted that the attacker was not from New Zealand by drawing attention to the fact the attack had been conducted by a Sri Lankan national in her first press conference on 3 September. (Radio New Zealand, 2021a). From that point, the media continued to refer to Samsudeen's Sri Lankan nationality, either as part of their introductory framing or in a summary of the facts at the end of each article. One particular article drew on interviews in LynnMall to draw a clear distinction between Samsudeen and "normal Kiwis" present during the attack despite the source citied having no knowledge of the nationalities of the other people in the Supermarket at the time (Radio New Zealand, 2021j).

Some media articles attempted to build associations between Samsudeen and terrorism in Sri Lanka, including by referring to the area in Sri Lanka where Samsudeen came from as a "hotbed of Islamic extremism," and noting this area had also been responsible for the terrorists who had carried out the 2019 Easter terrorist attack in Sri Lanka (Ibrahim, 2021). Other articles made reference to the Sri Lankan government "investigating whether Samsudeen was linked to the bombings in Colombo on Easter Sunday 2019, which killed 279 people," (Radio New Zealand, 2021g) despite Samsudeen having left Sri Lanka in 2011. Sri Lankan media also moved quickly to disassociate from the attack, with Sri Lankan television focusing on comments made by Samsudeen's mother suggesting he had been radicalised by "Syrian neighbours" (Radio New Zealand, 2021g; Radio New Zealand, 2021j).

As part of the othering discourse, Samsudeen's refugee status was in focus in many of the articles. Reporting on his refugee status fell into two groups. The first – and larger – group of articles focused on Samsudeen's refugee status in a negative context. These articles questioned Samsudeen's engagement with the refugee process, focusing on allegations he had misled officials and been granted refugee status on false grounds (e.g. Robson, 2021c), and later highlighting weaknesses within the refugee system, including in the resettlement, support, and deportation processes in place (e.g. Bond, 2021). These articles drew from information released by the Government following the lifting of the name-suppression order.

The second, smaller group, reflected Samsudeen's refugee status through a victim lens, highlighting his history in Sri Lanka and the factors behind his migration as a refugee. These articles used Samsudeen's history as a means to distance Samsudeen's family from the event, highlighting their own refugee stories and experiences. (e.g. Radio New Zealand, 2021f). Articles by Chen (2021) for example, focused on the fact that both Samsudeen's family and the wider Muslim community were fearful of reprisals and contained interviews with local Muslim residents reporting an increase in race-based abuse towards their community. These concerns were later validated by displays of violence towards LynnMall staff reported by Radio New Zealand on 9 September (Radio New Zealand, 2021k) and later in New Zealand Police crime data, (e.g. Graham-McLay, 2023).

The first group of these articles contributed to the discourse of othering by building a narrative around how Samsudeen was not living to New Zealand's self-perception of societal and ethical standards. They adopted a right-leaning narrative that portrayed Samsudeen as an untrustworthy and conniving foreigner, while later articles questioned how someone of this character could avoid refugee screening regimes. The second group adopted a more left-leaning lens. These articles demonstrated a greater awareness of a possible public race-based reaction towards Muslims in Auckland as a result of the attack and attempted to humanise Samsudeen's family. The narrative contributed to closing the gap between Samsudeen's family and the Auckland Muslim community with the wider New Zealand 'in' group. These articles were similar in approach to some of the wider community interviews conducted with the Muslim diaspora following the Christchurch attack.

The move to make Samsudeen's identity public also meant that his mental health history was revealed to the public at the same time his immigration case files were released. Despite this, only a small number of articles reviewed in this case study considered Samsudeen's mental health history in much detail. Articles that did included interviews with experts and clinical psychologists who had assessed Samsudeen's mental health following his release after previous offences (for example, Todd, 2021, or Bradley, 2021), or considered the reports of trauma while in Sri Lanka as playing a contributing factor (for example, Bonnet, 2021). However, the majority of the articles framed mental his health requirements in the context of gaps in New Zealand's terrorist or refugee legislation (Todd, 2021; Robson, 2021d; Bradley, 2021), or omitted to report on this aspect altogether.

