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THE CHANGING FACE OF SPORT MANAGEMENT

A Study of a Provincial Rugby Union facing Professionalization and Corporatization

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Business Studies
in
Sport Management and Coaching.

Christopher (Kit) David McConnell
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Abstract

Sport is an integral part of New Zealand society. Dominating the sportscape of New Zealand is the national game of rugby, which in the past decade has been subjected to a variety of forces of change.

The purpose of this research was to examine the management of New Zealand rugby at the elite provincial level. This was done in order to determine the profile of people involved and the manner in which elite provincial rugby unions have been affected by the two most prominent change forces, professionalization and corporatization. The historical forces shaping rugby management, particularly the ethos of amateurism and the counterforce of professionalism, were examined.

Within the case study method, the qualitative research tool of the interview was the main data collection tool, with a range of rugby managers providing data to the research. In addition qualitative data was provided by the completion of questionnaires.

The research concluded that forces of change have had significant affects on governance and management structures of provincial rugby unions, and changed the roles and profiles of managers involved in these structures.

Key to Technical Terms and Abbreviations

AGM	Annual General Meeting
All Blacks	The national representative rugby team of New Zealand
BMB	Boys Management Board
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CoD	Council of Delegates, the governance structure of club rugby in the subject union
IPC	International Provincial Competition, proposed for 1996 involving South Africa, Australia and New Zealand which was later to be named the Super-12
IRB	International Rugby Board, the international governing body of rugby
JMB	Junior Management Board
NPC	National Provincial Championship, the New Zealand domestic provincial rugby competition.
NZRFU	New Zealand Rugby Football Union, the governing body of rugby in New Zealand
RFU	Rugby Football Union
SANZA	The name given to the provincial and tests series involving South Africa, Australia and New Zealand which was sold to News Ltd.
Springboks	The national representative rugby team of South Africa
Super-12	The provincial competition betweeen Australia, New Zealand and South Africa for 1996, the television rights of which were sold to News Ltd
Wallabies	The national representative rugby team of Australia
WRC	World Rugby Corporation, the proposed rugby competition which emerged in 1995 to recruit players to a professional rugby competition

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter introduces the research study. It provides an outline of the background to the study, and a rationale for the research. The objectives of the research are outlined in this chapter, and the structure of the study is presented and explained.

1.1 Background to the Research
1.2 Rationale of the Research
1.3 Research Objectives
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
1.5 Summary and Review

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

The researcher has always had an active involvement in sport, with schoolboy provincial representation in one major sport, and social participation in a range of others. This, coupled with developing academic interests in sport and society and the management of sport, led to completion of a post-graduate Diploma in Business and Administration, in sport management. As part of the requirement for this qualification, a practicum was undertaken at the country's largest provincial sporting code organization, a provincial rugby union. The researcher's interest in the subject area of this present research study was kindled during that practicum.

In that four month period, an understanding was gained of major corporatization forces which would soon be introduced to that sport organization. Corporatization, may basically be described as the process of changing the management and governance of the union from that of a traditional non-commercial sporting organization to that of a business. Discussions were also held with provincial rugby managers regarding the imminent affects of professionalization, which were perceived by these managers to be beyond the control of individuals involved in provincial rugby management. Professionalization, which is primarily the formal allowance to contract and pay athletes in a sport, was perceived to potentially affect the entire management of the organization.

Consequently, fusing personal, experiential and academic perspectives, the researcher elected to study the changing union as the focus for an original thesis investigation. Such research was envisaged as adding to sport management knowledge, particularly in the field of sport organizations adapting to forces of professionalization and corporatization.

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

It was noted, after discussion with academic staff that the field of sport management generally lacked quality research of significant depth, and this was accentuated in an examination of the emerging field of New Zealand sport management. As noted by Parkhouse, Ulrich and Soucie (1982), "Research is an extremely vital rung of sport management" (p.184), yet the lack of in-depth scholastic research is a characterising feature of the sport management field in general. This was reinforced by Applin (1986) noting "sports management is in its embryonic state and almost entirely devoid of research content" (as cited in Paton, 1987, p.27). This lack of research restricts the growth of the field in academic terms, as "Until enough sport-specific research on sport organizations is completed, it will be difficult to develop sport-specific management theories" (Haggerty, 1993, p.7).

Such statements confirmed the researcher's beliefs, and part of the rationale of this study was to add to the researched body of knowledge in New Zealand sport management. Additional to this was the researcher's desire to record, in part, participant perspectives on a process of change which could be considered by proactive sport managers to enhance their planning and operations. The research period presented a unique opportunity to research the transformation period first hand, and freeze the voices and perceptions of participants in that change, without hindsight clouding or distorting these invaluable perceptions. Specifically, new structures and management roles in provincial rugby unions should be better understood in the light of such research.

At the outset of this research period the internal and external environments of the case study organization were discussed at length with one of the managers, and it was clear that the corporatization process was to be introduced early in the research period, although it remained unclear when the professionalization process would be introduced. This latter process required alteration to the governing laws of the game which, in turn, required a complex process of negotiation and consensus at the highest international levels of rugby management.

Wider questions on rugby management were informally discussed with persons at all levels of the provincial rugby union organization with which the practicum was served, academic colleagues and individuals in the sport management field. It became clear that little was known about the individuals involved in governance and power broking roles of the provincial organization. It was also clear that antithetical perspectives were expressed on the historical forces of the game's development and amateurism, which were perceived by these respondents to have handicapped the progress of rugby management. Of concern to rugby union staff was the lack of knowledge about affects of the introduction of corporatization and the rumoured introduction of professionalization.

The rationale behind the researcher's focus upon the sport of rugby union reflected the premier sport profile of rugby as the national game, having

also the highest number of registered playing numbers in any sporting code. It commands the highest television audience (1,773,000 viewers for the second Bledisloe Cup test 1995), receives the greatest sport media attention and has a grip upon the national psyche, being "bred into New Zealanders' bones" (Walker, 1980, p.72). Given the centrality of rugby in New Zealand, research in that sport was considered to potentially reach more sport managers in a specific sport code than would research in any other New Zealand sport. Within rugby, the largest provincial rugby organization was selected as the case study organization. Related to this centrality, and the lack of New Zealand rugby and sport management research, this study is also seen as providing a record of the change for further research and historical examination.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Resulting from the researcher's background and the developing rationale for a research study three tentative research questions were constructed. Given the perceived importance of first division rugby the elite level was chosen as the area of focus for these questions. These proposed research questions were:

- *What are the historical developments of rugby, such as amateurism, which brought the management of the game to where it is today?*
- ***Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?***
- ***How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?***

The literature review in the study provided an understanding of the first research question but did not answer the latter two questions. Consequently the latter questions became the focus of the research project.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis structure which follows provides an overview of the development of the research and the presentation of its results.

The following chapter, **Chapter Two : Rugby in New Zealand** is the first chapter of the literature review and explores historical developments of the rugby game in New Zealand through the literature. This provides an understanding of the historical forces against which the processes of corporatization and professionalization would react. This chapter also provided, for the researcher, understandings of rugby's development. The literature draws a picture of the game's historical factors which have ingrained its traditionalist management.

Following the overview of rugby's historical development is **Chapter Three: Amateurism, Shamateurism and Professionalism,** which explores literature on the amateur ethos which has historically dominated the rugby game. This chapter discusses changes in rugby from the introduction of amateur regulations and the increasingly open breach of these. It concludes with an examination of the forces which ultimately led to the introduction of the professionalization process during the research period.

The final dimension of the literature review is **Chapter Four: Rugby Management,** which explores literature on the research question in the domain of rugby and New Zealand sport management. No significant body of literature was discovered on rugby management, with the bulk of material being player perspectives expressed in their biographies and autobiographies. Consequently the wider body of sport management literature was considered.

The literature provided did not adequately answer the two research questions, and a researchg plan was devloped to examine these. Qualitative research was central to this, providing change participant perspectives. The methodological outline is discussed in **Chapter Five: Methodology**. The data collection methods are discussed in this chapter with the rationale for these. The research population is outlined and considerations of qualitative methodology are presented. Questions of validity are addressed in this chapter.

Chapter Six: Background of Rugby Managers presents results regarding the background of the people involved in elite provincial rugby management in the elected research union. These backgrounds include the qualifications, professional background, gender, playing experience and sport management experience of those involved in the rugby management industry at the elite provincial level. The populations researched were managers, directors, staff, club chairmen and provincial rugby union Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).

The most identifiable change in the subject union because of the corporatisation process was the introduction of a Board of Directors, and the resultant managerial and structural changes. The results of this change are presented in **Chapter Seven: Structural and Management Change.**

With the Board being a new phenomenon in elite provincial rugby management, **Chapter Eight: The Board** examines the size and makeup of the union's Board. It also examines the individuals on the Board, their motivation for involvement in their governance role and notes implications regarding retention of the subcommittee structure. The chapter concludes with perceptions of the effectiveness of the Board in the research period.

Chapter Nine: The CEO Position critically reflects upon affects of the corporatization and professionalization processes on the vital position of CEO in the rugby organization. The changing role of the CEO is discussed, as are the perceived competencies of the individuals filling the role. The resignation of the CEO of the case study organization is discussed, with consideration given to the process by which his replacement was selected.

The corporatization process introduced a structural change towards increased departmentalization in the subject organization, and these departments are presented in **Chapter Ten: The Departments**. The facilities for the staff are discussed, then the operations of each of four departments are examined. Extra attention was given to the marketing department and the coaching and development department, as these were considered the least and most successful departments respectively by research respondents.

Chapter Eleven: The Team focuses on the union's professional rugby team management. Corporatization did not directly affect these areas as much as it did others, but this area made the greatest changes due to professionalization. The changing role of the coach and team manager are discussed, as is the large number of ways in which professionalization has impacted upon the elite provincial players.

The results chapters concluded with **Chapter Twelve: Club Rugby.** This considers the manner in which club rugby has been affected by the professionalization and corporatization processes. Areas of discussion include the club competition, the Council of Club Delegates and the relationship between the union and clubs.

In **Chapter Thirteen: Discussion**, the results of the research project are fully discussed, drawing together an overview of the implications of the research results. Major dimensions of these are noted.

Chapter Fourteen: Conclusions and Recommendations presents conclusions drawn from the research and presents these in the context of the two research questions. The chapter includes reflections on the research and recommendations for sport management practitioners and for further research.

1.5 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

This chapter has outlined the origins and rationale of the research. The originally framed research questions led to the literature review. This provided understandings for the first of these, on historical developments of the game and the contradictory ethos of amateurism-professionalism. Two proposed research questions were not answered by the literature and became the focus for subsequent research:

1. *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*

2. *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

The chapter then outlined the thesis structure of the methodologies, results and conclusion.

PART A: LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER TWO

RUGBY IN NEW ZEALAND

CHAPTER OUTLINE

With the research questions tentatively proposed in the introduction, the literature review chapters seek literature which may answer the proposed questions and provide informative discourse and research to illuminate the context and nature of the questions and their possible answers. This chapter draws upon historical literature and contemporary critiques to provide an outline of rugby's development and embedded role in society, particularly that of New Zealand. The origins of the game are briefly indicated and the introduction of rugby to New Zealand, with its consequent rise to become the national game, is drawn from this literature.

2.1 Origins of the Rugby Game
2.2 The Development of Rugby In New Zealand
  2.2.1 From introduction to *The Originals* (1870-1905)
  2.2.2 The Years of Success (1906-1980)
  2.2.3 Conflict, change and a World Cup (1981-1987)
2.3 Rugby in the Nineties
  2.3.1 The Boston Report : rugby management in the 1990s
  2.3.2 New Zealand rugby in 1995
2.4 Summary and Review

2.1 ORIGINS OF THE RUGBY GAME

Rugby School historian Jennifer Macrory (1991) believes the earliest forms of the game that was to spawn rugby can be traced to ancient Greece (p.5). This assertion is supported by Stewart (1995) who states that "there are sculptured representations in friezes in the Pantheon dating from the 5th century B.C., of Athenian youth playing a similar game" (p.1). The game played by the Greeks has been linked to a similar game popular in the Roman armed forces, and it is believed by Macrory that this explains how the game reached British shores. The Roman game was named *harpastum*, meaning 'to snatch', and Macrory and Stewart note this was a contest by two teams aiming to carry the ball over goal lines at each end of the playing area. This remains the primary objective of the modern rugby game.

References to evolutionary forms of the rugby game are scarce but Chamberlain (1992) reports that in 1583, English Puritan pamphleteer Philip Stubbes condemned football as a "devilish pastime [causing] envy, rancour,

malice, brawling, murther, homicide and great effusion of blood" (p.89). Macrory suggests that a form of harpastum remained popular in eastern counties of England into the nineteenth century. The form of the game played in this era was named *camp bell*. It was played on a clearly defined pitch measuring between eighty and one hundred yards long, with goals at each end having a width of only two or three feet. Players aimed to carry the ball between the goal posts. If the ball used was small, teams emphasized running with the ball in hand. When larger balls were used, kicking the ball in order to get closer to the opposition's goal was commonly emphasized. These two elements are directly reflected in the running and kicking strategies of modern rugby.

Up to the eighteenth century inhabitants of Wales popularized a game named *cnapan*. This was played with a small wooden ball, designed to be passed and thrown upon demand among the participants, who numbered up to two thousand. If the holder of the ball declined to pass three times in succession, he was persuaded to do so by the use of punching and cudgeling. This and other similar games declined as society emphasized less violent standards, and the open countryside became more enclosed. When rugby football became popular in Southern Wales in the 1870s its growth was helped by public perception of it as a natural successor to such games as *cnapan*.

Games of 'folk' football remained largely as social events in the country towns of Britain through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Games usually were played on local holidays, stirring passions and bonding communities. In towns and cities ball games were played in the streets. There was no uniformity for the games being played throughout Britain, rules were usually localized and unwritten, with games played under de facto agreements and verbalized understandings about playing laws. Some games emphasized ball handling, others featured kicking and some allowed a combination of these.

By 1823 the football game played at Rugby School in England permitted catching of the ball on the condition that it was then kicked back to the opposition. In that year, a pupil of the school, William Webb Ellis, is said to have broken with traditional football law by picking up the ball and running with it. This seemingly unsporting act allegedly represented the first evolutionary act of a new form of the football game, known as *rugby* after the school at which the legendary action took place. A plaque at the school bears the following inscription:

THIS STONE
COMMEMORATES THE EXPLOIT OF
WILLIAM WEBB ELLIS
WHO, WITH A FINE DISREGARD FOR
THE RULES OF FOOTBALL
AS PLAYED IN HIS TIME
FIRST TOOK THE BALL IN HIS ARMS
AND RAN WITH IT
THUS ORIGINATING THE DISTINCTIVE
FEATURE OF
THE RUGBY GAME

AD 1823

While the trophy presented to the winner of the Rugby World Cup bears the name of the sporting insurgent, the validity of the claimed action has been questioned. Some commentators suggest that memories of this incident by fellow students were inaccurate, others have argued that running with the ball was already allowed, while some argue that other pupils were responsible for the innovation (see Stewart, 1995, for example).

The game swiftly spread. In the 1850s it appeared that a hybrid form of the rugby game existed in every English public school or township. It was in this period that the game increasingly became a socially acceptable activity for adult members of the upper and middle classes. This link with the privileged remains indelible in England today and influences the International Rugby Board through the continuing dominance of this international body by England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales.

Blackheath was the first rugby club in the world to be founded, in 1862, but the sport often continued to be played in accordance with localized rules. This made matches between clubs difficult, but the gradual emergence of various football codes provided a commonality of rules. The continuing evolution and growth of the sport led to the need for national governing bodies to be established. In 1871 the Rugby Football Union was founded in England, and governed the first international played - Scotland versus England, in 1871. In 1873 the Scottish Rugby Football Union was formed, followed by the Welsh national body in 1880. The game of rugby was now firmly established as a popular sport in what were to become known as the 'Home Unions' of rugby - the countries of Great Britain plus Ireland.

2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUGBY IN NEW ZEALAND

2.2.1 From introduction to *The Originals* (1870-1905)

The first reported football games played in the Australasian colonies were played in Australia in 1829. A number of variant forms of football quickly emerged in the young European settlements in New Zealand. Many of these were hybrid games noted by historians encasing elements of the three main forms of football in the colonies - soccer, Gaelic football and Australian or Victorian Rules (Palenski, 1992; Swan 1948). As one description indicates, the flexibility of football rules was paramount - "Even the rules were flexible. Any number of men could play football, teams varying from ten to fifty players each; games lasted any period mutually agreed upon" (Olssen, 1981, p.257). The form of football developed as Australian Rules was very popular in goldmining areas, and was suggested by proponents as being suitable to become New Zealand's national game. Some football games were still played in the 1870s with Victorian Rules in one half and ball-carrying football in the other.

An early form of rugby was played by pupils of Christ's College, Christchurch, in the 1850s. Their game featured a huge paddock, an unlimited

number of players and an inflated bullock bladder which could be picked up and run with if caught on the full. This exercise reflected closely the game being played at the same time in public schools throughout the Mother Country, England.

In 1870, Charles John Munro (1851-1933), son of Sir Charles Munro the Speaker of the New Zealand House of Parliament, had returned from his public school education at Christ College in London. The Munro family resided in the South Island town of Nelson, and Charles introduced the sport to Nelson College. The younger Munro's active promulgation of rugby led to the historic match between the College and the Town (18 a side) at the Botanical Reserve in Nelson, on May 14, 1870. The score of two goals (Town) to nil paled in significance to the occasion, which is now acknowledged as the first organized game of rugby in New Zealand in its modern form (Palenski 1992). The College team later travelled by steamer to Wellington, on September 12, 1870, then overland by coach to the Hutt Valley, where they played a Wellington team. The Wellington team played the first "international" match in New Zealand later that year, against a team from the visiting British warship H.M.S. Rosario.

The relatively standardized version of rugby, as played in these matches, spread quickly. Historical commentators suggest the major appeal of the sport at this stage lay in its limited need for sophisticated equipment, grounds which required little preparation, unlike cricket, and rugby was not unduly affected by mud, as soccer was (Fougere, 1990). The clear objectives of the game, influence of schools, limited rules and the dominant characteristic of physical contestation were also significant. The spread of the game was aided by the rapid development of a comprehensive railway network, and the reduction in work hours which allowed more time for leisure pursuits.

The appeal of rugby broached racial divisions in the colony. By the mid-1890s, European settlers and the indigenous people, the Maori, were engaged in playing rugby over many regions of New Zealand (McLean, 1991; Palenski, 1992). While New Zealand society was not as defined as the social hierarchy apparent in England, social classes were identifiable. On the rugby field, however, "not only did classes meet, they were crushed together and bumped about" (Crawford, 1988, p.108). This aspect of the rugby game is also noted by McDonald (1995), who stated that because of New Zealand's egalitarian tradition, "rugby became the first genuine level playing field" (p.20).

Sociologists suggest that the male-oriented pioneer culture was susceptible to the appeals of a visibly aggressive sport and its related male socializing. The game was "appropriate for, and complementary to, a New Zealand society forged by a democratic press of 'mateship' and familiarity" (ibid.). Historians and sociologists describe a culture of drink, mateship, camaraderie and ascribed masculine values which dominated the rugby game in New Zealand at this time (See Fougere, 1990; Olssen, 1981; Phillips, 1987). Elements of this dominant culture are still evident today. Prior to the 1995 World Cup, campaign manager Brian Lochore demanded that "anyone not willing to die for the cause better get off the [All Black] bus now" (Johnson, 1995a,

p.B4). A respected rugby journalist, T.P. McLean, has also recently reflected values traditionally ascribed to rugby, by asserting that "Rugby by its nature is only incidentally classifiable as 'entertainment'. Primarily it is a manly contest challenging the skills and courage of its players" (1995, p.24).

The emergent rugby culture of late nineteenth century New Zealand emphasized physical aggression, not showing pain and a tacit acceptance of illegal play within an unofficial but universally understood code of conduct. The exclusion of women from most of rugby's social rituals swiftly became a deeply rooted phenomenon, especially at the 'after-match' function, where women were largely confined to a role of making tea and sandwiches for the men. This phenomenon still characterizes the game as the exclusion of females from a 1995 All Black trial match dinner in Auckland illustrates.

While emerging in the 1870s as New Zealand dominant popular sport, rugby was very important at school level. English public schools had a significant influence upon secondary education in the colony, particularly in the provision of teachers in private, and some state, secondary schools in New Zealand. In Dunedin, rugby had been introduced by a teacher, who was the son of a Rugby School master. In Auckland, former English public school pupils influenced the change of popularity from association football or soccer and 'Victorian Rules' football to the rugby code (Phillips, 1987).

Educators were also important in the introduction of sport to the secondary curriculum, and rugby was acclaimed as an avenue to conformity, discipline and apparent egalitarianism (Ryan, 1992). The promotion of the so-called public school ethos emphasized sportsmanship and conduct agreed upon by gentlemen. This emphasis was seen by some as contrary to the growth of rugby in the wider colonial society, in which the primary attraction came from the game's less sporting aspects (Ryan, 1992, p.168). Cutting across social boundaries, the emphasis placed on rugby in schools ensured a wide base of support as it emerged as the national sport of the young colony.

While the sometimes brutal nature of the game may have been attributed as a primary cause of its rapid growth, that perception also engendered a degree of public condemnation. Mild criticism centered on the opinion that rugby had "none of the discipline, grace and etiquette of cricket" (Crawford, 1984, p.8). As hacking (kicking of opponents' shins) and tripping were legal facets of rugby until the 1880s, more severe critics of rugby complained that the sport "tends to develop the worst impulses of man's nature" (*Otago Daily Times*, 3 June, 1878, as cited in Phillips, 1987, p.104).

In 1877 a club player died in Auckland, and the Parnell District Coroner declared that rugby was a game for savages. The *New Zealand Herald* in that year stated that bull-fighting and cock-fighting were more commendable recreations "than the rough-and-tumble hoodlum amusement called football which our youths seem to take so much delight in" (ibid., p.95). This view was not limited to pessimistic or antagonistic media observers, and continued into later decades. In 1889, the Wellington Rugby Union agreed their sport was not the vehicle of conformity and discipline promoted by the expatriate and colonial educators. These rugby managers described their sport as being "brutal, it is coarse, it is not scientific" (ibid.).

Despite the aversion of a sector of the public to the physically aggressive, perhaps even brutal, nature of the sport, and because of its attraction to many for the same reason, rugby became "the ethical exemplar of New Zealand social and spiritual life" through the closing decades of the nineteenth century (Crawford, 1988, p.108). Local histories illustrate the impact of rugby upon nearly every district of the country. The attraction of the game spread in virtually all communities throughout the country, generating a vitality in its growth as the national sport of the young colony. Indeed Crawford (1978) suggests that "the game adopted as the national sport was a symbolic representation of the life-style of the time" (p. 69), and cites sociologist Allan Levett's observation that rugby bears the "stamp of an agricultural society" (ibid.).

In Auckland, the development of the game accelerated at an exceptional rate. The earliest recorded game of football played in Auckland was in 1868 at the Auckland Domain, but it is accepted that football of differing rules had been played in the Auckland area for some time before this date. In 1870 the *H.M.S. Rosario* had arrived in Auckland, and her crew played games against local selections before sailing down to Wellington. In July 1870, a group of dedicated players met in a Queen Street office to form Auckland's first rugby club, matching those already formed in Nelson, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago. An Auckland team then played a team from the Coromandel goldfields with rules closely resembling those of Australian Football, and this match was repeated in the next two years under rules more closely resembling those of rugby union. By 1872 the rugby game had a clear dominance over the other football codes, with clubs appearing in Parnell, North Shore, Ponsonby, Grafton, Hamilton and Thames.

In Dunedin in 1874, 3,000 people were spectators at the Otago - Auckland rugby game out of a total Dunedin population of 18,000. The administration of the game in Auckland was successful in the manner in which it organized tours for its representative team, and the Auckland team again ventured south in 1875, achieving notoriety by losing all five matches heavily. Continued support for the game in Auckland saw a crowd of 1,000 witness the 1876 home match versus Canterbury, despite heavy rain (Crawford, 1988). Continued inter-provincial play was evidenced by a 1877 match between Auckland and Otago, and a home and away series between Auckland and New South Wales (ibid.).

Organizational and regulatory problems remained. Teams were seldom of equal size, as one Dunedin rugby match illustrated when a team of 26 opposed a team of 22 players. Rules and regulations were far from standardized, equipment was primitive and in short supply. As it had in England, the rate of growth of rugby necessitated the establishment of controlling bodies. The increasing social and political administration and organization of New Zealand, and advances in communication and technology were reflected in the establishment of provincial and national sports organizations, including rugby.

In July 1879, the Canterbury Rugby Football Union was established as the first provincial rugby union in New Zealand, followed by the Wellington

Union three months later. The emergence of provincial unions became the dominant factor in New Zealand rugby of the 1880's. In March 1881, the Otago RFU was formed, and Auckland became the fourth such union in April, 1883. In Auckland the provincial union was mooted by a sub-committee which drafted rules and a constitution, then officially formed the union on April 20, 1883. The union was originally named the "Auckland Rugby Union Football Association", and had jurisdiction over a large area of northern New Zealand. The geographical extent of the union can be seen by the amount of unions which have since emerged from under its early jurisdiction: Waikato (in 1909), North Auckland (1920), Bay of Plenty (1911), Thames Valley (1922), Counties (1955) and North Harbour (1985). The value of forming the union was shown in 1883, when the association successfully adjudicated upon several disputes arising from club matches.

Unions throughout the colony followed quickly. Hawkes Bay RFU, in May 1884, and Nelson Bays RFU, in June 1885, preceded the formation in 1886 of the Wairarapa and Manawatu Unions. The desire for autonomy led to the Southland RFU breaking from Otago in 1887, and South-Canterbury RFU from Canterbury in 1888. The process continued with the formation of other unions, and eighteen unions were formed in a fifteen year period to 1894.

The game itself was played by businessmen and miners, pakeha and Maori, urban clerical workers and farmers. Rugby players were from all walks of life, and could not be described by one simple profile. Administration of the game had developed one early but lasting characteristic. Nauright (1990) states that by the 1880s, "there was a clear predominance of middle-class control over the game's administration" (p.226). The founding charter of the Otago Rugby Football Union, signed in 1881, reflected the class-based beliefs of those who managed the sport in the 1880s. The perception of their relationship with players was clear , "if employers of labour wish to keep good servants, it is their duty to provide means of recreation after the toils of the day are over...and to patronize legitimate sports in every possible manner" (Fougere, 1990, p. 115). This apparent class-orientation is recognized by Crawford (1984), who views the Otago RFU charter as highlighting the fact that "the organization of rugby itself replicated the sort of regional occupational class structure in which they believed they existed" (p. 109).

Crawford (1984) also notes the critical effect these emergent provincial unions had on the organization of rugby. He describes the typical provincial union as "a mandarin bureaucracy who set up a stable administrative base and mixing legal savoir faire with business acumen made sense and order out of the hodge-podge of English football, Victorian rules and various rugby codes" (p. 9). This is characterized by the founding charter of the Otago Union, which contained 17 by-laws when drawn up in 1881. Crawford describes the charter as "a superb testament to keen intellects who recognized the importance of setting up an efficient machine that would generate ever increasing membership and be able to run the sport with the precision and aplomb of a law firm" (ibid.).

In 1882, the Southern Rugby Union of New South Wales toured as the first representative rugby team to play in New Zealand. This tour was reciprocated in May 1884, by the first team from New Zealand to play

overseas. The team won all eight matches on its tour of New South Wales. The year of 1886 saw another New South Wales tour of New Zealand, and the strength of the sport in the host country was apparent in the tourists' loss of ten of their twelve matches.

The first British rugby team to these shores arrived in 1888. Hints of controversy followed the tourists, who introduced the concept of backs handling the ball behind the forwards, a practice previously believed by New Zealanders to constitute offside play. This was countered by the prominent New Zealand captain, Tamihana 'Tom' Ellison, who introduced a *wing forward* position, which was seen by opponents as being an obstructionist position near the rear of the scrum.

The first major international tour by a team from New Zealand occurred in 1888-89, when a "Natives" team toured Britain being the first overseas rugby team to do so. The squad was predominantly comprised of Maori, with five pakeha team-mates, and attracted substantial media attention in the Home Country. The Natives underlined the development of the New Zealand game through winning 49 of the 74 games they played in the British Isles between October 3, 1888, and March 27, 1889. The team played an exhausting 108 games in a world trip lasting fourteen months.

The importance of this tour went far beyond the team's playing record. "These sporting exchanges were a starting-off point to boost national confidence and shape a national identity" (Crawford, 1988, p.108). After becoming a separate colony from that of New South Wales in 1841 following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, New Zealand was to become a dominion of the British Empire in 1907. It was fitting that rugby had provided the first opportunity for the emerging dominion to display a dominant feature as that would help define the in years to come. "In 1888, 1889 and especially 1905, a small colony named New Zealand on the fringe of the British Empire and known primarily for its remoteness, frozen lamb and Alpine beauty was seen in a new context, that of athletic excellence" (ibid.). This sporting excellence has subsequently emerged continually as a primary source of international exposure for this small South Pacific nation.

By 1890 there were nearly 700 rugby clubs and eighteen provincial unions in New Zealand (Nauright, 1990). However the continuing growth of the national game was not a totally smooth progression. The numbers of clubs rose and fell with the vagaries of a population exhibiting a high degree of geographic mobility. In 1891, the public announcement of a representative women's rugby team for a national tour was met with widespread condemnation, reinforcing images of the sexist culture which was operating within rugby, and the wider New Zealand society.

The need for a national governing body was voiced by representatives of the Wellington and Canterbury Unions as early as 1879 and supported by the Auckland RFU in the 1880s. Despite the increasing regulation of rugby in New Zealand, regional disagreements remained over fixtures, scoring values and interpretations of the rules, and a body was needed to organize and coordinate tours. The need for such a centralized authority to be nearer than England was now beyond question.

E.D. Hobden, an administrator of the Hawkes Bay Union, spent 1891 travelling the colony discussing the proposal of the formation of a national body with existing unions. Hobden called a meeting in Wellington, on November 7,1891, to discuss the possibility of forming a New Zealand Rugby Union. The unions of Wellington, Auckland, Otago, Wairarapa, Hawkes Bay, Taranaki and Manawatu were all represented at the meeting. The meeting set out the essential functions of a New Zealand Rugby Football Union in a draft constitution. They were to foster and control rugby football at a national level, to manage international matches, to arbitrate on the rules, to foster inter-union matches and "generally to attend to all matters pertaining to the welfare of the game" (Chamberlain, 1992, p.89).

In 1892 the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) was formed at a meeting on April 16, although the South Island unions of Southland, Canterbury and Otago did not join until 1893-94. The chairman of the meeting, G.F.C. Campbell of the Wellington Union, articulated the "need for a supreme football Court of Appeal in the Colony" (ibid.). The famous black jersey with its silver fern emblem was adopted as the national representative team's playing uniform at the annual meeting of the NZRFU in 1893, upon the motion of Tom Ellison. Ellison captained the first New Zealand team to play under the patronage of the NZRFU, in 1893, and produced New Zealand's first influential rugby coaching book.

The effect of the formation of a national body was now readily apparent. "The union rationalized and systematized rules, organized competition, and appointed referees armed with considerable authority. "As a distinctive code, rugby had been fostered by secondary schools during the 1870s, but in the space of thirty years it became the national game" (Rice, 1988, p. 262). In 1894 the New Zealand representative rugby team played its first official international match, against New South Wales, losing 6-8. In 1897 the first New Zealand representative touring team sanctioned by the national body made an overseas tour to Australia in, winning nine of its ten matches. In 1897 the North Island versus South Island match was inaugurated, a tradition which has continued into the 1995 season.

Literature portrays the controlled manner in which the finances of the Auckland Union were being managed, and the financial security of the union matched the growing support for the game. In 1884, the first AGM was held, admitting three new clubs, and announcing a profit of over three pounds for the first trading year, after 267 pounds was paid for a Southern tour, and the holdings grew in 1885 (100 Years, 1983). In 1886 the name was changed to *The Auckland Rugby Football Union* and the match against Wellington drew a crowd of 8,000 (ibid.). By 1887, the financial statement showed a balance of almost 270 pounds in credit (ibid.). In 1891, a trend emerged with stronger clubs inducing players from weaker clubs, to the extent that only three clubs remained in the senior competition in the 1891 season. To rectify this, literature shows the Auckland Union introduced a "District Scheme" which saw club numbers proliferate - the nature of this scheme is not described. Continued sound financial management of the Auckland Union saw credit grow to 580 pounds in 1892, and accumulated funds had grown to over 2,140 pounds in 1900 (ibid.).

New Zealand did not enter a team in the rugby competition at the 1900 Olympic Games. Only three teams were entered France won the gold medal, Germany silver and Britain bronze. This did not indicate the international strongholds of the game, and Germany has never been a senior member of rugby's international governing body, the International Rugby Board. Rugby featured again at the 1908, 1920 and 1924 Olympics. This means that the reigning Olympic rugby champions, from 1924, are the United States, who failed to qualify for the 1995 Rugby World Cup. New Zealand's national game has been recently reapproved as an Olympic sport, with probable entry into the AD 2004 Olympics.

In 1901 the Ranfurly Shield was presented by the Governor of New Zealand, Lord Ranfurly, as a symbol of provincial rugby supremacy. Soccer posts and a round ball were drawn on the original plate in error. It was initially presented to Auckland in 1902, as the Auckland team had been unbeaten for six years. The economic benefits of holding the Shield were soon evident, as 486 pounds were taken at the gate for the Wellington challenge in 1902, a clear provincial record at the time. The income generated from such defences helped the Auckland Union meet the cost of 3360 pounds to purchase 48 acres of grounds in 1903, while also needing to borrow almost one third of this amount and using money steadily accumulated in a *Ground Purchasing Fund*. Attendances to Auckland games grew steadily, with 20,000 watching the Auckland team play Great Britain in 1904. In 1906, interest in the Ranfurly Shield helped propel the Union to record a profit of 908 pounds with takings for the Wellington Ranfurly Shield challenge being over 80 percent of this.

The Ranfurly Shield swiftly grew in prestige, and was to remain the only tangible symbol of provincial supremacy until the introduction of the National Provincial Championship (NPC) in 1976.The Shield is still contested in a challenge format, generating a great deal of fervour, as evidenced by the public interest in the recent Shield tenure of the Canterbury Union, and the support in Auckland for their record tenure of Shield defences. Unlike the Ranfurly Shield matches, the NPC consists of a round-robin format followed by playoffs, which results in a build toward a climax, whereas Shield matches are one-off events.

In 1904 the desire for autonomy saw North Otago and Mid-Canterbury bring the number of unions to twenty. On the international scene, competition was becoming more regular. A representative team toured Australia in 1903, winning all ten matches. The following year the first fully representative British Isles team came to New Zealand. By 1904 New Zealand's national representative rugby teams had won 76 of the 104 games played against Australian and British teams. This was an impressive record, but the development of New Zealand rugby now faced its most demanding challenge to date - their first official tour of the Home Unions.

In 1905 the national team set out on a tour encompassing Great Britain, France and North America. The team became labelled as the "Originals", and was captained by the famous Dave Gallaher, in whose memory the Auckland club competition trophy is still named. The team played 35 games, losing

only one, the very controversial test match against Wales. The success of that 1905 tour lay in two broad areas - those of the players' personal and positional skills and the team's skilful game plans. For the first time in international rugby, positions in the team had specialist players and the forwards played with pace in support roles for the backs. These New Zealand initiatives shaped new perspectives of rugby in its lands of origin, the British Isles.

The patriotic emphasis placed on the tour and the establishment of New Zealand as, arguably, the world's foremost rugby playing nation, provided a lasting link between rugby and the national ethos of a young country. By providing a specific focus for national pride, "most scholars agree the 1905 tour was crucial to cementing rugby's position in New Zealand's popular consciousness" (Nauright, 1990, p. 220). By manifesting sporting excellence into a vehicle for national identity, the tour elevated rugby to an importance beyond that of sport itself:

> while the game of rugby was the country's premier national sport by the 1890s it was the success of the 1905 tour that transformed an imported game into a national ethos. In short, rugby expressed the core values of New Zealanders' society. Rugby was the one thing that New Zealanders believed they could do better than any other group of people in the world (Crawford, 1988, p.108).

The importance of the achievement was reinforced by the fact that the results had been achieved in rugby . "By proclaiming rugby, an upper-class English game, as the colony's national game, New Zealanders were proclaiming both their loyalty to Britain and their independence of Australia, where cricket had become the major vehicle of nationalism" (ibid.).

In the course of the 1905-6 tour the team were named the "All Blacks", a name which has been indelibly linked with the national rugby team of New Zealand ever since. The precise origin of the term is still debated, with some arguing that it came from the dominant colour of the players' uniforms, and others claiming a report of the team playing like 'all backs' was misquoted. Whatever the source of the name, "It was appropriate that the first players from overseas should have been New Zealanders, for the All Blacks, as they have been called since 1905, have been probably the greatest rugby players of the twentieth century" (Viney and Grant, 1978, pp. 30-31).

Strong links between rugby and politics in New Zealand were established during the tour. Prime Minister Richard John Seddon followed the results of the team closely, having the results cabled to him as government messages. Seddon obtained parliamentary approval to finance the team's return via the United States as a reward for a successful tour (Nauright, 1990). This recognition was reinforced on the team's return, with a reception from the Prime Minister in Wellington and adulatory comments from the Leader of the Opposition.

The professional rugby league code split from the amateur rugby code over the question of compensating players for time away from employment used to play rugby, the separation being formalized in 1895. League was not

initially perceived as a realistic threat to the strength of rugby union. The first international conflict between the unions and league codes of rugby was felt in 1907. In 1907, a New Zealand professional rugby league team left to tour England. The team was labelled the "All Golds" and included some 1905 All Blacks seeking payment for playing rugby league.

Reactions in New Zealand to the tour portray the social attitudes ascribed to followers of both league and union. Crawford (1984,) quotes a newspaper letter characterizing the union player as a "clean cut thoroughbred", in contrast to the "ungamely draught horse" of the league player (p.8). Since the bifurcation of the codes, the relationship has often been bitter, dominated by the moralistic attitude amateur rugby administrators had shown toward the professional code. The relationship remained strained to the present day, with rugby administrators resenting league clubs "poaching" elite union players, and descriptions in the media of union players 'defecting' to league. This led to restrictions upon rugby union players re-entering the rugby code after playing league (these restrictions are only now being loosened, a move accepted by senior rugby administrators under legal pressure).

2.2.2 The years of success (1906-1980)

Prior to 1914, the Waikato and Bay of Plenty Rugby Football Unions were formed. This brought the number of provincial unions to twenty-two, of the current twenty-seven. Of the 127 matches which New Zealand's national representative teams had played prior to World War One, 117 were victories, three were draws, and seven were losses. New Zealand teams had scored 3,110 points, and had 439 scored against them. As war on an unparalleled level loomed in Europe, on the other side of the globe the game of physical contact had become interwoven in the fabric of New Zealand society.

From being the national game of a young and relatively isolated nation entering the First World War in 1914, rugby grew at pace after that war. The New Zealand Combined Services team, representative of the country's Armed Forces, won the King's Cup international tournament in wartime Britain. The team played in South Africa, with the omission of outstanding Services players because of their colour. Representative New Zealand Universities and Maori teams made their first overseas tours in early post-war years.

Following "The Great War" rugby organization spread at a rapid pace, through rural New Zealand in particular. In 1920 the North Auckland Union, now Northland, was formed, followed closely by the East Coast RFU, then in 1922 the unions of Thames Valley and King Country were recognized. This increased the formal national administration of the game and, arguably, facilitated an accompanying increase in the social importance of the game in these areas. "Many districts in New Zealand would not have developed with their particular character and individuality had it not been for the strong influence of the rugby club and of the game of rugby in the district" (Stewart, 1995, p.33). This basal relationship between rural areas and rugby remained entrenched into the late twentieth century, as evidenced by the play *Foreskin's Lament*, written by an All Black trialist. In this play, the coach states "This is a team game, son, and the town is the team. It's the

town's honour at stake when the team plays, God knows there's not much else around here" (McGee, 1981, p.23).

The formation of these latter four, primarily rural, unions raised the number of provincial unions to twenty-six. The early development of the provincial unions has been a source of rugby pride and tradition, as twenty-five existing unions are at least sixty-five years old, including sixteen which are at least one hundred years old. Ironically, the sense of tradition which has become so deeply entrenched in these unions is now seen by many commentators as a barrier to needed change in provincial and national rugby administration and competition structures.

The seminal year of 1921 saw the first South African tour of New Zealand. The rivalry between the All Blacks and the South African side, the Springboks, swiftly developed into the most intense rivalry in international rugby. This first series between the two sides was drawn. The tour was keenly followed by the New Zealand public with few signs of the controversy which would increasingly envelop the sporting contact between the two teams over the ensuing seventy years.

In Auckland, the provincial union was consolidating its financial and administrative position. The union had signed a 21 year lease of Eden Park in 1914, and ten years later, the Eden Park Board of Control was established to oversee the administration of the ground. In 1927, the Auckland Union produced a profit of over 2,700 pounds "primarily due to the success and popularity of the representative team" (Rugby in Auckland, 1968, p.63). Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Auckland club rugby was played under *Auckland amended rules*, which were designed to make rugby a more attractive game to the spectator. Auckland had applied for and gained special dispensation through the NZRFU and the IRB to play under such rules. This was introduced as a defensive mechanism against the perceived acute threat of league in the 1920s, and led to the Auckland representative side adopting an open style of play that made them an attractive and lucrative team..

International contact became more frequent in the years between the World Wars, notably with the 1924-25 All Black tour of Britain, France and British Columbia. That All Black team became known as 'The Invincibles', through the winning of every match of their tour, prompting *The Times* in London to issue a special supplement on the play of the All Blacks. This again underlined the strength and importance of the game in New Zealand, and reinforced the sport as a lodestar of nationalism.

The two most acclaimed Maori players of that tour, Jimmy Mill and George Nepia, found themselves omitted from the 1928 tour of South Africa because of their colour, this being the first time the All Blacks ventured to that racially segregated rugby nation. The two countries shared "not merely a passion for rugby, but a similar approach to the game, and the rugby rivalry between two countries is felt to be distinctive" (Thompson, 1975, p.2). This "similar approach" was differentiated from others "by adding regulated violence and individual competitive fire to rugby" (Crawford, 1988, p.109). The place of rugby in South Africa was similar to that of New Zealand,

being "routinely and explicitly held up as a symbol of the desirable social order" (ibid.).

As tensions again developed in international politics New Zealand rugby continued to develop its international contacts. The first tour of New Zealand by the fully representative British Isles and Ireland team, known as the Lions, was seen in 1930. In the following year the Bledisloe Cup was introduced for trans-Tasman rugby test competition, and remains one of the supreme prizes which New Zealand contests in international sport. The economic depression affected gate takings at rugby matches in the early 1930s, but the Springbok tour of 1937 again raised the profile of the game, despite the All Blacks losing the series. The 1939 season saw Fiji make its first tour, highlighting the international and South pacific development of the game.

World War Two saw rugby played by New Zealand troops in all theatres of war. Immediately after the armistice in Europe, a representative army team, named *The Kiwis*, was selected. The team toured the British Isles, France and Germany, then played matches on their return to New Zealand. The team gained recognition for their free-flowing style of play. Following this tour New Zealand was admitted to the International Rugby Board in 1948. The continued dominance of this international governing body by Northern Hemisphere countries of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales is not tied to playing strength, but to the voting strength originally assigned to the founding IRB members.

Within New Zealand the Auckland Union again led the way in the management of the domestic game, with the construction in 1946 of a report on administration of rugby in Auckland, principally by A.L. Simmonds and T.H. Pearce (This document is not held by the union or any Auckland repository). The innovations of the union continued, with the introduction in 1948 of a comprehensive Players' Insurance Scheme, with voluntary participation

Following a tour to Australia in 1947, the first major tour by the postwar All Blacks was to South Africa two years later. This new era started poorly for New Zealand, with the loss of all four internationals in the republic and a further two at home to Australia. After suffering from these results, the year of 1950 returned the status of the national game to pre-war heights of popularity. The Lions tour of New Zealand in that year was a huge success, with the tourists playing attractive rugby although the home team won the test series 3-0. The Ranfurly Shield generated large crowds throughout the post-war decade, with Otago dominating its possession for much of this period. In 1955 the Counties Rugby Football Union became the twenty-seventh provincial union.

The 1956 South African tour of New Zealand saw rugby reach the zenith of its popularity in New Zealand. A bitterly intense rivalry between the two countries had been building since 1919. With the losses sustained in the 1949 series, the expectations of New Zealand rugby administrators equalled the vocal public in demanding success from the All Blacks (R.McConnell, personal communication, March 4, 1995). The national team responded to

expectations by winning the series 3-0, reaffirming the public appeal of rugby in this country.

The national game clearly dominated the New Zealand sports scene in the 1950s and 1960s. A typical perspective on this period comes from an outside observer, prolific writer and author of rugby books, J.B.G. Thomas, (1961), who noted that "New Zealanders are crazy about the Rugby Union game...Rugby to a normal New Zealander is a way of life and far more than a mere sport. It is a national form of demonstration of the physical prowess of the youth in the country" (p.109).

New Zealand participated in increased international competition through the early 1960s, including the hosting of tours by England and France. The 1965 tour by the Springboks again brought huge public support for rugby as "it still served to unite most New Zealanders around the synonymous ideals of rugby and nation" (Fougere, 1990, p.111). Support for rugby was high as the All Blacks won the series 3-1. Such widespread national support for the All Blacks continued as they displayed an expansive playing style, and won 38 of the 43 tests contested in the mid-to-late 1960s. This playing style, combined with the team's success, ensured the retention of rugby's place in the national psyche.

The relationship between rugby and television developed rapidly in the early 1970s. Some 51% of the available New Zealand audience viewed the third test between the All Blacks and the 1971 Lions, with 52% seeing shots of the Apollo 15 moon exploration immediately afterward (Ansley, 1987). The difference in importance to New Zealanders was marginal. In 1972 the test match against Australia was broadcast and later in the year a direct satellite telecast was received in New Zealand of the All Blacks' test against Wales at Cardiff. The impact of this communication medium was immediate and lasting. Television was vital in increasing the visibility and profile of players, allowing more advanced marketing and advertising of the game. Rugby was being taken into those households previously untouched by the national game. The game was now truly able to penetrate every part of the country in a more direct way, and this was important in attracting the younger, more television-oriented generation.

The introduction of television created conditions for changes to the existing market for rugby. For the first time rugby had the means of becoming a form of global entertainment. In 1977 these conditions influenced the first attempt to introduce a professional competition. This was to be based around New Zealand and British players competing in a televised competition, with the local arrangements organized by former All Black, turned league player, Joe Karam, sports broadcaster Tim Bickerstaff, and promoters Benny Levin, Russell Clarke and Lew Pryme (later executive director of the Auckland Rugby Union). Twenty All Blacks and other provincial players signed contracts for the professional competition, and these were soon emulated by elite British players. Grounds and sponsorship had been arranged, but at the last minute the British side fell through. Attempts made to organize a similar series in South Africa failed (McRae, 1990, p.22). Although this first attempt to introduce a competition primarily as a form

of television entertainment failed, it clearly laid a path to be followed by David Lord in 1983 and Kerry Packer in 1995.

2.2.3 Conflict, change and a World Cup (1981-1987)

Tours of New Zealand by overseas teams in the 1960s and 1970s had reflected the international expansion of the sport, with visits by Victoria, Romania, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Argentina and Italy. International politics also affected New Zealand rugby as the pressure built on New Zealand to cease contact with the apartheid state of South Africa. In 1965 the South African Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd reiterated that Maori players would not be welcomed as touring All Blacks. The growing number of New Zealanders proclaiming "No Maoris, No Tour" led to widespread debate on the extent to which rugby and politics interact.

Verwoerd's successor, J.B. Vorster, adjusted the official viewpoint, and the seminal 1970 All Black tour included three Maori and a Samoan, granted 'honorary white' status for the purpose of the rugby tour. Violent protests marked the Springbok tours of England in 1971, and Australia in 1972 yet the New Zealand government continued to deny links between politics and sport. Despite this claim, the captain of the 1970 tour to South Africa received an O.B.E. and his vice-captain an M.B.E.

The 1976 All Black tour to South Africa was concurrent with student riots and police shootings in the republic. These events led to vigorous public condemnation in New Zealand of rugby's close contact with the racist state. Some prominent All Blacks, including the captain Graham Mourie, declined selection in teams to play the Springboks. Rugby faced a decline in schools, where teachers were withdrawing from their involvement in rugby coaching, influenced by a belief that the NZRFU was offering tacit support to the apartheid government of South Africa through maintaining rugby contacts.

The debate escalated with the imminent tour of New Zealand by the 1981 Springboks. Two hundred thousand New Zealanders signed a petition against the tour (Coney, 1994). Many former All Blacks, including Bill Meates, J.J. Burrows, Dr Lui Paewai, George Nepia and Johnny Smith publicly voiced opposition to the tour. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, said the decision on the tour taking place was in the hands of the NZRFU. Rather than a decision being based on the beliefs of New Zealanders or the views of New Zealand society, "history showed that the rugby union made its decisions on sporting contact with South Africa solely on its assessment of what benefited the code" (Chapple, 1984, p.2). In the belief of rugby's national governing body, what benefited the code was a tour by the Springboks.

After this decision was announced the arguments became more bitter and clearly delineated. Most who supported the tour clung to the belief that the tour was simply a series of rugby games, and "seemed unable to perceive the wider ramifications of the attendant social upheaval" (Crawford, 1988, p.112). Once the feeling against the tour became apparent, defenders of rugby adopted a siege mentality, according to their critics. Fougere (1990) believes this can be attributed to the cultural baggage not associated with

rugby, "its powerful embodiment of particular relationships between men, the forms of identity they carried, and the national ethos they suggested" (p.117).

Those opposed to the tour espoused the beliefs of Jack Shallcrass, who had been active in the "No Maoris, No Tour" movement of the 1960s. He stated that the tour "became an issue of racism, something that transcended rugby" (Newnham, 1981, p.34). With two groups so diametrically opposed, so evenly divided, and so vehemently convinced in their beliefs, the stage was set for rugby to divide the nation.

Weekly demonstrations were well organized and attended throughout New Zealand. "They were matched by a massive deployment of police on a scale never before seen in New Zealand" (Fougere, 1990, p.112). The police armed themselves with helmets, shields and batons. The protestors donned motorcycle helmets and makeshift shields. As the two sides clashed, acclaimed New Zealand historian Keith Sinclair viewed the result as being "the worst scenes of disorder and violence since the Anglo-Maori wars of the 1860s" (as cited in Nauright, 1990, p. 220). Two tour matches were cancelled on police advice. The Springbok match against Waikato was one such cancellation, sparking clashes between rugby supporters and protestors. The tour culminated in the third test match, in Auckland. Protests were planned and negated in the manner of military operations, and the playing area was surrounded by barbed wire. A light plane buzzed the field throughout the game, dropping flour bombs onto the field.

Cameron (1981) saw the tour as a rite of passage for New Zealand to adulthood, as "it brought change in our concept of the police force...it changed the whole conception of the protest movement...it changed the image of New Zealand rugby. The tour dragged New Zealand into adulthood" (p.19). Although rugby supporters clung to the belief that sport and politics should be mutually exclusive, "the harsh reality of battered heads and flailing batons showed that rugby had become the fulcrum of profound social upheaval" (Crawford, 1988, p.112).

Commenting on media reports of the tour, NZRFU councillor Tom Johnston observed that "over the years rugby administrators charged only with the responsibility of administering their sport in the interests of participant members have been featured as intransigent, obdurate and fossilized in their thinking" (Crawford, 1988, p.113). He refuted this, but the NZRFU had not administered their sport in the best interests of participant members and followers. Rugby administrators had completely misread the mood of the populace and blindly stumbled into an intense confrontation with half of the country's adult population.

The 1981 Springbok tour markedly damaged the sport of rugby in New Zealand. The country was ostensibly a bicultural society, experiencing the increasing visibility of Maori as a political force, and the tour became a focus of social and political protest. New patterns were emerging in the social culture of New Zealand, which were seen as being at odds with the traditional and entrenched culture associated with rugby. These new social patterns had the effect of marginalizing rugby. Rugby became "just another

sport, important but not central" (Fougere, 1990, p.120). This was noted in 1982 by All Black captain Graham Mourie who observed "a slight drift away from active involvement in sport plus a general diffusion away from the singular pursuit of rugby into a myriad of other interests" (Mourie, 1982, p.229).

The groups opposed to the tour were important in increasing the marginalization of rugby in New Zealand society. Of these groups perhaps the most important in their direct effect were the secondary school teachers. Reeves (1992) describes secondary schools as "the cradle of rugby", due to the vital role they play in the development of young players. Many educators effectively disassociated themselves with rugby because of the 1981 tour, and concentrated on the development of other sporting options in schools. This process was coupled with the large number of parents who now did not want their children playing the game which had caused the societal upheaval in 1981. With these two effects, and the withdrawal of reimbursement for teachers taking activities out of school hours, rugby numbers dipped sharply in schools, throughout the first half of the 1980s at least.

In the more diverse, multi-cultural, urban and sophisticated New Zealand society of the 1980s, rugby no longer served "as a mirror, reflecting its particular image of New Zealand society. That mirror, and the pattern of relations it encoded and refracted, has been shattered irretrievably" (Fougere, 1990, p.120). Rugby may have remained the national game, but no longer reflected the fullness of New Zealand society. Rugby administrators faced a decade of rebuilding to restore the image and national acceptance of the game.

In 1983 the IRB rejected the idea of a World Cup for rugby, despite its obvious success in soccer and cricket. They believed that "because of the already high demands on leading players, a World Cup concept was disadvantageous and not in the greater interests of the game" (Haden, 1988, p.232). Following this decision, an Australian businessman. David Lord, announced his plan for a professional rugby tournament involving the eight senior IRB nations (France, England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, New Zealand, Australia and Argentina) to commence in 1984. The tournament had a budget of almost $11 million, with plans in place for seven competitions (this future was necessary as players would not be allowed back into the amateur ranks). The tournaments were to be played continuously, lasting two months each, with a similar break between tournaments.

Throughout New Zealand twenty-eight players were approached and only two declined to sign - a clear signal of the importance of the amateur ethos to elite players (Haden, 1983, p.236). The two who initially declined later attempted to sign, but were refused. Senior player Andy Haden offered to mediate in talks between Lord's representatives and the NZRFU but was refused by New Zealand's national union. A launch date of January 14, 1984, was planned at Wembley Stadium, London. A Heylen research poll commissioned by TVNZ in July, 1983, showed 50 per cent of those questioned saying they would attend live rugby matches (ibid., p.239). Despite having 208 players signed to the competition, Lord's deal ultimately failed,

primarily because he was unable to acquire the necessary revenue of pay-TV backing. "The organizers failed to attract sufficient worldwide television coverage, and with it the necessary sponsorship deals" (Starmer-Smith, 1986, p. 177).

The NZRFU allowed the rebuilding process from the experiences of 1981 to be interrupted by a renewed debate of an impending All Black tour of South Africa. Just four years after the 1981 tour had "unleashed a depth of public feeling and civil unrest in New Zealand unmatched since the Depression" (ibid.), national rugby administrators were advocating another series against South Africa, this time in the Springboks' own country. The NZRFU still espoused their policy of maintaining sporting links while being opposed to apartheid. Again, they misread the mood of the nation.

As in 1981, the two sides to the argument were broadly delineated along political and socio-economic lines. A *New Zealand Herald* poll of the populace on December 22, 1984, indicated 42 per cent opposed a tour, and 42% favoured it (as cited in Haden, 1983). National Party supporters largely supported the tour, while Labour Party supporters largely condemned it, reflecting party policies on the issue.

Andy Haden (1988), a prominent player of the time, outlined the arguments for and against the tour. Those favouring the tour viewed South Africa as a traditional rugby opponent, and a tour of the republic was seen as "the pinnacle of achievement by players and administrators alike" (p.52). Haden believed the tour was supported by the majority of rugby players, who viewed it as the opportunity to decide the "true world champion" (Haden, 1988, p.52). This player number was estimated to be approximately 200,000 at this stage by the NZRFU (as cited in Cushman, 1989, p.156). In addition, the tour was likely to provide the NZRFU with a lucrative source of income.

After the 1981 experiences, it was widely recognized the tour would cause considerable damage to rugby in New Zealand if the NZRFU allowed it to proceed. This damage would be most acutely felt in urbanized areas and at schoolboy level. If the NZRFU voluntarily cancelled the tour, it would be an opportunity for the NZRFU to gain credibility with the population it had alienated four years previously. Conversely a decision to tour, while sustaining the allegiance of rugby's heartland, was likely to further tarnish the image of the NZRFU to the general public. The decision to tour could also lead to a loss of sponsorship at both national and provincial level as rugby became a significantly less attractive product.

By March 24, 1985, when the NZRFU officially announced its decision to proceed with the tour, the anti-tour lobby had mobilized a nationwide protest movement. Reinforcing the decline of rugby in schools, the NZRFU received pointed anti-tour letters from principals and rugby masters from schools in Canterbury and Auckland, the two strongest rugby provinces at the time. A pop song was released entitled *You've Gotta Move (Move, Move) Cecil*, a demand for NZRFU chairman Cecil Blazey to resign. As the tour neared, the Prime Minister, Mr Lange, said the NZRFU's decision was to their

eternal shame, and later said he "would not believe any response he got from the NZRFU" (McLean, 1987, p.28).

On July 9, two Auckland lawyers, Patrick Finnigan and Philip Reardon, both rugby supporters, challenged the validity of the union's decision to tour. New Zealand political representatives had signed the Gleneagles Agreement in June 1977 which, in effect, forbade sporting contact with South Africa. These lawyers sought an interim injunction to prevent the departure of the All Black team to South Africa. On July 17, the NZRFU abandoned the proposed tour after a legal battle, a decision which Haden (1988) attributes to a disorganized defence rather than weakness in legal position. The NZRFU then organized a brief French tour of New Zealand, comprising a match against North Auckland and a test, which lost $27,285 (ibid., p.74).

A private tour of South Africa was organized by many of the current All Blacks, the team being known as the *Cavaliers*. Rumours surfaced immediately of the size of the team fund, which led to suggestions that the tour was the initial step in professional rugby. This assertion is supported by the belief that the Springbok players threatened to strike over their pay for the series (Mitchell, 1995a). The Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand decided Television New Zealand and Radio New Zealand would not broadcast the Cavaliers' games. The Cavaliers explicitly broke a NZRFU edict of "no sporting contact" with South Africa, prompting Starmer-Smith (1986) to identify "the indisputable fact that this tour cocked a snook at New Zealand's rugby officialdom" (p. 178). The players were suspended for two test matches on their return, and their coach Colon Meads was dropped from the All Black selection panel. This punitive action was widely viewed as an ineffectual response by the NZRFU.

In 1987, New Zealand was the primary host of the inaugural Rugby World Cup, with Australia also hosting several games. After years of debate amongst IRB delegates, the concept of a World Cup was accepted "because of a fear of the alternatives, rather than from a brave decision to advance the spread the prestige of the game" (Haden, 1988, p.209). The 1987 World Cup generated a profit of $23 million, thought to be a modest return. The IRB had formed a World Cup Committee, to manage the event, and made a former school-teacher its head (John Kendall-Carpenter), and a tractor salesman (Dick Littlejohn) its New Zealand representative. The mascot of the Cup, a characterized rugby ball named *Drop*, was abandoned before the first match was played, at a cost of $70,000. Haden (1988) alleges sponsorship deals were mismanaged by organizers, which restricted profits to be returned to the game.

The All Blacks initiated a new era of international dominance, as they swept through the tournament unbeaten. Gifford (1989) believes the campaign of the All Blacks "in every respect, except one, could be called totally professional. The sole amateur touch is that no money was paid for lending themselves to a massive advertising drive, or the time lost to work during the five weeks of competition, goes to the players" (p.23). No team came within twenty points of beating the New Zealand team, as they became the first team to claim the William Webb Ellis Trophy.

Exposure was assured as one and a half million viewers, half of New Zealand's population, watched on television, and one hundred million viewers watched worldwide as New Zealand beat France in the final. The All Blacks had many young players, and their expansive style of play attracted supporters nationally. The win was vital in rebuilding the public's faith in the national game after the debacles of 1981 and 1985.

For the next four years New Zealand completely dominated international rugby, not losing a test until 1990. Rugby again enjoyed a positive relationship with the public of New Zealand. There were 100 per cent increases in playing numbers in some areas (Cave, 1988). The biggest increases came in the lower grades, with the wave of popularity overriding concerns about injuries to young players, particularly at schoolboy level. The number of eight and nine year olds grew 80 per cent from 1987 to 1988 (Jones, 1988). Awareness of the World Cup triumph and continued All Black boosted support for rugby.

The rugby resurgence was reflected by the growth in rugby publications. In 1991 twenty-one new rugby books were published. In 1992, "the New Zealand Bibliographic Network, a computer record of books held in the majority of New Zealand libraries from the early 1960s, reveals there are more than three times as many different New Zealand rugby items on record (250) as cricket (69)" (Chamberlain, 1992, p.91).

The need for increased business acumen at the elite managerial level was recognized by Haden (1989), who stated "it is long overdue for professional people to be employed to run the game as a business" (p.190). Haden, in 1983, recognized that "the multi-million dollar business that rugby is needs top men in top positions, paid top salaries, and encouraged to make proper business-like decisions" (p.210). This need was to be much more acute seven years later. In 1989 the NZRFU had announced a record profit of $1.5 million. This commercially successful result included Lion Nathan signing a $400,000 sponsorship deal linking its Steinlager beer brand to the All Blacks, and $1 million from Canterbury International clothing manufacturers for the rights to the Silver Fern, which the NZRFU had protected as a registered trademark. The importance of television revenue was underlined when TVNZ paid $1 million for a three year contract, and Japanese television rights generated another $1 million (McRae, 1990).

These examples clearly portray the changes the national union was undergoing, as it faced challenges in areas of commercial and financial management to a degree unheralded in its history. A victim of this evolutionary stage was chairman Russ Thomas, ejected in 1990, because it was believed the NZRFU was not sufficiently progressive under his leadership (McKewen, 1995f). Thomas had never spoken in terms of the union making a profit or a loss, but "a surplus or deficit to plough back into the game" (Jones, 1987, p.48). Thomas was duly replaced by the more commercially orientated Eddies Tonks, a successful Wellington businessman.

2.3 RUGBY IN THE NINETIES

As rugby entered the 1990s it found a multitude of new issues faced the national game. Professional training and playing sacrifices were not being rewarded by open payments, sparking calls for an increasingly professional approach to player payments. Bans on players for drug-taking and on-field violence, debates on World Cup locations and organization, controversy on the selection of national coaches and administrators, and intense media debates in New Zealand and international rugby all impacted on rugby and its administration. Young persons were being drawn to alternative leisure pursuits, from individual recreation such as surfing to team sports such as rugby league.

The All Blacks were eliminated from the 1991 World Cup by Australia in the semifinals. Much criticism of the All Blacks having an undue focus on money and commercialism were noted (Gifford, 1992; Veysey, 1992). Despite the viewing time of 3:00 a.m., 25% of the New Zealand population watched the match against Australia (Chamberlain, 1992) .The success of the Cup as a vehicle to promote rugby internationally was readily apparent. An audience of 1.8 billion people in over 100 countries watched the competition, compared with 300 million in 17 countries in 1987 (Derriman, 18 July 1993). The international growth of rugby continued due, in part, to the increased visibility of its elite level through the globalized television coverage of the first two World Cups. This growth was evidenced by such events as the establishment in October 1995, of the first rugby competition in China.

This growth in television audiences mirrored the growing numbers of players internationally, with a rugby playing population of 400,000 in England, over 200,000 each in New Zealand, France and the United States, 137,000 in Australia, and approximately 100,000 in Japan (ibid.). These playing numbers were important, but were backed by widespread non-playing support for the game. This was explained in April 1992, by NZRFU executive officer George Verry:

> There are 207,000 rugby players in New Zealand. In the five to 29 age group, 28% of all males play. In a recent AGB McNair survey, 31 per cent of females aged 10-24 years, 30 per cent aged 25-34 years and 32 per cent aged 35-54 have a declared interest in the sport. We have a place at the top of New Zealand sport and our mission is to stay there (Chamberlain, 1992, p.90).

After matches against international selections celebrating the centenary of the NZRFU, the All Blacks lost the Bledisloe Cup in a tight 1992 series. At the end of the 1992 season the New Zealand team played a test match against South Africa in Johannesberg, the first test for the Springboks on their return to international rugby after the dismantling of apartheid. Under coach Laurie Mains, the All Blacks won only thirteen of the twenty-two tests played from 1992 to 1994. This caused much debate about the standards of New Zealand rugby in the international arena, evidenced by the degree of debate surrounding the retention of Mains as coach in October 1994.

However the interest in the fortunes of the national game remained intense, with the largest television viewing audience in 1994 being the Bledisloe Cup test between Australia and New Zealand, with 41% of the nation's homes watching the rugby encounter (McKewen, 1995a).

In 1992, semi-finals and a final were added to all three divisions of the National Provincial Championship, engendered a marked increase of interest in the end of season provincial games and adding another notch of inexorable pressure on 'amateur' players time. This move was an unqualified success, with interest and media coverage of the provincial competition growing annually. In 1994, North Harbour and Auckland made the first division final. Respective captains Richard Turner and Zinzan Brooke were estimated to have committed five hours a day in the week leading to the final, responding to media and promotional requests related to the final. This demand on amateur players is "an illustration of how well the concept of a grand final has gripped the imagination of the rugby public" ("Captains table their time for rugby spectacular", 1994, p.B12). The success of the NPC was concurrent with the interest in the 1994 Springbok tour. The seven week, fourteen match tour generated $23.7 million worth of economic activity for the New Zealand economy (Price Waterhouse, 1994).

2.3.1. The Boston Report: Rugby management in the 1990s

In 1993, the NZRFU commissioned the Boston Consulting Group to detail strategic options for the sport in New Zealand. The Melbourne branch of the American organization was contracted at a cost believed be approximately $40,000 (National rugby administrator, personal communication, April 7, 1995). The organization had completed, in similar circumstances, a highly successful report for the Australian Football League in the mid 1980s. In addition to the personnel of the Boston Group, a NZRFU steering committee was formed, consisting of Eddie Tonks (Chairman of the NZRFU), Malcolm Dick (former NZRFU Councillor), Richie Guy (NZRFU Councillor), John Hart (former All Black coach), George Verry (NZRFU Chief Executive Officer) and Wilson Whineray (NZRFU Councillor and former All Black captain).

The NZRFU attached a strict caveat to the brief for the review: "Paramount to the above brief was the need to recognise the important part rugby has played in the heritage of New Zealand and to ensure that so far as practicable the traditions of the game were preserved" (NZRFU, 1993, p.4). It is commonly felt by critics of the report that the heritage and traditions had often constrained progress in the sport, and had therefore partially necessitated a need for the report. To reimpose the overriding conservatism of rugby in the brief of the report arguably led to an inherent restraint of the workings of the steering committee.

The Boston Group was to initially review New Zealand rugby as it was currently structured. Once the existing position was determined, the group sought to analyze rugby's current strengths and weaknesses, and determine the issues and opportunities facing the game. The group then recommended appropriate strategies, structures and competitions to best serve the requirements of the game for the future (Boston Consulting Group, 1993, p.3).

The research involved interviews with councillors, players, referees, administrators, elite players and sponsors. Published on 10 March 1994, as *Taking Rugby Union into the 21st Century: Strategic Choices Facing the New Zealand Rugby Football Union*, the report was soon simply referred to as The Boston Report.

The report identified four inherent and historical strengths in New Zealand rugby: international leadership both on and off the field; a domestic competition that is strong both financially and competitively; high levels of customer satisfaction reflected in high public interest and support; employee welfare where the interests of 'employees' (players and officials) are served effectively (ibid., p.4).

The report identified nine major strategic initiatives the NZRFU "should consider adopting to take the game into the 21st century" (ibid., p.11). They were:

- A strong and financially viable international calendar
- Revised structure of premier and supporting domestic domestic competitions
- Grow and distribute central revenues
- Introduce mechanisms to ensure an even and financially stable competition
- Scheduling of fixtures to maximize attendance and TV markets
- Focus expenditure on a few stadia
- Continued emphasis on developing marketing and the rules of the game
- Revised governance structures for the game
- Work with the International Rugby Board to enforce similar principles worldwide

The major recommendation of the Boston Report was the introduction of a super-team national provincial competition. The report examined sporting competitions in South Africa, Australia, England, Germany, Canada and the United States, in order to formulate the plan for a new National Provincial Championship (NPC). The competition would be restricted to eight teams, possibly including Australian state teams (there are currently nine in the 1995 NPC first division). Unions not involved in this premier competition would become feeder clubs to those that were. For example, the North Otago and Southland unions would feed players into the much stronger Otago team. The report stated that players in this premier competition should be paid, with profits distributed to the lower-level provinces in order to ensure their survival.

The teams would operate on a budget of $3 million per annum. Player payments would mirror the quasi-professional Australian Football League and rugby league's Winfield Cup. Most players would have other jobs, but the average payment to players would be $50,000, "regarded as reasonable regarding given growing time commitments and physical risks" (ibid., p.B5). To ensure an even competition, a salary cap would be introduced and income would be distributed evenly among the premier teams.

At a national level, representatives of second and third division unions voiced concerns about their future under the report, which envisaged them becoming feeder clubs to increasingly powerful first division unions. These second tier provinces would not financially reward their players, as they do not have the financial resources to do so. While the Boston plan suggestions would ensure financial viability in lower divisions, it would also ensure their player loss. These unions have actively negated attempts by others to seriously discuss the implementation of Boston Report recommendations. This has been a primary source of frustration and conflict between provincial unions, particularly between first division unions and those in the second and third divisions.

A second major recommendation of the Report was to reduce the number of test venues to Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, where the stadia could be updated. These superior stadia would be instrumental in increasing the attraction of rugby attendance in comparison with the increasing number of entertainment choices. The number of international test matches would be reduced in order to maintain high interest in, and support for, the All Blacks. The 1994 reality, in contrast to this, was to see the most intense international season ever assigned to the All Blacks, with tours by France and South Africa, and a test against the Australia.

More night games, especially tests, were recommended in the Boston Report. To date New Zealand has not hosted any night tests. The Bledisloe Cup match in 1994 was played at 8:00 p.m. on a Wednesday night, in Sydney, and was the highest rating television programme in New Zealand for the year. This illustrated the demand for rugby during television's evening 'prime time' period. The Boston Report indicated that the NZRFU was missing out on the lucrative European television market through their use of a the 2:30 p.m. or 3:00 p.m. kick off on Saturdays and Sundays. If tests were played at 8:00 p.m. in New Zealand, they would be screened live at 7:00 a.m. in Europe. Television revenues are increasingly important as a source of income for sports organizations in North America, Europe and Asia. This option is seen to be a major source of revenue in the near future of the NZRFU.

The Boston Report recommended that all television broadcasting fees, along with profits from internationals and competition playoffs, would go to the NZRFU for distribution. Of these, 50 per cent would be distributed evenly among the premier unions. The unions in the feeder competition would receive 20 per cent, and the remaining 30 per cent would be retained for administrative costs, marketing and development. Gate sharing would used for all regular season matches, with play-off ticket sale revenue being retained by the host union as an incentive. Merchandising would be improved, and revenue from this would be equally distributed.

A third recommendation of the Report was the adoption of the structures and practices of a more competitive, market-focused sport organization, reorganizing the NZRFU Council to make it less cumbersome and more business orientated. The report recognizes that the "NZRFU is heavily involved in the day-to-day affairs versus governance [of the game]" (Boston Consulting Group, 1994, p.C27). The NZRFU had nineteen councillors,

seventeen of whom were elected annually. This combined with a high number of sub-committees, twenty-three, to increase the NZRFU's vulnerability to parochialism and vested interest.

A primary recommendation in this area was to replace the present nineteen man council with a board of between seven and ten directors, who would be appointed for three or four years and retire by rotation. This format reflects that used by the Winfield Cup, the Australian Football League and the South African Rugby Football Union. While the change to a board of directors has been made by a small number of provincial unions, such as Hawkes Bay and Auckland, into 1995 there is debate on the extent to which the changes suggested by the Boston Report have been seriously considered by rugby's national administrators.

The current NZRFU chairman, Richie Guy, felt the importance of the report was in danger of being over-stated. He states that many people think "the Boston Report, if adopted in its entirety, will solve all of New Zealand rugby's problems...But the Boston Report will not cure all ills" (McKewen, 1995f, p.B2). Guy was on the steering committee for the report, and his statement has several implications. The publication of the report had been greeted by a large amount of media attention, and renewed public speculation that the NZRFU was indeed capable of modernizing itself. Optimism was reflected by leading players. High profile Auckland and All Black players John Kirwan, Grant Fox and captain Sean Fitzpatrick stated their belief they should be paid for playing, as well as indicating their support for recommendations of the report (Choy, 1994).

If enthusiasm for change was widespread among players, supporters and the media, it was not reflected by the game's administrators. It was accepted that the report posed challenges for rugby's administrators, but the hope was voiced through the media that administrators could respond to these challenges. However the Chairman of the NZRFU at the time, Eddie Tonks, admitted the provincial chairmen "were alarmed" when they heard of the proposed streamlining at a NZRFU meeting (Gray, 1994, p.2:1). The report was intended to be implemented in a three year period.

The introduction of the report concluded that "rugby has a strong foundation. It is not a sport in crisis but is facing a number of challenges that have to be addressed" (Boston Consulting Group, p.5). The report concluded that "rugby is well positioned to meet the challenges of the future. Implementation of these strategic directions will lead to a stronger platform for the game as it moves into the 21st century" (ibid., p.19). Media commentator Trevor McKewen (1995f) has described the report as "arguably the most radical paper ever commissioned on the future of the game in any one country" (p.B2). Despite this, it has been left to individual unions to implement governance recommendations, while the national union has not provided an example for them to follow.

The Auckland, Otago, Hawkes Bay and Canterbury Unions introduced Boards of Directors but had to negotiate the change process without guidance from the national institution that initially commissioned the revolutionary report. The NZRFU in December 1995 finally accepted the recommendation

regarding the disestablishment of the present Council and introduction of a governing Board. The actioning of this had not commenced by the end of the present study's research year 1995.

2.3.2 New Zealand rugby in 1995

At the annual meeting of the NZRFU on 21 March 1995, a record financial return for the previous year was announced. Total commercial income for the NZRFU had totalled at $7.5m for the 1994 financial year, of which it is believed Steinlager provided a sponsorship of around $2 million (Gifford, 1994b). Despite this, outgoing Otago councillor and past deputy-chairman John Dowling, delivered a scathing verbal criticism of Tonks in a speech at the Council meeting. On 22 March, 1995, chairman Tonks resigned unexpectedly at the annual meeting, after discovering a council member, Richie Guy, was mounting a challenge for Tonks' position. Guy quoted "disquiet about the present administration" for his challenge (Gray, 1995c, p.1:1). Tonks' deputy Rob Fisher stood against Guy for the chairman's position, but Guy won on the third ballot.

The victory was unexpected, and immediately condemned by the majority of rugby commentators. Led by headlines such as "Jurassic Park wing of rugby wins the day" (McKewen, 1995f, p.B2), Guy's victory was viewed as a victory for the conservative, even regressive, rugby managers. The councillors who backed Guy's bid had been "openly aghast about administrators at the union headquarters, suspicious of commercial acceleration, wary of the Boston Report and Auckland influences" (Gray, 1995d, p.1:1). Prominent press commentator Trevor McKewen concurred with Gray's view, describing Guy's victory as a triumph for the smaller unions, those most under threat from the Boston Report (1995f). These views were also articulated by a leading All Black, Zinzan Brooke, who stated that "It seemed to the players to be a bizarre time to be having an eruption at the top of the game's administration when continuity was vital...What we knew was that a successful businessman with the players' interests at heart was replaced by what we with agricultural backgrounds might call 'a cow-cocky from Waipu'" (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.221).

In 1994, senior unions had sought to expand the National Provincial Championship to a double-round, in an attempt to extend the placing of the provincial rugby product in the television marketplace. This was primarily intended to help northern unions negate the expected wave of interest in the arrival of the Auckland Warriors league team, New Zealand's first fully professional rugby or league team. After this was rejected by the NZRFU council, northern unions resurrected the dormant Coronation Shield competition. This competition was run at loss caused by increased costs and poor crowds.

Tension arose from the provincial union organization of the Coronation Shield competition when the NZRFU refused to make available television fee income to the participating unions to cover this loss. NZRFU chairman Richie Guy stated that "If unions enter into arrangements that lose money, they cannot expect the New Zealand union to bail them out" (Gray, 1995f, p.2:1). This episode serves to reflect a major source of tension which

currently exists between senior unions and the national union. Senior unions feel they are not adequately rewarded for attempting to increase the amount of quality rugby because the national union appears to retain an unfair majority of the television income.

Following a huge June 1995 test victory against Canada, the All Blacks travelled to South Africa to compete in the third World Cup. The All Blacks produced an extremely expansive brand of rugby, and were generally accepted as the most attractive team at the tournament. The New Zealanders swept into final unbeaten, having defeated Japan and England by record margins. The All Blacks lost the final to the host country 12-15 in extra-time, the first major international match to go into extra-time. After the final it was revealed that nearly the entire New Zealand squad had serious food poisoning in the two days leading up to the final.

All Black winger Jonah Lomu, in his second season of international rugby, became the most popular figure in the rugby world, and the focus of international attention. Lomu was sought by league clubs, and became the first prominent New Zealand rugby player to be targeted by American football clubs. Increased business acumen was shown by the national governing body as the NZRFU announced on July 9, 1995, that it had taken out the name Jonah Lomu as a registered trademark, meaning they will have commercial authority over the use of the name (Mitchell, 1995e).

Rugby commentators from around the rugby world praised the style of play attempted by the All Blacks, and the standard to which it was raised. Gerald Davies stated that "All Black rugby is now, by far, the most exciting rugby played by any country" (Davies, 1995, p.29). He enforced this message by adding "This Rugby World Cup needed the All Blacks. With their presence, the quality of the competition has been raised....This was rugby that every other country should attempt" (ibid.).

On their return to New Zealand, the All Blacks were given a parliamentary reception. Prime Minister Jim Bolger thanked the All Blacks for the "entertainment, satisfaction and sense of pride" they had given New Zealanders during the World Cup (Thanks heaps team., 1995, p.1:5). Bolger's comments reflected the impact this All Black campaign had on the public. At least 33% of the potential New Zealand audience watched the World Cup final, but the number was likely to be larger because of the large numbers watching at clubs, bars and parties. TVNZ Director of Sport, John Chinless, believed it was a great achievement for any country to have more than a third of its population watching a sports team in the middle of the night (Network a winner, 1995, p.1:22).

Two other sporting events in 1995 gained huge ratings. The Warriors' debut match was rated at 32 per cent, but was screened in prime-time on a Friday night. The America's Cup final race rated at 30 per cent (42 per cent at its peak), but was screened at mid-morning on a Sunday (Ratings through the roof, 1995). Considering the timing of the Rugby World Cup final, kicking of at 2:00 a.m. on a Sunday morning, the ratings were clearly indicative of the support for the All Blacks, and also indicative of the contemporary standing

of rugby amongst other prominent sporting events for the New Zealand public.

Following the success of the World Cup campaign, in terms of generating public support, the linkage between New Zealand rugby and international politics again appeared. In defiance of international agreements, the French government decided in June 1995 to renew a limited number of nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll, a French territory in the Pacific. As New Zealand public protest spread against this decision throughout July, it became clear that France would detonate nuclear devices while the All Blacks were touring that country. The Labour Party spokesperson for sport asked the NZRFU to rethink the end of year All Black tour of France. The Alliance party even suggested the famous silver fern should be modified into an anti-nuclear symbol (Young, 1995).

Echoing his 1981 predecessor, NZRFU chairman Richie Guy stated "We don't involve ourselves in political protests" (Young, 1995, p.1:1), and said the NZRFU was "an apolitical organization" (Umbers, 1995, p.A1). All Black manager Brian Lochore added that "Sport and politics should be kept separate. [The All Blacks] are there to play a game and they shouldn't be used as political pawns" (ibid.). While public opinion was widely damning the nuclear tests, beliefs on the linkage with the rugby tour was mixed. A *Sunday News* poll indicated 73 per cent of respondents were in favour of the tour (Poll says oui! 16 July 1995, *Sunday News*). However this result was refuted by a poll run by the Auckland's *North Shore Times*, which had 1222 valid replies. Of these 992 (81.2 per cent) felt the All Blacks should not tour, and 230 (18.8 per cent) felt it should proceed. (Resounding non, 1995, p.1). Much of the population for the latter survey would fit the profile of the population who opposed the 1981 and 1985 tours, being urban, educated and professional.

Rugby has dominated the cultural and social life of New Zealand for nearly a century (Crawford, 1988, p.118). Rugby remains as New Zealand's national game in 1995, with a high participation level, viewing audience and generation of income. " By every measure rugby is our biggest sport. It has the most players, greatest income, highest profile, largest crowd and television exposure" (NZRFU, 1993, p.18). In 1994 there were 148,000 registered rugby players, compared with 137,000 in 1988. Ten years ago there was $78,000 spent on coaching, whereas in 1994 there was $543,000. NZRFU surveys indicate that 22 per cent of the general population note rugby as their first choice of a sport to watch or play, followed by league (12 per cent), outdoor cricket (7 per cent) and netball and tennis (5 per cent).

The importance of New Zealand in world rugby was underlined in September 1995, by the arrival in Christchurch of 6000 players in 200 teams involved in the Golden Oldies Rugby Tournament. Despite this popularity, and in order to maintain this state, many challenges currently face the game's administrators. Spectator numbers are being eroded through the increase in weekend trading and an increasing variety of recreational and entertainment options available, particularly in the urbanized areas which have become dominant on New Zealand's rugby landscape. Senior provinces are becoming increasingly confrontational with the national union, as views

diverge on how best to meet the inevitable changes to increased commercialism and professionalism.

2.4 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

Historian Jock Phillips argues that the sociology of rugby remains largely intact, stating that "certainly a large part of New Zealand male culture still identifies itself with this ideal of a 'rugby playing Anzac'" (Gray, 1995o, p.2:2). Phillips acknowledges the male population of today does not share the emotional involvement with rugby that their fathers experienced following the 1956 Springbok tour. Men are moving away from team sports into more 'self directed' alternatives, such as the individual sports of skiing and surfing. However Phillips admits the "heart of the culture will be following the All Blacks to such an extent that winning is vital" (ibid.). These views of Phillips are also given support by Gray (ibid.):

> Rugby may no longer hold sway it did in the public consciousness when the 15-man game, racing and beer were almost all of the nation's recreational pursuits. Sustained competition from [league], as well as a shift in leisure taste among an increasingly urbane and sophisticated population, mean the sport has to fight for - rather than take for granted - its popular following. But if the country doesn't go into mourning any more when the All Blacks lose a test, the game we once called football still looms large on our cultural landscape (ibid.).

While undergoing a metamorphosis forced upon it by the changing nature of New Zealand society, rugby retains strong traditional elements which have changed little since the days of informal rules and regulations. The physical aspect of the game remains as apparent as ever, albeit it in a more refined form, as All Black captain Sean Fitzpatrick exhibited when he explained his suspension for eight days for punching an opponent by stating that "rugby is a physical game and things happen" (South, 1995c, p.B6). Fitzpatrick's statement was mirrored by that of Richard Loe, who was involved in a fight while captaining the midweek team of the 1995 tour of Italy and France. Loe's explanation of the fight was "that's rugby" (Sports Quotes, 1995, p.52). Similar sentiments were also exhibited by administrators of the international game. The IRB Amateurism Working Party report which heralded the erasing of the amateur regulations described the changes "in a sport as physically violent as Rugby" (The report that changed, 1995, p.14).

Rugby has historically had a strong appeal to the New Zealand male, especially as the New Zealand representative team have traditionally ranked at the very top of international rugby. A critical reflection upon the development of rugby in New Zealand and its present state indicated a sport once entrenched as the country's national game still having strong appeal, but facing challenges to its appeal as the nation's premier football code.

Today, New Zealand rugby management is faced with many challenges. The NZRFU recognizes the need to respond to changing demands now confronting their traditionally amateur sport, and must consider transformations to professional stages of rugby's development. Given the pace of change in the game over 1995, the provincial and national managers of rugby face pressures to change the longstanding structures and administration of New Zealand rugby.

Few provincial rugby administrations have responded to the demands for change. In critically reflecting upon the changing demands of today's rugby certain questions arise, in the light of New Zealand rugby history, the Boston Report and the advent of the Super-12 competition, as underpinning the researcher's focus upon the two basic research questions : What has the union perceived as the forces which have led it to change its administrative structure? What is the new administrative structure and what primary goals does it have? What are the perceptions of present day needs for rugby structure and administration held by managers and players ? To what extent does the literature on regional rugby or other sport administration provide relevant considerations for New Zealand's reorganizing of rugby's administration at the provincial level?

It is with such considerations underpinning the tentative research questions that this study now turns to a critical consideration of relevant literature in the ethics and practice of amateurism in rugby as that ideology has influenced rugby management structures until the formalized acceptance of professionalism in rugby.

CHAPTER THREE

AMATEURISM, SHAMATEURISM AND PROFESSIONALISM

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Rugby has traditionally been an amateur sport. This chapter of the literature review opens with an examination of the origins of modern perceptions of amateurism, from their suggested roots in the Olympic Games of Ancient Greece to their application in the developing game of rugby football in nineteenth century England. From this detailed consideration of the concept and its application, the chapter will examine the fracturing of rugby's amateur ethos and breaches of amateur regulations. The sources of such *shamateurism* in New Zealand rugby are considered, and major forces which accelerated rugby's recent moves toward professionalism are outlined. The absence of a professional tradition with associated literature in New Zealand coupled with demands for professional sport, necessitates an examination of the concept of professionalism in sport, which concludes this chapter.

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Development of the Amateur Ideology
3.3 Shamateurism: The Reality of Amateur Rugby
  3.3.1 Player movement
  3.3.2 Time demands of elite rugby
3.4 Professionalism in New Zealand Rugby
  3.4.1 Player incomes and companies in New Zealand rugby
  3.4.2 Overseas professionalism and payment
  3.4.3 Pay for play : France, Italy, Japan and South Africa
  3.4.4 The impact of Rugby World Cups
  3.4.5 The influence of rugby league
  3.4.6 The introduction of a professional rugby competition
3.5 Professionalism in Rugby
  3.5.1 Origins of modern sport professionalism
  3.5.2 The formal introduction of professionalism to rugby
3.6 Summary and Review

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The often expressed belief that amateurism as an ethos is sourced in ancient Greece is not necessarily accurate. "The popular picture of ancient Greek amateurism is quite fictitious" (Young, 1988, p.27). Amateurism did prevail for a period in the games of Ancient Greece, but only during the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. That was a time of great economic inequity when only the wealthy had time for games, therefore financial remuneration

for time imparted to training and competing for such participants was not necessary (Amateurism, 1969, p.60).

After this period the games attracted those seeking rewards being showered upon these already moneyed champions, and by the second and first centuries BC, the Olympic Games of Ancient Greece were riddled with professionalism. As noted by Wallechinsky (1984), "Not only were they fully supported for almost a year prior to the Olympics, but even though a winner received only a olive wreath at the Games, back home he was amply rewarded and could become quite rich" (p.xxi). Such was the acceptance of athletes competing for tangible reward that the ancient Greeks did not even have a word for amateur (Young, 1988; Smith, 1993). Ironically, given its use by present day proponents of amateur sport, the Greek word *athletes* literally means "competitor for a prize" (Young, 1988, p.28). Further, given widely accepted modern definitions of the term amateur, "no ancient Greek athlete would be eligible for the modern games" (ibid.). Such paradoxes are illustrative also of the development of the amateur ideology in more modern sport ideals and practices.

3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMATEUR IDEOLOGY

The word *amateur* has its etymological source in the Latin verb *amare*, to love, and the French verb *amator*, lover (Eitzen, 1989; Schneider and Butcher, 1993; Stebbins, 1977). The word entered the English language via the French, where it was accepted as indicating someone who does something for the love of it (ibid.). It was in the early nineteenth century that the word *amateur* first became commonly accepted in the English language. Harper and Hammond (1977) indicate that the English aristocracy felt compelled to adopt acceptable pastimes with which to fill their days, and consequently became "noble dabblers" in a variety of leisure pursuits. Thus, they state the term *amateur* became largely synonymous with the word *gentleman*, and covered a whole range of genteel pursuits, such as amateur botany, amateur geology and, increasingly, amateur sport.

As the ideology of amateurism developed in this British aristocratic sense, it was used increasingly as an instrument of exclusion. English society was deeply divided by clearly distinguishable classes. The upper classes in this society exhibited a widespread acceptance of the ideology of social Darwinism, a theory which gave support to the belief that innate differences existed between members of the various social classes. It followed that social interaction of the elite classes with the lower classes was far from desirable. In the late 19th century clubs were formed for 'amateur gentlemen', to exclude the working class. It was clear that "the intent of amateurism as devised by the English social elite was to exclude from sport those of the lower classes" (Smith, 1993, p.431).

The rationale for this exclusion of the lower classes from amateur sports was clearly expressed by an upper class gentleman, Caspar W. Whitney, in 1895:

> Why there should be such constant strife to bring together in sport the two divergent elements of society that never by any chance meet elsewhere on even terms is quite incomprehensible...The labouring class are all right in their way; let them go their way in peace, and have their athletic pursuits in whatsoever manner best suits their inclinations...Let us have our own sport among the more refined elements, and allow no discordant spirits to enter into it (Eitzen, 1989, p.97).

Those involved in such amateur sport "wished to legitimize with an ancient precedent their own athletic system, which sought to restrict participation to a wealthy, leisured class" (Young, 1988, p.27). In such ways the myth of amateurism as a citadel of sporting and social purity in ancient Greece was introduced and embellished to provide this historical precedent. This new sense of amateurism was based upon play without pay, so "to be a pure amateur required independent wealth, since the true amateur derived no income from sports participation" (Eitzen, 1989, p.97). Through this exclusion of financial reward for participation in sport, amateurism intentionally became a "mark of status and wealth" (Strenk, 1988, p.309).

The social elite felt it was inappropriate to mix with those involved in ignoble trades for another reason. These trades usually involved physical work, which was viewed as giving them an unfair physical advantage compared with their genteel superiors, so such labouring persons were deemed professionals and banned from amateur competition. Through this exploitative ideology labourers were explicitly banned from such events as rowing. Because white males dominated amateur sport, it has also been seen as a form of sporting apartheid (ibid.).

