Organisational Scapegoats and Hierarchical Constraints:

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Inter-agency Collaboration within New Zealand's Public Sector

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Abstract

The legacy of the 2000s whole-of-government reform agenda promotes that public sector agencies work across the sector, encouraging an inter-agency collaborative approach to resolve the so called 'wicked problems' facing New Zealand. The initial 1980s public service reform agenda, established on a neoliberal philosophy, afforded greater decision-making autonomy to public servants and hierarchical simplification. Yet the author's experience of inter-agency collaboration as a mid-level public sector official is that, despite best intentions, it is difficult in practice due to the paradoxical requirement of autonomous decision-making power and obligation to individual departments and their Chief Executives. These paradoxes manifest as tensions between the collaborative causal powers (agency) of public servants and the structure and practices of New Zealand's Westminster system of governance that remains palpably hierarchical. This research uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a methodological means of validating this hypothesis within the context of a case study of the National Maritime Coordination Centre. This theoretically driven research presents CDA as an alternative and instructive lens that provides an enhanced understanding of the real world issues associated with collaboration within New Zealand's public sector to present possibilities for change.

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Chapter One - Introduction

The neoliberal predicated reform policies of the 1980s have irrevocably changed the structure and practice of New Zealand's public sector. In the 1970s and early 1980s, New Zealand's "cocoon economy"[1] was prised open to confront the reality of global interdependency. In 1973, Britain's entry into the European Common Market and the OPEC oil crisis catalysed New Zealand's economic deterioration. One example of these factors was that between 1974 and 1983 the New Zealand dollar lost over half its value against the U.S dollar.[2] The government's regulation of its state financial markets, its concerns over an outmoded welfare system, and its continued subsidisation of domestic industry compounded this economic decline. In 1984, New Zealand's currency crisis and the Parliamentary election paved the way for the newly elected Labour Government to enact radical changes to resolve the country's predicament. The Labour Government comprised of "avid reformers"[3] who reasoned that the liberalisation of the economy, the commercialisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs), and the introduction of managerial and institutional economic theory to reform the public sector would transform New Zealand's economic, political and public sector domains.

The first tranche of the 1980s reforms transformed the public sector through legislation, particularly the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989. Chief Executives (CEs) of public sector departments were afforded greater autonomy to make decisions in order to deliver public services in an efficient and effective manner. However, the romance of the initial reforms began to wane in light of politicians' concerns that more control was required over a permanent, unelected public sector.[4] My initial understanding was that the neoliberal concepts that espoused hierarchical simplification should have created reform conditions favourable for collaboration between departments. However, the reporting practices instigated by the 1980s reforms had the unintended consequences of creating

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[1] Allen Schick, *The Spirit of Reform: Managing the State Sector in a Time of Change* (Wellington: State Services Commission, 1996), 13, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/spirit-of-reform.

[2] "A Sick Economy was the Impetus for Reform," State Services Commission, last modified June 28, 2010, http://www/ssc.govt.nz/node/1305.

[3] "Political Leadership was Essential in Transforming New Zealand," State Services Commission, last modified June 28, 2010, http://www/ssc.govt.nz/node/1306.

[4] Richard Norman, *Obedient Public Servants? Management Freedoms and Accountabilities in the New Zealand Public Sector,* 2ed. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 149.

conditions that served to focus CEs' attention on their own department's performance, thereby reinforcing the existing vertical silos between public sector departments at the expense of departments working collectively.[5] The result was a fragmented public sector driven by a private sector philosophy to the neglect of delivering integrated and effective services to the public.

The 2000s whole-of-government reform initiatives were an attempt to re-balance the situation entailing structural consolidation, the review of departmental reporting, and the role of central agencies.[6] Promoting inter-agency collaboration as a means of delivering holistic, integrated public services was a central feature of the 2001 Review of the Centre. This pivotal document to the whole-of-government reform agenda explains the meaning of the whole-of-government as:

> "[a] term of considerable elasticity, intended to describe a subject applying to a large section, if not the entirety, of the State sector. In practice, it can mean anything from 'the entire State sector' to 'a lot of Public Service departments'."[7]

The initiative for this research was my desire to explore the apparent ambiguity in the meaning of the whole-of-government concept. My early research into neoliberalism within the context of public sector reform sustained this motivation, as well as my own and my public servant peers' experiences of working collaboratively. I therefore began examining the nature of the relationship between public sector reform and inter-agency collaboration. Consequently, I developed the research aim to enable a better understanding of why inter-agency collaboration, a seemingly logical answer to resolving the intractable problems of New Zealand, is difficult to undertake. Particularly within a sector that promotes "[b]etter Public Services" by "working across sector."[8] Therefore, what are the consequences of public sector reform for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration? This is the key research question.

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[5] Norman, *Obedient Public Servants?,* 20-21.
[6] State Services Commission, *Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre* (Wellington: State Services Commission, November 2001), 4-6,
http://www.ssc.govt.nz?upload/downloadable_files/review_of_centre.pdf.
[7] State Services Commission, *Review of the Centre,* 69.
[8] "Better Public Services," State Services Commission, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-services.

It is important to make clear that the terms 'collaboration', 'cooperation' and 'coordination' seek to explain the mechanisms through which organisations can work collectively. While other research in this domain investigates each meaning,[9] my research acknowledges McNamara's observation that no mechanism is more desirable over the other; rather the focus should remain on the results sought.[10] Accordingly, I also wish to make clear that my research of the collaborative conditions for public servants uses the terms interchangeably, rather than differentiating their technical meaning.

This research investigates a specific case study of collaboration within New Zealand's public sector. The objective is to review the case over a specified time that stems from the initial period of the whole-of-government reforms to the present day. The following section presents the reasoning, research design and selection of case study to consider the impacts of public sector reform on inter-agency collaboration.

The literature review in chapter two examines the context of the issue of the public sector reforms to frame my research question. It proceeds to review the collaborative research literature in order to propose an ontological and epistemological lens through which to establish a suitable methodological framework. There are five components to the literature review. The first focuses on the chronological debate about the progression of the reforms since their inception in the 1980s. It uses Richard Norman's research that highlights the significant paradoxes confronting public servants' decision-making power.[11] His research also emphasises the tensions of control between officials and politicians resulting from the initial 1980s devolution of decision-making autonomy, which subsequently conflicted with the principles of 2000s whole-of-government reform. A key consequence of the later 2000s reform initiatives was the re-centring of power to the State Services Commission (SSC), the

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[9] Anne Marie Thomson, James L. Perry and Theodore K. Miller, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19, no.1 (2009): 23, doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum036; Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, "Collaborative governance in theory and practice," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, no.4 (2008): 544, doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum032; Madeline McNamara, "Starting to Untangle the Web of Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration: A Framework for Public Managers," International Journal of Public Administration 35, no.6 (2012): 391, doi:10/1080/01900692.2012.655527.

[10] Madeline McNamara, "Starting to Untangle the Web of Cooperation, 391.

[11] Norman, *Obedient Public Servants?,* 18.

Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), in order to unite a fragmented public service.[12]

Second, the literature review clarifies the specific consideration of the impact of these reforms on the autonomy required by public servants engaged in interagency collaboration, particularly in a sector that, under the democratic Westminster system of governance, remains palpably hierarchical. Third, it examines the inter-organisational collaborative literature within the New Zealand public sector and in wider contexts, such as non-government organisation and government partnerships, as well as public-private sector partnerships. Fourth, the literature substantiates that the vertical and horizontal location of power between all involved actors is a critical resource for collaboration. In this context, the vertical applies to the hierarchical structure of the public sector departments and the horizontal applies between departments involved in collaboration. Finally, the literature corroborates that a critical methodological approach is required to elucidate the challenges and opportunities that eventuate for collaboration because of the underlying power relationships between actors.[13]

The literature review delineates the scope of the study; a case study of the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), which provides a viable opportunity to examine whether the context of collaboration corroborates the paradoxes of power the literature review delineates. In selecting a case study methodology, my research does not seek to make a generalised claim of the public sector. Instead, it adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the best method to reveal the challenges experienced within the collaborative practice of the NMCC, whose actors must negotiate the vertical and horizontal manifestations of power within a component of the public service. The discourse to be analysed is the language style drawn upon and used by the NMCC actors, which represents both the structural reality of their place of work within the public sector and the relationships developed between these actors.[14] Indeed, the proposed critical analysis of

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[12] Ibid., 164.

[13] Janine O' Flynn, "Crossing Boundaries: the Fundamental Questions," in *Crossing Boundaries in Public Management and Policy: The International Experience,* eds. Janine O'Flynn, Deborah Blackman and John Halligan (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 34-35.

[14] Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.

the language present in the NMCC discourse seeks to reveal power relationships previously opaque to actors.

Chapter three, the methodology chapter, establishes CDA as the methodological framework that not only situates the research objectives but exemplifies the utility of the CDA methodological framework. I explain how CDA, when applied to a case study of collaboration, explicates the what, how, and why of the situation through the study of discourse. Norman Fairclough's CDA framework is adopted as the preferred methodology. Because his extensive use of CDA to reveal the transformational qualities of neoliberal discourse and the potential of its language to shape social structures and practices is germane to my study of the NMCC actors' collaborative practice.[15] Furthermore, it demonstrates how the methods employed in the CDA consider the underpinning ontological and epistemological approaches to examining the power narratives introduced in the literature review.

Finally, chapter three explicates the methods used to examine the following research objectives:

1. Reveal the NMCC actors' construction of their inter-agency collaboration through the NMCC discourse.
2. Examine how the NMCC actors produce, distribute and interpret their collaborative discourse within their institutional setting.
3. Explain why the pre-constituted public sector structures and practices affect the NMCC collaboration.

Chapter four considers the *what* component of the discourse examined through a textual analysis of the 2006 NMCC governance text, as it is the overarching document that guides the agencies' operation of the NMCC and the expected outcomes of the NMCC collaboration. This textual analysis uses M.A.K. Halliday's concept of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and in doing so interprets the findings through an agency structure dialectic to explain the NMCC actors' construction of their collaboration within the discourse of the 2006 governance text. In this context, agency refers to the NMCC actors' causal powers to

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[15] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 4.

shape their collaborative practice that are not "reducible to the causal powers of structures and practices."[16] Accordingly, the actors shape this practice through their language but there are also structural constraints on their causal power, their agency to do so.[17] In the context of this research, the practices and structural constraints refer to the public sector and its institutions.[18]

The findings of chapter four reveal that the 2006 NMCC governance framework's language confers a low obligation for the involved departments to have regard for its guidance. Moreover, its language reinforces the vertical hierarchy of the public sector in its reference to the pre-constituted practices expected of public sector departments. The textual analysis of the 2006 Framework reveals two competing discourses, namely: the discourse of whole-of-government reforms, which the NMCC collaboration supports, and the discourse of the earlier reforms, substantiated through the 2006 Framework's discursive reference to existing individual departmental practices that limits the agency of the NMCC actors. Fairclough's application of Antonio Gramcsi's conceptualisation of power is used to interpret the findings that show there is no one fixed hegemonic discourse over time.

Chapter five employs an intertextual analysis of the 2006 Framework and other NMCC texts between the period of 2002 and 2006 to examine whether the dynamic between the two discourses within the NMCC has changed over time. In doing so, the analysis reveals *how* the NMCC actors produce, distribute and interpret the competing discourses over time within the institutional setting of the public sector. This chapter bridges the inductive phase of the CDA methodology to empirically substantiate the findings of chapter four. The intertextual analysis also reveals which linguistic traces and cues shape the NMCC collaboration and how the institutional structure of the public sector contributes to the language that the NMCC actors' use within their collaboration. In doing so, the analysis corroborates the claim that the discourse of the earlier reforms remains the dominant discourse within the NMCC texts throughout the 2002 – 2006 timeframe.

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[16] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 22.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 23.

The application of Fairclough's explanation of ideology contributes to elucidating how this dominant discourse 'contains' the whole-of-government discourse to the extent that the NMCC actors' order-of-discourse (their collaborative practice represented in their language use) becomes naturalised. Consequently, these actors no longer query why they continue to reproduce this specific order of discourse in their discursive practice. Using Jürgen Habermas's construct of means-end-logic, the chapter addresses how the NMCC's discoursal logic reveals the predisposition of neoliberal societies to adopt expedient institutional solutions without considering their potential long-term implications.

Chapter six explicates *why* the pre-constituted public sector structures and practices affect the NMCC collaboration. The ensuing discussion reveals that the NMCC order of discourse remains unchanged in the 2013 Maritime Security Committee's terms of reference, a document produced to strengthen the governance of maritime security outcomes for New Zealand; and therefore encapsulates the NMCC collaboration. The discussion proposes that the logic of the Westminster system of governance is entrenched in the structural conventions of ministerial responsibility. The result is that the later whole-of-government reforms, which promote inter-agency collaboration, create an additional layer of bureaucracy that reinforces the existing hierarchical structure of governance over the public sector. The consequence for the NMCC actors is these structures serve to reinforce their order of discourse thereby sustaining the decision-making paradoxes of power for their collaborative agency. Finally, this chapter shows how this situation compounds the vertical relationships of hierarchy and the horizontal constitution of individual departmental scapegoats, in this context the NMCC host agency – the New Zealand Customs Service.

Mindful of the existing research in the field, my research methodology marks a significant departure from existing research of inter-agency collaboration within New Zealand's public sector. More specifically the application of CDA enables this thesis to provide new insight for collaborative actors. This is because it reveals the impacts of requisite orders of discourse that not only show *what* the issues are, but more importantly CDA offers a process through which public servants such as managers and policy makers can employ their agency to *resolve* the issues. In this context the NMCC actors could utilise the recent 2013

amendments to the 1989 Public Sector Finance Act to break the cycle of repeating their order of discourse.