Despite the media's portrayal of Samsudeen as a violent terrorist, Dr Clarke Jones, the psychologist charged with assessing Samsudeen's suitability for rehabilitation in 2018, argued that the attack was not motivated by terrorist intentions. He instead attributed the attack to Samsudeen's deteriorating mental

health and issues with authorities (Todd, 2021). In articles published within a few days of the attack, Dr Jones discussed Samsudeen's mental health history and the findings of previous assessments with a specific focused on his assessments regarding Samsudeen's level of extremism and his threat to society. Writing in the UK Guardian, Dr Jones noted that "when Samsudeen was examined in 2018 to determine his suitability for rehabilitation upon release, he did not fit the usual characteristics of a radicalised offender." He further noted that Samsudeen "had a troublesome upbringing and was struggling with depression and other significant mental health issues…. exacerbated by his early experiences of persecution, kidnapping and torture in Sri Lanka, being labelled a terrorist and held in solitary confinement with no professional support." He concluded by stating that, "instead of radicalisation, Samsudeen showed clear signs of depression and post-traumatic stress." (Jones, 2021). Despite Dr Jones' assessment, the media chose to not to engage with the prospect of alternative narrative around Samsudeen's attack. Instead, one article published an interview with an unnamed source within the New Zealand Mental Health Foundation refuting Dr Jones' assessment (Client, 2021), and one cited unnamed immigration officials who deemed his medical report "unreliable" (Bonnet, 2021).

Samsudeen's criminal history was also widely represented in the media following its release, with most articles focusing on his terrorism related offending and his propensity for violence (Robson, 2021d; Radio New Zealand, 2021l). Furthermore, a statement independently issued by the National Commissioner of Corrections on 7 September 2021 had provided media with details of Samsudeen's threats, abuse, and use of violence against staff while in prison (Leota, 2021). However, the later independent inquiry into the attack found that this statement was unbalanced. They concluded it failed to note any of the threats, abuse or violence directed towards Samsudeen while in prison; the limited efforts to provide rehabilitation; and the inadequacy of his release and management plan (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 117). The inquiry concluded that this press release was "unhelpful and premature," and that some people "considered this press statement to be unethical" (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 117)

Collectively, the information released was used by the news media to shape their public representation of Samsudeen. Free of legal constraints, his death enabled the media to exploit Samsudeen's status as a terrorist within days of the attack occurring, and well before any investigation was carried out. However, it is uncertain whether Samsudeen was a terrorist in waiting, or if he had become one as a result of being branded as such over the years. The Security Services had applied the term to Samsudeen while

he was in prison, regarding him as “a high-risk potential terrorist” well before the LynnMall attack (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, p. 87). Furthermore, on 9 July 2020, New Zealand Police had unsuccessfully attempted to charge Samsudeen under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 relating to his earlier radical online activity and his attempt to buy a hunting knife. The charge was rejected by the court on 16 July 2020 as inappropriate under the Act. However, as Dr Jones (2021) noted, Samsudeen had not reacted well to being branded as a terrorist (Jones, 2021). The independent inquiry also noted that by 2020 Samsudeen had started to refer to *himself* as a terrorist (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Independent Police Conduct Authority & Office of the Inspectorate, 2022, pp. 77, 93-94).

6.5 The relationship between the media and the State’s response

The Government and the media had a particularly close relationship during the pandemic, with the media granted near daily access to the Prime Minister for regular COVID-19 media updates. Throughout the LynnMall event, the Government was continued to be proactive in engaging with the media, adopting a similar engagement strategy as they had for Christchurch, and in keeping with the Ardern policy of being regularly available to the media during times of crisis. However, the political context was different from the time of the Christchurch response.