Sport had clearly become used as a mechanism of exclusion of participants based upon social class: "The institution of sport through the mechanism of amateurism reproduced and even justified existing social inequalities" (Eitzen, 1989, p.97). This manifested itself very clearly in the sport of the time - in the late nineteenth century, cricket *players* and *amateurs* had different dressing rooms, separate entrances to the field, different travel arrangements (amateurs in first class, players in third class), and different accommodation at away games (Sissons, 1988). The annual Gentleman (i.e. amateurs) versus Players match did not cease until 1962 . Even in 1958, the controlling body of the English cricket game, the Marylebone Cricket Club, defined a professional as "any cricketer directly or indirectly paid for playing cricket" (ibid., p.281). This social differential has continued in amateur sport into recent times, and has been recognized as such by many athletes and commentators. An illustration of this comes from Anita De Frantz, an Olympic medal winner and the first black female elected to the IOC, who said that amateurism has "always been a way to exclude people" (cited in Eitzen, 1989, p.97).

These examples show the way in which amateurism, in its modern form, was introduced as a philosophy of exclusion in many sports. From a modern viewpoint of rugby, for example, it may be perceived as a rarely recognised paradox in major concepts of sport, being based on social and participatory separation, yet having been touted throughout rugby's history

as the characteristic term of inclusiveness in the game that binds all social classes together, discarding considerations of diverse backgrounds. It was this philosophic vein of social exclusion that became intertwined with the increasing regulation of the rugby game in late eighteenth century England, and entrenched in the establishment of the International Rugby Board in 1886. From its formation to the mid-1990s, "The IRB guards against the impurities of professionalism tainting its sport by shutting out forever anyone who has accepted money to play league" (Haden, 1988, p.184).

The amateur philosophy which dominated rugby until late 1995 can be directly linked to the evolution of this ideology in Britain. However, the amateur philosophy had itself evolved in rugby to stand as a belief system and credo of control which has substantially dominated the sport's development (see Williams, 1991). The amateur regulations could be related to three dominant philosophical perspectives of amateurism - that sport is simply another form of leisure and should not be commercialized; that amateurs compete merely for the love of sport; and that amateur sport promotes a superior set of values to those apparent in commercialized sport. These beliefs have shaped rugby's national and provincial administrations and influenced their decision making and governance of the sport for over 120 years. The following section will explain these three philosophies more fully.

Amateurism has historically provided the setting from which professionalism is built and the ethos which provides the contestable area of superficial compliance to its prescribed elements (e.g. non-payment for play). In its modern form, which has greatly influenced the ethos of the rugby game, amateurism rests on a triumvirate of philosophical assumptions - that sport is only a form of leisure; that athletes should compete in sport for the love of the game only; and that amateur sport promotes values which are viewed by proponents as being morally superior. This review turns now to these assumptions and critically examines their associated literature.

A *belief in sport as a form of leisure* underpins one concept of amateurism. An important component in the advocation of amateur sport is that play and leisure are separate from everyday life. This conception of amateurism, that sport is merely a form of leisure, can be directly linked to its nineteenth century British aristocratic sources. This belief, unlike other forms of amateurism, can also be dated to ancient Greece, where Plato remarked that "we should pass our lives in the playing of games" (as quoted in Sack and Kidd, 1985, p.43). It has come to be a prevalent notion of amateur ideology, evidenced by the view of former International Olympic Committee president Avery Brundage that "Sport is recreation, it is a pastime or a diversion, it is play, it is action for amusement, it is free, spontaneous and joyous" (quoted in Eitzen, 1989, p.96).

Csikszentmihalyi (1984) expresses a belief that "Man at play, as thinkers from Plato to Sartre have observed, is at the peak of his freedom and dignity" (p.xi). He argues that philosophers such as Heraclitus, Plato, Nietzsche and Sartre have held play in high esteem because play is an activity that one is free to enter and to leave (p.25). Csikszentmihalyi believes the difference between work and leisure is that work is something

we have to do most of the time against our desire, while the latter is something we like to do, even though it is useless (p.8). He introduces the term *autotelic* to describe an activity that requires formal and extensive energy output on the part of the actor, yet provides few conventional rewards (p.10). The field research of Csikszentmihalyi into chess players, composers, dancers, rock climbers and basketball players found enjoyment of the experience and use of skills was the most highly ranked reason for enjoying activity. Ironically professional rugby players have emphatically insisted that they play for enjoyment, self-fulfilment and the qualities of leisure involvement noted by Csikszentmihalyi (see section 4.4 in the following chapter)..

As sport is seen as only being a form of leisure, its practitioners are not specialists, so are "relatively unskilled or low skilled...appreciably lacking in sophistication" (Morgan, 1993, p.473). Stebbins (1977) further defines this perception of the amateur sportsperson by drawing a distinction between the amateur and dabblers. Stebbins views those who follow sporting pursuits with a low level of commitment and little time involvement as dabblers, and not as true amateurs. Amateurs still pursue sport as a form of leisure, but with a far greater degree of commitment. However to amateurs it remains a form of leisure for which the degree of commitment is the differentiating factor.

Stebbins (1977) continues that "One cannot be an amateur butterfly catcher or matchbook collector; no opportunity for full time employment exists here" so these pursuits are termed hobbies (p. 188). He believes that to be an amateur, there must be a counterpart of full-time pursuit or paid occupation. Accordingly, he defines dabblers as "those whose active involvement, technique and knowledge are so meagre as to barely distinguish them from the public of which they are actually a part" (p.190). Thus rugby players had no choice but to be amateur, as there was no opportunity for them to gain full time employment in the rugby union game.

Because this view of amateurism is vocationally oriented, the concept of amateur sport as a leisure pursuit disallows athletes from making a living off sporting exploits. While this is argued against by Beamish and Borowy (1988), who assert that amateur athletes meet the requirements normally required to determine employee classification, most of the literature on amateurism does support the view of sport as a leisure pursuit. It follows that an athlete should also have an alternative means of livelihood to ensure that sport does not become the sole occupation and concern in one's life (Morgan, 1993). English RFU secretary Dudley Wood has reflected this belief, stating that "The first principle of rugby union football is that it is an amateur game played as a spare-time activity and recreation by those who are following full-time careers" (Cain, 1993, p.19).

The purpose of the retention of a full-time career is "to insulate sport from the supposedly corrosive influences of obligation, necessity and utility by making it out to be a pastime, a leisurely adjunct to the hustle and bustle of ordinary life" (ibid., p.178). An amateur, having no material interest in sport, holds the view that payment for athletic services is antithetical to their sport ethos. However it does allow the practice of modestly

reimbursing athletes for the expenses they incur plying their athletic craft, so the relevant distinction is therefore between wages and expenses (ibid.).

While the concept perception centred upon amateurs competing in sport because it was a leisure option, the second concept of amateurism centers more strongly on participants' motivations; that is, *amateurs competing for the love of sport*. This follows the belief that "the true sportsman plays for the love of the game, the sense of mastery, the sheer joie de vivre which he feels in playing a stroke well, and not for the mere honour, or still less the profit, of a victory"(Graves, 1900, as cited in Meier, 1993, p.495). It is a belief commonly espoused in connection with the Olympic Games, as its modern founder, Pierre de Coubertin, stressed that "The important thing is not winning, but doing well" (as quoted in Harper and Hammond, 1977, p.125).

In this sense amateurism is a form of motivation, with pleasure and rewards coming from the intrinsic goals of the game (Eitzen, 1989; Schneider and Butcher, 1993; Sewart, 1981; Smith, 1993). Intrinsic goods are those which can only be achieved through participation in a specific activity. For rugby, these may be, for example, a try resulting from a perfectly executed backline movement, a pushover try which symbolizes physical domination of the opposition, or a successful conversion from the sideline. Sewart (1981) argues it is this process of competing and gaining intrinsic rewards that is the motivation for the amateur, not any external goals and ends, and that this "is transcendent of everyday life, being and consciousness" (p.45).

This belief has a historical influence upon rugby, as Fletcher (1925) states that "The essence of the Rugby game is that it is to be played by amateurs - that is to say, those who play purely for the love of the game and not for what they can make out of it" (p.102). Such commentators feel this motivation is tainted by the greatly increased extrinsic rewards offered by professional sport. Conversely, extrinsic rewards are usually desired in such common currencies as money and fame. The belief that such rewards can be detrimental to sport is evidenced Graeme Steel, executive director of the New Zealand Sports Drug Agency. Steel believed the move to professionalism in rugby would add an extra factor that may impact upon a player's decision to take performance enhancing drugs (Pro-rugby pressures, 1995, p.2).

Schneider and Butcher (1993) take this perception of amateurism as a state of motivational intent one step further, believing that it is possible to be paid to compete and remain an amateur. By differentiating the means (competing) and the ends (external rewards), Schneider and Butcher argue that if athletes compete purely for love, even if they are financially rewarded, this constitutes amateurism, because "getting paid for doing something that one loves does not prevent one from continuing to love it" (p.468). As long as the love for the game and its intrinsic good remain the guiding motivation, "payment is nice but irrelevant", so the athlete remains amateur (ibid.).

It is this stress upon the motive of competing in sport for its own sake that historically made rugby's amateur regulations so strict, before being

loosened somewhat in the last decade. In 1978, All Black Tane Norton was not reimbursed for his taxi travel to the airport, as rugby administrators argued it would have been cheaper to take the bus (Zavos, 1978). Before the regulation was amended in 1988, former All Black captain Graham Mourie was outlawed from the game for life, as a referee, coach and administrator, for he was deemed to have made himself a professional through his action of receiving payment for an activity related to his playing career, his involvement with the amateur sport being seen as inappropriate once he made money from this. Another prominent All Black, Andy Haden, received royalties from an autobiography he wrote after retiring, and only escaped a similar penalty to that of Mourie because he listed his occupation as a journalist. This draconian attitude was given further weight by the observation of Starmer-Smith (1986) that "any payment is beyond the pale in the context of this amateur sport" (p. 176). These examples illustrate the traditional rugby administration emphasis on playing for the sport's own sake, with minimal expense recovery for players.

The third concept of amateurism indicates a belief in *the promotion of superior values* forms of sport. Morgan (1993) views this as a "liberal bourgeois" sense of amateurism. Such a concept holds amateurism as embracing "ideas of fair play, good sportsmanship, honesty, an adherence to the technical rules of sport, a lack of commercialization, a certain ambivalence in relation to victory or defeat and the acceptance of a code of moral behavior" (Eitzen, 1989, p.105). This theory is evidenced by the experience of Canada in the first half of the twentieth century. In this time the Protestant middle class rejected professional sport because it was seen "to debase play, to emphasize ends rather than means, to involve passion rather than restraint, and to encourage gambling, drinking and frivolity" (Hall, Slack, Smith and Whitson, 1991, p.105).

This view is not confined to sociological observers. Peter Gent, former professional football player, believed that "Amateur sports, by emphasizing the thrill of performance, have the potential to build character, enhance self-esteem, and create a nation of healthy, capable, confident, well adjusted citizens" (as cited in Hall et al, 1991, p.105). Gent's views of the superior values attributable to amateur sport are also mirrored by those involved in rugby, especially senior administrators. Former NZRFU Chairman Russ Thomas stated that "rugby's about friendship, the joy afterwards, just as much as while the games are taking place" (Cave, 1988, p.24). IRB chairman Vernon Pugh has also alluded to the existence of rugby's values, through his statement that "everyone who cares about the game doesn't want to lose that special character that it has" (Kitson, 1995, p.2:1).

These statements by administrators are supported by some former players and media persons. David Kirk, former All Black captain, is clear in his beliefs: "Amateur rugby is superior because it contains and promotes a set of values that are superior to professional sport. These values are dependent on the fact that players are not paid to play. They play for fun, for camaraderie, for physical exercise, for personal and team goals of improvement and success and for the development of character" (Kirk, 1995a, p.B3). A similar perspective from a media commentator is presented by Kervin (1995), with an observation that "There is fear that this [professionalism] will lead to a new set of values, and that traditional

virtues like sportsmanship, civility and the joy of the game, will be sacrificed in the name of winning at all costs, self-indulgence and lack of camaraderie and community" (p.3).

Despite the administrators' views on rugby's promotion of ideals and superior values above those of other sports often professional, players have found conflicts in their desire to play rugby, as an amateur game, and their need or desire for recompense above minimal expenses or an income to support their lifestyle. Out of such inherent tensions, and differing pressures applied to players by certain administrators and entrepreneurs, rugby managers moved to retain players to play for their organization, and thus arose the player who ostensibly was an amateur but received 'professional' support - the *shamateur* rugby player.

3.3 SHAMATEURISM: THE REALITY OF AMATEUR RUGBY

"The problem with the amateur ideal is that it does not take sufficient notice of the fact it seldom gets followed" (Morgan, 1993, p.479). Strenk (1988) also outlines the common situation in which "amateur statutes have resulted not in honesty, fair play, good sportsmanship and cooperation, but in greed, dishonesty, cheating, hypocrisy, fraud, exploitation, violations of civil rights and freedoms, suspicion and manipulation" (p.331). Morgan (1993) argues that "when all is said and done, the appeal amateurism makes on our sporting practices is more hypocritical than moral, more muckraking than consciousness-raising in its effect" (p.478).

This review now turns to examine the inappropriateness of the amateur concept to fit the requirements of contemporary rugby, which led to the rise of shamateurism. This, in turn, led to the introduction of formal professionalism. Initially this section examines the widespread rise of shamateurism as a global phenomenon. This is followed with a consideration of shamateurism in New Zealand rugby. Major sources of change are examined, which emerged to compel rugby's shedding of remaining pretences of amateurism at the elite level.

In 1993, a noted rugby journalist observed that "Over the last decade, as New Zealand has changed from being one of the staunchest guardians of the old IRB amateur system to one of the leading countries devoted to bringing commercialism to the game and its players, the lines between the amateur and the professional in rugby terms have become very indistinct" (Cameron, 1993b, p.66). This indistinct sphere, in which New Zealand rugby operated throughout the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s, was commonly known as shamateurism.

Player dissatisfaction with the draconian amateur regulations of the rugby game surfaced early in the history of New Zealand's national game. In 1884, Bob Whiteside was considered to be perhaps the best back in New Zealand, but was not selected for the All Black tour of Australia after he requested that he be reimbursed for expenses he incurred (Problems with Professionalism? 1995). Despite these early beginnings, significant pressures

on the amateur regulations in New Zealand grew to be widespread in the late 1970s, when journalist Spiros Zavos stated "Revise the rules on amateurism or watch the game disintegrate is the message our reluctant administrators must face up to" (1978, p.50). However throughout the early 1980s New Zealand administrators remained devoted to the ethos of amateurism in rugby. Former chairman of the Auckland Union, Ron Don, called illegal payments, typical of shamateur practices, "the cancer in rugby's midst" (McRae, 1990, p.24), and in 1978 stated that "Once rugby becomes professional, it is no longer rugby" (McDonald, 1995, p.20).

The views of Don reflect the belief of a former chairman of the NZRFU, who said the "one thing rugby players have to accept when they start playing the game is that it is going to cost them money" (Haden, 1988, p.206). Another NZRFU Chairman, Russ Thomas, stated that "The great strength of New Zealand rugby, and of rugby throughout the world, has been its amateur characteristics. I accept that it has some weaknesses. But rugby is where it is today - played in 27 provinces throughout New Zealand - because of its amateur characteristics" (Cave, 1988, p.24). These comments by administrators at the highest level indicate attitudes that prevailed in rugby management until the last decade. Amateurism was strictly observed by administrators, and certainly not questioned to any significant degree, in public, by them.

However society, if not the game of rugby, was changing indelibly. Eitzen (1989) observed that "societal forces have transformed sport into something unrecognizable from the amateur ideal. This change...is nonreversible in the near future" (p.102). The amateur ideals which governed rugby since its inception were formulated in a protected and sheltered English environment of public schools, financial wealth and social stability. This environment became increasingly irrelevant to the athletes involved in elite rugby from the late 1980s, yet related literature still pointed to rugby as one of the few examples of amateurism surviving in the modern sporting world, while recognising this was largely through the desires of administrators, not players.

A Special Issue of *The Economist* on "The Sports Business" discussed amateurism, "In all sports, anywhere near the top, such phrases are whitewash. Few if any even bother to use them (except in 15-a-side rugby, and then only its administrators; leading players would gladly go pro)" (The Economist, 1995, p.2). However the administrators still retained the power, and rugby remained constrained by the basic principles developed from an environment of a century earlier as it moved into the 1995 season.

Sewart (1981) stated that a change to professionalism is a microcosm of wider societal change. Describing the failure of amateurism in American society, Smith (1993) supported Sewart, observing that the "upper-class amateur ideal of participation for the joy of competition and for no other motive was destined to be a failure in a society whose freedom of opportunity ideology provided for all to seek excellence through effort and ability" (p.443). This societal change had affected amateur sport throughout the world. Describing cricket in the 1930s, Sissons (1988) noted that "Ultimately, the decline of the amateur was a consequence of economic changes in society at large" (p.249). The ethos of amateurism also became

anachronised in Australian sport. Shilbury (1990) noted that "Since the 1977 cricket revolution, sport in Australia has frequently become commercially oriented at the elite level. So much so that participation at the elite level in sports such as cricket, basketball, Australian Rules football and rugby league has become far removed from the ethos reflected in the amateur athlete so prominent throughout Australia's sporting history" (p.9).

The observations of Smith and Shilbury could be directly applied to the emerging situation of rugby in New Zealand. New Zealand society in the nineteenth century, and the rising national game of rugby, did bear certain common elements to those of the home country, but quickly developed their own societal forces and features, such as a sense of egalitarianism, identifiable indigenous people, and a frontier culture, that were not apparent in contemporary England. The emergent societal imprints have had a clear effect on New Zealand's rugby culture, as was noted in Chapter Two of this study.

As New Zealand society has increasingly emphasized the acquisition of wealth, the concept of user-pays, and rewards for skills and training, these societal factors have become increasingly reflected in its rugby culture. This type of society is noted by Coakley (1994) as having "market economies where material rewards are given high priority in the lives of people connected with sports, including athletes and those who own teams or sponsor and promote events" (p.302). Coakley's views have been articulated in a New Zealand setting by Bryson (1988), who noted a "move to commercialism...as the expectation of young New Zealanders" (p.272).

This antithesis of the amateur ethos has been recognized by non-administrative personnel at the elite level of New Zealand rugby. In 1990, for example, prominent coach John Hart said "We've got to realize we're playing rugby in the 1990s while the amateur code and ideals are relevant to 30 years ago. Society has changed" (McRae, 1990, p.22). This increased recognition of external forces has also prompted current NZRFU Chairman Richie Guy to state that market forces will regulate what happens in the years to come (Caffin, 1995).

This change may be seen as illustrative of international sport, in basketball, rugby league and soccer, for example, through to the Olympic Games which were formerly a bastion of amateurism until progressive forces necessitated change. Schneider and Butcher (1993) suggest that "The insistence that an amateur athlete is an athlete who has not been paid, coupled with an inexorable desire for ever-improved performances, led inevitably to the rampant hypocrisy of millionaire amateurs and to the eventual collapse of a system that lacked a coherent justification" (p.460). In 1974 the IOC eliminated the term *amateur* from its eligibility regulations, and permitted athletes to receive payments for their living and training expenses. As amateurism has became removed almost entirely from the Olympics, Schneider and Butcher (1993) stated "it is a good thing that the end of amateurism is also the end of the hypocrisy of millionaire amateurs and illicit payments" (p.460). Schneider and Butcher also provide a discussion of implications for consequent changes in the sport administration.

One view of the reluctance of amateurism to concede to change attributes this to the belief that amateurism is an ideology exploited by sport administrators. Eitzen (1989) observes that while amateurism is often viewed as a romantic notion with moralistic ideals, "In reality...sports organizations have sometimes used this concept to exploit the labour of amateurs while amassing considerable wealth for themselves" (p.95). He continues that "today's top level athletes...are workers who sell their labour power...to employers. Sometimes they are exploited, under the guise of amateurism, by artificially low financial rewards, misrepresentation or being treated as instruments for producing victories and income" (p.101). Morgan (1993) mirrors this by viewing a major problem of amateurism as "Its uncompromising rejection of any form of financial reward for athletic excellence" (p.480).

Haden (1988) expresses one of the few critiques of rugby administration in a New Zealand setting:

> The rugby union runs a business. It has made a market for the players' time. The rugby union sells their time but it won't pay them for it. Therefore the rugby union maintains the fiction that their time is a valuable commodity to its customers, while to the players, the rugby union maintains the fiction that their time is not commercially viable, which is clearly a double standard (p.226).

At Haden's time of writing, players were used to generate television revenues, of which no part was returned to them. While levels of formal remuneration to elite amateur players increased markedly from 1988, in 1995 the All Blacks still received no part of ticket revenue or television rights, when their performance was the sole means by which such revenue was generated.

Harper and Hammond (1977) noted that "Traditions die hard, and misapplied words even harder" (p.122). Despite being deeply entrenched in rugby, among other sports, amateurism has clearly become irrelevant to the contemporary situation. Critics are numerous and unequivocal. Describing the Olympics, Strenk (1988) states that "as a code of conduct and a philosophical concept, amateurism was a failure. Rather than promoting virtue, good sportsmanship and honesty, the amateur code encouraged hypocrisy, dishonesty and corruption" (p.321). This questioning of the value of amateurism was also evident in the IRB, when their Amateurism Working Party report (which provided the basis for the move to professionalism) stated that "The Game does have a certain ethos, but whether this due to the long history of non-payment for playing/coaching is not at all clear" (The report that changed, 1995, p.13).

The explicit advocation of amateurism was largely ignored if not forgotten with the reality of the developing complexities of 'pay for play' in New Zealand. The staunchly amateur approach taken by rugby's administrators was eroded steadily throughout the decades of the 1980s, to a position

where the administrators of the game in the 1990s took a much more realistic approach to breaches of amateur regulations. Former chairman of the NZRFU, Eddie Tonks, articulated this attitude by saying that the New Zealand union has been trying to develop a more liberal attitude to amateurism since 1990, believing it was vital to be realistic about what was happening in world rugby (Gifford, 1994b, p.64). What was happening was in reality a paradigm shift, in which rugby commentator Graham Moody described rugby as becoming "in fact, a shamateur game...full of lies and deceit all through the world" (*Morning Report*, August 17, 1995).

The forces which exerted an inexorable pressure for professionalism in rugby have had very limited critical examination in literature. These forces are numerous and largely inter-related. Major forces for change included : increased player movement; a marked player commitment to time involvement in elite rugby; increased commercialism, incomes and companies; France, Italy and Japan paying foreign players to play and coach in their countries, along with South African rugby allegedly offering unofficial payments; the four-year cycle of Rugby World Cups exerting pressure for rugby player commitment; rugby union players leaving for the professional sport of rugby league; and the emergence of professional rugby competition. These have all added pressures on the amateur regulations in rugby. Collectively, they have moved rugby to a semi-professional state, with an emerging professional stratum at the elite level.

3.3.1 Player movement

Rugby superiority has been a source of pride and income to clubs and provincial unions since the game was established in New Zealand, so the need for superior players has always been apparent. Provincial unions by 1995 displayed few of the so-called amateur virtues in their pursuit of elite players whom they perceive as adding to the playing strength of their representative teams. The act of enticing elite players from other unions, with inducements of employment, scholarships or money, runs contrary to the intrinsic elements of amateurism, in which one plays for the local team for the love of the game, with the game perceived as a leisure pursuit which promotes certain desirable values as noted earlier .

Movement of players for financial advancement is not a recent development. In 1927 Bert Cooke, a member of the unbeaten 1924-25 All Blacks in Great Britain, was lured to the Wairarapa Union from Hawkes Bay. This change in allegiance was accomplished by Cooke's new union, with the financial contribution of supporters, buying him a £600 partnership in a clothing shop (McLean, 1987; Romanos and Harding, 1991). Cooke had originally played for Auckland but Hawkes Bay had attracted him by offering him a job paying substantially more than he earned in Auckland

This movement of players between unions has increased markedly in recent years. The Auckland Union has traditionally been criticized as being "a cheque-book union which attracted players like moths to a candle" (Cameron, D.J., 1993a, p.59). This accusation is apparently justified by the number of players who have moved to Auckland after beginning their rugby careers in other provinces. However this masks the fact that Auckland as a union and major city offers incentives to players that most

other unions can not. This attraction is shared with other first division unions such as Otago, Canterbury and North Harbour, and centers around four aspects - jobs, education, exposure and facilities.

In an article examining retention of players in second division unions, Hinton (1995d) stated "With the game entering a new era of professionalism, all of the representatives spoken to expressed optimism for an exciting time ahead. They know they will have to work hard to keep promising players - if not the best then the next level down - and to woo fans to their grounds, but they see a bright future, one they are determined to be part of" (p.B4). However this optimism expressed by Hinton has not been supported by the literature.

David Kirk, as a strong advocate of amateurism, believes "Today the greater proportion of player movement is characterized by dishonesty, disloyalty and greed...The introduction of money to the game has been accompanied by a growth in the number of players seeking full-time careers in rugby" (1994, p.B3). The movement, or drain as it is perceived by some provincial rugby unions, is increasing, and Gordon Tietjens, the Bay of Plenty provincial coach, believes "it must get worse if the big unions go professional" (Cameron, 1995d, p.2:2). This has implications for the administration of weaker unions attempting to retain players, generate sponsorship revenue and build infrastructures.

Many rugby players who star for prominent unions have their playing roots in rural areas. However, few modern national representative players are farmers or in associated rural careers such as wool buying or farm appraisal, and for most other careers the prospects of advancement are far more attractive in larger urban areas. In addition to the opportunities which players explore for themselves, such as with breweries, some senior provincial unions have implemented training programmes to find their elite players a career, or regular employment at least. An example is the North Harbour Union, which introduced a Career Management Programme, in 1992, involving an extensive personal appraisal of each player by consultants, and the major team sponsor Lion Nathan. Such programmes train players in order to provide real skills to potential employers.

If players are not employed or suitable programmes are not in place, many unions employ the players themselves. "Consequently the job of the '90s has become assistant coaching co-ordinator" (Harding, 1995a, p.21). Unions also have developed marketing and promotion roles for valued players and consequently many players in the first division, especially, are paid as a direct result of their playing the game, and to negate the lure of rugby league. This payment, within the ostensibly amateur sport of rugby, was acknowledged by NZRFU deputy-chairman Rob Fisher, who noted that "players are being paid at club and provincial level" (McKewen, 1995d, p.B2).

In addition to these official and unofficial payments generated by unions, and additional employment opportunities found outside the unions (often with major sponsors' companies), many rural-based players move to urban-based unions in search of higher education. This has been a traditional source of playing strength for the Otago Union, which has always drawn

from its local university students, who have moved to Dunedin from various provinces. In their opening 1995 NPC match, the Otago side did not have one player born in the region. This is a sign of the importance of the university to the union and a common aspect of the burgeoning emergence of professional sport.

A further primary reason for the movement of players is that of player exposure. As playing strength has become increasingly centered around a smaller number of unions, media coverage of these unions has duly increased. This fact is compounded by the increasingly centralised base of national media organizations in the city of Auckland. This imbalance of media coverage toward the Auckland city, coupled with the natural focus on the Auckland team as the most successful team in the country has been a recognised factor in players seeking to play for the Auckland Union especially in order to improve their exposure to selectors and consideration for higher representative honours.

With the increased mobility of players, unions are forced to improve their attractiveness to players in order to hold existing players and attract new players. This further delineates the haves and have-nots of provincial rugby in New Zealand. Haden (1988) recognized that many of the smaller provincial unions in New Zealand are technically bankrupt, which makes it almost impossible to prepare a fully competitive team. These unions cannot compete with senior unions in facilities and peripheral rewards for players such as team functions, travel and accommodation arrangements, ground facilities and equipment (ibid.). Combined with the education, occupational and playing possibilities offered by the senior unions these smaller unions have, in effect, become feeder unions to their urban counterparts.

This situation places commensurate strains upon the managerial, administrative and coaching staff of the smaller provinces. The selector-coach of third division Wairarapa-Bush, expressed helplessness as his players were being recruited by clubs in larger unions, and asked rhetorically "Why keep laying your body on the line and getting nothing when you can go somewhere else and actually get paid for doing the job?" (Small unions, 1995, p.2:3). With very limited sources of revenue, no significant money was available to stem the flow of players. This lack of revenue was compounded by the move toward shorter tours from international sides in the professional game. This meant fewer revenue-generating games against smaller unions. "The effect on smaller unions throughout New Zealand, who have traditionally relied on match-ups with major touring teams for essential revenue, will be heavily felt" (Johnstone, 1995l, p.B1)

Because it was counter to rugby regulations directly pay players, a more open method of attracting players emerged from 1992. Groups of businessmen sympathetic to the fortunes of their provincial rugby team began to organize themselves into de facto organizations and arrange job opportunities and remuneration for other unions' players to move to their province. This payment does not formally involve the union and thus does not contravene amateur regulations, as expressed by former NZRFU chairman Eddie Tonks, "The fact that there are amateur regulations is not the same thing as amateurism" (Bale, 1993, p.19).

One of the few examples of this approach noted in the sport literature was that initiated by the *Friends of the Waikato*, a group of less than a dozen businessmen and rugby supporters, who in 1994 attracted All Black Mark Cooksley to the Waikato province from the neighbouring Counties team. Cooksley's package was apparently worth $50,000 a year, consisting of a salary of $30,000, a new Ford Telstar and $10,000 in living and transport allowances (Gifford, 1994b). Instead of one guaranteed job, Cooksley works for six firms for six months each. The same group also approached Auckland All Black Craig Dowd, who is understood to have come close to accepting a similar offer (McKewen, 1994c).

This phenomenon is apparent in the gradual transition of most sports in the global village from amateurism to professionalism. In the transition of West German soccer in 1962/63, several clubs paid players more than the maximum allowable, while many struggled to pay the set amount (Gehrmann, 1994). This reflected the situation in New Zealand rugby, where unions were forced to provide more and more remuneration to their players. The Waikato Rugby Union provided a good example of this growth. The captain of the team at the time, John Mitchell, has since stated that Waikato players were paid $1250 in 1992 when the team won the NPC first division, an equivalent amount in 1993 when the team won the Ranfurly Shield, $2500 in 1994, then $5000 in 1995 (Power, 1995). This increased remuneration to players did not equate to performance and raised speculation on the increased need to retain playing talent through enhanced direct payments to them.

The Southland Rugby Union provided further illustration of such barely concealed shamateurism of New Zealand rugby, as the movement of players reached unparalleled levels in the 1994 and 1995 seasons. In May 1995, the Hawkes Bay Union announced it had withdrawn from a scheduled July non-championship match against Southland, because it objected to the latter union inducing a key Hawkes Bay player to Southland. Discussing the decision to withdraw from the match, the Hawkes Bay union chairman believed it was time to make a firm stand against the player-poaching trend (Game canned, 1995). The two teams had been involved in the 1994 second division final, which Hawkes Bay unexpectedly lost.

The Chief Executive of the Hawkes Bay rugby union recognized the importance of the missed opportunity for promotion of his team by stating that "You're nowhere if you're not in the first division", a situation he later thought would be exacerbated by professionalism (Smith wants Bay, 1995, p.47). As evidence, Smith pointed to the second division's lack of television coverage and restricted opportunities for All Black selection, which indicated widespread perception of the inferior nature of the second division (ibid.). Smith's views were echoed in 1995 by Northland coach Sid Going. After his team lost the second division final, missing promotion to the first division, Going was resigned to losing players: "That's the reality. These are scary times for rugby and first division unions will be determined to stay at the top any way they can" (Mitchell, 1995k, p.61). The King Country coach added further evidence of player movement in noting "They are making them tremendous offers and that does bug me a bit. I don't know

if we can survive if that continues. If these big unions can't find someone in their own area, for God's sake leave us alone" (Johnstone, 1995n, p.B6).

After winning promotion to the first division for the 1995 season, Southland businessmen joined together and formed a player recruitment group, which organized jobs, accommodation, transport and clubs (Hinton, 1995c, B4). The Southland Union is believed to have then immediately attempted to recruit Hawkes Bay players to the Southland Union. Southland successfully signed two Hawkes Bay forwards, including an All Black, and unsuccessfully attempted to sign two representative backs. Southland successfully attracted four internationals from outside the region for the 1995 season. The All Black, Norm Hewitt, To'o Vaega from Western Samoa, and Damian Hopley and Adedeyo Adebayo from England were all newcomers to the Southland province. In the first match of the 1995 NPC Southland fielded ten players who had played first class rugby for other New Zealand unions, excluding the two Englishmen who had not then fulfilled residency requirements. The majority of these outside players have been linked to *Team Southland*, the Southland equivalent of *Friends of the Waikato*. Following the lead set by Waikato and Southland, in 1995 the Northland Union established *Team Northland* to address the problem of player retention, and the Manawatu Union set up the *Manawatu Rugby Trust.*

This example of the Southland Union is the most obvious example of player movement, but other examples are readily apparent. In August, in an open breach of NZRFU regulations Peter Fatialofa played a club game in Auckland on a Saturday, then played for the Counties provincial team the next day. Pat Lam, named in the Auckland representative squad, switched allegiance to the North Harbour union in the week leading up to the championship game between the two unions, and played against his former union just five days after announcing the change. These examples evidence the degree of player movement in the early part of the 1995 season, when rugby operated between shamateurism and semi-professionalism, when player movement was largely unregulated by administrators, who were legally unable to introduce semi-professional regulations while rugby remained theoretically an amateur game.

The effective neglect of smaller unions is expected to markedly increase in the era of professionalism. With the introduction of professionalism, explained later in this chapter, players from second and third division unions were offered NZRFU contracts but they included no monetary payments unless players were selected for a regional team to play in the Super-12 international provincial competition. The entire sum of $13 million set aside by the NZRFU for player payments had been used in contracts of elite players (Norquay, 1995). A King Country player also believed this represented a "raw deal" for most provincial players, and added that the smaller unions had not treated smaller unions with respect (McFadden, 1995b, p.2:1).

Caffin (1995) described this situation as being "just another case of the NZRFU looking after the 'big boys' and forgetting that one of the real strengths of New Zealand rugby has been its appeal to people from all walks of life, and from all regions, no matter how big or small. Elitism and rugby have never gone together in this country. But I have a nasty

feeling they do now" (p.9). Elitism is synonymous with professional sport, and the fate of smaller unions in New Zealand rugby is one of greatly reduced status and exposure.

The Wellington provincial coach believes a transfer system is necessary to deal with the increased number of player transfers in the professional game: "Obviously the provinces that have the money will get the players. If you've got the money, you'll get them; if you haven't got the money, you won't. In fact, you'll probably lose some because someone will come along and whip away your best players" (Johnstone, 1995n, p.B6). Walker also believes an international transfer system is necessary by saying "Once they go then that is the depth of your province gone and they are your future as well, because they are young players who are only a season or two away from making the top side yet can go overseas and make good money playing club football" (ibid.). The use of a transfer system has also been mooted by England's Rugby Football Union Commission, which will reduce the transfer stand down period from 120 days in 1995-96 to 7 days in 1996-97 (English clubs, 1995).

3.3.2 Time demands of elite rugby

Sport may be defined as a leisure pastime in the context of amateurism, and consequently having non-work time available to take part in sport is a crucial factor for any participant of amateur sport. Throughout the 1980s, and into the first half of the 1990s, administrators continually increased the length of the rugby season and the number of high intensity matches, in order to increase revenue and raise the profile of the game. This point is noted by the Boston Report, which found that a senior Auckland player played 21 'High Intensity' matches in 1993, compared with nine in 1960 (Boston Consulting Group, 1994, p.A18). Deaker (1993) observed that "The schedule the All Blacks have followed [in recent years] has been more arduous than most Winfield Cup teams and as tough as that achieved by many professionals on the tennis and golf circuits. It is this commitment that has virtually turned the All Blacks into full-time rugby players" (p.4).

Compounding the increasing time needed off work, to play the game, was the increased demand on players for professional training methods. In the mid-1980s trainer Jim Blair revolutionized New Zealand rugby training by implementing fitness and skills routines which had proved successful in other countries, notably North America. Blair's programme with the Auckland and Canterbury teams coincided with the rise of a number of talented athletes in the Auckland team and the reign of a coach, John Hart, who aimed to utilize superior fitness and skills for an expansive game played for the full eighty minutes. As Auckland's success continued, other teams were forced to mirror the Auckland team's preparation in a bid to remain competitive. This increased the amount of fitness, strength and skills training for nearly all players involved in first division rugby, which was all done in the players' leisure time. With the increase in time devoted to training by 1988, one year after the first World Cup, rugby in New Zealand was "a highly professionalized version of amateurism, a sort of compromise which pacifies the coalition of players and administrators and suits the New Zealand game's profile, prestige and position in the social structure of the country" (Haden, 1988, p.209).

As time devoted to rugby increased inexorably, it gradually outgrew available leisure time and began encroaching on time that was previously devoted to work. Again the New Zealand experience mirrors the transition to professionalism of sports in other countries. In the transition of West German soccer in the early 1960s, a popular soccer magazine, *Kicker*, described the problem: "Many a job and many a promising career suffered because a player had to be given time off for soccer. A star on the field, excellence in the office, this combination was rarely achieved" (as cited in Gehrmann, 1994, p.148). This clearly was not consistent with amateur ideals, but was consistent with the emerging shamateurism of sports.

McDonald (1995) notes that "New Zealand rugby's long history of bending the strict amateur code - 'shamateurism' to its critics- has evolved a unique system of players holding down the kind of jobs that give them flexible work commitments and their employers a bit of profile" (p.22). However by the early 1990s players were finding that even such jobs as those described by McDonald were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Deaker (1993) observed "No longer is it attractive to companies to employ an All Black. The player is rarely available to do any work" (p.4). This view has been articulated by a number of rugby managers. Typical of this was the observation by the chief executive of a senior provincial union that "To hold down a job and do justification to a job, and turn around and ask these players to perform Saturday after Saturday, is just impossible. We had to go professional" (Provincial union CEO, personal comment, September 3, 1995).

That view has also been publicly supported by senior players. A current All Black, Jeff Wilson, stated that "If you want to be an All Black now, I couldn't see someone holding down a steady job. That's not a possibility" (Gifford, 1995b, p.7). Wilson's belief has been given evidence by the resignation of All Black Craig Dowd from his carpentry job, following the 1995 World Cup, because he could no longer balance the demands of a fulltime job and an elite rugby playing career (Gray, 1995j, p.2:3).

That the game was enveloping significant amounts of time normally devoted to work became a central argument for the introduction of professionalism. Potential income was being lost, careers retarded and ultimately jobs not obtained or retained. The traditional source of player income in the form of fulltime jobs outside rugby, had become severely jeopardized by time commitments to rugby, generating further arguments that the players should be paid directly for playing the game. Rugby union in New Zealand and other countries now faced the realities of shamateurism, challenges of rugby league and the growing forces for the development of an openly professional sport. There is very little critical literature on this topic in rugby and an absence of New Zealand resources.

3.4 PROFESSIONALISM IN NEW ZEALAND RUGBY

In August 1995, rugby became a professional sport. This move had been forced on the game by the increasing pressure applied by clearly identifiable environmental forces. This section of the literature review will critically examine these environments forces, and discus the ways each acted upon New Zealand rugby in order to force such a paradigm shift in the sport. The first force discussed will be the growth of commercialism in New Zealand rugby, which can be linked to the introduction of player companies, and. this is followed by an examination of professionalism and pay in other prominent rugby nations. The pressures exerted on New Zealand by the increased professionalism in Japan and Italy will be discussed, including such countries' impact upon the New Zealand coaching population.

The critical role played by South Africa in leading toward professional rugby will be examined, then the focus will shift to the impact of the World Cup tournament, held every four years. Finally the section will consider the changing pressure exerted by the professional code of rugby league, and the manner in which formal moves toward professional rugby occurred in 1995.

3.4.1 Player incomes and companies in New Zealand rugby

As New Zealand society became more commercialized and financially orientated throughout the 1980s, elite rugby players became more concerned and proactive in their approach to successfully structuring avenues of revenue through the game. Commercialism, and players' attitudes towards this, underwent a dramatic growth in the late 1980s, as players explored areas of income made available under loosened IRB regulations. Indicative of this was the move by All Black John Kirwan to form his own company, which enabled him to keep the money he made from advertising and marketing initiatives (Cave, 1988, p.23). This increased commercialism has led to the establishment of player companies, contracts and trustfunds.

In October, 1990, the amateur regulations were altered by the International Rugby Board to allow player remuneration for media and promotional activities. This development was immediately followed by the establishment of All Black Promotions Ltd., a company which was established in order to channel promotion and sponsorship money to the national team players. Malcolm Dick, former deputy-chairman of the NZRFU, and former chairman and president of the ARFU, observed that through the establishment of All Black Promotions Ltd., "the commercialism which was developing in the game has been brought out into the open" (McLean, 1992f, p.7).

The growth in commercialism became a contentious issue at the 1991 World Cup. The team was eliminated in the semi-final, and it was widely felt the New Zealand team was one of the least accessible teams to the media and supporters at the tournament (see Thomas, 1993). Alex Wyllie, All Black coach at the Cup, believed that the All Blacks "spent more time worrying about what they were making than what they were doing"

(McKewen, 1992, p.19). His co-coach, John Hart, concurred with this, observing that "The team focus became money and when that happened, nowhere near the same thinking or preparation went into playing the game" (ibid.). The same acknowledgment has been made in the literature by a player of time, All Black Zinzan Brooke:

> The players had become bigger than the game. Now here was a runaway train headed for a big crash. Inflated ideas of our own worth became embedded. As playing-through world champions we were a highly marketable commodity and we sold ourselves dearly. Spoiled brats with our hands out for bucks - but even better, pounds sterling. Some players were more tuned-in to the ching of the cash registers than the codes of the lineout calls. Gains became bigger then the game and pride in he black jersey was one of its victims. It is long past time this was acknowledged from within the team. It may be long past time, too, that the New Zealand Rugby Union acknowledged player-contracts may have anticipated this problem (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.110).

While unions were compelled to increase the commercial opportunities available to players in order to sustain player retention, rugby officials became "utterly sick of the 'handout mentality' many of New Zealand's rugby players have developed" (McKewen, 1994d, p.B4). David Kirk was forced to admit "The disturbing truth is that a game which has always sought to provide exactly the opposite values is now providing the vehicle for the growth of [financially-oriented] base qualities" (Kirk, 1994, p.B3).

The increased emphasis on commercial incomes was facilitated by relaxations of IRB amateur regulations. By 1993, All Blacks in home tests received an allowance of $66 per day, resulting in the build up period of Tuesday to Sunday in a test week being worth $482 tax free. The amounts were the same on tour, but if the players were not being paid by their employer, which applied to the majority, they earn double the base amount. All Black teams now travel business class, stay at five star hotels, and receive clothing and accessories to the value of approximately $5000 to $6000 each (Edwards, 1993). How the remuneration to All Blacks has escalated over the past decade is clearly portrayed by Figure 3.1.

In 1993, Regulation 4.3.2 of the international amateur regulations was altered. Labelled the 'Open to interpretation' regulation, this clause allowed the players to earn sponsorship money, usually through sponsorship of their respective union, as long as the promotional activity in which they were engaged was not rugby related. The IRB allowed each union to interpret this clause as they saw fit, so national unions such as those of Argentina and Ireland strictly enforced this, despite the former losing a number of players to Italian clubs, whereas the senior Southern Hemisphere rugby nations of New Zealand, Australia and South Africa interpreted it more loosely (Cain, 1993).

In order to maximize the loosening of this regulation, the All Black Club was launched in July 1993. This was intended "to generate increased income which can be applied to the initiatives designed to give some level of financial security to present and potential All Blacks" (Cameron, 1993b, p.66).

Rob Fisher (the Chairman of the All Black Club Board of Trustees) reiterated this with a statement that "Our long term goal is to provide a New Zealand-based option for players who wish to participate in the game at the highest level in this country but are under financial pressures" (Press Release, 1994). Laurie Mains (All Black coach and a member of the All Black Club Board of Trustees) expressed the importance of the Club from a coach's view with the belief that "Players can't give 100% if they have financial worries" (ibid.).

The level of income and support provided by the All Black Club supplemented the direct remunerations allowed under IRB regulations (See Figure 3.1). In 1993 the Club realized a payment estimated at $25,000 to each All Black representative of that year (Mitchell, 1995f). This return grew steadily, with All Blacks under contracts receiving an estimated $50,000 for the 1995 year (ibid.), and $30 000 for the tour of Italy and France at the end of the 1995 season (All Black tour pay, 1995, p.2;3). In addition to this financial payment, players on the tour were provided with playing outfits and equipment, casual wear and accessories worth an estimated $5,000 (Lampp, 1995a, p.59).

As the All Black Club systematized payments to players, regulation was needed to control these. This regulation came in the form of player contracts. The contracts incorporated a demand that an overseas team pay a transfer fee if an All Black left New Zealand to play for them, and also promised players a regular income from promotional work. They also forbade contracted players from playing overseas in the build up to the 1995 World Cup, and committed them to the camps and activities organized for the All Black squad. While most theorists concur that amateurs are free to direct and control their own lives and sporting activities (See Morgan 1993, for example), these contracts were clearly a form of professional sporting contracts operative within an ostensibly amateur sport. Rob Fisher, Deputy-Chairman of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union, agreed with this, observing the contracts were moving "towards the semi-professional end of the scale" (All Black contracts, 1994, p.2:1).

While permissible under IRB regulations, the two companies and the contract system introduced by the NZRFU clearly contravened the ethos on which rugby's amateur regulations were based. This is evidenced by Dudley Wood, of the English Rugby Football Union, who stated that "The All Black scheme is designed to circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the law...It is a scheme devised to provide material benefit quite contrary to the laws of the game" (Newcombe, 1994, p.17). An IRB statement issued on 15 March, 1995, dismissed trust funds and player companies as having "little justification" and being "simply a disguised method of paying for playing" (Kitson, 1995, p.2:1). This was substantiated by a Wood (1992) observation that trust funds "are, of course, no more than a form of delayed payment" (p.19). This fact was later admitted by the CEO of the All Black Club, who said that "Our club was set up to pay guys through promotions, that was a smokescreen but it was within IRB rules" (Gray, 1995j, p.2:3).

While the amateur ideals involved in the establishment of such companies may be questioned, the importance of the companies can not be

	1994	1984
Allowances (Daily)	Home Tests: $60 On Tour: $60 Restraint of trade: $60 Hardship Allowance: $60 Total possible per week: $1260 tax-free	Home Tests: Nothing On Tour: $30 Total possible per week: $210 tax free
Travel	Flights: Business Class Hotels: Five-star	Flights: Economy class Hotels: Three-star
Endorsements	Books: Able to accept royalties After dinner speaking: Able to accept fees TV commercials: Able to accept money	Books: Unable to accept royalties After dinner speaking: Unable to accept fees TV commercials: Unable to accept money
Clothing Package	Worth approximately $5000 per year, including casual clothes	Worth approximately $500 per year, predominantly training gear only.
Car	New Ford Futura (for six months)	No vehicle supplied
Miscellaneous	All Black Promotions: Use of personal agents All Black Club: Payment for personal appearances, career training and placement in long term jobs.	No formal rewards.

Figure 3.1. Increased remunerations to All Blacks (1984-94).

(Source: *Sunday Star-Times*, 27 November 1994, p.B3).

underestimated in the examination of increased commercialism and professionalism in New Zealand rugby. The All Blacks were contracted to All Black Promotions Ltd, and were paid for promotional services, not for playing rugby. This was confirmed in the 21 page contract that the All Blacks have signed with the NZRFU.

In retrospect, it was clear the All Black Club was an important mechanism in facilitating the increased professionalism of New Zealand rugby. This was recognized by its chief executive:

> I believe the All Black Club helped lay the foundations of professional rugby in New Zealand. It was the catalyst for many of the moves that have been successfully adopted. Through its existence the structures were in place in New Zealand to help make the transition a lot smoother here. Other countries have had to wrestle with this [professional] thing but New Zealand hit the ground running. There will still be a lot of teething problems but, yes, we have certainly helped get things rolling (Johnstone, 1995o, p.B6)

While the role played by the All Black Club was moving New Zealand rugby increasingly toward an overt semi-professional game, the situation was being replicated by other major national unions also. The following section of the literature review will thus turn to an examination of the situation developing in the global rugby environment, of which New Zealand rugby is an integral dimension.

3.4.2 Overseas professionalism and payments

Despite protestations by the International Rugby Board, national unions other than New Zealand were not slow in introducing their own formalized sources of income for players. The attitude of Australian officials was reflected by the Queensland Rugby Union media director, Michael Butcher, who in 1989 stated that "Our feeling is certainly that players shouldn't be financially out of pocket for the playing of the game" (Gifford, 1989, p.24). Further evidence of the Australian approach was provided by the Australia national coach Bob Dwyer (1992) when he stated that "It has long been obvious to me that a steady and irreversible move towards professionalism is under way in Rugby" (p.181). The Australian Union attempted to maximize the impact of their success in the 1991 World Cup by introducing Wallaby Promotions and Marketing Pty Ltd. This player company permitted earnings of "just about anything short of match fees" (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20).

The New South Wales Rugby Union formed its own players' fund, then sought ten companies to pay $50,000 each to the fund. In return, the players were asked to attend and speak at boardroom functions, openings, trade days and other functions. This scheme was then reproduced by both the Queensland and Australian unions. The sport marketing company, International Management Group, was contracted by the Australian Union to globally represent the Wallabies as a team. Australian players were duly placed on contracts, which provided the players with "a decent share of the elite players' pooled earnings from off-field promotions and gate receipts" (Coleman, 1995, p.B2). Mirroring Butcher's (1989) statement of six years earlier, Coleman observed that "For top players smart enough to make the most of the opportunities the game can offer, money is not in short supply" in 1995 (ibid.).

While developments in Australia and New Zealand focused on permissible remunerations to players, anecdotal evidence made it clear that illegal payments were widespread in the Home Unions of the British Isles. Welsh international Scott Gibbs signed a lucrative rugby league contract, then exposed the reality of elite rugby in Wales. He stated that:

> The Welsh are the worst in Britain when it comes to upholding the amateur status. Every player in Wales knows that when you play on a Saturday, if you win you can get a few quid. Players get the cash after the game. Envelopes are handed around. At some clubs you get it in cheque form at the end of the month. It's a win bonus ... In most of the clubs they are paying right the way through the divisions now...Whatever way it goes, sides in Wales are paying their players ... Every player in Wales knows the unwritten rules. When he has to make a decision about whether to join this club or that club, the first question he always asks these days is: 'What inducements can you offer me?' (as cited in Stafford, 1994, p.20).

Rugby journalist Ian Stafford believed "Scott Gibbs' experience gives strength to allegations against rugby union of broken promises and of tacky, under-the-counter behavior which, frankly, insults our intelligence" (1994, p.19). The chairman of the Welsh Rugby Union amateurism committee, Russell Jenkins, said that if Gibbs was to "give me evidence to support his statements, giving names and amounts, I would be pleased to receive it" (Gibbs attacks, 1994, p.27).

While Gibbs' statements outlined illegal payments in Wales, the Welsh national union was leading the Home Nations in establishing legal sources of remunerations to elite players. Welsh teams had been decimated by defections to rugby league. Jonathan Price, marketing manager of the Welsh national union, observed that "While rugby union remains a fundamentally amateur game you will never match rugby league financially. Therefore what we have to do is try to close the financial considerations so they no longer outweigh all the other positives" (Bale, 1993, p.18). In order to improve the 'financial considerations', Wales became the first national union in the Home Nations to create a players' trust fund, which paid 5% of 'elite' sponsorship in 1993 to international players, estimated to be $5000 per year per player (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20).

Benefits from the game of rugby in the United Kingdom are not always direct or illegal, as shown by the experience of Australian international Troy Coker. Contacts made during the 1987 World Cup team enabled Coker to study law and political science at Oxford University, during which time he joined the famous Harlequins club. Through this club, which is London-based and well connected to the financial centre, Coker made a number of valuable business contacts. He saw it as "a natural progression to get a job through these contacts" (Coleman, 1995, p.B2). The real importance of these opportunities were that they did not lead to "pointless" jobs, but valuable careers, and Coker notes that "you can't put a price on that sort of opportunity" (ibid.).

Coker related that "I have a couple of mates - not rocket scientists - who through rugby have jobs in London worth around $250,000 a year. Spread that over a lifetime and even Super League [the lucrative rugby league competition] couldn't match it" (ibid.). Coker himself spent several years as the managing director of England's largest privately owned textile mill, and in his spare time played rugby throughout the world. In early 1995 he returned to Australia, able to live on his savings while making a bid for World Cup selection. After playing in the Cup, Coker played for Hawkes Bay in the New Zealand second division provincial championship.

In the years immediately prior to the introduction of professionalism, the Rugby Football Union of England continually reiterated the virtues of amateurism in rugby. This stance was enforced by its former chairman, Dudley Wood (1992), who believed that "Once you sacrifice the principle of amateurism, there are no halfway measures" (p.19). In 1993 the RFU demanded its 1,200 clubs sign a "Declaration of Compliance", a document framed in defence of the seemingly outdated amateur regulations. The document attempted to end peripheral rewards to players, such as the supply of free cars, a common perk for leading players (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20). However progress toward semi-professionalism was made with the introduction of a company for England's players. The company, Playervision, allowed anything not directly linked to rugby products or images, and its payment to players in 1993 was estimated to pay between $7,500 and $12,000 per player (ibid.).

Despite the administrative attempts to stem the swelling tides of commercialism, it is clear that illegal payments have been widespread in England. In 1990, the NZRFU obtained affidavits from a number of New Zealand players pinpointing breaches in the regulations in overseas countries, including the home unions, but the affidavits were never presented to the IRB. Bristol coach Brian Hanlon observed in 1989 that "It's just a sham at the moment and the English are one of the worst" (Stratford, 1989, p.43). His view enforced a 1992 admission by the president of England's Rugby Football Union, that "illicit payments" were widespread in the English game, and had extended down to junior club level (Davies dents rugby image, 1992, p.31)

However, with the demise of Wood as chairman, the English administration took a more realistic view of the situation. This was reflected by a statement in July, 1995, by Bill Bishop, the newly elected president of the English RFU, at the annual meeting. Bishop stated "The word 'amateurism' has become an anachronism. At the top end of the game, it really is an outdated and ill-fitting definition" (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20). His opinions fit well with those of team captain Will Carling, who stated his belief in July, 1995, that the England team would compete against South Africa in November as fully fledged professionals: "There is no way that we are going on the field disadvantaged in money terms compared with the Springboks" (Get your chequebook, 1995, p.2:1).

These developments toward semi-professionalism have also been apparent in the other Home Nations, Scotland and Ireland. In 1993, the Scottish Rugby Union signed a four year sponsorship deal with Famous Grouse Whisky, worth £2.5 million. The union announced the revenue would be split 50-50

with the players. In addition the players were to get $2000 per international, which was seen by the media as "further startling evidence of rugby's seemingly inexorable drift towards semi-professionalism" (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20).

3.4.3 Pay for play : France, Italy, Japan and South Africa.

While these example of growing commercialism in the Home Countries were important in portraying the global growth of semi-professionalism, the role played by their neighbour France was of greater direct importance to the growth of pressure for a professional game in New Zealand. The literature review now turns to examine the specific role played by French rugby, and how it affected a national game of a country on the other side of the world.

France has traditionally been accepted as a source of commercialism in rugby, with players believed to get direct payments for playing the game (see Williams, 1991). The Home Unions broke off official contact with France from 1931-1945, primarily due to allegations of monetary transactions, with violence a secondary cause (Starmer-Smith, 1986, p. 176), and the French Union was only re-admitted to the IRB in 1978. This laissez-faire attitude of French administrators contributed towards payments to players in France being more open than elsewhere. In 1993, it was believed that first-class players in France were commonly paid $2,500 in match fees, and between $7,000 and $9,000 in other income (Amateur rugby wars, 1993, p.20).

Bernard Lapasset (President of the FFR and IRB Chairman) openly observed the trends in rugby toward professionalism with such statements that "Amateurism no longer exists. It is a fact, and money has now become a reality in this sport" (They said it, 1995a, p.B18). However Lapasset believed the evolution toward professionalism in rugby "in no way prohibits an amateur spirit" (Nier, 1995, p.8). This openness proved attractive to New Zealand players in the final years of the amateur game. In November 1992, the NZRFU had granted 208 players entitlement to play overseas in the 1992/93 Northern Hemisphere season, with the highest number of these, 56, departing for France. The remainder comprised 30 to Ireland, 29 to England, 28 to Scotland, 24 to the USA, 17 to Italy, nine to Wales, eight to Japan, four to the Netherlands, and one each to Northern Ireland, South Africa and Spain (Sanders, 1992, p.41). This number of players heading overseas grew even larger in the following seasons and Fogarty (1995a) noted an estimate of 296 New Zealand players playing overseas in the Northern winter of 1993/94.

This move to play in foreign competitions is a phenomenon which has been repeated throughout the sporting world in cases of transition to professionalism. In West German soccer for example, there was a growing trend of German superstars leaving their country to play in Italy and Spain, with the greatest fear being that the German league would soon operate without any national players (as cited in Gehrmann, 1994, p.148). As with rugby, these fears greatly accelerated the introduction of open professionalism to the sport. This movement to foreign clubs is almost certain to increase in the realm of elite world rugby. In New Zealand, a

company named Rugby Link International was established in October, 1995, to link second tier New Zealand players to overseas teams. Company director, and former Chief Executive of North Harbour rugby union, Peter Goldsmith, said New Zealand should accept that in a professional world, it can no longer expect to keep all its top talent (Logan, 1995a).

Ironically, once professionalism was regulated, Lapasset rejected full professionalism in France, stating that "French rugby has chosen not to become professional. Our goal is to respect our traditions and values and to protect the image of French rugby in France and at international level" (French reject pro rugby, 1995, p.B4). In effect, players in France are able to earn money but not a salary. This has led administrators in France to fear a reversal of the trend that was apparent before the introduction of professionalism. Now, with French players being paid what they perceive as being a substandard amount of income, leading French players are devoting more time to playing in foreign competitions, and missing the opportunity to represent France in prominent test matches. In the French team which played the All Blacks in November 1995, three leading players (Roumat, Cabannes and Lacroix) were not selected because they had not returned from the South African domestic competition in time to meet selection requirements.

While the growth of professionalism and commercialism within prominent rugby playing nations such as France are important in terms of their effect upon the game in New Zealand, of perhaps greater direct relevance has been the growth in influence of Italy and Japan. These two nations are not noted as being traditional rugby powers, but have had a clear effect on the professional course and commercial orientation of rugby in New Zealand through their ability to attract the playing talent of this country.

In 1992 All Black coach Laurie Mains underscored the shamateurism of rugby when he stated a belief that "Italian rugby could turn out to be the salvation of New Zealand rugby. At the moment they are keeping some of our All Blacks in rugby who for financial reasons would have gone to rugby league" (Cameron, 1992, p.71). By providing an income to New Zealand players, and not involving the NZRFU, Italian rugby thus provided a double advantage to New Zealand rugby. The number of New Zealanders playing in Italy grew to the extent that Blucher (1993) was able to identify 168 New Zealanders playing club football in Italy. In the early 1990s the Italian season became extended and started to overlap the New Zealand and Australian seasons. This brought the focus of Australasian administrators more closely onto the Italian game as their players risked being omitted from representative teams in the early home season. It also became clear that the Italian game involved a very thinly disguised form of rugby professionalism.

While rugby in Italy does not boast the widespread popularity apparent in South Africa or New Zealand, Italian rugby "provides a highly prestigious hobby for some of the country's richest businessmen" (Coleman, 1995, p.B2). These businessmen inject huge sponsorships into rugby teams, as the sponsorships can be written off against tax. Foreign players are regularly employed by their team's sponsor. Michael Lynagh, a Wallaby, was employed as a media liaison officer and David Campese, his fellow

international, was involved in public relations for a travel agency. John Kirwan summarized the employment situation, "The jobs we get are pretty easy going and we get paid fairly well" (ibid.). In addition to this formal employment, very liberal expenses were paid to players. However the veil of amateurism is maintained. "Players do not receive payment for playing...But they are financially supported whilst playing rugby, the basic difference between professionalism and amateurism" (Garland, 1992, p.6).

Foreign players in the Italian game are rewarded for long service to their clubs. Elite players are reported to get US$100,000 in first year, then $120,000, $160,000 and $220,000 in the final year of a four year contract. In July, 1995, Willie Jackson, advisor to Frank Bunce, stated that Bunce received an offer for $90,000 for four months to play in Italy, the statement being accepted without question as indicative of open payments in that developing rugby nation (Rattue, 1995b). Australian captain Michael Lynagh played in Italy in the season leading into the 1995 World Cup, as he was on the fourth year of a contract. Campese has played in Italy for eight of the last ten years. A commonly quoted story centers on Campese accepting an award as the outstanding player of the 1991 World Cup. He was told by an official he would become the game's first millionaire, and laughed "That happened five years ago" (ibid.). As the level of payments available in Italy became known, Campese's answer was no longer considered a joke (Personal communication by elite rugby player, July 17 1995).

The movement of rugby personnel caused by increased shamateurism and commercialization was by no means limited to players. Amateur regulations, based upon the ethos of sport as a leisure activity, do not allow the payment of coaches. The IRB regulations ensured this process by stating that no individual employed by a rugby union or club may coach the senior team. To evade this restriction, some coaches established their own companies, which are then contracted by the union, so the coaches are employed by the company not the union. A prominent example of this process is New Zealand sevens coach, Wayne Smith, who established his company, Tryline Productions, when he went to coach the Benetton club in Italy.

As with the international movement of players, the coaching exodus hit its peak at the end of the 1992 New Zealand season. Three first division unions lost their senior coaches - Wellington's Andy Leslie and King Country's Noel McQuilkin to Ireland, and Waikato's Glen Ross to England. In addition, three first division unions lost their coaching co-ordinators - Nick Sheppard of Wellington to Japan, Dean Shelford of North Harbour to England and Wayne Smith of Canterbury to Italy. The Canterbury Union also lost two further club coaches to overseas nations, and former Canterbury and All Black coach Alex Wyllie to South Africa (Sanders, 1992). The trend continued into the research period, with 1994 North Harbour coach, Brad Meurant, having moved to coach in South Africa. In addition Wallaby coach Bob Dwyer has moved to coach the Racing Club in France, and All Black coach Laurie Mains has had several offers to coach in Italy. Such movements of coaching staff added another important weight to the argument for the introduction of professional rugby, in order to retain the wealth of coaching talent in New Zealand. The value of coaches to the

game was formally recognized in 1995, when Laurie Mains and his assistant were paid the same amount as the players (Equal pay for Mains, 1995).

In 1992, a new and unexpected threat to New Zealand rugby appeared. Rugby in Japan was a sport growing in popularity, and matches between companies were becoming the focus of great attention and honour. Relaxations in international transfer regulations allowed the Japanese companies to begin attracting foreign players to boost their teams: "Japan may be a rugby minnow but as an economic giant it has seized new amateur regulations with free-market enthusiasm" (Sanders, 1992, p.39). Shiggy Kono, the president of the Japanese Rugby Union, remained strict on the amateur regulations, but was unable to stop companies recruiting elite New Zealand rugby players to real jobs. Companies were ensuring players had fulltime positions, with good career prospects, unlike the Italian situation. The companies usually offered contracts for three years, worth between $US60,000 and $US125,000 per annum.

In 1990 Japanese companies lured provincial players Marty Brooke (Auckland) and Steve Miln (Bay of Plenty) to the Mazda Motor Corporation in Hiroshima. This spurred other companies to follow suit. In 1992, the exodus to Japan reached its height, with All Blacks (Kevin Schuler, Paul McGahan, and Joe Stanley), provincial players (Scott Pierce, Andrew McCormick and Craig Philpott), and a number of club players all adopting careers in Japan.

The fear became apparent that these players would start playing for Japan after three years, although no New Zealanders have yet represented Japan. The other major concern was the fact that the players going to Japan would be lost to New Zealand rugby. Because the players had fulltime, well paid jobs, they were unable to return to New Zealand for the rugby season. Thus the players could effectively be lost permanently to the New Zealand game for the duration of their playing careers. Kevin Schuler was only cleared by his Japanese employer to play in the World Cup days before the set deadline, and All Black Graeme Bachop retired from international rugby after the 1995 Bledisloe Cup because of commitments to his Japanese employer. Bachop's deputy in the All Black team, Ant Strachan, and a fellow All Black, Arran Pene, announced they would move to work and play for the Kaneka Corporation on five year contracts. Both said the money was no better than playing for the All Blacks, but the job training and career opportunities were too attractive to ignore (Gray, 1995l, p.2:1). In addition All Black Jamie Joseph also signed with a Japanese company.

Following this defection of four leading players, All Black manager and senior NZRFU councillor Colin Meads expressed his belief a harder line should be taken with the Japanese union in order to stop the 'brawn drain'. Meads said "We have to get a heavy handed so some sort of compromise can be worked out", and advocated the denial of rights for Japanese junior teams to tour New Zealand (Palenski, 1995, p.B3). This is a clear example of the pressure felt by New Zealand officials to negate the financial attractiveness of Japanese offers, or risk further losses of elite and developing players. This growing threat of Japanese poaching of New

Zealand elite players was an important source in the building of pressure for a revision of the amateur regulations.

The roles played by France, Italy and Japan show how the globalized nature of rugby, which has been seen as the greatest strength of the sport, was vitally important in the growing move to professionalism. The appeal for rands for play accentuated such moves. South Africa is New Zealand's most acclaimed rival test country, and one of the three countries signed to the first officially regulated professional rugby competition. It is widely believed that South African provincial unions have directly paid their players for a long period of time, a process not regulated by the IRB during the years (1982-1992) when South Africa was outside the jurisdiction of the IRB. In recent seasons there has been little attempt to hide this process.

An English international, Mike Catt, admitted he was paid to play for Eastern Province, and while the IRB sought clarification of this statement, the South African Union did not see fit to investigate. In 1993, Natal manager Frank Parkinson stated it was accepted practice for senior provinces in the Currie Cup provincial competition to pay their players between $500 and $600 per match (Deaker, 1993). This statement has only been questioned for the amounts stated and not its basic assertion. The Western Samoan team's technical assistant, Bryan Williams, believed salaries for Currie Cup players ranged from $50,000 to $150,000 (ibid.).

Following the 1995 World Cup, the South African provincial competition had no restrictions on foreign players. This was a feature of the amateur regulations of rugby, which centred on freedoms of the individual. Exploiting these regulations, the Natal province had six international players from other countries playing for them, in addition to two former New Zealand provincial players, and Western Province had four foreign internationals. Contravening a founding ethos of amateurism, Currie Cup rugby sides in 1996 will be restricted to two foreign players per side (Natal attracts, 1995, p.B2). Such restrictions are a common feature of professional competitions, in which managers and administrators have regulatory control over players' movements.

The Transvaal Union is arguably the most professionalized rugby union in the world. This union has dominated rugby in the South African republic in recent seasons, and also shown clear signs of professional elements off the field. The President of the Transvaal Union, Louis Luyt, is also the president of the South African Union, and chairman of the SANZA corporation which governs the IPC competition, so his views and practices have a tangible affect on New Zealand rugby. Francois Pienaar, captain of Transvaal and South Africa, has emerged as a vocal proponent of professionalism in rugby. Pienaar played 44 games in the 1994 season, and felt this constituted a fulltime profession. In June 1994, more than a year before the Murdoch deal was signed, Pienaar articulated his beliefs, stating that "Rugby was a great amateur sport, but practicalities have taken over. Why should there be amateur sport - any sport? They talk ethics and ethos but these things don't pay you a cent" (McLean, 1994a, p.3:3).

In July 1995, the Transvaal team made clear the degree to which professionalism had advanced in the provincial union. On 3 July, the twelve Springboks in the side, including Pienaar, replicated the actions of a number of North American professional sport teams by refusing to train. The players demanded a pay increase of R15,000 per month from July to December, win bonuses, and benefits, including medical insurances and superannuation (Dobson, 1995, p.11). It was accepted by the media that the group wanted R14,000,000 per year to be split amongst the senior squad of 26 players. When the Transvaal administration stated it can not afford to meet these demands, Pienaar stated "It was felt that this constituted little less than a poorly disguised attempt to stifle free debate and discussion" (ibid.).

Transvaal chief executive Johan Prinsloo responded to the player demands by telling the media that "We are called the chequebook province. The reason for that is that we look after our players so well. A player's monthly package for his expenses could be up to 14 000 rand [$5,693] a month" (Payment row heating up, 1995, p.2:2). His point was evidenced by the fact that thirteen of the senior players in the Transvaal team had been attracted to the province after playing first class rugby for other provinces. The players were forced by the Transvaal administration to withdraw their demands, with a statement from the union's administrators that the players "concede their requests may have been premature and eagerly await the outcome of the IRB's discussions on amateurism in August" (Luyt and rebels, 1995, p.B5). Despite the backdown by the players, this episode clearly portrayed the degree of professionalism in South African rugby, which increasingly impacted upon New Zealand rugby as the amount of shared management of competitions drew together the administrators of the two nations, with those of Australia.

3.4.4 The impact of Rugby World Cups

Inaugurated in 1987, Rugby World Cups are identified as a source of professionalism in rugby (Brooke and Veysey, 1995), bringing together all the top players, administrators and media in one place at the one time. The importance of the World Cup tournament in the growth of commercialism and professionalism in rugby was readily apparent from the announcement of the first tournament. After the tournament was announced in 1985, the British magazine *Rugby World* made the following judgement:

> The amateur bastion of Rugby Union has only 12 months left to acquire the business acumen so desperately needed to control the greatest financial explosion the game has known. The first rugby World Cup, to be staged in Australasia in two years' time, threatens to overwhelm the men struggling at the top of the respective unions. Not in a playing sense; but through the awesome commercial interests which are an inevitably of such an event....Once lured into the heady atmosphere of high finance and extremely lucrative sponsorship, will the players continue to resist the inevitable attractions which are likely to be laid before them in the future? (A French Lesson, 1985, p.47)

Haden (1988) viewed the game in New Zealand as "a diluted form of professionalism, due significantly to the impact of the World Cup" (p.204). The commercial possibilities of rugby on a global stage were highlighted by the financial returns of the tournament, as outlined in the previous chapter. The inaugural tournament was handicapped by mismanagement, but this was reversed by 1991.

At the 1991 tournament, "Rugby union was stretched to breaking point in its bid to retain its amateur traditions against a backdrop of a multimillion-dollar tournament that was producing a level of commerce every bit as intense as its level of competition" (Tasker, 1991, p.41). It was the first tournament at which players were fully considering financial advancement at an openly identifiable level. This was understandable, given the paradox of profits from the prevailing amateur status of the game. The cost of the Wallaby squad in the British Isles for the tournament was above $A500,000. While the tournament was believed to have made a profit of over $50 million, the players were paid $40 per day, plus another $40 if they were able to prove hardship. Following the second World Cup, it was clear that "Outside Britain, few people care much for rugby's virginity, certainly few leading players" (*The Economist*, 1992, p.3).

In 1995, at the World Cup, the players' legal allowance had increased, but they were still technically amateurs. Players were paid expenses of £22.50 per day, so squads reaching the semi-finals were remunerated £1000 for their efforts. Compared with the expected tournament profit of £20 million, this meant each player in the four best teams was paid 0.0005% of the tournament's profits, for which they were the central drawcard. This again fuelled accusations of exploitation, such as "The players are being brazenly ripped off in South Africa. Many are being paid out of trust funds by their individual countries, but their World Cup payments are ludicrous when weighed against the tournament's expected profits" (Johnstone, 1995a, B4).

However once again the theoretically compliant situation hid the reality. South African players were believed to each receive a $50,000 bonus for winning the World Cup, paid by wealthy South African corporates, in addition to their income of $15,000 for the five-week tournament (Mitchell, 1995c, p.62). Speculation on payments to the All Blacks for their part in the tournament, centered on a common belief that the All Blacks received $12,000 a player for the tournament. English and French players were believed to be paid approximately $16,000-18,000 for the tournament. This widespread practice of payment is seen to have been a turning point in the degree of payment to players, as teams were able to discuss and compare payments. English RFU chairman Dudley Wood expressed the belief that "It may be that the game changed irrevocably in South Africa during the World Cup, as many of us thought it might" (New chief changes, 1995, p.61).

The spread of shamateurism was not limited to one sector of the international rugby community, despite accusations being traded between the two hemisphere's major playing nations. While the attractions of the franc, lira and yen were important it was moves by New Zealand administrators to protect their playing strength, and the increasing pressure from rugby league clubs throughout Australasia and from England that were perhaps

the most important single source of environmental pressure for the rugby game to become professional. The literature review now moves to examine this important area.

3.4.5 The influence of rugby league

The formal break between rugby union and rugby league in 1895 over player payments for broken time away from work to play rugby was noted in Chapter Four of this study. For New Zealanders as late as 1988, rugby was seen as a monopoly as players could not find similar employment elsewhere (Haden, 1988). Due to a lack of competition for their sporting abilities, players' remuneration from rugby's administrators was next to nil. To that point the only notable recent defection to the professional game of rugby league had been the 1987 All Black Mark Brooke-Cowden. However, in 1989 the All Blacks Ridge, Gallagher, Botica, Schuster and Simonsson all signed to play rugby league, and suddenly the threat of league to New Zealand rugby was very real.

The Winfield Cup competition, based in Sydney, had grown steadily in terms of support and financial strength. The marketing manager of the New South Wales Rugby League, who managed the competition, stated that perhaps the most important aspect of the growth of the competition was an improvement in management, administration and the image of that game (Hyde, 1991, p.94). This improvement was notable in 1989, when the Australian Rugby League 52 person management committee was replaced by a nine member board. "It is also significant to note the way in which rugby league streamlined its operations to resemble closely that of a corporate entity" (Shilbury, 1990, p. 12). Televised Winfield Cup games were being shown three nights a week in New Zealand, and still are, unlike NPC rugby matches which have been consistently shown for two hours on a Saturday afternoon, and usually for an hour on Sunday afternoon.

The league competition was being successfully promoted as family entertainment, while rugby retained a marketing focus on the traditional male population. Canterbury International's sale of Winfield Cup replica jerseys increased five-fold in 1989, then doubled again in 1990 (ibid.). In 1991 there was a 20% increase in New Zealand league playing numbers from the previous season, and the perceived threat to elite rugby players was acute. Research, commissioned in part by the ARFU, found league had "developed into a mainstream sport" and "Rugby (in particular) is no longer 'the' winter spectator sport" (Eden Park in the 1990s, p.11).

In 1992, North Harbour chief executive Peter Goldsmith stated that "We can't afford to lose the top two percent of players to league. This takes away our ability to attract supporters. Players develop a following - Frano Botica is a good example - and when you lose the player you lose the supporters" (Pooley, 1992, p.86). Losses to league continued, with All Black Craig Innes switching codes, along with prominent provincial players Crossan, Halligan, Hill and Iti. At this time, league was widely perceived as the major threat to rugby's elite ranks, and attempts to improve rugby's remunerations were largely aimed at combatting league offers. This seemed a necessary move in

New Zealand rugby, although the secretary of the Rugby Union of England, Dudley Wood, criticized New Zealand's "paranoia over rugby league" (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.104).

Haden (1988) a prominent past All Black campaigner for player remuneration, stated his pleasure in the growth of league "because it keeps pressure on rugby to improve its game" (p.87). This new competition for the services of elite players was also a key influence in the introduction of the All Blacks Promotions Ltd. company, supported by the NZRFU and the accelerated relaxation of rugby's amateur regulations. These moves helped in stemming the flow which had appeared to constitute a major threat in 1992.

In the next two seasons, only Va'aiga Tuigamala signed from the All Black ranks, despite a ruling by the New South Wales Rugby League that rugby signings would not be included in clubs' salary caps in their first year in the professional code. All Black coach Laurie Mains called such moves to allow rugby players to be excluded from salary caps "an open declaration of war on rugby" (McKewen, 1994c, p.B4). The arrival of the Auckland Warriors as an Auckland based team competing in the Winfield Cup attracted a great deal of support and interest, with the Winfield Cup now a "A$100 million entertainment industry with a hard-headed focus on financial management and marketing" (Balasoglou, 1994, p.39). However rugby playing numbers were not unduly affected. League numbers in the crucial 16-19 years group actually dropped, against most predictions (Rattue, 1995c, p.2:2). The only rugby player who signed for the Warriors during the 1995 season was a recent All Black, John Kirwan, who had previously been omitted from both the New Zealand and Auckland teams.

Implicit and explicit views of rugby as a superior game to rugby league are readily apparent in discussions concerning the relative merits of the two codes. NZRFU councillor Jock Hobbs believes that "Rugby can offer a more holistic approach" than the fully professional league game, and expressed his belief that many players valued the freedom and enjoyment of playing the semi-professional union game (McKewen, 1994d, p.B4). Former All Black captain Andy Dalton observed "There's been a helluva lot of players who have had contracts and turned them down. You have to ask why. And the answer is that obviously they feel rugby has a lot more to offer them" (ibid.).

As rugby became professional, the most innate difference in the two games was dissolved, and barriers between them began to be dismantled. To make a return to active rugby, a league player had to make a statutory declaration of his earnings from the professional game, and have not received any payment from the game in the two years prior to his reinstatement application. The applicant was also forced to state why he wanted to return to rugby, and the application had to be authorized by the NZRFU and the IRB. From 1992-95, 520 league players in New Zealand over the age of nineteen had been reinstated into rugby (South, 1994a, p.B5).

In 1994 the process was challenged in a successful court case by former Wallaby Brett Papworth, who, after playing league, sued the NSWRU for the

right to play rugby again. Papworth's case was nearly replicated by Brett Iti, who has successfully been reinstated in the Auckland rugby team after threatening legal action. With precedents set, the barriers to returning to rugby were rapidly eroded, and on 7 September 1995, the NZRFU announced the stand down period for league players returning to rugby had been abolished (Stand-down period now history, 1995, p.2:1). This exercise was part of a global process, and the first notable players to exercise this chance to return to rugby from elite rugby league were Jonathan Davies and Jonathan Griffiths, who were accepted back by the Welsh Rugby Football Union.

As rugby had appeared to have successfully negotiated the threat from rugby league, the advent of the Super League competition in Australia greatly escalated the level of payments available to elite rugby players contemplating a switch of codes. Financed by Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd corporations who also bankrolled rugby's Super-12 competition (discussed later in this present study), the internationally televised Super League in Australia has an estimated turnover of $130 million per year (McKewen, 1994c, p.B4). Despite assurances to the contrary by Super League officials, representatives of that competition were at the 1995 World Cup, and deeply involved in contractual offers with players, predominantly from New Zealand, Australia and South Africa.

This action prompted the South African Rugby Football Union to issue a statement in October 1995 that read: "SARFU appreciates the fact that leading South African players remain in demand with various forms of rugby clubs around the world, but requests these organizations to respect contracts where they exist" ('Don't poach', 1995, p.B2). It was no coincidence that the coaches of South Africa, New Zealand and Australia were the most active proponents of professional rugby. Despite the attentions of Super League scouts, John Timu and Shane Howarth were the only two All Blacks who signed for the league competition before the World Cup.

This competition for the services of the players very clearly was a major factor in the development of the Super-12 competition, initially a covertly professional competition. In the late 1980s, as the growth of the league competitions in New South Wales and England increased, rugby responded by relaxing amateur regulations in order to increase player remunerations. In 1995, as the threat of Super League became very real and apparent, the need for the implementation of a well financed rugby competition added clear urgency to the negotiations with representatives of the News Ltd corporation, capitalizing upon the perceived threat of league as a clear stimulus to establishing professional rugby.

As it transpired, only two prominent New Zealand players switched to rugby league after the deal with News Ltd was signed - Marc Ellis and Mark Carter. Carter, an Auckland and ex All Black flanker had signed a three year contract with the Auckland Warriors, but then had severe misgivings and only announced his switch after the threat of legal pressure from the Super League organization. Carter cited the lack of selection for the national team as being the prime reason for his switch, and did not articulate the traditional reasons for switching codes - a new challenge,

which is commonly regarded as meaning an increased amount of remuneration for the player's services.

3.4.6 The introduction of a professional rugby competition

In 1995, several deals were discussed with the NZRFU and the national unions of South Africa and Australia which amounted to being professional competitions. The first of these was presented by the Sky pay television channel to the NZRFU, and amounted to a $60m professional three year competition. The competition was fronted by former All Black coach John Hart, and was proposed for six teams from New Zealand and two from Australia, to replace the existing Super-10 early season competition. Each team would have squads of 30 players, with the competition having a salary cap of $12 million per year and players to be paid approximately $50,000 each for the three month competition starting in March.

Teams would be regionally based, which would mean forming brand new teams. The NZRFU delayed signing the Sky deal because of the setting up of franchises, the fact that Sky would have players under contract, and the chance that Sky would negotiate some of the franchises outside rugby's control (Cameron, 1995c, p.2:1). The Australian national union was not disposed toward the offer as they wanted another Australian team involved and South African involvement, because of the huge financial backing of South African corporates and to prevent the possible pushing of South Africa into an alliance with the Northern Hemisphere (Harding, 1995a, p.21). The bid remained under negotiation until it became clear the Murdoch deal was more attractive to the national unions involved.

A second deal came in the form of a bid presented by Carnegie Sport International, who organized and ran the existing Super-10 competition, which was fundamentally an international competition involving provincial teams from New Zealand, South Africa and Australia. Carnegie proposed a 16-team provincial competition expanding upon their Super-10 competition, which could possibly have been tied in with a similar competition in the Northern Hemisphere. Carnegie had proactively approached the New Zealand Union, found what they sought in such a competition and attempted to provide it to them. Ex-All Black Grant Fox, managing director of Carnegie's New Zealand operation, expressed the belief that "We felt it was important that rugby should make the plans, that it should govern its own destiny" (Cameron, 1995c, p.2:1). Despite the attempts of Carnegie to provide the NZRFU with what it wanted, the deal never got past the planning stage.

It was on the day before the 1995 World Cup final that the deal was announced which would finally propel rugby into open professionalism. The deal was signed between Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd organization and the national unions of New Zealand, South Africa and Australia. In September, 1995, *Vanity Fair* magazine had named Murdoch as the most powerful man in the world. Murdoch was 61 years old, and controlled an empire worth roughly $US30.7 Billion (Murdoch named world's, 1995, p.24). It was Murdoch's News Corporation Ltd. which had earlier provided the finance for the rugby league Super Leagues in Europe, Australia and New Zealand.

The deal signed with the three national rugby unions gave Murdoch the television rights to all representative rugby played in the three countries from 1996 to 2005, including tour matches, test matches and provincial in the three countries. Under the agreement, the three nations would play each other twice on a home-and-away basis each year in a test tri-series, and a new twelve team international provincial round-robin competition would be introduced, which would last for thirteen weeks and involve five New Zealand teams. The agreement was worth US$550million (NZ$828million) for a ten year period, which national administrators in New Zealand believe gave "undreamed of wealth for the NZRFU" (Howitt, 1995c, p.14). A new company was formed, named SANZA (South Africa, New Zealand , Australia), with Australian rugby manager David Moffett as its head. Moffett praised the deal, and said "There has never been a better deal to hit the table than the News Ltd offer" (Gray, 1995n, p.2:3) .

The announcement of the Murdoch deal was made the day before the World Cup final. It was clearly timed to counter the threat of the Super League scouts, as SANZA chief executive David Moffett publicly admitted (ibid.). The timing was vital the Western Samoan captain, Pat Lam, said he knew of several All Blacks who would either have retired after the 1995 World Cup or planned to switch to league but had decided to stay because of the lure of the professional rugby competition. (Lam: exodus soon, 1995, p.2:5). Lam's views were backed by those of Australian representatives such as Troy Coker, Tim Horan and Tim Gavin who felt the deal would allow players to more confidently reject the financial lure of league contracts (Gray, 1995k, p.2:1).

NZRFU Chairman Richie Guy stated the large injection of funding from the deal would "be used for the development of the game in all its facets" (Johnstone, 1995e, p.A1). However, it was soon suggested that the motivation for the deal was not to inject much needed finances into the game at every level, but to enable the national unions to offer greater financial deals in order to counter the very real threat of Super League cheque books. Guy admitted this by stating "There are a lot of advantages to this deal. Rugby will receive a lot of worldwide promotion it wouldn't have without the deal. It means a huge increase in income. It means the objectives we set when Super League surfaced can be achieved, i.e. the retention of players " (Mitchell, 1995d, p.49). Chairman of the South African national union, Louis Luyt, was more direct, saying "The deal was struck to beat rugby league" (Ogilvie, 1995c, p.62).

The deal bred a situation in which the television rights of the first professional rugby competition were owned by the same company that had similar rights to the rival Super League competition. At the signing of the deal, News Ltd. officials said they would instruct their Super League representatives to leave rugby players alone, yet senior Springboks were targeted immediately following the World Cup, and most members of the New Zealand World Cup squad received offers from Super League clubs (Mitchell, 1995g, p.63). All Black coach Laurie Mains was adamant the approaches were made by representatives of Super League, not representatives of the clubs (Gray, 1995g, p.3:1), which would mean an immediate reneging of the agreement by the News Ltd organization.

These approaches were compounded by the exemption of rugby players from the salary cap in their first year in the Winfield Cup, and not being counted under restrictions on foreign players in the English league. Besides the offers to All Blacks, a large number of second tier level players were being sought by Australian Super League sides looking to boost their playing strength before the competition started in the following next year. Super League director John Ribot, plus prominent ex-players Mal Meninga and Michael O'Connor, reportedly had developed a hit list of twelve rugby players, six of them All Blacks (Rattue, 1995a, p.2:1), which enforced the need for an immediate signing of a competition which allowed the NZRFU and other national unions to pay their players to retain their services.

The contract between News Ltd. and the SANZA company was believed to have been conceived and sealed within seven weeks, and there was immediate criticism of the contents of the deal. The primary concern was over the fact the deal apparently contained no escalation clause - questions were asked regarding the fact that if rugby became a sought after commodity in the world of global television then greater revenue for the News Ltd. organization, would not be reflected in an increased supply of revenue for the national unions involved. It seemed strange to many commentators that the rugby administrators who negotiated the deal had not been able to include concessions for the increased value of televised rugby until five years into the next millenium. This led corporate analysts to state that the unions' chairmen had undervalued the commercial value of the television rights, while one estimate placed the real value of the ten-year deal at almost $3 billion (Mitchell, 1995f, p.62). It appears the ten-year span was only agreed to at a late stage, and it is understood that until just before final agreement the deal was only five years, when Murdoch's representatives renegotiated the deal.

A second primary concern was that the Pacific Island nations were not involved in the deal. Many thought this would allow the rugby playing talent of these nations to be lost en masse to the Super League competition, as seen by the view of ex All Black captain Graham Mourie that "New Zealand rugby can't dispute the benefits of the strong Pacific Island influence in the sport over the past ten years...by leaving them out in the cold, we open a dangerous gap through which league can go in and plunder new talent. That's short sighted" (Mourie, 1995a, p.62). To deflect these criticisms, Luyt and Guy both insisted Argentina and Western Samoa had not been ignored and Luyt assured the public with a statement that "They are part of the southern hemisphere. We will be discussing their futures with them as soon as possible" (Ogilvie, 1995c, p.62). Guy mirrored this with a statement that "The logistics meant the island nations could not be included in the new competition. But that doesn't mean they've been forgotten" (Pacific exclusion, 1995a, p.2:1). Guy strongly insisted New Zealand was committed to assisting the South Pacific and would continue to do so.

Despite this, the loss of Western Samoan internationals was extensive in the ensuing months, with Auckland player Shem Tatupu becoming the fifth Western Samoan international to sign with league in two months when he switched codes in September, 1995. The IRB paper which repealed the amateur regulations recognised the fact that the poorer national unions

could become increasingly disadvantaged: "Some even poorer countries, such as those in the Pacific, are at particular risk..." (The report that changed, 1995, p.14). That became very clear to Western Samoan administrators, who then had to construct their own competition, after Western Samoan technical advisor Bryan Williams observed "It became very clear we had to govern our own destiny" (Hinton, 1995d. p.B8).

A third concern raised was the possibility that the laws of the game could be altered to make the rugby game a more attractive television vehicle. Guy attempted once again to deflect such concerns by stating that "There's been absolutely no discussions with Murdoch's group involving any change to the game...they don't want to have any part in the organization of the game. That remains entirely in the hands of the unions and the IRB" (Ogilvie, 1995b, p.62). This concern was given greater weight by the fact that Murdoch announced that the Northern hemisphere teams were not included in the deal because their play was not attractive enough, and they "will have to learn to play better rugby if they want to sign up" (Spin it, says Rupert, 1995, p.2:2).

That fear of game changes was widespread, but a review of the related literature indicates it as being misfounded, "Among the many misapprehensions floating around the debate is the fear that the higher profile of the game will lead to media interests reinventing rugby union, like they have so many American sports, making it bigger and brasher, packaging it badly and turning it into a quasi-American football meets rugby league product with no identity of its own" (Kervin, 1995, p.3). Furst (1971) had provided earlier related literature by stating that "In spite of the influence of spectators, what has occurred historically is that sports have...maintained their basic format. Innovations have been made within this framework (e.g. rule changes) rather than completely dismantling the design of game and starting anew with the entertainment inclination of the spectators as a guide" (as cited in Coakley, 1994, p.308).

A further concern was the fate of the Ranfurly Shield. As outlined in the previous chapter, this had become an icon in New Zealand sport, and there were fears that it would be taken out of the timetable, and become the knockout competition proposed in the Boston Report, despite this being largely opposed by the public. If it were to become a knockout, it was thought this would reduce the mana (prestige) of the shield games and resultant economic benefits for the holders. NZRFU chairman Richie Guy announced that modern commercial pressures would not be allowed to devalue the shield, and that "The rugby union will not do anything that will lower the value or place of the Ranfurly Shield" (Ranfurly Shield's fate, 1995, p.61), but debate and concern continued as the public now was forced to face the unexpected realities of professionalism entering the national game.

A fifth concern was the accessibility of the games through free-to-air television, with the deal containing no stipulation that some coverage must be on free TV. With Murdoch wanting to make a profit out of the deal, he would need to generate significant revenue through the sale of the television rights to local networks. The matter caused widespread concern in the rugby public of New Zealand, to the extent that one Member of

Parliament, announced he was considering introducing a private member's bill to ensure that coverage remained on free-to-air television (We won't hog, 1995, p.1:22). The government-owned and free-to-air network, Television New Zealand, retained the rights to the 1996 NPC, but for the new Super-12 series it would have to bid against privately-owned free-to-air channel TV3 and pay-TV company Sky. NZRFU chairman Richie Guy once again found himself having to allay fears about the new competition, and attempted to placate the rugby public, this time by saying that "I believe it is mischievous and scaremongering to suggest the matches won't be available on free-to-air TV" (New Zealand union to choose, 1995, p.62).

As these concerns were being voiced and debated in the public arena, a second major professional competition was being developed away from the scrutiny of the public, commentators and administrators. In mid-July, 1995, the first reports of a rival global competition to the News Ltd deal surfaced in New Zealand newspapers. The rebel competition was initially linked to former All Blacks Andy Haden, who was openly critical of the NZRFU handling of the Murdoch deal, and Bryan Williams, who was equally critical of the exclusion of the Pacific Islands. It appeared this competition was being financed by Australian media mogul Kerry Packer (Sanders, 1995c, p.B1). Packer had lost his majority control of televised Australian rugby league competition when his arch-rival Murdoch had successfully constructed the Super League competition.