Chapter six addresses the research question, which is to consider what are the consequences of public sector reform for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. The findings of the research apply Fairclough's application of Basil Bernstein's concept of recontextualisation to argue that the reform policies applied to the governance of the public sector, particularly the public sectors' accountability and performance legislation that holds the government accountable to parliament for its public spending, have recontextualised the theory of neoliberalism. Inexorably, the existing discourse serves to reinforce the structure of New Zealand's Westminster political system manifesting as an enduring ideological force that the public sector perpetuates throughout the eras of reform. Indeed, this enduring discourse reinforces hierarchy rather than creating an environment supportive of the autonomy of decision-making power required for inter-agency collaboration.

Chapter Two - Literature Review

2.1   Introduction

Commencing with a review of literature concerning New Zealand public sector reform since the late 1980s, this chapter specifically considers the initial decentralisation of decision-making autonomy to public sector managers. Subsequently, it reviews the more gradual early 2000 reforms that promote a whole-of-government approach within the public sector. These reforms encourage the public sector departments to work collaboratively under a process described as *inter-agency collaboration*. The early 2000 reforms, rather than creating radical change, add a supplementary layer of complexity to the public sector's governance structure that creates additional challenges for public sector organisations seeking to engage in collaboration.

The literature regarding inter-organisational collaboration indicates a paucity of research into the relationships of power between collaborating organisations and their staff. Nonetheless, research into public sector collaboration within New Zealand shows that collaborating actors experience tension between their structure and agency. This tension, in view of the debates about public sector reform and the resulting state sector governance structure, suggests a need for an analysis of the specific points of tension collaborating public servants' experience. Accordingly, the problem of this research is to consider what the consequences of New Zealand public sector reform are for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration.

In the review of the literature concerning the explanatory frameworks employed to research collaboration, I conclude that an analysis of power will link the micro-level of collaborative practice with the macro-level of New Zealand public sector reform. For this reason, Fairclough's critical discourse analysis framework is employed, predicated on critical realist ontology. This framework creates a new approach to researching multi-agency collaboration within New Zealand's public sector, building on existing research within the field. Chapter two concludes with an outline of the research objectives.

2.2   The Events of Public Sector Reform

Fragmentation

Schick explains in the mid 1980s New Zealand was labelled a "cocoon economy,"[19] a country defined by a depleted export and state controlled economy. In 1984, the newly elected Labour government initiated radical changes to New Zealand's economy, its state owned enterprises and the public sector. The new government employed neoliberal principles to enact polices that aimed to free the economy from government control and transform the structure and practices of the public sector. This is exemplified in the State Sector Act (1988) and the Public Finance Act (1989) - legislation intended to "introduce rational, business-like efficiency"[20] to the state sector through government deregulation. The government's transformation of New Zealand's socialist style of centralised control over both the economy and the provision of services is not unique. For example, the 1980s neoliberal informed policies transformed the economies and public sectors in western democratic societies such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Australia.[21] Academics agree, however, that the New Zealand reforms of the 1980s took place at a speed and comprehension that made New Zealand an international leader for public sector reform at that time.[22]

Private Sector Practices

The reforms were intended to give clarity not only to the purpose of government ministers but also the supporting roles of the public sector Chief Executives (CEs).[23] Devolving decision-making power to CEs and 'let managers manage' was a key theme of the neoliberal inspired reforms.[24] This research does not attempt to define power or engage in philosophical debate about its nature and practice. Indeed, Guzzini suggests, "[a] neutral or

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[19] Schick, *The Spirit of Reform*, 13.

[20] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 19.

[21] Schick, *The Spirit of Reform*, 2.

[22] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 17; Grant Duncan and Jeff Chapman, "New Millennium, New Public Management and the New Zealand Model," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 69, no.3 (2010): 301, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2010.00692.x.

[23] Richard Mulgan, "Public Sector Reform in New Zealand: Issues of Public Accountability," *Public Administration Quarterly* 32, no.1, (2008): 2, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41288303.

[24] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 21.

descriptive meaning of power cannot be found."[25] Instead, this research uses the term 'power' to explain its importance to actors' construction of ministers and public servants' roles within New Zealand's public sector collaborative initiatives. In this context, the 1980s reforms, which devolved power to CEs, enabled politicians to focus on setting the government's strategic direction. Moreover, the reforms gave scope for public sector CEs to make operational the government's intentions with private sector-like autonomy afforded by the reforms. As a consequence of these early reforms emulating private sector practices, CEs became accountable for the performance of the public sector department they managed.[26]

Push back

The centre left coalition government elected in 1999 initiated a new phase of reforms slowly and incrementally.[27] Concerned by the excessive fragmentation of the public service from the 1980s the government grew uneasy about their loss of political control.[28] In the government's view, the CEs had too much decision-making power. Norman claims the managerial freedoms afforded to CEs made "Cabinet Ministers hunger for more control."[29] The government was also uncomfortable with the fragmentation of agencies and the excessive number of reporting outputs. Gregory, Norman, Christensen, and Lægreid all agree that the effects of the discernible fragmentation created a lack of coordination between agencies.[30] Christensen and Lægreid also suggest global factors, such as the 9/11 attacks, prompted the implementation of political agendas that re-established government scrutiny over a fragmented public sector.[31] Accordingly, in the early 2000s reviews of the

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[25] Stefano Guzzini, "The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no.3 (2005): 495, doi:10.1177/03058298050330031301.

[26] Norman, *Obedient Servants?*, 21-22.

[27] Robert Gregory, "Theoretical Faith and Practical Works: De-Autonomizing and Joining-up in the New Zealand State Sector," in *Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State,* eds. Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), 145.

[28] Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, "Post-NPM Reforms: Whole of Government Approaches as a New Trend*,"* in *New Steering Concepts in Public Management,* eds. Sandra Groeneveld and Steven Van De Walle (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 2011), 14.

[29] Norman, *Obedient Servants?*, 149.

[30] Robert Gregory (2003), "All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: Putting New Zealand's Public Sector Back Together Again," *International Public Management Review* 4, no. 2 (2003): 43, http://www.journals.sfu.ca/improve/index.php/improve/article/view/215; Norman, *Obedient Servants?*, 21; Christensen and Lægreid, "Post-NPM Reforms," 13.

[31] Christensen and Lægreid, "Post-NPM Reforms," 14.

effects of the earlier public sector reforms became more common in New Zealand. One of the documents instrumental to initiating change to the public sector was the 2001 Review of the Centre.

The government formed a Standards Board in 2000 to produce a review of the public sector's ability to meet the government's strategic objectives. The Board commissioned an advisory group comprised of senior officials to undertake the Review of the Centre (2001).[32] The Review advocated a more holistic approach to governance informed by a "whole-of-government"[33] concept. Gregory observes that the newly elected government "appeared to follow the lead of the [1997] New Labour government in Britain."[34] The governments of the United Kingdom and Canada pioneered the whole-of-government concept under the initial label of "Joined up Government."[35] This concept helps align agencies within the public sector to work collectively either between each other or with the private sector, non-government organisations, or groups of citizens.[36] The purpose of such a collaborative approach was to address a society's so-called "wicked problems", a phrase often used in government to describe problems that are "complex, unpredictable, open ended or intractable."[37]

The consequence of collaboration is that the collective practice requires decision-making power that is "disparate"[38] and no longer attributable to one authority. Indeed, Ling argues that the delivery of a joined up, integrated approach results in the state sector actors' growing confusion between traditional state hierarchical approaches and the growing expectation of more involvement of other sectors of society within a state.[39] The debates about the growing confusion generated by the initial reforms and the later whole-of-

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[32] Norman, *Obedient Servants?*, 211.