By the time of the LynnMall stabling, Prime Minister Ardern’s public popularity rating was in decline. According to a Talbot Mills Research poll published in the New Zealand Herald in November 2021, the approval rating for the Ardern-led Labour party had dropped 5 points to 41% during the September to October 2021 window (McClure, 2021). Another poll, commissioned by the lobby group the Taxpayer’s Union at the same time placed her even lower at 39% (McClure, 2021). Public approval for the Ardern-led Government had been dropping steadily since its peak following the election of 2020. At that time Government approval ratings had sat at 56.5%, and Ardern personally at 59.5%, making the Prime Minister the most popular prime minister in a century, and the Labour party the most popular political party ever. (Osbourne, 2020). However, by 2021 discontent over the extended localised COVID-19 lockdown in Auckland was leading a swing in public sentiment (McClure, 2021).

And the nature of the Prime Minister’s relationship with the media was also different. Some authors have identified the Prime Minister’s use of kindness during her media engagements during both the pandemic and the Christchurch attack as a key element of her leadership approach (Craig, 2021). However, others have highlighted that there were points of friction between the Prime Minister and unsympathetic media networks with competing political views (Edwards, 2021). In March 2021, the

Prime Minister had faced a political backlash following a decision to discontinue a regular weekly interview with Mike Hoskins on the politically right aligned Newstalk ZB station, leading to accusations from some quarters that she was attempting to control the media (Craig, 2021). The relationship between the Government and the media, while still strong, was not as strong as it was at the time of the Christchurch attack or during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this context, the Government's interactions with the media were as equally a response to the events itself as they were part of a deliberate political strategy to recover public popularity. According to agenda-setting theory, the media is well placed to shape the path of public opinion during times of crisis (Engblom, 2021; Buturoiu & Voloc, 2021; Kalogiannidis, Chatzitheodoridis, Papaevaggelou, & Nikolaou, 2023), and the Ardern government was very active in engaging during the first few days following the attack as they worked to provide information and to shape the resulting narrative.

Prime Minister Ardern also used her early media engagement to shape the environment for longer-terms reforms. This was likely in expectation that the media would shift their line of questioning onto the Government response once the first few days of the immediate event were over, which the media did from around 6 September. On 3 September, in her first interview with the media following the attack, Prime Minister Ardern expressly made reference to short comings in New Zealand legislation by telling journalists, "[i]f we'd reached a threshold for him to be in prison, he would have been in prison. If he'd committed a criminal act that would have allowed him to be in prison, that's where he would have been. Unfortunately, he didn't. That is why, instead, he was being monitored constantly and followed" (Radio New Zealand, 2021a). This was clear signposting that the Government intended to act.

On 30 September 2021 (less than one month following the attack), the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 was passed by the New Zealand Parliament, receiving royal assent on 4 October (New Zealand Government, 2021c). The Act amended New Zealand's counter-terrorism legislation to address vulnerabilities identified by the LynnMall attack. Specified additions included, introducing legislation to criminalise travel with the intention to carry out a terrorism offence, criminalise planning or preparing for a terrorist event, further criminalise the possession of weapons, and grant wider powers of entry, search and surveillance on individuals suspected of terrorism-related intentions. The Act was supported by both Labour and National, although ACT, Greens and the Māori Party all expressed concerns about the speed by which it was being introduced (Radio New Zealand, 2021n). Some NGOs also expressed concern about the consequences of the legislation on migrant populations given the focus on addressing refugee-related loopholes identified as a result of the LynnMall attack (McInnes, 2021).

6.6 Conclusion

The LynnMall case study throws up almost as many questions as it answers. There is some doubt as to whether the media played a role in shaping the State's response, or whether the State used the media to generate the social license needed to introduce their reforms. It is equally unclear why the media was so willing to accept the official narrative so readily to designate Samsudeen a terrorist before any investigation was conducted. Samsudeen's death was undoubtably a significant factor in granting the media greater freedom, but few media channels took the time to examine events leading up to the stabbing, or to question why the Prime Minister was so quick to designate LynnMall as a terrorist event.