The public and media face of the Packer-backed competition was Ross Turnbull, a former Australian international, who said that administrators had 'ludicrously' underestimated the sport's value as a television product because of a lack of business acumen in their dealings with News Ltd: "The people who are running rugby union simply don't understand their product in commercial terms. They panicked into something for reasons that they can best explain" (WRC chief, 1995, 2:2). Turnbull calculated the value to be several times the amount paid, and underscored the perceived global attractiveness of the rugby game as he sought to organize a competition which would surpass that already signed.

The All Blacks were reported to have already been approached, and offered annual packages of around $300,000 for many players. The new organization had no clear administrative base or spokespeople, and soon became known by the media as the World Rugby Corporation, or WRC. The principal attraction of the WRC was its global nature, whereas Murdoch's deal was related to the Southern Hemisphere. Turnbull said that as a global game, rugby needed to create a global structure to capitalize on the current advantage over rugby league in terms of its greater worldwide popularity (ibid.). In addition it appeared the players were angry at administrators for not consulting them over the negotiations with News Ltd. This criticism was fuelled by comments such as that made by Australian Rugby Union Chairman Leo Williams that "We don't have to consult with the players....We're elected to represent them" (Mitchell and Ogilvie, 1995, p.4).

As more details surfaced, media reports speculated that Packer was preparing to buy his own international teams in a pre-emptive strike aimed at sabotaging his rival's SANZA series. *The Daily Mail* claimed Packer was

planning to spend at least $NZ240 million in the race to build rugby's first televised world series, and that he was planning to sign the players, not the unions, aiming to buy the playing stocks of English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish teams en block (Warning that Packer, 1995, p.60). Murdoch had signed for the television rights of the unions, but not the players, so WRC attempted to exploit this weakness by signing players without gaining the sponsorship or TV rights. This paradox led to the situation where the WRC representatives could only offer players letters of intent, to be honoured on November 22, 1995, if sufficient funding for the competition was found. The WRC needed the players to sign investors, but concurrently needed the investors' money to attract the players.

On July 5, 1995, SANZA contracts for the All Blacks involved in the competition were presented to the All Blacks, with captain Sean Fitzpatrick and player and lawyer Eric Rush representing the players in their negotiations with the union, and a second round of negotiations on July 9, 1995, in Auckland. On 12 July, it was revealed that the All Blacks had signed contracts for the Bledisloe Cup series and the tour to France, but had left the Murdoch/SANZA contracts unsigned. The next day it was reported that Australian player Jason Little was to be the highest paid Wallaby, at $400,000 per season, with other contracts ranging from $50,000 per season. It was also reported that Jonah Lomu would be the highest paid All Black, on around $500,000, but the base rate for All Blacks would be $150,000, depending on their perceived commercial value on and off the field. (Mitchell, 1995f, p.62).

Senior unions were by this time expressing a great deal of frustration with the lack of consultation they were being given by the NZRFU. On July 14, provincial chairmen from all unions finally met Guy, after threatening to boycott meetings with him in retaliation for a lack of detail given to them. The structure and arrangements for the new competition had remained unknown to them to this point, with only the approximate sums to payers being paid, the fact the teams will be regionally selected, and the start and end dates of the competition.

By July 16, it became very clear that the emphasis was being clearly directed at players at the international level, as the NZRFU revealed a plan to pay players according to a three-tiered approach, with All Blacks being the highest paid, then those involved in the Super-12 and those involved in the NPC. The NZRFU would pay the first two tiers, but it remained up to the unions to arrange payment for the latter (Mitchell, 1995h, p.62). Second tier players who were not assured of test places were becoming disillusioned by the process, and more seriously considering more secure league contracts, which assured payments to them which were not based primarily upon selection (Johnstone, 1995g, B3). The fact that the elite players were being paid the entire income from the News Ltd deal did not impress a majority of commentators and rugby non-playing personnel. Wallaby coach Bob Dwyer had earlier expressed this fear: "Rugby administrators must frame the laws controlling payments to players to ensure that the game itself is not deprived - that there is still enough money to develop the sport among juniors. Rugby must also be careful to avoid the situation in which players are paid more than the game can afford" (Dwyer, 1992, p.183).

The shadowy WRC organization had gained momentum swiftly, and by July 18, 1995, it was believed that the majority of elite players in six countries had signed, namely South Africa, England, Wales, Scotland, France and Western Samoa, and the organizers were now aiming to secure the signatures of the elite players from Australia and New Zealand. Players were shown letter of intent where each player would make more than $1million for three seasons, but there was an expiry date of November 22, 1995, for the players to sign. It was made clear to them that they would be ostracized by their national unions if they signed for the rebel competition, and that the competition would be played outside IRB jurisdiction, allowing a number of rule changes and innovations (Gray, 1995i, p.2:1).

By July 23, 1995, media reports were widespread that suggested that 130 players had signed throughout the world, and the WRC was aiming to sign around 30 players from New Zealand and Australian players after the Bledisloe Cup (Johnstone, 1995h, p.B1). In the week between the two 1995 Bledisloe Cup tests, it was revealed that 23 of the World Cup All Blacks had signed letters of intent with the WRC, and had each been offered packages worth half a million dollars a season. The realistic threat posed by this new competition was readily apparent: "One thing's for sure, the skepticism that has surrounded the WRC on both sides of the Tasman since it first surfaced back in early May should be replaced by a very real concern" (Johnstone, 1995i, p.B3).

With the All Black squad seemingly lost to the rebel organization, the administration sought to retain the next level of players, the bulk of first division provincial players. The complications of the situation were expressed in mid-July by Otago captain John Leslie, who said elite provincial players had received no indication as to how they would be affected by the advent of professional rugby, and said the only source of information for non-All Blacks was the media. He described the situation as "confusing" (Harding, 1995b, p.4). This confusion was added to by the plethora of offers available to some players. By late July, some players were believed to have had up to eight contracts before them, with the ARL, Superleague, News Ltd, the WRC, English League, France, Japan and Italy all seeking their rugby playing services.

At the last hurdle the WRC campaign disintegrated. Almost overnight it was rumoured the South African squad had been attracted back to the establishment, and two young All Blacks, Jeff Wilson and Josh Kronfeld, signed with the NZRFU. This led to a flood of the signatures as the national representatives signed with the national union. After successfully bringing the players back to the NZRFU after 23 of the 26 squad to World Cup had allegedly signed with the WRC, ex-All Black Jock Hobbs spoke of the tactics he had used as part of a three man team charged with securing the All Black squad with the establishment. Hobbs explained that "Unashamedly, as part of that presentation, there was a sell of New Zealand rugby. We spoke about infrastructure already in place, of the support base. The traditions, the colours, jerseys, the parks, all those factors were emphasized as what was good about New Zealand rugby, which should be retained" (McDonald, F., 1995, p.20). The success of these tactics

was clear and some players had made significant financial sacrifices to remain contracted to the NZRFU - All Black Glen Osborne was believed to have signed a four year rugby contract estimated to be half what he was offered for a three year rugby league contract (Cameron, 1995f, p.2:2).

A number of senior players expressed the opinion that they were reacting to the way they had been treated by administrators of the sport in recent years, having become commodities to be exploited. Senior All Black Zinzan Brooke expressed this belief in his autobiography:

> The professional feeding-frenzy of these past few months is the direct result of many years of comfortable idleness by rugby administrations which, generation after generation, have plied the players with more responsibilities than they could fairly be asked to cope with as 'amateurs' and with no meaningful proposal to see them right - either under or over the counter (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.217).

The threat of loss of control of the elite level of the game had been staved off by the NZRFU, but only just, and administrators had clearly been warned by the players that the job they were doing was inadequate as the game entered the professional era, and the management of the sport was more critical than ever.

3.5 PROFESSIONALISM IN RUGBY

When the deal was signed with News Ltd, and even as the WRC seemed set to capture control of the elite player power base of global rugby, rugby remained, theoretically, an amateur game. The payments to be made to players were still announced as being for 'promotional work', although this was clearly not believed by the most ardent of believers in amateur rugby. It was not until the meeting of the IRB in Paris in August, 1995, that rugby finally repealed its amateur regulations. The game was now officially professional. However knowledge of what this meant proved tenuous, with some commentators believing it only meant players would be paid openly. This section of the literature review examines the development of professionalism in sport in order to provide understanding of its application to modern professional rugby.

3.5.1 Origins of modern sport professionalism

Harris (1983) states that the words *profession* and *professional* originate from the Middle Age English word *profess*. A *professed* person in the Middle Ages was one "bound by a religious vow" (ibid., p.55). In these formative days of the established church, the only truly professional class of citizens included clergymen, doctors, lawyers and teachers. Each individual attempting to enter these vocations was required to take a solemn vow to comply with the code and standards of the discipline being entered. The second and modern, meaning of the word *professional* came into being in the late nineteenth century as the word *amateur* was

reinvented, and generated an antonym, someone who practised their craft for money.

No sooner was the vocabulary of amateurism constructed than the breach of the amateur ethos and rise of professionalism was being practiced. As Morgan (1993) explains, "The history of violations explains the unconcealed disdain of amateur sport that occasioned the rise of its rival, professional sport, which paid amateur principles no mind whatsoever" (p.476). Professional rowers sometimes raced for cash at the beginning of the nineteenth century, professional runners competed for prize money derived from gate takings, and the first 'Gentlemen versus Players' cricket match was played in 1806 (Amateurism, 1969, p.60).

Over time, the term *professional* became more defined, usually in language constructed to best suit the individual needs of a sporting organization. In 1960 the IOC defined a professional as one who neglected their vocation or career for sport, signed on a professional contract, used one's name or picture in advertising, or participated in a competition with professionals (Strenk, 1988, p.306). While this definition is very specific, most existing definitions of professionalism in sport center upon the notion of a sports participant relying on direct payment for their sporting participation and achievement as their primary source of income (Stebbin, 1977; Williams, 1991).

As the antithesis of amateurism became more widely practised there developed an "historical tendency to attribute virtue to the amateur and to assign evil to the professional" (Smith, 1993, p.433), to the extent that the term "professional" is denigrated, while the "amateur" is glorified (Young, 1988). This condemnation centers upon "a strong tendency by advocates of the amateur ideal to denigrate the professional athlete" (Morgan, 1993, p.480). Proponents of this belief asserted that "the professional participates not out of love for the activity but for crass materialism and self interest", and therefore the athlete is tainted and the essence of sport lost (ibid.).

During the Cold War this argument was used as a vehicle to promote western 'amateurism' versus Soviet 'professionalism', as Communist Bloc athletes were said to hold unfair advantages through their professional status. It is reflected in contemporary New Zealand rugby through such print commentators as David Kirk and D.J. Cameron. However, the condemnation of professionals through this reasoning is crippled by the fact that "there is simply no evidence that an amateur is more virtuous or heroical than a professional just by being an amateur" (Smith, 1993, p.433).

After examining the criticism more closely, it is clear sport is unique in this area of debate. Unlike other professions, where professionalism in the areas of medicine, law, theology and education is an accepted calling, it is questioned whether professional employment in sport has a similar ethical acceptability (Harris 1983; Morgan, 1993; Young, 1988). No one, arguably, denies a painter, musician, doctor or professor the right to make a living through his or her profession. These individuals are applauded for maximizing their talents in order to achieve a level of performance in their area of expertise in return for financial reward. However an athlete is

not accorded such recognition, and Harris (1983) describes this as a "semantic confusion" (p.55).

Eitzen (1989) suggests this discrepancy exists because professional sports people are not bound by codes which emphasize the welfare of the profession ahead of the individual. However it is more commonly believed this apparent hypocrisy singles out sport for exclusion from professionalism because sport is not as worthy an employment of talents as a traditional vocation (Harris 1983; Sewart 1981). This is a central argument drawn upon by adherents to the reinvention of amateurism, and follows that "Sport should remain a leisurely pastime, a harmless interlude from the serious of life, because it is constitutionally incapable of occupying a more exalted place in our lives" (Morgan, 1993, p.476). Morgan asserts that "Professionalism can be argued to be a superior ideal to amateurism in that it deals with a 'bundle of goods' attached to sports that amateurism does not, largely because it is indifferent to them" (p.481). These are the 'external goods' (power, fame and principally, money) with which amateurs is not concerned and therefore of which they are, theoretically, experientially ignorant.

While amateurism, as a collective group of related perceptions, is theoretically oblivious to the power of external goods which pervade sport at every level, critics of the professional ethos are not, and professionalism is commonly criticized for the promotion of these 'undesirable' rewards. Sewart (1981) is a prominent proponent of the theory that increased commercialism in sport has "meant a constriction and repression of that which is potentially liberating in the non-instrumental character of sport" (ibid., p.45). "That which is valuable, liberating or emancipatory in sport is suppressed. Sport becomes like any other commodity - something to be marketed, packaged and sold to a mass audience" (ibid., p.47).

This 'commodification' of sport is seen by some as being "degrading", as "Athletic contests become activities of *dis*-play - i.e. oriented toward producing satisfaction for a mass of consumers of entertainment. When sport becomes an activity of *dis*-play, it destroys what is valuable in sport altogether" (ibid., p.49). This occurs because "the emancipatory impulses of sport are continually assaulted and distorted as sport becomes just another commodity in a long line of objects to be consumed, or is degraded as it takes on the form of entertainment or spectacle" (ibid.). Because sport is shaped into a spectacle that is necessitated by market demand, Sewart speculates that "That which is valuable in sport is subordinated to the demands of the market" which he sees as a central weakness of professionalism (ibid.).

While few other critics or proponents of professional sport argue along such eco-political lines as Sewart, there is common agreement with his observation of professional sport as a spectacle. Former professional American football player, Peter Gent, believed "Professional athletes are first and foremost show business, dealing with illusion and entertainment. The first responsibility of the players is to the audience, not themselves...Audience satisfaction is not supposed to be a factor in amateur athletics" (as cited in Schneider and Butcher, 1993, p.468).

While Schneider and Butcher (1993) disagree with Gent's direct link between the player and the audience, they believe the player's primary responsibility is to their employer, the team owner, who is then responsible to the audience. This belief is further supported by Sack and Kidd (1985) who observe that whereas the amateur coach or manager must "cajole and demand", the professional coach and owner can "demand" (p.43). For this reason, "The professional athlete must ultimately comply with demands imposed by economic expediency...In return for financial compensation, the professional sacrifices a great deal of control over how the game will be played and over how his body and skills will be used" (ibid.).

This theoretical argument of writers such as Sack and Kidd or Butcher and Schneider is evidenced by a comprehensive programme of rule changes implemented in the professional National Football League in the late 1970s. Introduced at the request of team owners, the changes "cumulatively increased the game's mass audience appeal as spectacle" (Sewart, 1981, p.49). Among the more prominent changes were the movement of goal posts in order to reduce field goal attempts, and the addition of sudden-death periods to break ties in regular season games. In order to increase television ratings, owners introduced time-outs to increase advertising revenue; rescheduled games for a larger television audience; drastically altered the production and presentation of games; and increased sexual objectification of the cheerleaders. The owners left untouched the most dangerous aspects of the game, which were usually the more visually attractive: for example, they hardened playing surfaces, which increased both playing action and injuries (pp.49-50).

The increased control of managers in sport was evidenced almost immediately after the repeal of amateur regulations by the IRB in August, 1995. Springbok Kobus Wiese was fined NZ$21,000 for punching an opponent during a test match against Wales. Dobson (1995) believes that the fining of Wiese brought the realization from elite players "that professionalism brings curtailment of their freedoms" (p.11). NZRFU judicial subcommittee chairman Tim Gresson stated that a similar system of fines was likely to be introduced to New Zealand (Maddaford, 1995b), and IPC commissioner Peter Thorburn added that a fine system must be implemented into rugby's professional environment (Johnstone, 1995l). The increased control by rugby's managers was also enforced by a statement by NZRFU Chairman Richie Guy that " With an openly professional game we can actually control payments to players and even out teams, for better competition" (Gifford, 1995a, p.23).

Awareness of sports law has also grown concomitantly with the expansion of commercialism and semi-professionalism in rugby. While players are becoming more aware of legal action in their favour, David Howman, a lawyer who specializes in sport law, believes that sports law in New Zealand is roughly twenty years behind that of the United States (Sanders, 1995b, p.B10). In July 1995, the Australia-New Zealand Sports Law Association meeting in Auckland formed the basis of a panel available to resolve sporting problems or investigations. Howman has stated that "Once sports go professional, there will be disputes which become messy" (ibid), and this panel could provide an alternative to dissensions going through court. Indeed Voight (1991) outlines the extent which industrial and legal

problems can reach with his description of such problems in the formative professional years of the National Basketball Association.

The power of the administrators, managers and owners in professional sport is also reflected in the growth in the importance of industrial relations in professional sports. As the power of the employer has grown in professional sports, the formal and legal protection of the employees has also become increasingly recognized. This can be seen in the overturning of the reserve system, which dominated industrial relations in North American professional sport until the mid 1980s. This system gave athletes little if any control over their careers, with owners having full control over direction of the players contracts and movement. The system was only overturned when players associations gained strength and legally challenged this system.

Sanders (1995b) asserts that industrial relations will be the next widespread feature of sport, following improved training methods and sport psychology. The recent player strike in professional North American baseball lasted 232 days, and major industrial relations problems have surfaced in all major professional sports in North America in recent years. In New Zealand contractual disputes were one of the major features of the introduction of the Auckland Warriors professional rugby league organization.

As a result of their amateur status, athletes have had little course for redress from unfair disciplinary action and little protection in contractual disputes (Sack and Kidd, 1985, p.43). South (1995b) notes that "It is one of the more remarkable features of New Zealand sport that participants have historically had such passive roles. Sure, players are regularly told that the game is for them, that they deserve hands-on involvement in the running of their codes. But rarely does this happen. Even more rare is it when competitors speak out about how they are treated" (p.B6). However, as rugby moves ever closer to open professionalism, players have increasingly begun to reverse this passivity. The actions of the Transvaal provincial team have been outlined earlier, and elite New Zealand players have been slow to sign contracts for the NZRFU when faced with other options.

3.5.2 The formal introduction of professionalism to rugby

In 1988, a prominent rugby journalist observed that "Like a burr under a saddle, the question of professionalism in rugby, especially New Zealand rugby, is a constant irritation" (McLean, 1988, p.49). However the 'irritation' grew to the extent that it could longer be ignored. The need for changes to amateur regulations was widely acknowledged by senior administrators. NZFRU deputy chairman Rob Fisher stated "it's fairly obvious there are significant breaches of the regulations all over the place. The regulations have to be changed. It's a bad law when nobody follows it. You can't lock everyone up, so you have to change the law" (Gifford, 1994b, p.64). Andy Haden agreed that "The rules aren't enforceable and they are archaic" (McKewen, 1994f, p.B4).

As a result the chairman of the NZRFU openly stated that New Zealand was seeking full professionalism in the game, and added "we are the only major sport that is still amateur and that is not feasible these days"

(Krishnamurthi, 1995, p.52). Reviewing the situation, NZRFU councillor Tim Gresson, one of the proponents of changes to the amateur regulations, observed that this desire of New Zealand to change the situation directly impacted upon the international situation. Gresson observed that "When the IRB decided to set up a working party on amateurism, we were the first country to seek to have the old laws repealed...because of the shamateurism and hypocrisy that existed. We didn't want to continue down that path. There had to be a new regime that was credible and enforceable." (League pathway may, 1995, p.3).

In January 1995, the full NZRFU council unanimously accepted a recommendation from its amateurism sub-committee to urge the IRB to immediately repeal the game's amateur regulations. Tim Gresson, the chairman of the NZRFU amateurism sub-committee, stated that NZRFU councillors recognized full professionalism was inevitable: "The trend is irreversible. The current situation, with its obvious shamateurism, is completely lacking in credibility...While I imagine some people will regard our stand as a giant step, in reality we are merely following the natural evolution of such sports as tennis, cricket and athletics" (ibid.).

With the situation in early 1995 of rugby moving beyond shamateurism, into a situation of semi-professionalism, the logical and expected move to full professionalism came late on 27 August 1995, when the IRB agreed to repeal its amateur regulations. At a special meeting in Paris the Board's council agreed to revoke compulsory amateurism at all levels of the rugby game. The IRB Amateurism Working Party report from the meeting stated "The concept of amateurism as a central philosophy of the Game is redundant. Many may regret its passing, but its resurrection is not possible. Its influence has shaped our Game and will, hopefully, continue to be remembered in its future development. Further than that it has no continuing role to play" (The report that, 1995, p.16).

The council adopted a revised set of regulations, known as the "Participation in the Game" regulations. In a statement released at the conclusion of the meeting, the IRB announced that "Rugby will become an open game, and there will be no prohibition on payment or the provision of other material benefits to any person involved in the game" (Rugby joins the, 1995, p.1:1). It was agreed that payment may be made at any level of participation, there should be no pay ceiling imposed by the IRB and the regulations shall be permissive in nature and not mandatory (ibid). IRB President Bernard Lapasset stated that "This is a momentous day for rugby to recognize that the constraints of the modern game do not permit full maintenance of the amateur principles" (ibid.).

At the time in New Zealand it was observed that "the fact is that if you are good enough, you can be paid to play almost every sport in New Zealand. And the cruel reality is that those sports where professionalism is not possible are being squeezed out of the mainstream" (Pearce, 1995a, p.2:2) However professionalism is an alien concept to rugby, and is greatly different even to the advanced degree of shamateurism currently evident. Sanders (1995b) has noted that "The next few years will be a learning curve as the sport embraces professionalism" (p.B10). It is to the theoretical base of professionalism that this review now turns.

3.6 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

This present study considers elite rugby union management in an era of emerging professionalism. The latter ideology was examined in this chapter, following an outline of the amateur ideology and its transmuting into shamateurism. Player movements and an increasingly covert system of material reward, payment and commercial gains characterized much of *amateur* elite rugby. The emergence of overseas opportunities for New Zealand players and the impact of World Cups, along with rugby's response to material opportunities offered by league and efforts to introduce professional rugby competition were noted in the literature. The chapter concluded with a further consideration of the literature on the roots of professionalism and its formalized acceptance by rugby's international governors.

CHAPTER FOUR

RUGBY MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The previous two chapters adequately answered the first proposed research question. This chapter of the literature review examines the literature on the remaining two proposed questions, regarding rugby management in New Zealand. The limited literature consists primarily of elite player perspectives. Given such limitations of the literature on rugby management, the chapter draws upon a wider field of sport management for consideration.

4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Profile of Rugby Managers
4.3 Rugby Management in New Zealand
4.4 The CEO Position
4.5 The Players
4.6 Summary and Review

4.1 INTRODUCTION

After adequately discovering answers to the first proposed research question in the reviewed literature, this literature review chapter was designed to critically consider the available literature in order to answer the two tentatively proposed research questions. These questions are:

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*
- *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

This chapter examines the existing relevant literature on the profile and background of those involved in provincial rugby management, then examines the wider literature on rugby management in order to seek answers to the research questions. Sport management and administration are considered synonymous, as suggested by Mason and Paul (1988). Given the changing climate of sport, moving to professionalism, drawing substantially on sponsorships for survival and changes in personnel in national sport organizations this review includes consideration of literature related to CEO succession and selection. The chapter then examines the literature on rugby

players as professional athletes, focusing on areas such as effects of the introduction of formal contracts, emphasis on younger elite players, retention of employment or training, transfer systems and players' associations. From this point wider considerations of the sport management field are discussed in order to provide a background against which research may be undertaken.

The organization of sport dates back to ancient times as Parkhouse (1991) observes, "From an *applied* perspective, sport management has been in existence from at least the time of the Ancient Greeks, when combat among gladiators or animals attracted crowds of spectators" (p.4). However the independent discipline of sport management is relatively new and evolving as an academic subject (Mason and Paul, 1988, p.1). Parks and Quain (1986) note that "Sport management, as a *practical* pursuit, has existed since the advent of sport. Only within recent history, however, has attention been directed toward educating sport managers for the unique tasks they will perform and toward providing them with adequate ethical and philosophical bases from which to operate" (p.22). Contemporary changes in sport, the rise of professionalism, greater commercialism and marketing, allied with competition for sponsors' dollars, all suggest that persons skilled in sport management and with a specific training in that field could materially assist a sport's development.

The first directly relevant university-sponsored sport administration program began in 1966, "prior to that 'sports administration' was a little used term" (Mason and Paul, 1988, p.1). As Mason and Paul note, and others (Parkhouse, 1991; Coakley, 1994) concur, "It took the creative mind of the late Walter O'Malley, owner of the Los Angeles. Dodgers, to realise, as early as the 1950s that sport organizations and related recreational functions need professionally prepared individuals to administer their affairs" (p.1). In 1957, O'Malley envisaged a massive growth of sport at all levels, and encouraged James G. Mason of the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida, to prepare a sport administration curriculum. Mason duly began a graduate program in 1966, at Ohio University (Deane, 1992; Parkhouse, 1991).

The establishment of such ground-breaking courses, led Paton (1987) to believe that "The decade of the 1960s may some day be viewed as a pivotal point in the development of the field" (p.26). By 1973, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst offered programs at undergraduate and postgraduate level, and by 1977, six tertiary institutions in the United States offered programmes. Since 1978 the number of graduate programs in sport management has quadrupled to more than eighty in North America (Pike and Fay, 1994, p.62). This rapid growth in the academic field is noted by an observation from Parkhouse (1991), that "Although the first sport management program was established in 1966, the significant proliferation in curricular development was not observed until the mid-1980s. As a result, by 1988 only 10% of the programs had been in existence for more than five years" (p.6).

Pike and Fry (1994) note many stumbling blocks existing in the development of sport management as an academic pursuit. Due to inconsistencies in the labelling of programs, the title *sport management* does not accurately indicate a uniform offering or agreed body of knowledge within the field. They suggest that the disarray exists because sport management has grown out of various disciplines. These authors observe that a majority of programs have grown out of physical education and recreation courses, a view evidenced by Parks and Quain (1986) that the early programs usually required an undergraduate degree in physical education, and, typically, had no opportunity to specialize in management.

Further support for this belief is provided by Lambrecht (1991), and Brown and Spinks (1989). Lambrecht (ibid.) suggests that sport management is drawn from sports studies and business administration, and has developed in the United States "almost exclusively within departments of physical education (sport studies)" (p.28). Brown and Spinks (1989) found that most the majority of Australian sport managers had their development in "Sport Studies, Human Movement Studies and Physical Education", and that such programs "offer only a fleeting view of issues that receive considerable critical analysis in well established business and management programs" (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.25).

Other courses were described as either sport *administration* or sport *management.* Parks and Zanger (1990) note that "Frequently the terms are used interchangeably, and the differences are not always clear" (p.31). Mason and Paul (1988) evidence this by stating that "The term *administration* is synonymous with the word *management.* Administration is concerned with guiding and managing human behaviour; it is a process of getting people to work together" (p.3). However, Deane (1992) offers the belief that the two terms are not synonymous, with the suggestion that the administrator may be narrowly defined as being "somewhat reactive in function to the planning and organization of others" (p.25), but then goes on to use the two terms almost interchangeably. With a lack of clarification in this area the texts and discourse do not facilitate clear discussion or debate.

Parkhouse (1991) assists resolution of this dichotomy by perceiving actual differences between the two terms. She uses *management* as an all-encompassing term, representing all sophisticated facets and duties presented by qualified individuals in the organization of sport, whereas *administration* "is limiting and suggests a school-oriented focus" (p.4). The increased professionalism which is attached to the meaning of the term *manager* makes it applicable to the modern environment in sport, particularly at the level at which this present research is concerned. Parkhouse (1991) also notes the term "management" can be misleading in sport. Taken in the business school context, it exists as one area of study, limited to a subject matter which focuses on the planning, organizing, directing, and controlling functions of business (as noted by Pike and Fay, 1994, p.64). However in the context of sport management, the term is more broadly construed to

include all areas of business, economics, and laws as they apply to the operation of a sports organization (Pike and Fay, 1994, p.64).

In Australia, Deane (1992) argued that as early as 1972 John Bloomfield was advocating the development of the professional sports administrator. This belief was echoed by the Chairman of the Australian Sports Institute Study group, Alan Coles, who in 1975 recommended the establishment of short courses in sport administration (Quick, 1994, p.4). Coles' views were supported by Tom Hogg, the Director-General of the Victorian Department of Sport and Recreation, who asserted "There is an urgent need to upgrade the quality of sports administration. We have a need for more management-trained sports administrators" (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.24).

Quick (1994) noted that "Although there have been sporadic courses on organization and administration of sport over the last two decades, it has really been the development of a sport studies program at Canberra in 1981 which gave life to the field in this country. Since that time, there has been a proliferation of sport management type courses being offered by diverse organizations, at a variety of institutional levels" (p.4). However, despite the growth in sport management oriented courses offered in Australia, it was 1990 before the first sport management degree attached to a business studies program was initiated in Australia, at Deakin University.

This increased orientation towards more professional management content in sport administration in Australia mirrored the situation in the influential North American area. Parkhouse and Ulrich (1979) stated that sport required a new breed of specialists, highly trained managers specialising in one of six sport-related fields: commercial recreation; professional sport; amateur sport; educational athletic administration; arena/stadium management; and promotion, marketing, merchandising, and broadcast media (as cited in Pike and Fry, 1994, p.53). This shift toward greater management orientation was also portrayed by a statement by Parkhouse and Soucie (1982) that "Professional management skills and standards have become central to the discipline of sport management" (p.176). This view has also been articulated by senior practitioners in the field in New Zealand. Auckland Warriors CEO Ian Robson believes that "Most people think that success can only be measured by how many games they win. To a certain degree that's true, but we won't be around to win or lose those games if the business side doesn't tick" (Balasoglou, 1994, p.40).

In New Zealand there has been a marked development of sport management, sport science, and coaching courses in tertiary institutions. Degrees with majors in Sport Management have been offered at Massey University, Palmerston North, since 1992 and on their Albany Campus since 1993. The Sport Fitness and Recreation Industry Training Organization (SFRITO) has been charged with setting skill standards for the sport and recreation industry, arranging for delivery of training and monitoring training standards and the ways trainees and students are assessed (SFRITO, 1994). SFRITO is intended to work closely with the

New Zealand Qualification Authority in developing standards. SFRITO will be setting skill standards for sports administration and coaching.

The Hillary Commission provides support to national sport organizations, on the basis of their management plans being mutually agreed, as managing a successful sport organization "requires forward planning and strategic decision making". Funding is supplied to New Zealand rugby by the Hillary Commission (Hillary Commission, 1993, p.22). The grant for 1993-94 to the NZRFU was $233,500, of which $228,500 was for domestic (national) rugby. This grant is intended to facilitate sport management, provide training workshops and assist Executive Directors to receive training. "With independent research confirming that there is a direct correlation between an organisation's performance and the quality of its planning, the training and professional development of sport and leisure administrators is a vital strategy for New Zealand sport" (Hillary Commission, 1994, p.26).

The need for improved managerial competencies has been reflected in the needs of employers, with the Canadian Federal Government emphasizing to National Sporting Organizations that "it is imperative that the National Sport Organizations conduct their administrative affairs at the highest professional standard" (Chelladurai, Szyszlo, and Haggerty, 1987, p.111). Deane (1992) reinforced this with an observation that noted a "Perusal of job descriptions for senior management positions in the professional leagues and national and state sporting organizations reveals an assumption that successful applicants would, along with appropriate managerial experience, bring to the positions, formal business education...No longer, it seems, is the former playing career of the aspirant the paramount factor determining their success in securing the position" (p.24).

Into the 1990s, the acceptance of sport management as a valid academic discipline was widespread throughout the wider industry. Wendel (1988) notes "There was a time when the path from the playing field to the front office of a professional team was a direct line. But now a new route has emerged: through the halls of academia" (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.24). Wendel's observation is backed by the research of Shilbury (1993) who observed the Australian Football League in the mid-1980s. Shilbury found that "as sport and football moved from their amateur bases and began to hire full-time staff the norm was toward the employment of a former football player of note. Such hiring was based solely on an individual's knowledge of the game. Little concern was given to the need for financial, marketing and general skills to manage human resources" (p.126). This reflects points made by All Blacks in this present literature review.

The situation now arrived in which "Sport management is a distinct career choice requiring specific preparation" (Parks and Quain, 1986, p.22). This distinct career was defined by Bernard Mullins (1980) for "a person whose job entails planning, organizing, directing and controlling...performed within the context of a organization whose primary or predominant product or

service is sport or sport-related" (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.25). Jamieson (1987) described the discipline as emphasizing "functional aspects of all sport involvement such as organization, administration, finance, budgeting, marketing, staffing, coordination, planning and evaluation" (p.51).

Parks and Quain (1986) studied competencies necessary in sports management, and their research revealed ten important competencies which emphasized the specialization existing in modern sports management. The identified competencies were: management; public relations; marketing; budgeting; interpersonal communication; athletic administration; sales communication; mass communication; computer utilization; and accounting (Haggerty, 1993, p.1). This wide range of necessary competencies signifies the increased managerial demands on individuals at senior levels in the industry. This increased demand on managerial competencies is also highlighted by Pike and Fry (1994) who believe the sports business community must seek competent current and future sport managers with international business capabilities (p.54).

Haggerty (1993) underscores the belief that management and organization are the foundations of business success (p.7). Mason and Paul (1988) reiterate this link, advocating "Effective management is the key to success of any enterprise", and "Good management means control, in the sense that the enterprise is organized to accomplish the essential tasks of the organization" (p.1). Sport organizations are increasingly becoming corporatised and managed like businesses.

Links between the management and sport environments are widespread and comprehensive in developed societies. England's rugby captain Will Carling and management author Robert Heller (Carling and Heller, 1995) observe that: "the analogy between management and games has seldom been stressed" (p. 1). They further state that:

> Success in management and success in sports have the same roots. In business as in games players must master two critical aspects: the techniques (including those of strategy and tactics) and themselves. Self-mastery, making the best of your abilities is the foundation of achievement in both fields, but there are also clear and important analogies in the approaches taken by winning managers and winners in sports to an equally vital matter: working with and through others to achieve success (p.1).

In sheer economic terms, a gross national sports product was introduced in the United States in 1987, a statistic comparable to the gross national product. The GNSP includes gate receipts, sporting goods, broadcast rights, advertising, legal gambling, magazine subscriptions and more. For 1986, the measurement was US$47.2 billion, making it the twenty-fifth largest industry in the United States (Sutton, 1991, p.150). This vividly portrays the degree of commercialism in professional sport, which dominates the North American sport scene. Shilbury (1990) concurs with this observation by stating that "Corporate involvement in sport has become an increasingly

fashionable trend in Australia. As the link between the corporate dollar and sport has strengthened so too has the Australian sports system changed in order to accommodate this existence" (p.9). In New Zealand commercial sectors of sport generated $251 million to the Gross Domestic Product (Trenberth and Collins, 1994).

While these examples may seem to represent individual occasions when the sport and business worlds touched briefly, the links between sport and the corporate environments are becoming stronger. Balasoglou (1994) observes that in New Zealand "There was a time when sport and big business didn't mix but today it's difficult to tell where one ends and the other takes over" (p.38). In rugby this is being increasingly observed through the use of successful businessmen in rugby clubs and union boards and through players' and unions' links with sponsors' companies.

Parkhouse and Soucie (1982), surveyed sport management doctoral theses, concluding that "The most popular type of investigation has been surveys of administration policies, procedures and practices" (p.177), and that there was a need for further sport management research into organizational design. Parkhouse et al. (1982) highlighted organizational design as one of the nineteen areas lacking in sport management research (p.181). A decade later, Haggerty (1993) reviewed the trends in research in sport management, and made the primary recommendation to "Analyze a particular sports organization in greater detail through interview research to increase depth of data" (p.39). This field of study is recognized as being relatively new in New Zealand (Trenberth and Collins, 1994).

As noted by Parkhouse, et al. (1982), "Research is an extremely vital rung of sport management" (p.184), yet the lack of in-depth scholastic research is a characterizing feature of the sport management field in general. This view is reinforced by Applin (1986): "sports management is in its embryonic state and almost entirely devoid of research content" (as cited in Paton, 1987, p.27). This lack of research presently restricts growth in this field as "Until enough sport-specific research on sport organizations is completed, it will be difficult to develop sport-specific management theories" (Haggerty, 1993, p.7). Such writers note that the overall field of sport management research is lacking particularly the area of sport organizations. These weaknesses appear to be especially acute in the New Zealand field, where the study of sport management is still in its infancy.

Haggerty (1993) observes that "One area of research that has not been actively pursued, except for limited works by Mason and Paul (1988), Sheridan (1984) and Rosenthal (1981), involves the structure of American professional sport organizations" (p.1). He continues by adding that "Many studies have been conducted, and a wealth of information recorded, about organizational structure in large business organizations. Few of these relate directly to professional sports. The existing sport literature is limited to assumptions about who influences key tasks and decisions in professional sport" (p.5). The emergence of a sport management profession (or occupation requiring special training), with its vocational dimensions

depends, in part at least, upon a soundly researched body of knowledge being developed.

4.2 THE PROFILE OF RUGBY MANAGERS

The previous chapter noted a research question arising from the researcher's self reflection, and consideration of rugby change, as "*Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*". No specific research was located to answer this question. As new Boards of Directors were being introduced in New Zealand rugby unions, debate was sparked over the personnel on these boards. The importance of a 'mix' of Board personnel is noted in the literature of Mason and Paul (1988), "These councils and boards are more effective if the members come from a variety of backgrounds" (p.66). Cameron (1995g) recorded that the CEO of the North Harbour union, Grant Elley, stated that "we are delighted with at the quality of the new board members....The great thing is that the six seem to have complementary skills" (p.2:2).

The profile of sport managers is virtually all male. Shilbury (1992) researched 149 professional sport management personnel from the Australian Football League, Australia's National Basketball League, and Australian National and State Associations in Golf, Tennis and Cricket. He found almost 90 per cent were male, "reflecting a male oriented industry" (p.11). This identification of a male oriented industry is also supported by research by Sutton (1994), who identified the National Basketball Association of the United States as being "the most progressive of the major [US] sports leagues employing women", with a female Vice-President for Team Services of NBA properties, and the first ever female president of a professional sport franchise (p.9).

Sport administration in New Zealand is also a predominantly male enterprise, as found by the research of J.Cameron (1993). Cameron found 69 per cent of all members of the profession were male, 79 per cent of paid Executive Officers were male, 80 per cent of volunteer administrators were male, and 80 per cent of elected national directors are male (p.2), with the overall male percentage being 76.5 per cent (p.4). Cameron found that non-pakeha were also disproportionately under-represented among national sports administrators, with 96.8 per cent of administrators being pakeha (European) (ibid.).

In terms of age, Shilbury's (1992) research indicates that "Nearly three quarters (71.1%) of the respondents were in the 30 to 49 age group; 40.3 per cent were aged 30 to 39 and the group 35 to 39 was the largest single 5-year age group with 22.2 per cent" (p.11). Cameron's (1992) New Zealand research discovered that the age distribution of national administrators was heavily weighted to the 45-59 year category, with 52.8 per cent in 1991 (p.5), and also that the 20-30 age group is proportionately under-represented in the industry.

In terms of qualifications, Shilbury (1992) found a total of 51.7 per cent of respondents had completed tertiary studies; of whom 46.8% had completed business based studies and 37.7 per cent teacher/education based studies, predominantly in physical education (p.12). Of the 18 senior managers with tertiary qualifications, 12 had business qualifications. Whitelow (1990) surveyed 249 senior managers in the Australian Football League, National Basketball League, State and national Cricket Associations and State and National Tennis Associations. She found that 52 per cent of personnel had tertiary qualifications; ranging from Associate Diplomas to Masters Degree level. She found that "Almost half of all graduates (46.75 per cent) have a business qualification...[and that] The second most common area of training was education with 36.67 per cent of all graduates", which reflects concerns in Australia about the links between sport management and an over-representation of physical education tertiary qualifications (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.25).

J.Cameron (1993) found 59.6 per cent of New Zealand's national sport administrators classified themselves in professional and managerial roles (p.8), but discovered a dearth of sport management specific qualifications. This lack of qualifications is also indicative of a view expressed in New Zealand media of perceived inadequacies of senior sport managers in this country. While rugby, cricket, league, netball, athletics, tennis, softball, swimming and hockey all have annual financial turnovers between $2 million and $12 million per annum, "it seems the people in charge of these sports lack professionalism" (Mitchell, 1995b, p.62). However this is not a problem peculiar to the industry in New Zealand. Shilbury (1993) noted this phenomenon in the Australian Football League, stating that "There has also been a move toward the employment of full-time processionals, although the qualifications of these personnel remain questionable" (Shilbury, 1993, p.131).

This research into managerial qualifications was noted in the wider management field by Bartol and Martin (1991), "For most managers, education does not end with college and graduate school degrees...managers usually take additional management-related courses...effective managers think of management education as a process to be continued throughout their careers" (p.30). This assertion was supported by the findings of Strange (1994) who conducted a 1991 survey of 700 CEOs, and discovered that education was considered a more vital component in the management field than all others (p.19).

This phenomenon was also uncovered in Australia by Shilbury (1992), who found that "Overall only 32.4% of all personnel working in Senior Management and sport development hold a qualification identified as relevant to the job" (p.12), which reinforced Whitelow's earlier (1990) Australian research. This can possibly be related to a combination of the age of personnel researched and the comparative recency of relevant qualification courses. Personnel in senior positions of sport management have apparently not found the opportunity, time or need to gain such

qualifications since their greater availability in the 1980s and 1990s. The reality is that courses are so recent further research is needed to ascertain possible patterns or increased qualifications in sport management.

The playing background of sport managers is a dimension of the literature which indicates that administrators have playing experience. Kjeldsen (1982) found that between 1901 and 1968, (the most structurally stable period for major league baseball), 68 per cent of managers in professional baseball organizations had appeared as players in the major leagues. This research revealed that "managers were players with long careers who had played with prestige clubs and who had participated in more championship competition than non-managers" (p.92).

This link between a playing background and a managerial role was noted by in the New Zealand context J.Cameron (1993). Her research stated that "The competitive experience of administrators is arguably an important grounding for administration in their particular sport...for many administrators it is possible that administration is a follow-on to competition" (p.20). This research found that around half of the researched national sports administrators (51 per cent) had had administrative involvement in other sports organizations.

Hager (1984), also commented on the relevance of a playing background:

> Excluding a strong foundation in sports activities would be tantamount to sending a sailor out to sea without sails for his boat. The Sport Manager with a basic understanding of motor learning and biomechanics must develop the physical skills needed to incorporate this knowledge...If the Sport manager is going to be director of sport, an administrator of sport, or a promoter of sport, then the self-actualising experiences in a variety of sports are critical to professional education (as cited in Deane, 1992, p.26).

Deane (1992) did not concur with this assertion, stating that "perhaps active or vicarious participation in a sport is a less important pre-requisite for an efficient and effective manager" (p.26)

Parks and Zanger (1990) also provided applicable literature on the sporting background of managers in the sporting field, stating that "General managers of almost all professional sports teams have a long history in that sport" (p.31). They also asserted that "There is no fast way to become a general manager. You can attain this position only through years of experience and hard work associated with a variety of jobs within the organization" (ibid.). Such viewpoints and research indicate that study of New Zealand sport managers, in a specific sport, may well add relevant understandings to this debate.

4.3 RUGBY MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND

The historical literature, noted in Chapter Two of this study, reveals a consistent force of the ethos of management of rugby as an amateur sport. Ramsay (cited in Owen, 1955) encapsulates such an attitude, noting that the future for rugby is bright, "always provided that those who play rugby football and those who administer it will defend the amateur status which has so long been our heritage" (p. 6). McLaren (1992) exemplifies the critics of New Zealand rugby management who saw that administration condoning shamateurism, "Sometimes one gets the impression that they would rather just not know, not face up to the existence of wide-spread contradictions and anomalies" (p. 152). He noted the IRB accepting moves to allow commercial opportunities for players and suggested that presented challenges for rugby management, bringing into consideration the elements of shamateurism and professionalism noted earlier in this review. Dobson (1989) is blunt, perceiving rugby management in countries other than England having their administration controlled by "The big men of British rugby [who] resent having the pistol of professionalism held to their heads, but its likelihood is probably more of a statement of fact than a threat" (p. 165).

The introduction of the Auckland rugby league organization to the New Zealand sportscape has, arguably, had a fundamental impact upon the public's expectations of New Zealand rugby management, certainly in Auckland (Personal communication with major rugby sponsor, 28 August 1995). The Warriors have introduced levels of professionalism in the presentation of their management to the wider population, largely through the public relations efforts of their Chief Executive, Ian Robson. Mark Southerly, former Olympic canoeing and ice-racing coach, was compelled to state that Ian Robson "has made New Zealand sport administrators look like idiots" through his professional approach ("Wizard of Oz", 1994). The profile of Robson has led to an increased interest and knowledge in the sporting public of the management of major sports in New Zealand, particularly for the game of rugby union. This link is perhaps enforced by the similarities of management between elite levels of rugby league and rugby union, especially with both codes now operating in a professional environment. This is substantiated by Phillips (1994) who stated that "Union, at the top level, is very similar to league in its management, promotion and relationship with the media and commercial sponsors" (Phillips, 1994, p.212).

Despite these two notable exceptions of the winter sports, much of the administration and management of New Zealand sport is still voluntary, amateur and lacking full effectiveness. Mitchell (1995b) notes "The boards and councils which run sports are often elected on a geographical basis or as a reward for long service, rather than for their ability to direct a sport. The result is that while the boards and councils are well meaning they

don't exploit a sport's full potential" (p.62). Frisby (1982) states that these "Volunteers were often ex-athletes or parents of athletes who devoted their spare time to the organization of sport in a spontaneous and informal manner" (p.57). This phenomenon is a notable aspect of sport in most developed nations. In Holland, for example, the problem "is that the majority of people involved in governing sport are amateur, which implies they cannot devote the required time and effort to deal with the problems of Dutch sport" (Pruijn and Boucher, 1995, p.73)

This reliance on the amateur administrator, as opposed to the professional manager, is still the rule rather than the exception in New Zealand rugby at club and lower provincial levels. Malcolm Dick (former deputy-chairman of NZRFU, and president and chairman of the ARFU) stated that "a survey of the 27 provincial rugby administrations and the several hundred clubs affiliated to the New Zealand union would show many to be desperately embarrassed for want of committeemen [sic] with the money, and the time, to carry out the task of running the game" (McLean, 1992, p.7). This indicates that the availability of suitable personnel at these levels is a major constriction on effective sport management exacerbated by the growing degree of commercial orientation in the rugby game. This growing commercial orientation is illustrated by statements such as those by the Waikato Rugby Football Union chairman Stan Hickford, who stated that "Rugby's ceased to be an amateur sport. Its a pure business now" (Fogarty and Umbers, 1995, p.A1).

Dybvig (1995) drew a correlation between success on the field and strong administration, using the examples of the San Francisco 49ers, the Brisbane Broncos, the Auckland Warriors, swimming, golf and rowing. This belief is also apparent in rugby union. A Poverty Bay representative player has called for his union to embrace the Boston Report, to complement his side's on-field performance: "It's important that our union is administratively strong and able to financially support us" (Fogarty, 1995c, p.B2).

The introduction of professionalism into rugby has heightened the need for more professional management of the national game. In England, the ten senior rugby clubs passed a unanimous vote of no-confidence in a commission set up by the Rugby Football Union to consider the implications of professionalism. Complaining of a lack of consultation, the clubs then established their own working party to examine their interests, and to plan the possibility of their own commercial company ("No-confidence vote", 1995). Sir John Hall, chairman of the professional Newcastle Rugby Club in England, has stated that "Amateurs will continue to run the amateur game, but they will not be able to run the professional game" (Soccer guru, 1995, p.2). This view was also articulated by Alan McColm, a player agent in England, who stated that "If clubs decide that they have to grasp the nettle of professionalism then they will need to gear themselves up to run as commercial organizations" (McColm, 1995, p.32).

The actions of the senior English clubs have been reflected in New Zealand. The All Blacks wrote an open letter to the public in August 1995, stating that "If the game is going to go openly professional it is of vital importance to have the right professional structures in place to run the game" (All Blacks spell out, 1995, p.64). The national body in New Zealand rugby had already began piecemeal attempts to modernize its operations, where "Staff increases [to the 13 current full time employees] reflect the changing face of the game and the realization by its administrators that rugby today is about both business and sport" (Gray, 1995b, p.2:4).

New Zealand rugby literature has been severely limited in its research data, particularly on rugby management. This review now turns to the dominant field of New Zealand rugby literature, player biographies, to consider perspectives on New Zealand rugby management in a broad chronological sequence of the past two decades. This reveals a range of considerations for rugby management.

Meads (Veysey, 1974), a legendary player in rugby history, emphasizes the need for rugby legislation to "not adversely affect the players" (p.74). He believed administration had become too remote from the players and advocated a rugby management credo based on "Is it good for the players?" (p.254). McCormick (in Veysey, 1976) raises the counterpoint of rugby administrators developing laws, which have the potential to enhance rugby and crowd enjoyment of the game, only to find coaches and players not utilizing the opportunities within these. Going (in Howitt, 1978) believes the spectators would be attracted to professional rugby - "It is said professionalism makes a sport go bad. I say malarky. In not one sport has this happened...With professionalism you are taking big money...Rugby's administrators are strong on maintaining the game's amateur status, but often, I feel, get their priorities wrong" (p.286). He is critical of the IRB's restrictive control.

Bryan Williams (Howitt, 1981) underscores the long-standing issues now facing New Zealand rugby in 1995 with contemporary debate on Boards of Directors replacing rugby's provincial and national union Management Committees and Council. Williams emphasizes the importance of club rugby and, at the other end of the rugby management spectrum, is critical of "administrators who do not have an understanding of players viewpoints" and nationally are an entrenched group who should consider appointments to team manager positions, for example, from outside their own ranks (pp. 279-280).

Modern management would not include the "secret business" and entrenched governing body of the NZRFU argues Mourie (1982). Mourie argues that "rugby is on trial for its life," with competition from other sports, because of its own "rigidity" (p.229). He is concerned at rugby management not developing clubs and "the structure of the NZRFU seems incapable of any of the several logical moves which would bring some sanity" (p.233). At the provincial management level he commends his

chairman as being "fair and honest" serving the union well and intelligently. He notes the threat of overseas countries drawing off players, professionalism and appeal of television and an "international organization" competition being formed to challenge the status quo of rugby management. McKechnie (1983) is critical of the shamateurism and suggests that the IRB is ensuring rugby remained an amateur game but rugby administrators "should be aware of the fact that this could well leave them wide open to a "Kerry Packer style involvement in ruby" (p.165). Warnings from prominent players would appear to have sufficient serious reflections to compel their consideration - and response - by New Zealand rugby management.

Hewson (Gault, 1984) outlines the David Lord attempt to launch a professional rugby competition and emphasizes the loss of player income in "amateur" rugby. He argues for promotion of the game by rugby managers, "the game must be sold" (p.191) and reiterates the theme of "middle aged to elderly men out of touch with reality, administering the game" (pp.191-192). Fraser and Wilson (Gault, 1984) further emphasized the essential need for marketing the game, to ensure its continued prominence as the national game. They recognize New Zealand rugby management persons have a love of the game but criticize their lack of action to assist finances of the players. As with their peers they criticize the English dominated IRB.

Loveridge (1985) notes the import of rugby management decisions upon team success and player well-being, citing national championship arrangements as meaning "We were beaten by administrators" (p. 180). Such elements of rugby management, David Lord's initiative, sponsorship and recognition of club rugby, are echoed by Dalton, Knight and Ashworth (Knight, 1986), who note the special forces which have influence changes for rugby management to consider. "Broadly speaking, some of the factors which all came together to change rugby, and indeed both New Zealand sport and society, were an upsurge in the electronic media, the intrusion of modern marketing methods even into the sacred arena of sport and increased opportunities for touring and travel" (p. 271). Rugby management must adapt to such change but "there are still administrators who cannot keep in touch with the changing environment" (Veysey, 1986, p. 188). Mexted adds his voice to those noting the need for marketing and raises a greater consideration by rugby administrators of player families, wives and partners (Veysey, 1986). Mexted notes that rugby management must consider where the game, and its social setting, will be in another twenty years and show "clear administrative foresight" (ibid., p.196).

Haden (1988) takes the critical perspective further. He expresses concerns over professional rugby leading to violence and "win at all costs" and, like others noted here, is critical of the revenue generated by players which does not come to them in any substance. "It is time to ask: Who is running the game?" It would surely be far better to allow the commercialism in the game to thrive and with it the opportunity for

players to benefit materially...The future of the game hinges on this issue" (p.208). Haden reflects critical views of many players in noting that "the game of rugby in New Zealand is...a sort of compromise which pacifies the coalition of players and administrators. It's a game crying out for leadership and modern management" (p. 209).

Shelford (in Gray, 1990) noted the time commitment of elite rugby players who, he suggests, should be contracted to play for their country. He criticizes "outdated attitudes" as "Rugby is my business...The IRB would be doing the game a great service if it relaxed its amateur laws" (ibid., pp. 178-179). Stanley (in Gifford, 1990) provides an All Black's supportive perception of his provincial union administration. He has observed greater support of players and positive communication between the players and his Auckland Union administrators. Wyllie (Gifford, 1991) notes supportive actions of his Canterbury Union administrators once the Ranfurly Shield generated high revenue. Wyllie's use of endorsements and rugby generated income are discussed, as are decision making processes of rugby managers in their appointment of selectors.

Gary and Alan Whetton (in Lewis, 1991) perceive an emerging innovative cadre of rugby managers, at the NZRFU level, "who know what administration is about, are 'skilled at man management and who know how to relate to players" (p.100). Perhaps significantly, two of those administrators came from the Whettons' province and have been active in developing discussions on a more commercially and corporate oriented Auckland Union. A playing contemporary, John Kirwan, is more critical and argues that rugby management should either preserve the amateur game, and cut back demands on players, or accept that rugby faces changes and competition from other sports and get on with following through the management implications of meeting such challenges. He endorsed the All Black company set up to support player finances but is critical of rugby managers who do not understand such social and sport changes as have been noted above, or have an outmoded belief that the representative jersey is enough reward for a player.

Fox (in Thomas, 1992) endorses those options. He supports a statement that rugby administrators should not stifle rugby development yet could maintain intrinsic rugby values. Fox positively recognizes the importance of coaching programmes in his Auckland Union with its "strong development programme" (ibid., p. 187). Tuigamala (in Howitt, 1993) provides perspectives for rugby managers to consider on the appeal of professional rugby league to "amateur" rugby union players. "It is hard for rugby people to comprehend the offers [league] clubs like Wigan put together" (p.205). Howitt (1993) notes critical elements for rugby management to consider in terms of crowd-pulling star players. This linkage of players, marketing and income has been supported in rugby literature by rugby persons other than All Blacks.

On its formation, the Bay of Plenty Board of Directors identified several priorities: "building a winning representative team, developing Bay rugby,

marketing it, rekindling spectator interest and having effective management" (Gray, 1995m, p.2:1). When North Harbour sought to be the base for the fifth Super-12 regional provincial team, its chairman noted the importance "establishing a set of criteria that each union...should be measured against by an independent management auditor", and added that one of the central points of the North Harbour proposal was that "the management structure, procedure and practices will stand up to stringent review" (Hinton, 1995b, p.B4). Another example came in February 1995, when a meeting of administrators involved in the Super-10 to discuss elements of rugby management was organized. The agenda for the meeting included topics such as the competition management, contracts, promotions companies, the media, marketing, stadium development, a Pacific perspective and the direction of rugby heading into the 21st century - an agenda which reflects the corporate nature of elite rugby management (Gray, 1995a).

As rugby increasingly turned professional (see Chapters Two and Three of the present study), most larger provincial rugby unions in New Zealand moved into process of introducing changes to their management and governance structures in order to cope with the perceived increases in commercialism and professionalism. Rugby has been traditionally administered on a committee basis, with volunteers serving on committees being the ultimate power source in rugby management. The weakness of this system in recognized by the International Rugby Board Amateurism Working Party report, which concluded the meeting which repealed the amateur regulations. The report noted the assertions that "The Administration is not equal to a professional game", and decided "This is true. The position will have to be remedied. It is vital that a world-wide popular sport is run and regulated efficiently, expertly and strictly" ("The report that changed the game", 1995, p.15).

A senior manager of the Auckland Rugby Union stated that the whole change to professional rugby was very much a learning curve for all rugby (Personal communication, April 1995). A similar situation had occurred with the increased professionalization of the management of Canadian amateur sport, in the mid-to-late 1980s, of which Slack and Hinings (1989) note that "Surprisingly, however, there has been very little, if any, detailed investigation of this phenomenon of professionalization" (p.187). While this situation has been rectified somewhat in Canada, there is a very clear lack of literature and research into the management of the professionalization of sport in New Zealand. Research to locate further understandings of the New Zealand situation would appear to have potential value. "Competent scholars must generate research specific to problems of the sport management industry" (Parkhouse and Soucie, 1982, p.177).

Mason and Paul (1988) noted that "All organizations including sports organizations must have some type of machinery to help them run smoothly and effectively, and to organize and execute their affairs, so that the goals for which they have been created will be achieved, this machinery is administration; it is the framework of the organization" (p.2). An added dimension of locating appropriate research is that this could

assist the smooth operation of the administration of rugby, through providing information to the personnel involved in the administration of the game. The sport management practitioner "must be informed of alternative ways of behaving that enhance his or her chance of success" (Parkhouse et al., 1982, p.176), because "Administrators and managers tend to be practical people". The reality, however, is that "practical" research relevant to rugby managers is not readily available.

The day-to-day task of both personal and organizational survival may, in a sport management climate marked by rapid change, benefit from research and theory that "will help solve problems, suggest directions, or address real concerns has appeal to them" (Paton, 1987, p.30). Through assisting rugby managers, the sport management field in New Zealand can be advanced in a significant and tangible manner, because "Seeking, as well as providing knowledge for the skilled practitioner affords the opportunity of self-direction, regulation and advancement of the field" (Silva and Parkhouse, 1982, as cited in Parkhouse and Soucie, 1982, p.176).

4.4 THE CEO POSITION

Dalton and Kesner (1985) stated that "In most organizations, the central concept of the business seems to originate with the CEO" (p.749). This observation was enforced by the literature of Miller and Droge (1986), who specified a range of researchers who "show how small organizations can be influenced dramatically by the personalities of their leaders" (p.539). This literature also noted that "the CEO can act upon the organisation's structure by moulding it to fit his or her goals, needs for information and desires for control. But it is also possible that organizations attract, recruit, promote and even breed CEOs who fit their existing structures" (p.541).

Given the pivotal role of the CEO, and the implications of rugby changes for new managerial directions, the literature was turned to in order to consider CEO succession, which would, presumably, result from a provincial or national rugby union changing to a more corporate structure. Such an appointment would be required to maintain certain rugby dimensions and to bring fresh commercial expertise to enhance a business orientation. The New Zealand Rugby Union had, up to the start of the present research period, February 1995, not agreed upon the introduction of the Boston Report and its attendant rugby management changes. As with the research on New Zealand rugby management there was a distinct lack of sport management literature related to this transition of management. However, this lack of sport management literature was not reflected by the literature in the wider management field. Boekker and Goodstein (1993) noted the importance of this managerial phenomena by stating that "Few events that occur in organizations are as substantively important or as open to potential contention as chief executive succession" (p.172) and this importance was also stressed by Schwartz and Menon (1985).

This wider body of literature referred to by Comte and Mihal (1990) emphasized the organizational change element in CEO succession. This was confirmed in the research of Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986), who stated that "Executive succession seems to be a powerful tool in managing frame-breaking change" (p.42). This was further clarified by the explanation that "Frame breaking change also involves new executives, usually brought in from outside the organization (or business unit) and placed in key managerial positions. Commitment to the new mission, energy to overcome prevailing inertia, and freedom from prior obligations are all needed to refocus the organization" (p.38). These authors concluded that in the organizations they researched, those with the highest turnover of CEOs "tended to be older - though not significantly" (p.51). These authors believed this conclusion may imply problems are caused in attempting to reorient an established organizational archetype. Given the stability, or inertia, of New Zealand rugby administration this literature would appear to relate directly to the national game.

Literature which was similar in content to that of Tushman et al. (1986) was noted from Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baumbin (1988). This opened with the query "When do CEOs get fired? The most obvious answer, and one for which there is empirical support (James and Soref, 1981; McEachern, 1975; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980), *is when their organizations perform badly"* (italics added) (p.255). This literature produced a strong emphasis on the link between performance and succession, noting that "In general, if the board (or some of it members) expects better organizational performance than is being achieved and believes that top management is the key to obtaining that performance, it is likely that the CEO will be dismissed" (p.257). The authors of this literature also offered a statement which was applicable to the situation of the case study organization:

> Boards not only use the firm's prior performance to set their expectations; they also incorporate the performance of competing firms. In industries that have a wide variation in performance levels, board members will conclude that top management can have a major effect, and the CEO of a low performing firm is likely to be removed. When the performance of firms in an industry varies widely, observers (particularly board members) attribute it to superior or inferior management (Fredrickson et al, 1988, p.264).

A variety of other literature was discovered which added support to the perceived link between CEO succession and organizational performance. Schwartz and Menon (1985) studied CEO succession in the bankruptcies of 140 firms in the United States in the early 1980s, concluding that "Corporate chiefs can substantially affect major organizational characteristics, so their replacement can produce organizational change...Replacing CEOs may help to change both internal and external perceptions of companies' images and help restore confidence in their futures" (p.680). This was also noted in Dalton and Kesner (1985), "viable

turnaround strategies often demand replacing the top corporate officers" (p.752).

A cautionary note was provided by Comte and Mihal (1990) who suggested that "One of the more commonly advanced views of top management succession has been that it is a mechanism whereby the organization copes with its problems" (p.47). The inference that this act of succession may not solve the organisation's problems has relevance for rugby unions looking to appoint CEOs in the expectation that such a change will productively reorient the union.

These authors investigated eighty firms over a forty year period and found an indication of a generally rising incidence of CEO turnover. They found that only 17 per cent of researched CEOs left as a result of performance or restructuring. This, they added, supported the findings of Vancil (1987) that 60 per cent of CEOs take normal retirement at the appointed time, and that between 80 and 90 per cent retire or leave under usual, expected conditions. Vancil concluded that only 10 per cent of CEO turnover was related to poor performance. They concluded that "The results of the study do not appear to fit the commonly held view that much of CEO turnover is performance caused or, from a more macro perspective, that an increasingly volatile, hostile environment leads to organizational problems, subsequent inferior performance, and rising turnover" (p.50).

As suggested by these authors, this resulting data refuted much of the wider body of literature on the area of CEO succession. This wider literature generally asserted that "increasingly complex and volatile environments make it difficult to achieve performance goals; consequently, more firms experience problems. Failure to achieve goals leads, in turn, to board dissatisfaction and subsequent turnovers" (p.48). Comte and Mihail (1990) expanded on this statement by explaining that:

> Much of the research indicates that, as might be expected, organizational performance is an important determinant of top management turnover. The relationship is not, however, a simple one. External factors such as environmental volatility, resource scarcity and financial risk, and internal factors such as characteristics of the board of directors, size of the firm, and power of the incumbent, may have important effects on the decision to remove the CEO and who will replace him or her (ibid.).

The corporatisation and professionalization processes which were expected by rugby observers to impact upon provincial (and national) rugby organizations "environmental volatility", both internally and externally. The impact of this was described by the continued research of Comte and Mihal (1990) as "increasingly complex and volatile environments make it difficult to achieve performance goals; consequently, more firms experience problems. Failure to achieve goals leads, in turn, to board dissatisfaction and subsequent turnovers" (p.48). "It is reasonable to assume that the

difficulty in which a firm finds itself may be attributed to the incumbent CEO and his or her inability to turn the situation around" (ibid.).

An article by Dalton and Kesner (1985) provided particularly relevant literature to the research study. Their research centred on the debate of selection of an outsider or insider to replace the CEO. The authors reviewed the literature on this subject, and summarized that "They generally conclude that replacement of chief executives from within the organization represents a maintenance strategy. Outside successions, on the other hand, have often been associated with change" (p.750). The article continued that "This basic formula is appealing. Poorly performing companies may well choose outside successors to institute change; organizations with acceptable or better performance may be inclined instead to choose insiders who presumably will adopt maintenance strategies" (p.751)

To test this literature, Dalton and Kesner (1985) examined the 96 companies on the New York Stock Exchange which reported executive succession in one year. They found that outside succession was 16 per cent of appointments, and inside succession was 84 per cent. The authors believed the selection of outsiders for these firms was largely based on the "assumption that outside successors can change policies or embark on major organizational transitions" (p.751).

The earlier cited literature of Comte and Mihal (1990) also provided valuable literature in this area of outside versus insider selection, stating that "Firms experiencing performance problems may tend to choose outside successors, whereas firms with good performance would tend to choose insiders" (p.50). They observed this assertion backed by a strong body of cited literature. Comte and Mihal explained their assertion by saying that outsiders are not inherently committed to the firm's strategies, and therefore can more objectively evaluate the firm's ongoing strategies and initiate appropriate changes. Comte and Mihal cited Dalton and Kesner (1985) and Friedman and Singh (1989) as reporting that "organizations that perform poorly are no more likely to select outsider successors than those performing well" (as cited in Comte and Mihal, 1990). This suggests that rugby unions facing marked changes would be best served by careful selection of the best applicant rather than assuming that an outsider would automatically prove to be the most beneficial appointee to an executive position.

The article also discussed the role of the CEO in the selection process of his replacement. It noted that "major influence by the outgoing CEO on the choice of a successor tends to suggest a normal transition - not one marked by external difficulties or performance problems...76 per cent of the time in their researched organizations, the successor was chosen by the outgoing CEO" (p.49). However, the authors also noted that if the CEO's resignation was perceived to be related to a poor performance, "a board might tend, in such a case, to select the successor without significant input from the incumbent" (p.49).

Tushman et al (1986) add to the debate on insider and outsider succession. They note that "Frame breaking change also involves new executives, usually brought in from outside the organization (or business unit) and placed in key managerial positions. Commitment to the new mission, energy to overcome prevailing inertia, and freedom from prior obligations are all needed to refocus the organization" (p.38). Their article added that:

> *Synergy* within the new structure can be a powerful aid. New executives with a fresh mission, working in a redesigned organization with revised norms and values, backed up with power and status, provide strong reinforcement. The pieces of the revitalized organization pull together, as opposed to piecemeal change where one part of the new organization is out of synch with the old organization (p.38).

A large number of other articles were concentrated on this succession debate. Boekker and Goodstein (1993) researched 67 firms over a 22 year period, and found that in firms with high proportions of insiders on their boards of directors there was a significantly lower likelihood of outsiders replacing incumbent chief executives. The literature cited in this article included that of Cannella and Lubatkin (1993), Furtado and Karan (1990), Vancil (1987) and Walsh and Seward (1990). The article presented one particularly relevant statement, that "Firms in which outsiders have a high degree of influence, either through board membership or ownership, may feel it important to respond to performance downturns by selecting a successor who is not connected with the organisation's past problems" (p.183).

The literature of Fredrickson et al. (1988) was primarily concerned with the causes of CEO succession but also discussed the replacement process. The authors advanced a belief that "large firms usually replace executives with insiders, whereas small firms more often turn to outsiders. These differences are thought to be due in part to a correlate of size - the pool of general management talent" (p.262). To support this belief, they cited the research of Reinganum (1985), who examined the effects of an announced change in the CEO on stock prices. This 1985 research found that prices improved only if "the new executive is an outsider, the firm is small, and the previous office holder departs from the firm" (as cited in Fredrickson et al, 1988, p.268).

The management literature would appear to have implications for sport organizations. It suggests very clear considerations for executive succession. These have a particular relevance for rugby management in this present period of intense change. No research, however, exists on such rugby executive roles.

4.5 THE PLAYERS

The reviewed literature provides a clear indication of the importance of the players in professional sport. Balasoglou (1994) cited the Marketing Manager of the Auckland Warriors professional rugby league organization, Liz Dawson, as saying "The players are the tools that give us a product to sell, and enable us to make a product that is marketable to our part of the audience. It is just the same as business, they have to perform so that the product is attractive" (p.43). The Super League competition, in which the Warriors will play in 1996, was reported to have planned to "really emphasize the personalities of the game, and build them into superstars, replicating North American professional sport" (Super League sees big role, 1995, p.2:3). Shilbury (1990) noted that "The regular ongoing organizational activity is centred on the base activity: the sporting contest. Such contests are not possible without athletes possessing skills suited to providing an outstanding spectacle through competition" (p.10).

Professionalism increases the movement of players due to open offers of material reward (Coakley, 1994) and this increases the importance of the retention of the playing services of younger players in whom investment has been made. The literature of Friend (1991) observed this fact of professional sport by noting that "Errors in the scouting and player movement systems cost thousands, if not millions, of dollars when a player does not produce" (p.293), and added that this lack of production may be a result of the playing services being lost to other sporting organizations. Such scouting and player retention, or otherwise, has been a prominent cause of rugby administration debate and concern (see Chapters Two and Three of this present study).

Reviewed literature reflected this issue's growing importance in New Zealand elite provincial rugby. Dalton (1995) noted that the Auckland Warriors had printed a newspaper advertisement seeking trialists for their under-17 and under-19 teams to compete in the Super League competition. This author stated that "While rugby has fought off league's bid to get the signatures of many senior players, the fight has now shifted to talented players at youth level" (p.B19). He explained how a NZRFU negotiator had been sent to speak to the New Zealand secondary schools representative rugby team, outlining the money available if they stayed in rugby. The Director of Coaching for the Auckland Rugby Union was quoted in this literature, confirming he had signed under-19 representative players to Super-12 contracts.

Widespread literature appeared during the research period regarding the retention of employment or career training opportunities for rugby players when they became professional athletes. McDonald (1995) cited All Black Walter Little asserting that career factors influenced some players in not going to league. Little stated, "A lot of guys in New Zealand have good jobs, and they don't want to leave them to just solely play sport. I've still

got work. I don't probably have to for the next three years, but I'm looking at the bigger picture after rugby" (McDonald, 1995, p.22).

As rugby players were facing proposals of payment for professional rugby the literature on salaries in professional sport was considered in this review. Houlihan and DeBrock observed that "In all sports, player salaries are the single most important team expense" (p.207). Shilbury (1990) noted that "Payments from competing should be the athlete's predominant source of income and training and playing will be the predominant activity in which the athlete is involved. The ability to pay athletes implies the need to generate levels of income appropriate to the levels of payment required for a professional" (p.10).

Payments of professional athletes are linked to contractual agreements between performers and the relevant sport organization. Wong (1991) states that "A contract is an agreement between two or more parties that is enforceable under the law. A contract can be either written or oral, and it must contains a promise of one or both parties to do something in the future" (p.78). The importance of such an agreement is noted by Clement (1991), who believes that in any professional relationship between employer and employee, "A job description which is accurate and comprehensive is necessary to protect both parties" in order to comply with Employment Law (p.232). This will increasingly have a relevance for professional rugby players especially as contracts have implications for player responsibilities which they do not have as "amateurs."

As the movement of players between sporting organizations could be contractually enforced by their employer, this present review briefly turned to literature on transfer systems. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) observe that "The unique nature of the economic structure of the professional sports industry arises from the fact that the team's revenues as well as its access to new players depend not only on its own decision variables, but on the decision variables of the other teams in the league" (p.1307). The authors remark upon differing playing strengths of organizations with the related imbalance of revenue potential, noting this may be rectified by the introduction of a transfer system.

Along with possible developments in contractual responsibilities and player transfers the issue of player unions and associations was also briefly examined. The value of such players' associations in Australasian professional sport was shown in the literature of Dabscheck (1994), who described the actions of the Rugby League Players Union in Sydney. In 1991 this body successfully challenged the legality of the draft system, and forced changes to the generic contract clauses offered to New South Wales Rugby League players. The first signs of such moves in New Zealand elite rugby were originally advocated by All Blacks such as Haden (1988). The introduction of players' representatives to the governance structures of the NZRFU, such as the special committee to consult on tour schedules and more effective administration of the All Blacks, has been a positive

step reflecting the literature on perceived benefits of player-employer linkages.

Players associations and unions are well established in the professional sport scene of North America. As Wong (1991) described, "All of the professional team sports leagues in North America have had collective bargaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of employment for players in their respective leagues" (Won, 1991, p.75). Friend (1991) observed how the National Basketball Association Players' Association has a contract that pays them 53 per cent of the revenue that the individual franchises generate, and the Major League Baseball Players Association is paid 48 per cent of the revenue generated by baseball clubs (p.293).

The role of support staff to the team management personnel in professional sporting organizations was noted by Mason and Paul (1988). This literature described the team physician as being "Normally available on a part-time basis, during training and games" (p. 71). The position of equipment manager was described as being "most important in the option of both intercollegiate and professional sports" (ibid.). This individual is "concerned with selecting, purchasing, using, accounting for and maintaining supplies and equipment that are necessary for the operation of the professional team" (ibid.). Mason and Paul (1988) also emphasize the importance of the athletic trainer, observing that the National Athletic Trainers Association was set up in the United States in 1950. Most athletic trainers now have degrees in physical education and have studied athletic injuries, assert Mason and Paul. They note that "To be most effective, the athletic trainer needs a training room that is large enough to house the equipment and personnel who will use the facility. The training room should be centrally located in the gym, with access to both outdoor and indoor facilities" (p.1).

4.6 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

No specific literature was found to adequately answer the first of the remaining research questions, "*Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*". However a body of literature was reviewed which did built a broad profile of those involved in the wider sport management field. J.Cameron (1993) found New Zealand sport managers are usually male, European, under-qualified and had a history in the sport they managed.

No specific literature was found on the final proposed research question, "*How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*". A severe deficiency was uncovered in the area of academic literature of rugby management in New Zealand. The literature which does exist is almost invariably anecdotal, which handicaps the advancement of study in this area. As the rising professional dimensions of the game impact upon the management of the game, the

literature identified the lack of existing research for the game's management to consult for data and guidance. The rugby management literature noted public perception of the successful management of the Auckland Warriors and this has highlighted perceived inadequacies in the management of New Zealand rugby. The professionalization of playing in the game is seen to necessitate increased professionalism in the management of the game.

Given the lack of literature detail on rugby management the review turned to key participant perspectives, notably the New Zealand All Blacks. These views noted such needs as player income, marketing, innovative management, consideration of players and forward planning. This strong body of New Zealand player literature clearly indicated issue for rugby managers to consider.

The CEO position is considered vital in organizations. In a climate of change when new appointments are made to fit perceived new demands in sport these appointments are critical. CEO succession is commonly linked to poor organizational performance, but this was disputed by the literature of Comte and Mihal (1990). The assumption that poor organizational performance should lead to an outsider being appointed is complex and does not have full agreement in the literature.

The literature revealed that the players are considered vital in a sporting organization, as the focus of the organization. As emergent professionalism increases the mobility of athletes, an emphasis has increasingly been placed on retention of younger players. The organization which develops these players has a material interest in retaining their playing services, as a significant financial investment has been made in them, and a return on this investment is desired.

The reviewed literature reflects the emphasis on players retaining employment or vocational training while they are professional athletes, and also suggests that players did not have a realistic understanding of the realities of being contracted athletes. Players' associations are increasing in professional rugby.

Sport management is a comparatively young academic field. This is especially true in the New Zealand setting. This may explain, in part, the lack of significant research and be reflected in the unavailability of related literature. The two unanswered research questions were thus seen as the possible focus for further research. The literature review, whilst not answering these, did provide the researcher with an enhanced set of understandings in dimensions of sport management related to rugby.

PART B: METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The literature review concluded with two research questions unresolved. This chapter outlines the methodology used to seek answers to the research questions. The qualitative methodology primarily drew upon case study, interviews and questionnaires, and their relevance to the field research is explained.

5.1 Introduction
5.2 Qualitative Research
  5.2.1 The case study
  5.2.2 Interviews
  5.2.3 Life histories
5.3 Quantitative Research
  5.3.1 Questionnaires
5.4 Research Considerations
  5.4.1 Data analysis
  5.4.2 Triangulation
  5.4.3 Validity
  5.4.4 Ethics
5.5 Summary and Review

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The challenge of locating appropriate answers to the tentative research questions was not resolved in the literature review. The two questions for which research literature was lacking were:

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*
- *How do the professionalisation and corporatisation forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

The researcher was faced with actively seeking answers to these questions. The parameters of research were set, in paRt, with the terminology of the questions. *Elite* was taken as the highest level of national rugby, the first

division competition, and *management* was considered as the governance and senior union strata, that is the Board of Directors, Chief Executive and departmental head.

In critically considering the research questions the researcher was seeking a methodology which would generate insights and perceptions from participants affected by change. It was felt that the voices of those who are in the organisation would provide unique perspectives with which, it was thought, those affected by change in other rugby unions would identify. The local elite provincial rugby union was selected as an appropriate setting for such research and the researcher had established prior relations with key union persons.

Trow (1957) noted that the research question had implications for selection of an appropriate research design and techniques. The research problem in the present questions presented to the researcher the need to obtain dimensions of participant voice and the need for some underpinning (or relatively objective confirmation) of these.

5.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

The aim of the research was to provide answers to the two research questions. These answers were considered to have a strong human dimension, and the potential to evoke richness in detail and depth through participant perspectives (albeit with human biases and attendant predispositions) so the research was correspondingly oriented towards qualitative methods. This form of research has also been called a variety of names, including ethnographic, naturalistic, interpretive, grounded, phenomenological, subjective and participant observational (Thomas and Nelson, 1990, p.321). Qualitative research offers the researcher an opportunity to explore participant perspectives of perceived realities of the organisation to which they belong. The quality of the research rests upon its veracity, its representation of the daily and organisational realities of their environment and the ability of the researcher to answer a basic question: "What goes on around here?". The researcher was seeking a methodology which would give insights into organisational life in a rugby union confronting change. Qualitative research provided such methodologies.

Definitions of this range of research methodologies are numerous, and usually center on the notion of gaining rich, deep non-quantitative data, epitomised by Abercrombie et al. (1984) in their definition as that "which is not based on precise measurement and quantitative claims" (p.278). Rist (1975) defines qualitative research as "a direct observation of human activity and interaction in an ongoing, naturalistic fashion" (cited in Rogers, 1984, p.86). This is mirrored by Jary and Jary (1991) who describe qualitative research as relying on a skilled or "empathetic interviewer or observer to collect unique data (p.513). The definition of Denzin and Lincoln (1994) centers upon "the studied use of empirical materials - case

study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional and visual texts - that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals' lives" (p.2).

This form of research has been traditionally linked with the fields of sociology, anthropology and education, and has not developed a strong historical link with management research, with which this research was concerned. The use of qualitative research in sport science is relatively new (Thomas and Nelson, 1990), and, arguably, is even newer in sport management. However this does not mean the method is not applicable to sport management research. Gummesson (1991) notes that "Qualitative methodology provides powerful tools for research in management and business administration", and continues that "A greater awareness of the possibilities and limitations of carrying out research by means of qualitative methods ought to lead to improvements in the quality and usefulness of academic research in business administration" (p.83), and further support is given by Fineman and Mangham (1983).

The beneficial possibilities of qualitative research center upon the data collection being described as soft or rich in its description of people, issues and perceptions and conversations, which are not easily handled by statistical and scientific procedures. Fineman and Mangham (1983) note that the "Richness has something to do with 'variety', 'depth', 'realness' and 'colour', attributes which qualitative researchers frequently deny to 'number crunchers' (p.297). Locke (1988) underlines this by observing that qualitative research is devoted to complete and thorough description and analysis. More specifically, Sage (1989) argues for the use of qualitative research in physical education and sport research, and suggests that qualitative research approaches are selected as scientific methods are perceived as being narrow and increasingly sterile.

The most common criticism of qualitative research is that it is "insufficiently precise", as noted by Hammersley (1992). However this author also argues that precision is not necessarily more important than accuracy, which is as important in qualitative research as it is in quantitative. His view is backed by that of Krathwohl (1993), who observes that the qualitative description "is in words, picturing not only what happened but also qualifying the description with adjectives and adverbs to portray it more clearly" (p.29).

The qualitative research which this thesis utilises is primarily inductive, which is defined as "The process by which a general statement suggesting a regular association between two or more variables is derived from a series of empirical observations". However Hammersley (1992) believes "all research involves both deduction and induction in the broad sense of those terms; in all research we move from ideas to data as well as from data to ideas" (p.168). This approach allows research problems to emerge from the data, and remain open to interpretations differing from those initially held,




Figure 5.1. Methodological structure of the research

as noted by Krathwohl (1993, p. 311). While Pugh (1983) states that the notion that field workers can begin 'tabula rasa' is discredited, field methods for qualitative research differ greatly as is their point of entry.

Some qualitative researchers employ a highly structured approach to fieldwork and data analysis while "others rely less on preordained ways of seeing and sense-making" (Thornton, 1993, p.68).

The latter point is further evidenced by Krathwohl (1993) with a belief that "Qualitative researchers typically begin their observations with a target of interest but are open to whatever emerges of significance, changing their data collection accordingly" (p.29). Spindler (1982) provides further support for this explanation, stating that "Hypotheses and questions for study emerge as the study proceeds in the setting selected for observation. Judgement in what is significant to study is deferred until the orienting phase of the field study has been completed"(cited in Thornton, 1993, p.68). This inductive approach also helps in the later process of analysis. "The more theoretical the question, the more difficult it is to analyse the answers" (Mason and Paul, 1988, p.88).

In the present study the target of interest was clear, the eliciting of rugby management perspectives, and the literature supported the intention to explore these and to build upon initial interviews with subsequent interviews and questionnaires as emerging features were noted as possibly being significant.

5.2.1 The Case Study

The primary intention of the present study is to explore the perceptions and perspectives of the key persons in a sport management organisation in order to frame a picture of the individuals involved and the processes affecting its management. To gain the desired depth of research dimensions, it was decided that the organisation with which the researcher had existing links would be used as a case study subject.

In this particular study the *case* selected was one leading provincial rugby union. On one hand this offered the opportunity for in-depth exploration of participants' perspectives but on the other there was an awareness that the case study union might not be representative, it may not provide a normative example of unions in change. The researcher accepted this caveat as it was felt the selected union was at the forefront of change and could provide data for consideration by other unions, and sport organisations, facing change.

The case study method involves the detailed examination of a specific case, which is defined by Smith (1978) as a "bounded, integrated system" (cited in Stake, 1994, p.236). Another definition of the case is provided by Hammersley (1992), who describes a "phenomenon (located in space/time) about which data are collected and/or analysed and that corresponds to the type of phenomena to which the main claims of a study relate" (p.184).

The observation of a single subject or case has a rich history in scientific research. "From Hippocrates to Pavlov to Skinner, scientists have made notable discoveries and advancements based upon the single case study" (Silva and Parkhouse, 1982, p.50). Silva and Parkhouse (1982) observed that the utilisation of single case study designs in coaching and sport management to test various behavioural theories was an unexplored area (p.51). Within a decade, Gummesson (1991) observed that "The use of the case study for research purposes is becoming increasingly widespread in management research" (p.73).

Stake (1994) has identified three types of case studies, each undertaken for a different reason. He states the intrinsic case study is undertaken because further understanding of the particular case is wanted, without considerations for representativeness. Gummesson (1991) has described this as the specific conclusion case study. Conversely Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) have described this type of case study as applied research, which is intended to lead to the solution of specific problems. They contend that research type "is commonly used at Masters' level, although to gain academic approval it is still important to try to explain what is happening, rather than simply describing things" (p.7).

The second type of case study identified by Stake (1994) is the instrumental type. This examines a specific case in order to provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory, so the case study facilitates our understanding of something else or some other situation. This is described as pure theory by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991). Stake's third type is the collective case study. This is extended to several cases, in order to provide better understanding or theorising to a wider population. Gummesson (1991) has labelled this the general conclusion case study.

This thesis involves elements of the first two types identified by Stake. The research is intrinsic in that it is primarily concerned with the specific case of the subject organisation and attends to personal voices of persons in that organisation. However it contains strong elements of the instrumental, in that the research, being the first of its kind in New Zealand, provides some insight into, and understanding of, the managerial impacts of corporatisation and professionalisation. Thus the case study research in this thesis was seen, by the researcher, as providing valuable theoretical data for sport management in general, and elite New Zealand rugby management in particular.

The major concern surrounding the case study research method is that of generalisation. Research may be given added value by the application of its findings to other settings. In relation to a range of research methods, "the case study involves buying greater detail and likely accuracy of information about particular cases at the cost of being less able to make effective generalisations to a larger population of cases" (Hammersley, 1992, p.186). As findings may be unrepresentative of a larger population, the common reaction is to deny that case studies are intended to be

representative or typical in the sense that is true of the findings of surveys (ibid., p.159).

While accepting that the case study may offer a weaker basis for generalisation to large finite populations than certain quantitative methods, it is not true that there is no basis for such generalisation, or that the researcher cannot improve and assess the generalising of case study findings. It may be claimed by the case study researcher that the particular setting investigated is typical of some larger whole or aggregate (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). This is usually through the researcher claiming their research topic is typical in certain relevant respects to a wider population. If this claim can be verified, the implication is that what is attributable to the case is attributable to all or most of the population (ibid.)

In order to justify the generalisability of the study, the case must be understood to have typical elements of the wider population of settings. The researcher must clearly delineate the population to which generalisation will be made, and also present evidence about the validity of that generalisation. Specific actions were taken in the methodological process of the present study to improve generalisability, such as including the CEOs of each of the first division unions in the research so as to a clearer picture of the wider elite provincial rugby management sector. The fullness of research discussion and presentation of results is seen, by the researcher, as providing sport managers with sufficient clarity to enable them to make decisions on this case study's relevance and generalisation to their own settings.

The case study research involved in this research does have elements which can be generalised to a wider population. The population most directly related is that of first division New Zealand provincial rugby unions. Several of these unions have management structures similar to that of the subject union, and are subjected to very similar forces of change. For this reason the results of this case study may be directly attributable to these other unions. Some results may also be applicable to a wider population, that of the group of larger sport specific organisations in New Zealand. These organisations commonly face forces of change, currently centred around the forces of increased commercialism and professional management experienced by the subject union.

Another important reason for selecting the case study method was that a relationship had already been established with the 'gatekeepers' to the organisation. Crampton and Jones (1988) note the importance of negotiation of research with senior personnel as early in the project as possible, which allows access to most areas of the organisation. The researcher followed this observation, maintaining a dialogue with management in the organisation while the research focus was being cemented. Gummesson (1991) stated that "Access has already been defined as the researcher's number one problem", and in the current research this problem was avoided through the use of pre-existing trusts and understandings.

However, while this existing relationship was very beneficial in allowing swift access to the organisation, it also raised concerns over the level of objectivity of the researcher. Peshkin (1988) stated that "one's subjectivity is like a garment that cannot be removed" (as cited in Thornton, 1993, p.69), and it was never disputed or hidden that the researcher had links with the organisation he was analysing. Despite concerns over the threats of these links to the objectivity, it was believed by the researcher and his supervisor that the possible biases, or 'going native' and adopting informant viewpoints, were far outweighed by the benefits in access and knowledge. In addition, the data and discourses were checked by an academic colleague to examine an accurate representation of respondent views.

5.2.2 Interviews

Within the umbrella case-study method used in this research, interviews were utilised as the primary research tool. Thomas and Nelson (1990) state that "the interview is undoubtedly the most common source of data in qualitative studies" (p.326). An interview can be defined as a "face-to-face verbal interview in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to get information or expressions of opinions or beliefs from another person or persons" (Greendorfer and Hasbrook, 1991, p.30). Interviews centre upon the eliciting of perceptions, views and information from the interview subject (as outlined by Griffin and Templin, 1989, p.403).

Interviews are of special value for qualitative researchers for a number of reasons. Unlike questionnaires, the face-to-face interaction apparent in the interview situation allows the confirmation of understanding of meaning between the interviewer and respondent. Interviews can be used to elicit information from individuals who might otherwise ignore the completion and return of a questionnaire or conform with its constraints despite having additional information (Krathwohl, 1993, p.369-70).

The interviews in this research were not conducted in a positivist manner, which assumes there is a single reality, or one answer to a question. That approach, as described by Greendorfer and Hasbrook (1991), is based on the assumption that all respondents perceive reality in the same way. The interviews conducted for this research were conducted in a naturalistic manner, with the assumption that multiple realities exist because individuals see things differently depending on the situation or context in which they find themselves.

Not limited to one form, "Interviewing has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses" (Fontana and Frey, 1994, pp. 361). In structured interviews the interviewer has a set list of questions which have been constructed before the interview, and these questions "are answered rather than considered, rephrased, re-ordered, discussed and analysed" (ibid.). "Thus all respondents receive the same set of questions, asked in the same

order or sequence, by an interviewer who has been trained to treat every interview situation in a like manner (ibid., p. 363). This form of interview has been criticised by sociologists (Greendorfer and Hasbrook, 1991), because of the artificiality of the relationship with those who are being questioned. The structured interview is most commonly used by survey researchers, due to the comparative ease with which data can be analysed.

Contrasting with this type of interview, the semi-structured or informal interview sees the interviewer play a less dominant role. While these "do not represent an entirely 'natural' setting, it is often argued that their closeness to ordinary conversation renders them approximations to the normal" (Hammersley, 1992, p.164). They allow the interviewer to obtain similar information from each respondent, by drawing upon a common set of questions in an informal interaction in which the order and phrasing of questions is left up to the interviewer. The respondents are free to answer how they wish, and are not limited to a fixed set of questions.

These types of interviews may provide a greater degree of detailed data than the wholly structured variant. Through the utilisation of the experiences of others, the semi-structured type of interview can help the researcher to gain access to situations that through time, place or situation may be otherwise closed. Due to the conversational nature of the interview, points which the respondent make can be elaborated upon at the prompting of the interviewer. "On-the-spot follow-up questions are possible, enabling the interviewer to obtain additional important information" (Mason and Paul, 1988, p.1). The conversational element of the technique can be maximised as a research tool if a rapport is developed with the respondent.

However the researcher engaging in semi-structured or unstructured interviews needs a more detailed knowledge of the interview subject, so this knowledge can be expressed in questions in order to elicit greater degree of detail from the respondent. While this conversational element is valuable in providing a depth of understanding, it also necessitates a greater amount of preparatory work for the interview as "Prior to conducting interviews, the interviewer needs to carefully research the topic of the interview and prepare appropriate questions" (ibid., p.1)

The basic form of interview used in the research then, was the semi-structured interview. This allowed the interview to move away from predicted lines of dialogue to other areas perceived as important by the respondents. As it was not always possible to preconceive the areas of importance of each respondent, the semi-structured nature of interviews allowed each individual respondent to have a degree of control over the direction of the conversation, while basic research areas were ensured to be covered. This style of data collection allowed certain areas of the research to be commented on by every respondent, while the areas in which respondents had expertise and knowledge were explored to build the overall strength and depth of the research.

Fontana and Frey (1994) observed that the unstructured interview is rarely conducted in isolation, but is commonly part of a broader programme of research. This is particularly true of the present research. The researcher had sufficient confidence in the present knowledge of the research subject to allow interviews to move into areas not previously planned, while including a variety of generic questions in each interview which could be answered in a number of ways by respondents. Thus the interview type utilised could be termed semi-structured. This had the dual advantage of gaining data that complemented that which was gained through the questionnaires, while allowing for the serendipitous gain of additional valuable data.