[33] State Services Commission, *Review of the Centre*, 69.

[34] Gregory, "Theoretical Faith and Practical Works," 138.

[35] Tom Christensen and Per Lægried, "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform," *Public Administration Review* 67, no.6 (2007): 1059, doi:10.111/j.1540-6210.2007.00797.x; Perri 6, Diana Leat, Kimberly Seltzer, and Gerry Stoker, *Towards Holistic Governance: The New Reform Agenda* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 20.

[36] Tom Ling, "Delivering Joined-Up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems," *Public Administration* 80, no.4 (2002): 616, doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00321.

[37] Brian Head and John Alford, "Wicked Problems: Implications for public Policy and Management," *Administration and Society* 47, no.6 (2015): 712, doi:10.1177/0095399713481601.

[38] Ling, "Delivering Joined-Up Government in the UK," 624.

[39] Ibid.," 631.

government reforms are discussed below. These debates are the foundation on which the research question is predicated.

2.3   The paradoxes of New Zealand's reform agendas

Boston et al explain that the economic and business perspectives founded on the theories of public choice theory, agency theory, transaction cost economics and New Public Management (NPM) shaped the early 1980s neoliberal reform policies of the public sector.[40] Among these contributing theories, Boston argues NPM predominates as the model that contextualised managerial, institutional economics and market practices into the public sector. Nevertheless, this research proposes the present structure of the public sector is linked to the events of the neoliberal reforms because public servants' contextualise their own construction of the managerial, economic, and market practices through their social practice.[41]

Fairclough explains social practice "as articulations of different types of social elements which are associated with particular areas of social life;"[42] in this example, practices common to the public sector context. Accordingly, the public sector's social practice can control its structural possibilities through the inclusion and exclusion of the elements associated with neoliberal managerial, economic, and market practices.[43] Thus, under the 1980s reforms, the adaptation of economic and managerial practices reshaped the structure of the public sector to allow greater managerial control to departmental CEs. This research comments that the early reforms' emulation of private sector practices allowed CEs to deliver government outcomes more cost effectively to New Zealand citizens because the devolution of decision-making autonomy aligns with the neoliberal principles of simplified hierarchy. Norman draws attention to the fact that the reforms created "paradoxes" that influence the managerial practice within the public sector, which is of key significance to this thesis. [44]

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[40] Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot, and Pat Walsh, *Public Management: The New Zealand Model* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.
[41] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 23-25.
[42] Ibid., 25.
[43] Ibid., 23.
[44] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 18.

The paradox of autonomy

The State Sector Act (1988) and the Public Finance Act (1989) allowed the government to restructure of public sector organisations in order to create specialist organisations with specific functions to reduce departmental overlap. This change also meant greater departmental accountability to government.[45] However, Norman argues the restructures had the unintended consequences of stifling managerial initiative, as managers become more risk adverse as a consequence of not only "politicians' concerns about the extent to which they delegate power and authority,"[46] but also CEs preoccupied with "image cultivation,"[47] rather than attending to day-to-day business. This devolution of managerial power means that individual agency CEs are accountable to their ministers through processes aligned with current private sector managerial and financial practice. For example, accrual accounting allows CEs to provide quality information to monitor and account for the output costs of their department's service delivery. CEs report their departmental outputs through the appropriations process in order to deliver the outcomes determined by the government.

In short, the appropriations process enables respective ministers to purchase department services in order to deliver the government's political objectives. Norman observes whilst creating performance accountabilities "[o]utputs promote focus at the expense of coordination, narrowing the breadth of activity to the safe and predictable, crowding out innovation and risk-taking."[48] Accordingly, far from creating a new public structure that permits greater autonomy to CEs, Norman's extensive study[49] of the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s provides an illuminating account of paradoxical tensions of control, which he states "is an exhibition of power."[50] I explain this as a means for hierarchical authority to overcome resistance and influence behaviours.

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[45] Christensen and Lægreid, "Post-NPM Reforms: Whole of Government Approaches as a New Trend," 13.
[46] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 79.
[47] Ibid., 22.
[48] Ibid., 21.
[49] In his published study Norman interviewed 91 Public Servant Managers who had experienced, pre-NPM reforms, NPM reforms and during the writing of his study the post-NPM reforms. Ibid., 46-51.
[50] Ibid., 37.

The paradox for New Zealand's governance

The advent of neoliberalism has merged the economic, political, and social practices with the political and administrative practice of the public sector shown in New Zealand's 1980s reforms. I contend the merging of these practices within the public sector makes its governance more complex. Quintessentially, the meaning of governance includes the process of managing a complex social structure in which boundaries have blurred between and within public and private actors.[51] Furthermore, Emmerson et al, Ansell and Gash, and McGuire argue collaborative governance in a social democracy should be the focus of all public servants.[52] As people have become globally interconnected in their private spaces and workspaces "power is dispersed, not centralized...society worldwide demands greater freedom and individualism, rather than integration."[53] Drawing from these observations, it seems reasonable to expect that a society such as New Zealand should expect greater participation with the public sector, and a public sector that offers a holistic collaborative approach to meeting the 'wicked problems' of society.

In his study of governance, Stoker proposes three key features of modern democratic states. First, governance no longer relies on the dominant power of government to achieve state ends rather the government becomes an enabler. Second, there is autonomy to enable actors to self-govern. Finally, governance requires an identification of the power dependencies between organisations involved in collective action.[54] While Stoker's observations suggest the early reforms advocate a governance style favourable for managerial autonomy, he also draws attention to the implications of horizontal power dependency between organisations that risks domination of one organisation over another. Significantly, Norman's study draws attention to the hierarchical power issues within

[51] R.A.W.Rhodes, "Understanding Governance: Ten Years On," *Organization Studies* 28, no.8 (2007): 1246, doi:10.1177/0170840607076586; Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," *International Social Science Journal* 50, no.155 (1998): 17, doi:10.1111/1468-2451.00106; Matthew Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," *Public Administration* 80, no.1 (2002): 51, doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00294

[52] Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh, "An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance," *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 22, no. 1 (January 2012): 3, doi:10.1093/jeopardy/mur011; Ansell and Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," 545-546; Michael McGuire, "Collaborative Public Management: Assessing What we Know and How we Know it*," Public Administration Review,* Special Issue (2006): 34, doi:10.111/j.1540-6210.2006.00664.x.

[53] Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire, *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 23.

[54] Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," 18.

government and public sector organisations. Both observations about power dynamics are important for this research because they draw attention for the need for public servants to recognise and negotiate the use of power within collaboration. Flinders observes the study of governance should pay attention to "the evolving processes and mechanisms of control, co-ordination, accountability and the location of power within complex networks."[55] Therefore the following discussion about the whole-of-government reform era highlights the growing complexity of New Zealand's governance of the public sector and subsequent multi-agency collaboration.