The high frequency of media articles over the first three days following the incident built a sense of both urgency and importance around the attack. While there was little new information in the early articles, the cross-referenced stories and the inclusion of the RSS feed reporting on both public reactions and official responses created a sense that the attack was a significant event. Emotive language and explicit references to the Christchurch attack further played into this narrative. While the access to updated information may have been reassuring to some people, the manner by which this information was linked to the Christchurch attacks reawakened historical trauma among others, as evidenced in articles containing interviews with Christchurch survivors and other members of the public. Given the scale of the two events, attempts to make a comparison was both inaccurate and inappropriate. The associations formed overplayed the significance of the LynnMall attack while denigrating the severity of the Christchurch shootings. It was also a marked reversal from the caution and respect demonstrated by the media in 2019 where they had refused to allow their coverage to further Tarrant's cause or objectives.

The overall narrative that this was an urgent and significant event helped build the societal license needed for the Government's efforts to introduce their legislative reforms. It also created a political context that provided the government with an opportunity to demonstrate their decisiveness at a time when they were under pressure for their handling of the COVID-19 response in Auckland. The Government's showed a clear intention to demonstrate decisiveness and expedience to the public through the media. In the face of declining popularity ratings, a firm and clear demonstration of leadership carried a distinctly political flavour. Decisiveness had paid off politically in the case of the Christchurch terror attack and in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 context was a further significant factor that had an impact on the relationship between the public and the media. With movement curtailed and people restricted to very limited interaction,

the media played a key role in providing situational awareness to many in New Zealand. However, the pandemic was also a time of considerable fear and uncertainty for many among the population and a decisive approach was important for reassuring an already nervous Auckland population who were under stress due to the Auckland COVID-19 lockdown.

Furthermore, a decisive government response demonstrated the Government's commitment to the implementation of the findings from the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 (Royal Commission, 2020). It also helped mitigate some of the media criticisms directed towards the security service for their focus on Islamic terrorism in the wake of this report (Pennington, 2020).

However, in addition to not thoroughly examining Samsudeen's history, the media did also not explore why the Prime Minister was so willing to abandon the 'no face, no name strategy' that she had insisted on following the Christchurch attacks. This policy had been introduced to avoid glorifying Tarrant's actions, but had been disregarded by the Prime Minister under urgency in the case of LynnMall. The release of Samsudeen's name and history, including by providing information on his refugee status and previous offending, played a significant role in building the prevalent othering discourse. However, for the most part the media took this information at face value, and in some cases supported the narrative with their own commentary. Few media networks made a serious effort to investigate questions relating to Samsudeen's past, including about his mental health treatment, the actions of the security services in the years before the attack, and the potential role of the lockdown in commissioning the attack. Furthermore, few investigated why Samsudeen's radicalisation had worsened in the ten years he had been living in New Zealand despite Government awareness of the risk and the mitigations available. He had not entered New Zealand as a radicalised terrorist.

Nor did the media reflect on whether or not they had played a role in inspiring the attack. Given the number of similarities between Samsudeen's attack and Lambert's attack in Dunedin a few months earlier, question remain around the relationship between the media coverage of the Dunedin event and whether it helped inspire, or at least refine the details for, the LynnMall attack.

That said, it is not the purpose of this case study to examine whether or not Samsudeen was created as a terrorist while in New Zealand, or if he had entered the country with these proclivities. Regardless, the media unquestionably engaged with the attack as an act of terrorism, fuelled by both the official narrative and post mortem freedoms not available in other events. By resurrecting the spectre of

Christchurch, the media provided the government with the social licence needed to introduce new legislation under urgency, but this political gain came at a societal cost. Unfortunately, the rise in acts of violence against the Muslim population in the wake of the stabbing were in part a consequence of the media's othering process, which flamed the latent racism and islamophobia in New Zealand through their stressing of the foreign and refugee status of the attacker (Graham-McLay, 2023). The formula of othering and fear used in the case of the LynnMall attack proved to be a powerful tool for both the government and the media. The attention on the details of the case generated considerable public interest, and the government appeared keen to feed this appetite by freely releasing information into the public domain. This enabled the government to control the narrative and keep it focused on New Zealand's counter-terrorism responses while mitigating a causal examination by the media.