While conducting these semi-structured interviews, the researcher noted his growing use of the non-directive approach to interviewing. This approach requires the interviewer to rephrase and reflect to the respondent the main points and significance of what the respondent seems to be saying. In essence the researcher rephrases the respondent's answer, in order to clarify and enforce the emergent themes of data. This clarification of perceptions is important as "The spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how carefully we word the questions and report or code the answers" (Fontana and Frey, 1994, pp. 361).

The clarification also serves to build rapport with the interviewee, as this is perceived to foster more open responses and to indicate to the interviewee the importance attached to their responses. In addition, it is valuable in prompting the respondent to elaborate on the answer, which has the effect of increasing the comparative input. Elements of this non-directive approach emerged in interviews in the present study when the researcher felt the interview had touched upon important aspects of the research, and felt the need to maximise responses in these areas.

While aware of the possibilities of the focused interview, as identified by Merton, Fiske and Kendall (1956), the researcher did not utilise this form of interview. This interview method allows the respondent to set the initial course of the interview, and then increasingly focuses on the researcher's agenda as the interview progresses. The interview opens with broad questions and non-directive responses, then moves to semi-structured questions and finally to those which are structured. In one situation this approach was utilised, when interviewing a senior manager of the union in relation to a draft questionnaire. The interview opened an unscheduled and unexpected tangent, and valuable data for later analysis were gained unexpectedly.

Having an awareness of the potential value of the emerging data proffered in an impromptu manner, the researcher slowly increased the focus of discussion upon the planned agenda, while exploring themes which would be discussed more fully at a later date. This, unexpectedly, allowed an insight into perceptions of this key individual, which could more fully be explored in later interviews. All interviewing in this thesis was conducted

in a one-to-one situation. The researcher felt that a relationship was needed with the respondents in order to facilitate the discussion.

To allow all research informants the opportunity to express a fullness of views the researcher placed a statement on each questionnaire expressing the possibility of individual interviews with respondents who wished to do this. One respondent utilised this opportunity.

The research included thirty-three interview respondents. The organisation areas in which these respondents came from is presented in figure 5.2. Each of the nine members of the Board of Directors was interviewed, as was each of the managers of the case study provincial rugby union. The CEO who resigned during the research period was included in this grouping, as was his replacement. One staff member was interviewed, as this respondent had completed a questionnaire and requested further input. In the team management area, the coach and manager of the organisation's representative team participated in interviews, as did the immediate past assistant coach. This individual was chosen as he was perceived by other

Respondent Grouping	Number of Respondents	Respondent positions
Governance	11	- External Directors (7) - Internal Directors (2) --- - President - Immediate past Chairman
Management	6	- Current CEO - Former CEO - Marketing Manager - Rugby Manager - Finance and Administration Manager - Director of Coaching
Staff	1	- Staff member
Team Management	5	- Representative Coach - Representative Manager - Immediate past assistant coach - National coach - Director of Coaching, national union
CEOs	9	- All first division unions (8) - One second division union
Media	1	- Murray Deaker

Figure 5.2. Interview respondents

respondents to be a deep thinker about the provincial game, and able to articulate these beliefs. The coach of the national side was interviewed, as was the Director of Coaching for the national union.

The CEO of each first division provincial union in the national championship was interviewed, as well as the CEO of the second division union which had been the first provincial union to alter the traditional Management Committee governance structure. The president of the subject union was interviewed, as was the immediate past chairman of the organisation (who was also the deputy-chairman of the national union). The final respondent was the rugby media person Murray Deaker who offered an observer's perspective on the changes without being directly involved in these, and asked for his name to be used with his comments. No other person is named in the results.

5.2.3 Life Histories

As one of the two research questions centred on the profile of people involved in elite provincial rugby management, the interview process was important in gaining broad life history details from interview respondents. This form of eliciting information was used instead of the questionnaire as details and misunderstandings could be clarified in the dialogue, perceptions of these life histories of respondents discussed and unexpected patterns of personal history explored.

As a research tool, the life history method essentially centers upon the respondent's perceptions of the life. Dollard (1949) explains, "a deliberate attempt is made to define the growth of a person in a cultural milieu and to make theoretical sense of it" (as cited in Shaw, 1980, p.226). Most definitions of life history have several elements in common: they emphasise the importance of the teller's sociocultural milieu; they focus upon the perspectives of one unique individual; they have a time depth, so that a personal history also reveals matters relevant to a region's or group's history; and they relate that history from the point of view of indigenous narrators (Shaw, 1980).

This focus has led to the dominance of social research influences upon the life history method, emphasised by the amount of literature on life history research which is located in sociological discourse, rather than business and management. In fact, this method is not even mentioned in the management research works of Gummesson (1991) or Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991).

Goodson (1992) makes a distinction between a life history and a life story, in that the story seeks to understand the perceptual developments of an individual. In this research the data sought was of the life history as defined by Goodson. The 'hard data' were factually oriented, regarding age, employment positions previously held, length of tenure, rugby playing experience, professional background, qualifications gained. This information was open to bias, especially when provided by the respondent with no

request by the researcher for evidence of truth, but cross-checked, where possible to ensure its validity.

To gain the basic data on individuals the researcher examined relevant articles with information on the key individuals. Data which exist on the professional development of these individuals is very limited. Following the belief of Shaw (1980) that "The writing of life histories uses a methodology which falls under the general headings of personal documentation and oral testimony" (p.226), The limited print data were supplemented with interviews. These interviews provided the researcher with an understanding of the personal context of each director especially, on one hand, providing insight into their life experiences and confirmable elements and idiosyncratic dimensions such as motivation and emotions regarding rugby.

5.3 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

While the methodology outlined thus far is fundamentally qualitative, an element of the research was concerned with the use of quantitative research methods. Quantitative methodology "is usually regarded as referring to the collection and analysis of numerical data" (Marshall, 1994, p.432). This form of research allows for systematic collection and presentation of data in numerical form. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods maybe considered, at the risk of over-simplification, as the distinction between questions of opinion and questions of fact. The qualitative questions of opinion were those of managerial perception and beliefs, while factual questions are those about age, level of education, length of employment and occupation. Core interview questions, asked of each informant, were developed, checked with the researcher's supervisor and trialed on colleagues.

Silva and Parkhouse (1982) believe that flexibility in methodology should serve to remind us that the nature of the questions often defines the manner in which the answer must be pursued, and it is this belief that is followed in this research. Stenhouse (1980) believes that "It seems quite clear that descriptive case studies should not confine themselves to words" (p.1), and this case study has not. Further justification for the use of quantitative methods in this research is provided by Hammersley (1992), who observes that "Not all quantitative research is concerned with hypothesis testing some quantitative research is explicitly concerned with theory-generation" (p.168).

It is widely held that the two methodologies, quantitative and qualitative, exist as opposing paradigms (Hammersley 1992). Thomas and Nelson (1990) observe that "Qualitative research is often depicted as being the antithesis of the more traditional quantitative methods" (p.323). However the distinction between the two is misleading "because it obscures the

breadth of issues and arguments involved in the methodology of social research" (Hammersley, 1992, p.159).

Miles and Huberman (1984) characterise the distinction between the two methods in terms of the use of words (qualitative) rather than numbers (quantitative). However this distinction is disceiving as most research use quantifying terminology. Little distinction is made between the two in this research, which drew upon qualitative and quantitative research methods, and the forms of data elicitation used have elements of both qualitative and quantitative research.

5.3.1 Questionnaires

Conducting thirty-three one hour interviews was not perceived to provide the spread of data needed to adequately answer the research questions. This allowed the perceptions and views of key individuals to be known, and elements of life history research to be developed, yet restricted response the opportunity to meet with all union staff and club chairmen, because of the time needed to be given to each interview. The desire of the researcher to obtain perspectives from all significant union populations necessitated consideration of other research methods. Thomas and Nelson (1990) note the use of survey methods in qualitative research. Questionnaires, which can be described as "a set of questions given to respondents and designed to provide information relevant to the research area" (Abercrombie et al., 1988, p.341), were developed to survey groups who were not interviewed. While interviews allowed the detailed gathering of perceptions of a limited number of individuals, the use of questionnaires allowed the responses of a wide variety of individuals to be incorporated into the research and quantified at a basal but informative level.

Mason and Paul (1988) clarify their belief in the value of survey research in asking "Why are surveys so important to the administrator of professional sports programs?" The answer is that it is only through surveys, or questionnaires, "that specific kinds of information can be gathered that will help the administrator evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and will be helpful to the administrator in making important decisions" (p.83). While questioning the point that it is *only* through surveys that such information can be gathered, it is conceded that it is certainly *more efficient* to gain certain types of information through the survey, or questionnaire, research tool. This is recognised by Mason and Paul (1988), who observe that "Advantages of the questionnaire are that it permits wide coverage for a minimum expenditure of both money and effort; it affords wider geographic coverage than any other technique; it reaches people who are difficult to contact. Greater coverage results in greater validity of the results, by promoting the selection of a larger and more representative sample" (p.84).

The two questionnaire groupings were finalised as being the union staff, and the chairmen of each of the union's twenty-one clubs. The researcher valued the input of the staff members, but an increase in the number of interviews to include was not practicable in terms of realities of time, costs of travel and mutual convenience of meeting times. For this reason it was decided questionnaires would be distributed to these two groups. It was originally planned that delegates from the clubs to the club governing body, rather than chairmen, would be researched, but after consultation with the Rugby Manager it was decided that the questionnaire should be distributed to the club chairmen, as they were more influential in the management and administration of club rugby.

As noted by Marshall (1994), "Good questionnaires require a great deal of care and effort, to ensure that the questions are clear and easy to answer, to exclude leading questions unless by conscious design, to prompt and probe respondents' recollections of events that may not always be recent, and to shape the interview overall so that it is a pleasant and interesting experience for respondents" (p.433). With such considerations in mind the questionnaires were drafted several times, and completed by a sample population on each occasion. This sample population comprised the researcher's supervisor, adviser, fellow post-graduate students, a small number of players from the researcher's sports team, and a selection of friends from outside the sport setting. These sample studies realised a number of expected and unexpected problems, and proved invaluable in refining the draft questionnaires toward an acceptable form (See Appendices A (staff) and C (club chairpersons) for copies of the questionnaires).

"Questions may be closed-ended, in which case the respondent simply selects from predetermined answers such as yes/no in the simplest form, or from a list of predetermined answers in more complicated forms. Or the questions may be open-ended, in which case respondents answer as they wish" (Abercrombie et al., 1988, p.341). The questionnaires constructed used both types of questions.

The response rates gained from the questionnaires were relatively high, especially in the club chairmen sector. Figure 5.3 highlights the response rates for the questionnaires. The staff response rate was expected to be 100 per cent, due to the limited population and the proximity of this response group to the research focus point. A lower response rate was expected form the club chairmen, and the final high percentage was pleasing in terms of heightening research data validity.

Responses to closed questions were quick to complete and analyse, but the data gained from them may be superficial (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991, p.120). These questions were supplemented by the use of

Response group	Response rate
Staff	80%
Club chairmen	81%
Total	81%

Figure 5.3. Questionnaire response rate

ranking scales for a number of questions. These allowed a greater degree of latitude in responses, but were still relatively simple to analyse. The use of open questions was emphasised toward the end of each questionnaire. These questions required a statement, usually an opinion, as an answer. They allowed the possibility of obtaining unanticipated perspectives on an issue, but conversely their completion and analysis can be difficult and time consuming for those being surveyed.

5.4 RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS

5.4.1 Data Analysis

Qualitative methods utilised in this research provided an inordinate amount of raw data. The use of a tape recorder was important in the preservation of entire interviews for later analysis, but it also ensured a plethora of often peripheral verbal data which required careful classification and analysis. For this reason the problem of content analysis was real early in this research project. The researcher spread the interview schedule out so as not to be overwhelmed by the in-flow of information, and to allow for critical self-reflection upon interview techniques and the quality of related data. Greendorfer and Hasbrook (1991) advocate the creation of categories to classify information, and this was done from the time data were received.

The data were analysed inductively, so rather than fitting data into preconceived categories on an observation instrument or explaining data in terms of a theoretical framework identified at the outset of the study, data were organised as the study evolved. Subsets originally attached to one section of the study became reattached to others as their place in the research case study became clarified. Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously in a cyclical fashion, and themes were confirmed, discarded, and modified as relevant data emerged. While in a qualitative study it is possible that this on-going collection and analysis of data may lead to a shift away from the focusing questions chosen at the beginning of the study, this did not happen to a significant degree in this study. The researcher's inductive approach had a broad process similar to that of grounded theory, but did not follow the espoused details of that methodology.

Riley (1990) notes that "Summaries make it much easier to get an overview and to think about your data as a whole, provided that they are not too extensive" (p.53). For this reason, and to provide a workable

document, summaries of each area of research were constructed. The researcher was vigilant in ensuring that this process did not lose valuable data. Riley recognises that "summarising has its disadvantages. You are bound to lose some potential ideas if you abandon the fullness of the original data" (ibid.). For this reason the data were presented in a relatively full form in this thesis.

5.4.2 Triangulation

Triangulation is the "application and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzin, 1978, p.522), and is intended to provide more reliable and generalisable conclusions drawn from the data. The logic of this combination is outlined by Todd (1979), "Given basic principles of geometry, multiple viewpoints allow for greater accuracy. Similarly, organisational researchers can improve the accuracy of their judgements by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon" (p.602).

Thomas and Nelson (1990) believe that the value of triangulation stems from it being "a form of quality control, achieved by combining methods, observers and data sources" (p.321). This multiplicity is intended to "Provide a means by which qualitative researchers test the strength of their interpretations" (ibid., p.332). Harvey and MacDonald (1993) support this view of triangulation, adding that "Research methods are not neutral in how they represent the world, therefore some researchers use more than one approach as a means of dealing with this problem in a study" (p.22). This is further emphasised by Todd (1979), with the observation that "The effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premise that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another" (p.603). Todd also notes that "Although it has always been observed that each method has assets and liabilities, triangulation purports to exploit the assets and neutralise, rather than compound, the liabilities allowing researchers to be more confident of their results. This is the overall strength of the multi-method design" (p.608).

"However, it is naive to think that merely combining different kinds of data 'will unproblematically add up to produce a more complete picture'" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; as cited in Thomas and Nelson, 1990, p.321). There does exist the possibility that multiple methods may indeed magnify error. "In other words, each method has some error associated with it, and some methods have more than others. This has a multiplying effect" (Thomas and Nelson, 1990, p.333). Hammersley (1992) also concurs that triangulation does not necessarily reduce bias:

> Increased precision may often be of value, but is not always so. It may not be of value because the level of precision already achieved is sufficient for our purposes, or because the likely costs of achieving greater precision are greater than the probable benefits. The latter is an especially important point in the context

> of case study research., where a relatively wide focus is adopted (pp.162-163).

Denzin (1978) distinguishes four types of triangulation as part of a multiple method approach; data triangulation, using differing time, space and person; investigator triangulation, which engages multiple observers; theory triangulation, which uses more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the phenomenon; and methodological triangulation, which utilises more than one method, design, technique of data collection or technique of data analysis (ibid.). This present study primarily utilised the latter method, -methodological triangulation. The use of interviews, life histories and questionnaires complement each other and in many cases provide directly comparable data. Todd (1979) provides a theoretical base for this framework by identifying "qualitative data and analysis function as the glue that cements the interpretation of multi-method results. In one respect, qualitative data are used as the critical counterpoint to quantitative methods...Thus enters the artful researcher who uses the qualitative data to enrich and brighten the portrait" (p.609).

The researcher viewed the inductive analysis of emergent data as being a form of triangulation as these were checked against previous data and information from other dimensions of the research. Telephone calls and follow-up discussions were also utilised to double check on phases of research data.

5.4.3 Validity

Linked to the issue of triangulation is the question of internal validity, the power to link variables within a research study. Goetz and LeCompte (1984) believe that qualitative research faces some of the same threats to internal validity as other types of research. Merriam (1988) has stated that internal validity deals with the question of how one's findings match reality (as cited in Thomas and Nelson, 1990, p.336). He listed six strategies to ensure internal validity: triangulation; plausibility checks of taking data and interpretations back to the subjects; long-term data collection and repeated observations; peer examination and evaluation of findings; involving the participants in all phases of the research; and the clarification of the researcher's own bias and theoretical orientation at the outset of the study (ibid.). The present study utilised all of these techniques except that of long-term data collection and repeated observation.

External validity was also considered in this study. Also described as user generalisability, this centers upon the applicability of the findings of the study to other situations, and is common practice especially in medicine and law. Goetz and LeCompte (1984) use the term 'transferability' to refer to the degree to which the qualitative researcher uses and communicates the theoretical frameworks, definitions, and research techniques that are accessible to and understood by other researchers in the same or related fields (Thomas and Nelson, 1990, p.321). In this case the external validity

relates the research to other elite rugby unions and sporting organisations faced with the movement toward management of a professional sport or a corporatised organisation.

5.4.4 Ethics

Ethical dimensions of the research were considered by the researcher. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) note that "When using qualitative research methods, such as open interviews, the researcher has far more control about what information is gathered, how it is recorded and how it is interpreted" (p.65). In this research project the researcher was aware that the selection of subjects placed control on sources of information. Thus, the field of enquiry was deliberately broad to allow for the subject union governors and employees to provide perspectives on the researched area. The full consent of interview subjects was given following the researcher fully informing them of the nature of the research.

The Code of Ethical Practice of the National Oral History Association of New Zealand (NOHANZ) and the guidelines of the Massey University Ethics Committee were closely followed in order to ensure a positive ethical framework. Initially the researcher informed the interviewee of the purposes and focus of the research, and of the focus of the particular interview. Following this the interviewee was informed of the extent of dissemination and use of the information gained from the interview. This follows the observation of Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) that "In most cases we can assume that it is the researcher who has this control and ownership [of data], and that therefore they must exercise due ethical responsibility by not publicising or circulating any information that is likely to harm the interests of individual informants, particularly the less powerful ones" (p.65). The interview subject was asked about any areas they felt improper for discussion, and these preferences were documented and observed.

In the course of the interview every effort was made to prompt informative dialogue, through perceptive enquiry grounded in thorough research about the subject matter and the interviewee. The interviews were conducted with an emphasis on objectivity, respect and professionalism, especially in the relation building stage. Every interview was treated as a confidential conversation, the contents of which were disseminated only as previously determined by agreement with the interviewee. The researcher also attempted to ensure that recordings of the interview were made to the highest possible technical standard, in order to have a high quality primary record of the interview.

The full transcription of each interview provided for accurate checking of illustrative extracts. These full transcriptions are available at request from the author and are able to be analyzed in order to ascertain the setting in which quotes were made.

5.5 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

The literature review left two research questions for which the researcher sought answers, so a research methodology was constructed to gain such answers. The qualitative methodology which was formulated drew upon the use of the case study research. This would maximise existing access privileges to the organisation selected, and would provide a greater degree of depth and detail to the research. Possible researcher dispositions were identified with their impact on the objectivity of the research being a constant factor for consideration. Problems over generalisability of this case study research were negated, to some extent, by the input of CEOs from all first division rugby unions.

Interviews were the primary research tool used under the qualitative umbrella of research. These interviews took the form of semi-structured formal conversations with thirty-three respondents, from the areas of management, directors, staff, team management, governance and media. The interview schedule gained a 100 per cent participation rate, and provided the majority of data which answered the research questions.

Through these interviews, brief life histories of respondents were gained which, when coupled with data gained from completed questionnaires, addressed the research question on people involved in elite provincial rugby management.

The qualitative interview research technique was supplemented by the use of questionnaires, which were distributed to staff and club chairmen. The response was 80 per cent and 81 per cent respectively. (This qualitative method of data collection eased the pressures on data analysis, which was a major task, given the amount of qualitative data gained in the research and also provided a form of data triangulation.)

Ethical considerations were discussed and framed with the researcher's supervisor and anonymity of respondents observed, except for one person who asked for his name to be noted with his comments. The elicited data were checked against other data and other perspectives in order to further validity and triangulation in the study.

Part C Results

CHAPTER SIX

BACKGROUND OF RUGBY MANAGERS

CHAPTER OUTLINE

As the first results chapter, this chapter seeks to build a profile of the persons involved in the management of contemporary elite provincial rugby. It examines the professional backgrounds of respondents, their qualifications, board experience, club administrative experience, playing experience, and their perceived relevance of these.

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Professional Backgrounds
  6.2.1 Subject union management
  6.2.2 Board members
  6.2.3 Club chairmen
  6.2.4 Provincial CEOs
6.3 Qualifications of Rugby Managers
6.4 Club Administrative Experience
6.5 Experience on Boards
6.6 Playing Experience and Relevance
6.7 Summary and Review

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the importance of key figures in rugby policy and decision making, one of the primary research questions tentatively advanced in the introduction to this research was *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?* With no adequate literature providing an answer this became one of the prime research questions. This chapter draws upon research data to address the above question.

The bulk of the qualitative data was gained through interviews with management of the case study organisation (n=6), the Board of Directors of the case study organisation (n=9), staff of the organisation (n=1), the president of the organisation (n=1), the former chairman of the organisation (n=1), team management personnel from within the union

(n=3) and from other unions (n=2) and CEOs of other provincial rugby unions (n=9). These thirty-two interviews were supplemented by questionnaires completed by staff (n=8) and club chairmen (n=8). This section of the research presents the data gained on the professional occupations and backgrounds of individuals involved in contemporary elite rugby management. The results are divided according to respondent grouping.

6.2 PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUNDS

6.2.1 Subject union management

The professional backgrounds of the former CEO, new CEO, Marketing Manager, Rugby Manager, Finance and Administration Manager and the Director of Coaching were researched to ascertain their self perceived strengths and backgrounds which were relevant to their union roles. This showed that three of these six managerial respondents had a professional background in financial management before being appointed to positions in the subject union.

The former CEO of the organisation originated his professional career in trainee management of a clothing retail company, then progressed to branch management and retail operations at the company's head office. While still working for this company he moved into the marketing and advertising area, and became a "niche marketer" for that retail chain. Through this role he became involved in the sponsorship of the Ranfurly Shield for a season, while held by Auckland and he felt this completed a "very well rounded retail marketing background", in which he had dealt with a lot of sponsorships. From his retail chain position he was appointed, in 1990, as Executive Director in the case study rugby union and became the CEO when the governance change was formalised. He believed the relevance of his background to the CEO position was in the areas of marketing, advertising, sponsorship.

His replacement in the CEO position graduated from university and moved into the sales area with a major Australian wine company. Progressing into management of this company he moved into general management in another major wine company. In 1986, he shifted to New Zealand to become manager of sales and marketing with a prominent wine company. From this position, the new CEO was appointed Sales and Marketing Manager of New Zealand's only subscription-television network in 1991. This interviewee believes the relevance of his background to the CEO position in the case study organisation is in his overall understanding of business, having come from a sales and marketing background in two different areas. He explained that in his latter position he "fulfilled some general management duties". In this position he also worked with a senior All Black, whom his organisation had provided with employment, and was

involved in proposals for a professional rugby competition which failed to be accepted by the national union.

Three of the union's four departmental managers have financial backgrounds. The Rugby Manager has the most varied professional background. This respondent had professional experience in accounting, stockbrokerage, publishing and taxation in Great Britain. He then moved to New Zealand and, before being appointed to the union in 1987, was employed as a purchasing manager, then as an employment consultant. He believed that this varied background gave him "experience of life and different situations".

The Marketing Manager worked in the financial areas of investment and lending before being appointed to the case study organisation as the Executive Assistant in 1988. He believes this financial background gave him an understanding of the budgeting and financial tasks applicable to his current position. The Finance and Administration Manager position was created during the present research period and the successful applicant had a professional background as an auditor and accountant with one of a prominent financial organisations. This background, he explains, gave him "not specific roles, but ideas and understandings".

The Director of Coaching, a past All Black, has a background very different from those of his fellow managers. He was trained as a school teacher and "worked in that for a few years" before moving into wines and spirits retailing and then becoming the part-owner of a sports shop. From this position he became a coaching coordinator at the union, then the Director of Coaching. The relevance of his background is primarily "The school teacher background which helped in the coaching coordinator position".

The fact that none of these managers had worked for a sporting organisation before assuming their position at the union was a notable feature of their backgrounds. The staff who are directed by these managers were not interviewed but completed questionnaires which asked how long these persons had been working with the union and whether they had worked for other sporting organisations. The results are presented in Figure 6.1.

The data gained by these responses reveal that six of the eight respondents (75 per cent) had been employed for less than five years, and the remaining two for less than ten years. This indicates that managers' staff have been with the organisation for a longer time than the managers themselves. While two of the five managers were appointed during the research period, two others have been with the union since 1987 and 1988. Only one staff member had been employed by another sporting organisation

NUMBER OF YEARS	SUBJECT UNION	OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
0 - 4	6	0
5 - 9	2	1
10 - 14	0	0
15 - 19	0	0
20 - 24	0	0
25 or more	0	0

***Figure 6.1**: Staff employment in sporting organizations*

and that person was a member of the coaching development department who had been employed as a club coaching coordinator. From these data it is apparent that no member of the staff, or management, of the case study organisation had been employed in an administrative or managerial role in a sporting organisation before appointed to such a position in the union.

6.2.2 Board members

One respondent stated that " The Board should be able to make decisions because they are a different sort of people from traditional rugby managers - corporate people used to making hard decisions, and they shouldn't make the right decisions based on politics". This emphasis on the professional background of this group was also stressed by the statement of a director that "If you didn't have the corporate management background, I don't know how you'd operate in the new environment". This respondent's assumption of corporate linkages is evidenced by the present research into the professional background of the Board members.

The Board was introduced during the present research period and was made up of the chairman and his deputy from the Council of Club delegates, which is the governance structure of club rugby in the subject union, and seven other persons who fulfil no criteria other than currently possessing managerial competencies (This is further explained in Chapter Nine). The chairman and deputy chairman of the Council of Delegates are automatically appointed to the Board and are described in the results chapters as *internal directors*.

One of these internal directors has a professional background in motor vehicle sales, and owns his own sales company. From this background he believes he brings to the Board "People skills, people management skills, sales skills, negotiation abilities and an understanding of club rugby". The other internal director is a primary school teacher. He believes his occupation "Helps you to see both sides of an argument and you tend to think more as a counsellor than a director". In addition to these two

internal representatives, the president, who sits with the Board but does not vote, is a chartered accountant who is a partner in an accounting firm.

The current research indicates that the professional background of the *external directors*, (those appointed to the Board from positions outside the Union) on the Board is one of the defining characteristics of the changing nature of elite rugby management. One of the external directors is in his third general management position, including roles in two of the larger companies in New Zealand. He believes he brings skills in marketing, sponsorship, and corporate management to the Board.

A second such director worked for three years as the Marketing Manager of New Zealand's largest brewery, which he saw as a professional background "basically in brand management and product management". From this position he progressed to be the Chief Executive of the All Blacks' support company. Once professionalism was formally introduced to rugby and players' companies were no longer needed to channel monetary rewards to players, this individual returned to his former employer. (At present he is the General Manager of the International Export Division of that brewery). This director serves on the marketing and rugby subcommittees and believes he brings marketing strengths to the Board, particularly in the understanding of branding

Another external director has a professional background primarily in the areas of fast-moving consumer goods, marketing and general management. Having been the managing director of firms "with up to a couple of thousand people", he became the international marketing manager of a major international beverage firm, then managing director of a prominent confectionery company. After experience in corporate management in North America, the United Kingdom, the Far East and South Africa, he is now a sales and marketing manager for a multinational food organisation. He observed that his marketing, people skills and motivational skills "are complementary to others around that table who have got financial, human resources, rugby and technical abilities".

The corporate abilities evident on the board are further confirmed by a fourth director who was involved in the management of human resources with a prominent New Zealand company for twenty-eight years. In this time he "spent fifteen years in the top end of the organisation reporting to the CEO. Having been the coach of the senior representative side, and recently appointed as the All Black coach, this director explained that "My background is probably a little unique in the context of a deep knowledge of rugby, having been involved in the top end, and a deep knowledge and involvement with business at the top end". This respondent believes he has "An understanding of the issues that affect the game, an understanding of the practices required in the modern day styles and structures of management, and common sense".

The fifth external director has been a managing director of publicly listed companies for twelve years. Prior to this he had been a deputy-managing

director with a long history in senior management. Presently, he is the Managing Director of a major transport company. This respondent believes that he brings "finance skills, people skills and a range of management skills" to the Board. This is a similar profile to that of the sixth external director, who had a corporate background in planning, finance then general management. He progressed to be the Chief Executive of New Zealand's second largest brewery during the late 1980s. In this position, he played a significant role in establishing the existing major sponsorship deal between the union and his brewery. Since that time he has started own management consulting group, and is now "in effect a full-time director for a range of companies". He identifies planning, finance, and general management competencies as strengths he brings to the Board.

The final external director was elected chairman by the Board. Originally a civil engineer by trade, he was employed by one of New Zealand's most prominent civil engineering firms. In 1968 he moved into the corporate management of this company, and rose to be general manager of the group of companies which his employer controlled. Since 1989 this respondent has been a management consultant. He observes that he brings corporate management abilities to the Board. In his present and part roles, he was responsible for the acquisition and reorganisation of companies, "a role which ties up pretty well with this one".

6.2.3 Professions of club chairmen

Club chairmen have critical roles in their rugby organisations and, given rugby's greater corporatisation, interact with union management and directors. Question A6 of the club chairman questionnaire (see Appendix C) requested that respondents specify their current occupation. The full list of responses to this question can be found in Appendix D. Of the seventeen responses, five club chairmen indicated they were involved in management as their occupation, as Company Director, Manager, Managing Director, manager and Company General Manager. A further two respondents indicated they were involved in financial management as chartered accountants. Other respondents involved in rugby as club chairmen held could be deemed as *white collar positions*: Technical Photographic Manager, Dean, Property Consultant, Personnel Consultant and Inspections Officer. Three other chairmen held a variety of other occupations: Machine Operator, Loss Prevention Officer and Painting Contractor, while one was retired and the seventeenth was unemployed.

6.2.4 Provincial CEOs

Chief Executive Officers were noted in the literature as key figures in their organisations. In the changing climate of provincial unions these executives are in positions requiring corporate and strategic skills. The research into the professional background of individuals involved in provincial rugby management concluded with data on provincial Chief Executive Officers. The responses for this area were gained from CEOs of

the eight 1996 NPC first division unions, excluding the case study union. Of these eight respondents, five had been in the position for a considerably longer period of time than the other three. These five had been involved in the management of the game since the forces of commercialism first started placing significant pressures on the management of the game in the late 1980s.

The first of these five, who was replaced as the CEO of his union late in the research period, had a professional history with a hardware firm, then worked in a commercial traveller's job for the same firm. He later owned his own business before being appointed to the Executive Director position in his union. The experiential relevance he brought to the CEO position was seen as being "the ability to look after the books [finances] after running my own business for fourteen years". He had no experience in professional or paid management of sport before being appointed to his union's top management position.

A second CEO, who had been an Executive Director, had a background as manager in the state owned telecommunications organisation, in which he was "in charge of 200 staff". He then owned and managed his own grocery retail business for four years before accepting the Executive Director position in his provincial union. This background was similar to that of a third CEO appointed within the old structures of the game, who had been involved at the middle management level of the state taxation organisation. While this respondent had experience in coaching and managing representative sporting teams he had not been employed in sport management before becoming provincial Executive Directors.

The fourth provincial CEO, who has remained in his position through the pressures of change in the rugby management, remains the only part-time CEO in New Zealand first division rugby. This interview respondent has been a chartered accountant for twenty-five years, "mostly with business accounts". As a part-time rugby manager, this individual readily observed that he had no sport management experience, and relies on his financial skills to perform in his sport management position.

The final respondent from this first division grouping of the "old" CEOs was the only one of the five to have previous experience in the professional management of sport. His initial experience in estates administration and accounts with a trust company, was followed by thirteen years with a provincial Jockey Club, and another three years with an Historic Park Trust, before he became the Executive Director, then CEO, of his provincial union. This CEO assumed the Rugby Manager's position later in the research period when a new CEO was concurrently introduced with the province's selection of a Board of Directors.

The three remaining respondent CEOs from first division unions were believed by peers to represent the emerging generation of elite rugby managers. They are younger in age than the first group of five CEOs, and their professional backgrounds are more managerially oriented. Although he

had no sport management experience, the first of these respondents had been the Chief Executive of a large vehicle import and distribution company. He had also been a director of the local Crown Health Enterprise.

The second of the three most recent CEO appointments began his professional career in banking, and moved up to branch management. from this position. He then progressed into regional management, and in this role was involved in sponsorship of the local semi-professional basketball franchise. Through this sponsorship he served as a member on that sporting organisation's Board, and continued in banking. After moving to his present province union, he was again involved in the sponsoring of a representative team. Through this link he was later appointed to the union's CEO position.

The third CEO in this latter group heads one of the smaller first division unions. He spent four years in a finance company before being employed for five years as the programme director of a regional sports trust. This professional background gave him a "general understanding of sponsorship and the sporting industry, and communication skills". In many ways this manager typifies the profile that respondents in this present research expected to emerge in the CEO position of middle to smaller size unions.

The larger unions emphasise the corporate and financial aspects of their organisation through an increased differentiation of managerial responsibilities between the commercial and non-commercial aspects of their unions. However, smaller unions do not have the financial and human resources to readily apply this differentiation and the professional background thus sought for them may well be more rounded with the sport management dimension perceived to be more applicable than a corporate orientation.

6.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF RUGBY MANAGERS

The literature of Bartol and Martin (1991) and Strange (1994) emphasised the importance of qualifications of CEOs and corporate managers, but this literature was not replicated by research in the sport management field. In order to supplement the data gained on the professional background of personnel involved in contemporary rugby management, the current study sought to gain data on the qualifications held by the various rugby management response groups.

Managers within the case study union have a range of qualifications. The two managers with highest qualifications, each holding a Bachelor's degree in commerce, are the two managers who joined the organisation during the research period. This may indicate a trend toward increased emphasis on managerial qualifications entering the changing era of rugby management. Of the four other managers one had a Diploma in Teaching, another had

a professional qualification in accounting, and the final pair had a graduate diploma in Marketing Management and no formal qualifications.

Respondents Group	Union Management (n=6)	Union Staff (n=7)	Board Members (n=7)	Club Chairmen (n=15)	Provincial CEOs (n=7)
None	1	3	2	1	4
Undergraduate Diploma	1	1	1	2	1
Postgraduate Diploma	1	1	0	0	0
Trade Qualifications	0	1	1	6	1
Professional Qualifications	1	0	1	4	0
Bachelors Degree	2	1	2	1	1
Masters Degree	0	0	0	0	0
Doctorate	0	0	0	1	0

Figure 6.2: Qualifications of rugby union managers

Staff members of the case study organisation, below the managerial level, had an equally diverse range of qualifications. A large percentage of staff respondents (43 per cent) had no formal qualifications. In contrast, the two most highly qualified staff members, with a Bachelor of Commerce and range of qualifications in the sport, recreation and secretarial areas, are also the two youngest and most recently hired staff members. This reinforces perceptions of an apparent trend in the managerial appointments and staffing in rugby management.

The qualifications of the Board members possibly were belied by their business achievements. The highest qualifications apparent in this group were two respondents with bachelors' degrees. All the Board respondents with lower formal levels of qualifications explained that they had received in-house training from the companies they had been with early in their professional careers. The areas in which qualifications were held by Board members were diverse, being in the fields of civil engineering, commerce, science, accounting and teaching.

The majority of club chairmen (67 per cent) held either professional or trade qualifications. One chairman held a doctorate, which was the only qualification held above Bachelor's level by the 42 respondents. The divergence of chairmen occupations was evident. A full list of responses is located in Appendix D, but the range of qualifications held included the

fields of accounting, electrical trade, engineering, purchasing, urban valuation, seaman, police and customs.

As with the other respondent groupings, the first division CEOs had a range of qualifications. Of first division CEOs interviewed, 57 per cent had no formal qualifications. One of the three recent CEO appointees had no formal qualifications but, like three of the Board members, added that he had completed a range of in-house courses. The other two new CEOs each held an academic qualification; one having a degree in marketing and market research, the other with a Diploma in Recreation and Sport. This latter respondent along with one staff member in the subject union, were the only two of the 42 respondents to have formal qualifications in some form of sport studies.

6.4 CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE

The clubs at present are not professional sport organisations, having primarily unpaid players and amateur administrators. The linkages between clubs and unions are, arguably, facilitated by decision makers who have a first-hand understanding of the realities of club sport. Consequently, the research opportunity was taken to examine the experience in club administration of individuals involved in the management of provincial rugby. The data gained from this area of research are presented in Figure 6.3.

None	3	5	4	0	4
Some	3	2	3	15	3

***Figure 6.3**: Club administrative experience of rugby administrators*

Of the subject union management population, three had experience in the administration of sporting clubs and three did not. The former three were the former CEO, the Rugby Manager and the Director of Coaching. The former CEO had been the chairman of the promotions committee of a club in another province for several years, and later rose to be the deputy-chairman of a senior club. He believes the experience gave him "a feeling for rugby at the club level and where it is operating". The Rugby Manager had, in the past, been the coach, secretary and treasurer at a soccer club over a ten year period. He replicated the comments of the previous respondent by believing that experience "Gives me an understanding of what is done down at the grass roots level". The Director of Coaching had been a club captain at a rugby club, and in this

role was "involved in much of the organisation of the club". He too believed it gave him a greater understanding of the club's viewpoint.

Of the seven staff respondents, five or 71 per cent, had not had experience in the administration of sport clubs. The two persons with such experience were from the coaching and development department, and had been involved in club administration through their coaching roles in clubs. No respondent from the other three, more administratively oriented, departments had previous experience in club administration.

Three of the seven (43 per cent) Board respondents indicated that they had had club administrative experience. These three were the two internal directors, who are appointed from the Council of Club Delegates, and the chairman, who had formerly represented a rugby club on the Management Committee in the old structure. The chairman had been a club captain in another union for two years, was on the committee for ten years, and represented the club at sub-union level. He had been granted life member status by that club. This respondent was the president of a rugby in 1979 - 1980, and was made a life member of that club also. Chairman of his club from 1991 to 1994, he retired from it to be appointed as an external director to the present Board.

One of the internal directors had been on the Management Committee of the union since 1983 as a club delegate, and was now the chairman of the Council of Delegates. The second internal director has been on the committee of his club since the age of thirty, when he joined it as the players' representative. He has been in club rugby administration ever since, and this "gives me a feeling for the players". The remaining six external directors have not had any club experience. As one such respondent noted, "I never had the time to get involved in coaching or management at club level". This was enforced by the statement of a CEO that "People are prepared to serve on boards, but they don't want to do five years at a club and five years on a committee, they want to come straight in".

Of the seven respondent provincial CEOs, three (43 per cent) had previous experience in the administration of clubs. All three were from the perceived older bracket of CEOs. One of these respondents had been the treasurer of a club for two years while he was playing, and was later on the Management Committee for four or five years. He believes this helps him "understand how club players think". A second CEO was a rugby referee, and spent eight years in referee administration as the secretary, deputy and later chairman of his provincial Referee Association. The third respondent, who affirmed he had experience in this area, explained that he had thirteen years as an employee of his local Jockey Club.

While all club chairmen are obviously involved in club administration, the research examined the length of time they had been involved in this voluntary service. The results are presented in Figure 6.4.

Eight of the seventeen respondents (47 per cent) had been with their present club for less than five years, while four (24 per cent) had been in their present club for between fifteen and nineteen years. There was a clear evidence of long term club involvement, with eight of the seventeen (47 per cent) administrating in their club for at least ten years. Only six had administrative experience in other clubs, with five of these persons involved for less than ten years.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0 - 4	8	2
5 - 9	1	3
10 - 14	2	1
15 - 19	4	0
20 - 24	2	0
25 and over	0	0

Figure 6.4: The experience of club chairmen in club administration

6.5 EXPERIENCE ON BOARDS

To complete the research into the professional profile of the respondent population, data were sought on the experience of these individuals on Boards as one of the defining characteristics of the governance change which swept through the first division unions during the research period, and a frequently voiced opinion from informants, was the belief that new Board members were experienced corporate board persons.

Insights were sought from the two groups within the case study union who were observed to have direct involvement with senior management in the union - the management and the directors themselves. Of the six management respondents, four had no previous experience as members of a board. The two with such experience were the two CEOs. The former CEO had been chairman of a school board and on the Board of Governors of another, but had no experience on corporate boards. His replacement had been a member of a corporate board for eight years before his appointment to the subject union.

Only one director of the union's board had not had experience on boards before, "None whatsoever". His fellow internal director is "on the board of several smaller companies, but nothing as substantial as the union Board". This lack of experience can be explained by the fact these two are directly appointed from the club representative structure, and are therefore not necessarily selected for their corporate management skills and competencies.

Those selected for their skills in this latter area have, individually and collectively, a great deal of board experience. One director typifies this by reporting his "Extensive experience on boards of large companies". When questioned about the relevance of this to the Board of a sporting organisation like the union, he responded that it was "not essential, but it helps", that it helps in understanding the differing roles and complexities of the Board and CEO. A second external director is currently the chairman of one board, and sitting on another beside that of the union, and this mirrors his experience on boards for the last eighteen to twenty years. The chairman himself is on the board of a family company of which he was formerly the director. He is currently also "on about ten other boards", including directorship of a private hospital company.

The remaining four external directors confirm this depth of Board member experience with comments such as "I am the chairman of a number of companies", and "For the last five years I've effectively been a professional director". The remaining two directors have less experience but one has served on the board of a commercial sporting organisation and the other explains that although he has not been on commercial boards he has had extensive involvement with sporting boards.

6.6 PLAYING EXPERIENCE AND RELEVANCE

The new age of professional rugby brings new demands and expectations. The literature review noted pressures felt by contemporary rugby players. Experience in playing rugby could enhance administrators' understanding of the players for whom the union and its clubs are, arguably, administered. Figure 6.5 shows the playing experience of the different response groups, and Figure 6.6 shows the highest level achieved for each grouping. The relevance, to their management roles, of having a rugby playing background was also extensively discussed with respondents.

Among the six union managers, two had never played rugby. Interestingly, the Rugby Manager was one of these non-players, although he did have an extensive involvement in a variety of other sports, notably soccer, to the senior club level. A third manager played rugby to age of seven but subsequently concentrated on soccer, achieving regional age-grade representative status. The former CEO played senior club rugby, while his replacement was an Australian Schools and Sydney representative player. The Director of Coaching attained All Black status for a period of nine years.

Managers generally felt a sporting background was not vital to their positions, but was beneficial. One noted that "It helps to understand how players act, what the *team* means, how players act in different situations", while a second believed "A sporting background is very important to understand what happens in a team environment, but it doesn't matter

Never Played	5	0
1 - 4	0	2
5 - 9	0	2
10 - 14	1	5
15 - 19	1	2
20 - 24	0	2
25 and over	1	3

Figure 6.5: Playing experience of questionnaire respondents

what sport it is". Another manager, who does not have a background of involvement in sport, explained his belief that "It is not mandatory, as long as you understand sport and follow sport as a leisure activity...it's basically an understanding of the industry".

Never Played	2	5	0	0	0	7
School	1	0	1	0	0	2
Club	0	1	0	10	0	11
Club Senior	1	1	5	5	5	17
National Age / Grade	1	0	0	1	0	2
Provincial Senior	0	0	3	0	3	6
National Selection	0	1	0	0	0	1
Foreign National	0	0	0	1	0	1
All Black	1	0	0	0	1	2

Figure 6.6: Highest playing level achieved by respondents

One of the two managers who joined the organisation during the research period stated that "You need to have a knowledge of the sport and of rugby politics" but saw this knowledge as not necessarily meaning an extensive or elite playing background. The other new manager noted that the relevance of his playing background was "Very little. I think you need

an affinity with rugby, and it really helps with an understanding of the traditions of rugby". This emphasis on the understanding of the rugby industry replicated the opinion of a staff respondent, who stated that what is "more important is the understanding of the industry and the people involved in it". The final managerial respondent believed a background in the game was "Not a major component of rugby managerial requirements", and explained that "You have to have abilities in the area you are chosen for, and you don't learn that on the rugby paddock".

Team management respondents noted the importance of a p'aying background for managers in providing an understanding of the industry and environment in which their organisation operates. One such respondent, from within the union, explained "They have to know the culture of the game, and know rugby people...You need some experience as a player, and all of the management would have played senior football". A second team management respondent from the union noted that the sporting background was not important, saying the individual "needs the love of recreation, and an understanding of the sporting psyche...the main criteria are business ability, management of staff and selection of staffing ability".

A third team manager underscored this theme, responding that "If you have a rugby background, that would help, but I don't think it's the top criterion". He points to the background of the Auckland Warriors CEO, Ian Robson, who does not have a history of playing or managing rugby league. He added that "It would be a bonus, but the first thing would be the ability to do the job specified, rather than the sporting part of it, which is mixed up in it". The two team management respondents from outside the organisation placed slightly more emphasis on a sporting background for managers, one noting "It is important to understand how sports people work...To manage sports people accurately and well, they need to understand how they tick". The final team management respondent believed a sporting background was "Very important, a prerequisite for having a feeling for the game...but they have to attach professional skills to that".

All the CEOs interviewed had rugby experience, at least to club senior level. Three of the nine had reached provincial rugby as their highest playing level, while one had attained All Black status. The CEOs were largely unanimous in their perception of the relevance of this playing background for rugby managers. Besides the statement of one CEO that it is "Essential", the other CEO respondents emphasised the theme of the background being helpful to understanding the industry and the people that operate within it, but not vital in regards to managerial competencies. This was directly apparent in the response of the CEO of a smaller provincial union who stated a playing background was "Not essential, but helps in having an understanding of the game". A CEO from a smaller first division union reinforced this belief by stating that "It is of some importance in understanding what you are running".

The responses of the remaining CEO respondents confirmed this perception. One observed that a sporting background is "important in giving a love of the game, but I don't think having been a great rugby player makes you skilled in the administration of the game". Two other CEOs stated that, "It's not important to have played to a high level, but it's important to have a background in the game. It would be difficult for people to understand the rugby psyche without that knowledge", and the sporting background gave "an empathy for the sport, as the understanding of it is imperative"

As the interview schedule progressed, this response was articulated by every CEO respondent. One explained his belief that:

> It's got its place.... It's important to have some feeling for the game, to know about its background. You don't have to have been any good at the game, but to have that feeling is really important, to know who you are dealing with and how to deal with them. Rugby people aren't very receptive to high-flying city slickers coming in and telling them how to run their show...If they don't have a background in the rugby environment they have to research it, as Robson did with league and the Warriors...For credibility, you need to understand the mechanics and the people involved in the industry.

This respondent was from a smaller union and therefore did not have the corporatised emphasis in his union's senior management. One respondent, from a union with such corporate emphasis, explained that:

> An understanding of players' needs and expectations is going to be very very helpful, especially moving into the professional game. At the moment there not very many sport managers in New Zealand at a chief executive level, they are just not there, so we have to look for managers with experience in the game of rugby...So a rugby background is not essential, but certainly helpful in understanding the players' perspectives. This is changing, given the new environment, and the greater emphasis on business skills with which players must now familiarise themselves.

The final interview with a CEO respondent confirmed the research finding that, while business skills were needed by contemporary rugby managers, a background in the game was very helpful in understanding the peculiar industry in which rugby administrators were operating. There are strong traditional facets of the game that elite managers have to deal with, including remnants of the committee structures which remain a complicating factor of rugby management. This last respondent replicated most of the respondent group by stating that "It is important in being able to relate to players, and clubs...They [union administrators] don't need to have come from the top of the sporting field, but they have to understand the needs of people you interact with".

The playing experience of staff of the case study organisation possibly reflected their gender balance. Five of the eight staff members who responded to the questionnaire were female, and these were the five who had never played rugby. Although women's rugby is apparent in New Zealand, the sport remains almost exclusively a male sport. The three male staff members who completed questionnaires had all played rugby for at least twelve years to club level. The two respondents who had played for the longest period, (15 - 19 years and Over 25 years), and had reached the highest level, (Club senior and national selection), were both from the coaching and development department. The manager of this department noted that such a playing background was only important for those employees involved in the coaching department, "Because they have to have the knowledge of rugby".

The playing backgrounds of the chairmen reflected a long period of participation in the game primarily played at the club rugby level. The median period played was between ten and fourteen years, but the spread was relatively consistent. Three respondents had played for more than 25 years. Of the seventeen respondents, ten (59 per cent) had reached club rugby as their highest level, while a further five (29 per cent) had reached club senior level. The other two attained national age of grade selection and foreign national selection. Ten of the seventeen (59 per cent) had played rugby for the club they currently chaired (see Figure 6.7 for the years of rugby played by club chairmen). These data underscore a playing link and administration role for most chairmen and the club they represent.

The Board of Directors had, as a group, a comparatively high experience in playing rugby. One of the nine had only played rugby at school, five had played at club senior level, and three had reached provincial rugby. Data on Board members' playing experience, were gained in the present research, reflected the management and CEOs. The playing experience of Board members was thought to be desirable in giving an enhanced understanding of the organisation they were directing, but not essential to fulfilling their duties.

[illegible]	[illegible]
0	7
1 - 4	2
5 - 9	2
10 - 14	3
15 - 19	1
20 or more	2

Figure 6.7: Chairmens' years played for their club

The former CEO believes a background of playing the rugby game does help the Board members, "because it gives them a feeling for the players". A staff member of his agreed, explaining his belief that "They should

have an empathy with top level sport, although not necessarily rugby". The CEO of another large union agreed with the understanding such background of playing involvement provided, but concluded that "They should be businessmen understanding sport, rather than sportsmen understanding business". A CEO of a large provincial union stated that a playing background is "Not critical at all".

The latter viewpoint differs from the perceptions of two team management respondents. The first of these informants said "It is not as important for the Directors to have played rugby as it is for the managers, but they have to have a feel for rugby, an interest in the game...I think all the Board members would be keen rugby followers, but not necessarily have played the game". The second team management person believed that a playing background was actually a negative element, by asserting that it had "No importance at all. That has been the problem over the years, where it has been assumed that because you may have been an All Black, or played to a high level, you can become an administrator or coach". He added that he disagreed with the appointment of the two external directors who have had the closest links with the subject union as a coach and player respectively, "because they were so involved in the old system that we are trying desperately to get away from".

The mix of responses from the CEO and team management groupings on playing experience was reflected in a range of answers on the question from directors. One of the external directors with a provincial playing record stated:

> It is of huge importance, it gives a huge insight into what players go through. Players are completely different to everyone else, and unless you've played at that level it's pretty hard to understand things like the different players' needs, for example the different demands of Polynesians and pakeha [European] players. My background gives me a close relationship with the players, and I even played with some of them, so I can communicate well with them.

His views were replicated by another external director's comments that a playing background is "Fundamental". This respondent had playing, and club administration, experience in a very small union, followed by sub-union experience in another provincial union, so I understand the grassroots of rugby and what it really means".

Other Board members supported a playing background for directors, but placed less emphasis upon this. One external director stated that "You have to have an understanding, as it assists in managing and directing the union...Participating in a team sport does help understand how athletes think and behave". This respondent also highlighted the case of Warriors CEO Ian Robson, and his experience in team sport but not in rugby league. A similar response was made by a second external director, that "The board has to have a mixture of commercial and rugby expertise, you can't lose contact with the grassroots of the game, as it's fundamental to

the marketing and promotion of the game... It's an understanding of sport, which is in the entertainment industry".

Two other directors took this middle approach to the question of the applicability of a playing background. One was an internal director who noted that his experience has allowed him to "get to know personalities from other unions who are, and have been, administrators of the game...The playing of the game, apart from the old boy network, I don't think is as decisive a benefit as it was in the halcyon days of amateurism". Further qualified support for this experience came from the comments of an external director, who stated that "You don't have to have been a star player, but it does help if you understand the game and the players. It helps in relations with other directors, and with the team management and the team, so you really have to have a feel for it".

Other directors believed the importance of a sporting background was not of great importance. An internal director stated that "It's not that important, it's more important to have a feeling for people...It's in the subcommittee structure anyway, so if you are strong in an area, you are on that particular subcommittee". His views were supported by a second director, who noted that "A playing background is not important, because there is a mix on the Board of those who have a strong playing background and those who don't...If I had to choose I'd go with those with a business background, although a playing background does give an understanding of the industry".

When the president of the case study organisation was being interviewed, it was noted that he had an extensive playing record with the province. He was asked to comment on the applicability of this background to the position of the president. He explained that:

> It would be an advantage for that person to have a profile in the game. He is just seen as a figurehead, and as such does earn some respect if he has a playing record...He should have played for our union or had a high profile in the administration of the game, as this brings inherent respect form visiting teams and officials.

When asked to comment on the relevance of a playing background for Board members, he commented that it wasn't critical.

> They need to have a keen interest in rugby, which usually means you played, but not necessarily, because people could still have a great interest in rugby without playing it to a high level. Players are just one section of the management operation...You need someone there who gets automatic respect of the players, but most of the Board get their respect through their professional capacities.

6.7 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

This results chapter sought to construct a profile of the individuals involved in contemporary provincial rugby management. To do this the research focused on the professional background, qualifications, board experience and playing experience of the respondents.

Both of the CEOs who headed the union in the research period had marketing-oriented professional backgrounds, although the current CEO's background was clearly in a corporate environment. Three of the four departmental managers had financial backgrounds before coming to the subject union. None of these top six management persons had experience in sport management before being appointed. This was reflected in the staff, with the only staff member who had been previously employed by a sporting organisation being a member of the coaching and development department.

The professional backgrounds of the Board members emerge in the present research as a distinct dimension of the corporatisation of the provincial union. Each of the seven external directors has a depth of experience in corporate management, often in general management. The two internal directors were appointed from the Council of Club Delegates, and do not reflect the background of their external counterparts on the union Board.

The club chairmen had a range of differing occupations, often in managerial or financial roles. This range was also reflected in the management backgrounds of CEOs from other unions. These eight respondents were perceived, on the basis of their interview information, to divide into two groups - those CEOs who represented the past position of the Executive Director, and those who represented the present and future nature of the CEO position. Only two of the eight CEOs had been employed in a sport management role before being appointed to their current union position.

Recent managerial and staffing appointments in the case study union have signified a trend toward more highly qualified individuals being involved in rugby management. The management held a wide range of qualifications, while a high number of the staff held no formal qualifications. The Board also held a low level of qualifications and had commonly experienced in-house training. The majority of club chairmen held professional or trade qualifications. Four of the seven first division CEOs held no formal qualifications.

Half of the managers within the researched union had had experience in the management of sporting clubs, but the only two staff who had this experience had achieved it through their coaching roles. Of the external directors, only one had club administrative experience, and he was formerly the deputy-chairman of the union in the Management Committee structure. The only two managers in the union with prior experience on boards were the two CEOs, while all but one director had such previous experience. The experience of the external directors was usually extensive in this area.

Two managers, of the six senior managers in the union, had never played rugby and one had stopped playing at primary school. The relevance of playing experience for managers was believed to lie in their resultant understanding of the industry and people involved in this. Such relevance was also considered in terms of the Board. Of the nine Board members, only one had not played to club senior level, and three had played provincial rugby. All three male staff respondents had played rugby, while none of the five female respondents had done so.

Club chairmen had often had a long playing experience. They had usually played for their club, but not to club senior or representative level. The union president believed this position was enhanced with a strong rugby playing or administrating background.

CHAPTER SEVEN

STRUCTURAL CHANGE

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This results chapter seeks to answer the second of the primary research questions posed at the outset of the research and not answered in the literature. *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?* This chapter considers the governance structure that the case study organisation operated under prior to the research period of 1995, then examines the forces which generated change in the union's governance and the process of this change. From this base, the chapter discusses ways in which the governance changes have impacted upon management of the union. The increased departmentalisation within the union is considered with its resultant impact upon communication and planning functions. Differences between managing a sport organisation and other business are discussed and the possible future bifurcation of the organisation examined.

7.1 Introduction
7.2 Union Management Structure Prior to Change
7.3 Introduction of the New Governance Structure
7.3.1 Governance changes in other provincial unions
7.4 Business Emphasis in Provincial Rugby Management
7.5 Impact of Changes on Union Management
7.6 Internal Union Structural Changes
7.6.1 Communication problems in the union
7.6.2 Increased future bifurcation
7.7 Summary and Review

7.1 INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the researcher fulfilled a practicum (internship) in the case study organisation in the latter months of 1994. During this time it became apparent that governance changes were a priority among the management staff. Changes in governance from a Management Committee to a business oriented Board, were voted in at a special general meeting on 20 December, 1994, and the research period commenced in the month of the new Board's introduction, in March 1995. At this stage no other provincial union in New Zealand had introduced such a constitutional and structural change, and the affects of such a change had therefore not been known or critically examined. A review of the related literature was undertaken, which failed to provide research or

detailed consideration of this area of rugby or sport management. The present research examination of perspectives on the changes draws upon interview responses of: directors on the Board (n=9), union management (n=5), representative team management informants (n=3), one senior staff member, interviews with all CEOs of other first-division unions (n=9), the former chairman of the Management Committee, the current president of the union, one media personality, and two individuals involved in elite rugby team management area from outside the case study union. These thirty-two semi-structured interviews were supplemented by eight completed staff questionnaires and seventeen completed club chairmen questionnaires.

7.2 UNION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE PRIOR TO CHANGE

In 1994, the subject union continued to be administered and managed largely as it had been since its inception in 1883, having developed in an evolutionary manner. The union had only made slight structural changes, such as when a new employment position had been established, which supports the observation that "most organisations can be expected to gravitate towards a design archetype and remain there for a lengthy period" (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988, p.30). These authors also state that "Organisations that have developed in relatively stable conditions will not be as effective if they maintain their patterns of functioning and structure when their environments become more complex and unstable" (p.30). This is directly applicable to the situation of the rugby union under study.

Shilbury (1990) identifies the "need for a visible centralised administrative structure with regular administrative and operational procedures and the employment of executive staff who can fulfil traditional managerial functions of planning, organising, leading and evaluating" (p.10). This governance and organisational structure under which the subject union was operating was indicative of the structures of all provincial rugby unions in New Zealand, and a number of other sports in this country. The full time managers of the provincial union were accountable only to a Management Committee made up of amateur governors who represented rugby clubs in the province. The structure of this system, with all full-time administrative positions is presented in an hierarchical form in Figure 7.1.

Responsibilities were divided between, on one hand, the organisation and administration of clubs, schools, lower representative teams and other aspects of the non-profit game and, on the other, the marketing and management of the representative A Team. However, a critical feature of the structure was the Management Committee, which was made up of: a chairman and deputy-chairman; representatives of each of the 21 clubs; representatives of the referees; and representatives of primary schools, secondary schools, and under-19 and under-21 grades.

The Executive Director and the other managers were only involved with the Management Committee in specific subcommittee roles. For example the Marketing Manager was solely involved with the promotions subcommittee, which was only one part of his overall responsibilities. Apart from this he only interacted with the Management Committee on specific projects. One manager admitted he attempted to avoid dealing with the Management Committee as much as possible, in order to "escape the bureaucracy" although he felt the Executive Director was "unfortunately" unable to do this because of his position.




Figure 7.1. The union's management structure in 1994

In retrospect, with the hindsight of change, a 1995 director now believes the management of the union was easier under this 1994 system, because managers needed to attract only one sponsor, operate the union on a weekly basis and manage the home ground at match time. Such a view is not reflected in the comments made by other directors. Another current director recognises that, under this system, the Management Committee became very involved on a part-time basis with union management and "the management must have been very frustrated, because if they wanted to do something they still had to go and get approval from the governing body". He believes the danger in this system is that the managers then become reactive "and their reaction is not the right thing to as they think of what the committee wants instead of being proactive".

Structure should *enable* and *motivate* innovative behaviour as Van de Ven (1993) indicates, but the outdated governance structure of the union was clearly not doing this Because of this constant need for involvement and authorisation from the Management Committee, this director believed that union officers were not managers at all. This viewpoint was also articulated by another manager who operated under the old committee structure.

One present director who was involved in the Management Committee structure recognised the problems posed by that structure. He described how every delegate, because of their position on the Committee, felt they had the right to be seen and heard by the Chief Executive and "there's no business I know that carried on like that". He explains that while this was justified as being a flat organisational structure it is not, "it's a curve and, in fact, is not progressive but works in reverse". As articulated by another director, this compounded problems in the decision-making process, by the expressed need to allow the entire Committee time for their input before decisions were made.

The deficiencies of such a system are also readily apparent to the CEOs of other rugby unions who have had similar administrations. One complains that "There was no accountability in the old rugby management setup, absolutely none. In the old system, everyone was well-intentioned, but totally uncontrolled". He describes how his union had six subcommittees operating from the Management Committee, and "each was largely a law unto themselves". This CEO gives an example in which he and the marketing manager drew up the union's first ever marketing plan, and were then informed by the chairman of the marketing committee about a plan he had unilaterally constructed with a prominent advertising company.

A second CEO notes that the Management Committee structure was largely oriented toward dealing with existing problems, and explains that "While every union developed a strategic plan, there was no-one to tie it up". One individual involved in the coaching and development area indicated that the committee system allowed "too much politics in rugby, so that decisions are made to keep positions on management committees or councils, no-one will make hard decisions because it could cost them votes".

7.3 INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The literature review in this present study noted the challenge of a professional sport environment to amateur sport administrators. Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) state that "The most effective executives... foresee the need for major change. They recognise the external threats and

opportunities, and took bold steps to deal with them...by acting before they had to do so, they had more time to plan their transitions" (p.41). This statement is directly applicable to the situation of the subject union executive in 1994. As increased commercial pressures, speculation on professionalism, sponsorship and marketing issues and player retention pressures came to bear upon the management of provincial rugby unions, the executives of some unions began planning to implement governance changes recommended in the Boston Report, published in March, 1994. This had recommended the introduction of a seven to nine man Board for the NZRFU, being responsible for policy, strategy and direction, with a delegation of management activities to professional managers.

The need for such a change in the senior provincial unions was expressed by one CEO interviewed in the research: "The days of voluntary sport administrators being successful are gone. You can't have a committee structure waiting all week to decide on expenditure. You can't have conflicting political agendas pulling each other apart". This was also a primary criticism levelled at the Management Committee. It was becoming plainly clear to certain committee members that the Management Committee structure had lost its effectiveness and became discredited by modern sport management standards.

One interview respondent, who was involved in the former structure, as well as the new, said that "The difficulties in the past have come from the lack of corporate structure". Another individual involved in the governance of the union at the time of the change expressed the urgent need for such change:

> The reason we got the Board, in my view, was because the calibre of people coming through onto the Committee was deteriorating. We were going to have less and less qualified people to run the game. We virtually had nobody on the Management Committee who could talk about a million dollar sponsorship deal, other than perhaps the Chairman. If you got a year when you had a chairman who had no commercial expertise at all, then you were lost. The delegates knew rugby, but they could not handle the major issues of the game. We would have gone further into trouble. We had 24 people asking how things affected their club and deciding their support from that, not considering the issues or effects on our provincial rugby. We had decision-making for the wrong reasons.

By this time the Boston Consulting Group had been commissioned by the NZRFU to examine, among other matters, the governance structure of the national union, which closely replicated that of the subject union. The chairman of the provincial union, who was also the deputy-chairman of the national union, requested his provincial organisational committee delay its first report until it was clear what the Boston Group recommended, and how the NZRFU would act upon the recommendation.

As the Boston Report was presented to the NZRFU, the retention of the local union Management Committee structure was causing ever greater problems in the management of the union and the Management Committee was keen to act to effect a change in the provincial union's governance structure. In the first years of the 1990s there was a growing awareness and acknowledgment in sport administration of the increased importance of such areas as finance and marketing, as rugby was forced to compete with other leisure options for the discretionary dollar. This growing awareness led, in 1991, to the president of the subject union proposing changes to the governance structure. The present president and the Management Committee set up a working group, entitled the Steering Committee, to oversee the introduction of a new governance structure. This group consisted of the chairman and deputy-chairman, new president, the two immediate past presidents who were professionally involved in restructuring organisations, and a former coach (who would become a future director) of the union.

This Steering Committee had a meeting with the NZRFU Boston Report Committee, and the two groups discussed how rugby's national administration perceived the report. Then, as one of Steering Committee described to a newspaper, "The reform of the management structure came after a small group of stalwarts persuaded union officials, life members and club delegates that progress of the sport was being hindered", and they "argued for a new management group - a Board of directors to operate [the subject union] with commercial expertise and passion for rugby" (Gray, 1995b, p.4).

"Vision is the driver of Board governance design; without a clear vision of what it wants to be and do, a board's decisions relative to structure and process are as likely to be wrong as right" (Beals and Eadie, 1994, p.131). The union group constructed a governance design, accepting the challenge to "fashion a Board governance design that is consciously tailored to a particular association's unique circumstances, capabilities, and needs and that provides for creative Board involvement in leading the association" (ibid., p.130). When the plan was devised, it also anticipated the introduction of professionalism, according to one of the participants on the Organisation Committee, and was constructed with the recognition of a need to prepare for adaptation to this eventuation. This process of construction of a planned governance change was complicated by the fact that there existed no applicable blueprint to follow. The plans that the two other unions had constructed differed from the subject union's in the degree to which the "corporate model" of organisational governance was followed.

Once the model for governance of the provincial union was established, the chairman and his deputy began the task of its implementation. The Steering Committee had meetings with life members of the union and club chairmen in order to involve them in the process and gain their input; in effect, to get their part-ownership over the change. The model they worked to implement differed in significant ways from that first proposed

by the president in 1991. The areas in which it now differed were the "maintenance of the grassroots of the [union] rugby culture with the Council of Club Delegates, and the preservation of club rugby under that structure, rightly or wrongly" according to a present director who was active in the former system. The deputy-chairman at that time, who is now chairman, feels that while the determination was there to introduce a professional Board which would make policy, this would not have been able to proceed without concessions made in retention of the Council of Delegates. The ultimate power in the decision to introduce a Board lay in the hands of the Management Committee, on which each of the 21 clubs was represented. If concessions were not made to these club representatives, it was felt they would reject the introduction of a Board outright. With the changes made, however, the new structure was voted in almost unanimously.

The introduction of the Board to the union in place of the previous Management Committee signalled a new age of rugby management in New Zealand. The union was the first to introduce a full Board of Directors, although another union had instituted a smaller management group without the constitutional changes made by the former. Four other unions all signalled their interest in a change replicating that of the union in this study. The latter chairman expressed recognition of the importance of the change in a newspaper report: "It was a momentous event for...rugby. **The subject union was the first union to formally change its constitution to bring in a business orientated governance**, rather than the traditional management by a large committee" (Gray, 1994, p.1) (Bold added by author). The need for a rapid introduction has been evidenced by the rush of other unions to do the same in the ensuing period.

Appreciation of the early actioning of change was expressed by several interview respondents in each area of the present study's interview groups, (union CEO, Board members, management, team management and related personnel), and is reflected by such statements as "Thank God we put our governance structure in place last year. If we'd put it off for another 12 months I hate to think what mess we'd be in now" (Board member); "The fact that we brought in the changes when we did is a strength" (management); and "it was a unique year, and I would have hated the union to try to have managed it under the old structure, which couldn't have handled it" (Board member). The CEOs of other unions have also recognised the importance of the early move by the union. One explained how his union and others in the first division were planning "to get there in the foreseeable future, but **the advance of professionalism has shocked everyone**. We could see it coming, but not at the pace it did" (Bold added by author).

The chairman at the time of the change agreed that the changing nature of modern rugby now demanded far more commercial expertise from administrators in such areas as finance, promotion and marketing, and concluded that "The new structure ensures that is available and shows [subject union] leads the way off the field as well as on" (Gray, 1994,

p.1). The Executive Director, who became the Chief Executive Officer in the new structure, reiterated this link between playing and managing success, by stating that his union "is committed to continuing that trend of success and the appointment of a Board of Directors is helping that aim. The new board, which boasts outstanding talent in terms of rugby background and business, management and marketing skills, has inspired genuine excitement. With the support of the club delegates who have served [our] rugby so well in the past, the Board will keep the province at the cutting edge" (Wright, 1995, p.4).

7.3.1 Governance changes in other unions

"When sports begin to depend on generating revenues, the control of sport organisations usually shifts further and further away from the players" (p.311)". This statement of Coakley's (1994) is readily evidenced by the present case study. When commercial pressures and profit orientation in first division provincial rugby management increased, a concomitant need to group decision-making and policy formulation into a relatively sophisticated , smaller, less representative governance area became a priority for provincial rugby management. While the researched union was the first provincial rugby union in New Zealand to corporatize its governance structure, it was not the first to significantly change. That landmark move to alter the committee type of governance structure was made by a second division union. In late 1993, a former All Black and New Zealand seven- a-side coach was in Italy coaching and managing a prominent Italian club when he was approached by individuals who later became directors of the union. As he explained, "They understood the need to restructure, given that the game is changing".

Following this lead, two first division unions began more intense moves to alter the governance of their respective unions. Soon, following the example of the subject union, another union introduced a corporatised Board structure, followed by a third union from the first division. Other unions have followed relatively rapidly.

By the end of 1995, there were only three first division unions which had not formally introduced the Board structure. These three were all making attempts to reduce the size of their executive core, albeit through informal means in some cases. This desire to change was recognised by one union research respondent who stated that "Most unions are attempting to improve their management, which is encouraging".

The first of these unions operates under a system whereby the subunions are represented on a 19 person elected council which elects a seven person executive committee which, according to the CEO, "Makes all the worthwhile decisions". While not making formal governance changes, this executive committee reflects the manner in which some unions have, in effect, moved away from the larger Management Committee system toward smaller empowered groups of decision-makers.

The CEO of the second union is keen to change that union's governance structure, and in 1995 presented a business plan to his Management Committee outlining the desired changes. At the Annual General Meeting in December, 1995, the Management Committee of this union agreed to establish a working party to address the next stage of the transformation. In 1976 this union had dismantled the 'one club, one vote' system, and then moved to a twelve member Management Committee. While this committee was a step forward in the reduction of numbers compared with other unions at the time, the problems of the committee structure remained - the management committee of the Union had seventeen subcommittees. However the smaller Management Committee is at least operational in size, and as the CEO explains, "We don't have to make the same changes for the same reasons as other unions to get away from clubs and sub-union voting". In the changes the CEO is targeting the number of subcommittees is envisaged as being reduced to four or five.

This situation is also reflected in the third such union, which is easily the smallest in the first division, and has no full-time administrative employee. It is not listed in the telephone book, and correspondence is sent to the offices of the Executive Officer in his private capacity. This union has a Management Committee that has five sub-unions represented on it with two members each, and representative of referees, Maori rugby, junior rugby, primary schools, president, vice-president and a chairman, and others to total 25 persons on the management committee. As this union's CEO says, "It has to change". In order to make this Management Committee operational in the modern environment, the CEO operates a similar system to that of the first union discussed above. A financial committee of five is appointed, "And effectively that five run it. We are not doing it constitutionally right, but I don't give a stuff!". The CEO hopes to make the necessary constitutional amendments in 1996, to reduce the size of the committee and get "realistic" subcommittees.

The New Zealand Rugby Union also moved to adopt a Board structure late in 1995. The Council system under which it had previously operated had been vocally and vehemently criticised in ever increasing amounts (see the Literature Review in this study). A proposal for a special general meeting on 18 December 1995 was put forward to introduce a Board structure to operate the game at the national level. It is noteworthy that this had been recommended in the Boston Report of March 1993 and was being done after the majority of first division unions had changed their governance structures, two second division unions had changed and the game had become professional. The Board structure was accepted at that meeting, albeit it in an amended form. This move by the New Zealand national union followed that of its Australian counterpart ten days earlier when the Australian Rugby football Union had "adopted a new constitution which brings the structure and corporate governance of the Australian Union in line with standard public company practice" (Australian Rugby Football Union, 1995, p.1).

At the beginning of the research period, in March 1995, only the Hawkes Bay union had previously altered its structure to reflect changing demands in rugby management. An indication in the rate of change in the field of study was that by the end of the research period (December 1995), seven provincial unions had all changed their governance structures, as had the national unions of both Australia and New Zealand. Other unions are planning such a change, even if in a modified manner to suit available human resources. Within each provincial union the management personnel may face consequential changes in their operations and Board generated operational changes. With the rate of provincial change being clear, the present research now examines the effect such a governance change has had on the management personnel in the case study union.

7.4 BUSINESS EMPHASIS IN PROVINCIAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT

It is apparent that the subject union has moved to a business emphasis with corporate type Board of Directors. It was believed by most respondents that the union must be managed on lines primarily resembling those of a corporate or business organisation. Perspectives on this were sought in a question addressed in both questionnaires (D10 in the Club Questionnaire, B12 in the Staff Questionnaire. The Staff Questionnaire is located in Appendix A, with the results in Appendix B. The Club Questionnaire is located in Appendix C and the results in Appendix D). Figure 7.2 shows the degree to which respondents believe the union should ideally be run on business (corporate) lines.

Non-Business	0	0	0
Little Business	0	0	0
Some Business	0	1	1
Mostly Business	5	4	9
Total Business	3	11	14

Figure 7.2. Ideal business orientation of the union

The majority of respondents feel the need for a great degree of business emphasis for the management of the union. This, perhaps surprisingly, is greater amongst the club chairmen than the staff, as it could be believed that the chairmen would want less business emphasis in order to further emphasise the amateur side of the organisation, given their roles in, and presumable allegiance to, "amateur clubs". The vast majority (96%) favoured either a 'mostly' or 'total' business emphasis, while 58% favoured a total business emphasis.

When asked if this business orientation was actually the case with the union, the responses showed it was not perceived as being strongly evident.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Non-Business	1	0	1
Little Business	0	2	2
Some Business	2	5	7
Mostly Business	3	2	5
Total Business	2	5	7

Figure 7.3. Business orientation of the union.

Most respondents agreed the union operates in an area between 'some business orientation' and 'total business orientation, but responses were spread across these three groupings. Those who indicated the union should be run with a total business emphasis commonly linked this to the new professionalism in rugby, with such comments as "The union is now in a professional environment. Everybody will expect them to be a professional organisation, not just a club set-up" (Staff), and "Particularly as the game is now professional at all levels" (Club). Those who indicated that the game should be run only on 'some business' emphasis commonly expressed opinions such as "Not all levels administered can be run on business lines", or similar sentiments implying that because not all levels of the management of the game can be professionally managed toward a profit orientation, the union as a whole cannot be managed totally as a business. Presumably such discussions would include areas such as schools rugby and coaching.

Respondents, including both staff and management, expressed concern that several of the Board members did not grasp how the management of the union was complicated by the fact that it is a sporting organisation, a perceived lack of understanding which was especially noticeable immediately following the directors' introduction to rugby management. One manager noted that "I think the Board is learning the management of a sporting organisation is not consistent with that of a more mainstream exercise, because it has its own idiosyncrasies which make it different, even though the sporting organisation is supposed to be a business. While you will start to run it along business lines, and that will make it easier, there will still be areas of difference. They are struggling to come to grips with that in the short term"

Interviews with the Board, management and CEOs therefore sought their views on whether their involvement in a sporting organisation complicated the management roles they were performing. In effect, the profit generated by the professional team is spent, in a substantial part, on the lower levels

of the game. As most respondents stated, this fact complicates the directors' corporate role. While one director believed the difference lay in the fact that the union had to sell the product for a specific time only a few times a year, this merely equates it with a multitude of other entertainment business processes, and does not adequately encompass the complications the sporting dimensions of the organisation provide.

One external director said the management of the union may be more complicated if it was an amateur organisation. This portrays a lack of understanding regarding the degree of amateur administration which remains in rugby. The existence of the clubs under the jurisdiction of the unions ensures the bulk of the management of rugby is still amateur. The demands of this area of the game are very different from those of the representative team. The amateur side of the game is primarily seeking more financial investment from the union to support lower level and club rugby. One director recognises this financial link by observing that the union "can't be run on profit driven lines, because the union has a responsibility to foster the game. Clubs have their own resources to a certain extent, but they need finance, they need help".

This assistance for clubs in their fight for survival in the modern sporting environment differs greatly from the commercial and profit driven emphasis in the management of the representative team. Arising from this dichotomy, "The CEO walks a fine line between trying to look after the amateur people and satisfying the Board as well" (management comment). The CEO role has become more oriented toward the commercial side of the organisation in 1995 (see Chapter Nine), but he remains responsible for the club division also. This was raised by a CEO from another union, who used the job description for the CEO position in a major union to illustrate his point. This job description, he argued, appeared as "a normal business CEO job description, which didn't take into account the peculiarities of the rugby organisation, the traditions, the need to marry the two things together".

Other provincial Chief Executive Officers also express both sides of the amateur - professional debate. One CEO identified and discussed the aspects of the sporting organisation which he believes make it different to any other business. He explained that he believed athletes are being paid by the union for their services but they are not employees. He explains that they can not be treated as employees because "they are performing in a different way, they are motivated in a different way. Employees train themselves, dress themselves, but athletes expect trainers, training areas and clothing. You have to understand they are not standard employees".

While not refuting these beliefs, another CEO argued sport was like any other business. He allowed that the product is restricted by some factors beyond the control of the management, such as the fixtures and the level of competition the union is in, but that was merely the state of the market, and there were other comparable markets in other businesses. He concluded that "We've got customers as any other business does". His

comments are supported by a director, who also believes rugby management is now a business. He states they "we are talking big money with $800 million [the amount paid by News Ltd for the tri-series competition]. Getting 40,000 - 50,000 along each week is big numbers. You're not talking recreational sport, you're talking business". He was supported in this belief, in a more qualified manner, by one of the two new management personnel. This manager stated that "I see professional sport as being like any other business, you are selling goods or a service. If I treat it that way, that will get me most of the way there, but you have to understand more about sport and complexities of it".

Individuals on the Board recognise the balance needed also - one director articulated the belief that while rugby was "first and foremost a business" and needed to be run at a profit, managers of the game needed "to be aware of the greater service they provide to the community in terms of developing and fostering rugby". Another director, stated that "We can only be corporatised within reason, we don't want to lose sight of the fact that the huge strength of rugby is its amateurs - just look at the Board".

This extensive linkage with amateur administration is where the management of a provincial rugby union differs from the management of many other professional sporting organisations. Many professional sports competitions operate on a franchise system, such as Super League and the four major professional sports in North America. Even in Auckland, the Warriors' league organisation only managed three teams in 1995, which is set to be reduced to two in 1996. Thus the entire focus of the organisation can be directed toward the management of these two teams, who each compete in different grades of the same competition, travel together and play at together at host venues every week.

This argument can be linked to the increased differentiation between the amateur and commercial sides of modern provincial rugby management. If the organisation as a whole is considered, the responsibilities to the amateur base of the game are so great that the union cannot be considered to be run on wholly corporatised, profit oriented lines. This is because so much of the union is oriented in this manner. However if the focus is centred only on the commercial part of the organisation, which consists of those departments focused upon the management of the professional team, then it could be readily argued that the union should be run on such business-orientated lines.

As Luschen (1974) notes with a professional sport organisation, "the structure is a *business concern*" (p. 367), and this certainly true of the commercial side of the subject union structure. This sector of the organisation does resemble the structure and operations of professional sporting organisations which operate as franchises, without the jurisdiction over a regional base of amateur sporting activity. Some research informants noted a lack of persons skilled in the management of professional sport. In part this is due to the lack of widespread professionalism in New Zealand sport. The present research focused on respondents' perceived

understandings of the management of professional sport. A primary point raised by respondents - CEOs, Board directors and management staff - in interviews, when this issue was considered was the apparent lack of elite sport managers in New Zealand (This was the subject of discussion in the literature review). One director believed this is the case because the remuneration for the elite positions has not historically been attractive enough to encourage the desired standard of person, and as a result "there is no-one who really does it well".

This concern included respondent perceptions of the existing management of the union. One director said that knowledge in this area was "limited, in that they have had their only major experience working for rugby", but he then stated his belief that this was not of great importance, because such management employees would have a short time to adapt to the change. A second director expressed a greater concern, saying "The issue is whether the competency is there to achieve it".

Besides the expressed concerns over the standard of the industry as a whole a more specific concern was clear over the lack of professional rugby managers. As one director said, "If Peter Moore [the chief executive of a professional rugby league club in Sydney] was available, you'd grab him, but that type of person just isn't available". One CEO also highlighted this lack of experience, saying the understanding was not great, "because we are dealing with something that is totally new". As a result of this lack of base knowledge, one team management individual noted, "We are on a big learning curve, and that is natural I think". One other respondent on professional sport administration skills succinctly concluded that "I don't think it's very high in the union at all".

One manager believes he has the knowledge necessary to adapt to the management of the professional rugby game. He believes this is "due to tenure as much as anything, but also the study of overseas sports, and visiting overseas sporting organisations". This manager has undertaken two fact-finding visits to professional sporting organisations in North America. He was also the only individual identified by staff as having an adequate knowledge of this subject area.

7.5 IMPACT OF CHANGES ON UNION MANAGEMENT

The new governance structure was introduced to the subject union in March 1995, and professionalism was introduced to the game of rugby less than six months later. These two factors, were of marked significance in combining to affect massive changes in the manner in which the union was managed. As one staff member observed, "I thought the changes which occurred this year would have taken three years" and a director explained that "We were prepared for the change in governance, but not the explosion of professionalism, which threw us into a tailspin". One manager stated that the two changes combined to mean "We're going

through a metamorphosis, a rebirth". This 'rebirth' has meant the relationship between the management and the executive changed fundamentally and financial pressures attached to the introduction of professional regulations have enforced changes to the management of the union.

The new union officer reporting process has also meant changes and different pressures applied to management. Where previously the management were reporting to a chairman and 25 delegates, they are now reporting to a Board of nine, who have greater expectations in levels of employee performance. This was raised by one manager, in an interview, who explained that "The change meant I had direct contact with the management group that I hadn't had previously, and it was an additional responsibility to meet with them and prepare presentations for them". The more direct form of reporting has increased direct accountability in the management system. As identified by one provincial union CEO, this change "comes through the governance structures, where this man is responsible for setting policy, and this man is accountable for implementing it. It's a philosophical change". He explains his belief that accountability is a management style, consisting of giving others a job to do with guidelines in which to do it. From that stage, he explains, "it is their problem it is not done and their fault if it is not done". This can also be described as empowerment, being positive if the capabilities are adequate, and negative if the employees capabilities are inadequate or if administrative information, support and autonomy is lacking.

In a positive sense, the management personnel can become more empowered by the governance change. They can now act as managers, in more than name, by having the authority to make decisions within the jurisdiction of their control. One manager observed that the Board could "empower the management to make decisions within the defined strategies", whereas previously they had made decisions which the CEO may have wanted but were aware the Management Committee may well have negated.

This is a fact emphasised by the Board, who do not want a role in the routine implementation of their plans and clearly understand the role that management perform. The managers are left to implement plans to the best of their ability and report on their progress. One manager viewed this positively as, it "has freed up the CEO to make more decisions". He explained that, "The previous philosophy of the organisation was that if you were employed as a professional administrator then you were here to do, not to think but to do, whereas the Board has recognised that you are here to think, and get other people to do". One Board member reiterated this by saying management will now have to propose strategies and policies.

This empowerment was also identified by another CEO. He stated that:

> In a positive sense, the management personnel became greatly empowered by the governance change. They could now act as managers in more than name, by having the authority to make decisions within the jurisdiction of their control. This is a fact emphasised by the Board, who do not want a role in the routine implementation of their plans and clearly understand the role that management perform. The managers are left to implement plans to the best of their ability, and report on their progress. One manager viewed this positively, as for example it has freed up the CEO to make more decisions.

The positive aspect of this empowerment is also expressed by a director. He believes that "You are often pleasantly surprised by people's abilities given the opportunities, so the Board has a big responsibility to create the environment in which people can demonstrate the abilities and skills to succeed".

However the existence of the Board has brought new pressures of accountability to bear very plainly on the management personnel, and the Board has made it clear that personnel must adapt to the new corporatised system or they will be replaced. One director recognised that this governance change was "quite intense, and it follows that the changes in demands are extreme, as evidenced by the changes that have gone on here". In this last comment the director was referring to the decision of the Chief Executive Officer to resign in October 1995 during the research period (The effects of the change on the CEO position are more fully discussed in Chapter Nine). These changes were explained by one manager who believed that: "Higher standards mean greater requirements on personnel, higher standards of personnel". This increased accountability was desired by at least two respondents to the club questionnaire, the first of whom sought "More accountability at all levels, and the second "More accountability through an improved administration structure".

The changes in governance placed different pressures on the managers, because the change to professionalism meant the emphasis on financing the union increased greatly. This is due to the greater demand for funding of the professional team, and personnel related to it, which necessitates the growth of revenue streams. This increased emphasis upon revenue generation, says one director, "Involves the harnessing of different set of skills, and managers will have to reorientate, and not all will be successful". Included in this reorientation is an increase in efficiencies, or as one director phrased it, "the need to pull it all together better by the management".

In this sense it is important to note that the management team retained their positions when the governance change was made. They were given the opportunity to prove they were capable of not just surviving the change in essential nature of the organisation, but being able to thrive in the new environment. These individuals attained their positions when the rugby was an amateur game, run by an unwieldy Management Committee, and the demands on their individual position were entirely different in

nature. Several directors have noted this problem in discussing the change in the governance and the changing nature of provincial rugby management. One director noted that "The problems have come from the fact they got the jobs when the game was totally different" and another stated that "A lot more is required of senior management. Their jobs have changed".

A third director informant was even more explicit. This director stated that "We have a lack of competence in the management team, which may well have been adequate five years ago, but is not adequate in the context of what is happening today". This view was supported by one staff response, saying the management of the union was 'average', and explaining that "The management, excluding the Board, is of average ability, they haven't had much exposure to senior management positions before and are slightly out of touch with management skills and PR skills, and a growth in their industry". The roles in action of the department managers as perceived by informants in this research study are discussed further in Chapter Ten.

7.6 INTERNAL UNION STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Besides the change in the governance structure of the subject union, a concurrent change was made to the management structure of the union. Theberge and Loy (1976) note that "A final feature of sport organisations which makes them especially suitable social systems for purposes of comparative organisational analysis is their structural stability. Sport organisations experience relatively few such changes" (p.74), and this has been historically applicable to the subject union. The prospects of professional rugby and perceived needs for a greater business orientation of the provincial union's governance reflected the literature in that "reorganisation almost inevitably follows organisational repositioning and devitalisation" (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988, p.8).

The CEO of another union first-division rugby union stated that "We have to get in place the structure which can cope with the demands of professionalism, which are totally different to the demands of amateurism". As noted earlier in this chapter, the Steering Committee which initiated the change in the union's governance structure were intent on constructing an organisational and management structure which would be able to adapt to the advent of the professional game. The changing demands such a move would make on the structure were evidenced by the president of the Australian Rugby Union when that structure was formally changed in December 1995: "The new constitution will enable the ARFU to operate far more efficiently and effectively in the new era of professionalism" (Australian Rugby Football Union, 1995).

When comparisons are made between Figure 8.1, the 1994 management structure, and Figure 8.4, the 1995 management structure, it becomes clear that a new financial management position was created. The title of

financial manager in the old structure had been largely a misnomer. The position was charged with financial control of the union, managing the clubs and also an ad hoc role in the management of the administrative systems. As the manager who held that position explains, "the financial part of my job only took up 25% of my time. Through being involved in the administration of an amateur sport, we became jacks of all trades, which was a continuation of what happened at club level". When this manager joined the union in the late 1980s, the organisation only employed five or six staff, so those individuals "had to cover several bases". He believes the new role is just an extension of what he has been doing for the last nine years, and "hopefully I will be able to focus on one particular aspect, rather than three, and not being able to do any of them particular justice"




Figure 7.4: The union's management structure in 1995

Beer (1972) recognised the basic problem facing all systems was how to cope with increasing complexity (p.27). The union had previously done so by slight adaptations when needed, usually in the form of adding an additional occupational position to the organisational structure. This supported the literature of Parkhouse et al. (1982), who observe that "sports franchises often emerge with little thought as to the design of the

organisation (Parkhouse et al., 1982,p.183). This had certainly been the case with the subject union, and so when the governance change was planned, alterations to the organisational structure were considered also.

The most important of these in the operational sense was the creation of a new managerial position, entitled Financial and Administration Manager. This allowed the former financial manager to become the Rugby Manager and manage the area of club rugby in the union. The new Financial Manager had control over the accounting areas of the union and a more detailed role in the administration area of the union, such as staffing and systems. With the move of a manager to the specific area of club rugby, the CEO was allowed to de-emphasise his involvement with this area, and concentrate more fully on the elite team and business aspects of the union. As the former CEO observes, "the club area took up an enormous amount of my time". When he joined the union as the Executive Director, "delegates from clubs were only prepared to talk to the CEO, not to anyone else...it's only in the last couple of years that we've got them to make appointments".

The changes allowed the CEO to join with the Board to form a more focused 'strategic apex'. "Here are found those people charged with overall responsibility for the organisation - the chief executive officer, and any other top-level managers whose concerns are global" (Mintzberg, 1979, p.24). This level focuses on the strategic orientation of the organisation, and does not intend to become overly involved in the operational side of the organisation. This has provided a further form of empowerment for the CEO, and is more fully discussed in Chapter Nine of this study. Mintzberg (1979) notes that "The strategic apex is joined to the operating core by the chain of middle-line managers with formal authority" (p.26). He continues that "In general, the middle-line manager performs all the managerial roles of the chief executive, but in the context of managing his own unit" (p.29). This underpins the degree of empowerment which the restructuring allowed the managers, and more clearly defined their spans of control.

Perceptions of the management of the union by the staff and club chairmen remain mixed. Both groups were asked how they would describe the management of the union under the current structure, responding soon after the governance change was introduced. The results are shown in figure 7.5.

The full results of the question can be found in Appendices B and D, but it is clear from the summary table that both sets of respondents were not convinced about the management of the union. The club chairmen provided a variety of responses, but most indicated a belief there was much room for improvement. They provided an almost even spread centring on the 'average response'. The staff were only slightly more positive. They were more specific in their explanations of their responses, citing a lack of

Very Poor	1	0	1
Poor	0	3	3
Average	4	8	12
Good	2	3	5
Very Good	0	1	1

Figure 7.5. - Perceived standard of management in the union

communication and one seriously questioning the abilities of management personnel. A general feeling to emerge from the responses was that there was clearly room for further improvement in the management of the union. The question may indicate a need for the management to critically explore perceptions and determine the domains which could be more efficiently developed. There may well have been an element of uncertainty reflected in the responses which would be resolved more positively once the new governance became clear.

With the management areas being more clearly defined, there was a consequential increased departmentalisation of the structure. Four seemingly distinct departments were formed each headed by a manager. The four departments were rugby, finance and administration, marketing and coaching. These positions can be seen in Figure 7.4 in their relationship to each other and the positions for which they have responsibility and more are more independent in their operations than before the change. This was intended, as related literature (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1993; Robbins and Mukerji, 1994) confirms to increase the motivation of group members and further define their focus. Each department or unit now has greater autonomy to create its own structure, culture and technologies. This departmentalisation has been considered necessary in recent years as the need for better organisational systems increased. As one manager explained, "We've been trying to sectionalise rugby for years now, but the funds and time weren't right". In the former (pre-1995) structure only the coaching and development area could readily be defined as a department, largely because its role was so different to the others in the areas of clubs, finance, ticketing and secretarial-type duties.