Another layer of control?

In order to foster, a whole-of-government approach among organisations greater leadership from central government agencies was re-established, in response to the findings of the 2001 Review of the Centre. These central agencies - the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), State Services Commission (SSC), and the Treasury subsequently strengthened their role and powers.[56] For example, the SSC became more prominent in developing the leadership of the sector through the Leadership Development Council. There was a move from the 'individualism' associated with Public Choice theory towards embracing ethics and offering quality services to the public.[57] Indeed, the SSC's introduction of the 2007 Code of Conduct policy for public servants was in order to foster a culture of working transparently, ethically, and collectively for the good of the New Zealand public. Duncan and Chapman observe that the early 2000s amendments to the State Sector Act 1988, the Public Finance Act 1989 and Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 "allow for greater flexibility in sharing appropriations across ministerial portfolios and for one department to deliver or contract services on behalf of another."[58] Accordingly, proponents of the 2000s reforms advocate the "centralized or collaborative capacity"[59] as preferable to multiple specialist agencies operating like private companies. Advocates of this generation of reforms label them Post New Public Management (post-NPM).

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[55] Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 54.
[56] Duncan and Chapman, "New Millennium, New Public Management and the New Zealand Model," 304.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Martin Lodge and Derek Gill, "Toward a New Era of Administrative Reform? The Myth of Post-NPM in New Zealand," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 24, no.1 (2011): 143, doi:10.1111/j.1468.0491.2010.01508.x.

The paradox for decision-making power

Critiques of the post-NPM era liken the whole-of-government approach to a mythical rhetoric that has immolated private practice.[60] Christensen and Lægreid question how much of the state sector has really changed and how multi-agency practice gains from the changes. Additionally, Lodge and Gill argue that NPM principles still drive the public service. Not surprisingly, they suggest that political agendas drive public sector change in an ad hoc fashion that creates diversification from the 1980s reforms but no revolutionary change.[61] Goldfinch and Wallis support their view and argue that the post-NPM agenda is "an adaptation"[62] to fix NPM's unintended consequences and they observe the strengthening of central agency power.[63] This growing centrality of power Stoker links with the "strong tendency for political leaderships to impose order and issue directives" in the face of "complexity and autonomy."[64] His views, as well as Lodge, Gill, Goldfinch and Wallis's add weight to the discussion about collaborating actors growing confusion concerning where decision-making power lies. Rather than decentralising power, the state creates parameters within which public sector organisations to work. Could the current New Zealand government reverse the post-NPM trends? Duncan and Chapman suggest not, and that ongoing changes to the public sector will continue to be gradual.[65] Certainly, the focus of the current government remains to deliver "Better Public Services" by working "across the sector."[66]

The literature and analysis of New Zealand's public sector reform reveal the unintended consequences of adapting neoliberal economic theory and managerial private practice principles to the operation of the public sector. The result has created a tapestry of conundrums for collaborating public servants, particularly with respect to their perceived managerial autonomy. The literature review thus far reveals the conditions are a result of tensions between neoliberal practices that require less hierarchy and New Zealand's

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[60] Christensen and Lægried, "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform," 1062.
[61] Lodge and Gill, "Toward a New Era of Administrative Reform?," 142.
[62] Shaun Goldfinch and Joe Wallis, "Two Myths of Convergence in Public Management Reform," *Public Administration* 88, no.4 (2010): 1109, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01848.x.
[63] Goldfinch and Wallis, "Two Myths of Convergence," 1103-1104.
[64] Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," 24.
[65] Duncan and Chapman, "New Millennium, New Public Management," 312.
[66] "Better Public Services," State Services Commission, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-services.

governance structure of its public sector, which remains palpably hierarchical. The literature about the later 2000s reforms reveal government's concerns about the 1980s neoliberal reforms that fragmented the public sector, and as a result the government espouses an integrated whole-of-government approach to address the "wicked problems"[67] of society. The literature explains the whole-of-government's aggrandised collaborative approach requires a dispersion of decision-making power that not only challenges but also undermines New Zealand's growing hierarchical governance structure – the expanding centrality of control to which the literature attests. These observations raise a question about how the public sector reforms that continue to shape the governance of New Zealand's public sector inevitably continue to create unenviable paradoxes for those expected to embrace a whole-of-government approach. This research aims to examine the specific tensions between the influences of the ongoing reforms on the practice of public servants engaged multi-agency collaboration.

The open issues from the literature lead to the research problem that is to consider what the consequences of New Zealand public sector reform are for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration.

To study the problem this research will use a case study of an inter-agency collaboration that began in 2002, and continues to present day. The case study, the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), is an inter-agency organisation in which collaboration is paramount for the successful civilian maritime patrol and information exchange within New Zealand's maritime security environment. Moreover, according to Fiss, the case study "still presents one of the most attractive research strategies for understanding life in and around organisations."[68]

2.4   The Case Study

In 2002 the government founded the Maritime Intelligence Coordination Centre as a precursor to the NMCC in direct response to the recommendations of the 2001 Maritime

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[67] Head and Alford, "Wicked Problems," 712.
[68] Peer C.Fiss, "Case studies and the Configurational Analysis of Organizational Phenomena," in *The SAGE Handbook of Case-Based Methods,* eds*.* David Bryne and Charles C. Ragin (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 427.

Patrol Review. The 2001 Patrol Review recommended the government establish a coordination centre to manage public sector (civilian) organisations' patrol requirements of New Zealand's extensive maritime borders. In the same year the 2001 Review of the Centre reported to the Labour government the fragmented condition of the public sector on account of the 1980s reforms. The 2001 Review recommended that the public sector adopt a whole-of-government approach to deliver effective and efficient integrated services,[69] therefore the NMCC provides an example of an integrated whole-of-government approach. The NMCC supports the Government's maritime goals in both civilian and military domains through the central coordination of maritime patrol and maritime-related information gathering.

In 2004, eight organisations, henceforth the NMCC organisations, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that formalised the operation of the NMCC.[70] These are the New Zealand Customs Service (Customs), Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI),[71] New Zealand Police, Maritime New Zealand (MNZ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the Department of Conservation (DoC), the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). The day-to-day operation of the NMCC is the responsibility of public servants from the NZDF, Customs, and MPI. The NMCC personnel engage with managers from the NMCC organisations that are signatory to the 2004 MOU. The NMCC also offers services to other public sector organisations requiring patrol services such as services provided to GNS Science to gather aerial and surface information about an undersea volcano.[72] Customs is the host agency for the NMCC and as at 2015 and it employs two NMCC managers and two staff. All of the NMCC personnel adhere to the operationally independent principles articulated in NMCC governance documentation.[73] In 2006 the NMCC senior official oversight committee, a sub-committee for the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) called

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[69] NMCC Working Group, *National Maritime Cordination Centre Governance Framework* (Wellington: New Zealand Customs Service, 2006), 4.

[70] A later MOU was signed in 2009 to include Ministry of Forestry and Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) in this arrangement but since 2012 MAFBNZ has become Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).