7 Discussion and Conclusions

Having reviewed the three case studies in the context of both relevant definitions of terrorism and communication theories, this research draws the following conclusions:

There is always a relationship between the New Zealand media and Government in times of terrorism. In all three case studies, a relationship between the New Zealand and the Government was identified. The nature of this relationship varied, however. A less strong relationship was identified between the media and the terrorist, with only one case study – the Christchurch attacks – showing evidence of media considerations by the terrorist. This may have been due to the differing objectives by the terrorists in each case study, or the varying scale of the events, but it is more likely because both the terrorist was not seeking to publicise an underlying political ideology in the Rainbow Warrior and LynnMall cases, unlike in Christchurch. Arguably neither event reached the threshold to be truly considered terrorist events.

The New Zealand media's response to terrorist events that occur in New Zealand has changed over time. The media did not follow one single approach across all three cases. An enhanced people-focused narrative that emphasised the effect of terrorist events from a human perspective replaced the factual, case-focused approach taken by the media at the time of the Rainbow Warrior bombing. However, commonalties in the media narratives from the Christchurch and LynnMall attacks suggest the media has become more consistent in recent times and is increasingly willing to take a side when reporting terrorist events. This may be in part due to news media experiences with the 'War on Terror' and the related discourses, that created a generational shift in the approaches taken by news reporters.

There has been an increased willingness by the media to engage with, and ultimately champion, official Government discourses. The media's engagement with agenda-setting narratives, particularly around defining events as terrorism, played a role in shaping public perspectives in all three cases. The media's reluctance to engage in terrorism rhetoric at the time of the Rainbow Warrior bombing limited the influence of official agenda-setting efforts, with the official narrative only becoming more prevalent once the bombing became an interstate issue. By contrast, the media had a far closer relationship with the Government during both the Christchurch and LynnMall attacks. The media's association with, and representation of, agenda-setting and social cultivation related narratives during these later attacks built social license and enabled the Government to advance specific policy outcomes. However, there is a risk with this approach as the closer the media aligned with the official narrative, the greater the risk was of

the media surrendering objectivity. This was particularly apparent during the LynnMall case where the application of Christchurch discursive approaches conflated two very different events and arguably led to the securitisation of the LynnMall stabbings.

But the Government discourse is not always consistent. Terrorism is an inherently political action, as is the Government's response to terrorism. As such, the official discourse changed throughout the case studies reviewed. For example, significant efforts to disempower the terrorist by not referring to his name during the Christchurch response were completely reversed in the LynnMall case, to the extent that the Government pursued legal measures under urgency to make the information publicly available. In choosing to engage with the official discourse, awareness of both the political objectives underpinning the official narrative and rationale for particular discursive efforts is important to avoid politicisation of the media.

The immediacy of information creates an inflated sense of importance. The greater access and immediacy provided by online news media enabled more frequent updates in the later cases than were possible during the Rainbow Warrior bombing. The increased volume of articles, coupled with live RSS feeds and links to previous articles, created a greater sense of urgency than those articles governed by the editorial and print cycle. This ease of access provided timely information to the public, but also increased the level of public investment, enabled greater cultivation to occur, and magnified public concerns around safety irrespective of geographical proximity.