This increased accountability, empowerment and corporatisation of management roles in the organisation also allowed them to be more assertive and goal oriented. With this new role of empowerment, each manager would now take more direct responsibility for their span of control, including managing functions of that span of control toward feasible and challenging goals. These goals would be constructed in conjunction with the CEO, and should have been discussed with the Board but (as explained later in this study) the Board has, to date, been unable to become as involved as it desired in the planning for the managerial areas. These plans should have included planned dates for review of the goals and progress toward them.

These goals also assist the CEO in coordinating the efforts of different departments toward a common goal, which is an important aspect of the Management by Objectives (MBO) approach to planning. This is recognised by one manager who stated that, "I think the organisation will become more managed by objectives". This includes a focus on objectives in sponsorship targets, season ticket sales, and corporate hospitality targets in the marketing department. This manager believed that the systems within the union "will have to change to deliver", and added that "In the future we will become a much more goal oriented organisation".

As the orientation of the organisation increases in direction toward pre-set goals, especially those of a strategic nature, this increases the need for effective planning. A brief reflection indicates strong links between the Board intentions and related literature. Filley, House and Kerr (1986) defined planning as "the specification of means necessary to achieve a prescribed end *before action toward that end takes place*" (as cited in Parks and Zanger, 1990, p.45), and explained the link between goals by noting that planning "involves setting goals and objectives and then determining how those goals and objectives will be reached" (ibid.).

This link between goals or objectives and planning is reinforced by the literature of Koontz (1980), who defines planning as the process of "selecting objectives and means of accomplishing them" (as cited in Chelladurai, 1991, p.137). The effectiveness of such an approach to management was identified by Bennis and Nanus (1985), who suggested that "individuals and organisations are more effective when they have (a) a clear image of what they want to achieve, and (b) the steps required to attain this desired end" (as cited in Wallace and Weese, 1995, p.188). Given the business orientation of the Board and their individual success in the corporate world such perspectives appear to illustrate and reinforce the new union image.

Planning was done in the case study organisation under the old governance structure, but not to a degree that satisfies the present Board. As a body, the Management Committee did have an element of strategic orientation but the representative structure which produced Committee membership did not deliver the type of individual who had commonly had experience in the strategic planning of a middle-sized organisation. This concern was raised by one internal director, who noted that "The business plans need to be more specific". It was thought by most involved that the Board would construct enhanced strategic plans once in operation, but unforeseen complications precluded such an operation. As one external director noted, "It been very hard to plan strategy and work out long term plans while the ground has been changing daily". These complications had continued until toward the end of 1995 according to many research informants. Such complications included changes in personnel, competition changes, professionalism and a key resignation.

Noting the problems in predicting future developments in the world of elite rugby, one external director explained "it would probably be June,

1996, before the IPC (Super-12) competition will be out of the way, and then we will probably know what is happening for 1997, and be able to put a long term plan in place". He believed it would be possible to construct a long term plan before this date, which would be twelve months since the Board had been established. This director's views on the impact of the new competition on the planning function were reinforced by the comments of another respondent, who stated that "We have a rough idea about the IPC for the first year, but know nothing about the second year".

The importance of constructing such plans was also noted by one CEO from another union. This respondent emphasised a link not raised by any respondents in the case study organisation, between planning and the critical area of sponsorship:

> Corporate funding is going to be a huge part New Zealand rugby, and if you haven't got business people capable of dealing with major corporates, if you haven't got a structure that can identify where it is going and how it is going to get there, and you haven't got a good financial plan in place, you are going to miss out on the sponsorship dollar. The first thing major sponsors ask for these days is a financial plan.

This emphasis placed by sponsors on having a secure understanding of the medium-term direction of the recipient organisation has also complicated the task of the union in seeking sponsorship for its involvement in the new competition, the difficulties of which are fully explained in Chapters Ten and Eleven.

7.6.1 Communication problems in the union

One concern that the introduction of increased departmentalisation raised was that it may accentuate existing communication problems within the organisation. Watkins (1991) believes that communication as the exchange and sharing of messages, "Is the cornerstone of human society" (p.107). Parkhouse (1991) discussed in the literature review, defines communication in sport management as "the ability to interact in written and oral forms in a clear, concise manner to accomplish a specific purpose. Sport information director, sports promotion director, and media liaison are examples of positions in sport management that require an especially high level of communication skills" (p.19). This assertion could be advanced a step further in this present research to suggest that while such positions may require an *especially* high level of communication, so does that of the CEO in a sporting organisation, and the management positions of the union require, as a bare minimum, high levels of communication skills.

This critical issue of communication was underscored in the union staff perspectives. The research revealed that staff felt there was a lack of understanding between themselves and the management. This concern emerged very clearly in a number of staff questionnaire responses. In

response to a question seeking suggestions for the improvement of the operational management of the organisation, a typical staff reply was "Communicate. Let us know what is happening". A response to this question noted that "The management might be communicating with one another but that's where it seems to stop" and a further perspective described the management of the union as being very poor, citing "No communication. They seem to be too busy all the time".

Other responses confirm the emergent theme of a deficiency in the communication between the staff and management personnel. Staff meetings had been planned at the beginning of the research period to address any emerging communication problems, but as one respondent explains "There does not seem to be any communication between management and staff. We have had two meetings with the staff through the year, and one of those was about our contracts". Another staff member recognised this problem and offered a solution: "A weekend away to talk about common goals and where we are headed would be most beneficial for office administration staff". However, this may ignore the cause of the existing problem. Such a cause was advanced by one staff member, "Over the last few years the union has grown so quickly that management has struggled to keep up. Very poor communication between management and staff".

As a result of this lack of communication, one staff member believes that "There seems to have become two levels, with [the managers], and that's there, and it almost feels like there is a lower level [where we are]". This respondent explained that "there was no information passed on. I appreciate a lot of things must remain confidential but I think a lot of things should have been passed on to us. It's extremely embarrassing when you either read in the paper or someone tells you things that are going on here that you should know about but don't, which has happened a hell of a lot for me". This respondent believes the staff should be informed about what the management are working on, even if the details of it are not discussed.

Watkins (1991) observed "organisations are often characterised by status hierarchies that affect the flow and accuracy of upward, downward and horizontal communication. This should not necessarily cause an organisational feeling of poor communication. It is primarily the downward communication which is causing problems for the union. This problem has not been recognised by all individuals concerned. Despite widespread concerns regarding this vital area of organisational operations, most of the management do not recognise the extent of the existing problem. One of the two new managers responded by saying that "I don't think there is a communication gap between management and staff". The other new manager stated that "I sense it's very good. I don't think there's a problem, although it has been mentioned to me that there is". He believes there is no excuse for having poor communication "because it is such a small office there is not such a huge amount of people", and later concluded that "I can't imagine in an office, this size why there would be a communication problem, but if there is I will fix it".

Interestingly, these comments of these two new managers were not mirrored by those of two more experienced managers in the organisation. One such manager observes that the communication style between management and staff is "Pretty relaxed", and admits "we can always do better". He explains the problem is historical in the organisation as "Our communication has always been piecemeal, because we have always been fighting fires at the union". "To develop the communication", he explained, "we need more time, so we can actually talk about things, primarily in our departments". This time was the concern in addressing the problem "Maybe we need half an hour out to sit down and plan things, but I don't know how we'd do it during the season". Despite such problems in rectifying the communication problem, this managerial respondent agreed it was a priority. "It's important, but it will take a lot of commitment and willpower... It's one area I would like to see us move ahead".

A second manger also recognised that the communication weakness had a history in the organisation. "Historically, it's not been the best, it's been poor because all the management have been stretched". He added that communication has improved since the restructuring, "because we are more departmentalised now, which has helped a lot". He agrees the area still needs attention, and sees the CEO as being important in this area, as he came into the organisation with an objective viewpoint, not being directly laden with any historical baggage of the organisation's amateur days.

Reference to literature supports the importance of regular formalised meetings advocated as being an effective mechanism for breaking down gaps between departments of an organisation (Bartol and Martin, 1991; Robbins and Barnwell, 1994). The former CEO agrees with this proposal. "I believe it's something that we should be doing". Another manager also gives qualified support to this idea by stating that "I think weekly meetings are good, if that is required. You shouldn't have meetings just for the sake of having meetings, but it's good to keep everyone informed. People like to be in the know, and it's good for staff morale to feel involved".

As one manager explains, there have been recent attempts to establish such formalised meetings, but these attempts "have fallen away, because once inside the season the demands are horrendous, and people are always pulling the pin on such meetings". He acknowledges the importance of these meetings by saying "it's so critical for those things to take place, for everyone to understand where the organisation's going this week, this month". This maintenance of a flow of communication and information has not been apparent in the case study organisation, and so this manager has "seen communication breakdowns, I've seen the public be misinformed because people weren't up to date. I've seen people say 'I don't know' when they should know".

A staff member explains that these staff meetings were planned to be held every fortnight or month, "even if it's just for five minutes to chat, but I think we've had three since I've been here. We've felt almost isolated...I thought it wasn't anyone's fault, but I suppose it is, but it hasn't happened simply because there isn't the time". Although time was often expressed as a precluding factor for the introduction of formal meetings, the staff member says "I think it's important to make time for those sort of things really...There have been times when there have been [disagreements] which should have got sorted out".

One method to consider is that of introducing formal weekly departmental meetings. In these meetings, the manager of each department would be able to discuss the issues facing the department and the organisation as a whole, and explain plans and operations for that week and their implementation. At such meetings major developments in other departments could be discussed. It would be the responsibility of the manager to arrange times for these meetings, which would be easier to arrange than meetings for the whole staff. These smaller meetings would also be able to effectively develop departmental cultures, serve as an additional, mechanism to develop interpersonal communications, and enable managers to exert their leadership more directly with their departments.

The benefits of such a scheme were raised by one manager, who noted that "The way I see it, we have four heads of staff, and we treat our staff how we think best, and then we four sit around once a week, with the CEO, and discuss where we are all going". The major weakness of this method is that it may further distance the CEO from the staff. It could be argued that the CEO's reliance on his managers to communicate effectively with the staff is sound business practice and managers should be of sufficient quality to do this. This does not preclude the CEO examining efficacious means for his direct linkages with staff.

Besides concerns about communication between management and staff, the suggestion by one manager regarding meetings between managers and the CEO raises a secondary concern in the area of communication between the departmental groupings. This concern was raised in one staff questionnaire "There is not enough communication between various departments and committees. Operations are quite often very disjointed. 'The right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing' so to speak". The new CEO also identified that "Between some of the management there is a communication problem". As a result of this, he initiated a weekly meeting between the managers and himself. He stresses that this meeting "is not a formal meeting, but we take action points and make sure someone does them, and carry them on to next week". He believes these meetings have been successful.

7.6.2 Increased future bifurcation

Many respondents in this present research believed the increased departmentalisation will eventually lead to an organisation of two halves, one managing the non-profit club and coaching / development areas, and the other managing the professional team. This is evidenced by the view of one manager that the present structure "will actually run as two separate organisations under [the new Rugby Manager] if it's done properly".

One first division rugby union has approached this separation in a more formalised manner. This was the first provincial union to change their governance and management structure after the introduction of professionalism to rugby, in what the CEO described as a "massive change, probably the biggest since the unions inception". He explained that his organisation has attempted to place the "professional people" on one side of the organisation, and clubs on the other side. This was done to retain some form of emphasis upon club rugby. He saw some other unions as placing the focus almost exclusively on their representative team, "and everything else under that", but the his union attempted to avoid this by keeping a flat structure. "In other unions clubs have felt disenfranchised, they feel they don't have a part to play. We've tried very hard to make sure that doesn't happen". Thus the organisation was effectively bifurcated, with the CEO overseeing both sides of the operation.

The union had planned to introduce a company to handle the professional side of the organisation, with responsibility to the senior representative team, the employment of staff and players, and the generation of sponsorship. This idea was mooted because the union management were unsure of the financial limits within which an incorporated society could operate in a professional environment. As the CEO explains, he was in a similar situation to other senior provincial rugby managers, "We suddenly went from being an amateur organisation to one which employed players and we were unsure of the ramifications of an incorporated society being able to do that". It was then revealed that the limitations were very high (several million dollars) in comparison to the fiscal operations of this union. With this in mind, it was decided the legal status of the organisation be maintained as a incorporated society, as is the case for the subject union, because the legal liability of the officers involved in an incorporated society is a lot less than that of a limited liability company.

Despite the non-introduction of the mooted company, a smaller operation was set up in the neighbouring union which has responsibility for the marketing, promotions, revenue generation and sourcing of sponsorship. This small company will have the union CEO and one other Board member as directors and will be used as the major funding source of the union. This company is owned 51 per cent by the union, and 49 per cent by the managing director. The funding from this company is approved by the Board, then the CEO, and is channelled into the two sides of the organization.

7.7 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

As noted in the literature review of this present study there is a range of sport management literature on the structure of professional sport organisations, and the ramifications of this structure. The Management Committee structure of the researched union had become outdated and inappropriate to the demands of contemporary provincial rugby management. This structure handicapped the planning and decision-making functions of the organisation's managers who lacked the relative autonomy to make commercial decisions in a swift and comprehensive manner. As the commercial pressures on the organisation increased inexorably, it became clear to certain governors that the structure needed replacing with a corporatised or business oriented body. The union became the first in New Zealand to adopt a corporatised Board structure, and most other first division unions have since followed. The research period saw great change in the governance of New Zealand provincial rugby.

The introduction of this new governance structure was closely followed by the introduction of professionalism to rugby, and these two events fundamentally affected the way managers in the case study organisation fulfilled their tasks. The most important of these changes was the empowerment of managers, which removed many of the restrictions the previous Management Committee structure. The changes also increased the pressure on managers to develop the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations.

There were differing perspectives in the study responses on the degree to which provincial rugby management could be managed using a business/corporate emphasis. Those respondents who believed it should have a high degree, were usually external Board directors who identified aspects of the organisation's operations, such as customer relations and sales, which made the provincial rugby union similar to any other business. Those who argued that the management of sport was different from other business pointed to the high number of amateurs still involved in the management of provincial rugby and the large non-commercial segment of the organisation's operations, especially the clubs.

The structural changes of the organisation increased the degree of internal departmentalisation. This departmentalisation included the creation of a new managerial position, the Finance and Administration Manager. The four managers - Marketing Manager, Finance and Administration Manager, Rugby Manager and Director of Coaching - each now headed their own clearly differentiated departmental grouping. The changes also meant the union, reflecting corporate lines, will become more goal-oriented, which in turn increases the need for effective planning. This was a primary aim of the new Board, but has been postponed due to the environmental disruptions of professionalism and wages and personnel changes of the CEO which had a severe impact during the research period.

Communication problems between the staff and management were identified by many staff respondents. These concerns were not directly reflected by management responses. The increased departmentalisation may ease these problems if managers establish good interpersonal relationships with their subordinates but need to be addressed. Some concern was also expressed about the communication between departments and this was being addressed by the new CEO.

The organisation is likely to become increasingly bifurcated. The operations supporting the commercially oriented professional team are becoming increasingly separated, formally and informally, from those surrounding the non-commercial operation of the organisation. Compounding the challenge of developing a competitive sport business, with its attendant amateur element, there is a perceived lack of available staff skilled in professional sport administration. Understanding of the management of professional sport in the union is not perceived to be comprehensive, largely because of the historical lack of administration of professionalism in rugby.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The previous results chapter of this research study examined the introduction of a new governance structure to the subject rugby union and its impact upon the management of that organisation. This chapter examines the Board of Directors that was introduced to govern the union in place of the previous Management Committee. The initial period of operation for the Board has been turbulent, with the external rugby environment in a constant state of flux, and the relationship with the CEO deteriorating to the extent that he resigned. The size and composition of the Board and its ideal role are considered, as are linkages with staff sectors

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Board Size
8.3 The Composition of Rugby Boards
8.4 The Role of the Board
8.5 Motivation for Rugby Board Directors
8.6 The Board Chairman's Role
8.7 Board and the CEO
8.8 Board Effectiveness
8.9 Summary and Review

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The new Board governing the union's rugby brought in under the revised structure noted in the previous chapter provided the provincial union with a business oriented body. It was expected by those pushing for change that such a body would develop a vision, policy and strategic plan which would then allow clubs and the union's management to implement these. Impacting on the intention, however, were the realities of Board size, its relationship with the CEO and environmental factors of rugby policies, professionalism and relationships. This chapter draws upon interviews and questionnaires noted in Chapter Five to provide actual voices of participants and informants providing perspectives of the Board.

As the research in this area of the organisation developed a degree of depth, other secondary questions arose surrounding the board. These secondary concerns were related to the need for subcommittee structures

attached to the Board, the motivation for directors to be involved in the case study organisation, interaction of Board personnel, and the relationship of the Board with the CEO management and staff.

In order to compile data in this area, semi-structured interviews were held with each of the Board of Directors (n=9), the president (n=1), the two successive CEOs (n=2), management (n=4), one senior staff member (n=1), team management personnel (n=3), former chairman (n=1), one prominent rugby media person (n=1) and CEOs from every other first-division provincial union (n=9). The qualitative data gained by these thirty-one interviews were complemented by that gained from the completed questionnaires of staff (n=8) and club chairmen (n=17).

8.2 BOARD SIZE

With a major criticism of the former Management Committee system being its size, the size of Boards in provincial rugby management was examined in this research. A range of critics note the link between Board size and manageability. The literature review reflected Clendenin (1972) who states that "large boards...are unmanageable" (p.28), often "because as the size of the Board increases, it becomes less cohesive" (Fredrickson, Hambrick & Baumbin, 1988, p. 257). In terms of the governance issue. Fredrickson et al. (1988) may have more accurately stated that "as the size of the Board increases, *the possibility, and indeed the likelihood,* increases that it becomes less cohesive".

Literature such as Dobrzynski (1993) advances the value and efficiency of small boards and advocates twelve as being the optimal number on a governing board. The new Boards in New Zealand rugby are invariably of an even smaller size. One CEO observed that "With the rate of change in rugby, you need the flexibility that a small Board offers. A small decision making unit is really important to be able to keep up with the play". The subject union has nine voting members on its Board, including the chairman whose role doubles as the union chairman. The other provincial union which has nine members is a neighbouring union, while the national unions of both New Zealand and Australia have this number of directors. Other first division unions have seven directors and the CEO of a further union has also proposed this number. These numbers also reflect the preference for odd-numbered boards, presumably to resolve issues if a vote is needed.

In other sports, the Australian Rugby League disbanded a 52 man management committee in 1989, and established a nine member Board. "It is also significant to note the way in which rugby league streamlined its operations to resemble closely that of a corporate entity" (Shilbury, 1990, p. 12). Two respondents, in personal communication, noted the ARC and New Zealand Cricket moves for board changes. In the research period under consideration, 1995, New Zealand Cricket introduced a seven man Board, which replaced a thirteen man committee largely composed of

association delegates. As with rugby, this governance change at the national level was considered overdue: "One reason for some of the problems was that NZC was governed by a constitution that had taken 100 years to evolve, and had proved 100 years out of date" (Cameron, 1995i, p. 7).

Sporting Organisation	Number of Voting Board Members	Voting Make Up of Board
Subject union	9	- Chairman and deputy - chairman of Council of Club delegates - Seven independent directors, including chairman
Provincial union	7	- 2 Union delegates - 4 Outsiders - Players' Representative
Provincial union	9	- CEO - President - Chairman of Council of Clubs - 6 outsiders
Provincial union	7	- 4 Rugby members - 3 Outsiders
Provincial union	7	- 2 From Rugby management Committee - 5 Outsiders
Australian RFU	9	(Includes) - 3 State representatives - Players' representative
New Zealand RFU	9	- 6 Rugby representatives (2 each from three zones) - 2 Outsiders - 1 Maori Representative
Auckland Warriors	8	- CEO - CEO of major sponsor, - - Chairman and deputy-chairman of Auckland Rugby League - Two representatives of Auckland clubs - Chairman - Independent director

Figure 8.1. Size and composition of sample rugby and league boards

8.3 THE COMPOSITION OF RUGBY BOARDS

While the directors for the subject board were selected by a selection committee formed from within the union, two other first division unions

used management consultant companies to manage the selection process. The CEO of one of these unions explained this was done in order to increase the confidentiality of the process and to reduce possible public exposure of the rejection of individuals. However all unions primarily decided upon their Board structure by themselves.

The subject union includes the chairman and his deputy from the Council of Club Delegates as insiders on its board. One of these internal directors explains:

> While the Board has a lot of omnipotence in most things, most of them are relatively new to the ways in which the subcommittees of the union work, so its important to have representatives of the Council of Delegates there in case some things do get a bit thorny, to provide the background...We provide an understanding of the personalities. Bring a fairly good understanding of the administration of club rugby, that's probably why both the deputy chairman and myself are there. We're familiar with the historical structure, a lot of which is still in place.

The other such representative agrees with these sentiments. "It is important, because while I don't have the technical qualifications of a lot of the directors, I have an understanding of the clubs that the directors don't have, so I can bring something to the Board that they can't. I also have enough business sense to be able to interact with them".

Other provincial unions, perhaps because of their rural or conservative bases, have a higher percentage of rugby representatives on their boards. One second division union has the chairman and three others who represent club rugby; a first division union has two union delegates of the seven voting Board members, and a proposed union structure includes four rugby members on the seven man board. A union adjacent to the subject union has just one club representative on a nine man board but also includes the president, and another prominent union has two of seven directors coming from club structures.

At a national level, the New Zealand Union originally proposed that five of its nine members be rugby persons from rugby zones, but when the governance change was accepted, this was amended to six such members, considered by some observers to be a very high percentage. The Australian Rugby Union Board of nine includes three state representatives, one each from the major playing states of New South Wales and Queensland, and one representing the other states. The Auckland Warriors league organisation has a diverse Board of eight persons, which includes the chairman of the Auckland Rugby League and his deputy, and two other representatives of Auckland league clubs.

A primary motivation for the introduction of the Board system was to allow individuals with relevant expertise, but without formal links to the game, to be introduced to the governance of rugby. These individuals were

thought to provide expertise in the commercial areas of the game, such as marketing, finance and strategic planning. In addition, as one respondent to the club chairman questionnaire identified, "New directors should be independent and objective". The case study union has seven of the nine board members as such 'outsiders', who are not required to have formal links to rugby in the union.

The place of such external directors is explained by one of the Board. "Contrary to what a lot of people are saying about a group of businessmen coming in and taking over rugby, the business people who come are business people who love rugby, and most of them on our Board, bar one, have a very strong affiliation with rugby...A balance is needed, an empathy with sport is valuable, but then it's also valuable to have the people that come from different viewpoints and bring different perspectives to the table, which is what I think we've got with our board". This mix of business acumen and sporting background is clear from the profiles drawn in Chapter Six of this study.

However the reality is that several of the directors have governance roles in order that the union can utilise their commercial expertise. This is recognised by one of the individuals involved in the selection process of these individuals, who stated that "We thought we had the rugby side of it covered with the chairman and the deputy-chairman of the Committee of Delegates, then we looked at the business side and we were very fortunate as we were able to get people who were qualified highly in a business sense, but also who had an excellent rugby background". In other unions, there are similarly high proportion of outsiders with five out of seven, four out of seven and has a proposed three out of seven. The New Zealand Union has only two of nine and the Auckland Warriors has provision for one such person.

Another area of debate, indicated by interviewees, was the inclusion of an organisation's CEO on its Board as a voting member. Of the New Zealand provincial unions, only one union utilises this mechanism, as do the Auckland Warriors. One manager believed this should also have been done in the subject union, in order to further empower the CEO. Neither of the two sporting organisations which allow the CEO to have a vote on the Board combine his role with that of the chairman. The motivation for the provincial union which institutes the CEO's membership of the board is explained by the CEO of that union. He states that the management consultancy firm and group from the union, which had established the governance structure identified common threads in the governance of successful and unsuccessful New Zealand companies, "and found amongst the most successful companies that the CEO can attach ownership to a full vote. In that regard I am part of the decision, and will feel comfortable with the decision and part of it, even if I vote against it. Rugby isn't big enough yet to divorce the CEOs".

The structure in which the CEO is independent of the Board is widely favoured in contemporary rugby management. The most common

justification for this independent structure is that it allows the Board to fulfil its governance function in regard to the monitoring of the CEO "Given that one of the board's central functions is to monitor the performance of top management, allowing the CEO to fulfil both roles is thought to compromise the desired system of checks and balances" (Rechner and Dalton, 1991, p.155). The Board needs to be able to be critical of the CEO when needed, without criticising elements of the Board itself which would be case if the CEO was on the board. The inclusion of the CEO on the Board may also complicate the role of the CEO, by involving that person in the tasks and politics of the Board.

Only one union has the president as a voting member of the board. That union deliberately selected a president with business qualities as well as the more traditional rugby qualities. In the subject union, the President explains his position as attending meetings of the Board, speaking at such meetings, being involved on a subcommittee, but never voting. He sees the position largely as a figurehead, much like the patron's role. Where the president of the other union retains this role, his CEO explained that "we can add value to them if they have some input in the running of the game".

In terms of other persons represented on rugby management boards, the players' representative is becoming more common. One provincial union near the subject union was the first to include a players' representative on their Board. The Australian Union includes two players' representatives on their Board, with one having voting rights. Other notable inclusions are the Maori representative on the NZRFU Board, and the CEO of the major sponsor on the Auckland Warriors Board. However, there is little evidence of provincial rugby unions, overall, committing themselves to having a player representative on their boards.

The former chairman of the subject union, who had a prominent role in the selection of Board members, said that there had been approximately twenty contenders for the nine positions on the Board, "All of the applicants were of a very high calibre. The committee who interviewed the candidates were impressed by each and in time it may be they will all be represented on the board." This section is not concerned with the sporting and management background of these individuals, which is explained and discussed fully in Chapter Six, but with their perceptions and the manner in which they are operating on the Board. These provide insights into the realities of professional sport administration in a New Zealand setting.

Examining the management backgrounds of the Board, which were presented in Chapter Six, it is readily apparent that the directors are individuals who have each achieved great success in their chosen fields. While this gives the union a great deal of knowledge and expertise on which to draw, some individuals believe it has also brought about the

situation in which these directors have egos which are clashing. One manager observes that "There are a lot of fairly big egos there, that's a danger. The feeling I get is that the egos could sometimes be detrimental to the overall policy setting, because there are some very strong agendas there, and personally I don't believe it's healthy". He believes that this conflict comes from the mix of the individual personalities on the Board, and that "any Board in New Zealand would have difficulties controlling that particular group". However this manager also believes these personalities will be a strength in the future, "provided it can be controlled", and states that the chairman should be stronger in this regard, as he "struggles with this group".

A director adds substance to this argument. He states that, while "The Board members with marketing and financial responsibilities are very strong, more than capable of handling any crisis we may face...There is a threat of people with agendas putting themselves, or supporting others, into positions of power and the monetary reward of the position". He does expand on this concern, but it is important that the Board considers and, if necessary, recognises the threat of individuals using their positions to further personal agendas. Decreasing director involvement in more peripheral activities, such as subcommittees, to allow frank governance discussion, may facilitate open debate.

A second manager believes there is not an identifiable culture among the Board at the moment, a point also made by another manager. This second manager believes the Board are "Not a team yet" but does not attribute this to conflicting personalities. He believe the problem lies in the fact that "I don't think they have made the effort to mould themselves into a good team. They have been too busy fighting fires. Teams don't just happen". He believes the chairman should be more effective in this regard. This criticism of a lack of unity has been directed at another prominent sporting board in the same period. The CEO of DB Breweries, the major sponsor of the Warriors, serves on the Board of that sporting organisation, and he strongly criticised the Board at an election meeting. Describing the "public infighting and politicking", this director said "In their first year the Warriors have been arguably the most successful new team in the history of sport in New Zealand.....but there is one missing ingredient, namely a united, professional Board of directors" (Blake hits out, 1995, p.2).

This question of Board unity was discussed with one of the individuals involved in the selection of the external directors. This individual responded that the group "Looked at that likely compatibility. We looked at people's personalities". He described how the group interviewed one individual who had been very successful in the senior position of an organisation, but had an "abrasive" personality, and it was thought this could cause problems on the board. He explains that because the number of available individuals for the seven positions exceeded the available positions by a ratio of three to one, the selectors could look beyond the professional profiles of the individuals, and at other factors including the personalities of the individual applicants.

Despite such concerns about the personnel and their interaction on the Board, the majority of directors express their satisfaction with the existing personnel. One rugby-appointed director stated that "There's a good mix on the board" while another rugby-appointed director believed that

> They have put the right Board together, I'm impressed with them as a bunch of people who represent so much all-round skill...Each of the six [external directors, excluding the chairman] brings something special, skills and knowledge to the Board, and they have the added value of being well respected in the general community. They care about rugby. There are a couple of guys that are ambitious, but that's good, that's healthy.

This director also saw it as a chance to extend himself as a professional in that company. One new manager also reflected this in an interview, saying "From an outside perspective, they seem to be a complementary group, professional in their approach", while one staff member responded in a questionnaire that "The Board of Directors have excellent credentials to carry rugby through. The professionalism of the [subject union] is still ahead of most unions".

Perceptions of the Board by rugby managers outside the province are very mixed. One provincial union CEO identified a significant strength of the subject union as being the personnel on the Board. "They are high profile business people with good qualifications for running a business, and have good rugby backgrounds also". A second CEO noted that "I am sure [the union] will be able to adapt. They have got some high quality people on heir Board, and that will be the key to it". Criticism has been centred on the fact that "Some boards have probably gone too business-oriented and are losing focus of all rugby by focusing too much on the top team", which the informant said was applicable to the subject union. Another first-division union CEO criticised the composition of the researched Board, saying it wasn't working well because "The composition of the Board is made up of high-flying people but you could never get them together".

8.4 THE ROLE OF THE BOARD

There was a clear consensus which emerged in interviews of first division CEOs, subject union management and Board members about the role of the subject union's Board. The consensus emerged that the Board's role was the same as in any other business, setting the policy and strategic direction. Strategic direction was usually related to setting policy and constructing plans: "Setting policy with a long term vision". The Board were strongly oriented toward their role of setting policy and allowing the management to implement this, with the management reporting to the Board but not including them in the operational management. "The ideal is obviously that the Board has no direct day-to-day responsibilities". CEOs of other provincial unions also recognise the importance of the Board staying out of operational management, with typical statements being, "It

does not have a role as far as the hands-on running of the game is concerned" and "They should be a policy setter, with others actually doing the work". This is also reflected in reviewed literature, with Mason and Paul (1988) stating that the function of the Board "is to advise, not operate the program" (p.1).

One manager felt the Board will "have to be careful they do not fall into the trap of getting too hands-on", which the subcommittee structure allowed them to do. A second manager feels this has already happened. He states that when the directors came on Board, they couldn't understand why there were so many subcommittees and they were satisfied with the oversight capacity articulated to them when they accepted the roles on the Board, but now "some of them are now falling into the trap of supporting the committees". He believes this is because directors enjoy having the more direct involvement in rugby management that a subcommittee structure offers and "only one or two" have remained untouched by the system. Another individual, involved in the governance of the union added to the debate by explaining that "We are not at the ideal at the moment and directors are having to put considerably more time into Board work than would otherwise normally be associated with directors. I would think every director at the moment would feel they have too much involvement". This belief is evidenced by three separate responses from external directors.

A manager believes the existing subcommittee structure should be abandoned, and such committees only formed for a specific temporary projects after the request for them has been tabled by a senior manager through the CEO. The beliefs of this manager are given a degree of evidence by the comments of one director. This director admitted that "Around the Board we have a group who individually do very well in their own business but they can, in the sporting side, get slightly seduced by it all. Suddenly it's a limelight thing with big name stars...You want to be more involved than you legitimately should be involved as a Board member".

This increased involvement in the subcommittee system also increases the voluntary sacrifice of time from the directors, which may in turn decrease their propensity towards continued involvement with the Board position, given other demands on their time. A director recognises this, "You're putting a lot of time in. It's not like being a director of a public company. It has taken more time than I thought, but it has been enjoyable". This is further evidenced by another director, who said the situation was not ideal because it was too 'hands-on'. He explained that "There are too many functional tasks we don't have the time to do...It's getting frustrating because it's taking up management time for a lot of the directors, which takes some of the enjoyment out of it. When it is taking ten to fifteen hours of your week and starts eating into your work it's a bit more serious". A third Board director raised this concern, explaining that "It's been far from ideal, we've been involved in almost a daily context".

This is one major reason why one of the two new managers believes the subcommittees "are a nonsense". He believes there is a legitimate need for an audit and a finance committee, and possibly even a compensation committee, but avers that the present structure does not fit the corporate ideals espoused by the Board. As he is new to rugby management, he can see a role for a rugby committee advising him on certain issues but would ultimately like to see the structure disbanded. He believes it is the place of the CEO to drive such a disbanding. The chairman has also expressed some foresight toward destructuring the subcommittees. He stated that "Next year I would expect we'd drop the individual subcommittees...and adopt a more ideal role".

8.5 MOTIVATION FOR RUGBY BOARD DIRECTORS

Although the literature emphasises that the rewards for directors on boards are varied, financial reward is seen in the corporate world as being substantial (Linden and Lenzner, 1995). In marked comparison to major commercial boards, the directors who provide their services to the subject rugby union do so for no material reward. The chairman has estimated that the nine directors would cost the union $200,000 per year on the open market, but the service is voluntary and unrewarded for the directors in a material sense. In order to explore this seeming altruism the research included the questioning of directors as to why they would give their services free to the union when, unlike many involved in club rugby, there were already constricting demands on their time. No literature was unearthed for this present study which could provide any focus on the motivating factors for the voluntary services of directors of sporting organisations, so in this regard the current research will provide a base for further research in New Zealand sport management.

Most directors serve on the Board because they view it as an opportunity to participate and contribute to rugby in a way that was unavailable beforehand. Indicative of this is one response by a director saying "I was very concerned about the way rugby was going in New Zealand and saw it as an opportunity to contribute", while another described his motivation as being, "To help rugby, I love the game, and have something to contribute". A third stated that "There was a hell of a lot of debate about rugby, and where it was going to go, and I saw the opportunity to participate and use some of my skills to the game's advantage".

This love of the game combined with the obvious strength of local rugby to form another kind of motivation, reflected in one director's statement that "Rugby is no better than it is in New Zealand, and New Zealand rugby is no better than it is in [our region]". This love of the game seems to make the Board members' involvement with the sporting organisation less of a necessary working task and more of an enjoyable

experience. "It's pleasure rather than work, a love of the game". The wider desire to be involved in such a high level in elite sport was apparent in comments such as "I like the company of top sportsmen".

Such individuals would not have been able to readily participate in the governance and direction of the union in the old structure as they were not representatives of the clubs or other affiliated bodies. This is the strength of the introduction of 'outsiders' to sporting boards of directors. Individuals with proven strengths can be involved in the management of the game, without having had to progress through the ranks of its administration. Another director, who had experience in the management of New Zealand rugby, cited the change in union governance as his motivation to seek a position. This director said that while he was "always motivated to improve the sport which I got a lot out of" he was also "Frustrated with the administration as a player, and, previously with the lack of flexibility through their delegate and council structure, and the politics that became involved; so the Board structure as an independent body for me was a really exciting opportunity to make things happen". The change in governance also attracted a second director: "With the change in the governance structure, the chance arose for me to put something back into rugby that I had never had before, a chance for me to actually do something for the sport".

8.6 THE BOARD CHAIRMAN'S ROLE

The Chairman's role is central to the efficiency of the union's Board. In one of the few descriptions of the role of the chairman in New Zealand sport management, Kirk (1995c, p.83) stated that "The chairman's responsibilities centre around various issues of governance and stewardship, major issues of personal appointment, strategic direction, financial good health and dealing at a high level with stakeholder bodies". This implies a corporate manager with a range of responsibilities, and challenges to their executive skills. This increased emphasis on governance issues rather than management and operational issues shows the way in which the role of the chairman has changed with the union's structural change. This is also reflected by the comments of the recently appointed to the post of chairman of New Zealand Cricket who has "over the last 30 years, has filled almost every position open to him in club and [provincial] cricket. He has taken the job for one simple reason: 'Because I love the game. It is a consuming passion'" (Cameron, 1995h, p.7). The chairman recognises the changing nature of sport governance, by observing that his sport "these days needs governance, all roads lead from there. The game must be developed at all levels, and these days that needs the management of big business".

A similar blend of a love for sport and of business acumen is evident in the rugby chairman. His role was commented upon by respondents. One interview respondent noted that provincial rugby unions have traditionally been run by their chairmen. They knew "virtually everything that

happened", and spent a lot of time working with the CEO. Because of this, the respondent recognised that "It was very much a hands-on chairman, and we have to get away from that. It's just not on".

The nature of the task often made the chairman very autocratic because, although he operated with an overtly democratic system, he had enough power vested in his position to enable him to become the effective power broker in the organisation. The respondent believed that the subject union was an example of this system, with an identifiable history of autocratic chairmen. He also believes that this structural emphasis on the chairman's position developed strong personalities who occupied it, although it could be argued that this position attracted such personalities. He explained that the previous chairman was not this type of person, but by this time that style of chairmanship had become the accepted means for the position.

This respondent believes that the traditional role of the chairman will have to change now he has to deal with the Board, who are likely to be stronger individuals than those who served on the Management Committee. As a result of the change, he can also no longer dominate the CEO as he used to. However he qualifies this statement by saying elements of his job remain which were attached to the old structure. A final point made by this respondent is that due to his senior position, the chairman will always have to give more time to the union than other Board members, so this commitment restricts the availability of personnel.

However another respondent believes the role of the chairman is changing "quite considerably". The chairman's media role should cease, according to this second respondent, who has had involvement in the senior governance of the union. "Ideally he shouldn't pop up in public at all. He shouldn't be seen on radio or television; that should all be the CEO. The chairmen are going to have to learn to step back out of the limelight". He believes the chairman "should run the meetings, retain overall responsibility for the union, in a policy and governance sense rather than a hands-on sense which is the traditional way. Traditionally the chairman is the busiest person along with the CEO, although he hasn't been paid, or not paid full-time".

8.7 BOARD AND THE CEO

The literature review noted the importance of board-staff relationships and linkages between boards setting out their vision, policies and strategic directions which management and staff then implement. This chapter now moves to a consideration of Board linkages with staff, from CEO down. Each staff group is discussed further in following chapters.

The nature of relations between the Board and its CEO had a poor start, as the CEO resigned during the research period. Although no-one was prepared to publicly comment on the resignation, it was suggested there existed a lack of understanding and a degree of mistrust between the two

power bases. The nature of the relationship between CEO and chairman has also been a focus of attention at another primary sporting organisation - The Auckland Warriors. During the research period, a conflict surfaced between Warriors Chairman and CEO, which deteriorated to the extent that the former felt compelled to resign.

Given the lack of literature of such issues in New Zealand sport management, the situation in the corporate world was considered by the researcher in order to provide a context for considering the Board - CEO relationship. The literature notes different types of boards and their ultimate powers to hire and fire the CEO. This is directly applicable to the situation in the subject union, with the Board retaining ultimate power, but choosing to select a individual perceived to be capable of the position of CEO and working with that individual, rather than dominating him.

The importance of the relationship between the CEO and the Board in elite rugby management is evidenced by the advertisement which sought applicants for the position of CEO for the International Rugby Board. This described the CEO as being "Responsible to the chairman of the IRFB for the efficient and effective management of the organisation in support of a wide range of activities". Taking into account this, and the reviewed literature of corporate boards and their relationships with CEOs, it seems clear this is the model being pursued by the Board in the case study. This Board is attempting to build a strong relationship with the CEO, with clear areas of responsibility. The directors also recognised their responsibilities toward the CEO: "To advise and assist a strong Chief Executive, come up with strong strategies and policies in conjunction with the CEO". They also note the need to oversee the CEO's "appointment of his support staff" and to co-author a five-year plan with the CEO. This has been complicated by the break-down in relationship between the former CEO and the Board, which one director attributed to being "probably just personal". It is a relationship that is of prime importance to the successful management of the organisation, and it appears this is recognised by those involved.

The relationship between the Board and the CEO in the present study is examined in depth in the following chapter which explores the requirements of the CEO position in the era of change. The relationship between the Board and the management (other than the CEO) differs from the relationship between the Board and the CEO primarily because the two positions are more than one step apart, with the CEO acting as a linking mechanism (see Figure 7.4). The Board provides a focus for top and middle management, through their establishment of strategies and goals, which the management strata are then empowered to achieve and fulfil. The Companies Act, which came into force in New Zealand in July 1994, "put corporate governance concerns squarely in the hands of directors, not in the hands of management", as "the management of companies is the duty, responsibility and liability of directors. It does not rest with management any more" (Bowes, as cited by Smith, 1994, p.34).

Some organisations recognise the gap that sometimes evolves between the Board and the management strata, and take steps to address it. At Telecom, for example, "directors are encouraged to visit top managers not only to get to know them but to help the Board put a human face on commercial issues" (Smith, 1994, p.34). One subject union manager stated that his only direct contact with the Board was through the subcommittee to which he was connected. A second manager, with whom this issue was discussed, stated that his primary form of contact with the Board also came through the subcommittee upon which he served. The manager determines when the meetings are to be held, and their content.

Outside these formal sessions of contact, the manager makes informal phone calls to different members of the Board, when he wants to utilise their experience. He believes the subcommittee structure should be disbanded, and once it is, eighty per cent of the communication between the Marketing Manager and the Board should be through the CEO, "as the conduit for information going up and coming down". This informant also suggests that a manager needs more direct contact with directors because of the manager's need to discuss more fully, and directly, certain relevant issues with directors. The research responses indicated that the relationship between the Board and the provincial union's staff is even more disjointed. One director identified a communication problem between staff and the Board but did not expand on this.

This communication problem seems to be partly a result of the perceived existing communication problem between management and staff and also a result of the gap between the two strata in the organisational structure. One staff member discussed this issue, saying "We don't get see much input from them, but that's not to say they do not do a lot of work. It's hard to know what they are doing. It would be nice to have occasional contact with them". This staff member states that there are no formal links between the Board and the staff. Chapter Ten of this study explores further dimensions of staff and management.

8.8 BOARD EFFECTIVENESS

Perceptions on the effectiveness and performance of the union's Board have been mixed. Prominent media personality Murray Deaker* openly questioned their success. He stated he had "been distressed by their inability to come to grips with anything new...if they ran their businesses the way they are running rugby they would be bloody broke". He continued that "You can

only change by results, and nothing has changed. They haven't fired a bloody shot, even though they came in with terrific hopes for everybody".

* This respondent specifically requested for his name to be used.

Two managers expressed the belief that the Board did not fully understand the nature of their roles when they were took up to their positions. One stated that "I believe the Board had unrealistic expectations of what could, and could not, be achieved in an amateur sport, because it is still basically an amateur sport besides the top level". The second manager said

> I think the Board is learning that the management of a sporting organisation is not consistent with that of a more mainstream exercise, because it has its own idiosyncrasies which make it different, even though that sporting organisation is supposed to be a business. While you will start to run it along business lines, and that will make it easier, there will still be areas of difference. They are struggling to come to grips with that in the short term. It's a learning curve for them.

These statements can be related back to the earlier discussion of the degree of the organisation's business orientation (see Chapter Seven of this study). The Board believed, according to these two managers, that the change in the governance structure would revolutionise the entire organisation into a corporatised organisation, with a commercial orientation throughout it. This has not been the case. The change has been dramatic for the already commercially oriented representative sector, but for the departments of the organisation related to club and amateur rugby the realities of their orientation and operations have changed little, according to informants.

A common belief expressed in interview and questionnaire responses perceived the Board as 'settling in', and as such could not be expected to provide widespread and significant changes in this period. One individual in the team management area stated "Clever people don't just go in and change everything". He believed that "the Board will start to really function in 1996, because they would have had a year to settle in, and by the mere nature of the quality of the people in there, they are going to want to improve things". Another individual in the team management area mirrored this belief. He observed that "They have been a bit slow on some things this year, which has been a frustration. The transitionary year has meant they have largely been reactive, rather than proactive. Haven't been able to get the policy in place which would allow easier decision-making".

A manager supported this belief by stating that the Board was "still getting to grips with what it is all about. This year they are holding back and assessing the situation, and I think next year they will take a more active role". More support comes from a second manager, who believed that the first year was always going to be difficult, with the Board "finding its feet". He said that "Everyone was on a learning curve. I don't want to comment on whether the Board did a good job or a bad job, because I don't think it is applicable. We can do that after two years". Another individual interviewed from outside the province articulated a similar belief by stating that "All unions who introduce the Board will have a settling down period of two or three years.....there may be a double up with the old management structure for a while".

One of the directors believes other factors also contributed to the lack of results in the research period. He stated that "The Board picked up quite a mess...The timing was very fortunate, because sponsorship deals were less than secure, and I don't think there was a comprehensive philosophy or policy for what rugby was trying to do". He believed the union was being managed on a "sort of ad hoc" basis, and added that "I don't think the Board is getting the quality of information that is required to make the decisions that it needs to make". Later in the interview he reiterated the lack of competence in the management team, "therefore the Board has found itself in sort of a recovery mode looking at a lot of the operating issues rather than the strategic issues".

Another director expressed the belief that events beyond the control of the Board have negated their effectiveness. He said that "In the six months since it was set up, the Board has been incredibly disrupted because of the Sky proposal, then Murdoch, then the WRC and all the peripheral things involved. Consequently the role of the Board has been largely responding to approaches and initiatives and events, rather than setting policy, so it has been more reactive than desirable". He believed that a twelve month period would be required before the Board leaves the reactive stage behind. Other interview respondents, involved in the governance structure, strongly reinforced this viewpoint. Another, external, director saw the Board in and "evolutionary stage of finding its feet, in relation to full time employees, in relation to Council of Delegates, and in relation to the NZRFU. It's a growing pains problem".

One question included in the questionnaire asked those staff and the club chairmen who were aware of the change in governance whether they believed that the management of the union had improved since the restructuring. (See question number D6b in the club questionnaire and number B8b in staff questionnaire in Appendices C and A respectively). The majority of respondents (82 per cent) could see no change or believed the management had only slightly improved under the current structure. All union staff respondents fell into these two groups. The Board effectiveness was not yet perceived as having enhanced union management.

Comments made by the two groups reflect the opinion of directors that the Board have not had sufficient time to make an impact as yet. A number of club responses indicated there had not been sufficient time to make such a judgment. Typical comments were: "Difficult to comment - elapsed time is not sufficient to judge results", and "It's only in its infancy, so let's give it the breathing space it deserves".

Other responses noting factors which have negated the Board's impact, reflect issues raised by Board directors. Such responses in this category include "Hard to indicate as there appears to be a lot of other things

MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION UNDER CURRENT STRUCTURE	STAFF (n = 6)	CLUB CHAIRMEN (n = 16)	TOTAL (n = 22)
Significantly Weakened	0	0	0
Slightly Weakened	0	3	3
No Change	2	5	7
Slightly Improved	4	7	11
Significantly Improved	0	1	1

Figure 8.2. - Perceptions of union management improvement

taking priority, such as professionalism", and "At present I don't believe that the total processes have been established as newer members are not totally familiar with the systems which were in vogue".

Staff responses also reflected club and Board views. Staff members provided a variety of responses, with one noting: "The process of change will take time 'Rome wasn't built in day' but will eventually be of great benefit". A second stated that, they could observe no change, saying "Apart from a lot of meetings and countless courier parcels, we have seen no effect". A third staff response noted a slight improvement, noting "The top management seem more accountable and perhaps very slightly more professional".

8.9 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

With the literature review failing to reveal any applicable literature related to boards of directors in corporatised or professionalised sports organisations, the research for this chapter did not have a base with which data could be compared or which provided comparative research insights. The literature review (Dobrzynski, 1993; Smith, 1994) did reveal a trend in corporate boards towards a smaller size, and this is apparent in New Zealand provincial rugby management. There are nine persons on the researched Board which makes it smaller than its previous 28 person Management Committee.

Rugby unions emphasise the importance of internal, or rugby-related, directors on their boards. These individuals are ostensibly appointed to the Board for their knowledge and expertise in the rugby area. They are also members of the Council of Delegates which makes the ultimate decision on

a corporatised structure for their unions, and thus are committed to that although they may approve the change they will want to retain a degree of input. The Board contains an unparalleled number of external directors, seven of the nine. These directors do not have existing formal links with rugby bodies, and are selected primarily for their expertise in areas of corporate management, such as marketing and finance. The selection of external directors saw consideration given to their background in the game, their understanding of modern rugby management and their interactive potential.

A clear consensus emerged from the research respondents regarding the ideal role of the Board. This ideal role was centred upon the setting of policy and the provision of advice and guidance to the rugby organisation's senior management. This ideal role has, in reality, been handicapped by the existence of subcommittees on the board. The group who constructed the governance structure decided to retain a number of subcommittees in order to acquaint the external directors with the operations of the union but these subcommittees have become a problem, with directors becoming more involved at this operational level than is considered ideal. The amount of time directors devote to their duties in the case study organisation has been greater than expected.

Unlike most corporate boards, the directors of the case study organisation are volunteers. Therefore, remuneration and material reward are not the motivation for their involvement in the governance of provincial rugby management. The research for this chapter revealed the common motivation of directors was a love of the rugby game and a belief they could make a positive impact on the management of the sport.

Respondents perceive a lack of Board culture. Some Board members claim this is because the Board has been too busy managing unexpected and complicated challenges, rather than to concentrate on traditional Board duties.

The role of the chairman is becoming less influential having traditionally been a source of power and influence, or even of domination. The chairman's role will increasingly resemble the role of a corporate chairman, and decrease the direct involvement in operational management of the union which was apparent for the Chairman under the Management Committee structure. This change mirrors the shift in relationship between the governing body and the CEO. The nature of the Board's relationship with the CEO was a contentious issue during the research period which saw a deterioration of this relationship resulting in the resignation of the CEO. The relationship between the Board and the management has not yet had the opportunity to develop fully. Management level employees expressed a desire to have some informal contact with the Board.

The Board was not notably effective during the research period. Defendants of this low level of effectiveness identify the normal 'settling in period'

necessitated by the nature of such a change, and the hyper-turbulence of the external environment. Critics of the inaction believe such explanations are tantamount to excuses for under-achievement in the initial period of operation with some respondents suggesting that Board directors had not initially appreciated the special complexities of a sport organisation.

CHAPTER NINE

THE CEO POSITION

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The Chief Executive Officer position is, according to the reviewed literature, of prime importance to any corporate organisation. This chapter sought to gain knowledge of the manner in which the dual processes of corporatisation and professionalisation affected the CEO position in the case study union, and how the roles that the CEO performed were consequentially change.

9.1 Introduction
9.2 Changing Role of the CEO
9.3 Resignation of the CEO
9.4 Selection of the New CEO
9.5 Summary and Review

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Initial and informal discussions held in the research period with employees of the case study union noted comments made by individuals indicating they perceived changes in governance and the possible introduction of professionalism as significantly impacting upon the CEO's position. These beliefs were especially clear in the comments of management staff, one stating his belief that most commentators outside the organisation were not aware of the importance of this position in the Auckland Rugby Union.

The importance of the CEO position in the case study organisation was recognised and articulated by another manager who stated that "The role is one of the most important and prominent in New Zealand rugby". This reflects Miller and Droge (1986) and Dalton and Kesner (1985), who concluded that the CEO role is of prime importance in corporate organisations, exerting influence over the organisation through their strategic and influential decision-making capacities. There is a scarcity of researched based literature which explored these assertions in a sport management organisation.

As the senior management official, the CEO position was obviously going to be subjected to the impact of major changes, and given the lack of available sports research literature the present study was felt to be of particular interest. In order to ascertain perceptions on the changing role of the CEO, semi-structured interviews were held with management staff (n=6, including the two individuals who held the CEO position during the research period), the Board of Directors (n=9), CEOs from all other first

division provincial unions (n=9), one staff member, the president of the union and the former chairman of that organisation.

These twenty seven interviews were the primary methodological tool used to gain information in this area of the study, but were supplemented by interviews with team management officials (n=3), team management individuals from outside the case study organisation (n=2) and one sports media personal. Additional data were gained from the completed questionnaires of staff (n=8) and club chairmen (n=17). While these questionnaires did not include any questions directly related to the area of the CEO position, comments were volunteered in these regarding that position.

9.2 CHANGING ROLE OF THE CEO

The research results clearly indicate that the CEO job is changing significantly in the case study organisation and that this change is mirrored in first division provincial rugby unions throughout New Zealand. As the former CEO noted, "It has changed quite dramatically". Other unions' CEOs recognise the change. One stated that "I've been here for three years, and the turnaround with what I did then and what I do now is quite dramatic", while another believed "The job of the CEO is changing very rapidly, we are starting to go into a different world". This was underlined by the response of a respondent., involved in the governance of the case study organisation, who stated "Clearly the role of CEO will be critical, because they will have to take on a bigger role than before, when the chairman dictated to him, and he was not really in a corporate role. The biggest single pressure point in the change will be on the CEO".

The demands on the CEO during the research period increased greatly, as the changes in governance, volatility of the external environment and introduction of professionalism all combined to add demands to the CEO position. This concern was raised by one director, who believed that "This year must have been a nightmare for any union's CEO". One of the areas in which the role of the CEO increased markedly during the research period was in commitments associated with the representative team.

This was especially apparent during the WRC challenge, which highlighted the demands of players and increased professional dimensions in their treatment by rugby managers. The former CEO notes that "the time commitment to players has increased sharply, a lot of time is now spent on players' needs. The professionalism which realistically has been in place has greatly increased the time dedicated to the top team, particularly the players, their needs and their wants". This area of change was also recognised by one external director who made the comment that the CEO was "Now dealing with a very different animal in terms of player".

The CEOs of other first division unions also noted this growth in importance of their links with the team in the professional games. One such respondent stated that "The role is changing dramatically. There is going to be a lot more direct contact with the players, as regards contracts

and payments. CEOs are getting away from the hands on running of the game, getting away from club rugby, and running matches, and becoming more professional...there's a lot more contact with the senior team players". A second CEO perceived "an increased demand to be more accountable both to the rugby public and the players. You have to be more professional and organised in what you are doing, because the demands and expectations of senior players are higher".

Besides the increased commitment to the management of the representative team, the increased departmentalisation of the restructuring has placed increased demands on what Katz (1974) describes as the conceptual abilities of the CEO (as cited in Haggerty, 1993, p.10). These include the CEO's managerial ability to view the organisation as a whole, which was complicated as it moved to self-contained internal departments. Because of this change in the provincial union studied, consideration has been given to the identification of how various functions and departments of the organisation depend on one another and interact in their planning and operations. The managerial ability to efficaciously develop a changed structure was identified by one director as being a requisite ability in corporate management and is now applied to the provincial rugby CEO role.

A further change to the role of the CEO was identified as completion of that role's transition from an administrative role to that of managerial or executive manager. One manager of the organisation alluded to the fact that, throughout the year, changes meant the CEO role had removed most remnants of its administrative traditions to become a pure management position, with greater emphasis upon policy and decision making. This distinction reflects the literature of Deane (1992) noted earlier in Chapter Two, which states that the term *administrative* implies reactions to the decisions of others, whereas *management* has greater self-determination. The earlier administrative bias in the CEO role was caused by the power and role of the Management Committee chairman who, in effect, dictated terms of operation to the Executive Director or CEO, whose responsibility was to administer the actioning of the management committee's operational outlines. This constriction was observed by the CEO of another union, who explained that "Under the old regime, the chairman was all-powerful, now the CEO is responsible".

This change is thought by several respondents to have caused problems for the CEO who resigned during the research period. One managerial respondent highlighted this belief by noting that as the former CEO had assumed his position as the Executive Director, "he was administratively biased", and therefore did not have corporate-oriented management skills and abilities perceived as being evident in his successor as CEO. This point was reflected by one external director who noted that "The game has moved a long way in the five years since he was recruited". Such change was also discussed by CEOs of other unions, one of whom noted that "The CEO will become more of a General Manager, policy-type manager. At the moment I am spending more time on the straight mechanics of the role"

A union manager also added that "I don't believe a new CEO has any intention in getting bogged down in administration...they have to have a clean desk operating policy". This clean desk policy is one in which the manager does not have set operational functions which they are compelled to perform but has a flexible agenda in which to operate strategically, implementing the vision and broad policies of the Board, facilitating the roles of other managers to perform their functions, and identifying and managing emergent problems before they impact upon the operational functioning of the rugby organisation.

This increased emphasis upon the strategic sector was also noted by one external director, who stated that "The demand is more strategic now", and another interview informant, who agreed that in the old governance structure, the CEO "didn't really have the opportunity to shine through as a true CEO and think strategically". This strategic orientation has moved the CEO into a more inclusive relationship with the Board, as noted by another provincial CEO. He asserted that "The environment the CEO is working in has changed dramatically - they are now working with the Board of Directors who write a policy and promote a vision for the union...It is my job to ensure that the vision and the goals of the board are met".

As noted in Chapter Eight, this empowerment of the union's management staff brings additional pressures. These were noted by one external director, who believed CEOs of provincial rugby now "have to be much more a personality and more of a driving force than they have been. Rather than working in conjunction with the chairmen, they have to pick the ball up and run the management team...They now have more responsibility, they can't hide behind the inefficiencies of an old committee system". The CEO of another first division union also noted this change concluding that "It all falls back on the CEO".

In addition, the role is widely perceived to have assumed a greater orientation toward marketing, with one external director noting "there is more of a marketing bias required now". This increased emphasis on marketing is discussed more fully in Chapter Ten, which examines the marketing of the union in the research period. The CEO of a neighbouring union observed that with the new corporate structure, "We are not just focused on the rugby aspect, we are focused on the commercial and marketing sides to generate funds, so we can pay the rugby side of it". Another CEO discussed the increased emphasis on earning revenue, and the resultant demand for enhanced marketing abilities. However this respondent then expressed the belief that "you can't be an administrator and a marketer at the same time, so the need is there for younger marketing personnel". His union may not have agreed with this statement, for an advertisement for applicants for his position when the union was corporatised late in the research period, included responsibility for *"Providing a leadership role in the marketing and management of the union"*.

A notable aspect of the changing role of the CEO is the increased media profile of this individual. This aspect was illustrated by one manager

stating that "The biggest role for the new CEO to assume is being the public face of our union's... He should appear to the business community as someone in control, with a high degree of professionalism". The present CEO agrees, saying "I see it as my absolute responsibility, I don't think I could delegate it down, and I don't think I should delegate it up". He adds "It's hard work but I have to be focused upon it". As evidence of his commitment to this area of the organisation's operations he cites his actions soon after assuming the position. On his third day he put out a seven page media questionnaire to the seventy-five identifiable media sources in Auckland, "asking about their perception of Auckland Rugby, about their access to players, and what they needed on game day". This initiative received an 85 per cent response rate within a week, which he believes signified the importance of the organisation to these media sources.

The CEO believes this was the greatest area of weakness of his predecessor, saying that "I don't think he handled the media very well at all", resulting in the fact that "We have a real weakness in our relationship with the media". However one of the union's managers disagrees with this, and believes such criticism of the past CEO does not include wider resourcing considerations. This manager admits "We haven't had the profile of rugby league in the last two years but that is nothing to do with the CEO. That is to do with the Warriors having three years to build up to big bang day. They had the money we simply did not have". The importance of the CEO's role with the media was also noted by research respondents outside the case study union. One provincial CEO agreed that the media profile of his union would increasingly center upon him in the professional game because "You can't have five or six different spokesmen, self-appointed or appointed, each saying different things to the general public". A second CEO agreed that the role of the Chief Executive would become "higher than that of the Board and the chairman...He will be the key man in the union now".

Another respondent explained how the new CEO of the Australian Union made it very that, before he accepted the job, he would take over the responsibility for being the spokesman for Australian rugby. This was reinforced by the published advertisement for the CEO position of the IRB, which specified that the CEO would "Act as chief spokesman for the Rugby Union with the media, government bodies and the game's infrastructure worldwide". The present research also revealed this development in other New Zealand sports. One respondent outlined a similar media focus on the CEO in New Zealand Cricket, who "makes all the statements, so if he makes a mistake the Cricket Board and chairman are removed from it". He notes that the Auckland Warriors' chairman was very rarely "used to front the media".

One respondent commented that "Appointments of coaches, appointments of whatever, will now come through the CEO, rather than as last year, where the appointment of anybody required the voting power of 25 delegates". This is a further change from the former role of the CEO. In the old structure such personnel decisions were made by the Management Committee. In the new governance structure, with the empowerment of the

managerial personnel, the CEO is clearly the dominant individual in the selection of potential employees. The CEO discusses his likely decision with the Board, who make the ultimate decision, but the CEO has the authority to assess the candidates and make a proposal to the Board.

Such executive role changes were noted by the CEO of another union, which was the first to employ a CEO in a semi-corporate rugby structure. This respondent described his role as "a difficult assignment". He cites examples of this Board asking him to draw up employment contracts and set up employment objectives and organising reviews. He did not know how to draw up the former and had to consult management texts on the latter. Another provincial CEO reflected this description of increased task diversity expressing concerns over demands for his increased involvement in the legal side of the organisation, especially with the growth of the contracts for staff and players.

These changes in the CEO role for this provincial rugby union indicate that major dimensions of the role are becomingly increasingly congruent with those of other professional sport organisations, particularly in overseas sports environments. However, one manager noted provincial rugby is unlike sport in most professional sport organisations, because of the large amount of non-commercial rugby under its jurisdiction. This manager observed that "People liken the role here to that of Ian Robson the CEO of the Auckland Warriors, but Robson manages an organisation with three teams, down to two now. The rugby CEO here has twelve rep. teams, 420 club teams, and another 180 school teams. If people are trying to compare apples to apples, then there is no way you can compare a rugby union to the Warriors".

This area of the research was primarily concerned with the changing role of the CEOs of senior unions, with their large population centres, strong player bases and relative financial security, but considerations were raised by respondents over the role of CEOs in other first division unions which did not have these strengths. These noted the importance of CEOs for such smaller unions, in providing some managerial strength to their operations, believed to be necessary for such unions' survival in the professional rugby era. One major union CEO believed that "Those unions which don't change will die, and others like [a named union] will rise and take their place. They just need someone in charge who is accountable".

One staff questionnaire expressed the belief that " The NZRFU must make sure the smaller areas are looked after in terms of resources and finances. Many of these areas are the backbone of rugby in New Zealand". Late in the research period the NZRFU did make attempt to address this issue. In December, 1995, the NZRFU announced it would budget $15,000 for each union, apart from those unions running the four main test grounds, to help appoint a full-time CEO ("Balancing act", 1995). This action recognised managerial challenges facing smaller unions yet had certain flaws which were readily apparent. The grant of $15,000 constituted approximately half the average wage, so it would be left to the smaller unions to supplement this figure in order to attract qualified individuals to the positions. The

minimum figure that the unions would have to add to the NZRFU grant would probably be another $15,000, which the most needy unions could not manage.

One first division union is an example of such a limited rugby organisation. This union is something of a management aberration in comparison with other first division unions. It has only a part time CEO, no administrative staff, is run out of the private business office of the CEO and is not listed in the local telephone book. The CEO believes that using the staff of his self-owned business for rugby administration, they devote about 25 hours a week to the union. He notes that "If charged out at normal rates, it would cost five or six times what I am being reimbursed". This respondent believes the NZRFU does not want his union in the first division, because of this lack of managerial personnel and structures, and is pessimistic about the fate of his and other unions of a similar size. He believes that "At the end of the day, the small unions are going to disappear, one way or the other.... They are destined to become feeders" to larger unions. This scepticism is shared by the CEO of a larger union who commented that "Some of the smaller unions will never come to terms with professionalism. They will never be able to cope with where we are heading in professional rugby".

One external director stated that the transition "is all about leadership". This emerged as an area of concern, as one external director noted that "more of a leadership role is required" by the CEO, "which I don't think is being necessarily provided". This comment was passed when the former CEO was still in that position. A managerial respondent also noted that "The organisation is clearly more proactive, but still has reactive elements that will only diminish once a leader appears, who is going to be the CEO, I believe". These statements directly reflect the reviewed literature of Bourner and Weese (1995) and Stratford (1994) and which emphasised the importance of CEOs in sporting organisations.

The former CEO identified his leadership style as being "hands-on leadership". He explained that "I like to lead in a way that I'm seen to be out there doing it with the people". He believed that his strongest asset was his people skills, and he "has built an excellent relationship with other unions, and in the Super-10 management". Another manager believed this individual's leadership style was "strong but silent. He has an assurance about him, and doesn't go beating the drum, but gets it done".

His replacement in the CEO position commented that "The culture is lacking leadership...They are looking for leaders all the time, which isn't a good attitude". When asked to define his style, he identified "a willingness to make mistakes to learn...reasonably open...and a style of 'lets get things done'". Another interview respondent observed that the new CEO had "real leadership skills in terms of authority, so he's got a bit of charisma, which means what he says really counts".

When one manager was asked what type of leadership this new CEO should display, he replied that "He should be his own person. I don't think you can manufacture people to be what they are not, and if he has

a style, it will be his own, and we will give him 150% support no matter what that style is". A second manager stated that the new CEO "should exhibit a style of professionalism, like an Ian Robson-type role...in control, be the public face" of the organisation.

Two other managers commented on the style of leadership they believed they displayed. The Rugby Manager explained that "I encourage the staff to be themselves, to bring up ideas and to take responsibility for themselves, because it gives them more interest in their job". The second managerial respondent observed he had a cooperative style of leadership, "so the guys are involved in the decision making".

9.3 RESIGNATION OF THE CEO

As two director respondents stated, the extent of change that the CEO position underwent during the research period was evidenced by the resignation of the individual who had held the position since 1990. While no informant was prepared to comment directly on the details of process which led to this resignation, a belief emerged from the research that the Board decided the CEO was not the person they wanted to lead the union into the new age of professionalism. From this point it was unclear whether this decision was expressed to the CEO directly, or pressure was placed on him until he voluntarily relinquished the position. Either way, it was clear that while he did not leave the organisation in the most pleasant of circumstances he was pleased to put the situation behind him.

There exists a perception amongst some respondents that the former CEO was a victim of circumstances forced upon him. As one staff respondent stated, "I feel so sorry for the position he found himself in, he had to do so many things at the same time; dealing with the players, dealing with CEOs of other unions, dealing with overseas unions, he got the clubs hassling him...Some things may have got neglected in some areas, because he had no support, he had very little outside help and it's all been placed on his plate". This concern was expressed by another staff member who responded that "The CEO needs help with his diverse workload" (both informants indicating they were referring to the CEO who later resigned).

The evidence of this statement was provided by a comment made by the former CEO. At one period of the season, in the four weeks building up to the NPC first division final, he could only manage one day in which he was not at his office. As he noted "that's not good enough". While he did not comment any further on this issue, this may indicate the lack of support identified by the staff member. Despite these concerns, the CEO at the time expressed appreciation of the efforts of the staff and management in the negotiation of these demands, by saying "The commitment that people in this organisation have put in I don't think has been really appreciated, particularly by the Board...efforts by the Rugby Manager and Marketing Manager in particular, have been outstanding".

More support for this CEO came from one manager who believed that:

> He was the right man for the time. The introduction of professionalism has been both fast and slow. It really started about ten or fifteen years ago with growing player demands, so from that point of view it has been slow. But with the change in 1995 it was very fast, so a lot of stress and a lot of strain has been put on the CEO, more than any of us - I mean we all worked the six and seven day weeks, but he worked the twelve and fourteen hour days, and was always readily accessible to the public. That's a massive load to carry, and I think he did remarkably well. I often thought he would have cracked under the pressure, the hours he put in. He steered us through some pretty tricky times. We were successful most of the time, we were unsuccessful at times, but that's because we worked under pressure. I think his contribution has been immense. He has been a great ambassador.

Further recognition of that CEO's contribution to the case study organisation and to New Zealand rugby management was forthcoming in interview responses.. He was seen by staff as having "excellent people skills" and an external director observed that the case study CEO "Was seen as the top chief executive in the country Another union's executive officer, stated that the CEO "was a real strength [who] formed valuable rugby contacts for New Zealand throughout the Southern Hemisphere". Another indicated great respect for the former CEO.

Nevertheless, the fact that this individual became overloaded with tasks was seen as a weakness by some directors. One stated that this individual "had very strong people skills, but perhaps didn't extract the best from people around him". Another observed that "He tried to do everything himself, and he couldn't. There were too many things put on his plate, and that created a managerial weakness".

Evidence of this problem was noted by one staff member. This respondent explained how the former CEO had held annual performance reviews with each staff member. The staff member explained that "I know [the former CEO] listened to them, but all the concerns I raised and the fears I expressed were eventuated. I know he listened, but he didn't have time to act on them". Another example was provided by a manager who explained that this CEO "basically left us to do what we thought was best. He was so busy, he had to "say this is your department, you run it", but he was very supportive". While neither of these two comments were intended to be criticisms of the CEO's performance, they appeared to be viewed as such by the Board, and given the realities of leading an organisation would appear to indicate areas of management which needed attention.

Other reasons were identified by respondents for the board deciding against the CEO's continued occupation of the position. One external director observed that "He has been under a lot of pressure because of the changes the Board want.. The Board wants more quality information, more quality decision-making, clearer accountabilities, and clearer strategies...He didn't have the competencies needed to survive in the new environment". A respondent in the team management area believed that he "was a nice person, but didn't have the upmarket skills that are required". This view was also articulated by one of the new managers who noted that "Up until now they have done it as a series of middle managers managing different areas of the operation...They haven't had a CEO who has been

able to manage the business for the Board the way they wanted it managed".

Thus the present research fits the literature related to the between change and performance. As noted by Comte and Mihal (1990), for example, major changes in the external environment may combine with internal changes to affect decisions by governing bodies to replace CEOs. As has been discussed in this chapter, the external environmental change of the introduction of professionalism combined with the major governance changes to compel the Board to examine their existing CEO more critically than may otherwise have been the case. The performance of the CEO in the period leading to his resignation has also been criticised, yet was greatly complicated by the changes over which he had no control and, conversely, which controlled his actions. Thus his performance was not considered adequate regarding the requirements of his role and the Board desired his replacement. This reflects the literature of Dalton and Kesner (1985), Fredickson et al. (1988), Comte and Mihal (1990), Schwartz and Menon (1985) and reviewed in this present study.

The present research into this organisation also fits the executive succession literature. The related literature, outlined in Chapter Three, can be summarised by the assertion of Boekker and Goodstein (1993) that "Few events that occur in organisations are as substantively important or as open to potential contention as chief executive succession" (p.172), and the conclusions of Comte and Mihal (1990), Schwartz and Menon (1985) and Tushman et al. (1986) that executive succession often reflects a major change in the organisation, and the commitment of the Board to the maximisation this change. The change in the provincial rugby union CEO was largely driven by the Board and related to planned changes of corporatisation and professionalisation.

9.4 SELECTION OF THE NEW CEO

As this study has now made clear, the research period was one of great challenge to provincial rugby's CEOs. One CEO believed the changes in the role "Demand a different type of person...Either you change the person or the person changes themself, which isn't hard".

He explained the rate of change was major factor in forcing these changes as, "It's very new, it only happened two months ago, so who knows what it will be like this time next year". After discussing the resignation of the CEO of the case study organisation, he explained there were a lot of other union CEOs who were questioning whether they wanted to retain their positions in the professional age because "a lot of people don't like the new environment and might not stay around". Soon after he made this comment another union was advertising its CEO position. Another CEO noted that "It's been a steep learning curve in the last six months, some are adapting, some aren't", while another interview respondent stated that "some will adapt, some will be casualties. They have to accept that, they can't avoid it". This 1995 period saw the resignation of the CEO of the case study organisation and new CEOs appointed to two other unions

when their Boards of Directors were introduced, with their existing CEOs moving to Rugby Manager positions within those two unions.

The interviews conducted with the management, directors and team management which were conducted between the announcement of resignation of the first CEO and the announcement of the appointment of the second discussed the issue of a replacement CEO. Not one of these respondents raised the possibility of an existing manager being promoted to the CEO position. (The reviewed literature of Dalton and Kesner (1985) that the succession of outsiders promotes strategies of change was illustrated by those interviewed as being relevant to this case study organisation.) The literature of Boekker and Goodstein (1993), which suggested that organisations with large numbers of external directors are more likely to select a replacement CEO from outside the organisation was also supported by the present research. Further related literature which was supported by this research was that of Fredickson et al. (1988).

During the period of uncertainty over the new CEO of the organisation, the opportunity was taken to research the perceived qualities such a person should have. The demands for a new type of person to fill the CEO position in provincial rugby management had been made clear to the researcher in two early interviews. In one, the interview respondent was involved in the team management area from outside the case study union. This respondent stated that "The problem is that unions have promoted into these positions people with professional backgrounds but often not from the right professional backgrounds. The view was that anyone with letters behind their name was good for the game and anyone who has been in a management position would be suitable to do this job. There are cases around the country where people are being called Chief Executives; the term is a misnomer given the lack of ability".

A second respondent agrees with this perceived weakness in quality sport managers at the CEO level but believed this weakness related to the long periods of attachment to the Management Committee structure, under which mangers could not develop. Now, this respondent believes, "because of the increased emphasis on the CEO position, there will be a development of people competent in the managing of CEO positions in sport organisations, which is good for New Zealand sport management".

Due to informants' perceptions of weaknesses in existing CEO personnel, the desired abilities for a new potential appointee were explored. Between the announcement of the resignation of the former CEO, and the announcement of the replacement appointment, interview respondents within the case study organisation were asked to state the competencies and background the new CEO should have. A relatively clear consensus emerged on perceived qualities of an elite sport manager in contemporary provincial rugby.

In terms of personal characteristics, one respondent believed a rugby union CEO "should have guts, courage and mental capacities that are beyond the norm...someone with a lot of flair, not scared to make decisions, who doesn't feel inhibited by the Board". A management respondent believed

that "In the new environment we are going into, the person really needs to be very articulate, responsive to all levels, the face of the organisation, has to present themself very well in the way they speak".

Vision and strategic orientation were other key areas of perceived competency. One team management respondent noted that the ideal individual "Has a vision and gets on and does it, that's a very special man. This businessman of outstanding ability...should be constantly trying to improve things for the union". An external director also emphasised the importance of strategic thinking in the individual, while a manager noted that the new CEO must "have a vision for the game and the organisation and know how the vision can be fulfilled". This strategic emphasis was given further support by a second external director's wish for "A person that has good strategic planning skills". A third added his preference for "Someone who is strategically sound... They must have a feel for the strategic marketing issues".

This orientation toward the strategic management of the union necessitates a move away from administrative tasks that respondents believe over-burdened the former CEO. As one respondent noted, "He's not the person that runs the office. He's got his finger on it, but there's someone else running it...he shouldn't be doing menial tasks...We need a CEO who isn't tied up with endless meetings, most of which are irrelevant". These views were reinforced by those of another respondent, from the team management area, that the replacement CEO "Has to be able to manage people, and delegate responsibility...move away from the traditional administration style of management".

It was widely acknowledged this individual would have to be well remunerated in order to the quality desired. One respondent explained that "He should command a high salary so he's not under pressure for money, but he's under pressure to perform, and the union gets the needed expertise". An internal director also raised this concern, noting that "Because of competition, we've had to compete, and we have to pay that person well to do the job", while an external director also stated that "It will cost a lot of money, more than people realise, but we won't get the payback unless we do pay the money".

Financial skills were identified as necessary qualities by one team management respondent and a director added that "Obviously he has to have CEO skills of a multi-million dollar business, strong people skills, and good financial skills". Financial skills were also considered a valuable asset in the selection of Ian Robson as the Auckland Warriors' CEO. "Robson, a Tasmanian-born accountant, has the right background for the job. In the past he was the auditor of the Victorian Football League, company secretary/ financial controller of the Sydney Swans, worked for a Melbourne stockbroking firm and was part of the accountancy firm which handled the liquidation of Sydney's Italian Army Club" (Balasoglou, 1994, p.40).

Human resource management was a widely valued competency amongst the respondents. One interviewee commented that the new CEO needed "an

ability to get on with a wide variety of people". A staff member believed the new CEO must "get on with people, so he can understand and survive the political nature of rugby management". This point was also raised by other informants, with one management respondent stating that the new CEO "needs to be a good relationship builder"; an external director preferring "A good communicator in written and oral forms"; and a second external director supporting "Someone that has skills in the people management area, to build relationships with the media, sponsors, staff and the players". Two respondents from outside the case study union also recognised the prime value of human resource management and communication skills. Both were from field of team management, with one stating that "Man management is the most important component", and the other noting that "The prime people are those from industry who are good at managing people, and are from a rugby background; then financial aspects are subservient to that".

The importance placed on the communication abilities of the new CEO were underlined by comments made by the individual he was replacing. The former CEO believed that the staff receptiveness to the new CEO "depends on his style, and how he handles it. He is going to have to tread pretty warily, particularly with delegates and clubs...He shouldn't rock the boat too much to start with". This respondent also stated that the new CEO should make extra efforts in order to develop a positive relationship with club delegates and club chairmen, "because even though there is now a Rugby Manager, the CEO still needs to understand clubs".

The importance of a marketing background was expressed by one respondent in the team management area. This was also strongly noted in the literature review in the present study. An internal director noted that "He needs to be very strongly marketing oriented, needs to have excellent PR skills", and this was also noted by two external directors, one specifying the value of "a strategic marketer".

These marketing skills were commonly linked with competencies in the area of general management. A manager agreed the new individual would "need to have a marketing bias", but added that "they also need very good management skills". An external director also identified this link between the marketing and general management competencies, believing the new CEO should "either be the CEO of a major company, or a senior manager with a marketing bent". This desirable combination was expressed by an external director believing the new CEO should have a "General management background with a strong consumer marketing background".

Other external directors enforced this emphasis on the management background, a typical comment being that "the new CEO definitely needs a corporate background". Another expressed the need for "somebody who is capable of overall general management" and added that, combined with the other requisite abilities, this type of person was "damned hard to get...there's not many of them around". A third director believed the "successful applicant should have proven experience as a general manager of a large business, or in a senior functional role in a business".

The corporatised nature of elite rugby management is reflected in the fact that very few respondents stressed a sporting background as being important for the new CEO. One staff member specified "An empathy with rugby or elite sport of some sort" as being desirable, but not vital, while an external director noted that the individual "has to have an interest in the game, but not necessarily a background in it". These comments were supported by those of a second external director, that the individual would ideally have "an affinity to sport, not necessarily rugby, but rugby would help". This interest in rugby would be apparent in the individual in any case, explained a third director, because 'at that level managers don't usually take a job in an industry unless they are interested in the product".

An external director also noted he did not believe the selected individual would have a sport management background, because there did not exist the necessary abilities and experience within the sport management industry at this time. He explained that "it will come with the spread of university courses, but at the moment we wouldn't find someone with a sport management background and the necessary training in strategic and corporate management". (See the literature review for discussion of sport management training and the emergence of this profession.)

The perceived lack of competent senior sport management personnel in this country was also lamented by one management respondent, who believed experience in sport management would be very valuable. This respondent noted the provincial rugby union CEO "will effectively be managing two business units - the A team and the amateur infrastructure, which have totally different demands", he suggested the appointee's generic corporate management background would assist him to cope with new complexities of professionalism and commercialism in their new position. An external director also noted the value that experience in sport management would bring, as the position needed "someone who is used to working with a national organisation and influencing what goes on in there".

The individual appointed to the position did fit most of these perceived requirements. He had a strong representative rugby background, representing his nation at schoolboy level and his region at senior level. He had a history of management in the sales and marketing area, originally in the wine industry and latterly in the area of pay-television. The directors who commented on his appointment expressed great satisfaction at this move, and believed he fulfilled the requisites commonly identified by other respondents. This was evidenced by one director who commented that "A major strength is that we have got a top CEO".

Despite the pleasure expressed in gaining what was perceived as an excellent individual for the position, questions were raised by one respondent over the selection process of the new CEO. This respondent, media personality Murray Deaker, explained that the position was not advertised, "they didn't seek the position internationally, when they could have got applications from anywhere in the world for that job". He believes that the fact the position was not advertised precluded application for it by a large number of quality managers, from both sport and

corporate organisations. He also believes the appointment process was an insult to the sport management industry in New Zealand.

The new CEO had, in the eighteen month period leading up to his appointment, interacted professionally with one of the future directors of the union. Later this interaction would be perceived by informants as a crucial link in the Board approaching the prospective appointee to accept the CEO position. As the new CEO explains, "They decided [the former CEO] wasn't the right man for the long term, and from a timing perspective they needed someone on board quickly. A couple of them had seen me in action over the whole professional thing and I had got to know [one of the external directors] well in the last twelve months".

He believes the marked change the organisation was undergoing, with the planned corporatisation and unplanned professionalisation, demanded that a new CEO be appointed as soon as possible. This was believed to preclude the time frame needed to advertise and interview respondents in a full selection process. Such time demands, combined with the fact that the Board was confident in his abilities, meant the Board did not feel the need to advertise for applications. "It was very much a one horse race because I made them feel comfortable that they did not have to look any further. They thought they would get the same result anyway, so why bother with the time and money of advertising".

The new CEO stated in an interview, however, that "I do feel pressure because of that selection process". He expressed his belief that this method placed additional pressure on him to justify the method in which his appointment took place. "I know the Board don't see it that way, but it's a personal thing". Although he does feel the situation is slightly unusual, it was mirrored by another rugby union during the research period. During this period, two other positions were advertised while another was not. The Chief Executive of the IRB was advertised in New Zealand newspapers in December, 1995, and the CEO position for the NZRFU was also advertised internationally, with the use of specialist consultants. Conversely, the CEO position of the Australian union was not advertised, with the individual who was to fill the position being proactively approached by representatives of the union.

9.5 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

The reviewed literature related to the Chief Executive Officer position concluded that this position is of prime importance in corporate organisations. This was proved to be true in the case study organisation. As a result of corporatization and professionalization pressures, the CEO position changed markedly during the research period.

A primary area in which the changing role was apparent was in the increased commitments of the CEO to the demands of the senior representative (professional) team, an area in which the direct links and responsibilities grew swiftly. The increased departmentalisation of the

organisation, outlined in Chapter Ten, also served to increase demands on the CEO position.

The CEO position was believed to have assumed an entirely executive managerial nature by the conclusion of the research period, whereas it was considered to have had strong administrative and hands-on dimensions at the outset of this period. This change is perceived by respondents to have been important in the resignation of the existing CEO. This individual was perceived to have been "administratively biased", which was an important perception of the Board in the deterioration of its relationship with this CEO.

The role assumed a greater marketing emphasis during the research period, reflecting the increased importance placed on revenue generation in the professional game. While the CEO's influence in the process of employee selection increased significantly, their commitment to becoming the focal media point of the organisation was perceived to be more important as this would serve to raise the public profile and awareness of the organisation.

The importance of CEOs in smaller unions has grown, due to the increased commercial influences, which impact upon provincial unions of all sizes. This was recognised by the commitment of NZRFU funding to subsidise the introduction of CEOs to all provincial unions. However this funding was inadequate to attract appropriate personnel to the positions, and would need to be doubled by the union's funding to constitute even a low wage for the CEO position.

The extent of change to the CEO position was believed to have been evidenced by the resignation of the CEO during the research period. There were enormous amounts of pressure placed on this individual, and a number of respondents from the management and staff believe he responded beyond expectations to such pressures. However most directors responded in interviews that the CEO did not manage these pressures as he should have, and inadequacies were apparent to them which persuaded the Board that he was not the person they desired to continue in that vital position.

The research reflected the reviewed literature on executive succession, which describes the increased likelihood of succession following major changes in the external environment. The selection of an outsider to succeed this CEO supported the reviewed literature, which suggested that outsider selection reinforces changes to the organisation, as does the number of outsiders on the Board.

Perceptions of the desired competences of the new CEO were sought in the interviews conducted between the announcement of the resignation of the CEO and the appointment of his replacement. Vision and strategic thinking were stressed by the majority of respondents, as were abilities in the human resource management area. A sporting background was considered desirable but not essential. A sport management background was considered valuable but unlikely to be found, reflecting perceptions of a

lack of qualified sport managers at the CEO level in New Zealand. The selected individual closely fitted the profile built by these responses.

There was a degree of controversy surrounding the process by which this replacement CEO was selected. The position was not advertised, when at least one respondent believed such advertising would have led to a valuable group of applicants from which to choose. The new CEO is very conscious of this criticism of his selection process. Although the CEO positions in the IRB and NZRFU were advertised, the position for the Australian union was not, replicating the subject union appointment process. The new CEO now faces the marked demands of a changing rugby environment.

CHAPTER TEN

THE DEPARTMENTS

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This results chapter examines the departments of the case study organisation. Each of the four departments is discussed, with the marketing department and the coaching and development departments being discussed in greater detail due to respondent perceptions of those as the most important departments in the subject union

10.1 Introduction
10.2 Office Facilities
10.3 The Finance and Administration Department
10.4 The Rugby Department
10.5 The Marketing Department
  10.5.1 Parochial support
  10.5.2 Match entertainment
10.6 The Coaching and Development Department
  10.6.1 Player retention
10.7 Summary and Review

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The results section thus far has examined the profiles of individuals involved in contemporary elite provincial rugby management, and the changing governance structure and the affects of this change on the management of the case study organisation. Issues concerning the Board were discussed and the changing role of the CEO position examined. Chapter Eight provided an initial understanding of the departmental structure of the subject union. In this chapter the focus moves to the next level of the organisation, the departmental level. Data for this chapter were gained from interviews with directors of the organisation (n=9), management personnel (n=6), staff (n=1), team management personnel (n=3), CEOs from other provincial unions (n=9), team management personnel from other unions (n=2), the president of the organisation (n=1), the former chairman of the organisation (n=1) and one rugby media person (n=1). These thirty-three interviews were supplemented by completed questionnaires of staff (n=8) and club chairmen (n=17).

10.2 OFFICE FACILITIES

One of the major areas of concern in the discussion of the staff was the facilities at their disposal. The questionnaire completed by staff included a question related to this topic, the problem having been tentatively identified by the researcher prior to the research period. Question B5 of the staff questionnaire asked respondents for their perceptions of the office setup and facilities. The responses to the question are presented in Figure 10.1 and the full questionnaire results are located in Appendix B.

Severely Inadequate	2
Poor	3
Acceptable	2
Good	1
Excellent	0

***Figure 10.1**: Staff perceptions of office facilities*

Five of the eight respondents (63 per cent) indicated that the office facilities were less than acceptable. Only one respondent indicated that the facilities were good, and this respondent did not work in the main office. In that main administrative office, four staff members have their work stations, and it is the only means of access to the Marketing Manager's office. In addition to this, the coaching department also has its three staff members based in one office.

The responses generally indicated a perception of the lack of space available to staff. One respondent from the coaching area commented that there "Needs to be more space provided for office staff. Coaching coordinators have one room for three staff. Need to develop further rooms". One staff member who believed the facilities were severely inadequate explained that "The systems are outdated, office space is at a premium. Procedures are non-existent and major duplication occurs".

Even the sole respondent who indicated that the facilities were *Good* commented that there was a "Restricted area to work in, due to space or lack of it". A respondent who believed the facilities were poor enforced this perception with the comment that there was "Not enough office space for the number of staff" and a further person commented that it "Could be improved to ensure more efficiency", although the situation was 'acceptable'". A more complete explanation was offered by one staff respondent that to improve operational management, the organisation "needed much bigger offices and quieter working conditions, without all these old rugby people coming into the office and walking around, checking on you, and having a social chat. This will have to change, definitely". This respondent added later in their completed questionnaire that "confidentiality is often just not possible".

A second respondent believed this situation was poor, and "Getting worse. Too many people in too small a working space. Too many outside people having access to the office during and after office hours". This problem of access to outsiders was illustrated raised by another respondent who believed that the situation is severely inadequate: "I am working under very cramped conditions where five people share an office meant for three people maximum. These conditions are getting worse every year. Some days you have 20 to 30 people walking through the office". A staff member explained that "From a confidentiality and accuracy or total concentration level, it is becoming increasingly difficult to work in an office room with four people and others sometimes amounting to up to ten people".

These problems of office space were raised in the interviews with management personnel. One manager observed a "there is a major problem with space, which is to the detriment of environment. He believed the Accounting Officer "should have a separate office in the accounting area", and the CEO's Personal Assistant "should also have a separate office". A second manager explained that "Practically, physically, the offices need to be better, because we've got too many people in such a small space, and the only reason it's working okay is that we've got such a good chemistry there". A further managerial respondent enforced this perception, commenting that "We badly need more office space, and getting that change would change the atmosphere for the better".

The managers also recognised the concerns of staff over access to the office space. The statement of one these informants clearly indicated the extent of the problem as "It's quite frightening really, because we have all these people walking through, and there's confidential files and accounting files open. I've been out into the office to clean them out sometimes, because there's been seven or eight people there - not staff". He observed that the club delegates to the Boys Management Board and Junior Management Board do need to have occasional access to certain staff members, but believes they abuse this privilege. He suggests the Rugby Officer and Rugby Liaison persons should be moved to outside the main office area, so the club delegates who need to see these staff members do not have access to the working space of other staff members.

A second manager discussed the inconveniences manifested by the access problem. He explained that there are "Players walking past the offices and the noise is a concern, especially when we try and create an open atmosphere by keeping our doors open". This, he added, was not a conducive environment for the professionalisation of the organisation's operations. This respondent also noted that "The CEO gets it all too", as his office was closest to the main entrance to the offices. As an example of how the lack of physical office facilities affects the management, this respondent noted how the Finance and Administration Manager, created as a new position, was forced to operate off a table in the Rugby Manager's office for his first four months in the organisation.

This physical environment was thought by three respondents to impact upon the culture of the staff. One staff respondent believed that "The culture is quite relaxed, but it is moving away from that, and will probably lose some of the present relaxation next year with the increased impact of corporatisation. He later added that a positive culture was vital for operations to be performed adequately when the staff were "crammed". This perception was supported by one managerial respondent also, and the new CEO perceived it to be "not that healthy" at the time of research. He believed that the staff feel threatened by the corporatisation process which has had such an impact upon the organisation already, and perceives them having a fear of the unknown". He stated that it was part of his job to alter this culture to one "which is relaxed but professional".

A solution for this office problem has been planned. One manager explained that this involved moving the coaching and development department into a refurbished house owned by the organisation, located on the perimeter of the reserve ground of the stadium at which the organisation is located. This house is intended to accommodate the coaching department, the head fitness trainer, the Rugby Foundation, (a non-profit organisation with formal links to the union), and a room for the coach and manager of the representative professional team. As another manager explained, these groups were selected to be put together "because they all complement each other quite well".