[71] The staff member was formally a Ministry of Fisheries (MFISH) Officer but in 2012 MFISH amalgamated with the former Ministry of Forestry and Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) and New Zealand Food Safety Authority (NZFSA) to become MPI.

[72] Michael Field, "Undersea eruption caught by satellite," *Stuff.co.nz,* August 14, 2012, http://www.stuff.co.nz/science/7476032/Undersea-eruption-caught-by-satellite.

[73] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 8.

the Network of CEs approved its governance document - the NMCC governance framework, henceforth the NMCC (F).

The coordination of civilian maritime patrol takes place in the NMCC monthly planning meeting. Prior to the meeting the NMCC managers and other public sector representatives, submit bids for their organisations' maritime patrol requirements through the NMCC staff.[74] The term 'NMCC manager' refers to the officials who represent their respective NMCC organisations' operational planning departments. The NMCC managers work collaboratively in the inter-agency patrol planning meetings to seek the most effective outcomes for their respective organisations' maritime patrol requirements and share information pertinent to New Zealand's collective maritime security.

The NMCC provides a case study of a collaborative practice founded in the initial stages of the whole-of-government reform, which is still ongoing. Initiating and sustaining the collaboration is not easy and the NMCC case shows perfectly the paradoxes facing public servants discussed in the literature about state sector reform. The strengthening of central agency power, as the literature explains, compounds the paradox of decision-making power for collaborating public servants. This is revealed in the 2010 audit of the NMCC conducted by the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG). The audit recommended that the NMCC needed strategic guidance in its analysis of the effectiveness of civilian maritime patrol.[75] Subsequently in 2013 ODESC established the Maritime Security Oversight Committee (MSOC) a permanent committee to encompass a wider mandate and membership to address New Zealand's maritime security issues, including the NMCC.[76]

The paradox of autonomy discussed in the literature also presents challenges for the NMCC managers who all must deliver vertical reporting targets to their respective minister in an environment dependant on all parties working collaboratively. For example, the 2010 OAG recommends that the NMCC organisations improve the measurement of patrol deliverables,

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[74] Ibid., 8-9.

[75] Office of the Auditor-General, *Effectiveness of Arrangements for Co-ordinating Civilian Maritime Patrols: Performance Audit Report* (Wellington: Controller and Auditor-General, 2010), 4. http://www.oag.govt.nz/2010/maritime-patrols/docs/maritime-patrols.pdf.

[76] Office of the Auditor-General, *Effectiveness of Arrangements for Co-ordinating Civilian Maritime Patrols: Progress in Responding to the Auditor-General's Recommendations* (Wellington: Controller and Auditor-General, 2014), 4. http://www.oag.govt.nz/2014/maritime-patrols.

objectives, and performance targets.[77] As the host agency for the NMCC it is Customs'

responsibility to report on the NMCC performance targets. The 2012/13 Customs' annual

report shows the NMCC failed to meet its service delivery targets.[78] These service delivery

targets were the allocation of resources for maritime patrol and departments' satisfaction

with the NMCC's responsiveness, transparency, and prioritisation in coordination tasking.

This fact is also evident in the 2014 OAG report that comments the NMCC failed to meet its

service delivery targets.[79] Paradoxically, the 2014 report also states the NMCC needs to

review the patrol planning reporting measures,[80] despite the same measures being an

individual organisation's (in this case Customs) responsibility and the patrol assets being

predominately provided by the NZDF.

This research contends these paradoxes influence the actions of the NMCC actors and the

success of the NMCC collaboration. For example, the 2010 OAG audit revealed that separate

patrol arrangements were still organised between the NZDF and MFAT, and between the

NZDF and NZ Police.[81] Moreover, the OAG's 2014 progress report confirmed these separate

patrol co-ordination arrangements as ongoing.[82] This study proposes the NMCC case study

allows a deeper exploration of the impact of public sector reform on inter-agency

collaboration.

The debates in the relevant literature show the impact of reform on the governance of NZ's

public sector that, specifically for collaborating public servants, create vertical and

horizontal challenges to their decision-making autonomy. It became obvious from the

literature that a study of power within a specific case study of collaboration, in this case the

NMCC, will address the research problem.

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[77] Office of the Auditor-General, *Effectiveness of Arrangements for Co-ordinating Civilian Maritime Patrols: Progress in Responding to the Auditor-General's Recommendations* (Wellington: Controller and Auditor-General, 2012), 13. http://www.oag.govt.nz/2012/public-entities-progress.

[78] The measures were first the percentage of marine areas with aggregated risk assessments in the highest 5% that are allocated resources. Actual Figures 79.7% out of the 90% target standard, a variance of -11.4% from the 2011/12 figure of 89.5%. Second, the percentage of requesting agencies and asset providers satisfied with NMCC's responsiveness, transparency, and prioritisation in coordination of tasking. Actual figures: 80% out of the 80% target, a variance of -11.1% from the 2011/12 figure of 100%. New Zealand Customs Service, *New Zealand Customs Service: Annual Report 2012/13* (Wellington: Customs, 2013), 49, http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/documents/ar20122013.pdf.

[79] OAG, *Effectiveness of Arrangements* (2014), 4.

[80] Ibid., 7.

[81] OAG, *Effectiveness of Arrangements* (2010), 31.

[82] OAG, *Effectiveness of Arrangements* (2014), 5-6.

In her critique of research approaches into collaboration, O'Flynn observes:

> "[p]ower is a critical issue and one that does not get as much attention as it deserves in studies of cross-boundary working, but it has been recognized as a critical resource for joint action."[83]

O'Flynn is not alone in her observations. She draws from Purdy as well as Hardy and Phillips's observations that power issues include the regulatory authority to act, the agreed sharing of resources, and "discursive legitimacy"[84] that drives the scope and management of a collaborative project. Their claims align with Murphy and Dixon's observation that "power, discourse and identity"[85] continue to reoccur as issues for the relationships between people engaged in collective practices. This context generates the question of how collaborating public servants form, sustain, and resist power relationships against their own organisations' identities and structures that the governance arrangements within the public sector shape.[86] So far the literature review has shown the reforms create a sector structure in which collaborating actors experience tensions of control that restrict their collaborative agency, which is the discursive legitimacy to which O'Flynn refers.

This significance of this study lies in its conceptual framework that enables the resultant research to provide collaborating public servants with an awareness of the dynamics of power so that they recognise and negotiate their use of power when working across the sector with others. In order to present the conceptual framework that is the foundation for this research design, the following section considers the theoretical foundations and the ontology in relation to the study of power within this research.[87]

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[83] O'Flynn, "Crossing Boundaries: the Fundamental Questions," 34-35.

[84] Ibid., 35.

[85] Alexandra. G. Murphy and Maria A. Dixon, "Discourse, Identity, and Power in International Non-profit Collaborations," *Management Communication Quarterly* 26, no.1 (2012): 168, doi:10.1177/0893318911424374.

[86] Ibid., 170.

[87] Guzzini, "The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis," 447-448.