The 'othering' of the attacker and their ideals is a common approach. There was significant emphasis placed on the foreign nature of the attacker in all three case studies. While the attacker's nationality or heritage is a statement of fact, the means by which this information was used by the news media had an effect on public perspectives. Othering forms part of the public's defence mechanism, in so far as the general public are presented with an easily marginalised aggressor and, simultaneously, reassurances that they were not from their own communities. However, while it is perfectly normal to seek to distance from violent events, the act creating an 'othered,' or foreign hostile, particularly lone wolf attackers, also contributes to the impression that similar issues do not exist within society. This can lead to the downplaying of issues, such as racism and right-wing extremism, that may be present in New Zealand. The increase in violence following the LynnMall stabbing illustrates that the media's portrayal of the 'other' can lead to an increase in collateral harm directed towards specific groups within our communities. Similarly, the media's othering process runs the risk of creating hero-like figures among communities that share the terrorist's ideology. This was particularly apparent around the

uptake of Tarrant's manifesto and the rise of subsequent copycat attacks. Care needs to be taken by the media when engaging in othering discourse to ensure the othering process does not inadvertently result in already marginalised communities becoming targets for further aggression.

The Media adopts different approaches post-mortem. The media reaction to terror events in which the attacker is arrested differs from events where the attacker is killed. Media legal considerations around privacy and slander do not extend post-mortem in New Zealand, granting the media greater freedoms to speculate than in cases where the jurisprudence process still applies. This was also exploited by the Government narrative, providing the Government with an opportunity to shape the discourse with greater freedom. Considerations around the inadvertent promotion of the terrorist message considered during the Christchurch event in particular were abandoned by the time of the LynnMall case, in part due to the death of the attacker. However, the media's response was tacitly endorsed by the Government and enabled by legal actions that freed up access to previously confidential records.

7.1 Limitations of the research method and future research

The methodology adopted for this thesis worked well for both the Rainbow Warrior and LynnMall case studies, but proved cumbersome when dealing with the significantly larger volumes of information published around the Christchurch attacks. The reliance on online material meant that only the most immediate articles were considered, meaning that potentially more comprehensive media articles appearing in print media were underrepresented in later case studies. The inclusion of these case studies may change some of the findings from this study, particularly around the effects of online journalism.

This research has shown that the news media in New Zealand now plays a significant role in shaping public perceptions of terrorism in New Zealand, reinforcing the official Government narrative, and providing the means for the Government to generate the social licence needed to introduce reforms. Comparisons between the news media discourse at the time of the Rainbow Warrior and later Christchurch and LynnMall attacks suggest that journalistic approaches in New Zealand have been influenced by politically-charged discursive approaches formed during coverage of the War on Terror. This includes in the way the news media engaged with each event; how they portrayed the attacker, and, most critically, how they contributed to building the 'social licence' needed by the Government, particularly in the most recent of the case studies. New Zealand has been fortunate not to have experienced the trauma of multiple terrorist events. This relative inexperience with terrorism suggests the New Zealand news media relied on international discursive approaches as exemplars of best practice

during New Zealand-based events. But in adopting international discursive approaches the media was also adopting the consequences of these approaches, including increasing the news media's exposure to efforts by Government to shape the narrative. The consequences of these discourses continue to play out internationally as the world becomes increasingly polarised, yet the consequences of these discourses on wider public wellbeing and societal cohesion are not yet well understood in the New Zealand context. These case studies suggest that the approach taken by the news media in covering New Zealand-based events can play a significant role in shaping public perception not only during the event itself, but also for decades to follow. Yet a causational relationship was particularly difficult to identify through this method. Further research into harm during terrorist events, such as calls to helpline services, in relation to media coverage would be a valuable addition to the pool of research examining the relationship between the media and terrorism.

With social media attracting academic attention, particularly since the Christchurch mosque attacks, the relationship between news media and terrorism has been an under theorised part of security studies. This research attempts to offer a modest contribution to closing this gap while, at the same time, seeking to advance the frontier of New Zealand focused studies on terrorism.