The increased use of computers by sporting organisations was noted in the literature review. This was typified by the statements of Leonard (1994) that "More sports and sports organisations are using computers for a number of functions" (p.246), and "As sport becomes more and more a business, sport management will be pushing for the advancement of computer technology...in order to be more competitive in the financial aspects of the game" (p.256). Haggerty (1991) also noted the widespread use of mainframe computers in professional sport organisations in North America. This usage is not evident in provincial New Zealand rugby management, as was noted by the comment of a provincial CEO that this area

> needs the establishment of a database management...Rugby in New Zealand has abysmal information systems. We record data every year, but no-one's ever bothered putting it in a system. Our accountant will also create direct-marketing systems for season tickets, merchandising and player support systems.

The computer situation at the case study organisation can be summarised by the comment of one staff member who observed that "There have been continuing problems due to the inefficient computer programme package". Another staff member explained that, "while it took the new Finance and Administration Manager three months to get a personal computer, all the managers now have one. Each of the four staff members in the main office has a personal computer. One of these was only provided after the season had ended, when its recipient had needed it all year, and had been

using that of another staff member". The ticketing office also has one personal computer.

When the interview with this staff member was directed toward the software used on this equipment, problems with the existing system became clear. The informant explained that off the computer they use, "we've been able to access some software, which can access the team-draw software, statistics menu or player registration menu...I don't know where it has come from, I don't know much about it except that it's there and I use it". No handbook or instruction had been given nor had any explanation of the full range of computer programme possibilities been discussed. The respondent added that the Accounting Officer has a personal computer, "but that is solely for accounts, and she doesn't go into any other areas, or use a word processor".

The respondent noted that the office's personal computers are using Word Perfect, but are considering changing over to Microsoft software. He explained that "some have Microsoft and some haven't, and Microsoft seems to be the better". A computer company has installed a networking system on the organisation's computers, "but the package they've put us on has caused us a hell of a lot of problems in the five years since they installed it...it's a bit of a dinosaur".

When asked about formal training for computers, The staff member explained that "We haven't had any formal training for the computers...it was needed but we've taught ourselves most of it, but there's still a hell of a lot of it there we don't know. We explore it at the end of the season when the pressure comes off". This lack of training was evident in responses to Question B4 of the staff questionnaire. This question asked respondents to specify any skills they wished to acquire which would facilitate their role in the organisation. The results are presented in Figure 10.2. All five respondents identified computer skills as their most desired skill, with four of them ranking this the highest.

1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice
Computer skills	Managerial training	
Computer skills		
Computer courses		
PR course	Computer course	
Computer skills	Presentation techniques	

Figure 10.2: Skills desired by union staff

One managerial respondent enforced this perceived deficiency by stating that "We're probably not up to the computer age as much as we should be but we're trying to work on that". This latter point was evidenced by the comment of the Finance and Administration Manager, who is responsible for this area of internal operations. This individual explained

that "I have to look at getting a company-wide computer system, but because of the number of issues that I am faced with this has been put on the back burner at the moment". While one staff member perceived problems with this introduction because "The attitude is not extremely positive, it's resistant to change and technology", this was refuted by another staff member, and the data presented in Figure 10.2 indicate that five of eight staff respondents are not resistant to technological change.

10.3 THE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

A team management respondent, from within the subject union, stated that "the office people are, by and large, very good but the office needs someone to bring it up to speed". A managerial respondent noted that "the office will become more fine-tuned in the future". These interview responses highlighted the need for a manager whose responsibilities explicitly included the internal systems and operations. This need was accentuated by the corporatisation process, which prompted one manager to say the organisation "will have to change to deliver", and added that "In the future we will become a much more goal oriented organisation".

The lack of training of staff was a concern raised by the holder of a new position, a staff member and a manager. The manager explained that administrative and managerial skills are vital for his role, "But I've had very little training in these". The staff member observed that some of the staff were frustrated at the lack of training, especially as they were aware some directors were critical of their performance and ability to adapt to corporatisation and professionalism.

As noted in Chapter Ten, in the old structure the Financial Controller had both financial and club rugby responsibilities. The movement of the holder of this position to become the Rugby Manager allowed the introduction of the new Finance and Administration Manager during the research period. While the primary role of this individual is to manage the financial operations of the organisation, he also has significant responsibilities in the managing of training, systems management and human resource management. In his immediate department he has an Accounting Officer to assist in the financial management, a Personal Assistant appointed to the CEO, and the organisation's receptionist. In addition he has administrative responsibilities over the staff of other departments. The position has not been in place for sufficient time to evaluate its effectiveness or possible crossed lines of personnel control and responsibility.

The financial management of the organisation was perceived by many respondents as a critical element of contemporary sport management because of the amount of revenue generated by the organisation. This was noted by two external directors, and two team management respondents from other unions. One provincial CEO stated that "Overseas, rugby is




Figure 10.3. Structure of the Finance and Administration department

linked to the monied corporate world and [the researched union] is more oriented that way than any other New Zealand union". Another suggested that "Two unions in New Zealand are miles ahead of any others... only those unions have had the financial base to be able to professionalise properly...You have to have the investment to grow, have to have the money to invest. This is not due to population, but due to the team success factor, which attracts sponsors".

10.4 THE RUGBY DEPARTMENT

This department is concerned with the liaison of the union with clubs under its jurisdiction. The department is headed by the Rugby Manager, who formerly held the Financial Controller position under the old governance structure. In this former role, he was responsible for club rugby and the financial management of the organisation. To assist the manager with his present duties, there are two staff members in this department.




Figure 10.4: Structure of the Rugby department

The Rugby Officer performs a range of liaison tasks, and is charged with constructing draws and competition standings for all grades of club rugby. During the off-season this staff member formulates the data from the previous season and constructs proposed draws for the forthcoming rugby

season. The Rugby Liaison Officer is responsible for the organisation of lower level representative teams.

10.5 THE MARKETING DEPARTMENT

The review of literature noted the strong emphasis upon the critical needs for marketing and sponsorship voiced by a number of All Blacks. The role of the marketing operation of the union was described by an external director "There are two basic parts to marketing in the union, one is getting the money in through sponsorship, tickets, season tickets, and the other is putting the money out through promotions and advertising. A third and less emphasised aspect which is linked to both, is publicity". Under the old governance structure, the core duties of the Marketing Manager were the use of public relations and advertising agencies, dealing with sponsors, event management, pre-match entertainment, special events, programmes for matches, and organisation of players for promotional work. While these core duties remain the same, the new structure has made this a departmental manager position, which recognises the importance of marketing in the "new" environment and allows the management abilities of this manager to be more fully utilised. He perceives this change as a more efficient use of the available human resources of the organisation.

When the introduction of the Board and its affects were discussed with him, he replied that he had been allowed a greater degree of autonomy under the Board, but added there also had been problems. As is shown by the backgrounds of the Board members in Chapter Eight, most of the Board members have a professional background in the marketing area, and desire input into the marketing function of the organisation. As the Marketing Manager explains, he formally deals with the marketing subcommittee, which is comprised of five of the nine directors, the CEO and himself. He believes this structure "makes things drawn out, because there's too many of them...It has been self defeating".

As noted by another manager, "everyone on the Board is a marketing expert", and he expressed sympathy for the complications this causes for the role of the Marketing Manager. However a director, not on the marketing subcommittee, attributes the excessive involvement to a lack of ability of the Marketing Manager. He explains that "The marketing guys are far too involved, so the CEO has to have a strong marketing involvement to take the pressure off them. It's a personal view but I believe the Marketing Manager isn't up to scratch". A second director expressed a similar belief, commenting that the Marketing Manager faced particular challenges to consolidate his position in the organisation. One interviewee noted "I don't think he will survive...there is something lacking in that area".

An external director noted that the division of marketing duties was debatable, "How you split them is the problem...whether you split the duties between the Marketing Manager and the CEO, or have fifteen

people is the question". At the moment the emphasis is clearly split between the Marketing Manager and the CEO, the latter selected because of his strong marketing background. This staffing issue was noted by another external director who stated that "there is usually more marketing staff in the marketing area of a similar size operation. In the future the resource team you need for marketing will need to be bigger".

The Marketing Manager explained that "There were a lot areas that are under marketing that weren't [there before] but are now, such as ticketing and customer services". He agreed his position was assuming a full management orientation, with a concentration of generating revenue.

> The marketing subcommittee has a view that the Marketing Manager doing all the work is false economy, that I should be out sourcing sponsorship as much as possible. I now have staff reporting directly to me, and have an advertising agency, an event agency, we're looking at a sponsorship agency. These resources are added to the Board themselves I now have a wide range of expertise that I can manage... manage is the operative word in my title, not do.




Figure 10.5: Structure of the Marketing department

The union has no public relations officer. Parks and Zanger (1990) described this position as being "charged with maintaining a positive relationship between the team and the local community" (p.31). This duty currently falls under the responsibilities of the Marketing Manager, although he is assisted in this operation by the use of an external agency.

The department does have a ticketing officer. The importance of this function was identified in the literature of Parks and Zanger (1990), who noted that "most professional teams maintain ticket outlets throughout a wide area of the region, and the ticket director must keep account of all tickets for all games and ensure accuracy of financial audits and ticket accountings for each game...Ticket managers in professional sports usually have a large staff because of the magnitude of their work" (p.31). While this clearly was not the case at the time of the research period, the emphasis placed on the generation of revenue through ticket sales in the professional environment may necessitate future development of this operation.

Widespread concern over the marketing of the union was one of the clearest themes of the research results to emerge from the questionnaires and interviews. There was very little identifiable positive comment regarding this aspect of the operational management of the union but there was widespread negative comment. Typical of such response was a team management person, who noted that "The game is desperately in need of an uplift in terms of marketing, profile and encouragement for people to come along and watch". If the definition of Kotler (1976) of marketing as "the human activity directed at satisfying needs and wants through exchange process" is used as a base form of understanding, it is clear that most observers and respondents in this study believed marketing of the case study organisation and its products in recent years to have been unsuccessful. This lack of success was illustrated through such responses as "Very concerned with the way the union is being marketed, re: poor advertising, lack of merchandise facilities, not enough ticketing outlets. Rugby public's demands are not being met, complaints re: sound systems, entertainment, *curtain raisers*. Unprofessional hired staff eg. stewards, ticketing. Public complaints tend to be ignored. Profile of the representative teams needs to be improved".

Other respondents were more forthright in their appraisal. Murray Deaker, a prominent sports media person stated, "I think the marketing and promotion of the game has to rank as one of the disgraces of New Zealand sport". This statement may seem over-emotive, but a comment passed by one staff member of the union gave substance to Deaker's statement. This staff member explained that "The public perception of the marketing is so bad that at social occasions I was vague about where I worked, otherwise I'd start copping abuse about the image of the organisation...I have huge concerns about that".

The transition to a professional game will invariably increase the marketing emphasis of the organisation. This is evidenced by the ideal background that respondents identified as desirable for the new CEO. Chapter Nine also noted Board perceptions that their appointee had such a marketing orientation. This was confirmed by the new CEO himself. As identified by the Marketing Manager, the union's increased organisational emphasis will mean "marketing not just being the four Ps, the traditional facets of the marketing operation, but everyone in the organisation being marketing oriented".

This criticism of the marketing of the union under discussion also reflects the wider spread criticism of the marketing of the rugby national union. One respondent from the team management area expressed such a criticism:

> If you are selling the best product in New Zealand, then you are going to get through. The NZRFU is the classic example of it. The marketing committee manages to make a profit, but it is really a poor one when one considers that the All Blacks are the most marketable brand product in New Zealand. They are talking $2-3,000,000, where they should be talking $40-50,000,000.

> Wouldn't the real marketing people around the country just love to have a brand like that.

In defence of the marketing of the national union, however, a small number of respondents noted the 1995 NPC 'Cut Loose' campaign as a successful promotional campaign, and the sheer growth in marketing personnel in the national union, as perceived by other personnel in that organisation, was evidence for them of the increased emphasis the national union is placing on marketing the national game.

Factors of concern in marketing the case study organisation included complications caused by competitions in which the representative team operated in the research period. The early season competition in which the researched union competed was the Super-10 series. This was an international provincial competition comprised of teams from Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Western Samoa. As noted by one external director, "The public don't place much importance on the Super-10". The lack of local public interest in the competition was complicated by the fact that the union's home ground was still being used for cricket fixtures while this early-season rugby competition was being played, and so the rugby union team was forced to play at the home stadium of its major rugby league rivals.

While the NPC competition has arguably been the most prominent and widely supported sporting competition in New Zealand in recent years, the structure of it has clear weaknesses, especially for teams in the first division. Each team has only four home games in the regular season and, as with the case study union in the research period, can receive a poor draw and play the four strongest teams away from home. This meant the four weakest teams were the only teams to play at the subject union's home ground during the season and this greatly affects ticket sales. This issue was raised with an external director, who agreed it means the team "does not have a consistent programme that runs throughout the season, so it's hard to generate revenue, with the NPC not getting underway till late in the season".

The ingredients for a competition which would facilitate the marketing function were identified by two external directors. The first believed "the best want to play the best; that will appeal most strongly to the players, most strongly to the fans and most strongly to the sponsors...with those three, financially, you've got a viable game. We need a home fixture list to compare to the Warriors, in a clearly understood competition with fan appeal, sponsor appeal and player appeal". This negative comparison with the competition in which the Warriors competed was also noted by the second director. This respondent stated that "we need to have the stars playing in an international class competition, played weekly in a good stadium. We've got a good stadium, we haven't got the other two", noting his pessimism as to whether the union would have them in 1996. He explains that the Warriors competed in a well known competition, and "You don't have to be too smart to work out that a Warriors game is on every couple of weeks but people don't have a bloody clue when our

union's games are on at home...we could go four weeks without a game, then have two in a row, then go another three weeks without a game, so we have to spend a lot of money in advertising to build awareness".

However problems are already apparent for the 1996 marketing of the organisation's teams. As noted by several respondents, the short time span before the new competition makes its marketing extremely difficult. One respondent who recognised this problem stated that "There will be a real difficulty for marketing staff. The Warriors took three or four years before they played a game, and we've got five months". The teams and team names for the new competition were not announced until six weeks after this interview took place, leaving a matter of only two and a half months for the union's marketing staff to frame and implement marketing plans before their first professional rugby team played a game.

Sponsorship has been identified in the literature as one of the vital sources of revenue generation for the case study organisation as it enters its first year of management in a professional sport. This revenue provides funding for a variety of organisational functions, including payments of player salaries in the team which provides a highly visible advertising and promotional medium or focus for the sponsoring organisation and its products.

The union has two primary sponsors. The first is one of the country's two main breweries, who has been the major sponsor of the union and its representative team for a significant period of the last decade. In October 1994, this major sponsor signed a three year contract with the union, which included the right of renewal. It was reported that this sponsorship deal is worth approximately $750,000 per year, including a mixture of cash and other deals. This deal was signed only after debate between the two parties, and it was "thought the relationship might have ended as the union wanted to increase the cash content" (Sponsorship in doubt, 1994). As a secondary sponsor the union has a contract with one of the world's largest sporting apparel manufacturers, which includes the provision of boots and training clothing.

Problems in this existing sponsorship situation were raised by several respondents. One management person suggests that "I think we have a real weakness in our relationship with our sponsors" and a second admitted "Sponsorship hasn't come through for our rugby the way we would have hoped". An external director added that "The sponsorship revenue they get is appalling, in terms of what they have". This criticism of the lack of sponsorship gained by the union was reinforced by the statement of an individual involved in the team management area who identified that the union is attractive to sponsors because of the region's population and high playing profile. He explained that "I don't know what their annual sponsorship turnover is, but if you put in a top class marketing team that might cost another $150,000 in salaries, they could double that turnover. Whatever it is they could double it".

This situation will have to change to ensure the growth of the union in the professional environment. As identified by one external director, "They have to increase it substantially in order to finance other things". This belief was also expressed by one new manager, who explained that in any business the operations are directly constrained by the revenue and, "the only way to get any real horsepower into the business is to expand the revenue streams, and in this business there are two very clear revenue streams, the sponsorship and the gates". For that reason, he adds "We have to ensure the sponsors are happy". A further sign of this increased emphasis on sponsorship relationships was the statement by the new CEO that "My primary goal for 1996 is to rearrange the sponsorship, bring in some sponsors, and add value to our business and their business".

This increased importance on sponsorship has been significantly handicapped by the introduction of the regionally based Super-12 competition. Players in this competition are contracted to the NZRFU and cannot appear in promotional work for the subject union's existing sponsors as representatives of this new competition. This situation is caused by the contractual tie to the NZRFU which means the players are effectively contracted, by extension, to the sponsors of the NZRFU and the Super-12 sponsors but not to the subject union or its sponsors. This directly dilutes the effect of existing sponsorship deals, and significantly reducing the availability of players and the team as promotion vehicles for the local union's sponsors.

Emerging concerns in the sponsorship area center around the fact that the new Super-12 competition emerged after the two current major sponsors had agreed to terms for the 1996 season, and the new competition infringes upon the playing period in which the union team can take its traditional form. As the new competition involves regional teams, the new regional team which encompasses the subject union in the Super-12 competition will wear new uniforms which differ in appearance from the current NPC playing jersey of the union. As the Super-12 organisation is sanctioned and managed by the NZRFU, the manner in which this affects the existing sponsor rights of host unions was unclear to the provincial

regional side in the first part of the season, then a reversion to its traditional provincial form in the latter half. He expressed concern over how the union could sell sponsor rights for the entire season, "so immediately there are problems from the financial side". Further concerns were expressed by a respondent who lamented that "we've got everything going for us, but we haven't been able to approach sponsors with a firm product".

This introduction of what is, in effect, a second regional representative team nullifies existing sponsorship commitments regarding the early season competition which, in turn, raises the necessity of gaining sponsorship for this product. This opportunity, and threat, was clearly of concern to the Marketing Manager, who noted, "There is potentially the opportunity to derive greater sponsorship revenue, but in the short term there are too many unknowns in the new competition, it's now too late to get large sponsorship for the competition". After discussing the sponsorship problems created by this late introduction of an entirely new competition the manager later asserted "there are opportunities to gain offshore sponsorships because of the international nature of the new competition", and the subject union late in the research period created a promotional vehicle with which to approach such potential international sponsorship sources. The importance of such a promotion is underlined by the assertion of the Marketing Manager that "growth for us may depend on whether we can secure an offshore type deal".

The future need for increased sponsorship is widely acknowledged by research subjects as inevitable. It coincides with similar trends in other sports in New Zealand but the increased commercialisation in New Zealand sports has meant that more organisations are placing an increased emphasis on sponsorship as a source of funding for organisational expansions and increased remuneration of elite athletes. This trend was identified by one external director, who believed this would mean "the competition will be tougher, and numbers considered bigger" and a manager who stated that "Sponsorship is a big concern, with growing competition for the major sponsorship sources". The impact of developments in professional rugby may dominate this increasingly competitive market. The first influence from rugby will be the search for sponsors for the five regional Super-12 teams playing for the first time in 1996.

Following this initial surge of demand, the impact of increased demands on revenue in elite rugby will continue to be a dominating factor in the sponsorship market of New Zealand sport. This trend was identified and discussed by the union's Marketing Manager. He explained that "We have existing sponsorship arrangements but we are having to build new sponsorship structures under a different name, with increasing pressure from other sports and arts, from events, from casual groups and, now, from social agencies". The manager felt that, while this demand for sponsorship revenue has increased greatly the level of available sponsorship money has not. This results in a situation where "In the short term there will be a real fight for sponsorship and after that certain groups will

dominate". One of those groups will be the case study organisation. "The [case study] union will basically rape the market, which may well cause a number of smaller organisations to collapse", was expressed as a view by one respondent from another region, who believed all major sources of sponsorship will become linked with the major sporting and arts organisations only.

The changing demands of sponsorship have also been noted by other unions' CEOs. The sudden introduction of professionalism has added concerns to one director. "Suddenly we've got a wage bill of $300,000, and we have to finance that next year. The only way we can do that is through sponsorship, and if you do increase sponsorship, you have to have something extra to offer them, which means more money". This identification of the value of having something tangible to offer prospective sponsors was also raised by a second CEO. This respondent later raised the issue of the demands of sponsorship management as, "the managing of sponsorship is far more important than the obtaining of it. It is only a short burst over six months to negotiate it and get it signed, and then it is generally a three to five year deal". The demands on the management of the deal were also articulated by the CEO of a neighbouring union who believed "The relationship with sponsors has changed. Ten years ago it was basically like a grant, now sponsorship is very carefully measured by both parties".

Merchandising, to date, has not been developed as a consistent source of significant revenue for the union, and no specific New Zealand rugby research has been directed toward this aspect of the marketing operation. The importance of merchandising was raised by the Marketing Manager and the issue was discussed with him. During the research period, a prominent international sporting and leisure manufacturer launched a merchandise range in conjunction with the union. This range had only six items in it, considered to be the core merchandising products. Next year this range is planned to expand to twelve items. These are sold through two leisure and sporting wear chains of retail outlets, but the retail distribution is planned to increase in 1996. It is believed that, by the third year (1997), merchandising could start to become a key source of revenue for the organisation as it is for most professional sport organisations. A centralised merchandising programme between provincial unions and the NZRFU is being developed, "but slowly", and it will be primarily attached to the Super-12 competition, not the NPC.

10.5.1 Parochial support

As, arguably, one of the most successful and strongest provincial team in world rugby, the research union's team has a notable lack of parochial support from its local population. This is manifested in the small size of crowds for provincial rugby matches at the union's home ground. The Marketing Manager of the organisation believes the size of the crowds "doesn't just bring revenue, it is the way the public judges whether this

organisation is successful, this game is successful". If this true, the organisation may currently be judged by the public as a relative failure.

In an interview, prior to the period of research for this present study, the Marketing Manager of the union's biggest sporting rival stated the belief that the local populace did not readily take ownership of anything, and cited the union as an example of this. The rival code has maximised the fact they are the only New Zealand team in an Australian based competition, and utilised this nationalism and fierce anti-Australian parochialism. The nationalism option is not available to the union as a marketing device in the NPC, which is the primary competition in which the team operates, and the marketing operations of the union failed in the last decade to find a mechanism with which to build parochial support, which would then manifest itself into increased revenue through ticket sales.

The success of the marketing operation of the rival code has drawn even more criticism of the marketing function of the union. Such criticism was typified by the response of Murray Deaker. Discussing the merits of the union's marketing campaign against those of its rivals, Deaker believed "The union marketing has been a disaster, because the product is so good, and if you can't sell that, you sack people, and employ others who can do it. It's the national game of the country, they almost never lose at home, but they are consistently outsold by the other crowd, who lose constantly, and have a number of overseas players". These concerns were also voiced from within the case study organisation, one manager acknowledging that "The rival code's team are more part of our city than we are and they have been here for one year, and they are all Poms [Englishmen] or Aussies [Australians]".

This lack of parochial support within the province for its rugby team has been apparent to the players. The union's captain observed that his city "seemed to have no identity, no collective pride" (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.175). This view was replicated by an interview respondent who noted that while one identified union has a "collective spirit", this spirit in the subject union's region is diluted by the fact that residents in the province have their loyalties split between neighbouring unions, each of which is among the leading playing provinces in New Zealand. A prominent subject union player and All Black, raised the issue of divided support in the region. He explained his belief that "Basically [the subject union's region] is a four team city now. He was referring to three local first division union rugby teams and a strongly marketed league team. There are also a lot of other things for people to do other than go and watch rugby on a sunny day." [Ranfurly Shield] era" (Gifford, 20 September, 1995). The same player noted the thinning of crowds since a major trophy was lost.

This point was also acknowledged by a managerial respondent. He stated that "We are not perceived anywhere nearly as well as we should be by the public...We're not part of the fabric of the city", and concluded that

"The public need more ownership". As explained by one external director, who has a marketing background, this lack of following has weakened the strength of the product as a brand, which then handicaps most other marketing operations.

This parochialism is made more surprising, and more of a concern, because of the enormous success of the union's team. The team has won the NPC for the last three years, and during the research period regained the nation's premier rugby trophy. This concern was raised by one manager who believed that "The local people don't feel passionate about their rugby team, yet we're the best provincial rugby team in the world, bar none". Further comment on this subject was made by one external director who observed "A negative attitude to the representative team, despite results and playing style". The captain also noted this phenomenon of the local population being so used to winning that they became spoiled by it (Brooke and Veysey, 1995, p.175). This lack of appreciation shown for their rugby team by potential spectators has developed to the extent that it was described by one external director as being "a two-edged sword". He explained that "If our top team plays great rugby and have a big win, then that turns people off, and if they don't play well and it's a narrow game then the team gets rubbished, so we can't win either way".

These problems have been apparent for at least five years. In 1990, in conjunction with the Cricket Association and the Trust Board of their home ground, the subject union commissioned research into public perceptions of attending major sports at the ground they shared with cricket, seeking explanations for the declining crowds at provincial sporting events. The research noted that "The social context ... to attract spectators has undergone significant change in recent years. Extensive media coverage and the rise of competing sports means that attendance at live rugby and cricket matches can no longer be taken for granted. The great New Zealand weekend is not what it was - work patterns, Saturday shopping and greater involvement in a wider range of leisure and family related activities means that time is valuable" (*Eden Park in the 1990s*, 1990, p.5).

The report added that "Rugby (and to a lesser extent cricket) no longer dominate the sporting calendar as they did twenty, or even ten years ago. [People] are presented with a wide range of sporting activities to choose from" (ibid., p.10). The report later concluded that "spectators are increasingly demanding. They have less available time to watch sport, are more selective than ever before, and are being presented with more alternatives" (ibid., p.13). This report identified the challenges that the subject union's marketing operation was facing to reverse the emergent trend of declining crowds, yet to date the trend has not been successfully addressed.

There are three major theories advanced for this lack of local support. The first explanation is that, ironically, the clear superiority of the team in the last decade may have meant a loss in the parochial support for the team.

As noted by El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), "The essential economic factor concerning professional team sports is that gate receipts depend crucially on the uncertainty of outcome of the games played within the league. As the probability of either team winning approaches 100%, gate receipts fall substantially. Consequently, every team has an economic motive for not becoming 'too' superior in playing talent compared with other teams in the league" (p.1306). This was evidenced by the situation with the researched union in the past decade. There was declining interest in their games because the result was rarely in serious doubt. El-Hodiri and Quirk also state that gate receipts increase as the likelihood of the home team winning is above 50 per cent, but not too close to 100 per cent. This phenomenon was apparent during the record period for which the union held the Ranfurly Shield. Crowds were large in the early period of this tenure but as the gap between the union team and all others grew the crowds diminished.

Deaker advanced a further theory, explaining the lack of parochialism arising from most Aucklanders not being born in Auckland, and thus having parochial or family ties to other provincial unions. Deaker believes this demographic challenge combines with the fact that "Like American sports, the major crowd demographic is the middle aged, middle or upper class white, while the athletes they watch are predominantly young blacks, or in Auckland's case, Polynesians". He believes that the union has never faced this in the marketing of its product, and consequently had problems in the accurate targeting of appropriate demographic groups.

A third explanation advanced by research informants for the lack of parochialism is that rugby is not as important to the public of the subject union' city as it is to the public of other provinces. The subject union is set in the largest and most cosmopolitan of New Zealand's cities. The large ethnic communities of Polynesian and Asian extraction in the populace are extremely under-represented in the demographics of union crowds and serve to dilute the overall grip the team has on the public psyche in the province. In addition the competing entertainment options in the city were noted by two respondents as being a major factor in reducing the attraction of the representative rugby team to the public of the area. As noted by one respondent from outside the research province, "If that team was anywhere else in the country, they would possibly have far greater support than they have got...locals are probably spoilt by having too many choices climatically; it's maybe the premier sporting city in the world".

Another respondent, formerly involved in the governance of the union, acknowledged the problem with spectator numbers. He observed that the city is more diverse than the others with more things for people to do, and "unfortunately people have just got out of the habit of going to the rugby". Two CEOs from other unions also recognised this complication. The first alluded to the problems the subject union has with competition for crowds, and the second believed a weakness of the union's management was the ability to attract the crowds, but added that "It's so

terribly hard in their city to market it". Overall then, these three factors are seen to influence the size of crowds, and indicate major concerns as the organisation enters its first full year in the professional game, with ticket sales constituting one of the two primary revenue streams (the other being sponsorship).

A further concern is the lack of season ticket sales. As noted by one external director from a sales and marketing background, "It's much easier to fill your stadium if it's presold. In 1995 we had to virtually start from scratch every Monday morning...Maintaining the hype is a hell of a lot easier than selling the ground". Season ticket sales are a dominant feature of ticket sales in North American professional sports and success in marketing of the Auckland Warriors league team, who by the end of the research period had sold over ten thousand season tickets for their 1996 season.

The Marketing Manager of the case study organisation understands the importance of season tickets for professional sporting organisations and has obtained research into this aspect of sport marketing. Towards the end of the research period his organisation had sold approximately three and a half thousand season tickets for the 1996 season and the Marketing Manager explained they were "looking to boost that to around ten thousand, plus the six thousand for the [home ground] Trust to make it to 16,000". If this level of sales is reached, then all of the premium seating in the arena will have been sold and this will have the added bonus, which the league organisation exploited, of creating scarcity. In theory, this will allow the remaining tickets to be sold more easily. To achieve this aim the Marketing Manager plans to "integrate it into everything, everything is built towards selling season tickets". This issue was also discussed with two external directors, both of whom expressed concern about the existing deficiencies in this area. One of these respondents concluded that "In the future, there will be an increased emphasis on people committing themselves to long term seating arrangements through season tickets".

10.5.2 Match entertainment

As noted in the previous section, the increase in ticket sales is vital in boosting the revenue to levels needed to develop the organisation in the professional sport environment. This fact is widely appreciated by interview respondents. One external director stated that "If we don't bring people in, we don't survive", while a second noted "It's a very competitive market for the recreational dollar...The game needs the money from the turnstiles and if people don't come the union will struggle to survive".

Aside from the financial benefits of increased ticket sales, the existence of large home crowds is important to the union's players. Players expressed great regret that at a critical highly publicised game in 1993 the home ground stands were clearly dominated by supporters of the opposing team

(Brooke and Veysey, 1995). Players have also expressed the preference for playing in front of larger crowds as it creates a greater arousal to perform (Brooke and Veysey, 1995; McConnell, 1994). This point was also raised by a respondent involved in the management of the union team. He believed that the primary goal for 1996 "is to get the crowd back in". He explains that this is vitally important as "players play better in front of a packed audience. It's more exciting to play at home when there's people there". He also acknowledges that "the biggest challenge is how to get patrons in. Apart from the rugby, what entertainment do we need to provide to get them in".

This latter point made by the respondent raises a major concern that has been advanced for the lack of crowd numbers at the union's home fixtures and that is the quality of entertainment offered. Pre-match entertainment, especially and, to a lesser extent, half-time entertainment, is of great importance in encouraging the wider public to attend provincial rugby fixtures. As noted by the Boston Report and market research commissioned, in part, by the union, the majority of the population are no longer 'hard-core' rugby supporters, and will be attracted to provincial matches as attractive forms of entertainment, not simply because they are games of rugby. These theatre-goers, as they were termed by the Boston Report, are a vital component of the market as they have the income available to attend entertainment events and, as a demographic group, may be commonly attracted to rugby events.

The importance of such entertainment to the presentation of the professional sporting product has grown throughout the 1980s to its primary position in modern sport management. This growth in importance was evidenced by the 1983 statement of George Steinbrenner, owner of the New York Yankees, that "Baseball is not just a sport any more; we are a business. We are show business. To compete for the entertainment dollar... you have to have more than nine guys playing baseball; you've got to have an attraction. And I have tried to do the best job I possibly can to give my fans an *attraction*" (as cited in Coakley, 1994, p.302). The importance of the entertainment which surrounds the professional sport product is heightened for the case study organisation because of the number of other entertainment options available to residents, and popular support expressed over the pre-match and other entertainment provided by the rival code's home games.

Concerns centring on the effectiveness of the existing entertainment programme were expressed widely in the research. Symptomatic of these responses was that of an external director that "It is imperative the games become entertainment...event management is not good...pre-match is pretty pathetic". Staff also expressed their misgivings, as evidenced by one questionnaire response which said the "Marketing of the game, especially pre-match, needs further attention", while another added that "Pre-match entertainment is at an all-time low". Concerns have also been expressed in the media by senior players, including one noting that "People want to come along and see more than just a rugby game. Pre-match

entertainment, halftime entertainment. Whether they've got the marketing right, I'm not too sure" (Gifford, 20 September, 1995). In addition, criticism has been apparent in the media, with one commentator noting that "it is certainly time for the [subject] Rugby Union to check what it is doing right and wrong in the promotion of representative games" (Pearce, 30 September, 1995).

Besides the most obvious motivation of increasing ticket sales, other reasons were also advanced for improving the entertainment offered at matches. One manager observed that an improved experience for spectators at the games greatly increases the likelihood of their return and their transition to becoming regular customers. A second reason was alluded to by an external director, "Rugby will continue to become more of a spectacle than a sport...we need to get people there for longer periods of time". As crowds get larger, spectators tend to arrive at the ground earlier to avoid congestion and this improves sales of discretionary items. The increased income for such vendors increases demand for their positions and increases the rent returned to the governing bodies of the stadium for sales positions. A third reason raised for an improvement in entertainment was a more global consideration. An external director observed that "The game is going to be presented on a live world stage through world communication channels, and therefore we've got a real responsibility to present it as slick, well presented entertainment".

The Marketing Manager explains that the major constriction on the entertainment programme during the research period was "that the budget got cut to pieces, so there was no money to spend". This is given support by a staff questionnaire response, which stated that "their marketing and advertising budget is far too low to promote and excite the public". The manager noted that once the Ranfurly Shield was regained late in the season, more money was allocated to the entertainment programme. When the Shield was won, the marketing subcommittee met and examined the programme used by the previous Shield holders, who had regularly sold out their shield defences. An entertainment programme was formulated which included some new untested entertainment events and some aspects which had been previously successful. He believed that, with this programme, "the last four games went very well".

The entertainment programme proposed as the basis of the match-day package will include removal of the traditional 'curtain raiser' game between two lesser sides and include, as the core of the package, a band "to pack the terraces". This package will primarily be targeting the 18-30 year old age group. That group has been identified as the most important demographic group for increasing ticket sales and the Marketing Manager expressed an intense commitment to a programme aimed at them.

The Marketing Manager believes one major marketing benefit of the introduction of the Board is that directors "can recognise the fact that everyone isn't a rugby fan now", whereas the Management Committee could not. He believes that "The market research that has been done by

rugby unions has possibly been interpreted favourably by ourselves to see the good news" with the consequence that many rugby managers have an unrealistically optimistic perception of the marketing challenges in the current external environment. The reality, he believes, is that "theatre-goers are not rugby supporters...There is a very limited hard core rugby market out there". The most important market segment to exploit now "is the sports fan, who wants something that is exciting and entertaining".

If this type of spectator is attracted in sufficient numbers, as envisaged by the Marketing Manager's plans, an atmosphere is created which "brings in everyone else". For this reason, the marketing plans for representative fixtures center around catering to this type of spectator. Curtain raisers will be discontinued. "Curtain raisers don't work, end of story. We had excellent curtain raisers that did nothing for the crowd, except for rugby purists... When we had bands, people were coming on the terraces for one hour and a quarter before kick-off". The spectators who came in earlier to enjoy the music and the atmosphere it created were also observed to be "more vocal, more identifiable".

The manager identifies a semi-final match as providing evidence for these entertainment trends. "For that game, we had eight days to market it from start to finish, and we packed the terraces. The players said it was great to run out and see [the home colours] all around them". In addition to the use of bands, quick sound-bites were used over the ground announcement system to maintain the atmosphere created by the pre-match entertainment, and although no longer a primary attraction, the superscreen added to the atmosphere with replays and crowd shots. While the young spectator is the primary focus of the entertainment plan, the marketing department at the union realise all major demographic grouping must be catered for, and therefore future plans for the stadium include the informal segmentation of seating areas into "different areas for different cultures, like youth, middle aged, family and corporate". In addition the focus on the youth element will be enforced by continued proactive manipulation of the *terrace culture* through the introduction of such support mechanisms as chants.

10.6 THE COACHING AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

As described by the Director of Coaching, the role of the coaching and development department "is the recruitment and retention of players and coaches and, to a limited degree, referees. Our main aim is to recruit players. We aim at primary schools, trying to build the numbers in junior rugby. We try and build the numbers in secondary schools and keep an interest in rugby at that level...And we try and retain them at the end of the secondary school years". He believes that the introduction of professionalism will not change these aims or operations of his department, as it deals ostensibly with the non-commercial area of the game. He

believes the only alterations to his focus that professionalism may bring are an increased focus on elite players at younger levels and less liaison with other unions.

The Director of Coaching believes his job "is totally a management position now", moving away from a coaching oriented position which it was in earlier stages of its development. This manager has three staff members, as shown in Figure 10.6. The role of these three staff members is to assist in the development of coaches and players in clubs and schools. The department was observed by its manager as having the most relaxed culture of the whole organisation, "Maybe because of the clothing we wear, with the tracksuits and shorts".




Figure 10.6. - Structure of the Coaching and Development department

Two interview respondents who were involved in the coaching division of rugby believed that the area of coaching and development is the most seriously neglected area of the management of the game in New Zealand. One respondent viewed this function as the research and development area of rugby management, and explained his perception of its treatment in New Zealand rugby management:

> Rugby managers usually think short term, and do not realise the role of research and development. The squeeze is going on research and development, which is everything you see going on the field of play. Research and development is proportionately declining in relation to what is going on elsewhere....The marketers raise the money for the game.....but nothing goes into the development of the game.

Later in the interview the respondent returned to this topic and added further comment:

> The Director of Coaching says that the development side of the game has to constantly fight for their share of the cake. There is not a sympathy for the development side of the game amongst the management people throughout the game in New Zealand, and our union is no different. I think that is because they can see no self promotion in that area. It is unbelievable to me the difference in salaries between the Director of Coaching and the CEO - it bears no relation to the input and responsibility they have. Everyone [in that development group] could be snapped up by someone in Asia who would pay three or four times what they are getting, and in South Africa, Australia and Europe at least twice what they are now getting.

> Development in other areas like marketing and administration is plugging holes, but they don't realise their long-term survival rests on their standard of play, which is in direct relation to the training of coaches, training of players right across the board to elite players, the training of referees, and all the fitness programmes. It can be tied to a lack of vision. I know that [the current and former Directors of Coaching] had visions of becoming the best playing union in the world. I don't know if that is tied into the overall development plan of their union.

These comments were outlined to the Director of Coaching in the case study organisation, who responded:

> In our union we are given a fair go. The management truly believe that we do do a good job and we are valuable. I believe that at NZRFU level they do not give the Director of Coaching the kudos he deserves. He is just a spare piece of the puzzle sometimes, he's basically incidental, isn't he? I think they only have him there because every other union has one.

The second respondent expanded on this belief that the NZRFU has seriously neglected their Director of Coaching. As evidence for this statement, this respondent explains how the manager of this area in the NZRFU "has been neglected. All the money [this manager] receives comes from the IRB, the Hillary Commission or the Sports Foundation [two national sports organisations], he doesn't get any money from the NZRFU. It's appalling". Late in the research period, the individual who held job in the NZRFU accepted a position with the IRB as the Development Manager after expressing, in an interview with the present researcher, his frustration at the lack of appreciation he received from the national body.

In order to strengthen understandings of the coaching and development area in New Zealand rugby and to foster its perceived importance to rugby managers, the manager of this department does liaise with other unions. To date the strongest links made have been those developed with the two neighbouring unions with whom the Coaching Director has "two or three meetings a year" in addition to "two or three meetings a year in Wellington with the other coaching directors". This respondent has perceived the impact of professionalism upon this process, by acknowledging that while at the moment there was a lot of sharing of knowledge, the advent of professionalism may change this. He observed that cooperation between the unions may diminish as they each seek to gain a competitive advantage over each other, with the development of playing resources being important in this.

The success of this department of the organisation was widely noted in interview responses from all respondent groupings. Typifying these responses were those made by the managerial response group. One manager within the subject union responded that "Our union has got the best coaching scheme in the country", while another noted that the department "Is a strength of our rugby". A third manager responded that "a strength of the union is that the coaching scheme is so good".

The success of the scheme may be considered from the amount of quality players who emerge from the development programmes. The importance of these playing numbers was articulated by one respondent formerly involved in the governance of the organisation, "The most important numbers in rugby are the playing numbers, not the balance sheet numbers. You can have a healthy balance sheet but if there is no-one playing the game you will be in strife". The strengths of the organisation were widely recognised by CEOs from other unions, with two stating that the depth of players was a great strength of the union, and would be a great resource to have in professionalism". A notable comment on the success of this area of the organisation was made by the manager of the equivalent department of another large rugby union. This respondent commented that:

> More money could make their development programme better but, given the money that is devoted to the Director of Coaching and his group, the amount and quality of players they are spitting out is amazing. I get the feeling that the union at their very worst are still ten points better than the next best around the country. It is testament to the development scheme that they've gone through the rebuilding phase of the rep team, but not at the expense of results, where most other unions have to lose in the process. It's just incredible.

Recognition of this output of quality players was widely expressed by respondents from the Board. One external director believed that the organisation had "Got good player resources, built through a very good coaching programme". Supportive comment also came from one internal director's statement that "The depth of players is a strength", while another internal director also offered unqualified praise for this facet of the organisation, saying "The coaching development and coordinator scheme is proven by the continual strength of our sides". A second external director with elite rugby coaching experience, identified the strengths of this area of the organisation. He observed that "The depth of the player base is a huge strength, and this is accentuated by very good coaching staff. The talent identification is also very strong".

Additional support was provided by managers from the case study organisation, with one observing that "We've got a regular stream of players coming through". A second manager noted that "The prime reason our rugby is so strong is the player development. We've got players on our bench who are the envy of other unions". An individual from the team management area stated that "A certain quantity of players will produce the quality that is needed for the representative sides" and ventured the view that the success of this department is proven by the development of player quantity.

This refutes the criticism noted in Chapter Three, and often leveled at certain unions that they attract players from other regions through the offer of material rewards. The criticism, respondents assert, should actually be directed at other unions who have not made the efforts which their union

has. One manager expressed such sentiments by saying that "whereas other unions try to come in at the top and start buying players they would be better advised to start developing players". Murray Deaker, a sport media personality, noted that "The fallacy about this union bringing in players from outside is just that, a fallacy. They actually develop more players than anyone else".

The success of the department, according to its manager, is because "We have a large base of players to work from. and a good base of coaches to work from, so to an extent it is a numbers game...Numbers always help". This population benefit was also identified by a manager who recognised that "We have a high population, but it goes beyond that". This observation that the basically advantageous figures need good management was also raised by the Director of Coaching, who explained that the personnel within the department are instrumental to its continued results - "We've also got a good team of people here. [The original Coaching Director] got it organised properly from the start, and we've managed to employ the right people, and we have planned well, we've planned for what we want to do, and we've managed to be able to achieve what we have set down".

One CEO of another union expressed the belief that the success of the subject union's player development programmes can be directly tied to its large amounts of expenditure in this area, stating "They've got plenty of money to develop teams". This level of expenditure was also noted by respondents from within the organisation with one manager explaining that "It's not just the size of the union, it's the active way we do it. We spend half a million dollars a year doing that". This observation of financial support for the programmes of the department was further supported by a second manager interviewee, saying that "We've invested a lot of money in developing the sport and that is really paying off now". Such beliefs were also exhibited in the interview responses of an external director that "We've tried to be very progressive in the development side of the game... there's been a lot of effort and money go into the development of the next generation of players".

A key aspect of the Coaching Department effectiveness has been the development and operation of the Coaching Coordinator scheme in the union area. The coaching and development department of the organisation has introduced a programme to help more clubs employ full-time coaching coordinators and the union has subsidised the salaries of these appointees. Subsidised coaches link with clubs, "and perform a similar role to ourselves, except it is done at a club base, so they are concentrating on recruiting and retaining players for their clubs". The scheme initially was introduced with the premise of a declining level of subsidisation by the union. In the first year, the union paid fifty per cent of a club coaching coordinator's salary, to a maximum of $15,000. In addition, the union provided training equipment for the coordinators, and the clubs provided a vehicle for them. This subsidy was planned to reduce yearly until the

coordinators' wages were entirely paid by the clubs, "But that didn't work".

The scheme reached a peak of about fourteen clubs out of the twenty-one participating, but this quickly declined to the present level of six. Due to this lack of success with the scheme, the union has revised the subsidy structure, and the level now remains at 50 per cent to a maximum of $15,000. The Director of Coaching believes participation of the scheme declined once rigorous drink-driving laws were introduced. These new regulations greatly impacted upon the revenues clubs gained through their bars, which were at the time considered to be the major revenue sources for most clubs. With this revenue stream reduced, many of the participating clubs struggled to meet their committed payment to coaching coordinators, and thus such positions were discontinued.

The Director of Coaching agreed a major reason the scheme is currently not being utilised by fifteen of the twenty-one union clubs because of a lack of funding, but adds that apathy is a major problem also. "We've had some damned good coordinators there", he explained, "and the clubs give them no support, they don't support the ideas they present". He believes that this scheme could work in the future, but it would need big changes in the subject rugby union. "At the moment we've got twenty-one clubs, which is probably too many. If we had about twelve senior clubs, we could pay for their coaching coordinators, and they could, in turn, help the minor clubs" .

10.6.1 Player retention

The major problem identified in the present research, in the area of coaching and development, is the retention of rugby players in the game once they leave secondary school. This concern was identified by respondents from the team management area and the union's directors. The latter observed that while overall playing numbers are rising in the union, the numbers in the under-21 grade are not, "which is a concern". This area of concern is not confined to the research union, as evidenced by a perusal of other unions' annual reports.

The Director of Coaching in the research union explained his view of the causes of this problem in an interview:

> With the players coming out of school, some of them have been playing rugby for too long, they've played too much rugby, especially for representative teams. Sometimes they are pressurised too much, some of them have been given too much, with trips and blazers, so they're not hungry any more. Then they are at that age where they become their own person, there are a lot of decisions to be made and they quite often change their lifestyle. Their school discipline isn't there, their own discipline takes over and they make unorthodox decisions.

One other respondent also commented upon the causes of this perceived retention problem, believing that youths of this age faced a multitude of options in their lives, of which rugby was probably not perceived as one of the most important. Once the decisions were made in this period of their life the emphasis on their leisure activities often moved away from organised team sport, and once they moved away from that environment it was hard to attract them back.

Respondents recognised that to rectify this problem would be a difficult task. The Director of Coaching stated that:

> It's very difficult to tackle, because the reasons are so varied. Some stay in rugby because they are successful, some stay because their mates are playing, some because it's something to do on Saturday. We have to provide opportunities for the school-leaver who is serious, another for the one who isn't as serious.

One other respondent suggested that the union introduce "liaison officers to coordinate the players in schools, and to encourage the continuation of their interest once they leave schools". This in effect would replicate the existing coaching coordinators and regional director positions already existing in the organisation but their focus would be directed to school rugby exclusively, including liaison between clubs and schools.

One external director also identified problems in the area of grading young players into playing divisions based upon their weight and not on their age or other criteria, "where weights and grades don't reflect demographics". He explained the grading system has remained largely untouched for a long period of time and as players across all grades are getting heavier, the grades which are weight-related no longer accurately reflect the playing population, especially with the perceived weight differentials of Polynesian youths. Such a concern regarding the matching of existing grades with the demands of the playing population of the union, and the union's recognition of these, was also raised by a managerial respondent. This respondent explained a situation during the research period in which:

> Players were leaving the game after the under-21s, especially in second division clubs, because they did not make the senior reserves team. These players couldn't play President's Grade because that is only for age 35 and over, and most didn't want to play social rugby because they liked the competitiveness of the under-21s. Senior B is a mainly Polynesian grade, and this turned some players off it, so there was no vehicle for these players to remain in the game. There was clearly a demand for a new grade, so we introduced the emerging players grade.

He also explained that such changes in the club area are complicated by the necessity of the Council of Delegates to accept them, saying that "The introduction of this new grade had been held back in the past because the smaller clubs have complained it would only strengthen the bigger clubs".

The Coaching Director believes the areas of weakness for his department are that "We're not staffed as much as we could be, so we can't fulfil our duties to all the schools". This is the negative side of the union's large rugby playing numbers, and the sheer volume of players creates huge logistical challenges for the coaching and development department in its efforts to reach all of them. As the Coaching Director explains, "That's where the numbers game is a problem for us, because we then struggle to reach everyone, but on a three yearly basis, we'd cover most of them".

10.7 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

The office facilities of the case study organisation are inadequate. This concern was clearly recognised by a range of managerial and staff respondents. This problem primarily manifests itself in a lack of space, which leads to a lack of privacy and confidentiality. A solution for this problem was proposed for implementation at the conclusion of the research period.

Computer problems plague the staff of the organisation. The availability of personal computers to staff members increased during the research period, but networking and software problems continued. Computer skills are the most desired skills by union staff, which reflects a lack of training. The lack of an adequate training programme has been a source of frustration and disappointment for a number of staff members.

Weaknesses in areas of staff operations have been addressed in part by the introduction of the Finance and Administration Manager. This new role entails a more direct responsibility for training staff, managing systems and ensuring a greater maximisation of the organisation's human resources. The new structure also more clearly delineated the Rugby Department from the coaching and development department.

There is widespread concern over the marketing operation of the union, which was indicated in all areas of interview and questionnaire responses. Questions were raised over competencies of the Marketing Manager. Concerns over the perceived ineffectiveness of the marketing operations were increased during the research period due to the introduction of professionalism to the rugby game, which immediately heightened the focus on revenue generation. This importance of marketing was evidenced by the core characteristics sought in the replacement CEO, which were outlined in Section 9.4 of the present study.

The competitions in which the union's senior team competes complicate the marketing of that team in a tangible and identifiable manner. In 1995, the early season competition failed to arouse widespread public interest and, due to a prolonged cricket season, these games were forced to be played at the home ground of their most prominent entertainment competitors from a rival code. Despite the strengths of the NPC competition, particularly at the first division level, the structure of this

competition contains inherent weaknesses for competing organisations. Only four home games are provided by the competition, and for the 1995 season the four home games of the case study organisation were played against the four lowest ranked teams from the previous season, which is believed by respondents to have severely handicapped the level of ticket sales, and revenue, for the organisation. This low number of games also diluted the presentation of the subject union's primary product in the marketplace.

The research also revealed concerns over the servicing of existing sponsorship by related union personnel. Sponsorship has been identified by respondents as being one of the two main sources of revenue for sporting organisations in New Zealand, and the importance of this revenue was increased by the professionalisation process. The attractiveness of the organisation to potential and existing sponsors is handicapped by the introduction of the new Super-12 (IPC) early season competition in 1996, in which the union will manage a regional team. This regionalism nullifies the existing sponsorship contracts for that period of the season, lessening the attractiveness of the organisation to sponsors. In addition, the differences between the regional team in the Super-12 competition and the provincial team in the NPC competition are believed to greatly complicate and handicap the essential branding of the organisation's primary product in the marketplace.

It is widely believed by respondents that the sponsorship marketplace will become more competitive. This is because increases in demand for sponsorship funding far exceed increases in the supply of sponsorship funding. Provincial rugby unions are expected to be one of the dominating forces in the sponsorship marketplace, especially with the demand for sponsorship of the new regionally based teams for the Super-12 competition.

The marketing function is complicated by the widely recognised lack of parochial public support for the union's rugby team. This weakness has been noted by media, players, sport managers and the union's employees also. This lack of enthusiastic support comes despite the outstanding playing record of the representative team in the past decade. A number of respondents believe the playing record actually has caused the lack of support, referring to the excessive dominance of the union team in the late 1980s. This response reflected the literature of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), which indicated that the dominance diminished interest in results and, therefore support, for the representative team. A second explanation advanced by respondents for the lack of parochialism is the number of residents who identify with other unions. A third explanation is the amount of entertainment options available to the local region's residents, which dilutes the regional impact of the representative rugby team.

This lack of parochialism manifests itself most markedly in the lack of ticket sales. Of particular concern is the lack of season ticket sales, which necessitates increased marketing expenditure in order to sell the remaining

tickets for each match. This lack of ticket sales was also linked by informants to the inadequacies of the entertainment offered by the organisation at its home matches. This entertainment was widely perceived to be poor.

The role of the coaching and development department of the organisation is to recruit and retain players and coaches. Its importance and success was noted in the literature review. This role is not perceived to have been changed by the corporatisation or professionalisation processes. This role is perceived by respondents to be a clear area of neglect at the NZRFU, however the manager of this department, the Director of Coaching, believes this is not the case with the subject union. This perception contrasts with that of a respondent in a similar position in another union, who believed that the Coaching Director was not given the recognition he deserved by the case study union.

The success of this department was widely noted in interviews with all respondent groupings. This success was perceived to be evidenced by the amount of quality players emerging from development programmes. Independent respondents agree this internal development of players refutes criticism of the union attracting elite players from other provincial unions. Investment in this department to produce such results has been large, which was recognised by respondents from within the case study organisation and also by informants from other unions.

An important facet of the department's effective operations is the club coaching coordinator scheme. This is intended to allow more clubs to have full-time coaching coordinators, through the union subsidising their salaries. This scheme is not currently successful, as clubs are perceived to lack the financial and managerial resources to fulfil their obligations to the scheme. This scheme may be seen as illustrating the goals of the department and programs used to achieve them.

Major problems for the department exist in the area of retention of players in the rugby game on their leaving secondary school. This loss of players is thought to be related to the increased options young players have in their lives, and solutions to this problem are thought to be very complex. Secondary concerns for the department were expressed over inconsistencies between playing demographics and graded competitions offered by the union through the clubs.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE TEAM

CHAPTER OUTLINE

With the players being considered the major product of the organisation, the direct management of that product has been vested in the volunteer services of the team manager and coach. This chapter examines the changing role for each of these positions, and the type of person needed to fit that role in the professional game. In this results chapter the focus is also on the effects of the professionalisation process on the players. This includes an examination of the professional culture, players planning for their futures, players' unions, contracts and consideration for developing players. The chapter concludes with a discussion of player movements.

11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Team Manager
11.3 The Coach
11.4 Rugby Players as Professional Athletes
11.5 Player Development and Movement
11.6 Summary and Review

11.1 INTRODUCTION

This results chapter explores the issue of the team and its management in greater depth. It explores perceptions of respondents regarding the role of the team manager, type of person needed for the team manager position, role of the coach and the likely uses of support staff in professional provincial rugby. Recognition of the importance of players was a clearly emergent theme in the interviews, being discussed in preceding chapters, emphasised by all response groups. This chapter examines the issues that emerged from the research regarding players and the professional team.

This chapter draws upon the qualitative data provided by interviews with the board of Directors (n=9), management personnel from the case study organisation (n=6), staff from the case study organisation (n=1), team management personnel (n=5), media person Murray Deaker, the president of the organisation, the former chairman of the organisation and CEOs of other provincial rugby unions (n=9). These thirty-three interviews are supplemented by data gained from the completed questionnaires of staff (n=8) and club chairmen (n=17).

The importance of players and the representative or professional team was stated unequivocably by a number of interview respondents. One external director typified these statements by saying that "The game is ultimately about the players...if the players are unhappy, they won't play well. The players have to play entertaining rugby week in and week out, winning more than they lose. If you haven't got that, people won't turn up." Another respondent noted that "The rugby product is not the same as any product sold across the counter. The product is the players and the product is only as good as the extent to which the union looks after their players."

Identified by twelve separate interviewees, the strength of the representative team is one of the defining characteristics of the Union. This recognition was especially notable amongst Board members. When asked to identify the major strengths of the union as an organisation, five of the nine directors identified the strength of the representative team. The comments made by four external directors formed a clear theme: "We've got a very, very strong team;" "A primary strength is that we are the best side in the country;" "[our union] is in the best two or three club sides in the world;" and "A major strength of the union is that we've got the top team in New Zealand, and that gives us a damned good product." These comments were supported by an internal director that "The best thing that happened to the union was winning the Ranfurly Shield, and then the NPC."

Apart from the five directors who identified this major strength of the organisation, four of the six managerial respondents did so, including two new appointees. Comments volunteered by this group of respondents closely mirror those made by directors: "A strength is our recognised level of performance on the field, at all levels;" "The strength of the team is one of the major strengths of the union...we've been successful over a number of years now, and we've got a culture of success there now;" "The team is without doubt a great strength;" and "The strong team is a great help...We've got an awesome team out there." As noted by the CEO of a rival union, "That playing strength is going to be an enormously valuable thing, heading into professionalism."

Two of three team management respondents articulated such beliefs. One observed that the success of the past decade had bred a winning culture within the team which, in turn, has led to greater success. He added that support for the team from the union's management "has been great - everyone cares for them." The second respondent from this grouping expressed very similar beliefs, explaining "They have developed a pride of performance which is passed on from the older players to the younger ones, so that's very important...The union finances us to do things most other unions can't, like going into camp the night before a home game and having the union pay for it."

The strength of the union's representative team was statistically illustrated in the research period. Eight players were selected for the All Black tour

of France, the most from any province. The union has had 124 national representatives to date, more than any other. Since the inception of the NPC in 1976, the subject union has won this championship more times than any other union, including the last three years, and is the current holder of the Ranfurly Shield, the traditional symbol of provincial rugby supremacy in New Zealand. The union holds the record for the longest tenure of the Ranfurly Shield, (62 games, from 1985 to 1993), winning this back on their first challenge since losing. The union has provided three of the last four All Black captains and the fourth played for the union in his formative playing years.

11.2 THE TEAM MANAGER

During the research period, the last year in which elite New Zealand rugby operated as a amateur game, the team manager reflected the amateurism which still dominated management of the representative team. The team manager, described by one other respondent close to the team as being "from the old school," explained the nature of his voluntary involvement in this critical management position:

> I frequently come to work at 8:30, and I'm usually still talking rugby at 11am, and by that time I would have done very little of my own business. During my business day, the phone will go about rugby, players will want me, and I have to organise promotional work. The phone will go all day related to rugby. That's fine - I'm fortunate I am my own boss. My love of the game is so great, I've enjoyed what I've done. It's been a privilege to do it and be a part of it...I could spend on average about four hours a day, six days a week, and average out about 20 hours a week [on my team role].

Later in the interview, the question of role change in the professional era was raised. He answered that:

> With the change to professionalism, there are more requirements, but the role will only change because people will think it has changed. Really, managers of the Auckland side do a professional job anyway...It's such a high quality team, and the expectations here are so great anyway, you really have to be professional to do it at the moment. It has been, I believe, professionals running an amateur game anyway. A few little things will change, but the planning, the organisation will not change greatly...You don't win three NPCs in a row, and the Ranfurly Shield 35-0, without professionalism in the role.

Despite these comments by the team manager, the present research data indicated that the existing role, as currently practised, was widely recognised as being outdated and redundant. Respondents expressed a common belief that the demands and challenges imposed upon the team and its management necessitated a changed role of the manager. Interviews

with other team management personnel yielded data which indicated such a changing role. The first of these stated that "The role is changing quite dramatically - before he was amateur, now he is an employee, albeit of the NZRFU." A second managerial respondent agreed "It will change significantly, you only have to look at what [the new All Black coach] wanted in his manager," while the third noted that "They are far more accountable than they have ever been, and that is a good thing."

A prominent sports media person and past provincial rugby representative, Murray Deaker, believed this change was an important aspect of the professionalisation process of the organisation. He believed that in the professional age of elite rugby, the team manager should be responsible for players' contracts, attendance at training, disciplining the players, outlining the players' commitments and also act as a medium for communication between players and the CEO. He explained that for this position to be reached, a change process is necessary, "The coach coaches, and the manager manages, and at the moment that doesn't happen...I think they are going to try and change the manager's job in a piecemeal way, and that's tragic."

Deaker later made the point that "The manager is responsible to the CEO, not the coach, and that's never happened in New Zealand rugby." This change was also recognised and discussed by a number of other interview respondents, who observed that the changing role of the team manager will assume some tasks previously the responsibility of the CEO. One of these respondents was an internal director, whose interview response reflected such a link:

> The team is the most important commodity the union has, so it has to be put on a pedestal...The CEO has to have the closest links with it. The right manager is more important than the coach in lots of ways - the coach has to get the best out of the team, but the manager has to get the best out of the product, in association with the CEO. To do this he has to also be involved with the players' problems, as it's vital we nurture and nurse the younger players coming on.

With the demands on the CEO position increasing, (see Chapter Ten), the movement of greater responsibility to the team management position has been welcomed by three CEO respondents from other provincial unions. One such individual observed that:

> Before, the team was basically run by senior management and office staff, now the manager must run it. That will take quite a bit of pressure off the office administration, and now the office will only be used in a support role to the manager...Before it was the CEO's job to get players to attend certain things, and it was done by the office not the manager, now he's accountable to run the team under the CEO, almost as a division of the organisation.

The second CEO to comment on this aspect of managerial change explained how, in his union, the team manager no longer reports to the chairman as he did in the old governance structure, but to the CEO. When asked about the changing role of the team manager, this respondent replied that "He won't change dramatically, his job will still be to look after the needs of the team on an on-field basis...While his reporting lines will change, his role shouldn't change a hell of a lot."

The third CEO respondent also expressed recognition of the impact on the CEO position of the changed role of the team manager. This respondent explained this recognition:

> I have matters I am dealing with at the moment that normally I would do, but now I am handing them over to the manager, so it makes the CEO's life a bit easier, they are now doing part of our job. He now has to be accountable for everything to do with the team, and fulfil all the administrative parts...In the past when managers had problems they came straight to the CEO. Now they have problems and only come to the CEO as a final resort...We look after the administration and the marketing, and let him look after assembling the team, organising the team, and organising the travel. He has a budget, and he has to work within it.

Later in this interview, the respondent raised the additional issue of the pay disparity between the CEO and team manager positions. He explained that he and other CEOs felt aggrieved that they were only being paid a slightly higher salary than the team managers of Super-12 teams. This, he said, was hard to accept as the team managers were only employed for a four month period.

Other respondents, observed how the team manager role was increasingly resembling that of a corporate manager, rather than retaining its traditional role. This placed differing demands on their competencies. One managerial informant observed that "Whilst they do have their financial affairs taken care of in terms of money," their management of this should be watched carefully. He added, "They are being paid like highly successful businessmen, and that is how they are going have to behave. They have to have excellent time management with the amount of travel they are engaged in...It's just like being a business manager, you have to be all things to all people." A second manager explained how "They now have to supply a myriad of data to the NZRFU and the subject union management, which will demand financial accountability," a point also raised by the CEO of a provincial union.

This espousal of increased accountability was also apparent in the comments of an external director. This respondent commented that:

> The players are getting serious money - they have to be managed well and controlled. The whole success of the transition comes down to the team...it doesn't matter how good the park and the facilities are if the product isn't well managed. We need the wins

> on the scoreboard to get the revenue at the gates, if the manager isn't getting the results, you have to get someone who can.

A second external director who discussed this changing role of the team manager added the response that "They should be able to do things better, they should be better organised...the standards are going to be raised quite considerably." Such statements by Board members were given further support by the response of an internal director that "He has to be a business manager." In addition to these statements by directors, one CEO of a provincial union also recognised that the team manager role would increasingly become "More managing, less doing."

Four team management interview respondents commented on the type of person who should be appointed to the new team manager role. The first, from within the case study union, stated that "If he didn't have management background, he would have difficulties." He further explained that the team manager needed to have people and communication skills and, reflecting his own background, concluded that "Being a coach is a very good way of becoming a manager." The other three respondents from this grouping disagreed with him. the second team management respondent, also from the subject union, observed that consideration of his background was now more important:

> A profile has never been considered before. In the past the selection criteria have been: who has wanted it; who has done the years of service on the union to understand the union; will he get the fourteen votes of the 27 on the Management Committee to give him a majority, and is he a pretty decent joker?...I can see no reason why the person should come from the union itself. They could pick anyone who wants to do the job and has certain abilities - a knowledge of the rugby psyche, man management skills and an ability to administrate on a daily basis all the silly little things you have to do as a manager...He has to be loyal and know his exact relationship to the coach. The manager should be in charge, but that is rarely the case. The job has never been carefully delineated in that way.

The observation made by this respondent regarding the traditional selection criteria was also observed by a team management respondent from another rugby union. This interview informant observed that "At present in New Zealand rugby, the managerial positions are jobs for the boys. Whether you have got the abilities as a manager or none at all does not matter, when your turn comes around you get the position." The fourth respondent reinforced the need for a professionalised selection process, explaining his belief:

> I believe unions have to go out and headhunt for professional managers, who are either experienced in sport management or have a business management background that can be taken into the professional sports area. To manage these elite professional sports teams, they need to find people who have the management skills

> and professionalism about them and understand what makes sporting people work.

The team manager was appointed by the Management Committee under the old governance structure, which added complications to the process by involving club affiliations and politics in the consideration of applicants. As the CEO of one union which still operates under this system noted, "It has worked because the right person has been there. If the right person isn't there, we would have to look at getting a professional manager or the coach appointing someone they want." As the game embraced professionalism, this system was perceived to be redundant, as it was thought to not be a competent mechanism for providing the type of individuals needed to suit the changing role in the professional game. This concern was also replicated in discussion of the coaching position. One respondent explained that as the new governance structure was established. "It was a contentious issue over who would appoint the coach, as a lot of the clubs felt very strongly that they should do that. It was felt that because of the changing role of the coach, the appointment should be made by the board."

The CEO of a smaller provincial union expressed the belief that he "doesn't see much changing" in the team manager's role or background. This view received no support from the diverse group of respondents who also commented on this area. One manager of the case study organisation believed the team manager should have served a role "Like a CEO...he has to have a good background in management, with good communication skills and very good media skills." A staff member of this manager's department expressed a similar view:

> Getting the right man is crucial. He has to be solely devoted to that, it's a huge job...I don't think you can run your own business while doing the manager's job like you could in the past. His background should be as a business manager, basically running it as small business...While it would be help to know rugby as a sport, it is not a necessity.

This perception of the relevance of sporting background was also raised by an external director of the case study organisation, who explained that "A sport background would be important to understand the culture of the players, but they have to have the management expertise." The final comment made on this issue was by Murray Deaker. Deaker preferred the team manager to be "Someone trained in team management, in managing a group of people who are professional sportsmen...and you can't have them being paid peanuts."

If the increased managerial competencies of the team manager are realised, the qualitative data revealed a desire for increased autonomy for management of the team. The response of a staff member that "If the right man is appointed, increased autonomy would be good" typified interview comments. A second staff comment replicated this response,

saying "The professional team would have to be managed independently but in conjunction with the union." Senior management figures also identified this possibility, with one CEO of a first division union stating "We will have fortnightly checks, but the management of the team's operations is his responsibility." In addition, a team management respondent believed "It has to be autonomous, or the teams will be castrated by rugby politics, and the lack of vision of our administrators."

Three external directors of the subject union also enforced this backing of increased team management autonomy. One explained that "They've got a lot of autonomy now, but it could perhaps increase." A second explained his perception that "It is really autonomous at the moment...It should be a strategic business unit, a subsidiary that has to live within the budget and produce the results." This observation of the team as a form of subsidiary company was mirrored by the third external director, "In a corporate world, the team would be a subsidiary because it can't be totally separate."

11.3 THE COACH

In the reviewed literature, Gray (1995p) cited newly elected All Black coach John Hart as explaining that the elite coaching position was becoming "more holistic," with different skills required. While this literature appeared late in the research period, this questioning on this had been posed to interviewees as the researcher had hypothesised that the professionalisation process would change the coaching role in some way.

Within the case study union, one respondent explained that the subcommittee which established the governance structure believed "these days the coach needs to be more than just someone who motivates the team and gets them on the paddock, there is a whole range of business skills, PR skills and that sort of things that the coach needs today." This belief was mirrored by other respondents from within the organisation. An external director stated that "The coaching role will become more of a paid role, fulltime," and a manager explained that "The amount of high intensity games brings a new type of skill, and there are going to be more fulltime coaches...More man-management abilities are needed."

The two team management individuals who commented on the changing role of the coach had slightly divergent opinions of the degree of change. The respondent from the subject union said:

> In the sense that you're there to win a game of football, probably not a lot will change, except you will have greater access to the players...There will be a lot more group fitness work. It's very important that the development of players is implemented, and the coach plays a lead role in that.

However this view of only an incremental change was not shared by the team management individual from outside the case study union. This informant explained that "In the IPC teams, the critical person is the one we currently call the coach. He will be given responsibilities far beyond what they ever imagined they'd be responsible for as the provincial coach."

Two other interview respondents provided data supporting a lack of change in the coaching role. The first, the CEO of a smaller first division provincial union, believed the coaching position in his union would not change because the resources available to him wouldn't change. The second respondent who perceived a lack of change was Murray Deaker who explained that:

> I don't want the coach to do anything but coach the team, they don't in any other professional code in the world. He will still do the things he has always done in the past - he will be responsible for convening a selection panel to pick the best team and be responsible for coaching it...In professional sport, one thing only counts - winning. Everything else is secondary. However, because we are such a small country, the team coach has had to be all things to all men and hasn't been able to fit that ideal profile.

The major perceived change to the team support staff, due to the professionalisation process, is their increased use. The use of such staff in professional sport was outlined in the reviewed literature of Mason and Paul (1988). While the subject union does not currently utilise all the positions evident in North American professional sport, the comments of one external director during the research period highlighted the use of such staff by the current team management. This director "We've got plenty...it's quite embarrassing playing [a rural based union], and there's seven people assisting the subject union team, and there's only the manager and coach with the opposing team."

Four team management individuals commented on the use of support staff in professional rugby. The first, from within the union stated that support staff "are going to have to have a greater time commitment to the game." This view was supported by a second individual from within the union, who responded that "If there are more demands on players to train, there will be more demands on support staff to be there with them." He explained the situation during the research period in which the volunteer physiotherapist of the representative team lost a lot of income because he managed his own business, and so he couldn't serve either the team or his business to the best of his ability. For this reason he believed support staff should be paid for their duties. This view was shared by another of the team management respondents, who stated that most of the positions will be part-time positions in the professional game, in order to keep costs down. Further support for this advocation was shown by the fourth such respondent, who believed that "It should be matter of having the

bases covered" by part-time support staff, in order to provide adequate services and limit costs.

Aside from the responses of team management respondents, three other individuals provided data on the use of support staff for the research. An external director of the Auckland union observed that "The IPC will be a very condensed competition, with a lot of travelling and all tough games, so there will be a lot more time demands on the physio and trainers than would normally be the case. Because of this, you have to pay them." This respondent added that the team definitely needed a full-time physiotherapist. An internal director noted that "There will be greater competition for positions." The final comment on the subject was made by the CEO of another union, who believed the amount of support staff is likely to increase, as will the amount paid to them. He continued that "Accountabilities will increase and the support staff will be employed on a more professional basis...Fitness training, mental training and media training are going to become more important, physical trainers, medical staff, sport psychologists are all going to be more important."

11.4 RUGBY PLAYERS AS PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

The most commonly expressed opinion expressed by the researched group, regarding the players, was the perception that these elite athletes had extremely unrealistic understandings of the effects of professionalism upon their commitments to rugby. It was felt by most respondents that the players believed nothing was going to change for them, except that they would be openly paid large amounts of money. It was also believed that the players did not understand the increased commitments they have to the NZRFU as their employers, their provincial unions as their primary supervisors, and the game as a whole. This is primarily due to the lack of history of professionalism in elite New Zealand sport which would serve to raise realistic levels of understanding for players.

This problem was summarised by the comments of an external director, that "We've taken a bunch of amateurs, given them a lot of money, but they don't understand what being a professional is all about." Other respondents mirrored this comment, one explaining that "The players see a lot of money thrown at them, but perhaps don't understand the responsibilities that go with it, and the demands that go with it." The views of another external director continued this theme, "Players will have to make a major adjustment to the fact that they are now employed, and will have to do as they told, which I don't think is the case now." A provincial CEO supported these beliefs, and added that "players do not understand what they are up against."

Murray Deaker, who has dealt with players through his media role, expressed even greater concerns. "For $250,000 in this country, most

people have to work bloody hard. At the moment, very few players have any concept of what it is to be professional - they are money hungry prostitutes with their hand out," and he added that there was an immediate need to educate the them in the realities of being a professional athlete. Such concerns over players' attitudes toward professionalism were further exhibited in the comments of the CEO of a provincial rugby union. This interview respondent noted that "A lot of players think nothing is going to change except they get a lot of money in their pocket come the end of the season. We have to get players to adjust to the fact they are professionals, they are employed and as such they do as they are told."

Two managers within the case study organisation provided further qualitative data to this body of evidence indicating the players' lack of understanding of professionalism. One stated "There is a culture out there where players don't think anything is going to change except that they are going to get some huge pay checks, but their culture does have to change...their accountability has to increase...they have got away with quite a lot in terms of putting personal effort into it off the field." The second manager noted that "We have to educate them as professionals, because if we don't there will be some pretty big egos running around." He added that the issue was so important, the coaching and development department is educating the young players coming through the representative teams and development programs, so the present perceptions of elite players do not continue into future years. Such education could well draw upon discussion of professionalism and professional sport, as noted in the present study's literature review.

Many of the respondents expressed a belief that the players should retain employment or occupation outside their playing of the professional game of rugby. This belief reflects the reviewed literature in this area. As discussed in Chapter Three, the literature of Fogarty (2 July 1995), Johnstone (8 October 1995), and McDonald (1995), cite the respective comments of the CEO of the All Black Club, elite players Walter Little and Jeff Wilson, and the NZRFU Marketing Manager advocating elite players retaining employment. This was supported by former All Black captain, Mourie (3 September 1995), who stressed the importance of elite players being able to move back into the "real world" at the conclusion of their careers.

Four of the five interview respondents from the team management grouping stressed the importance of players retaining employment or training outside their playing career. This response rate is especially notable as this group was the closest to the players, interacting with them as a continuous aspect of their rugby management roles. One of these respondents stated that "I think it's unhealthy if players don't have other interests. I'd still like to see the players working, and having some kind of work ethic, because you can't actually train them all day." This respondent also recognised that players may not perceive the need to retain another, often lower paid, job. "With the minimum Super-12 payment being $50,000, some players will put all their eggs in one basket and

won't work at all," as they attempt to train and prepare for selection in the competition. The paradox which must be addressed by union administrators is that of reconciling the fulltime professional employee role, with its attendant obligations, and the need to have linkages of careers or training apart from rugby.

Others from the team management response group stressed the importance of a job or training to allow the players to become more complete individuals. A typical view was:

> There is a view of young players that they do not have to get a job, that the game will set them up for life, and that is tragic. There is still a need for every rugby player in this country to have a vocation for which they train, so the fringe players who don't quite make it still have a job to pursue...There is no question the union must be part of the education process of the player. Everyone in the union's control should be given training outside rugby. No-one is a Brisbane Bronco [an Australian professional rugby league team] unless they have a job, they have to have a job...Young players who see themselves becoming All Blacks at the age of seventeen - that's garbage. They need to see themselves as young New Zealanders who need to get training.

The evident feeling with which this response was made was shared by the other informants conveying the perceived importance of this issue. A viewpoint from the managerial level of the case study organisation expressed a clear concern of players neglecting the development of their wider interests:

> We have to ensure the players use the money wisely, so they establish financial security. The union has a definite role to play in educating the players in this area. We should be more autocratic in that we should bully the players into investing wisely, so they don't finish up broke. I don't think many of them are in positions to make sensible decisions about what to do with all this money, so they should be told. The development of the person is so vital, both educationally and vocationally, financially, leadership wise and responsibility wise, so you have the total package, and its a happy package. Young players may need their arms twisted by a strong person to ensure they go through that process. I would like to see the All Blacks selectors not pick people who are not on a sensible personal development programme, for the sake of themselves and the sake of the game. The captain, coach and manager should arrange for a financial investment expert to come in and talk to the players, and explain the different types of investment...maybe the guys have to submit reports on their financial situation every month as part of their contract. The team needs to see that the financial responsibility is part of the whole deal.

The clear emergent theme of such interviewee responses is the importance of the development of the individual, not just their playing ability as a

contractee. This belief was further supported by the comments of the national team management respondent, this one from outside the case study organisation.

> Young people given a contract have to be directed into a holistic way of life, because statistics tell you they are not all going to make it. We don't want someone burning their bridges and then finding they do not have a qualification for a time after rugby. There has to be a huge emphasis on education...We should follow the Japanese model for looking after workers, and give them security, which results in them performing. We are dealing with athletes who aren't necessarily good in all aspects of their life, but they are damned good at playing rugby and therefore they will be sensitive and naive in many other aspects of their life - they have to be nursed through it.

These beliefs were replicated to a lesser degree by interview responses from three of the union's directors. One spoke for the Board by stating "We have a view that players should also have a career, despite the fact they are being paid such large salaries and are employees of the union...they should at least be gaining some training or education." The second director observed that "Careers are important, and education is important. We should be trying to encourage young people to become educated and get jobs, and moving players around from province to province for the Super-12 teams doesn't achieve that... There is a whole education process that goes with that in terms of personal financial education." The third respondent from this group identified the importance of educating the athletes in the prudent use of their income, saying "we have to make sure the players are investing the money wisely, and though that's not the union's role to tell them what to do, we should be steering them in the right direction."

Employees of the case study union also exhibited the belief that jobs or education should be compulsory for athletes employed by the Auckland and New Zealand unions. One manager who commented on this area explained that "We're looking at upskilling our younger players, paying for their tertiary fees, or getting them job placements. I think it's very important for them to have jobs, even if it is just part-time. It gives them discipline, which carries on to the training and the game." Two staff members understood that response. One explained that "I was thinking what kind of job a full time rugby player could have and the only real solution was as a student or job training." The second noted that "A fulltime rugby employment and careers adviser would be an asset for the union in professional rugby. This person would be in charge of assisting in the placement of players in jobs, tertiary education etc."

Aside from the commitments to a form of employment or training, a number of respondents believe that players do not appreciate the increased commitment they will need to make to the media. The fullest explanation of these changes came from Murray Deaker.

> The attitude of players won't change at all, but media expectations will increase greatly and will become prickly initially because expectations are so high. Because some of the media will get frustrated, there will be some bad press around for a while. Contracts for the players should explicitly set out the relationship between the players and media, and what is expected of the athletes. They should be trained to speak...Some players have, to date, refused to talk to the media, and that can't be allowed to continue. In addition the unions are going to have to promote the captains more in the media. The reason why [in the subject union] rugby is struggling to get bums on seats is that they haven't used the players well enough to market the game, they haven't built the stories.

Deaker later explained that the media had, up to the present, taken a lenient approach to the publishing of stories which would have been to the detriment of the rugby game in New Zealand, saying "The stories that are not made public because they would kill the game are appalling, and it is because weak officialdom has allowed it."

This strong emphasis played on the importance of players commitment to the media was also raised by an external director during an interview for this research. He observed:

> The way they manage themselves is critical...they are our advertisement for the game, they must manage their behaviour on and off the field. The players have a responsibility to the union and to the New Zealand public which they've never had before. For the money they are going to make they have to make themselves available to the New Zealand public, the most important thing is the way they are seen by the public - if they're seen in a bad light it reflects in the support of the union, which is a reason proposed for the lack of support for the team in the early 1990s. That team was aloof, arrogant, untouchable to the public...the public saw them as a bunch of primadonnas and turned off them. It was probably quite an accurate perception... The players have got to help in developing the game.

The observation of increased media and public relations commitments by the elite provincial players was reinforced by a variety of other respondents. A respondent from the team management area observed that "Players have a very big commitment to raise the profile of the game, in order to get bums on seats, and I don't think the players understand that. They have an obligation to make sure the game is taken to the public, daily, in all sorts of areas - to clubs, to schools, to societies. They have to be trained to talk." This latter point was also advanced by the CEO of a first division union, "It's important they can speak to the public and media because these commitments will increase greatly in professionalism." In addition, a staff member of the case study organisation stated in a completed questionnaire that "Players will need to do a hell of a lot more off the field." These responses endorsed the explanation by the union's Marketing Manager that the players will increasingly be marketed as

individuals, with commensurate demands on their media, public relations, interpersonal and public speaking skills.

Despite this widespread agreement among respondents that the commitments of players would increase, the research revealed an apparent divergence of opinion regarding whose responsibility it was to rectify this misunderstanding by the players of their roles. One manager believed the prime responsibility for the education of the players as professional athletes lay with the union which they represented, "The union, both at provincial and national level, have responsibilities to educate the player." This emphasis on the provincial union was presented in a more qualified manner by a provincial CEO. who observed that "It's probably the job of the NZRFU through the provincial unions, but now it has been left to the Super-12 unions to do." This latter point, was evidenced in interview responses made by another union's CEO. This respondent, from a union hosting one of the regional Super-12 teams, explained that his organisation had identified this problem of players' perceptions of professionalism, and had taken immediate steps to rectify the problem when their status as a host union had been confirmed. He explained that "Our province is going to bring all the players together and educate them in conjunction with a players' committee. We've already had a formal Super-12 meeting to do this."

A number of respondents identified more specific sources of education of the players. The CEO was commonly identified by respondents as being the primary source of player education. This emphasis on the CEO was expressed by one first division union's CEO who noted that the education should be done by "CEOs in conjunction with the NZRFU, who have the training to do it." An internal director also identified the CEO as the source of the players' education, qualifying this by adding that "It's up to the CEO to direct whoever he chooses to do it properly." These views were supported by those of two external directors also. The first such respondent stressed the importance of CEO in this process of education, stating "It's the union's responsibility to educate them. As the union's head, the CEO has to make it clear to them what is expected in punctuality, training, diets and so on. The union has invested a lot of money in them." The second external director qualified this support of the CEO, noting that the "CEO is responsible, and he should use the expertise available on the board, and expertise of the manager."

The coach was also identified by respondents as being important in the education of players. One managerial respondent believed that "The coach should educate them, especially as they are now being paid in the Super-12," and added that this use of the coaches would continue down through the lower representative teams. This view toward the coach was replicated by an individual involved in the team management area, who said that "It should be the coach if he had the skills, but not all coaches will have the skills needed for this. If he doesn't, then one of the directors could be responsible for it." A second respondent from the team management area also placed the onus for the players' education, as professionals, on the

coach but for a slightly different reason "A lot of work has to be done in this area. The union should get someone in but the players may not respond to that and so the coach will probably do it."

Other respondents stated their belief that "It's probably the manager's role," and "The manager is the key." Such respondents indicated that the increased role of the team manager should encompass such duties. This recognition of the development of responsibilities of the team management, in educational roles, was also noted by an external Board director. A similar response came from an internal director, "The union should educate the players through its professional structure...The manager of the professional team has to ensure their behaviour is professional and that they act professionally."

Two respondents pinpointed a concern that the personnel available within the union may not have the requisite expertise to provide advice to players regarding their professionalism. One external director noted this in commenting that "Ideally a lot of it should come from the leadership of the team, on both a formal and informal basis. The team management have to give access to good advice. The coach and the manager probably shouldn't be doing it themselves, but they should make sure the players are getting the best advice on both personal and financial issues." The second respondent to identify this issue, a provincial CEO, believed "It is up to the CEO and team manager together to make sure the players get the right advice from professional people. It's no good telling the players how to handle the press if the CEO and manager can't do that or engage well in public speaking themselves."

Respondents also expressed beliefs that the players had much greater responsibilities to themselves in the professional age. One managerial respondent exhibited such a belief by stating that "Now the player has the responsibility to look after his own destiny too. These guys are very, very well paid athletes now, and they have to take responsibility for themselves...they will have assistance from the union, but they are basically responsible for themselves."

The reviewed literature revealed that players' unions, a characteristic of professional sport, were becoming more prevalent in rugby and player representation on rugby management structures was becoming more common. By the conclusion of the research period, players' unions had been introduced in Australia and Great Britain. The effects of these players unions and associations is evidenced in the literature of Dabscheck (1994), Friend (1991) and Wong (1991), while Brooke and Veysey (1995), in a more colloquial manner, noted the emergent effect of professionalism on this area of rugby in New Zealand. No specific research question was posed regarding the respondents' perceptions of the area of players' unions and representatives in professional New Zealand rugby. The question of players' representation did gain three significant responses, one each from a management respondent, a team management official and a CEO from another provincial rugby union.

A management figure from the subject union believed that players' official representation should come at the rugby subcommittee level of the Board of Directors, and in meetings between senior union management and the team management. He added that players' representatives "should have had more input than they have had," and "it should be more formalised than it has been in the past." This respondent explained his belief that the representative should act as a conduit of formal communication between the senior managers and the players, "with issues from players ideally coming up through that representative." He noted that the representative should not be on the Board.

The team management respondent believed that "Players have to have the opportunity to communicate with the Board, but that doesn't have to happen with set, formal meetings. If the occasion arises when a meeting is needed, then call it." He admitted the introduction of professionalism did increase the need for such a representation, explaining that "There will be the need for a players' committee in the professional teams, to work with the coach and the manager to develop some ground rules on how that professional side operates, for example to set fine system, because the players are more likely to accept it from their peers."

The CEO of the only provincial rugby union in New Zealand which had a players' representative on its Board was questioned by the researcher. That union's player representative represents the three senior representative teams (the A team, B team and under-21 or Colts teams). In an interview, the CEO explained the inclusion of this representative on the Board:

> Because the Board decides on player payments and player contracts and because the players are our top product - we believe they should have an input into how that product is run. Their representative can't be a current player or a team management person. The teams have set up a committee, with three players from the As, two from the B's, and one from the Colts, and they elect the representative to the Board, and the appointments committee have to ratify it.

The literature review confirmed the importance of contracts in the introduction of professionalism to the elite rugby game. The literature of Rowell (1995) and McColm (1995) noted a perceived lack of understanding, of the impact of contracts, by players and managers. The present research explored this key dimension of the change to professional rugby.

The most common area of comment to appear in this aspect of the research project was related to the system used to contract players. This was best explained by a manager within the case study organisation:

> Players are contracted to the NZRFU, and they are not even sub-contracted to the provincial unions to play Super-12 or NPC.

> Under the conditions of the contracts, the players can't do any work for sponsors other than the Super 12's sponsors as a Super-12 player. Players were contracted to the ARFU for 1995, but have not been contracted to us for 1996...Super-12 players are paid $15,000 by the NZRFU to play in the NPC but non-Super-12 players aren't, so they have to paid by the unions...Contracts will have to be sub-contracted to provincial unions because the player can at the moment refuse to do any promotional work for our union as they are contracted only to the NZRFU. We have attempted to rectify this, but the NZRFU is stalling in subcontracting them back.

Other respondents also stressed the complications caused by this system. The CEO of a provincial union offered a suggestion, believing "The provincial unions should have contracted the players and made them available to the national union. Now suddenly the players don't belong to us any more, and we don't know what is in their contract. We don't know what we can do with them and what we can't do with them." An external director reflected concerns over this loss of control, complaining that "The subject union doesn't have the control over the product it should have."

Two further interview respondents expressed concern that the contractual system attempted by the NZRFU was not apparent in any other successful professional sport. A manager within the union stated "I can't think of another sport where the national union contracts the players," and a team management respondent from outside the case study union declared "I don't think there is a pro competition in the world where the players are owned by the people running the competition. They are owned by teams involved in the competition. I don't know where we got this blueprint from, but it is an untried one." The reviewed literature in this present study reflects this statement, with no evidence being found of a notable professional sporting system which replicates the contractual system introduced by the NZRFU.

The concerns of two other respondents regarding contracts were expressed in the area of differing levels of payment. While this is a defining characteristic of professional sport, this differential was perceived by one external director as being a possible source of conflict within the team. The second respondent, an internal director of the subject union, believed "The only factor in our game which has been rewarded is the elite player...maximum salaries should be introduced."

The employment status of contractees was noted by two respondents. One, a team management individual, explained his belief that:

> Each team will have its own perception of what professionalism is, and the contracts should have a job description explicitly setting out such conditions. The players are now employees and servants of the union. We should put a lot more demands on players. Players shouldn't dictate anything, they should do exactly

> as they are bloody told. Before professionalism they asked what was the earliest time for players to get off work to train, now it won't be what suits the players but what is the optimal time to train as professional rugby players. Training could be done much better under a professional training regime, with much more control.

The second such respondent to recognise this contractual obligation was Murray Deaker, who noted that "Professional sport is about performing a role for the sport...you are owned by the sport when you sign the contract." These two respondents reflected a body of literature in this area, in which the works of Campbell (1995) and Wong (1991) are particularly applicable.

A third area of concern in this research focus was the issue of *win bonuses*. One interview respondent, a provincial union CEO, was the only respondent to identify this area of debate, by stating that "Losing is less acceptable in a professional age. The contracts should have win bonuses, because nearly all pro sports do." This latter assertion was supported by the literature. In this present study's review, the reports of Lampp (12 November 1995) and others are used to describe the levels of bonuses offered to European national teams. The use of bonuses is another defining feature of professional sporting contracts and constitutes a further area in which the current New Zealand rugby contractual system may differ from the standard type offered in professional team sport.

Respondents raised a final area of concern regarding the introduction of contracts to elite rugby, the use of player agents, because "Greasing the way of money almost everywhere are the agents" (*The Economist*, Special Issue. 25 July, 1992). The first respondent on this issue raised his concern about the use of agents while discussing the wider contractual issue. A manger within the case study organisation, he noted that "There are a lot of agents around now, offering the players assistance...Ideally I would like to see the national union make sure the agents involved are licensed for rugby because often they don't have the qualifications to do the job properly."

Two other respondents were more scathing in their comments of players' agents. Deaker agreed that "Unfortunately, I think they play quite a big role. There are a lot of them around, and 90 per cent are useless and users...I hope they don't play too significant a role in professional rugby." A respondent from the team management area also questioned the intent and ability of these agents, "They are there now, and they are a pain in the ass, quite frankly. I think most of them will be there to line their own pockets, and not act in the players' best interests. I wonder at the advice some of the younger players are getting from so-called agents."

11.5 PLAYER DEVELOPMENT AND MOVEMENT

Interview remarks by the team management respondent and others noted the importance of the younger elite players to the case study organisation. This importance was also noted in the reviewed literature of Dalton (1995). The value of these emerging elite players was highlighted by the comment by the CEO of another union, who noted that in the city in which his union is based, "A company is contracting school players and trying to sell them to clubs." The comments of a several respondents from within the Auckland union underlined this importance to the case study organisation, in which the success of the coaching and development scheme has produced large numbers of talented young players (see Chapter Ten of this present study).

A managerial respondent explained that with the inception of professionalism, the coaching and development department will probably spend more time on training the union's better players. This trend would occur "because they are being targeted by everywhere else, and so we'll make more effort on identifying, keeping and developing the core players, whereas in the past those players haven't usually had the incentive to move away." Two responses in staff questionnaires underlined these concerns about other unions targeting the subject union's developing talent. The first such response observed that "Although elite players deserve attention the union needs to look at players below that level and look after the future of the union (ie secondary schools, u-19, u-21, Colts etc)." The second response by a staff member offered similar beliefs:

> It is important with the advent of professionalism that the union does not neglect the grassroots of rugby in primary schools and secondary schools. These are the next generation coming through and we need to make sure that parents and their children can see the union assisting them at this end of the scale, not financially but in practical terms. With this in mind the coaching staff are vital to this area, as are club coaching co-ordinators.