2.5   A discussion of power and its implications to the research design

The following section considers the realist and constructivist ontological lens from which to apply a conceptual framework to study power issues within collaboration. It subsequently justifies the application of critical realism to underpin the research design.[88]

The Realist View of Power

According to Fairclough, the ontological claim of realism is that "there is a real world, including a real social world, which exists independently of our knowledge about it."[89] Accordingly, a realist epistemology would claim the NMCC actors' collaborative actions are a result of the public sector and organisational structures they occupy. Consequently, the actors' causal powers to collaborate derive from these structures and not because of the NMCC actors' own abilities to shape their collaborative interaction. This analysis contends that a realist approach to power limits the ability of this research to consider the agency of actors, which in this context is their causal power to shape their collaborative practices that are not "reducible to the causal powers of structures and practices."[90] The realist view considers the NMCC actors as powerless subjects that allow external factors to influence their interaction within the NMCC. As such, the resultant conceptual framework would not account for Murphy and Dixon's call for an exploration of how actors form, sustain and resist power relationships against their own organisations' identities.[91] Additionally, it would not provide public servants engaged in collaboration with an analytical framework that facilitates their awareness of the dynamics of power through which they construct their collaborative interactions.

The Constructivist Claim

Constructivists explain power as "agential and intersubjective (including non-intentional and impersonal power)."[92] Accordingly, the physical world an actor occupies is socially

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[88] Norman Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism" *Organizational Studies* 26, no.6 (2005): 916, doi:10.1177/01170840605054610.
[89] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism," 922.
[90] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 22.
[91] Murphy and Dixon, "Discourse, Identity, and Power in International Non-profit Collaborations," 170.
[92] Guzzini, " The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis," 507.

constructed and it follows that the relationships between actors are of their own making. Constructivism's epistemological claim is that an actor's language constructs his or her own roles and identities, and that of others. Guzzini explains this language is "intersubjective,"[93] that its actors share a similar community of practice and subscribe to similar language. In the context of the case study, the NMCC actors subscribe to the language of the New Zealand public sector. The application of constructivist ontology would give this research recourse to apply Foucault's theory of what power does, in that power can "structure the possible field of action in others."[94] The subsequent relationships of power between the collaborating NMCC actors is negotiated either deliberately or unconsciously within their thought community of practice within the public sector, irrespective of the public sector and organisational structures they occupy. In reference to Foucault, Reed contends there is "nothing 'outside' of discourse but more discourse,"[95] he remarks:

> "power…is not, as Foucault asserts, impossible to possess and control: power can be and is generated and controlled by agents and structures as they struggle to impose their interests and/or logics on others at the level of everyday interaction and institutionalized politics."[96]

This study agrees with Reed's contention in that constructivism denies an opportunity to examine the role of institutions because it fails to recognise that actors anchor within "pre-existing structures of material, social, and discursive relations."[97] Therefore, my research posits for a theoretical foundation that considers the NMCC actors' agency to construct the NMCC inter-agency collaboration whilst considering the constraints or enablers associated with their organisational and public sector context.

Critical Realism and Fairclough

The ontological claim of my thesis is the NMCC actors' relationships shape their collaborative practice and the public sector institutions in which their collaboration takes

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[93] Ibid., 498.

[94] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", in *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Vol 3)*, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 1994), 341.

[95] Mike Reed, "Organizational Analysis as Discourse Analysis: A Critique," in *Discourse and Organization,* eds. David Grant, Tom W. Keenoy, and Cliff Oswick (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1998), 210.

[96] Reed, "Organizational Analysis as Discourse Analysis: A Critique," 212.

[97] Ibid., 211.

place. Additionally, the NMCC actors' relationships are also shaped through the same practices and institutions. Scholars advocate that critical realism can explicate what power does to actors and how actors use power within a particular context.[98] For this study, I use Fairclough's explanation of critical realism that draws from the work of Bhaskar.[99]

Fairclough explains that critical realism acknowledges a real world independent of an actor's construction of it, in this case, the New Zealand public sector. However, unlike realism, critical realism claims the social world is "dependent on human action for its existence – it is socially constructed."[100] This is how the NMCC actors construct their knowledge of inter-agency collaboration within the public sector, and the identities and roles of the NMCC actors are dependent on their social reality according to the "concrete events of social life."[101] These concrete events refer to the 1980s and later 2000s whole-of-government public sector reforms that shape the NMCC actors' organisations and the wider public sector as a whole. The reforms and the public sector also materialise through the NMCC actors' social practice. Fairclough explains social practices "are associated with particular areas of social life,"[102] for example, the practice of inter-agency collaboration. He stresses social practice "articulate[s] discourse (therefore language) together with other non-discoursal social elements."[103] For example, the NMCC (F) text explains the ways in which the NMCC actors use language within the social relations of the public sector, which involves the structuring and use of processes the actors must employ to collaborate.

The following section considers how the pertinent research approaches to collaboration provide best fit with the ontological foundations of this research. From the discussions, this research considers the conceptual framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) that enables the analysis to address the research problem.

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[98] Guzzini, "The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis," 435; Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, "The International' as Governmentality*," Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no.3 (2007): 689, http://www.mil.sagepub.com/content/35/3/677.full.pdf; Samuel J. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review* 5, no.3 (2003): 337, doi:10/1046/j.1079-1760.2003.00503002.x.
[99] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism," 937.
[100] Ibid., 922.
[101] Ibid., 923.
[102] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 25.
[103] Ibid.

2.6   The research design – the conceptual framework

Ryan et al observe "there is very little published New Zealand research on what actually happens when officials work together."[104] Therefore, the review of existing research widens to include approaches to inter-organisational collaboration that include social and commercial contexts. Hibbert et al explain that regardless of the scale of the study in the context of inter-organisational research, "there is no parallel division of research approaches"[105] and therefore both qualitative and conceptual, case study and quantitative methods are employed in a manner unrelated to scale.

In the context of collaborative research, Bryson et al observe two approaches.[106] The first approach places research that employs a macro-focus of structural variables that are external causes beyond the collaborative actors' control. Subsequently, these structural variables shape their collaborative practice.[107] This approach aligns with the realist view in relation to the study of power and collaboration. For example, Bailey and Koney's use of macro-economic theory concerning competitive advantage explains how non-government organisations can attract funding through collaboration.[108] Other research uses institutional theory to explain collaborations that adhere to institutional norms gain legitimacy that symbolise their efficiency.[109] Also social network theory allows researchers to determine how collaborative organisations are and should position themselves within their social

[104] Bill Ryan, Derek Gill, Elizabeth Eppel, and Miriam Lips, "Managing for Joint Outcomes: Connecting up the Horizontal and the Vertical," *Policy Quarterly* 4, no.3 (2008): 14.

[105] Paul Hibbert, Chris Huxham, and Peter Smith Ring, "Managing Collaborative Inter-organizational Relations," in *The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations*, eds. Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris Huxham, and Peter Smith Ring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3 of 21, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199282944.003.0014.

[106] John M. Bryson, Barbara C. Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone, "The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature," *Public Administration Review* 66, s.1 (2006): 52, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00665.x.

[107] Chris Skelcher and Helen Sullivan, "Theory-driven Approaches to Analysing Collaborative Performance," *Public Management Review* 10, no.6 (2008): 751-771, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719030802423103.