Appendix One: Summary of Rainbow Warrior Articles

Serial	Date	Author	Publication	Country of Publication	Title
1	10/07/85	Reuters	Toronto Star	Canada	Mystery blasts sink Greenpeace ship
2	11/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Midnight Blasts Rip Peace Boat
3	12/07/85	unknown	The Age	Australia	Terrorist hunt follows Greenpeace blast
4	12/07/85	Bernand Lagan & NZPA	The Dominion	New Zealand	Terrorists sank Warrior
5	12/07/85	NZPA	NZ Herald	New Zealand	No Effort Spared to Solve Crime - PM
6	12/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	TERRORISM STRIKES Limpet Mines Suspected In Sinking of Peace Ship
7	12/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Donations pouring in
8	12/07/85	Karen Mangnall	NZ Herald	New Zealand	The work must carry on - Greenpeace
9	13/07/85	Police Reporters	NZ Herald	New Zealand	French Pair Questioned on Fatal Ship Bombing
10	13/07/85	Dai Hayward	Financial Times	UK	New Zealand's First Taste of Terrorism: Sinking of Environmental group Greenpeace's vessel. Rainbow Warrior
11	15/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Rainbow Warrior efforts saluted
12	15/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Armed Guard on French Consul
13	16/07/85	Police Reporters	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Police Swoop on French Yacht
14	17/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Bail Granted to Couple
15	18/07/85	Police Reporters	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Suspicions Grow of French Connection
16	19/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Foreigners Remanded in Custody
17	23/07/85	Associated Press	Toronto Star	Canada	Two arrested in blast that sunk Greenpeace ship
18	25/07/85	Associated Press	Toronto Star	Canada	Probe into Greenpeace blast off to Switzerland as 2 charged
19	25/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Foreign Couple Charged with Greenpeace Blast
20	25/07/85	unknown	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Bombed Ship Lifting Agreed
21	10/08/85	Karen Mangnall	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Govt Agency Linked to Bombing
22	28/08/85	NZPA-Reuters	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Infiltration Their Aim
23	28/08/85	NZPA:AFP	NZ Herald	New Zealand	PM: Friendship killed
24	29/08/85	Tim Murphy	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Ouvea Police Found Sign of Explosives
25	24/09/85	Campbell Page/ Ian Templeton	The Guardian	UK	French inquiry into Rainbow Warrior bombing

Appendix Two: Summary of Christchurch articles

Serial	Date	Author	Publication	Country of Publication	Title
1	15/03/19	NZ Herald	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque massacre: 49 confirmed dead in shootings; four arrested - three men, one woman
2	15/03/19	NZ Herald	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: New Zealand's worst since 1943
3	15/03/19	Australia Broadcasting Cooperation	ABC News	Australia	Christchurch shootings leave 49 people dead after attacks at two mosques. Here's what we know
4	15/03/19	Guardian staff	The Guardian	UK	Jacinda Ardern on the Christchurch shooting: 'One of New Zealand's darkest days'
5	15/03/19	RNZ	RNZ	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: 'This can only be described as a terrorist attack' - PM Jacinda Ardern
6	15/03/19	Duff, Michelle	Stuff	New Zealand	Warning signs of terror attack in New Zealand have been apparent, experts say
7	15/03/19	Sherwood, Sam	Stuff	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: Man claims responsibility for shootings, records assault on video
8	15/03/19	NZ Herald	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: Gunman livestreamed 17 minutes of shooting terror
9	15/03/19	RNZ	RNZ	New Zealand	Mosque shooting: Man posts videos and documents online
10	15/03/19	RNZ	RNZ	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: What you need to know
11	15/03/19	RNZ	RNZ	New Zealand	Deadly Christchurch mosque shootings: 49 dead after 'well-planned' attack
12	15/03/19	Eleanor Ainge Roy & Lisa Martin	The Guardian	UK	49 shot dead in attack on two Christchurch mosques
13	15/03/19	Lisa Martin & Ben Smee	The Guardian	UK	What do we know about the Christchurch attack suspect?
14	16/03/19	Tracy Watkins	Stuff	New Zealand	Terrorist attack in New Zealand: A dark day that could change everything
15	16/03/19	MacManus, Joel	Stuff	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque terrorist shootings: What you need to know