Two external directors also recognised the importance of these developing players in the contractual discussion. The first acknowledged that "Auckland is under great pressure to protect its player base...we could stand to lose ten players every year from the colts and B team, so how far do you contract the players coming through?." The second respondent from the Board added his belief of a solution:

> One of our problems is how we retain our base, while every other union wants to take our base out. I think we should look at alliances with unions, whereby we lend players to them for a season who are fringe representative players...we contract them out, but retain control of them, and when they are ready they play for our union. They play in the NPC, probably in second division and that develops them as players and also helps the teams they play

> for to raise their standards, but the players stay in our control. These players should go to unions nearby, so they can continue their education development and training within [the subject union area].

This final point made by the external director alluded to the issue of player movement. As was seen in Chapter Three movement of provincial players between unions had increased markedly in the past decade as shamateurism offered material reward for some players to change their provinces and other players sought education, jobs and exposure by moving to larger unions. Despite allegations that the union was one of the 'worst' unions for offering material reward to players contemplating a move to this union, the importance of the voluntary movement to the case study union was highlighted by the CEO of another first division provincial union. "The only player they went out and recruited was James Kerr, the rest went to the union because they saw it as an opportunity. I think what has attracted them in the past is their professionalism, the management of their players. The team got successful: success got money, money got organisation, organisation got professionalism, and professionalism got more players in."

This process was successful in attracting players during the shamateur era of rugby (see Chapter Three), but most respondents feel the professional era will be characterised by a greatly increased amount of player movement between first division teams. One interviewee explained that "At present, the strength of New Zealand rugby lies in its parochialism. Regional rugby through the Super-12 has broken that. If we can't retain the parochialism, there is going to be an open market in the buying and selling of players." It is believed this increased movement will emphasis the adverse effects of professionalism upon the smaller unions. "The smaller unions will lose more and more players," observed one provincial union CEO, and this view was reinforced by the CEO of one of the smallest first division unions. This latter respondent explained his union's position and the manner in which player movement already exists, "We have had to always source some of our players from outside the area, because we don't have technical institutes and universities in our area, so any reasonably intelligent person will be going away from us for the period when they are 18-24 years old, anyway, so we have to source players...We traditionally have a couple of players who find out what we are short of and then, with the coach, we target the closer unions. We work with the unions in those areas in doing that."

Two respondents articulated the belief that the most important method of stopping this "pillaging" of the playing resources of smaller unions was to introduce a transfer system, in which the smaller unions received a payment when their players were contracted to other unions. The literature review revealed this system was also favoured by 83 per cent of clubs in Great Britain (Rugby World, October 1995, p.19). One respondent believed that the long term survival of his union in its current form "depends on transfer fees. However even then it will be hard because the transfer fees

may not cover replacements of a similar standard. Our union set up a Player Welfare Programme, which tried to help with employment and the easing of hardship. Players in our team have a real loyalty, but we can not rely on that in professionalism. Movement will be more controlled through transfer fees." The second respondent on this issue explained that "A transfer system is needed, but with transfer fees, player scouting is going to become more necessary...it's important to have networks around the country." While a transfer system was not introduced into New Zealand concurrent with the advent of professionalism, the NZRFU did impose a moratorium on players changing provinces for the 1996 NPC season.

11.6 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

The data gained revealed that the existing role of the team manager was widely recognised as being outdated and redundant. While the existing team manager did not see his role changing in a great deal, other team management personnel did perceive a need for change.

This change was believed to create additional team. This empowerment would remove much of the present responsibility from the CEO, who would then act as an overseer of the team manager's management of the team. As with other managerial positions already discussed, this empowerment was thought to demand enhanced competencies. These competencies were identified as being those akin to executive management - financial skills, human resource management and time management.

The type of person sought for this role has changed to meet this enhanced demand on their competencies. Criticism of the existing selection process was revealed by the research results, as it was believed that the existing process would not provide the type of individual desired to manage the team in the professional environment. The business and corporate management background of the new manager was stressed, ideally in a sporting environment. It was thought that if this type of person with the desired competencies was appointed, the autonomy of the team manager position could be increased.

The qualitative data gained showed that the coaching position was perceived by some respondents to be changing to become more holistic. However this belief was challenged by other data asserting that the core dimensions of the position would remain focused on winning rugby games, and thus the position will not change greatly. The use of support staff for the coach and team will become more extensive to meet increased playing and training demands. To meet these demands, it is thought more support staff will be used, and paid, on a part-time basis. This is intended to adequately meet the players' demands and limit expenditure in this area.

Recognition of the importance of the players in the new era of professional rugby was virtually universal in the responses of the interview subjects. The playing strength of the representative team was confirmed by these interviews as being one of the defining characteristics of the union, a point made by all respondent groupings. An equally strong perception was that the players did not understand the realities and implied employee responsibilities of being a professional athlete and, in particular, the increased commitments this role now brings.

Most respondents concurred that the players should retain a form of employment or vocational training. this view was particularly strongly emphasised by respondents from the team management grouping. It was felt these interests outside the rugby area would make the individual more well-rounded, which was thought to be more important for younger players. Commitments to the media would increase greatly for professional rugby players. This is symptomatic of an overall increase of demands in the areas of public relations, public speaking and interpersonal areas for players as primary promotional vehicles for the rugby game.

The question of whose responsibility it was to educate players about these increased commitments was a point of respondent disagreement. A number of respondents believed it was part of the CEO's changing role to organise the education of players in this regard, while others identified this role for the coach or manager. Two respondents recognised that the personnel within the union may not have the requisite competencies to educate the players, and they may need to source these competencies from sources such as members of the Board.

Players' unions and representatives are thought to have become more common in the changing rugby climate. While no data were gained on players' unions, respondents believed formal representation of players in the governance structures of New Zealand rugby will change, and has already done so in one provincial union.

The contractual form of elite rugby in New Zealand was seriously criticised by respondents. Players are contracted to the national body, and are presently not sub-contracted back to provincial unions. This situation was considered by respondents to be irrational, and not apparent in any other professional sporting competition. This contractual situation reduced the direct links between players and the union management. Other concerns were expressed over differing levels of payments in the contracts, the need for the inclusion of win bonuses and the growing use of agents in New Zealand rugby.

Elite young players are becoming a more valuable resource in professional rugby, which has increased efforts by the case study organisation to protect the depth of their developing players from other unions. Controlled player movement was advanced as a means of allowing the development of young Auckland players but in a wider spectrum this increased player

movement is believed to threaten the already diminishing depth of the smaller unions.

CHAPTER TWELVE

CLUB RUGBY

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter examines the place of club rugby in the professional game in a New Zealand provincial rugby union and discusses issues related to contemporary club rugby. As it became inevitable that rugby at the elite level was to become professional, concerns over how this would affect club rugby were immediately apparent. Club rugby is the level below provincial and may be described as the base of the rugby pyramid. This chapter examines the importance of that base and discusses the structure and administration of *amateur* rugby while the elite provincial level encompasses open professionalism. Interaction between the subject union and club management is discussed. The structures used to govern club rugby in the case study provincial union are analysed and problems associated with the senior club competition are considered. The chapter on concludes with an examination of the need to amalgamate a number of clubs and a discussion of increasing centralised management by the union of facets of club rugby.

12.1 Introduction
12.2 Retention of Amateurism in Club Rugby
12.3 Representative and Club Rugby
12.4 Club-Union Communication
12.4.1 Clubs and the Board
12.5 Club Chairmen
12.6 The Council of Club Delegates
12.6.1 Junior Management and Boys Management Boards
12.6.2 Perceptions of club delegates
12.7 Marketing Club Rugby
12.8 The Club Competition
12.9 Amalgamation of Clubs
12.9.1 Centralised management of club rugby
12.10 Summary and Review

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Club rugby has traditionally been the basal level of New Zealand's national game, as noted in Chapter Two of this present study. The literature review drew out a range of perspectives which underscored player support for club identity and strength in the changing rugby climate. The onset of provincial union changes and the moves of rugby to become a professional game have placed club rugby under threat,

according to some critics. It was considered important to examine the place of clubs in the changing climate of New Zealand rugby.

A poll of clubs throughout Britain in October, 1995, found that 73% of British clubs believed they would be in a better position in five years' time "as a result of these far-reaching changes to the sport" ("What the clubs say, 1995, p.19). Such optimism was not reflected in clubs in the current research study. Through the bulk of the interview and questionnaire responses a body of knowledge was built up which encompassed widespread and deep-rooted concerns over the fate of club rugby in the case study rugby union. One CEO from a province outside that of the case study stated "It will take ten years for clubs to strengthen in professionalism". This statement provided the only categorical interview response in the present research which foresaw a strengthening of club rugby as the elite playing level embraces professionalism. This guarded optimism was countered by the wide of responses encapsulated by a staff questionnaire comment which observed that "Club football is taking a backseat to other advances in the game". The literature review in this present study noted strong concerns expressed by a range of All Black players about rugby management and the future of clubs.

As identified by one manager, "Our primary focus historically was to oversee club rugby". The term *union* primarily refers to the organisation as being an amalgam of clubs in the area. The importance of club rugby to the union was stressed in almost every interview response and the only response group which did not stress this were managers of departments in the union not directly related to club rugby. This focus of concern arose because of a widely perceived and indelible bond between clubs and the union. One team management respondent stated that clubs "will be more important than ever, because without club rugby the heart of rugby will die". Directors expressed views that, "The union is not rep rugby and club rugby, the union is rugby" "Clubs are absolutely vital - no clubs, no game". The CEO of a rival first division union reinforced such sentiments by believing that "We ignore club rugby at our own peril".

Another important discussion of club rugby, commonly articulated in the research data was the mechanism it provided for players to progress toward the professional elite level. Such comments as "Club rugby is of major importance because players hoping to reach the benefits and riches of being an All Black have to progress through club rugby", by a team management respondent illustrate this. One director saw clubs as "Very important, crucial for bringing through the players to senior rugby...very important in developing the talent which will become the rep players and the All Blacks. These views are also supported by those of a manager who said that "Clearly they are critical in terms of the nursery for players to move from the highest level". This individual also made the important point, not noted by any other informant, that the clubs are important in providing a place for players who have failed at the highest level, so they are both for players on their way up to the elite level, and those on their way from that peak.

CEOs interviewed from a range of first division unions stress the importance of club rugby. One stated that "They are the nursery of pro rugby, if you don't have clubs you don't have anybody". A second CEO explained in an interview that "It's disappointing to me that some people think you have one without the other. You can't, because if you haven't got a strong club rugby base, you haven't got anything". This recognition of the strong base club rugby provides was expressed by an individual formerly involved in the governance of the subject union. This respondent expressed his hope that the increased marketing and promotion of elite rugby will result in more people playing the game, and the only place they can play if they are not at school is at the clubs, so their role is vital in providing opportunities, coaches, fields and facilities.

12.2 RETENTION OF AMATEURISM IN CLUB RUGBY

When the IRB revised the amateur regulations in Paris in September 1995 to allow professionalism to officially envelope rugby, it was agreed that professionalism would be regulated by the national unions of the member nations. On 9 September, 1995, the NZRFU made an announcement that it had no intention of restricting professionalism at club level. At the time it was commented that "The open policy is expected to spark a bidding war between clubs and create a situation where the rich thrive and poor" ("Pro fears for clubs", 1995) and the NZRFU chairman, Richie Guy, admitted a concern that "the smaller clubs in smaller areas may suffer" (ibid). Despite the allowance of free market ethics to dictate payments at club level, amateurism is thought by research respondents to continue as the dominating ethos at club level. The New South Wales RFU surveyed its clubs, and 12 of the 13 responding said club players should not be paid (Campbell, 1995, p.65). This belief was mirrored in the present research.

Even as the introduction of professionalism into rugby union was being debated, concerns were being expressed over how this would effect club rugby. In the research period, the chairman of the NZRFU amateurism subcommittee, expressed the belief that rugby would retain its amateur base "Simply because of the supply and demand situation, there won't be enough money to take it right down to the grass roots". This lack of financial resources was the major argument raised regarding the retention of amateurism at club level, being reflected in a manager's statement that "Clubs should remain amateur because there is no way they can afford to go pro". An external director of the union supported this view, saying "I don't think there should be any professional influence in clubs at all as they are not strong financially", and "The clubs should at least agree in principle to that". A second director believed this would be the case, where underneath the representative team, all others will be amateur, similar to systems followed in British soccer and cricket.

However the fragility of such an amateur system again reflects the weaknesses and ambiguities of the pure amateur ethos as discussed in the literature review earlier in this present study. One director believes that "Maybe it's a head in the sand attitude saying they should remain amateur". This is supported by the observation of another director that "it only takes one player to be paid, and the whole payment area is opened up". One manager also agrees that the clubs cannot afford to pay players, and further explains the reality of the situation. This manager explains "they could pay tuition fees, so nothing changes. We can't stop payments. You can legislate for it, but law is only as good as the ability to police it". Because the law to police payments is not apparent at the moment, this informant believes that clubs will still offer material rewards, and the market will be left to regulate such payments at club level, but these would center around jobs, accommodation and education. This view was also expressed by the CEO of a smaller union, who accepted that payments would continue at club level. This realistic view was reiterated by a Board director, who thought the material rewards should be towards the education of the players, not just straight monetary payments.

12.3 REPRESENTATIVE AND CLUB RUGBY

With the elite level becoming professional, and the club level remaining primarily amateur, there are widespread fears that the gap between club and representative rugby will grow even wider than exists in the present situation. This concern was expressed in a forthright manner by former All Black coach Alex Wyllie, who stated that:

> I don't believe they've looked at the bottom end as to where the clubs and smaller unions fit into the structure. Top players are now unable to play for their clubs because of the expanded international provincial programme, so how can the top players impart their knowledge to club players? Club rugby is the foundation of our rugby and I don't think the administrators have thought the money distribution through properly. They've rushed into large lump payments for an elitist group ("Bitterness ahead", 1995)

A senior All Black, Michael Jones, also commented on this issue: "In New Zealand it's a big concern, how this will affect club rugby. There's talk about how all the money will filter down to the clubs, which I hope will happen so that the young club player is given just as much incentive to play and develop his rugby" ("Jones would like to see", 1995).

Another senior All Black, Mike Brewer, stated that "It's a time of great change in the game with what amounts to professional rugby a reality in all the major rugby nations. I have no problem with that, but my one area of concern is that the links between professional rugby, and the amateur structure are very carefully monitored" (Brewer, 12 July 1995). One interview respondent further enforced the above sentiments by stating that "I'm concerned that all the efforts of the union will go to looking

after the elite group, that they will not gave sufficient time, money and resources to the club scene, and if it doesn't, the Board should be bloody shot, because it is club rugby which sustains the group at the top".

This relationship between elite and club rugby caused a number of differing responses from interview respondents. One first-division union's CEO believes that "Clubs and unions traditionally look on each other as competitors, but they are not...The sooner they start working together in promotion, business and management, the more successful they will be". He recognises the fact that:

> By definition, a union is a union of clubs...Historically, the administration totally served the clubs, with rep teams only being the culmination of club rugby. Now the rep team gives the commercial revenue to operate in a business sense, and if we don't put our emphasis there we will die. The focus of unions to clubs will not go away, because you still have to organise them. The focus of unions will change, but there still has to be rugby at schools, colleges, clubs and so on.

This statement was mirrored in the responses of other contributors to the research.

The clubs will get nothing from the national injection of revenue from the News Ltd deal because the demands of the players meant the entire sum, (and some informants suggest additional money also), was used to meet their salaries. Thus there was nothing left, after the players' demands, to be used for the development of the game at club or other lower levels. This concern raised by an individual involved in team management who expressed regret over this occurrence. "Sadly because of the demands of the players, the money from the News Ltd deal will not be able to trickle down to clubs, and at the end of the day we would all liked to have seen a more even distribution of the pot".

Clubs have traditionally relied on their representative provincial team to raise the profile of the rugby game in the province, and as one CEO observes, "We get the PR from the rep team, it makes kids go to clubs because it gives them heroes". Now this reliance has gone one stage further to become more financially oriented. This is reflected in the comments of a manager that "The amount of money we can put back into clubs relies solely on gate takings and how much sponsorship we can attract, it's got nothing to do with the new professional era, because 100% of that money has gone to the players". Because all of the revenue from the News Ltd deal has been committed to player salaries, the funding of clubs is directly reliant on the revenue generation of their union's representative team. The new CEO expresses such a belief bay saying that "Clubs have to realise that if we can increase the numbers coming the gates, I can give them more money". This reality was also raised by a CEO, from outside the subject union, who stated that "Clubs have to realise that it is solely because of the representative team that we can pass on money to them, through sponsorship and gate receipts. Every other

team is a cost, the only earning capacity you have got is through the provincial team".

A further concern, evident in responses, is that professional representative rugby players may not play for their clubs at all. The availability of representative players for their clubs has decreased inexorably in recent years, to the extent that they now rarely play as many as five or six club games a year. An interviewee involved in team management expressed concern over this trend, articulating the need to give clubs an opportunity in the season's programme so all players other than the elite All Blacks can play club rugby. He explained that:

> If the provincial professionals, not the All Blacks, do not play club rugby, there will be a massive loss of the expertise which is very important to maintain standards. They set the standard for the next generation of representative team players by bringing down tactics, styles and training methods. That has been what has sustained the game over the years, and it is getting harder to do with the time commitments of the players to representative football. We need a time gap between the IPC and PC to allow this to continue.

Concerns about this trend were also raised by a director. This respondent observed that "Stars don't get to play in club rugby now, so you're not getting the experienced guys passing on their knowledge and experience to the younger guys. They've almost become totally different entities, there's not much interaction between the two". An interview respondent expressed concern about another aspect of this developing gap, that the trend "places more pressure on club coaches, because they won't have the expertise of rep players to help anymore".

Other interview respondents believe that elite players are at fault for not bridging the gap and making more effort to help the clubs that assisted them in their rise to the top. Rugby media critic, Murray Deaker, believes the players should be giving more back to the clubs, in terms of souvenirs to be raffled, free coaching and other benefits. One director insisted his view be included in the presented research. He believes every player who goes on to professional rugby should pay a fee back into the club, which he knows is going directly back into the club, in order to assist in the development on young players. This director feels the players should pay a figure of around one per cent of the salary to their rugby club, "which would be a great help".

One manager raised the issue of clubs now wanting transfer fees from the union for the players they use in the representative team. Clubs feel this would help to ease the financial pressures upon them. The manager explains that "Some clubs are agitating to contract club players, then lease them out to provincial sides and national sides. They forget that it was the union who paid the coaching co-ordinators, rep teams and schools who developed the players. They want the trickle down effect for the News Ltd money, but the trickle down won't come directly through the IPC

money". This was also recognised by a director who observed "a strong feeling around that the union should pay the club for each player they take away, because it is a huge cost to the club".

This view is rejected by two managers. The first reiterates the view that it was the union who paid most of the costs toward developing the player in the first place, while the second believes the clubs would be better served to accept reality and forget about the rep players who have already established themselves in the elite ranks of the game. This manager states that the clubs "should pat themselves on the back for producing the players, but accept they are gone, and look to replace them".

This lack of available funding for club rugby also means there is a lack of available monetary resources to pay or reimburse the predominantly voluntary administrators at club level. As one manager recognises "administrators, especially amateur ones, have to accept they are not going to get much money out of the game...the whole fabric of the game could be in danger if voluntary administrators are not prepared to continue". CEOs from a range of New Zealand first division unions had similar beliefs to those expressed by the latter manager. One believed that clubs now have to be aware their elite players will probably never play for their clubs, because "you can get hurt in club rugby just as much as in professional rugby, and now with so much income at stake, players will be loathe to come back and play in a non-meaningful game".

Another CEO was more succinct: "Professionalism is not going to change how much players play for clubs, because they are not playing there already". This reality, according to a third CEO, had already been accepted by clubs in his province. "The availability of players of representative calibre to clubs is going to disappear. That was a concern of clubs, but I don't believe it is a concern nowadays, because there is now an acceptance of the fact that they are not going to have their representative players. If they play at all, it will not be for a long period".

The comments of these three CEOs perhaps reflect the fact they come from the larger established and well-populated provincial unions. However the bulk of provinces do not fit that profile nor do they exemplify the relationship, noted here, between the representative team and club rugby in the Auckland union. The situation in the smaller provinces is explained by the CEO of one of the smallest unions in the first division. This CEO observes the representative - club axis is shifting, because all unions have to emphasise their representative teams as well as generate the income needed for all levels of rugby in the provinces. He explains that "The big provincial unions probably do not care about club rugby, but we exist on clubs. We can not exist without them. Our emphasis has to remain on club rugby. We need strong clubs to have a strong rep team, whereas [the subject union] doesn't, because they can effectively be professionals and not play for their clubs". This explanation fits the majority of provincial rugby unions throughout New Zealand, whereas the particular representative

clubs relationship problem noted here in the context of the subject union is relevant to the seven largest unions in the country.

12.4 CLUB-UNION COMMUNICATION

Communication has been noted in this research study as a concern within the researched rugby organisation's management structure and operations. The wider issue of communication between the union and club management is a further critical division of rugby in the changing times. The subject union was formed in 1883, and soon showed its role in effective interaction with clubs by successfully adjudicating in several disputes arising from club matches. Communication was, arguably, provided for in the 'old' Management Committee structure as all clubs were directly involved in union management. Today, as one staff questionnaire response stated, "The union still consists of 21 clubs so they should still have a representation. It is important that players and administrators at the 'grass roots' level have a say, and are able to express their views". Communication channels have been structurally weakened in recent times and now face a major challenge with the introduction of professionalism. "Will it be possible for unions to introduce, as a number are doing, relatively high powered business oriented Boards of directors without marginalising and alienating the traditional rugby administrator who has served the game very well for many years?" (Problems with professionalism, 1995, p.1).

One manager believes that the communication between the CEO and clubs should come through the chairman of the Council of Delegates or, on occasion, the delegates themselves, but never through Junior Management Board ("JMB") or Boys' Management Board ("BMB") delegates. Another manager believes the Rugby Manager (see Figure 7.4) has an important role to play in the communication process but suggests that role is basically one of action and implementation. The Rugby Manager basically communicates with the clubs through the Council of Delegates but sees that changing. He explains that "I want to get into the grassroots. I'd like to get out there to the coaches and the players. I see that as an important role, not just seeing the one person, so I can talk to a range of people".

A union manager states that "I really have to have a relationship with those guys, they have to understand where I am coming from. They are my employers. At the end of the day, they are the body which are the stakeholders in our rugby union. I have to have a good relationship because we need changes, and I am only going to be able to sell changes if they are confident in me, and understand I have their interests at heart". An alternative view was voiced by a staff member who noted that "Perhaps top management should be kept quite separate from all the committee people who volunteer their services through the rugby season. These people still want the involvement of top management in their decisions"

One of the staff recognises that there is "an element of mistrust between some clubs and the union, which can be related to communication problems in the past". This is backed by the observation from a director that "There hasn't been a clear understanding about what each other is about". The CEO's Personal Assistant is the only member of administrative and management staff who attends the Council of Delegate meetings, and this presence is solely that of minute-taker. The one staff member to comment specifically upon this element of operations believed such lack of formal contact was good, "because we should be kept away from the politics of the committees".

Opinion was voiced that the recently introduced 'Best and Fairest' award night has partially broken the communication gap, as people from the union and clubs are actually meeting each other. He believes any existing communication problems "can be totally tied back to the job the delegates are doing". He gives the example of the union in 1995 organising the club season for the following year earlier than ever before, and cites this as being an example of the emphasis the union is now placing on a proactive relationship with the clubs. This belief is backed by the questionnaire response of another staff member, who explained one strength of the case study union as being "Dedication. The recent efforts in meeting clubs' demands cannot be faulted".

Judging by the results of the club questionnaire, the efforts seem to be paying off for the union. The club questionnaire (Question D2) asked clubs to indicate their satisfaction with the treatment of clubs by the union management. (See Appendix D).

Completely Dissatisfied	0
Partially Dissatisfied	5
Neutral	3
Partially Satisfied	7
Completely Satisfied	2

Figure 12.1. Club satisfaction with treatment by the union.

The median response was 'partially satisfied', while 53 per cent of responses were in the two positive response options, compared with only 29 per cent in the negative response area. No respondents indicated they were "Completely dissatisfied", while two indicated their complete satisfaction. "Always helpful" was the most positive of comments. The negative comments given in reply to the question centred around a lack or recognition or understanding for club rugby such as "Club football is taking a backseat to other advances in the game"; "At times requests were not given the action they deserve"; "Lack of recognition of the long hours contributed by unpaid volunteers"; "Clubs don't rate highly enough in

priority", and "Lack of interest in clubs' day-to-day operation". (A full list of results to this question can be found in the D2 question of Appendix D.)

When considerations of union-club communication were raised in interviews of first-division CEOs outside the case study organisation it was clear a variety of situations exist between provincial unions and their clubs but most appear to be relatively satisfactory in the opinion of the CEOs. In one large union, the CEO describes his union's communication with member clubs as being "Not good, but improving". He outlined how the clubs complained to the union about the communication so the union assembled a separate rugby subcommittee from the management committee. It was planned that the union would put two representatives on this subcommittee, and the clubs would provide five. The clubs initially failed to find volunteers to fill the places but once this was done internal conflict caused a lack of effective decisions to be made. The CEO of that union believes communication is improving because the union management is placing more emphasis on it. (The staff and club delegates of that union were not surveyed to confirm this perspective).

A second CEO states that club rugby is relatively strong in his union, "because we actively promote club rugby, we're strong on it." He explains that "Whereas some see it as a necessary evil, we see it as vitally important. If you want to have the top product, and that is what you stand or fall on, you have to have the strong base underneath". The CEO of a third first division union also reports a positive relationship, "because of good communication and consultation. They understand the processes and why we are doing things". The fourth CEO to comment on this area also believed his union has "Pretty good communication with the clubs". However he recognises this is partly due to the small size of the union, (twelve clubs in a small geographic area), a feature which the subject union does not have.

One small first-division union also employs a Rugby Operations Officer, from March to October, to manage club rugby. In addition the union has assisted clubs to introduce internal structures which parallel those of the union's management structure. Consequently, club personnel, although predominantly volunteers, have equivalent role persons in the union who provide assistance, guidance and meetings with relevant and specific personnel. The positions in the clubs presently do not have the same role titles as those of the union but attempts are being made for the clubs to replicate the names of union positions. This system has been deemed a great success by the union, and its greatest benefit appears to be in aiding union-club communication processes. A replication of this model would be useful in the subject union where, as one external director noted, "there are 21 clubs, all with a structure of their own, all administered differently".

The introduction of the rugby manager position is intended, in part, to greatly assist communication between clubs and the union. It will take the

pressure off the CEO to deal with this as a formal responsibility on a daily basis. The rugby manager will be empowered to act, on most instances, without the authorisation of the CEO, and will have a much clearer focus on the needs of clubs than was the case in the old management structure of the union. This communication will be important in easing the fears of clubs as they feel the effects of a growing gap between themselves and the elite level of the game.

12.4.1 Clubs and the Board

An important discussion of communication between the union and the clubs is that of communication between the Board and the clubs. One internal director believes the most important need of the board is to gain the confidence of rugby people. He believes there is still an element of mistrust from this population, though the Board has "gone out of its way of late to try and put those troubles to rest". As an example of this effort by the Board he cited a meeting between the club chairmen and senior delegates in September, 1995 "in which we spoke about the particular responsibilities at Board level. It was a very good meeting and most were a lot happier about it". This meeting was also cited positively by another interview respondent. He further explained how on this occasion the Board had attended a Council of Delegates meeting and "made a presentation, and gave their analysis of the situation as it was and what their proposals were for the future". He expressed the belief that the delegates were "really impressed" with the quality of individuals on the Board and what they were doing. This is another example, as with the earlier cited 'Best and Fairest' awards night, in which the management of the union have met the managers of the clubs, and such meetings have been instrumental in dispelling mistrust and scepticism.

The Board has attempted to remain apart from the operational decisions of club rugby, primarily due to their belief that this is more appropriately placed under the jurisdiction of the Council of Delegates. This view of the differing realms of control of the Board and club has also been expressed by the CEO of another major union. This CEO explains that his "Board has three main areas of control - finance and administration; sponsorship and marketing; and the rep team. Underneath that, you have a rugby committee looking after club rugby, school rugby and the judicial area. The two will not have a lot in common, but the overlap comes with the budget approval of the committee's budgets by the board".

Concerns over the subject Board becoming involved in the operation of club rugby have been expressed from another viewpoint. Discussing this, a provincial CEO believed "The idea of the Board is right, but whether the high-powered personnel can relate back down to clubs, who are the grass rots of rugby". The relationship is further defined by one of the management staff. He explains that the Council of Delegates "still hold a considerable amount of power. They can get rid of the board...The Board has all the operational power, but the clubs still have the ultimate powers"

in terms of changing the structures. The union's rugby clubs retain the constitutional power to change the governance structure at the union's annual general meeting. This relationship is noted by the CEO of another major union. He says "We consider club people our stakeholders, just like shareholders in a company. Ultimately they have the final say. Within the constitution they can call a special general meeting and sack us, so we are accountable to them".

An interviewee involved in the governance of the union believes that "The Board would be keen to give help and direction to any club, but can really only give direction". He explains how the Board offered to help with the club competition during the research period but while that was well received the offer was not followed through by the club administrators. The same informant expressed hope that the two bodies, the Board and the Council of Delegates, would work together "in harmony" more in the future. The relationship between the two bodies was also voluntarily commented upon by two club chairmen in questionnaire responses. One chairman recognised that most of the Council "has been taken over by the Board" and another stated his belief that "the Board has overall control".

Only one external director of the Board believed the Board should have some form of input into club rugby and believes that, at the moment, this is the case. While he stated that the clubs are willing to listen to the Board, "We have to be aware we can't do everything, we can't control club rugby, and don't want to get involved in running the clubs. It's important they do take responsibility for themselves in terms of their competition, but there needs to be a bit more liaison". His views are at variance with those of a club chairman who stated that "We need more directing from the Board".

The views of the latter individual were enforced by a staff member involved in the club area who believed that the Board should have more say in important decisions made concerning club rugby. Further support is noted in a club chairman's questionnaire which stated "We need more direction from the Board". In discussing this issue, the staff member cited the example of the controversial club competition in which "If the Board had met to approve the club competition, they would not have allowed it". This respondent believes the Board should have had more say in the final decision on this matter because the adopted structure was seen as detrimental to club rugby. While he acknowledges that the clubs do have to have certain powers, and should not be dictated to, he argues that the Board is in place to promote rugby and should have involvement in such a final decision.

The relationship between the Board and its clubs was noted by one interviewee as having parallels in the first operational year of the major professional New Zealand rugby league club, the Auckland Warriors. Describing concerns that developed about the orientation of the board in that sporting organisation, Logan (29 October 1995) explains that "Unlike

a privately owned franchise like the Brisbane Broncos, [a board member] says the Warriors should be more committed to non profit areas such as developing the game at grass roots level through the clubs. After all, the clubs own 51 per cent of the Warriors". The board member felt the league clubs "believe there is not enough consultation. And we on the Warriors board must take responsibility" (ibid). The Senior Officers' Spokesman of the league clubs, stated that the chairman "has just not made the contact with the clubs whereas he is supposed to be our representative" (Rattue, 11 November 1995). When the board elections occurred shortly after this debate, that chairman did not get one of the nineteen club votes (Sanders, 19 November 1995). While not suggesting a similar rift will occur when the subject rugby union Board is due for election, this example portrays the power that clubs retain and shows the need for the Board to consider their relation with clubs in a positive and proactive manner.

12.5 CLUB CHAIRMEN

Club chairmen were surveyed by questionnaire, as described in Chapter Five of the present study (See Appendix C). As shown by Figure 14.2, the ages of all responding club chairmen fall into the age group of 40-69 years. Within this 30 year spread, six (35 per cent) were in their forties, eight (47 per cent) were in their fifties, and three (18 per cent) were in their sixties. As there are no comparable figures with which to compare these data, there are no trends evident. However it is clear these chairmen are older than the staff of the union but broadly comparable in age to those of the Board directors.

Under 30	0
30 - 39	0
40 - 49	6
50 - 59	8
60 - 69	3
70 and Over	0

Figure 12.2. Ages of the union's rugby club chairmen

All club chairmen were male, strongly evidencing the perception that the club or amateur management of rugby remains strongly male dominated. The entire Board is also male in the case study union, as are the CEO and the four managers. Of the seventeen respondent club chairmen, fifteen (88 per cent) were either married or with a partner, while two (12 per cent) identified themselves as being single. In terms of dependants under 18 years of age, twelve (71 per cent) of the seventeen had no dependants in this group, while two (12 per cent) had one dependant, and three (18

per cent) had two dependants. These figures indicate the personal family commitments the club chairmen presumably have outside their occupations and duties in club administration. A profile of those involved in chairing rugby clubs in the subject union region would indicate they are typically aged between forty and sixty-nine, male, married or with a partner, and have no dependants under the age of eighteen.

In order to build an understanding of the selection and appointment processes which operate in contemporary club rugby, each chairman was asked to outline the process by which they attained their current position. The most detailed response explained that "Ten Board of Management (BoM) members are elected, of whom five are elected at the AGM, (two of these being for two year terms), and five are elected by club committees. After each set of annual elections, the BoM elects its own chairman". Most responses indicated a similar process in which a committee is elected at the club's Annual General Meeting, and that committee elects its chairman. Six other responses identified such a process, while four stated only that they were elected at the AGM. Three responses indicated that members vote at the AGM, while one stated he was appointed 'By nomination'. One other chairman stated simply 'Election', while the final respondent explained that "Prior to the AGM suitable prospects are approached re availability. Almost annually the sole nominee is pre-arranged. Occasionally more than one person is nominated, with selection by vote".

The Club Chairman questionnaire (Question C5) sought information from respondents on whether they drew upon any skills, knowledge or qualifications from their occupations or areas of training. Of the fourteen respondents, only one indicated he did not and this respondent was unemployed. The full list of responses to this question can be found in Appendix C, and the results are summarised in Figure 12.3 below. The two most important areas that the chairmen draw upon are the areas of people skills, or Human Resource Management, and general management skills and experience. It is believed by two respondents that the importance of the people skills arises from the democratised system of club administration, in which committees are appointed for most functions of club operations. The management skills would seem necessary to maximise the usage of scarce resources. The third most common response category was financial management, which highlights the pressures on available financial resources that club administrators are subjected to.

The questionnaire for rugby club chairmen contained one question eliciting their perception of three major skills required for their administrative positions. The researcher had anticipated that strong commonalities could emerge from responses to such a question, and these data could then be

SKILL / KNOWLEDGE	NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Dealing with people / HRM	8
Management skills / experience	8
Financial Management	5
Public Relations / Marketing	3
Planning	1
Chairmanship	1
Fundraising	1
Property Management	1
Computer skills	1
Clubroom maintenance	1
Legal	1
Interview / Selection	1

Figure 12.3. The skills and knowledge of club chairmen.
(n=17 but more than one skill may be noted by an individual)

used by the Rugby Manager to construct education programmes to strengthen these requisite skills in club leaders. As can be judged from the responses, presented as Figure 12.4, such commonalities were not readily apparent. While there were no clear trends in the response rate, the seventeen chairmen who responded often cited financial skills, man management and communication. (Each row represents one chairperson's nominated skills).

The chairmen were asked (Question C7) if there were any specific skills which they wished to acquire to further facilitate their club administrative roles. The results are presented as Figure 12.5. Although seventeen (of 21) returned questionnaires only eight of these addressed the question, which was disappointing as this was seen as a valuable opportunity for chairmen to express areas of perceived needs in administrative roles, which could then be addressed and strengthened. The areas that did emerge from this limited response rate were marketing, which figured strongly, and skills of finance and chairing meetings, to a lesser extent.

1	2	3
Communication skills	Basic accounting and business practice	
Organisational	Financial planning	Facilitating
Open Mindedness	Financial	Enthusiasm
People	Management	Financial
Business Skills	Man Management	Planning
Control	Delegation	Being Positive
Ability to chair a meeting	Communication skills	Co-ordinate committee activities
Communicative	Able to handle disappointments	Firm
Financial	People	Administration
Financial and business skills	Leadership	Correct plans to develop playing strength
Dedication	Delegation	Jack of all trades
Communicating with people	Earn respect	Balancing finances
Man management	Organizer	Financial skills
Listen, learn to be positive	Communication	Patience
Judgment	Direction	Man-Management
Man management		
Leadership - direction	Organisation	Encouragement

Figure 12.4. Major skills required by club chairmen (N=17)
(Each row represents one chairman's response)

CHAIRMEN'S DESIRED SKILL GROUPS N=8		
Promotion skills	Finance	Computer knowledge
Patience		
Running meetings	Time management	Finance raising
Marketing	Knowledge of professionalism at club level in other codes	
Increase success	Increase playing numbers	
Marketing	Sponsorship marketing	
Meeting protocol		
Chairman course		

Figure 12.5. Skills which club chairmen wish to acquire
(Each row represents one chairman's set of responses)

Following these two questions the chairmen were asked whether they had attended a seminar, workshop or training session which was directly related to their current rugby administrative position. All seventeen returned

questionnaires addressed this question, with only three (18 per cent) of the chairmen having attended such courses.

Those who had not attended such a course were asked if any had been made available to them, and who had needed such courses. Eight said courses had not been available to them, while seven indicated that they had courses made available. Of the latter seven, five stated that the union had made such courses available, while the other two chairmen cited the Hillary Commission and a regional sports trust. Four responses were very positive about the relevance to their administrative positions of the courses attended.

These questions led towards eliciting chairmen's perspectives on attending courses if the union made them available. Sixteen respondents (to question C10) commented upon their interest in attending such courses. The responses are presented as Figure 12.6. As can be seen by this table, interest was mixed, with responses apparent in each category. Eight of the sixteen (50 per cent) indicated they were interested to varying degrees, while four (25 per cent) indicated degrees of disinterest. Only three chairmen (18.75 per cent) stated they were definitely interested. This was a disappointing result, accentuated by the belief of the Rugby Manager that the chairmen's responses would probably be more positive to such a questionnaire enquiry other than in the actual situation of facing a decision. on actual course involvement.

Definitely Uninterested	1
Probably Uninterested	3
Uncertain	4
Probably Interested	5
Definitely Interested	3

Figure 12.6. Interest of club chairmen in course attendance

12.6 THE COUNCIL OF CLUB DELEGATES

In the organisational restructuring, the Management Committee was renamed the Council of Delegates and retained control of matters pertaining to club rugby. This Council is made up of twenty-seven people, with the twenty-one rugby clubs each represented, along with representatives of the Junior Management Board (JMB), Boys' Management Board (BMB), primary schools, secondary schools, and referees. As the Council, in effect, replicates the Management Committee, the same criticisms are made of its structure as were made of the old Management Committee.

The perception of an unwieldy body is reinforced by an individual who serves on this Council, admitting "The structure of the Council of

Delegates is the major weakness of the union". An internal director supports this statement by adding that "The board believes that 21 clubs running the competition is non-productive". This criticism of the structure is also expressed by staff. One staff member stated that a number of the Council's individuals, delegates from secondary schools, primary schools, referees, JMB and BMB are voting on a club competition that does not involve them. This staff member describes the situation as being "totally ludicrous", and adds that "It's to the detriment of club rugby certainly". Other staff members recognise this problem also. In order to improve the operational management of the Union, one staff member stated "Change the voting structure of the Council of Delegates", while another responded with "Still need to look at the Council of Delegates structure. It seems to be too cumbersome".

In place of the Council of Delegates, one manager tentatively advocates the introduction of a Council of Chairmen. He states that "The chairmen of the clubs are the movers and shakers in terms of steering the clubs...Maybe the delegates should get gradually phased out" and he more firmly advocates the introduction of policy meetings with chairmen because this would enhance relationships with clubs and their management. This manager believes that "We have to become more autocratic, rugby is too democratic...We can no longer sit down and wait for committees to decide on matters". A staff member supports this view, advocating the introduction of a Board on a smaller scale. One external director believes the union should subsidise the introduction of general managers in each club, and it should be these individuals who work with the union to manage club rugby.

Apart from the size of the Council, another criticism is the voting system it uses. As one member of this body observes, the smallest club represented has only eight teams in the entire club, but has three votes on the Council. Describing this situation, the individual says "It stinks". A club chairman raises similar concerns, suggesting the Council "Gives larger clubs a more proportional vote, our club has 20 per cent of BMB numbers, but only 5 per cent of the vote".

One of the provincial unions to introduce a modernised governance structure, used to have sub-unions under that structure, but now has individual clubs electing a *Club Council*. This Council elects four members to their Board, in addition to the chairman, and acts as a communication medium between the clubs and the Board. In another larger union, a similar body is entitled the *General Committee*, on which similar groups to those on the subject union's Council of Delegates are represented, including clubs, schools, and referees. The CEO of this union explained that "club rugby is the focus at this level, rather than having broader focus". At the time of the interview with this CEO, early in the 1995 research period, his union was looking to establish a new body to provide authority over club rugby in a more formalised manner. A third provincial union also has every club represented on a *Council of Clubs*. As with the other unions' combined club bodies, this Council included representation of

referees, secondary schools, primary schools, (all of whom have less votes than the clubs), and has non-voting representatives of Maori rugby and the regional sports organisation.

In defence of a club representatives structure, one subject union staff member believes the delegate system should work, as the minutes at Committee meetings always go out in time. One interview respondent supported structure "in that it gives a say to all the clubs... we have to hope they will start to make decisions for the good of our rugby but we've been hoping for that for the last how many years and it hasn't happened". Further support for the structure comes from another individual who was formerly involved in the governance of the union. This respondent believes the Council was "Good, in that it still provides a role for the amateur administrator...Important when we move into the professional administration of the game that we don't alienate the countless thousands of people through New Zealand who have given the game service".

The views of the latter respondent were supported by those of an external director, that "Volunteers still have a role to play, they are invaluable to the support structures underneath the glamour top end of the game, so we have to make sure they don't feel cut out or left out of the process". The importance of this retention of volunteer administrators was also noted by two CEOs from other first-division provincial rugby unions. One of these stated that "There are a lot of people involved in the club scene who won't want to be involved in the professional side, but there are still many people dedicated to the survival of club rugby", while the second CEO observed that "The perception that clubs will get big money from professionalism is wrong, they will still be run by volunteers. They have to be the most important people in the union".

The Council of Club delegates structure does have wide support from club chairmen. Questioned on the degree of influence which the Council of Delegates has on the management of the union, nine of the fifteen chairmen indicated their belief that the Council had 'some influence' (60 per cent), while four (27 per cent) indicated their belief that the Council had little or no influence, and two (13 per cent) believed it had a 'large influence'. (A full list of the varied comments may be found in Appendix D). The most common response indicated the chairmen regarded the introduction of the Board as having lessened the impact of the Council.

In response to a question asking "Are you satisfied with the formal channels of communications you have with the union through the Council of Delegates?", 82 per cent (14 responses) answered affirmatively, while 18 per cent (three responses) answered in the negative. Those respondents to this question who responded in a negative manner commented that the union "Should interview clubs directly", "The Council of Delegates can become too much of an exclusive club ..." and "A wider range of opinions would be beneficial". One interviewee expressed the opinion that the Council of Delegates are sometimes inefficient amateurs.

[illegible]	[illegible]
Total influence	0
Large influence	2
Some Influence	9
Little influence	3
No influence	1

Figure 12.7. Club chairmen's perceptions of the Council's influence

Those respondents who expressed positive perceptions of communication through the Council of Delegates often qualified their support. One stated that "Communication is not the problem but rather the decision-making and management systems need improvement", while another responded that it is "Usually acceptable". Other positive responses highlighted the importance of the delegate communicating with his club: "It works if the delegate communicates"; "If our delegate was more active..."; and "Our delegate always keeps us informed".

12.6.1 Junior Management and Boys Management Boards

In addition to the Council of Delegates, two other governance structures exist in the area of club rugby. The Boys Management Board has jurisdiction over the grades from under-7 year olds to under-15 year olds, and the Junior Management Board covers under-16s through to under-21s, and also the restricted weight grades. Each board has a composition similar to that of the Council, each having twenty-six members.

Interviews of Board directors and Union management indicated that support for these structures was shown by only one respondent, who was a member of the Council of Delegates. However his views were contrary to all others expressed in this study. One manager stated that these structures of the JMB and BMB must change, primarily because they use such a high number of personnel when capable personnel are an increasingly rare commodity in the management of club rugby. This use of such personnel was described by the manager as being "bloody ridiculous". He explains that "each club has to provide three people to fill the Council and Boards, and these people could be freed to perform other roles within clubs". A second manager agreed totally with these beliefs. This belief is given further credence by the comments of one club chairman, who expressed the belief that "Many club delegates at all levels, but particularly BMB level, are very inadequate. There are too many freeloaders from clubs who sit on these bodies".

One manager suggested the duties of the junior and boys boards should be amalgamated into those of the Council of Delegates, each being represented as a subcommittee of that Council. This would not change the operational side of their areas, as although the two junior boards are

empowered within their own areas, but all recommendations made on the JMB and BMB boards need to be ratified by the Council anyway. This manager believes this situation would not effect the quality of decision-making, as each of the junior boards "could be run by a smaller committee of four or five people", which would be subcommittees of the Council of Delegates. These subcommittees would each have a head, who would sit on the Council as a voting member, so this would retain voting capabilities of the JMB and BMB on the Council.

There has been serious discussion about making such changes this to the JMB in recent years, "but that's been given stay of execution for the last couple of years", explains the Rugby Manager. This has been done because of resistance of clubs' delegates to this JMB committee who "think of what they would lose, rather than what is best for Auckland rugby". He believes the drive for this change "has to come from the top, probably from the chairman through the CEO to me, through to clubs". He recognises that resistance to this change would be unavoidable, as "It would be seen as depowering club rugby, but in fact it would be repowering club rugby, and giving it new direction".

One interview respondent gave a vivid example as to why the BMB board should be disbanded. He explained how the BMB delegate from one club failed to ensure his young players signed their registration cards in the stipulated manner. Teams from this club progressed to the semi-finals in the under-13 and under-15 grades before one of the other competing clubs grades discovered the teams had failed to signed their cards correctly, so they lodged a protest. The BMB board expelled the two teams concerned from the competition and stripped them of their points for the season. This decision was discussed by a select committee comprised of the union's chairman and two directors. The teams were reinstated and decreed to have shared the championship. The club which protested then voted out their senior delegate at the club's AGM. Ironically, the final decision over the reinstatement had nothing at all to do with this individual, and he was viewed by those who had contact with him at the union as being one of the hardest working delegates in recent years.

This action, described by the staff member as "Petty political bullshit", is not judged to be indicative of the total situation at this level of management of the union but does highlight the weakness of an over-democratised system. This system requires too many individuals to be used as delegates to boards in which their ultimate power is to make recommendations - which many informants suggest could be made equally as well if differently composed boards. With the perceived inadequacies, and some strength in existing structural arrangements of club-union linkages noted by club and union persons, the research now focuses on the union's club delegates who represent the amateur rugby organisation to the business oriented union.

12.6.2 Perceptions of club delegates

As noted in the preceding discussions on the Council of Delegates structure, there is some support for the structure itself but personnel who serve on this Council are perceived by a range of research respondents as not necessarily of adequate quality to make meaningful and informed decisions for the advancement of club rugby. This is recognised by one manager, who observes that the "calibre of delegates coming through the Council of Delegates has dropped away quite considerably... very few have real management or policy skills". His views are supported by a second manager's statement that "There are some good people coming through, but there are only a few of them".

Further support for this perception of a reduction in quality human resources in the Council was provided by a wide variety of interview respondents. One team management individual stated that "The delegates, overall don't have the ability. That's not being derogatory in any way, there are some great club men in there, but some of them don't have the business qualities to move the union into the twenty-first century". An individual previously involved in the governance of the union said he "Would like to see a better standard of delegate coming through from clubs...Gradually see a more qualified delegate coming through, who knows his rugby side but has the business skills to go with it".

An external director stated succinctly that "Clubs are short of good people", while an internal director agreed the competence of the people being put forward is major problem, concluding that the Council meetings are "frightening". This problem has also been noted by CEOs from other provincial unions. One CEO noted that "It's already a problem enticing people into the administration of the game. There just are not enough people entering the administration of the game, which is unfortunate in that respect". A second CEO stated that "There are obvious frustrations in people being elected who aren't able to understand the concept which is now managing rugby". Two club chairmen added weight to this argument, with the first stating that "Many club administrators lack the skills and resources to function as a business", and the second responding that "Most club rugby administrators are not trained to handle the requirements of the business approach which is necessary when you are competing with the entertainment world".

One manager advanced a coherent and logical explanation for this lack of rugby management's human resources. He believed that "the calibre of person isn't coming through because of economics". Explaining this notion, he expressed the belief that the large majority of people do not have the available time these days to be volunteers in the administration of sports clubs, especially those individuals who are successful in their chosen vocation. "The hours during the season that these people have to put in, are quite considerable ... Three hours every month at the Council of Delegates meetings, and frequent club meetings and weekends at the clubs,

is too much: usually the more successful people are too busy to do these things".

A manager asserted that it was people who were successful in their business or career who had the necessary skills and abilities to successfully manage the Council but noted that this type of person was increasingly precluded from contributing to a marked degree because of other commitments. "Going back ten or fifteen years, it wasn't difficult for most people to have a couple of hours off in an afternoon to go and do something for the club, whereas this is generally not an option now". After expounding this viewpoint, the manager added "I don't see the situation changing". In fact the existing situation may become exacerbated. One respondent noted that, as the Council becomes increasingly impotent as seems probable, the desire to be a member of this will decrease further, and with that reduction in attractiveness will come an even more basal level of representational competency.

Respondents' perceptions are clear that fewer people than ever have the discretionary time needed to be involved in the most important positions of club rugby. One question in the research questionnaire to the club chairmen (C3) sought clarification of this perception, and asked the chairmen to indicate the number of hours per week they devoted to their club administrative duties. The results are shown in Figure 12.8.

NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK	IN SEASON N=17	OFF SEASON N=17
0 - 4	0	5
5 - 9	2	6
10 - 14	7	1
15 - 19	1	3
20 - 24	3	1
25 - 29	1	0
30 - 34	1	0
35 - 39	0	0
40 or more	2	1

Figure 12.8. Rugby administration hours of club chairmen

The median number of hours devoted to their club in a rugby season is 15 - 19 hours per week, with two chairmen devoting forty or more hours. This equates to a fulltime employment position and it must be noted, these chairmen are not remunerated. No chairman devotes less than five hours to his club administration during the season, and the largest individual response rate was in the ten to fifteen hour bracket. Out of season, the number of hours devoted is notably less, with the median slipping back to five - nine hours per week. Only one chairman, with over forty hours, devotes more than twenty-four hours per week to his club out of season. It should be noted that this respondent listed his

devoting of over forty hours in each category and was clearly at variance with the time given by the other respondents; this respondent is retired, which may indicate he has more available time than other chairmen, who are in salaried employment.

One manager made the statement that "The strength of the club does not start with playing strength, it starts with administration". At present - in 1995 - the administration and management of clubs is perceived to be weak, primarily due to the dearth of quality managers. "It's tragic to see a great club ... with such a proud history, being weakened by poor management" (internal director). This is a theme which was apparent in perceptions of the abilities of personnel on the Council of Delegates, and permeates every area of the union's rugby clubs' administration.

The apparent lack of quality individuals being involved in the delegate system may be traced to the lack of people involved in the administration of club rugby. As recognised by one manager and a number of club delegates, this lack of available personnel means that while the clubs may fill the chairman and president roles, they often struggle to get a secretary, treasurer or club captain. This was reflected in the description by one of the Board's directors who noted that "We as a club are struggling to get a treasurer. We have to use bribery, corruption, beg and plead", and he does not envisage this situation changing. "As time has gone on, less and less people give their time... I've been trying to get out of it for years".

A question was posed to the chairmen of clubs in the questionnaire which addressed the issue of competition for appointments to positions of club responsibility and administration. The question was asked, "To what extent has the competition to hold your current administrative position changed in the last five years" (see Appendix C). Of the seventeen respondents to this question, six (35 per cent) confirmed that competition for appointment to responsible club positions had declined dramatically, while a further four (24 per cent) indicated that interest had declined slightly. With these two groups combined it is apparent that in some 60 per cent of rugby clubs, the level of internal competition to hold administrative positions had declined in the last five years.

PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETITION	NUMBER
Competition has declined dramatically	6
Competition has declined slightly	4
Competition has remained static	5
Competition has increased slightly	2
Competition has increased dramatically	0

Figure 12.9. Competition for administrative positions in club rugby

A further five chairmen, (29 per cent), stated that competition in their club had remained static, meaning just two rugby club chairmen, (12 per cent), indicated a slight increase in competition for administrative places. No

respondents observed a dramatic increase in such competition. This is a trend which must be perceived as a major threat to the short term and long term future of club rugby administration. The data gained from this question are presented in tabulated form in Figure 12.9.

Question C2 of the club questionnaire asked chairmen which positions they had held in their current club. (Figure 12.10 shows the results to this question). The results show that chairman have clearly held a wide variety of positions within their clubs, mostly near the top of the club governance structures at the levels of committee, president and a delegate to the Council and JMB board. This also shows the experience the chairmen generally bring to their positions, that provides primary knowledge of the operation of varied facets of the club organisation.

The seventeen club chairmen include five who are in their first term in that office. Twelve had held the club chairman position before their present appointment to this position, as indicated in Figure 12.10. While the chairmen have held a wide variety of positions, they have usually been in the club administration systems for a long period of time and generally do not hold other positions at the moment. Of the seventeen chairmen who responded, only seven (41 per cent) currently hold an administrative position additional to that of chairman. Of these seven, four are also the presidents of their clubs, one is the delegate to the Council and JMB bodies, one is the Council delegate, and the seventh is the JMB delegate and club captain.

The identification of chairmen with their clubs, reinforced through administrative service, may influence their objectivity in terms of club and wider rugby interests. One manager raised such a concern by noting that "The game cannot do without these people but whether they should make the decisions, I don't know". One club chairman expressed similar concerns, responding in his completed questionnaire that "the decision-making and management systems need improvement". This decision-making capability is handicapped by the voting orientation of the delegates in the opinion of some research informants. It is commonly believed by union officials, for example, that delegates vote in the narrow-focused interests of their clubs, often against the wider benefit or provincial interests of the game. This view was advanced by an external director, with the statement that "a lot of decisions they make are in their own personal interests, not for the good of the game". Staff members of the subject union expressed significant concerns. One typical statement notes that, to improve the union's operational management, "The clubs must think more about the good of rugby overall".

Position	Number	Years Held
Chairman	12	1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 6, 12
Committee	5	2, 9, 10, 18, 16
JMB Delegate	3	3, 4, 11
President	3	1, 3, 5
Senior Delegate	2	1, 11
Manager	2	3, 9
Club Captain	2	5, 12
Treasurer	2	2, 12
Coach	1	10
Secretary	1	2
Junior Boys Captain	1	2
Junior Boys Treasurer	1	2
Junior Boys Chair	1	2
Old Boys Committee	1	12

Figure 12.10. Positions previously held by club chairmen before their present appointment (n = 17)

This problem manifests itself in the decision-making inconsistencies that appear to emanate from the Council of Delegates. One manager stated, "The way the Council meetings run at the moment, they may pass something this month, then next month change their minds". The Council appears to have difficulties in making operational decisions, and during the research period appeared to make no positive strategic decisions (as described by Mintzberg, 1979). This reduces the strategic positioning and direction of club rugby to a practically non-existent level, and thus dislocates it to a tangible degree from the overall strategic direction of the union. It also places under threat, if the observation is accurate, the relationship between clubs and the union.

This view is supported by two employees of the union. A manager, who believed that the role of the clubs' delegates needs defining, asked senior delegates if they were there to put forward the cases for their club, or there for the benefit of union rugby, "and no-one knew". This dichotomy in the allegiance of the delegates prompted the manager to conclude that "It's an invidious position". One staff member appeared very concerned about this issue and went one step further than other respondents. This staff member complained that "There's a lot of bullshit that goes on at that level and that is what has held rugby back for so long. I'm not sure about this, but I think that at these meetings they vote, not in their club's best interests, but in their own best interests". Further support for this notion was provided in staff questionnaire response, which stated that

"Some delegates are incompetent and only there for their own interests". In effect, these respondents were saying the delegates do not vote for the good of the game as a whole in the province, nor even in the best interests of the clubs they represent, but in their own personal interests. If true, this is a major concern for the union and the Council of Delegates.

Another problem area identified by respondents, in both interviews and questionnaires, was the perceived lack of communication between the delegates and their clubs, with one manager stating that "A lot of delegates are out of tune with the grassroots of their clubs", adding later in the interview that "Clubs need delegates to work more in the clubs". This was given strong support by the Rugby Officer, who works closely with the clubs (see Figure 6.4). He asserts that a lot of the communication that goes on at the Council meetings does not get back to the clubs. He explained that "In my job I am continually asked by clubs for information that I know has been given to the delegates or the captains or whoever but the information has been provided to the club, and they initially totally blame the union for an apparent breakdown in communication which is the fault of their own delegate!". This view by the staff member is supported, at least partially, by one club chairman, who stated in his completed questionnaire that the delegates "Attend enough meetings and receive plenty of information".

The ulterior motives of some delegates to the Council have been questioned by respondents. One individual from the team management area within the subject union believed that "It is harder today to get administrators in clubs because the possibilities to administrate at a higher level are not good anymore, and many club administrators see the zenith of their administration as being a delegate". He expressed the belief that "There is status in club rugby administration, which should be chopped off further by the new CEO". He identified a major motivation for club delegates: "They get their blazers, sit in the grandstand, and go to aftermatch functions" . This belief is backed by a union manager who answers "Many delegates are aiming to get their free match tickets and their union blazer after five years". One comment by a club chairman may have given support to this theory as he complained in his questionnaire response about a "Lack of recognition of long hours contributed by unpaid volunteers, for example, as club chairman and president I have extreme difficulty getting decent test tickets". There would appear to be value in a frank and open enquiry into club administration or examination of material support and benefits to meet the interests, and needs, of both the union and the clubs.

12.7 MARKETING CLUB RUGBY

The decreased interest in rugby club administration has come as rugby's grip on the national psyche has slipped considerably, as outlined in Chapter Three of this study. One interviewee articulated this trend when he noted that "Club rugby right throughout the nation was traditionally the

focus of most people's Saturdays as a family. There are so many things for people to do now which are less demanding of their time compared with 50 years ago, when the whole family was involved in the club and it was the outing of the week". The CEO of a first division union supported this with the observation that there is "not enough population to sustain the number of clubs we've got, there are too many other things to do today...When they were formed everyone played rugby and the rugby club was the hub of the community and that's where everyone went".

The rise of rugby league is recognised as a threat by administrators, in private communications to the researcher. The Auckland Warriors team has assumed a high sport/business profile in New Zealand sport.

A major reason for the decline in interest in clubs is the increase in entertainment options, especially in major metropolitan areas. These are outlined further in Chapter 10.5., of this study. Another major factor is seen as in the increased drink-drive regulations, which greatly affected the vital revenue generation source of the club bar. More people also work and shop during weekends than 10 and 20 years ago as retail hours have been extended through the 1 August 1990 repeal of the Shop Trading Hours Act which removed restrictions on shop opening hours. Saturday and Sunday shopping now directly clashes with the traditional times at which senior club rugby was played, usually 2.30p.m. or 3.00p.m. on Saturday or Sunday afternoon. As interest from the wider population in club rugby has inexorably decreased, the importance of the marketing of club rugby has correspondingly risen.

Marketing efforts have been made in recent years, with the union making notable efforts to boost the profiles of clubs. A seven page club rugby supplement to the local newspaper was published on April 24, 1992. In the same year club rugby was televised nation-wide on Friday nights. (The two hour coverage was scheduled to extend from May 29 to August 7.) The Executive Director of the union stated that the programme would "be innovative in many ways", being presented to enhance the image of club rugby and to develop further public interest in the sport (*New Zealand Herald,* April 24, 1995.). He also added that it would be welcomed by the clubs because it would create sponsorship interest, and give players exposure to a national audience (ibid.). This television coverage was planned to include player profiles, footage of participating clubs, and interviews with former players and prominent club administrators. Unfortunately, the television ratings were not high for this product, and the programme was terminated well before the scheduled date.

Other than such clearly identifiable but rare marketing efforts, the union's Marketing Manager does not think that the "club rugby competition was ever really marketed as a product, it was only advertised". This advertising primarily took the form in recent years of "advertorials" in the daily newspaper, which were written previews of the weekend's forthcoming senior club games, including times and venues of the draw. This form of marketing was forced upon the union because this newspaper largely failed

to preview club rugby matches, and thus denied such vital exposure of club rugby in this widely read newspaper. While one team management respondent believes this was done because "the media is controlled by league interests so it's hard for rugby to get what it wants", it is more likely that this was done because the editors of the paper perceived a declining interest in club rugby and made a decision to cease previewing. Given the paper's decision to cease such previews, the Marketing Manager felt compelled to pay for a service which was similar to that which was previously provided through the journalistic previews. This became a considerable expense to the union. In essence, the marketing of club rugby had been kept to the absolute minimum as the emphasis very clearly moved to the representative team and money spent on marketing the club rugby competition was considered by some in the union to be wasted money in any case.

One external director recognises that the union "Spent a lot of money in 1995 trying to build interest in the club competition". In 1995, the union established a rugby television programmme on the regional television network, which the Marketing Manager claims is "a first for sport in New Zealand". He believes that "it achieved what we wanted it to achieve in the first year, which was basically to get the product on TV". This also served to de-emphasise the expensive press advertising which was not perceived to be cost-effective. Press advertising of club rugby was moved from Saturday to Friday. In addition, the Club Dinner had its second year as a major function for clubs, and was moved from hospitality facilities at the home ground to convention facilities in the city. This dinner provided a culmination for the promotion of clubs and gave the clubs a clear focus of their own. The success of this awards night was also noted by a respondent in the union's team management area who believed "the club dinner should grow in importance".

While the Marketing Manager recognises that he will have some involvement with club marketing, he believes that now the Rugby Manager should have a lot of control in this area also. He suggests this because the demands of the professional side are going to grow, that is where the marketing emphasis must continue to be, and he can not dilute his efforts for the professional team by also concentrating on club rugby. As a result he will have less direct involvement with the club scene, "in fact my direct involvement will be virtually nil, with exceptions being those marketing programmes which target club populations". However, he believes that, as Marketing Manager, he must also have an oversight role in aspects of club marketing situations so there is some consistency between what is being done at that level and what is being done at the professional level "because they do interact". This interaction comes partly because "We want to use the club structure as a conduit for promotion of the representative team". Thus, he intends to seek a situation in which the Rugby Manager will implement marketing plans and "I will only be involved in the strategic thinking".

In 1996, the Marketing Manager believes the marketing will probably increase the focus on the club competition itself, in order to increase spectator numbers. This will placate the concerns of two respondents: one external director, who recognised that there "has to be more interest built in the club competition" and one other respondent who expressed the "Need to capture those people that are still interested in club rugby, and ensure they attend club games".

The Rugby Manager believes that clubs have to do more for themselves in the marketing of the game. He states that "I think too many of them are expecting the union to do it all for them, and I think they have to come hand in hand with us". He continues that "We haven't got a bottomless pit of money, and if we did would it be any good to put it into the marketing of club rugby when we know club rugby isn't going to draw crowds?". In his mind there is a lot that can be done on the public relations of club rugby, "because clubs can do a lot more themselves". He expresses the belief that clubs should attempt to get stories in their local press and newspapers and build parochialism in their local area. In essence, this belief is that clubs should be responsible for the marketing in their own area. "It should be out in its own community, club people know the community better than us". In addition, this manager believes that the clubs should be attempting to make themselves more attractive to non-playing members. "They have complained about drink drive regulations hurting bar trade, but they should still be able to get that money in other ways". He adds that this challenge and opportunity has not been recognised by many involved in the management of clubs. There would appear to be considerable value in the union and its Board, with their business skills, developing marketing guidelines for club administrators.

12.8 THE CLUB COMPETITION

One respondent working in the area of team management said that "There's no question club rugby has to improve, the question is how?". It became clear the answer to this question lay at least partly in the recognition and subsequent rectification of problems currently besetting the club competition. A poll in the United Kingdom in October, 1995, showed that 76 per cent of clubs were dissatisfied with the current club level competition system in those countries ("What the clubs say", 1995). This dissatisfaction with the competition is also a major problem in the subject union's club rugby. One respondent stated that the most important thing to do in the area of club rugby is to create a meaningful competition and an internal director concurred with this, stating that "the competition is the main thing... If we don't have a strong competition, we will just continue to weaken the game". This may sound like a simplistic task but it remains an area of controversy in local rugby.

In 1995, the senior club competition had twenty-one clubs broken into two groups, with the top ten teams in one section and remaining eleven in the other. The rankings for this competition were based on the rankings from

the year before. The top group played off for the major trophy in club rugby. One union staff member, with whom this issue was discussed, believed that this competition was acceptable and better than the competition planned for 1996. He gives the example of one club which was ranked almost twentieth two years ago, then rose to fifteenth going into 1995, and is now in the top ten for 1996. This staff member believes that this shows how clubs can better themselves within the system "if they work hard on development". While this staff member perceived that competition to have "worked pretty well", the Council of Delegates has voted out this system and re-introduced a competition that has been used in the past. The 1996 rugby club competition is based on the twenty-one senior teams beginning the season in three equivalent groups of seven teams. These groups are based on rankings from 1995. For example, the teams ranked first, fourth, seventh, tenth, thirteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth in 1995 are in one 1996 group. The top three teams from each group, and the other top qualifier, will progress into a new group for the top trophy competition, and the other teams will play a secondary competition.

This 1996 system allows all teams to challenge for the prestigious club trophy by giving them the opportunity to reach the top group after the early season three group competition. The staff member agrees that this "sounds great but you've got teams ranked 12 to 21 - harsh as it may be for them, they are not going to be in finals contention because they are not up to it". This belief is backed by that of an internal director who argues "At the moment we have a crazy system where everybody has a crack at getting the [major trophy]. The reality of it is that only four clubs have had it in the last ten years, I think, or are likely to". Further criticism of this system comes from another respondent: "There is a wide disparity between the clubs and any competition that puts them all in together is destined to failure". The staff member foresees "some horrific mis-matches next year...it's not going to be attractive rugby". An added negative feature of the new system is that for the first seven weeks of the competition, there will be three senior teams who are not going to have a competition game. What makes this fact more important, according to informants is that the clubs have complained continuously about the lack of consistent rugby.

This again appears to be an example of the overly-democratic rugby system, where it is believed to be essential to give all teams a theoretical chance of winning major titles, when they realistically have little or no chance, and this denigrates the level of competition for the larger clubs. This mis-matching of teams is believed to be a major detraction from any competition, argue a number of respondents. One respondent in the team management area stated that "The competition is not right...It's very poorly structured". As one manager points out, "Every one wants to compete, hence the word competition".

Another manager furthers this line of argument by stating that "Sport, both as a player and a spectator, is most attractive when the score is close". A

club chairman supports this link between a strong competition and strong playing chairman levels, noting a need for "More dynamic competitions to attract skilled players so that top levels continues to receive highly skilled and motivated players". One manager observes that "Probably every other sport in the world has top teams playing top teams". An internal director believes the Council should follow the Boston Report recommendations on competitions, as the principles and arguments for rationalising competition apply equally to clubs as to first class union competition. That report stressed the importance of even competitions. An external director also makes the point that a strong competition, while attracting more interest through closer results, also improves playing standards. Two provincial union Executive Officers from outside the union also made valid points regarding the merits of an even competition, stressing how the clubs themselves would benefit from this. Despite such arguments this ideal appears to be anathema to the Council of Delegates. Not apparently considered, however, is the possibility of perceived weaker clubs now seeking to attract new and stronger players as their club has the opportunity to reach the top group.

The respondent believes the new competition structure was only accepted by the Council of Delegates "because the bottom clubs got together and decided they didn't want the stronger clubs becoming stronger, so it replicates what happens at the national level". If so, this also reflects the parochial voting system of the Council of Delegates, with delegates to this body voting, as perceived by respondents, in the narrow-minded interest of their own clubs, and not the greater good of the game in the province. As the competition presently stands for 1996, the staff member believes "We're going to have a hell of a job promoting that competition, it's going to become a laughing stock, I think".

Other individuals also criticise the Council for accepting this new competition. One manager believed the competition has been put together by a committee "with no feeling for what is good for rugby", while a second respondent stated that "we've changed for the wrong reasons". Further explanation is provided by an internal director, who also serves on the Council of Delegates. This respondent explains that "Part of the problem is that the Council changes the competition each year depending on who's got the vote, so it becomes extremely political...the vote is almost always a split between division one clubs and division two clubs". An individual who was formerly involved in the governance of the union also expresses such a belief. He states that "The union vacillates between competitions that put only the strong clubs together, then they back off that and change it". He admits he can not remember in the last decade a competition lasting for more than two years, which makes it hard for the public to understand, and for club allegiance to stabilise.

Another identifiable problem with the competition is that the representative players rarely play for their club sides. This means the players in the club are competition are largely unknown to wider population, so they do not attract significant numbers of spectators, and the flow-on effect from this

lack of crowds is a decreasing revenue from the bar of the club. The primary remedy to this problem is to build awareness and interest in the existing competition, which will, with the correct uses of available local marketing mechanisms, be vital in attracting interested people back to club rugby games.

This is accentuated by the complicated nature of the existing and proposed competitions which, says one manager, are "a nonsense, people don't understand it". One club chairman stated in his completed questionnaire that "The 1995 club competition was confusing and unhelpful". This need for a simply structured competition was also expressed by two external directors, each involved in product marketing in their professions, so people could readily recognise the club competition in the province. This perceived need for an understandable competition is reinforced by the comments of an external director, "The competition we run is an absolutely bloody joke. I didn't understand it, had it explained to me about ten times then still didn't understand it, so how the public are supposed to understand it I'm buggered if I know!".

Several respondents expressed the view that a club competition should be arranged which included teams from the neighbouring unions. This competition is believed to move optimal potential if played at the end of the season. Three external directors also raised this possibility. This competition, perhaps combining clubs from the unions, "would be sensational" says one manager, and he raises the possibility that television rights to such a competition could be sold to generate further revenue for the unions involved. One manager suggests the teams included in this competition should be regionally based, with teams from north, south, central and east zones of the rugby province, which could conceivably lead eventually to a national club championship on this basis.

12.9 AMALGAMATION OF CLUBS

One issue deemed by informants to be of great importance in club rugby is the amalgamation of clubs. One manager identified the present number of clubs as "In danger of weakening the whole structure, particularly the competition". One of the new managers observed "There are twenty-one clubs. I just can't conceptualise why we need that many", and another manager asserted "There *have* to be club amalgamations... If there aren't amalgamations, some clubs will die and that's a problem that most of them can not see". An external director placed further emphasis on this area of club rugby, "The most important area is rationalisation, we've got too many clubs, we need to cut back now".

There are various pressures on the clubs to amalgamate. The most prominent of these is to boost playing strength. As one respondent stated, "it's stupid having two weaker clubs fighting over limited playing resources, which means neither can compete with the top sides". Another respondent, involved in the union's team management area, supported these

views. He says, "Everyone trying to produce a top senior side just causes fighting over the playing talent available, and there aren't enough players to sustain that...To get a higher standard of rugby, we should amalgamate some teams". This argument was evidenced by a newspaper report which appeared late in the research period. In early December, 1995, two clubs began formal discussion about a merger. Both clubs are believed to have been significantly effected by the formation of a new neighbouring union in the 1980s and the perceived practice of larger clubs to look to the catchment of these two clubs to boost their own playing strength.

Another pressure in the move toward amalgamation is the financial situation of most clubs. One external director recognised this factor, noting "I have concerns that we have too many clubs that are inefficient and broke". His view was supported by that of an internal director also. This director observed that "I think amalgamation will occur not just because of a lack of playing strength, but also because of financial problems. I think 95% of clubs are having financial problems"

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At present there are twenty-one clubs in the provincial union. One provincial manager believes the ideal number of clubs would be sixteen, a number also identified by an external director. Another interview respondent believes the union should be aiming to reduce the number to approximately twelve. The benefits of such a reduction were outlined by one external director. "If we got back to about sixteen clubs which is about where we should be, the union could look, in time, to fund the administration or management of those clubs by subsidising professional club administration, which would allow us to better market and promote clubs".

One manager believes that amalgamation of clubs should be driven by the union's Board, but this will have to be done with care, because "if the Board is seen to be doing it, it will be difficult". He observes that some clubs are talking, and this process "should be pushed along". An external director also believes the Board and management should play a role in the amalgamation, "but it can only be done by negotiation, not dictation". This view of the union pushing clubs toward amalgamation runs contrary to a second view that the clubs must be left to amalgamate themselves. One manager played 130 senior games for his club, which later amalgamated and lost its name, so he is aware of the ramifications of such changes. He believes "It has to come from within, it would be hard to force upon them".

The major reason most clubs have not amalgamated to date is that one of the clubs often loses its name, or on occasion both clubs may do so and the loss of identity is a major fear in the staunchly traditionalist sport of rugby. As one manager notes, "Most amalgamations fall down because the name will change". A secondary fear is that the amalgamation adversely effects playing numbers from the two combined clubs, with the combined total playing numbers of two previously independent clubs dropping. This is disputed by one manager. He believes that "against popular belief,

amalgamation has actually strengthened clubs and meant more teams". He links this perceived growth in playing numbers to an increase in administrative strength as "The strength of the club does not start with paying strength, it starts with administration". This belief is countered by that of the CEO of another provincial rugby union. This CEO states that "it seems, unfortunately, that the overall number of teams for the joint club reduces. It sometimes strengthens the club but takes away players, which ultimately reduces the numbers playing the game". This CEO's view is backed by that of a club chairman, who suggests the union "Not try to reduce the number of clubs by amalgamation, but have more clubs, more players, more chance of honing their skills".

One manager advances the idea of a geographically spread competition, with ten top senior teams and ten bottom teams. Each of the top ten clubs would 'adopt' a bottom club, with stronger links fostered between the two clubs than exist at present. These clubs would be paired through their geographic location and the personalities of their clubs, which would need to be compatible. This adoption would allow the movement of players, coaching, and support, and would give them greater knowledge of each other This would lead to erosion of the 'fear of the unknown', and would facilitate the amalgamation process in a significant way.

One major alternative to full amalgamation exists, and this is the introduction of a feeder competition, which was advocated by a number of interview respondents. One team management individual believed that "In amalgamation, one of the clubs could become a feeder and produce teams up to only a certain level, so they produce strong junior teams". The manner in which clubs could be allocated to the two levels could come through the setting of criteria for their promotion to senior status. One external director suggested that if such requirements set by the union were met, an interest free loan should be offered, or an administrative manager subsidised for consolidation of the successful clubs. The primary strength of this two-tier structure is that each club would be able to retain an identity in their community and maintain integral elements of their tradition. The retention of the present number of clubs, albeit some with different status, would also play the important role of taking rugby further into the community. "We need the lesser clubs to keep the tentacles out there".

One manager suggested that stricter criteria should be introduced for acceptance into the senior competition. He advances a system in which clubs are required to have a senior and senior reserve team in the first year of the system, in the second year an under-21 team would be required in addition to the senior teams, with an under-19 added in the third year. A certain number of teams would be required at lower levels. To cater for the clubs unable to meet such requirements, a lower competition for clubs would run concurrently. In addition to these two competitions, a knock-out competition could be run in this competition in order to provide the small clubs with the opportunity to beat the larger clubs.

The phenomenon of club amalgamation is not confined to the subject union. In another first division union, three clubs amalgamated in 1994 and another amalgamation occurred in 1995. The CEO of that union believes this was totally driven by the clubs and, "Probably driven by playing numbers, and the playing strength of their senior team". The union had ten teams in the 1995 senior competition and will have eleven in the 1996 season. The same union constructed a strategic plan in early 1994, and this included the recommendation to restrict the senior competition to eight teams, although this matter was never discussed with the clubs. The CEO of this union believes there are "probably still some amalgamations to come". A second provincial union CEO identifies a "big need for amalgamation of clubs" in his union and believes it is up to the clubs involved to drive this as "They don't want big daddy telling them what to do". Guidelines on club development, strategic planning or 'five year plans' would be an invaluable union-club focus for positive interaction in the subject union.

12.9.1 Centralised management of club rugby

During the present research period the Queensland Rugby Union in Australia introduced a system in which each of five union-appointed full-time rugby managers has a responsibility for the management of three clubs. This raised the question of the possibility of increased centralised management of club rugby within the subject union.

Some interview respondents believed such positions would indicate a positive and necessary progression in the domain of club-union management but recognised difficulties in introducing such a system. The statement by a team management person that "Yes, it should be done, but it will be hard to do", typified such responses. One external director believed that there "definitely has to be increased centralised management...it has to be controlled by the union if they are spending significant amounts of money on these clubs".

This need for increased funding of the game's administration at club level was identified by more than one respondent. A belief was apparent that the money put into the coaching coordinator scheme was successful, but one respondent, in critical reflection, feels "the money may have been better spent helping to get fulltime managers into the clubs first". These managers would create the right atmosphere for making ensuing positive changes. A club chairman advanced similar beliefs with a statement that "We spend a lot of money on developing players to play the game, but little or none at all in developing the ability to be team management or club administrators". The reluctance of club chairmen to attend courses, noted earlier in this present research, adds emphasis to the need for other club persons to acquire club management skills.

This view was supported by an external director who stated that "I think the days have gone where the clubs could be left on their own...some of the wealth generated from provincial level has to be directed more to the clubs to keep the talent coming through, keep volunteers involved and maintain interest in coaching and development". Later in the interview this respondent returned to this subject and added that "obviously it has to be managed to make sure the money is directed into areas that are identified, certainly with a degree of centralised control. I would like to see the union having more control over the clubs".

A second external director advocated the union providing assistance to clubs "in order to improve management expertise by subsidising management officers". He observed that about five or six clubs have full time managers, suggesting those really needing help are the less affluent. His views were supported by an internal director who believed that "Ideally clubs should retain their own identity and run their own ship but some clubs do need positive assistance". Of the seventeen completed questionnaire returned by club chairmen, the respondents indicated that eight (47 per cent) of these clubs had no fulltime positions. Six clubs (35 per cent) each had a manager, described by one respondent as a position which "Looks after the everyday running of the club, carries out tasks on behalf of committee members, acts as caretaker, bar manager, assistant secretary and looks for ways to promote the club and get sponsorship". Three clubs had fulltime treasurers or financial controllers, two had fulltime coaching co-ordinators and one had a fulltime bar manager.

Most respondents however, were not in favour of the union assuming club management tasks. This view was expressed by one union manager who supported the union providing assistance and training to club managers and providing resources to help them manage their clubs in an improved manner but "not to manage their clubs for them". Typical director comments, expressed in interviews, were "The clubs shouldn't have heavy handed union involvement", "We would prefer not to do it, we would prefer not to be seen entering into club matters".

An additional complexity in this issue is the uncertainty whether the clubs would accept any offered help as a number of club managers are perceived by union staff as insular and mistrusting of the union management. One of these staff member believes "If people could see beyond their own bar, their own club and their own position, and see there are ideas, and people from the union that want to help them beyond just their own area, then maybe it would be good". He adds, for example the Rugby Manager has requisite skills to offer clubs appropriate financial advice "but whether they would accept it is another matter".

Only two interview respondents from outside the subject union made a significant comment on this issue. The first was ardently against any form of centralised management, stating that clubs have to retain their individualism because "There are no two clubs in this union who are the same...All cater to different socio-economic groups". The other had

differing views of the issue, believing there is a place for the increased centralisation of club administration. He observed that "It is possible that a rugby union could have on its computer the accounts for all clubs under the union's umbrella, so that amateur club secretaries have their work done for them. Again, it is just getting the professionalism into this and taking some of the onerous workload off administrators at club level". He explains that the unions have the office facilities to do this and most clubs have computers. This officer states that such financial administration would not mean more union control of club administration but more efficient club management. However he acknowledges that this is a remote possibility "Because of petty jealousies. Rugby is a bit too segregated at the moment, everyone looks after their own patch". The realities of organisational controls, financial power and union knowledge of club affairs suggest that this organisational linkage would impact upon club autonomy, with consequent control implications.

12.10 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

The literature review in this study noted that clubs form the base of the provincial rugby pyramid. This base is important in providing rugby playing opportunities for children and adults, a vehicle for players moving toward the elite level and those descending from participation at that level, and a setting for those who will never play elite rugby. The introduction of professional elite rugby will not alter the fundamental nature of club rugby in the immediate short-term. Material rewards to players at this elite level may become more regulated and formalised but they will continue to primarily comprise payment of accommodation, provision of job opportunities and payment of educational costs, rather than the significant monetary payments which have become apparent at the elite level.

The gap between representative and club rugby has increased to the extent that the availability of elite players to their club teams is now negligible and this trend will continue to the extent that representative and club rugby could become mutually exclusive. This gap between the two levels extends to the revenue areas. Despite the huge injection of revenue through the News Ltd agreement with the NZRFU there will initially be little, if any, revenue trickling down to the club level. The entire sum for the first year of the now professional rugby competition has been budgeted to meet the demands of elite player payments. The increased commercial emphasis of the professional provincial teams means the short term expenditure focus of provincial union management will be the promotion of such teams in the Super-12 and NPC competitions.

The club chairmen charged with leading their clubs in such a changing environment have a broadly common profile. They are usually aged between 40 and 69 years, are married or with a partner and have no dependants under the age of 18 years. The chairmen are each selected from an elected committee which is appointed at their club's AGM. The most important aspects of chairing a rugby club are man-management and

general management skills, while the major skills sought are in financial, marketing and meeting procedures.

The Board of the subject union has attempted to remain detached from club rugby and focus upon the union's commercial operations. This appears to have placed increased importance on the Council of Club Delegates successfully governing club rugby. This structure has the potential to operate successfully if skilled and impartial delegates are available (and appointed) but the existing personnel are presently of insufficient ability to operate in such a large and diverse group with any significant positive impact for club rugby. This lack of quality personnel reflects a significant decline of interest in persons standing for club administrative positions in recent years. In addition to the Council of Delegates, the JMB and BMB bodies are regarded by a number of respondents as unnecessary, out-dated and counter-productive, and constitute a further erosion of club rugby administration by drawing upon already scarce human resources.

The research indicates that the operational marketing of club rugby will increasingly become the responsibility of the Rugby Manager, who intends to stress to clubs the role they must play in the promotion of club rugby. The marketing of club rugby is seen by informants as being handicapped by a poorly structured competition which has been introduced for the wrong reasons. This planned competition is believed by a range of union administrators to confuse rugby followers and suppress playing standards through a potential preponderance of mis-matched games.

Amalgamation of clubs is seen by a number of respondents as an important area of club rugby which will boost clubs' administrative strength, financial stability and future prospects. The cost of this may be a significant loss of club identity. There is mixed debate regarding the centralisation of certain management functions of club rugby, with a common suggestion being the subsidisation of club managers at each club.

In reflection upon the questions which provided the thrust of this research club rugby administration has multi-faceted demands which may well reshape both its structure and its operation. There would appear to be considerable value in the union establishing a taskforce to examine the implication of those demands. The club rugby dimension of the present research indicates areas which could well be examined.

PART D: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

DISCUSSION

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter provides a critical reflection upon the results generated in the research study. The discussion has a particular focus on the two major research questions which initiated this study and discusses results in terms of these. Following consideration of Board profiles the chapter discusses a range of corporatization and professionalization issues which emerged from the research.

13.1 The People in Elite Provincial Rugby Management
13.2 Professionalization and Corporatization in Elite Provincial Rugby Management
13.3 Summary and Review

The researcher's interest in the subject area of this research study was fostered while serving a practicum (internship) at the case study organization, a provincial rugby union. During this four month period, an understanding was gained of the corporatization which would soon be introduced to the organization. Discussions were also held with provincial rugby managers regarding the imminent forces of professionalization, the introduction of which was considered by them to be beyond the control of provincial rugby management.

The internal and external environment of the organization was discussed at length with one of the managers, and it was clear that the corporatization process was to be introduced early in the research period, while it remained unclear when professionalization would be introduced. This latter process required the alteration of the governing laws of the game which, in turn, required a complex process of negotiation and consensus at the highest international levels of the rugby football management.

With one process planned to occur during the research period, and the introduction timeframe of the other being unclear, wider questions were

discussed with management persons in the organization, staff and students from the academic population, and individuals in the wider sport management field. It became clear that little was known about the individuals involved in the seminal changes in the provincial union. It was also clear that little was known about the historical forces of the game's development, especially the ethos of amateurism and development of professionalism. Amateurism and the perceived hypocrisy of rugby administrators on shamateurism and incipient professionalism in rugby were perceived by these respondents to have handicapped the progress of rugby management.

Of marked concern to these respondents was the lack of knowledge about the affects of the proposed introduction of corporatization, and the rumoured introduction of professionalization. Consequently the researcher carried out an initial and exploratory investigation of the literature, which appeared to indicate a lack of informative rugby management literature and research in these areas. Generating that review were the questions :

- *What are the historical developments of rugby, such as amateurism, which brought the management of the game to where it is today?*

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*

- *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

The literature review first focused on the historical development of the game in New Zealand to gain an answer to the first proposed research question. A large body of literature was reviewed, which described historical roots of rugby and its earlier forms of folk football. In New Zealand, rugby grew to dominate the winter sports scene because of its ability to cross cultural and socio-economic lines, and attract the large male sector of the frontier culture which dominated colonial New Zealand society.

As the game became widespread, there was great variance in playing rules and conditions, which influenced formalisation of the game's management. Thus the first provincial rugby unions were formed, with the case study organization set up in 1883. In 1892, the national union was formed. The literature of Nauright (1991) noted the middle class individuals who dominated these developmental years of provincial rugby management, a trend which became more deeply rooted throughout the following century of rugby management.

The literature also indicated the passionate following for rugby which developed in colonial New Zealand, and was enforced by successes in early international contact. The emerging international dominance of the national

representative All Black team galvanised public support for what soon became the national game, and this success is perceived by commentators as indicating to rugby administrators the virtues of amateurism and traditionalism and justification of the continuance of existing management procedures. This was especially true of the case study union, whose historical playing success is one of the dominant characteristics of New Zealand provincial rugby.

As the game in New Zealand entered the last two decades of the twentieth century, the literature revealed that management at provincial and national levels was forced to confront the pressures of increased commercialism in what had been a stringently amateur sport. The dichotomies, of increased commercialism in the management of the amateur game and the incremental growth of shamateurism, set against a backdrop of frequently articulated amateurism principles created tensions between players and administrators.

The Boston Report was commissioned by the NZRFU in 1993 to examine the structure and governance of the national game. The report concluded that corporatisation of the game's management at the elite level was necessary to successfully negotiate increasing environmental pressures such as professionalism, entertainment, commercialism and appeal of other sports. While this report was, in effect, ignored by the national union, provincial unions recognised its importance and progressively implemented its recommendations.

The proposed research question highlighted the need to understand the concept of amateurism and the affect of the amateur regulations on rugby and its management at provincial level. A large bulk of literature exists, and was reviewed, on the history and theoretical basis of amateurism. This noted the false premises on which modern amateurism is based. The reviewed literature then described the manner in which this ethos became applied to, and enforced in, the game of rugby football

With the theoretical base of espoused amateurism critically examined, the study discussed the manner in which the rugby game became increasingly divergent from the theoretical base of its regulations. As the commercial pressures on the elite level of the game increased during the late 1980s, governors of the game at the international level loosened the amateur regulations. These regulations had been openly breached in some nations, and covertly breached in most others. This breaching of the amateur ethos by covert acceptance of money or material gain became known as *shamateurism.*

As the loosened regulations became increasingly tested in the early 1990s, the elite rugby game in New Zealand was subjected to a number of

commercial forces and the introduction of professional regulations. Time demands for top players to participate in the amateur game increased inexorably as the managers of the game sought to increase revenue generation through an increased number of games. Players' companies were introduced, which increased players' awareness of, and emphasis on, the material rewards available at the elite level of this amateur game.

Japan, Italy and France openly rewarded New Zealand players participating in their domestic competitions. South Africa had reacted to its enforced isolation from the international rugby community by creating a barely concealed form of semi-professionalism in its domestic competition. Rugby World Cups increased the awareness of the game's managers of potential revenues available if the game was managed with a commercial acuity. These influences were enforced by the growing threat of the professional code of rugby league attracting elite rugby players. The threat of the introduction of a professional rugby competition compelled critical considerations of the game's amateur regulations. In August 1995, during the research period, the amateur regulations on the game were amended, and the process of professionalization then legally confronted the management of rugby, with all its attendant implications. The literature review broadly answered the proposed question regarding the affects of the historical development of the national game of New Zealand on management of the sport.

The profile of people involved in contemporary rugby management was questioned by the researcher and relevant literature examined. Although a body of related literature was reviewed, including the New Zealand based research of J.Cameron (1993), no adequate or specific research had been conducted to answer the stated question. A severe deficiency of rugby management literature was revealed, despite the range of business and management literature, and the centrality of sport in New Zealand life. The literature did not present informative source material on the management transition of sport codes from amateurism to professionalism, nor from amateur governance to corporate governance. This may be related to the reality that such processes usually incrementally shape a sport rather than specifically shift the axis of a sport's management as occurred with rugby in 1995.

Thus the two research questions which lacked direct elucidation or related research from the literature were :

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*
- *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

In order to answer these questions, an appropriate methodology was devised. The primary research intention of the present study was to explore perceptions and perspectives of key persons in a rugby organization in order to frame a picture of the individuals involved in that body, and affects of the dual forces on their organization and management. In order to gain a depth of data and understanding, the researcher decided, in consultation with the researcher's supervisor, to basically adopt a case study as the primary research method for the investigation. This research method would draw upon links between the researcher and the management of the case study organization, and would assist greater accessibility to personnel and documentation.

The focus upon a particular rugby organization - a provincial rugby union which was moving into the era of change and was located reasonably close to the researcher - allowed qualitative research to explore participant viewpoints and frame perceived realities. The case study research in this thesis was intended to provide valuable data for rugby management in particular and considerations for sport management in general. In order to increase the applicability of the case study research to rugby organizations in New Zealand, other than the subject union, qualitative data were sought from the CEO of every first division rugby union in New Zealand.

The interview was the principal form of data collection. Thirty-three interviews were conducted, and a 100 per cent response rate to requests for interviewee involvement was gained in this area.. Interviews were conducted with the six managers of the subject union and the nine members of the Board of Directors. One staff member was interviewed after that individual requested further input into the research. The CEO of every 1996 first division provincial union was interviewed, as was the CEO of the second division union which was the first to make adaptations to its governance structure. The president of the case study organization was interviewed, as was the immediate past chairman. This latter individual was important as he was also the current deputy-chairman of the national union, and involved in the changes made to introduce the corporatization process.

In the team management area, the current coach and the team manager of the union's representative team were interviewed. The assistant coach of the previous season was interviewed, as it was perceived by other respondents that he was a deep thinker about changes the organization was undertaking, and was perceived to be articulate in expressing these thoughts. The coach of the national team was also interviewed, and this opportunity was greatly valued by the researcher. A second interview in the national domain was that conducted with the national union's Director of Coaching. The final respondent was the sport media personality Murray Deaker, who was the only respondent in the research to request his name be used with his comments.