16	16/03/19	Rebecca Stevenson & John Anthony	Stuff	New Zealand	Thousands' of Christchurch shootings videos removed from YouTube, Google says
17	16/03/19	Unknown	Stuff	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shooting kills 49, gun laws will change PM says
18	16/03/19	Unknown	Stuff	New Zealand	Christchurch shootings: Terrorist attack at mosques
19	16/03/19	NZ Herald	NZ Herald	New Zealand	Christchurch mosque shootings: Sky News taken down, replaced with Fox Sports
20	16/03/19	RNZ	RNZ	New Zealand	As it happened: Forty-nine people dead after shootings at mosques in central Christchurch

Appendix Three: Summary of LynnMall articles

Serial	Date	Author	Publication	Country of Publication	Title
1	03/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall stabbings a 'terrorist attack' by a 'known threat to NZ' - PM
2	03/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Man shot dead at Countdown supermarket in Auckland
3	03/09/21	Unknown	New Zealand Herald	New Zealand	Auckland terrorist attack at Countdown supermarket: Chilling video captures shoppers fleeing
4	03/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Terrorism attack: Crown files urgent court action to lift suppression orders
5	4/09/21	Sarah Robson	RNZ	New Zealand	New Zealand counter-terrorism legislation outdated - law experts
6	4/09/21	Sarah Robson	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall terrorist's name suppression revoked, but remains secret for now
7	4/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	New Lynn terror attack update: 'Every legal avenue was tried'
8	4/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall attack: Four women and three men among victims
9	4/09/21	Anusha Bradley	RNZ	New Zealand	New Lynn terror attack: Failure to use Mental Health Act criticised
10	4/09/21	Tom Dillane	New Zealand Herald	New Zealand	Auckland mall supermarket terrorist attack: Witness accounts of the 60 seconds of horror in New Lynn Countdown; PM Jacinda Ardern: A 'despicable' act
11	4/09/21	Unknown	New Zealand Herald	New Zealand	Auckland terror attack: Six stabbing victims still in hospital
12	5/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall terrorist's family: 'We are heartbroken'
13	5/09/21	Sarah Robson	RNZ	New Zealand	Auckland supermarket terrorist: Government unsuccessfully tried to strip his refugee status
14	5/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall attacker 'brainwashed' by neighbours, mother says
15	5/09/21	Sarah Robson	RNZ	New Zealand	Timeline leading to terrorist's attack in New Lynn
16	6/09/21	Liu Chen	RNZ	New Zealand	New Lynn locals 'freaked out' by terror attack

17	6/09/21	Katie Todd	RNZ	New Zealand	Missed opportunities to deradicalise LynnMall attacker, says criminologist
18	6/09/21	Sarah Robson	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall attacker spent years under watchful eyes
19	6/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Man chased by LynnMall terrorist says Kiwis stood up 'for what's right'
20	6/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Cabinet ministers to consider whether law changes needed following LynnMall terror attack
21	6/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Grant Robertson on counter-terror laws: 'It is important to get this right'
22	6/09/21	Anneke Smith	RNZ	New Zealand	Muslim leader 'baffled' Corrections passed up rehabilitation offer for LynnMall terrorist
23	6/09/21	Liu Chen	RNZ	New Zealand	Neighbourhood shocked LynnMall terrorist was living among them
24	6/09/21	Jordan Bond	RNZ	New Zealand	Opportunity to deport LynnMall terrorist missed if considered security threat - lawyer
25	7/09/21	Katie Todd	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall: Woman describes trying to help wounded during chaos
26	7/09/21	Gill Bonnett	RNZ	New Zealand	Medical report on LynnMall terrorist 'unreliable', officials said
27	9/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	National demands LynnMall attack inquiry, appoints Counter-Terror spokesperson
28	9/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	LynnMall terrorist told prison guards he would hunt them down, documents reveal
29	9/09/21	Unknown	RNZ	New Zealand	Countdown staff face rise in abuse after LynnMall terror attack

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