Questionnaires were distributed to the chairmen of each of the twenty-one clubs in the province. It was originally intended that the delegates to the Council of Club delegates be the representatives of each club to complete questionnaires, but after discussions with the Rugby Manager it was decided that the chairmen be the target population. This decision was made because the Rugby Manager explained that chairmen made more important decisions affecting club rugby than the delegates, and also had a better perception of wider club considerations. Seventeen of the twenty-one chairmen responded to the questionnaire, which was mailed to their home address with a stamped self-addressed envelope. The response rate of 81 per cent was gained on the third mail-out. While a response rate of 100 per cent was the stated aim, the response rate gained was pleasing. Literature reviewed suggested response rates for mail out questionnaires was usually low.

Questionnaires were also distributed by mail to the ten staff members. As with the club chairmen questionnaire, a personalized covering letter accompanied each questionnaire, as did a stamped self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire form was used for this group in order to provide a 'voice' for their perspectives.

13.1 THE PEOPLE ELITE PROVINCIAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT

The first body of results gained in the present study was in response to the first research question: *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?* Four areas of population were studied - managers, staff, directors and club chairmen.

None of the management had experience in sport management before being appointed. Data underlined perceptions of the lack of experienced sport managers at a senior management level. As a concern, this was enforced by a similar situation with the staff, where no respondent had had administrative experience in a sporting organization prior to the current organization.

As was recognized by respondents early in the interview process, the professional backgrounds of the Board members emerged as one of the defining characteristics of the corporatization process of the organization. Each of the directors was a success in their own profession, and the external directors, especially, are perceived to form one of the most highly qualified Boards in New Zealand management.

After initial informal discussions with respondents and other sport managers, it was believed that club chairmen, as amateurs, would hold a range of differing occupations, and this proved to be correct. A diversity was also apparent in the management backgrounds of CEOs from other unions, which further enforced the lack of a string sport management field in New Zealand. These eight respondents were believed to be divided into two groups - those CEOs who represented the old position of the Executive Director, and those who represented the present and future nature of the CEO position.

A positive aspect which emerged in the answer to this research question was the identification of a trend toward more highly qualified individuals being involved in provincial rugby management. The management held a wide range of qualifications, while a high number of the older staff held no formal qualifications. The Board also held a low level of qualifications, with progressive knowledge coming through in-house training. The majority of club chairmen held either professional or trade qualifications. Four of the seven first division CEOs held no formal qualifications. This image of a low level of qualification throughout the rugby management field seems accurate, although recent appointees in the subject union have clearly raised the standard of qualifications.

Playing experience was believed to have been common to managers of the game, and this proved true in all cases except the management level. Of the four departmental managers, three have no significant experience in the participation of the game. The relevance of playing experience for managers was believed to lie in understandings of industry and the people involved in it, although it was believed by some respondents that this understanding could be gained through experience in the industry. Of the nine Board members, only one had not played to club senior level, and three had played provincial rugby. All three male staff respondents had played rugby, while none of the five female respondents had. As was expected, club chairmen had often had a long playing experience, but not reached higher levels.

This research thus provided an answering frame for the question on the type of people involved in provincial rugby management.

13.2 PROFESSIONALIZATION AND CORPORATIZATION IN PROVINCIAL RUGBY

The research then moved to focus on the second research question: *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?.*

With the literature review failing to uncover relevant research literature related to boards of directors in sports organisations which have been corporatized or professionalised, the research for this chapter did not have a base with which data could be compared, and from which comparative research insights could be drawn. Despite this and, in part because of this, it was felt that the current research would have special relevance to the sport management field in New Zealand, as it offers sport managers a realistic picture of such change and challenge and provides a research account which may readily be replicated.

It was found that the principal impact of corporatization was the introduction of a new governance structure. As was perceived during the researcher's time in the organization during the previous year, the Management Committee structure of the subject union had become outdated and inappropriate for the demands of contemporary provincial rugby management. This structure was also criticised for handicapping opportunities for managerial competency development and innovative practices of employees, thus restricting development of the union and its managers. The introduction of the Board structure was the primary characteristic of the corporatization process, and served to both empower and challenge competencies of the organisation's managers. The Board was intended to establish a vision, a structure for that vision's realization and oversee the broad development of policy to meet changing demands of competition, commercial forces and professionalism.

Corporatization increased the degree of internal departmentalisation in order to improve organisational efficiencies. The four managers - Marketing Manager, Finance and Administration Manager, Rugby Manager and Director of Coaching - now headed their own clearly differentiated departmental grouping. This move increased concerns over existing communication problems, with inter-departmental communication being emphasised, while the communication gap between staff and management continued to cause concerns.

Soon after the corporatization process was introduced, in a relatively controlled manner by the governors of the union, professionalism was introduced to first class rugby in an unplanned manner. This was fortunate for the research as it allowed primary observation of the first steps of the professionalization process in provincial rugby.

The researched rugby organisation is likely to become increasingly bifurcated. The affects of professionalization have increased the existing orientation of the support structures of union's the premier team, while the amateur game at club level remains largely untouched by such a commercial orientation. The new forces will also enhance corporatization

processes within the commercial side of the organization, which may be seen as reflecting professional sporting organizations throughout the world, while the amateur side may be seen as reflecting amateur sporting organizations throughout New Zealand. The board of nine was large for a New Zealand provincial rugby union but still represented a major reduction from a club oriented Management Committee to a business oriented Board.

The literature review reflected viewpoints such as that of Dobrzynski (1993) in supporting a supposition that smaller Board size is optimal. In a major poll Korn / Ferry International surveyed 327 large North American companies and, in a second by Spencer Stuart and Associates, which canvassed 55 of the biggest American companies. Both found that boards are getting smaller, "heading toward the dozen members experts believe is optimal" (p.26). Dobrzynski (1993) states that this is because "smaller boards can more easily discuss issues. And individuals in small groups take responsibility more personally" (ibid.). This trend is observed in the boards of two major New Zealand companies, where the privately owned company Telecom has ten directors on its Board, while state-owned Coal Corporation has seven directors.

The subject union was found to have a simplified structure, with only two *internal directors* (appointed from the club representative Council of Delegates) and seven *external directors* from outside existing rugby structures. These latter directors do not have existing formal links with rugby bodies, and are selected primarily for their expertise in areas of corporate management such as marketing and finance. The Board chosen clearly had outstanding collective abilities in these areas. No divergent beliefs on the role of the Board emerged from the interviews. Such consensus centred upon perceptions of the Board setting policy and its provision of advice and guidance to the rugby organisation's senior management. This is in accord with a corporatization process, and directly reflects the corporate dimension of the Board's role. Given the strong corporate ethos in the governance structure, it was surprising that a subcommittee structure was retained in conjunction with the Board. This bridging mechanism from the old to new structures caused problems for the external directors. There would be value in a joint Delegate and Board group critically appraising the role and efficiency of the subcommittees.

The literature review also noted two studies which showed that "boards continue to cut insiders in favour of outsiders" (Dobrzynski, 1993, p.26). This description has mixed applicability to the situation of rugby management. Insiders at different rugby structure levels can be considered as representatives of: club structures, be it of clubs themselves or club governance structures (e.g., the Council of Delegates); sub-unions or unions (e.g., the large rural unions); special representation such as of schools or Maori; and geographical regions such as zones (e.g., with the New Zealand

Rugby Football Union), or states (e.g., in the Australian Rugby Football Union). The primary reason given for the inclusion of such persons is that there needed to be a retention of traditional rugby administrators within new governance structures. As one CEO says, "It is important in a rugby organisation to have some rugby people there with an extensive knowledge of the game". However an equally important reason for the presence of these individuals, as seen by respondents, is the ultimate voting power to they have to introduce, accept or reject proposed governance changes and the resultant need for them to have a say in the new system.

The governing body under corporatization, the union's Board, did not have the CEO as a member. One provincial union does have such a place, but no strong body of opinion in the present study supported (or suggested) such a move for the subject union. The review noted Rechner and Dalton's (1991) argument that the major reason for placement of the CEO on the Board is that it provides a clearer focus for objectives and operations: "The reason the positions of chairman and CEO are usually combined is that it provides a single focal point for company leadership. There is never any question about who is boss or who is responsible. This is an important issue" (Anderson and Anthony, 1987, as cited in Rechner and Dalton, 1991, p.155).

While these authors note an increasing tendency for United States' firms to adopt this CEO 'duality' placement in the corporate structure, they also recognise concerns of this system that have been expressed in management literature in Japan, Germany, France and West Germany (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Concerns in this area, such as role ambiguity and lack of complete Board autonomy if the CEO were a full Board member, were not reflected by present respondents to any significant degree.

Unlike most corporate boards, the directors of the subject rugby union are volunteers. In interviews with these individuals, the researcher discussed with them their motivation for accepting positions on the Board. The warmth and passion they exhibited in responses to this question portrayed the devotion they have to the organization and game but this may also have a negative impact, with the directors becoming too involved in the organisation's operational management. Some respondents indicated one individual was becoming too powerful on the board, and his dominance was retarding an emergent culture. This concern was reinforced by comments upon the selection process of the new CEO.

The Board's relationship with the CEO was an important part of the corporatization process. The CEO resigned during the research period. As this issue was explored, a body of opinion was discerned which indicated a belief that this resignation was driven by the Board. The attitude of the

Board toward this individual also conveyed what some respondents felt was a lack of confidence in him.

The Board was not notably effective during the research period. This apparent inactivity drew sharp criticism from some respondents, notably sport critic Murray Deaker. Defenders of the Board identify the turbulence of the external environment for this apparent inactivity, and some apportioned blame to apparent deficiencies of the former CEO. Not one Board member expressed surprise or regret at the Board's lack of effectiveness during the research period.

From this examination of the Board, the results chapters moved to a discussion of the CEO position, and affects of corporatization and professionalization upon this. The literature review had earlier enforced the importance of this position in organizations, and the corporatization process appeared to confirm this, with the position being greatly affected by that process.

Increased commitment of the new CEO to the professional team were perceived by respondents, as were the CEO's coordinative competencies as departmentalization became more formalized. The marketing dimension of the CEO role is now greatly emphasised, as the professionalization process demanded greater revenue generation. Another important finding was that the data indicated the position had become entirely managerial rather than a hands-on operational role. This enforced the empowerment noted in Chapter Nine, and differentiated the position significantly from CEO positions in Management Committee governed unions.

This point also proved to be a major justification of the Board in accepting the resignation of the former CEO, who was perceived by them to be an administrator rather than a corporate manager. This individual had a loyal following from his managers and staff, which clearly emerged in interviews with them. However, the Board were firm in their belief that he must be replaced, and he eventually resigned from his position. It is unclear whether the Board confronted that CEO and informed him of their desire to replace him, or whether they inexorably increased pressure on him knowing at some point he would tender his resignation. Either way it appeared from matching a variety of informant comments that the move was perceived as being driven by the Board, although only one respondent explicitly noted this.

The changing role of the CEO position in elite contemporary provincial rugby management was clearly portrayed in the data gained on the perceived qualities needed by the new CEO. Vision and strategic thinking were stressed by the majority of respondents, as were abilities in the human resource management area. A sporting background was considered

as a desirable but not essential aspect of the individual's profile. This enforced the corporatization priorities of the position.

Moving another step down the governance ladder, the affects of the dual processes of professionalization and corporatization on the organizational departments were analyzed. The first area discussed was that of office facilities of the case study union. It appeared the management changes had little affect on these, which remained inadequate. Central to this problem was the lack of space, which leads to a lack of privacy and confidentiality (A solution for this problem was proposed at the conclusion of the research period, within the case study organisation).

The literature review noted the need for businesses to have modern technology. The organization had surprisingly outdated computer facilities. The availability of personal computers is now adequate, but networking and software problems continued. This area of weakness was clearly enforced by the emphasis on computer skills as the most desired skills by union staff. Staff training and development has been lacking in recent years, and corporatization has led to a greater emphasis on efficiencies, which includes the maximisation of human resources. For this reason the Finance and Administration Manager gave assurances to correct these deficiencies.

The effectiveness of the marketing department emerged as the most openly and deeply criticised facet of the organisation's operations. This was a clearly emergent theme throughout all respondent groupings, and especially strong amongst Board members. Central to these concerns were questions over decisions and directions in marketing, particularly focused upon the effectiveness of the Marketing Manager. The professionalism process raised concerns over the amount of revenue being generated by this department. Literature reviewed indicated the critical importance of marketing in contemporary sport organizations. Problems were perceived in the areas of sponsorship, where increased revenue is vital to finance expenditure in other areas. This importance was evidenced in October, 1995, when the chief executive of a first division union joined a Chamber of Commerce trade mission to Japan. A report of the venture stated that "The union wanted to boost revenue by exploring commercial relationships, with a view to sponsorship from some of the big companies" (Wellington chases, 1995, p.2:7). Combined with the previous examples, this occurrence portrays the developing links between sport and corporate business. Other concerns in the marketing area were expressed over the competitions in which the team competes, a lack of parochial support, ticket sales, season ticket sales and match entertainment. The emphasis placed on this organizational function was made clear by the strength of Board members and the CEO in the marketing area.

A major role of the coaching and development department of the rugby organization is the recruitment and retention players and coaches, a role that was not visibly affected by the dual processes of change. This department was clearly successful in its operations, evidenced by the amount of quality players emerging from development programmes and positive research responses. However an area of weakness did appear with the lack of success of the club coaching coordinator scheme. Major problems for the department also exist in the area of retention of players in the rugby game on their leaving secondary school.

The importance of club rugby was stressed by many respondents. This was mirrored in the literature review. The perception of clubs being nurseries for the representative professional level has also been expressed by elite players. Subsequent to the literature review stage of this present study All Black Mike Brewer reinforced the importance of club rugby, stating that "Rugby must keep on top of looking after the grassroots with the funds from the professional end of the game. We need the infrastructure to nurture players at school, club and provincial level, because without it we won't have the highly skilled players coming through that are needed for the professional section of the game" (Brewer, 1995, p.7). Further weight is given to this view by the response of a subject union director, who explained that "If we don't continue to attract people into the game at the base level, we won't continue to have this reservoir of talent that invariably has been our, and New Zealand's, strength".

Professionalization and corporatization were not expected to impact upon the nature and role of club rugby and this proved, overall, to be the case. The data gained in the research indicate that club rugby is perceived as remaining the base in the immediate future, for providing playing opportunities for children and adults, a vehicle for players moving toward the elite level and those descending from participation at that level, and a setting for those who will never play elite rugby. Professionalization is expected to increasingly regulate the provision of material rewards to players at this level but amateurism is expected to initially remain the dominant ethos in club rugby.

The corporatization process did effect the governance of club rugby. Whereas previously the Management Committee had overseen this function, the introduction of the Board to replace the Committee meant a new body was needed to govern club rugby, and the Council of Club Delegates was constructed. This structure was openly criticised, with respondents expressing frustration and, at times, despair at the quality of personnel being appointed to this body by clubs. This frustration was caused by poor decisions emanating from the Council, which remains plagued by problems which had led to the dismantling of the Management Committee.

The research data revealed the professionalization process had impacted significantly upon the team management area. Qualitative interviews revealed that the traditional role of the team manager was widely recognised as being outdated and redundant. Professionalism, respondents perceived, demanded a team manager with enhanced managerial competencies and responsibilities. This, in turn, would relieve the CEO from some duties. The new manager of the team was believed to need competencies synonymous with corporate management - financial skills, human resource management and time management, which indicated the processes of corporatization and professionalism affecting this area.

Similarly, the coaching position was perceived by some respondents to be changing to become more holistic. However this belief was challenged by other data indicating that core dimensions of the position would remain focused on winning rugby games, and thus the position will not change greatly. This issue was discussed by the media during the selection process of the new All Black coach, in which the successful applicant espoused enhanced duties for the coach. As elite coaching is perceived to be moving toward a more scientific and managerial role, support staff are increasing in importance to assist the coach with a variety of specialised areas. These support staff are also becoming valuable due to the increased number of games and intensive training sessions. In order to limit expenditure and meet this demand, the data indicated that support staff would increasingly be paid for their part-time services, whereas they were commonly voluntary in the past.

The professionalization process will affect the players more than any other group in the organization. They have become contracted employees of the national rugby union. A strong trend in the data enforced perceptions that the players did not understand the changed realities and implied employee responsibilities of being professional athletes and, in particular, the increased commitments the roles now bring. These data were reflected in related literature which emerged during the research period. The lack of knowledge of contractual law by elite rugby players also emerged as a clear theme in contractual literature, and was confirmed by researcher discussions with rugby managers and players.

An English survey found that 83 per cent of British clubs do not believe their players "really understand the disadvantages of being tied to contracts" ("What the clubs say", 1995, p.19). Alan McColm, a British player agent, noted "I don't believe many of the players who are contemplating being professional realise the implications. They would be well advised to sit alongside a rugby league player and see the manner in which they have to conduct their lives and see the implications of a contract" (McColm, 1995, p.33). The present research raised, but did not resolve, the

question of whose responsibility it was to educate the players in the reality of being professional contracted athletes.

Further evidence for this perceived lack of understanding by the players was provided by England's rugby captain Will Carling. Carling expressed the belief that "It will be a culture shock for players. They will have to fulfil their obligations. I think if you ring up your club and say 'I'm sorry I'm going to a wedding this Saturday' you'll be told, 'no you're not'" ("They said it", 1995b, p.B18). Such control measures were also observed by Campbell (1995), who noted that "Players will no longer be able to play wherever they want in the off-season - Wallabies [Australian national players] applying to play the off season in Italy and France have been flatly rejected", and they were also unable to participate in invitation tournaments in places such as Dubai, Punta del Este and Bermuda (p.64). Conversely, Campbell notes, players will be ordered to attend union and sponsors' functions. The present research indicated concerns that the players did not yet understand their contractual obligations and also noted a range of views that rugby management should be compelling greater public relation involvement and employee commitment from contracted players.

The research findings also indicated that players should retain a form of employment or vocational training. This view was particularly strongly emphasised by respondents from the team management grouping. It was felt these interests outside the rugby area would make the individual more well-rounded, which was thought to be important for younger players. This was evidenced by the emergent literature during the research period. F.McDonald (1995) observed that All Black Jeff Wilson, who works for an international sportswear company, had had to cut back on his work time because of the "huge demands of rugby" (p.22). Wilson was quoted in this literature as stating that "you've got to plan for post-rugby. There's no way I'm just a player" (ibid.). Mourie (1995b), a former captain of the national team, expressed similar beliefs by noting that "As a rugby community we need to establish that the ability of players to successfully make the transition out of the game and back into the 'real' world is an important one for the future of the game's standing in the community" (p.46).

Fogarty (1995b) cited the belief of the Marketing Manager of the NZRFU that the All Blacks Club had a clear role assisting players with jobs, education and financial advice. This individual was quoted as saying "We believe the players play better football when they have got a work ethic and they've got a job to go to...it might not be so heavy in terms of responsibility for a year or two, but certainly we see the players as having an all-round lifestyle. But we don't see them as being fulltime professional athletes" (p.B5).

Players' unions and players' representatives are thought to have become more common in the changing rugby climate. While no data were gained on the area of players' unions, respondents believed formal representation of players in the governance structures of New Zealand rugby will increase, and has already done so in one provincial union. Formation of *The Rugby Union Players' Association* in Britain reflects a developing focus on the subject of players' unions, associations and representatives. The Australian Rugby Union in the research period also formed a players' association. This association had two members on the Board of Directors of the Australian union, one of whom had full voting rights.

The contractual form of elite rugby in New Zealand was seriously criticised by respondents. Players are contracted to the national body, and are presently not sub-contracted back to provincial unions. This situation was considered by respondents to be illogical, and not apparent in any other professional sporting competition. This contractual situation reduced the direct links between players and the union management. Other concerns were expressed over differing levels of payments in the contracts, the need for the inclusion of win bonuses and the growing use of players' agents in New Zealand rugby.

The use of transfer systems to regulate movement of players was advanced in the responses of several individuals. This reflected an emerging debate in rugby literature. A report was released later in the research period which revealed that 83 per cent of clubs believed there should be an official transfer system so that clubs can receive compensation for the loss of their best players ("What the clubs say", 1995). However this restriction on player movement has been the subject of legal challenges in European soccer during the research period. This legal aspect of the transfer system was noted in the literature of Rowell (1995) who is involved in the elite level as a coach, and observed that "Clubs around the world are there to win and if they can recruit a major talent from another country, I do not see them being stopped. Any legal challenge to a regulation attempting to resist this trend would centre on restraint of earnings" (p.23).

Elite young players are becoming a more valuable resource in professional rugby, which has increased efforts by the case study organisation to protect the depth of their developing players from other unions. Controlled player movement was advanced as a means of allowing the development of young subject union players but in a wider spectrum this increased player movement is believed to threaten the already diminishing depth of the smaller unions. Dalton (1995) noted the subject union's Director of Coaching expressing supportive comments on scholarships for players. The CEO of a players' company was cited by Johnstone (1995n) as explaining that:

> The younger players need to be set right with career opportunities and education so that they don't become totally professional players without skills. Rugby is a rough, tough game, and players generally have a short lifespan at the top. What we want to establish is help before they get to that All Black level where the commitment is obviously a lot greater. Then they will have some skills and education to fall back on and are employable at the end of their careers (p.B6).

13.3 SUMMARY AND REVIEW

This chapter discussed the major research results and the emerging research information. A broad profile of the people governing the case study union was developed and indicates a strong business professional dimension and past involvement in playing rugby.

The corporatization and professionalization of elite provincial rugby was discussed in some length and a range of issues, for researchers and rugby managers, has emerged from the present research. The Board has a corporate ethos and distinctive reorganization intended to enhance function and performance of the union structure has occurred. A range of perspectives of the changes was discussed and responses indicate that the Board has not yet made the corporate impact that was expected. Effective marketing is a particular challenge for the subject union. The present study now draws upon the discussion and the research results to formulate a set of conclusions from the research.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This final chapter summarises the findings of the research study. Recommendations for rugby and sport management and for further research are made, which draw upon the results of the study. This chapter includes the researcher's critical reflections upon the study.

14.1 Conclusions
14.2 Reflections on the Research
14.3 Recommendations
14.3.1 Recommendations for rugby management
14.3.2 Recommendations for further research
14.4 Concluding Statement

14.1 CONCLUSIONS

The genesis of this masterate research lay in a sport management practicum carried out by the researcher in the case study organization for four months in late 1994. During this time an awareness and understanding was gained of the challenges facing the management of the elite provincial rugby game in New Zealand. These challenges were expected to actualise in 1995, when the corporatization process was to be introduced to the organization. In addition it was understood that the professionalization process would impact upon the union in the near future, but the introduction of this could not be accurately foreseen due to the turbulence of the external environment. Reflections upon these factors led to the researcher formulating questions for possible academic investigation.

Once the focus of the research had been established, three tentative research questions for the masterate research were framed. Two of the questions were not answered by the literature and consequently became the essential guidelines for the research:

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*
- *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

Qualitative methodologies were developed, primarily drawing upon case study, interview and questionnaire techniques, to be used with a prominent provincial rugby union to elicit perspectives of union persons on domains of the two research questions. The results from the research were oulined in Chapters Six to Twelve. The results, and the discussion of these in Chapter Thirteen, provide the basis for the following conclusions.

The first focus of research results sought perceptions to answer: *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?* The study drew the following conclusions.

1. Managers of the subject union have a professional background in marketing or financial areas. They are becoming increasingly qualified, but remain inexperienced in sport management. Only half of them have a notable playing experience in rugby, but all except one have an extensive playing background in organised sport. As a group they are all European males, and not experienced in being members of boards.

2. Staff were inexperienced in sport administration before being appointed to the union, but are becoming more qualified. Over half are female, which creates a gender discrepancy in comparison to the management. If male, they have played rugby for a significant amount of time. They are of varied age.

3. All external Board members have extensive experience in corporate management. As a group, they have a great amount of experience on boards. Nearly the whole Board played rugby to club senior level, while they commonly played provincial rugby. All males, they do not hold a high degree of formal qualifications. The Board members have accepted office as they have a love of rugby and enjoy the elite sport environment.

4. Club chairmen are entirely male, and hold a variety of occupations, but commonly are engaged in the areas of finance and management. They are usually aged between 40 and 69, and usually hold professional or trade qualifications. These individuals usually had extensive playing careers, but did not reach representative levels. They commonly played for the club they now administrate, but not at club senior level.

5. CEOs of first division unions are entirely male, and nearly all European. They have mixed qualifications, but tend towards the unqualified. They usually did not have sport management experience prior to their current positions. Most reached club senior level when they played. All played rugby.

6. It may be concluded that the present study's findings reflect the research of Cameron (1992). The field is almost totally Pakeha (European), and the management strata is entirely male. Respondents usually played rugby, and often to club senior level. A trend is apparent in rugby management toward more qualified and experienced sport managers at staff and management level, and more corporate management experience at CEO level.

The second question of the research study led to an examination of changing demands upon rugby management, asking: *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

The following conclusions were drawn.

7. The corporatization process had its significant affect in changing the governance structure of the organization. A Management Committee structure of elected club representatives was altered to be named the Council of Club Delegates in this change, and charged with governing club rugby. In its place was introduced a Board of Directors to articulate a vision and chart the strategic planning of the union.

8. Corporatization of the Board led to the empowering of managers in the organization but placed additional performance pressures on those managers. The corporatization process also led to a structural change in the organization, with the union being delineated into four specialised departments. This departmentalization increased the degree of bifurcation in the organization, with two of the departments (marketing, finance and administration) being commercially oriented, and two operating in a non-commercial emphasis (coaching and development and clubs).

9. The Board of the case study organization had nine members, which was large but not unusual for provincial rugby. It had an uncharacteristically simplistic makeup, with two internal directors drawn from the Council of Delegates, and seven external directors. All other elite provincial unions had fewer outside directors. CEOs sat on some unions' Boards, as did other individuals such as representatives of the sponsors and representatives of Maori rugby, but this was not the case with the subject union.

10. The role of the Board is to set policy and advise senior management. The Board has retained subcommittees, an action which has caused complications for directors involved on these. subcommittees, especially, has been criticised for the amount of time it consumes.

11. The directors volunteer their time for no remuneration, which complicates time commitments.

12. The Board was not notably effective during the research period, which drew criticism from a small respondent population but, overall, was seen as being engaged in a 'settling down' period..

13. The CEO position assumed an executive nature at the apex of the organization's paid management structure, whereas it had previously been considered to have strong administrative and hands on components. This change is perceived by respondents to have been important in the resignation of the existing CEO, as he was perceived by directors to have been "administratively biased". The CEO position will increase as the focal media point of contact. The extent of change to the CEO position was believed to have been evidenced by the resignation of the CEO during the research period. There were enormous amounts of pressure placed by corporatization and professionalization on this ndividual, and there were differing perceptions of his reaction to hese pressures.

14. The professionalization process has placed greater emphasis on the public relations of the organization, as a strong positive relationship with the public is perceived by respondents to be linked to ticket sales.

15. Vision and strategic thinking were the most desired competencies sought in CEOs of rugby unions, as were abilities in the human resource management area. A sporting background was considered a desirable but not essential aspect of the individual's profile. A sport management background was considered valuable.

16. The office facilities of the case study organization were considered inadequate to deal with the increasing pressures of corporatization.. Computer problems were a concern of the staff. The lack of staff training has also been a source of frustration and disappointment for a number of staff members, and a weakness in the human resource management of the organization.

17. The professionalization process increased the emphasis on revenue generation, and this in turn emphasised the role of marketing in attracting customers. There was widespread concern over the marketing operation of the union. Central to these are concerns over operations of the Marketing Manager.

18. Competition structures, sponsorship problems, widely recognised lack of parochial public support for the union's senior team, lack of ticket sales and inadequacies of the entertainment are of concern to those incolved in provincial rugby management.

Although highlighted and exacerbated by the corporatizationa and professionalization forces, the roots of these perceived concerns lay in the pre-Board period.

19. The role of the Coaching and Development department is not perceived to have been changed by the corporatisation or professionalization processes. The success of this department was widely noted, but major problems for the department exist in the area of retention of players in the rugby game on their leaving secondary school. The club coaching coordinator scheme is significant, but not all clubs participate, probably to their detriment.

20. The professionalization process has made the existing role of the team manager outdated and redundant. The position was considered to have adopted new responsibilities in the financial and resource management of the professional team, which would demand greater competencies, such as financial skills, human resource management and time management.

21. A clear conclusion on the elite union coach role did not result from the research, with a perspective of the role being more holistic than previously contrasting with the belief that preparing a winning team is the dominant requirement. The use of support staff will become more extensive to meet increased playing and training demands. To meet these demands, it is thought more support staff will be used, and paid, on a part-time basis. This is intended to adequately meet the players' demands and limit expenditure in this area.

22. The research reinforced the importance of the players in the professionalization process. An equally strong conclusion was that the players did not understand the realities and implied employee responsibilities of being a professional athlete and, in particular, the increased commitments this role now brings. Most respondents concurred that the players should retain a form of employment or vocational training. This view was particularly strongly emphasised by respondents from the team management grouping. The professionalization process also was perceived to increase the importance of players' unions and representatives are thought to have become more common in the changing rugby climate.

14.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH

On reflection it would have been beneficial to interview representatives of the national union, although the former chairman of the subject union who was interviewed was also the deputy-chairman of the national union. If these individuals had been interviewed the findings would have becn increasingly generalisable to national sporting organizations in addition to provincial ones. However the primary aim of research was to understand the affects of corporatization and professionalization upon the management of a provincial union. In addition the size of the case study organization is larger than nearly all other sport-specific organizations in New Zealand, and thus the organizational aspects may be directly applicable to national sporting organizations.

It is clear from the methodology that the players were not involved in generating data and having input into the research. At the outset it was planned that questionnaires would be distributed to each of the players in the senior representative squad, and interviews were intended to be held with a selection of the team's senior players. When this was discussed with the team manager, he explained the coach did not want the players being disturbed in such a way during the season and suggested that questionnaire distribution and data collection would proceed immediately following the grand final of the domestic competition, in which the representative team of the union was involved.

Plans for the elite province's players to participate in the research became complicated with the national team leaving the country for an international tour four days after the final and, in addition, the subject union had planned a tour for its emerging players to South America at the same time. These two tours took the bulk of the representative squad out of the country for three weeks late in the research period. It was decided that the remaining time period was not sufficient to distribute the questionnaires, conduct interviews and adequately analyse the data. While this situation was regrettable, the emphasis of the research was on the management of the union, and not the players. The research would have been enhanced by the input of the players, but was conducted with success without their input. The team's management were involved in the research process and data were gained on perceptions of issues affecting the team.

Overall, the researcher felt that appropriate methodologies had been utilised. The critical importance of relating to an interviewee was noted informally by respondents whom the researcher had met in the preceeding practicum. that relationship proved valuable in facilitating frank discussion in the research period. The methodologies proved demanding, with each interview transcibed by the researcher to ensure accuracy in recording. In retrospect the researcher was satisfied with the basic structure and operation of the research.

14.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

14.3.1 Organizational recommendations for rugby managers

This research was intended to provide understandings, not finalise recommendations for the union used as the case study. However a number of considerations arose which the researcher felt should be presented in order to provide a focus for the subject union and sport managers facing changes through corporatization and professionalization.

- The directors of the subject union should critically consider their first year, the shift in roles and their allocation of time. Staff could beneficially be involved in such a review process, which could include a review of the efficacy of the revised structure and operations.

- Linkages between the union management and clubs should be reviewed. This review should include an examination of club personnel expertise.

- The organization should disband the Boys Management Board and Junior Management Board. These two club governance bodies needlessly absorb scarce human resources in the administration of club rugby, and have little direct authority in their areas of jurisdiction. With these two boards disbanded, the clubs would have more human resources available for other tasks.

- Development of strategic planning for clubs should be developed by the union. This could include addressing issues such as the implications of amalgamation.

- A clear policy on the elite team is needed, which outlines a changing manager role and includes workshops on a brief programme to inform players on the obligations and responsibilities inherent in their professional roles.

- The CEO should emphasise to his managers the importance of communicating with their staff. The method of communication must be the choice of each manager, but steps should be taken to ensure existing weaknesses in the communication between staff and management be rectified.

14.3.2 Academic recommendations for further research.

- Further research be carried out into sport-specific organizations. With increasing emphasis on the business component of sport management, more detailed research must be conducted into sporting organisations such as the one used in this case study research in order to formulate a body of research for management to draw upon.

- Research studies should be made of senior management in New Zealand sport. While J.Cameron (1993) and the current study present valid data regarding the backgrounds of sport managers in New Zealand, there are existing weaknesses in this field. With the small range of research into decision makers and organizational shapers who manage sport, such studies could replicate the present research, with other levels of rugby or variant sporting codes or examine national sport organization management.

- Specific research into player roles and responsibilities in professional sport would have potential value.

- Similar research should be undertaken into the national union, in order to identify differing affects of the professionalization and corporatization processes on national sporting bodies from those at the provincial level.

14.4 CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The professionalization and corporatization processes are a dominant feature of contemporary New Zealand sport management. This research started out with three proposed research questions regarding such forces and elite provincial rugby management. The literature review adequately answered the first of these questions, which considered the historical forces acting upon elite provincial rugby management. The two other proposed questions were unanswered by the research questions. These were

- *Who are the people involved in elite provincial rugby management?*

- *How do the professionalization and corporatization forces affect elite provincial rugby management?*

In order to answer these questions, the researcher used New Zealand's largest provincial rugby union as a case study, and employed extensive interviewing as the primary data collection method. This qualitative research was complemented by the use questionnaires.

The research found that rugby managers are under-qualified and inexperienced in sport management, although this characterization is changing. Nearly all individuals in rugby management have a playing background in rugby, although

not considered as important as when the game was amateur. The industry in New Zealand remains exclusively male at senior management level, and exclusively pakeha (European) also.

The most apparent affect of the professionalization and corporatization is the introduction of a Board of Directors to replace a Management Committee. This change also created a focal point of change on the CEO position. In order to structurally adapt to the changes, the case study organization evolved to a more departmentalized structure. The professionalization process was perceived to alter the roles of the team coach and manager, and greatly affect the players in a direct manner. Clubs were perceived to be the least affected area of rugby management by the dual processes.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:
STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

[SUBJECT] RUGBY FOOTBALL UNION

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

Code:
(This code is used only in checking off returns)

Please read the question and options fully before responding.

PART A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1. AGE
(Please tick the appropriate box)

UNDER 30	
30 - 39	
40 - 49	
50 - 59	
60 - 69	
70 AND OVER	

A2. GENDER: MALE____ FEMALE _____

A3. MARITAL STATUS (Please tick one)

MARRIED / WITH PARTNER ____

SINGLE ____

A4. NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS UNDER 18 YEARS _____

A5. QUALIFICATIONS (Please specify)

BACHELORS DEGREE	
MASTERS DEGREE	
DOCTORATE	
UNDERGRADUATE DIPLOMA	
POSTGRADUATE DIPLOMA	
TRADE QUALIFICATIONS	
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS	

A6. NUMBER OF YEARS PLAYING RUGBY
(Please tick appropriate box)

NEVER PLAYED	
1 - 4	
5 - 9	
10 - 14	
15 - 19	
20 - 24	
25 OR MORE	

A6b. IF YOU PLAYED RUGBY, WHAT IS THE HIGHEST PLAYING LEVEL YOU ACHIEVED?
(Please tick appropriate box)

SCHOOL	
CLUB	
CLUB SENIOR	
NATIONAL AGE / GRADE	
PROVINCIAL SENIOR	
NATIONAL SELECTION (eg. NZ XV, Maoris, Universities)	
FOREIGN NATIONAL (eg. Manu Samoa, Tonga)	
ALL BLACK	

PART B: RUGBY ADMINISTRATION

B1. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU WORKED AS A PAID EMPLOYEE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION], AND OTHER SPORTING ORGANIZATIONS?
(Please tick the appropriate box)

NUMBER OF YEARS	[SUBJECT UNION]	OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
0 - 4		
5 - 9		
10 - 14		
15 - 19		
20 - 24		
25 OR MORE		

B2. HAVE YOU EVER HELD AN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION IN RUGBY AT CLUB LEVEL?
(If yes, please briefly outline the position(s) and length of time held)

NO ____

YES

_____

_____

B3. WHAT ARE THE THREE MAJOR SKILLS REQUIRED FOR OUR PRESENT POSITION AT THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

B4. ARE THERE ANY SKILLS YOU WISH TO ACQUIRE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE YOUR ROLE AT THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

B5. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE OFFICE SETUP AND FACILITIES AT THE [SUBJECT UNION] OFFICES?
(Please tick the appropriate box)

SEVERELY INADEQUATE	
POOR	
ACCEPTABLE	
GOOD	
EXCELLENT	

PLEASE COMMENT _____

_____

_____

B6. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please tick in appropriate box)

VERY POOR	
POOR	
AVERAGE	
GOOD	
VERY GOOD	

B7. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NZRFU?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

VERY POOR	
POOR	
AVERAGE	
GOOD	
VERY GOOD	

B8. IN 1994, THE [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE WAS REFORMED. DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS RESTRUCTURING?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

I'M NOT AWARE IT OCCURRED	
AWARE BUT NO UNDERSTANDING	
VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING	
SOME UNDERSTANDING	
GOOD UNDERSTANDING	
FULL UNDERSTANDING	

B8a. IF YOU ARE AWARE OF THE RESTRUCTURING, DO YOU BELIEVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE RESTRUCTURING?
(Please tick one box)

SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED	
SLIGHTLY WEAKENED	
NO CHANGE	
SLIGHTLY IMPROVED	
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED	

PLEASE EXPLAIN_____

_____

_____

B9. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE?

VERY POOR	
POOR	
AVERAGE	
GOOD	
VERY GOOD	

PLEASE EXPLAIN_____

_____

_____

B10. WHAT DO YOU PERCEIVE TO BE THE MAJOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE TO BE?

STRENGTHS_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

WEAKNESSES_____

_____

_____

_____

B11. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?

_____

_____

_____

_____

B12. TO WHAT EXTENT, IDEALLY, DO YOU BELIEVE A PROVINCIAL RUGBY UNION SHOULD BE RUN AS A BUSINESS?
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS IS THE CASE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please indicate your response by placing a tick in the appropriate box of each column)

EXTENT OF BUSINESS EMPHASIS	IDEALLY	[SUBJECT UNION]
NON-BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
LITTLE BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
SOME BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
MOSTLY BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
TOTAL BUSINESS EMPHASIS		

PLEASE COMMENT_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

B13. IF THE [SUBJECT] UNION WAS TO MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM, WHAT MANAGEMENT CHANGES DO YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY?

PLEASE COMMENT_____

_____

_____

_____

B14. HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE [SUBJECT UNION] WOULD BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM WITHIN THE UNION?

NO CONFIDENCE	
LITTLE CONFIDENCE	
UNDECIDED	
SOME CONFIDENCE	
TOTAL CONFIDENCE	

PLEASE EXPLAIN_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

B15. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER ASPECTS OF PROVINCIAL OR NATIONAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT ON WHICH YOU WISH TO COMMENT?

PROVINCIAL_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

NATIONAL

APPENDIX B: STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

PART A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1. AGE
(Please tick the appropriate box)

UNDER 30	4
30 - 39	1
40 - 49	3
50 - 59	0
60 - 69	0
70 AND OVER	0

A2. GENDER: MALE 3 FEMALE 5

A3. MARITAL STATUS (Please tick one)

MARRIED / WITH PARTNER 3

SINGLE 5

A4. NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS UNDER 18 YEARS:
2, 2, 3, 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0,

A5. QUALIFICATIONS (Please specify)

- None
- Trained Teachers Certificate; Primary Service
- B. Comm
- Senior Bus. Cert
- Diploma in Sport and Recreation, Certificate in sport and recreation; relevant reception and secretarial courses
- None
- Half a PE degree

A6. NUMBER OF YEARS PLAYING RUGBY
(Please tick appropriate box)

NEVER PLAYED	5
1 - 4	0
5 - 9	0
10 - 14	1
15 - 19	1
20 - 24	0
25 OR MORE	1

A6b. IF YOU PLAYED RUGBY, WHAT IS THE HIGHEST PLAYING LEVEL YOU ACHIEVED?
(Please tick appropriate box)

SCHOOL	0
CLUB	1
CLUB SENIOR	1
NATIONAL AGE / GRADE	0
PROVINCIAL SENIOR	0
NATIONAL SELECTION (eg. NZ XV, Maoris, Universities)	1
FOREIGN NATIONAL (eg. Manu Samoa, Tonga)	0
ALL BLACK	0

PART B: RUGBY ADMINISTRATION

B1. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU WORKED AS A PAID EMPLOYEE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION], AND OTHER SPORTING ORGANIZATIONS?
(Please tick the appropriate box)

NUMBER OF YEARS	[SUBJECT UNION]	OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
0 - 4	6	0
5 - 9	2	1
10 - 14	0	0
15 - 19	0	0
20 - 24	0	0
25 OR MORE	0	0

B2. HAVE YOU EVER HELD AN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION IN RUGBY AT CLUB LEVEL?
(If yes, please briefly outline the position(s) and length of time held)

NO 5

YES 2 - Rugby committee at a club for two years, senior coach for two years
- Coaching coordinator at a club for three years

B3. WHAT ARE THE THREE MAJOR SKILLS REQUIRED FOR YOUR PRESENT POSITION AT THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1	2	3
Be well organised	Able to communicate well	Cope with pressure
Knowledge of rugby	Organisational skills	Communication
Organisational	communication	People Skills
Customer focus	Time management	
Confidentiality	Professionalism	Accuracy
People skills	Organisational skills/ reception/ secretarial experience	
Communication	Knowledge of rugby	Time management / organisation
Customer focused	Patience	Computer skills

B4. ARE THERE ANY SKILLS YOU WISH TO ACQUIRE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE YOUR ROLE AT THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1	2	3
Computer skills	Managerial training	
Computer skills		
Computer courses		
PR course	Computer course	
Computer skills	Presentation techniques	

B5. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE OFFICE SETUP AND FACILITIES AT THE [SUBJECT UNION] OFFICES?
(Please tick the appropriate box)

SEVERELY INADEQUATE	2
POOR	3
ACCEPTABLE	2
GOOD	1
EXCELLENT	0

Comments - Initial response in brackets

- *(Poor)* - "Getting worse. Too many people in too small a working space. Too many outside people having access to office during and after office hours. Continuing problems due to inefficient computer programme package"
- *(Acceptable)* - "Need to be more space provided for office staff. Coaching coordinators have one room for three staff. Need to develop further rooms"
- *(Acceptable)* - Could be improved to ensure more efficiency
- *(Severely Inadequate)* - "I am working under very cramped conditions where five people share an office meant for three people maximum. These conditions are getting worse every year. Some Days you have 20 to 30 people walking through the office"
- *(Severely Inadequate)* - "The systems are outdated, office space is at a premium. Procedures are non-existent and major duplication occurs"
- *(Poor)* - "From a confidentiality and accuracy / total concentration level it is becoming increasingly difficult to work in an office room with four people and others sometimes amounting to 8 - 10 people"
- *(Poor)* - "Not enough office space for number of staff"
- *(Good)* - "Restricted area to work in due to space or lack of"

B6. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please tick in appropriate box)

VERY POOR	1
POOR	0
AVERAGE	4
GOOD	3
VERY GOOD	0

B7. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NZRFU?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

VERY POOR	1
POOR	2
AVERAGE	4
GOOD	1
VERY GOOD	0

B8. IN 1994, THE [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE WAS REFORMED. DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS RESTRUCTURING?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

I'M NOT AWARE IT OCCURRED	1
AWARE BUT NO UNDERSTANDING	2
VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING	0
SOME UNDERSTANDING	1
GOOD UNDERSTANDING	4
FULL UNDERSTANDING	0

B8b. IF YOU ARE AWARE OF THE RESTRUCTURING, DO YOU BELIEVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE RESTRUCTURING?
(Please tick one box)

SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED	0
SLIGHTLY WEAKENED	0
NO CHANGE	2
SLIGHTLY IMPROVED	4
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED	0

Comments - Initial response in brackets

- *(No Change)* - "Apart from a lot of meetings and countless courier parcels, we have seem no effect. Pre-match entertainment is at an all-time low. I thouglit the Board of Directors had the final say regarding pre-match entertainment (curtain raisers, etc)"
- (*Slightly Improved*) - "The adoption of a Board of Control has been a positive change. Decisions made here will have more meaning than before"

- *(No Change)* - There does not seem to be any communication between management and staff. We have had two meetings with the staff through the year, and one was about our contracts"
- *(Slightly improved)* - "I haven't been here very long, however I believe this change is a step in the right direction"
- *(Slightly improved)* - "The top management seem more accountable and perhaps very slightly more professional"
- *(No response)* - "Haven't been at the union long enough to know how it was before. The restructuring happened when I first started
- *(Slightly Improved)* - "The process of change will take time 'Rome wasn't built in day' but will eventually be of great benefit"

B9. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE?

VERY POOR	1
POOR	0
AVERAGE	4
GOOD	2
VERY GOOD	0

Comments - Initial response in brackets

- *(Very Poor)* - "No communication. They seem to be too busy all the time. Skilled at their specific roles, though"
- *(Average)* - "Still need to look at the Council of Delegates structure. It seems to be too cumbersome. Too many delegates looking after their own patch rather than working for the good of our union"
- *(Average)* - "Over the last few years the subject union has grown so quickly management has struggled to keep up. Very poor communication between management and staff"
- *(Average)* - "There is still room for improvement. It is still very 'old fashioned' in that 'things are done that way because they have always been done that way'"
- *(Average)* - "The management, excluding the Board, is of average ability, they haven't had much exposure to senior management positions before and are slightly out of touch with management skills and PR skills, and a growth in this industry. The union has just employed two people with degrees - an accounting and a marketing executive, so this should perhaps improve"
- *(Good)* - "You know who's who, who's in charge of what areas, and to who you should report"
- *(Good)* - "Needs improvement"

B10. WHAT DO YOU PERCEIVE TO BE THE MAJOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE TO BE?

- "Dedication. The recent efforts in meeting subject union clubs', demands cannot be faulted"
- "The Board of Directors have excellent credentials to carry rugby through. The professionalism of the subject union is still ahead of most unions"
- "Personnel - Many have been in the organisation for years - experience"
- "Major strengths are perhaps their understanding of rugby and how to deal with TV, radio etc".
- "We are leading the way in provincial rugby in NZ, in the procedures that are being put in place"

WEAKNESSES

- "Some delegates are incompetent and are only there for their own interests. Marketing of the union very poor"
- "Marketing of the game especially pre-match needs further attention. Although elite players deserve the attention, the union needs to look at players below and look after the after the future of the subject union (ie secondary schools, U-19, U-21, Colts etc)
- "Attitude - not extremely positive. Resistant to change and technology" "Their marketing and advertising budget is far too low to promote and excite the public. They need new innovative ideas"
- "There is not enough communication between various departments and committees. Operations are quite often very disjointed. 'The right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing' so to speak"

B11. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT] UNION?

- "Change the voting structure of the Council of Delegates. The clubs must think more about the good of rugby overall. The CEO needs help with his diverse workload"
- "A fulltime rugby employment and careers adviser would be an asset. This person would be in charge of assisting in the placement of players in jobs, tertiary education etc"
- "Communicate. Let us know what is happening"
- "Plenty! New improve premises, better equipment, better communication"
- "Perhaps a management consultant team firm to interview staff and suggest a few changes to make the organisation more professional and also much bigger offices and quieter working conditions, without all these old rugby people coming into the office and walking around checking on you, and having a social chat. This will have to change, definitely. Perhaps top management should be kept quite separate from all the committee people who volunteer their services through the rugby season, these people still want involvement of top management in their decisions, eg. hospitality side of proceedings on match days"
- "A weekend away to talk about common goals and where we are headed for office administration staff would be most beneficial"

B12. TO WHAT EXTENT, IDEALLY, DO YOU BELIEVE A PROVINCIAL RUGBY UNION SHOULD BE RUN AS A BUSINESS?
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS IS THE CASE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please indicate your response by placing a tick in the appropriate box of each column)

EXTENT OF BUSINESS EMPHASIS	IDEALLY	[SUBJECT UNION]
NON-BUSINESS EMPHASIS	0	1
LITTLE BUSINESS EMPHASIS	0	0
SOME BUSINESS EMPHASIS	0	2
MOSTLY BUSINESS EMPHASIS	5	3
TOTAL BUSINESS EMPHASIS	3	2

Comments - Initial response in brackets

- *(Ideal = total, Subject = some)* - "Due to professionalism changes must be made to keep up but not to lose sight of the heritage of the game of rugby and its significance to the Kiwi culture"
- *(Ideal = total, Subject = total)* - "In this day and age rugby must be run professionally. This is paramount in order to retain players and keep the public happy with regard to the image of the subject union"
- *(Ideal = mostly, Subject = none)* "The subject union should realise they are now in a professional environment. Everybody will expect them to be a professional organisation, not just a club set up"
- *(Ideal = mostly, Subject = mostly)*- "It has to be run with 'Mostly business emphasis', as due to the current changes happening, ie. going professional and also it is a large organisation, and therefore requires certain structures and procedures to be in place so that it can run efficiently"
- *(Ideal = mostly, Subject = mostly)* - "The subject union consists of 21 clubs so they should still have a representation. It is important that players and administrators at the 'grass roots' level have a say, and are able to express their views"
- *(Ideal = mostly, Subject = some)* - "The subject union is a very informal environment that only has some degree of business to it"

B13. IF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNION WAS TO MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM, WHAT MANAGEMENT CHANGES DO YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY?

- "The management would be made up of specialist people not keen amateurs. This team of people are a separate entity to club rugby administration"
- "Probably a streamlining of positions already in place to make these more specific to the areas of need"
- "The management might be communicating with one another but that's where it seems to stop"
- "More staff, because the workload will increase drastically, new offices, and more modern technology, eg. a new switchboard"
- "The professional team would have to be managed independently but in conjunction with the [subject union]"

B14. HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE SUBJECT UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM WITHIN THE UNION?

NO CONFIDENCE	0
LITTLE CONFIDENCE	0
UNDECIDED	1
SOME CONFIDENCE	4
TOTAL CONFIDENCE	3

Comments - Initial response in brackets

- *(Total Confidence)* - "Provided the right people are put in place, in the right positions, with very clear guidelines"
- *(Some Cconfidence)* - "At the moment the people employed by the union are doing a good job and are capable of adjusting to change"
- *(Undecided)* - "They would certainly need more qualified personnel who have had experience in this domain"
- *(Some confidence)* - "Given all of the above the subject union should be very successful in, managing a professional team"
- *(Some confidence)* - 'I think that the change to professional rugby would be managed well by the subject union. We have a good team"
- *(Total confidence)* - "But only if suitable personnel are put in place to market, mange and administrate the team"

B15. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER ASPECTS OF PROVINCIAL OR NATIONAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT ON WHICH YOU WISH TO COMMENT?

PROVINCIAL

- "Very concerned with the way the [subject union] is being marketed, re: poor advertising, lack of merchandise facilities, not enough ticketing outlets
  - Rugby public's demands are not being met, complaints re: sound systems, entertainment, *curtain raisers*
  - Unprofessional hired staff eg. stewards, ticketing
  - Pubic complaints tend to be ignored
  - Profile of the team needs to be improved
  - Threat of the Warriors (league) had been underestimated and not met head on"

- "It is important with the advent of professionalism that the [subject union] do not neglect the grassroots of rugby in primary schools and secondary schools. These are the next generation coming through, and we need to make sure that parents and their children can see the union as assisting them at this end of the scale, not financially but in practical terms
  - With this in mind the coaching staff are vital to this area as are club coaching coordinators"
- "Most unions are attempting to improve their management which is encouraging"

NATIONAL

- "Needs to institute the Boston report recommendations and eliminate the boats voting system. Needs to get the correct people with the correct skills for the roles required within management"
- "The NZRFU must really get more information and details confirmed in order for the unions to do their job properly. They also need an 'attitude adjustment' programme to go through"
- " The NZRFU must make sure the smaller areas are looked after in terms of resources and finances. many of these areas are the backbone of rugby in New Zealand"
- "The national union has been very slow to accept change, and move with the times. They should be in a position to take a lead role"

APPENDIX C:
CLUB QUESTIONNAIRE

[SUBJECT] RUGBY FOOTBALL UNION

CLUB CHAIRMAN QUESTIONNAIRE

Code:
(This code is used only in checking off returns)

Please read each question and options fully before responding.

PART A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1. CLUB POSITION CURRENTLY HELD
(Please tick appropriate position)

CHAIRPERSON ____
OTHER (Please specify) _____

A2. AGE
(Please tick the appropriate box)

UNDER 30	
30 - 39	
40 - 49	
50 - 59	
60 - 69	
70 AND OVER	

A3. GENDER: MALE ____ FEMALE ____

A4. MARITAL STATUS (Please tick one):

MARRIED/WITH PARTNER ____

SINGLE ____

A5. NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS UNDER 18 YEARS: ____

A6. OCCUPATION: _____

A7. QUALIFICATIONS
(Please specify)

BACHELORS DEGREE	
MASTERS DEGREE	
DOCTORATE	
UNDERGRADUATE DIPLOMA	
POSTGRADUATE DIPLOMA	
TRADE QUALIFICATIONS	
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS	

PART B: RUGBY BACKGROUND

B1. NUMBERS OF YEARS PLAYING RUGBY
(Please tick one box)

NEVER PLAYED	
1 - 4	
5 - 9	
10 - 14	
15 - 19	
20 - 24	
25 OR MORE	

B1b. IF YOU PLAYED RUGBY, WHAT IS THE HIGHEST PLAYING LEVEL YOU ACHIEVED?
(Please tick appropriate box)

SCHOOL	
CLUB	
CLUB SENIOR	
NATIONAL AGE / GRADE	
PROVINCIAL SENIOR	
NATIONAL SELECTION (eg. NZ XV, Maoris,Universities)	
FOREIGN NATIONAL (eg. Manu Samoa, Tonga)	
ALL BLACK	

B2. HAVE YOU PLAYED RUGBY FOR THE CLUB YOU REPRESENT AS CHAIRPERSON?

YES _____ NO _____

B2b. IF YES, HOW MANY YEARS DID YOU PLAY FOR THIS CLUB?
(Please tick one box)

1 - 4	
5 - 9	
10 - 14	
15 - 19	
20 OR MORE	

B2C. DID YOU PLAY AT SENIOR CLUB LEVEL FOR THE CLUB YOU PRESENTLY ADMINISTER?

YES _____

NO _____

PART C. RUGBY ADMINISTRATION

C1. NUMBER OF YEARS AS A CLUB ADMINISTRATOR
(Please tick one box in each column)

NUMBER OF YEARS	PRESENT CLUB	ALL CLUBS
0 - 4		
5 - 9		
10 - 14		
15 - 19		
20 - 24		
25 AND OVER		

C2. POSITIONS HELD IN CURRENT CLUB
(Please specify and note years in position(s))

POSITION	NUMBER OF YEARS HELD

C3. HOW MANY HOURS PER WEEK DO YOU DEVOTE TO YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES?
(Please tick the appropriate box of each column).

NO. OF HOURS	IN SEASON	OFF SEASON
0 - 4		
5 - 9		
10 - 14		
15 - 19		
20 - 24		
25 - 29		
30 - 34		
35 - 39		
40 OR MORE		

C4. PLEASE BRIEFLY OUTLINE THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR YOUR CURRENT POSITION.
(If holding more than one position, please outline the process for one position, and state the position)

_____ _____

_____

_____

_____

C5. IN YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE, DO YOU DRAW UPON ANY SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE OR QUALIFICATIONS FROM YOUR OCCUPATION OR AREAS OF TRAINING ?

NO ____

YES (Please specify) _____

_____ _____

_____

C6. WHAT ARE THE THREE MAJOR SKILLS REQUIRED FOR YOUR PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

C7. ARE THERE ANY SKILLS YOU WISH TO ACQUIRE WHICH WOULD FURTHER FACILITATE YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE?
(Please list in order, 1 being most important).

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

C8. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMPETITION TO HOLD YOUR CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION CHANGED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?
(Please tick one)

COMPETITION HAS DECLINED DRAMATICALLY _____

COMPETITION HAS DECLINED SLIGHTLY _____

COMPETITION HAS REMAINED STATIC _____

COMPETITION HAS INCREASED SLIGHTLY _____

COMPETITION HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY _____

C9. HAVE YOU EVER ATTENDED A SEMINAR, WORKSHOP OR TRAINING SESSION DIRECTLY RELATED TO YOUR CURRENT RUGBY ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION?

NO ___ (Go to C9b)

YES ___ (Go to C9c)

C9b. HAVE ANY SUCH COURSES BEEN MADE AVAILABLE?

YES ____ NO ____

IF YES, WHO ORGANISED THESE? .....

C9c. PLEASE SPECIFY AND COMMENT ON THEIR RELEVANCE

_____

_____

C10. IF A COURSE OR WORKSHOP DIRECTLY RELATED TO YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION WAS OFFERED, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR INTEREST IN ATTENDING THIS.
(Please tick one response)

DEFINITELY UNINTERESTED _____

PROBABLY UNINTERESTED _____

UNCERTAIN _____

PROBABLY INTERESTED _____

DEFINITELY INTERESTED _____

C11. PLEASE INDICATE ANY FULLTIME ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS EXISTING AT YOUR CLUB, AND BRIEFLY OUTLINE THEIR TASKS.

_____

_____

_____

PART D: LINKAGES WITH THE [SUBJECT] UNION

(Note that in the following questions the term [subject union] management refers to the fulltime administrators operating at the [subject union] offices, not the Council of Delegates or Board of Directors)

D1. HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES THE COUNCIL OF CLUB DELEGATES HAVE ON THE [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGEMENT?
(Please indicate by ticking one response)

TOTAL INFLUENCE _____

A LARGE INFLUENCE _____

SOME INFLUENCE _____

LITTLE INFLUENCE _____

NO INFLUENCE _____

PLEASE EXPLAIN_____

_____

_____

_____

D2. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SATISFACTION WITH THE TREATMENT OF CLUBS BY THE [SUBJECT UNION] OFFICE ADMINISTRATION.
(Indicate by ticking the appropriate response)

COMPLETELY DISSATISFIED _____

PARTIALLY DISSATISFIED _____

NEUTRAL _____

PARTIALLY SATISFIED _____

COMPLETELY SATISFIED _____

PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER

_____

_____

_____

D3. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE FORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION YOU HAVE WITH THE [SUBJECT UNION] THROUGH THE COUNCIL OF DELEGATES?
(Please explain your answer)

YES ___

NO ___

_____

_____

_____

D4. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please indicate by placing a tick at the appropriate response)

VERY POOR _____

POOR _____

AVERAGE _____

GOOD _____

VERY GOOD _____

D5. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NZRFU?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

VERY POOR _____

POOR _____

AVERAGE _____

GOOD _____

VERY GOOD _____

D6. IN 1994, THE [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE WAS REFORMED. DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS RESTRUCTURING?
(Please indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box)

I'M NOT AWARE IT OCCURRED	
AWARE BUT NO UNDERSTANDING	
VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING	
SOME UNDERSTANDING	
GOOD UNDERSTANDING	
FULL UNDERSTANDING	

D6b. IF YOU ARE AWARE OF THE RESTRUCTURING, DO YOU BELIEVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE RESTRUCTURING?
(Please tick one response)

SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED _____

SLIGHTLY WEAKENED _____

NO CHANGE _____

SLIGHTLY IMPROVED _____

SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED _____

PLEASE EXPLAIN _____

_____

_____

D7. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE?

VERY POOR _____

POOR _____

AVERAGE _____

GOOD _____

VERY GOOD _____

PLEASE EXPLAIN_____

_____

_____

_____

D8. WHAT DO YOU PERCEIVE TO BE THE MAJOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE?

STRENGTHS

_____

_____

_____

WEAKNESSES

_____

_____

_____

D9. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNION?

_____

_____

_____

D10. TO WHAT EXTENT, IDEALLY, DO YOU BELIEVE A PROVINCIAL RUGBY UNION SHOULD BE RUN AS A BUSINESS?
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS IS THE CASE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?
(Please indicate your response by placing a tick in the appropriate box of each column)

EXTENT OF BUSINESS	IDEALLY	SUBJECT UNION
NON-BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
LITTLE BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
SOME BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
MOSTLY BUSINESS EMPHASIS		
TOTAL BUSINESS EMPHASIS		

PLEASE COMMENT

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

D11. IF THE [SUBJECT UNION] WAS TO MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM, WHAT MANAGEMENT CHANGES DO YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY?

PLEASE COMMENT _____

_____

_____

_____

D12. HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE [SUBJECT UNION] WILL BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM WITHIN THE UNION?

NO CONFIDENCE _____

LITTLE CONFIDENCE _____

UNDECIDED _____

SOME CONFIDENCE _____

TOTAL CONFIDENCE _____

PLEASE EXPLAIN

_____

_____

_____

_____

D13. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES PRESENTLY FACING CLUB RUGBY ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHOULD BE NOTED BY PROVINCIAL, AND NATIONAL, ADMINISTRATORS?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

D14. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER ASPECTS OF CLUB, PROVINCIAL OR NATIONAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT ON WHICH YOU WISH TO COMMENT?

CLUB_____

_____

_____

_____

PROVINCIAL_____

_____

_____

_____

NATIONAL_____

_____

APPENDIX D:

CLUB CHAIRMAN QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

PART A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1. CLUB POSITION CURRENTLY HELD

- Chairperson +
- Council of Clubs delegates and Junior Management Board delegate
- Council of Clubs delegates
- President
- President
- President
- Junior Management Board delegate, Club captain
- President

A2. AGE
(Please tick the appropriate box)

UNDER 30	0
30 - 39	0
40 - 49	6
50 - 59	8
60 - 69	3
70 AND OVER	0

A3. GENDER: MALE 17 FEMALE 0

A4. MARITAL STATUS (Please tick one):

MARRIED/WITH PARTNER 15

SINGLE 2

A5. NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS UNDER 18 YEARS:

0 dependants = 12 responses
1 dependants = 2
2 dependants = 3

A6. OCCUPATION (n=15):

- Technical Photographic Manager
- Company Director
- Chartered Accountant
- Dean
- Manager
- Managing Director
- Machine Operator
- Manager
- Company General Manager
- Property Consultant
- Chartered Accountant
- Unemployed
- Loss Prevention Officer
- Painting Contractor
- Retired
- Personnel consultant
- Inspections officer

A7. QUALIFICATIONS (n= 15)

- Electrical Trade certificate
- ACA
- ACA
- Doctorate
- Certificate of Engineering
- Purchasing Diploma
- Bachelors Degree
- Post-Graduate diploma and professional qualifications (Diploma in Urban Valuation, MPMI, ANZIV)
- NZ Society of Accounts (Public practice)
- Seaman
- (Trade Qualifications)
- (Police Officer)
- Licensed Customs Agent
- (Trade qualifications)

PART B: RUGBY BACKGROUND

B1. NUMBERS OF YEARS PLAYING RUGBY (n=15)

NEVER PLAYED	0
1 - 4	2
5 - 9	2
10 - 14	5
15 - 19	2
20 - 24	2
25 OR MORE	3

B1b. IF YOU PLAYED RUGBY, WHAT IS THE HIGHEST PLAYING LEVEL YOU ACHIEVED? (n=15)

SCHOOL	0
CLUB	10
CLUB SENIOR	5
NATIONAL AGE / GRADE	1
PROVINCIAL SENIOR	0
NATIONAL SELECTION (eg. NZ XV, Maoris,Universities)	0
FOREIGN NATIONAL (eg. Manu Samoa, Tonga)	1
ALL BLACK	0

B2. HAVE YOU PLAYED RUGBY FOR THE CLUB YOU REPRESENT AS CHAIRPERSON? (n=17)

YES 10 NO 7

B2b. IF YES, HOW MANY YEARS DID YOU PLAY FOR THIS CLUB? (n=10)
(Please tick one box)

1 - 4	2
5 - 9	2
10 - 14	3
15 - 19	1
20 OR MORE	2

B2C. DID YOU PLAY AT SENIOR CLUB LEVEL FOR THE CLUB YOU PRESENTLY ADMINISTER? (n=10)

YES 3

NO 7

PART C. RUGBY ADMINISTRATION

C1. NUMBER OF YEARS AS A CLUB ADMINISTRATOR
(Please tick one box in each column)

NUMBER OF YEARS	PRESENT CLUB (n=18)	ALL CLUBS (n=6)
0 - 4	8	2
5 - 9	1	3
10 - 14	2	1
15 - 19	5	0
20 - 24	2	0
25 AND OVER	0	0

C2. POSITIONS HELD IN CURRENT CLUB

NUMBER OF POSITIONS HELD	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (n=15)
1	3
2	4
3	4
4	3
5	1

Position	Number	Years
Chairman	12	12, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 4, 1, 6, 4, 1, 3
JMB Delegate	3	4, 11, 3
Senior Delegate	2	1, 11,
Committee	5	2, 18, 16, 10, 9,
Coaching	1	10
Club Captain	2	5, 12
Secretary	1	2,
President	3	1, 5, 3
Manager	2	3, 9
Treasurer	2	2, 12
Junior Boys Captain	1	3
Junior Boys Treasurer	1	2
Junior Boys Chair	1	1
Old Boys Committee	1	12

C3. HOW MANY HOURS PER WEEK DO YOU DEVOTE TO YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES?
(Please tick the appropriate box of each column).

NUMBER OF HOURS	IN SEASON	OFF SEASON
0 - 4	0	5
5 - 9	2	6
10 - 14	7	1
15 - 19	1	3
20 - 24	3	1
25 - 29	1	0
30 - 34	1	0
35 - 39	0	0
40 OR MORE	2	1

C4. PLEASE BRIEFLY OUTLINE THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR YOUR CURRENT POSITION (n=16)

6 = Committee elected at AGM, which elects chairman
3 = Members vote at AGM..."Ten Board of management (BoM) members are elected being five at the AGM of which two are for two years terms and five are elected by club committees. After each set of elections (annually) the BoM elects its own chairman. I am one of the 2 year elected members
1 = 'By nomination'
4 = elected at AGM
1 = 'Election'
1 = "Prior to the AGM suitable prospects are approached re availability. Almost annually the sole nominee is pre-arranged. Occasionally more than one person is nominated with selection by vote"

C5. IN YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE, DO YOU DRAW UPON ANY SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE OR QUALIFICATIONS FROM YOUR OCCUPATION OR AREAS OF TRAINING ? (n = 14)

NO 1

YES 13

- Basic Business Experience as management
- General Bus strategies and planning
- Financial management
- Chairmanship, public relations, management skills; Fiscal and people (human resource skills
- Management skills
- Management experience; running own company
- Fundraising, financial
- Financial management; people skills, broad based administration and systems management
- Executive management training; property matters
- Financial management; people skills; some marketing knowledge; general business skills
- Dealing with public
- Man management
- Dealing with people,
- Management, marketing, people-management, computer skills, interview/selection
- Man management, legal matters, maintenance of clubrooms

Dealing with people / HRM	8
Management skills / experience	8
Planning	1
Financial Management	5
Chairmanship	1
Public Relations / Marketing	3
Fundraising	1
Property Management	1
Computer skills	1
Interview / Selection	1
Legal	1
Clubroom maintenance	1

C6. WHAT ARE THE THREE MAJOR SKILLS REQUIRED FOR YOUR PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION?

1	2	3
Communication skills	Basic accounting and business practice	
Organisational	Financial planning	Facilitating
Open mindedness	Financial	Enthusiasm
People	Management	Financial
Business Skills	Man Management	Planning
Control	Delegation	Being Positive
Ability to chair a meeting	Communication skills	Co-ord committee activities
Communicative	Able to handle disappointments	Firm
Financial	People	Administration
Financial and business skills	Leadership	Correct plans to develop playing strength
Dedication	Delegation	Jack of all trades
Communicating with people	Earn respect	Balancing fiances
Man management	Organiser	Financial skills
Listen, learn to be positive	Communication	Patience
Judgement	Direction	Man-Management
Man management		
Leadership - direction	Organisation	Encouragement

C7. ARE THERE ANY SKILLS YOU WISH TO ACQUIRE WHICH WOULD FURTHER FACILITATE YOUR CLUB ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE? (n=8)

1	2	3
Promotion skills	Finance	Computer knowledge
Patience		
Running meetings	Time management	Finance raising
Marketing	Knowledge of professionalism at club level in other codes	
Increase success	Increase playing numbers	
Marketing	Sponsorship marketing	
Meeting protocol		
Chairman course		

C8. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMPETITION TO HOLD YOUR CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION CHANGED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? (n = 17)

COMPETITION HAS DECLINED DRAMATICALLY	6
COMPETITION HAS DECLINED SLIGHTLY	4
COMPETITION HAS REMAINED STATIC	5
COMPETITION HAS INCREASED SLIGHTLY	2
COMPETITION HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY	0

C9. HAVE YOU EVER ATTENDED A SEMINAR, WORKSHOP OR TRAINING SESSION DIRECTLY RELATED TO YOUR CURRENT RUGBY ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION? (n = 17)

NO 14 (Go to C9b)

YES 3 (Go to C9c)

C9b. HAVE ANY SUCH COURSES BEEN MADE AVAILABLE? IF YES, WHO ORGANISED THESE?

YES 7
[Case study organization] (5)
Waitakere Sport (1)
Hillary Commission (1)

NO 8

C9c. PLEASE SPECIFY AND COMMENT ON THEIR RELEVANCE (n = 8)

- To create more efficient running of clubs by people who do not understand business
- Little relevance
- Cannot remember details - appeared to be specialised - e.g. sponsorship
- Very informative
- Boston Report now implemented throughout the subject union, and the clubs. It is simply progress
- Sponsorship marketing
- Excellent for members to acquire skills
- Entirely relevant -provided one has the time to devote

C10. IF A COURSE OR WORKSHOP DIRECTLY RELATED TO YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION WAS OFFERED, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR INTEREST IN ATTENDING THIS (n = 16)

DEFINITELY UNINTERESTED	1
PROBABLY UNINTERESTED	3
UNCERTAIN	4
PROBABLY INTERESTED	5
DEFINITELY INTERESTED	3

C11. PLEASE INDICATE ANY FULLTIME ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS EXISTING AT YOUR CLUB, AND BRIEFLY OUTLINE THEIR TASKS.

None = 8
Manager = 6
Coaching Coordinator = 2
Bar Manager = 1
Treasurer / Financial controller = 3

PART D: LINKAGES WITH THE [SUBJECT] UNION

(Note that in the following questions the term subject union management refers to the fulltime administrators operating at the subject union offices, not the Council of Delegates or Board of Directors)

D1. HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES THE COUNCIL OF CLUB DELEGATES HAVE ON THE SUBJECT UNION MANAGEMENT? (n = 15)

TOTAL INFLUENCE	0
LARGE INFLUENCE	2
SOME INFLUENCE	9
LITTLE INFLUENCE	3
NO INFLUENCE	1

COMMENTS

- Most decisions appear to be made at subject union level without maybe full discussion with delegates'' full knowledge
- Responsibility to the directors not the clubs
  Board of Directors has overall control. Probably too much influence as too many clubs often means that [subject union] management is inefficient
- Decisions made by the Council of Delegates are at times not actioned
- Appears the office staff dictate to the Council of Delegates - only a few of the delegates are actively involved in making constructive decisions - the rest are on a 'need to know' basis
- Appears too many issues are not being aired at club level
- Difficult, as I have not been a delegate
- There seem to be instances of conflict, e.g. changing rules of the competition part way through the season
- Subject union is the link between the clubs
- Most of their power has been taken over by the Board of Directors
  I believe their influence is beginning to increase since the acceptance of the Boston Report
- Infrequent meetings of amateurs, sometimes inefficient delegates relaying their interpretation of club's desires to a delegation from which recommendations result, is unlikely to have a large influence on fulltime paid staff who are involved, in touch with the business aspect of Auckland rugby hourly, daily, weekly
- Council of Delegates delegates help run rugby by putting club objectives forward

D2. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SATISFACTION WITH THE TREATMENT OF CLUBS BY THE [SUBJECT UNION] OFFICE ADMINISTRATION.

COMPLETELY DISSATISFIED	0
PARTIALLY DISSATISFIED	5
NEUTRAL	3
PARTIALLY SATISFIED	7
COMPLETELY SATISFIED	2

COMMENTS

- Always helpful
- Club football is taking a backseat to other advances in the game
- 1995 club competition was confusing and unhelpful
  - The subject union could not resolve club problems with BMB difficulties with council
  - Subject union administration did not help clubs with accommodation, ground problems
- At times requests are not given the action they deserve
- Direct links with [the Rugby Officer] are good, the rest do not appear to want to know you if you are not in the top six
- Some staff require some time at a club to realise what it is like at grassroots
- We are happy with our treatment, but have little feedback as to the treatment of others
- Lack or recognition of long hours contributed by unpaid volunteers, eg. as chairman and president I have extreme difficulty getting decent test tickets. More financial assistance should be made available to clubs
- Overall organisation of competitions leaves a lot to be desired with frequent changes during the season
- Clubs don't rate highly enough in priority
- [The subject union] and clubs must always strive to improve
- With the people I personally come into contact with I have no complaints
- Lack of interest in clubs' day-to-day operation
  Being a second division club is not too important to the [subject union], but I believe it is changing as the Boston Report is accepted
- We receive reasonable treatment from staff, but occasionally feel we are *not* the reason the [subject union] exists. Without clubs there would be no [subject union].
- [The subject union] still organize Sunday rugby, a lot of clubs don't want this

D3. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE FORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION YOU HAVE WITH THE SUBJECT UNION THROUGH THE COUNCIL OF DELEGATES?

YES 14

NO 3

COMMENTS

- *No* - Should interview clubs directly
- *No* - The Council of Delegates can become too much of an 'exclusive club'. A wider range of opinions would be beneficial
- *No* - The Council of Delegates are sometimes inefficient amateurs] - We are amateurs; very part-time, and of necessity have prior obligations. This prevents ideal communication.
- *Yes* - We need more direction from the Board of Directors
- *Yes* - Communication not the problem but rather the decision-making and management systems need improvement
- *Yes* - It works if the delegate communicates
- *Yes* - If our delegate was more active
- *Yes* - Usually acceptable
- *Yes* - Our delegate always keeps us informed
- *Yes* - Attend enough meetings and receive plenty of information
- *Yes* - Because if you had to wait for the union to pass things on, it would be too late
- *Yes* - Most questions are answered for us

D4. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]? (n = 17)

VERY POOR	0
POOR	3
AVERAGE	4
GOOD	9
VERY GOOD	1

D5. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NZRFU? (n = 16)

VERY POOR	3
POOR	6
AVERAGE	4
GOOD	3
VERY GOOD	0

D6. IN 1994, THE SUBJECT UNION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE WAS REFORMED. DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS RESTRUCTURING? (n = 16)

I'M NOT AWARE IT OCCURRED	0
AWARE BUT NO UNDERSTANDING	1
VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING	0
SOME UNDERSTANDING	1
GOOD UNDERSTANDING	6
FULL UNDERSTANDING	8

D6b. IF YOU ARE AWARE OF THE RESTRUCTURING, DO YOU BELIEVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE RESTRUCTURING? (n = 16)

SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED	0
SLIGHTLY WEAKENED	3
NO CHANGE	5
SLIGHTLY IMPROVED	7
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED	1

COMMENTS

- *(Slightly Improved)* - At present I don't believe that the total processes have been established as newer members are not totally familiar with the systems which were in vogue
- *(No change)* - Still average operationally
- *(No change)* - It hasn't been in affect long enough
- *(Slightly weakened)* - No firm sign of direction
- *(No change)* - No sign yet of improvement
- *(Slightly increased)* - No communication to delegates, no improvement in marketing and promotion
- *(Slightly weakened)* - Hard to indicate as there appears to be a lot of other things taking priority at this time, eg. professionalism
- *(No response)* - It is too early to tell
- *(Slightly improved)* - Since there has only been one feedback session since the change we can only base our reply on this one session. The information given at this session was more relevant than in the previous processes used for feedback to clubs
- *(No change)* - It may have improved but little evidence so far
- *(Slightly improved)* - Difficult to comment - Elapsed time is not sufficient to judge real results
- *(Slightly increased)* - This is the first year of the Board. I am sure the change is a positive for Auckland rugby
- *(Slightly improved)* - It's only in its infancy so lets give it the breathing space it deserves
- *(No change)* - The club delegate is now a lower grade to everyone
- *(Significantly increased)* - More communications and all clubs becoming important

D7. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT UNION] UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE? (n = 15)

VERY POOR	0
POOR	3
AVERAGE	8
GOOD	3
VERY GOOD	1

COMMENTS

- *(Average)* - Lack of attention to detail, e.g. filing of player records etc
- *(Average)* - No visible improvements
- *(Poor)* - No signs yet of improvement
- *(Poor)* - Lack of leadership and being treated with contempt
- *(Average)* - Needs to define definite areas of priority and communicate with clubs
- *(No response)* - Too early too say
- *(Average)* - Plenty of room for improvement in areas already addressed
- *(Good)* - A good relationship with clubs
- *(Good)* - I find communication good
- *(Average)* - Interfere in rugby too much
- *(Good)* - The Board hasn't been in long enough

D8. WHAT DO YOU PERCEIVE TO BE THE MAJOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT [SUBJECT UNION] MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE TO BE?

STRENGTHS

- "I don't believe we have any"
- "Good administration systems"
- "Great stalwarts of the game, great potential"
- "New directors *should* be independent and objective"
- "Financial, size of the organisation"
- "Directors are a strength if they had more say"
- "Resources"
- "Marketing, financial and administrative strengths of new members
- "Overall policy set by independent directors in established commercial skills
- "Theoretically the board is competent. Clubs have a vehicle to express opinions"
- "I find excellent communications with the people in the office that I personally deal with
- "More professional outlook and recognising the all teams are vital for the future"

WEAKNESSES

- "Lack of promotional activity for rugby overall. Most attention seems to be directed at the top rep team and the top four clubs"
- "Very poor marketers, only focused on rep teams"
- "Structure is not dynamic"
- "Too much influence from too many clubs on the Council of delegates"
- "Lacking promotions. Too much emphasis is placed on certain teams and clubs. Lack of open communication
- "Too many clubs and delegates"
- "Lack of understanding of true rugby people and their requirements - lack of willingness to look after the requirements"
- "Communication process need improvement, business communication is non-existent"
- "To date little visible evidence of improvement at club level - Appears to focus on reps. Are they aware of the grassroots problems facing clubs?"
- "First hand knowledge is scant, but comments given to me indicate weaknesses in key staff. I believe that many club delegates at all levels but particularly BMB level are very inadequate. There are too many freeloaders from clubs who sit on"
- "One major complaint - poor pre-match entertainment preceding some representative games. After all the public pays to see football, not some has been screaming singers of some twenty years removed"
- "No-one is accountable to many mistakes, no-one takes the blame"
- "Some members still believe that only the top echelon of rugby is professional, when all teams must be treated at the same level"

D9. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE [SUBJECT] UNION?

- "More accountability at all levels"
- "Rationalisation of some clubs. Strategic plan in management implementation"
- "More accountability through an improved administrative structure"
- "There should be three defined areas of priority - club rugby, rep rugby and marketing. Each area should be administered by its own, with a coordinator or GM to oversee it"
- "Weekly newsletters to clubs; visits to club committees by management to see how clubs do it and hear the club views, not only the delegate"
- "Ensure the positions are filled by persons with appropriate skills. Still seems amateurish in some sections, especially the area of boys rugby and competition format. Although early days, it seems doubtful that the board is familiar with basics of club rugby"
- "Give larger clubs [a more proportional vote], our club has 20% of BMB numbers, but only 5% of the vote. Wait one year to assess the Board of Directors"
- "I'm sure they are big enough and bright enough to work things out"
- "Get people who know rugby and marketing"

D10. TO WHAT EXTENT, IDEALLY, DO YOU BELIEVE A PROVINCIAL RUGBY UNION SHOULD BE RUN AS A BUSINESS?
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS IS THE CASE OF THE [SUBJECT UNION]?

EXTENT OF BUSINESS EMPHASIS	IDEALLY (n = 16)	[SUBJECT UNION] (n = 14)
NON-BUSINESS EMPHASIS	0	0
LITTLE BUSINESS EMPHASIS	0	2
SOME BUSINESS EMPHASIS	1	5
MOSTLY BUSINESS EMPHASIS	4	2
TOTAL BUSINESS EMPHASIS	11	5

COMMENTS

- *(Ideally = some, Subject = some)* - "Not all levels administered can be run on business lines"
- *(Ideally = mostly, Subject = little)* - "Too many amateur administrators, with the lowest common denominator precluding a business approach"
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = total)* - Market the game as a product we have to sell
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = total)* - Now the game is professional at national level it must be run as a complete business
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = total)* - "Although the [subject union] is run as a total business emphasis, it is ignoring the most important area and the reason they are there -the average rugby person"
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = some)* = "It appears they lose their way far too often. Perhaps even dictatorial"
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = some)* - "The subject union has changed to some business emphasis since the management restructuring"
- *(Ideally = mostly, Subject = mostly)* - "Big financial responsibility demands professional business approach but need to nurture administration (mostly voluntary) at clubs and grass roots level"
- *(Ideally - total, Subject = some)* - "[Should be totally business emphasis] particularly as the game is now professional at all levels"
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = total)* - "It has to be total business emphasis otherwise total chaos would take control"
- *(Ideally = total, Subject = no response)* - "Not possible to run a professional body and an amateur body as one, both must become one"

D11. IF THE SUBJECT UNION WAS TO MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM, WHAT MANAGEMENT CHANGES DO YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY?

COMMENTS

- "The coaching side of the team is presently adequate but a professional team would require astute and full time business commitments, with backup from a professional and business like [subject union] management team, without losing contact with the club level from whom the professionals will come"
- "Greater marketing focus to make the game an event"
- "The base of the pyramid would have to be strengthened"
- "One managing director"
- "The people with the professional ability to run it"
- "Must be completely diverse from club rugby and rep rugby - would

fall into the category of marketing"

- "Would have to be managed by a separate Board reporting to the Board of Directors"
- "It would need a business, people and resources plan. It would need to import expertise and recognise what expertise was required"
- " Professional appointment of key personnel, eg. coach, not voted by clubs where politics play a part"
- "Need for a top CEO, and a top board chairman"
- "The current management team has done a professional job in the past and will cope with ease handling a professional team"
- "The current structure is more than capable of managing the team professionally"
- "Get marketing people"
- "Subject union marketing managers to promote all teams, as they have the professional capabilities to promote all teams

D12. HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE SUBJECT UNION WILL BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE A PROFESSIONAL TEAM WITHIN THE UNION? (n = 16)

NO CONFIDENCE	0
LITTLE CONFIDENCE	3
UNDECIDED	6
SOME CONFIDENCE	6
TOTAL CONFIDENCE	1

COMMENTS

- *(Some confidence)* - "The will is there, however the way is not clear"
- *(Undecided)* - "Hope so, but doubtful with the influence of the Council of Delegates"
- *(Little confidence)* - "At present there are no clear definitions for this to happen within the current structure"
- *(Little confidence)* - "I do not consider they have the right people to do so"
- *(Undecided)* - "Too early to say under the current structure"
- *(Some confidence)* - "I think the union has generally demonstrated a willingness to try and keep up with demand. This could and should extend the professional team"
- *(Undecided)* - "Current management would struggle; directors may be ok"
- *(Some confidence)* - "the office staff would have to be more professional"
- *(Some confidence)* - "It is a learning curve for the first season"

D13. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES PRESENTLY FACING CLUB RUGBY ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHOULD BE NOTED BY PROVINCIAL, AND NATIONAL, ADMINISTRATORS?

COMMENTS

- "The promotion of rugby to competition with the activities of other sports. we must not take it for granted that rugby is the only sport"
- "All clubs will disappear unless help in funding comes from the union. Voluntary help is getting harder to get in basic administration and coaching and management"
- "More dynamic competitions to attract skilled players so that the top levels continues to receive highly skilled and motivated players. Clubs could build on better competitions to gain funding from bigger home crowds, better sponsorships, possible TV and other interests"
- "Lack of traditional funding sources. Lack of local government support for facilities and playing grounds, difficulties with recruiting and retaining players, conflict between club, provincial and national competitions"
- " Club rugby is at a low ebb, because of a lack of volunteers, therefore assistance and encouragement should be offered for smaller clubs to feed into a larger body"
- "Many club rugby administrators lack the skills and resources to function as a business, while their provinces may have an abundance it is not passed onto clubs, it is very much a sink or swim basis for many clubs"
- "The lack of money in our members' pockets, which results in the non-payment of subs, declining bar take, etc, which of course all means a financial struggle"
- "Most club rugby administrators are not trained to handle the requirements of the business approach which is necessary when you are competing with the entertainment world"
- "Increasing difficulties finding people available and willing to give up time to coach and administer. Costs of running a club with large sums of money available to rugby with the advent of professionalism there will have to be a direct trickle down to those at the coal face. Attracting parents and junior players.
- Perceived ineptitude at union and NZRFU level influences a fickle public - especially when compared with the professionalism associated with the Warriors. Need interesting local club competitions, without these club rugby support could diminish with adverse effects on finances etc"
- "Finance for the base of the game at club level now that the top players are being paid. This will put pressure on clubs to put funding of

club players, particularly at senior level"
- "Hanging on to your current players, amateurism and survival"
- "Player loss"
- "All agree to work together for rugby"
- "Lack of money. Lack of home games. Not enough support for JMB

D14. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER ASPECTS OF CLUB, PROVINCIAL OR NATIONAL RUGBY MANAGEMENT ON WHICH YOU WISH TO COMMENT?

CLUB

- "Meaningful club competitions which will stand for a number of years instead of being changed every year because of someone's whim that 'it's not working'. Players at clubs also need to know where they are going"
- "Protect the club season as much as possible. Include responsibility to play for clubs in contracts. Ensure that rep selections from younger age groups are not incestuous"
- "The recent changes to payment to players have included allowances for provincial and national mangers and coaches, but no recognition for the clubs and the changing environment for organised sport means that more and more clubs will struggle and fail. Therefore the subject union must address the future needs of clubs and put in place a strategy for rationalisation"
- "Clubs will be around for ever - how well they function will depend on the resources made available to them"
- "Committees must be mindful of results to be achieved in competitive administration of club facilities and the 'jobs for members' may in fact be the correct way"
- "Reiterate the importance of attractive senior club competitions. Club players must be important - not just the reps and All Blacks"
- "Difficult to find suitably qualified people for some roles"
- "Bring the game back to clubs with home and away fixtures"
- "All senior management should step in to direct clubs which get into financial difficulties and help them to recover. Not try to reduce number of clubs by amalgamation, more clubs, more players, more chance of honing their skills"
- "Structure the competition so teams play to their ability, not follow the seniors"

PROVINCIAL

- "Retain natural boundaries, disagree with the proposed selections for the Murdoch series"
- "Similar problem to clubs for smaller provincial unions needs addressing"
- "We spend a lot of money on developing players to play the game, but little or none at all in developing the ability to be team management or club administrators - We rely on the 'Good old club man' to make it happen - but turn a deaf ear to his requirements"
- "That the clubs form the provinces and that the 'province does not have clubs as its members'. Remember that feedback is a two-way process. For years with the [subject union] it has been essentially one way with the club delegate evoking the [subject union] position to the club and not vice-versa"
- "Poor marketing of the [subject union] rep team. poor facilities for spectators by world standards"
- "Matches to be played on Fridays under lights, or Sunday"
- "Get kids onto [the subject union's home ground]"

NATIONAL

- "Protect the All Blacks selection criteria - NZ origin. Retain Ranfurly Shield concept."
- "The main problem appears to be the poor management style / ability at national level"
- "As long as we win we're okay"
- "Need to eliminate the petty parochialism and politics which have been dictated selection of All Black coaches and elected positions on council. Should implement a system of professional selection where the best person available is selected"
- Make the All Black jersey worth more playing wise by reducing the number of tests per season"

APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW QUESTION OUTLINE

The interviews conducted for this research were of a semi-structured nature. They contained core elements which were used in each individual interview, supplemented by questions designed to gain data related to the specific area of expertise of the interview respondent. This appendix outlines the core questions which were posed to each respondent, then includes questions posed to the three main response groups - CEOs of provincial unions, management of the case study union, and members of the Board of Directors.

GENERIC QUESTIONS

- Please outline the professional background you had before attaining your current position.

- Did you have any sport management experience before this position?

- Have you gained any tertiary qualifications?

- In what ways do you think your professional background helped you perform in your role in rugby management?

- Please briefly outline your rugby playing background.

- What was the highest playing level you achieved?

- What do believe is the importance of a sporting background for managers and Board members?

- What are the major strengths and weaknesses of the [case study] union?

- What is the role of the Board in provincial rugby unions?

- What are the major threats to overcome in the transition to professional rugby?

- How do you see corporatization affecting provincial rugby management?

- How do you see professionalization affecting provincial rugby management?

- How do you see the role of the team manager and coach changing in professional rugby?

- In what ways do you think the demands on the management of elite provincial rugby are changing?

- What do you believe is the place of club rugby in the professional game?

- What do you believe are the major areas to address to strengthen club rugby?

- Whose place do you think it is to educate the players in the realities of being a professional sportsman?

PROVINCIAL CEO QUESTIONS

- Please outline the governance structures of your union and club rugby in your province.

- How would you describe the relationship between clubs and the your union? Why do you believe it is like this?

BOARD MEMBERS

- Considering your professional background and qualifications, what areas of expertise do you think you bring to the Board?

- What do think are the areas to address to strengthen club rugby in the [case study] union?

- How effective do you think the Board has been during 1995?

- What was your motivation for being on the Board of the [subject] union?

- How extensive is your experience on Boards of Directors?

ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT

- How would describe the leadership style of [the former CEO]?

- Do you think there is a leadership style [the new CEO] *should* exhibit?

- How would you describe communication within the organization?

- How effective has the Board have been during 1995?

- What factors do you think complicated the effectiveness of the Board?

- Do you have any experience on Boards of Directors?

APPENDIX F:
RESEARCH POPULATION

Respondent Grouping	Data Collection Method	Specific Positions
Board of Directors	Interview	- External Directors (7) - Internal Directors (2)
Management	Interview	- Former CEO - New CEO - Marketing Manager - Rugby Manager - Director of Coaching - Finance and Administration Manager
Staff	Questionnaire	- Personal Assistant - Receptionist - Ticketing Officer - Customer Services Executive - Rugby Liaison Officer - Rugby Officer - Accounting Officer - Regional Coaching Director (2) - Coaching Coordinator
Staff	Interview	- One staff member granted anonymity
Governance	Interview	- President - Immediate past chairman
Club Chairmen	Questionnaire	- The chairman of each of the 21 clubs in the union
Team Management	Interview	- Coach, subject union - Immediate past assistant coach, subject union - Manager, subject union - Coach, NZRFU - Director of Coaching, NZRFU
Provincial CEOs	Interview	- CEO of each other first division union (8) - CEO of one second division union
Media	Interview	- Murray Deaker