[108] Darlyne Bailey and Kelly McNally Koney, "Interorganizational Community-based Collaboratives: A Strategic Response to Shape the Social Work Agenda," *Social Work* 41, no.6 (1996): 602-612, doi:10.1093/saw/41.6.602.

[109] Christine Oliver, "Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and Future Directions." *Academy of Management Review* 15, no.2 (1990): 241-265; doi:10.5465/AMR.1990.4308156.

network to empower the collaboration to mobilise resources throughout the network's linkages.[110]

The limitations of these approaches to the study of power within collaboration are as follows. The competitive advantage approach recognises the dominant actors and organisations have power over others, but the approach addresses power inequality for the purpose of efficiency gains.[111] Whereas institutional theory relates legitimacy to political constructs and could explicate how the concept of whole-of-government symbolises legitimacy for the actors to adhere to its collaborative construct.[112] This approach cannot allow for an analysis of the tensions of control because it does not consider the relationships of power within collaboration. Social network theory uses the language of power but because this approach highlights how collaboration creates power, this particular framing is not useful for the research's investigation into how collaborating actors' construct their relationships within their public sector practice in particular how their causal powers, that is their agency to construct relationships, is impacted by their context.

The second approach to researching collaboration provides a rich empirical analysis easily digested by the practitioner,[113] or as Bryson et al explain, "action solutions to public problems." [114] This type of research employs practitioners' experiences to analyse their collaborative problems and clarifies the issue.[115] Unlike the approaches reviewed above the problem-solving research approach considers the vested power interests of collaborating actors.[116] In contrast, problem-solving research emphasises a study of power from a

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[110] Brian W. Head, "Assessing Network-based Collaborations: Effectiveness for Whom?," *Public Management Review* 10, no. 6 (2008): 733-749, doi:10.1080/147190308024230087; Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Thomas B. Lawrence, "Resources, Knowledge and Influence: The Organisational Effects of Interorganizational Collaboration," *Journal of Management Studies* 40, no.1 (2003): 321-347, doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00342.

[111] Nuzhat Lotia and Cynthia Hardy, "Critical Perspectives on Collaboration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations*, eds. Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris Huxham, and Peter Smith Ring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3 of 17, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199282944.003.0014.

[112] Lotia and Hardy, "Critical Perspectives on Collaboration," 3 of 17.

[113] Miriam Lips, Rose R. O'Niell and Elizabeth Eppel, "Cross-agency Collaboration in New Zealand: An Empirical Study of Information Sharing Practices, Enablers and Barriers in Managing for Shared Outcomes," *International Journal of Public Administration* 34, no.4 (2011): 255-266, doi:10.1080/01900692.2010.533571; Thompson, Perry and Miller, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration," 23-56; Ansell and Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," 543-571.

[114] Bryson, Crosby and Stone, "The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature," 52.

[115] Lotia and Hardy, "Critical Perspectives on Collaboration," 4 of 17.

[116] Ibid.

functionalist viewpoint in its assumption that all actors are complicit in their collaboration. Accordingly, I suggest these approaches predicate on realist ontology. This paradigm does not address the political arena that applies to the research problem, which explicates what are the consequences of public sector reform for inter-agency collaboration. Prebble remarks when building on theory concerning collaboration one must "incorporate power relationships or at least link to wider discussions of power and democracy."[117] Therefore, the functionalist approach to power leaves the ambiguities of actors' language use unexplored; moreover, it excludes analysis of the influence of the political and ideological landscape or the bias of the researcher.[118]

Despite the reservations about the functionalist approach to studying power dynamics in collaborative enterprises, Eppel et al's study exploring inter-agency practice within the New Zealand public sector has a significant impact on the development of this research's methodological framework. As a practitioner, I agree with Eppel at al's observation that there is a genuine commitment amongst public sector managers to work collaboratively. Specifically the research group's empirical studies series[119] which investigates the underlying "circumstances of interagency practice,"[120] observes the actors experience"interplay between agency and structure."[121] Significantly, Eppel et al remark that despite collaborating actors creating flexible and horizontal networks between their agencies, their department's hierarchical structure still employs people and owns resources, which unequivocally creates a tension for actors aspiring to collaborate. Their most significant findings indicate that constraints caused by 'soft' issues such as organisational identities, influence public servant's cultures, values, and beliefs and can therefore create

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[117] Mark Prebble, "Public Value and Limits to Collaboration," *International Journal of Public Administration* 38, no.7 (2015): 483, doi:10.1080/01900692.2014.949742.

[118] Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research* (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 49.

[119] Ryan et al, "Managing for Joint Outcomes: Connecting Up the Horizontal and the Vertical," 14-21; Eppel et al., "Better Connected Services for Kiwis: A Discussion Document for Managers and Front-line Staff on Better Joining up the Horizontal and the Vertical," *Institute of Policy Studies* (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington School of Government, 2008), 1-72, http:www.victoria.ac.nz/sog/researchcentres/egovt/research-projects/research-2007/research-2008/Connected_Services_ver_10.pdf.

[120] Bill Ryan, "Co-production: Option or Obligation?," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 71, no.3 (2012): 319, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2012.00780.x.

[121] Eppel et al, "The Cross-Organization Collaboration Solution? Conditions, Roles and Dynamics in New Zealand," in *Crossing Boundaries in Public Management and Policy: The International Experience,* eds. Janine O'Flynn, Deborah Blackman and John Halligan (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 58.

tension. Eppel Et al explain that organisational structures create rules, hierarchies, cultures, and power relations, which in turn create stable patterns that can be hard to change.[122]

Their findings are not only substantive but resonate significantly with my own experiences in that their study reveals the tensions between the actors' agency and pre-existing structure. Eppel et al's discussion confirms the earlier review of the public sector reforms, which create an environment that generates power paradoxes for collaborating actors. Nevertheless, their research design is not conducive to the analysis of power practices within a collaboration that influences the actors' construction of their roles, nor does it link the political landscape of reform to inter-agency practice. Furthermore, an empirical analysis such as Eppel et al's fails to accommodate the critical realist ontology on which this present research predicates.

The Critical approach to analysing collaborative power relationships

The functionalist approach to the study of collaboration focuses on its merits in terms of "cooperation, common good, risk sharing, and joint problem solving."[123] Whereas critical approaches consider how the dynamics of power are often opaque to collaborating actors mould their collaborative practice.[124] This research adopts a critical approach to its study of power dynamics within collaboration that shape New Zealand's public sector inter-agency practice. Its view of power concerns how the effects of power, as articulated in their use of language, influence all collaborating actors' actions. As Fairclough states, "nobody who has an interest in relationships of power in modern society can afford to ignore language."[125] The language to which he refers is termed discourse, that he explains as "ways of representing some part of the (physical, social, and psychological) world – there are often competing discourses associated with different groups of people in different social positions."[126]

My research explores the relationship between the events of public sector reform and the NMCC collaboration as shaped by the public servants' use of discourse. Therefore, the

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[122] Eppel et al, "The Cross-Organization Collaboration Solution?," 59.
[123] Lotia and Hardy, "Critical Perspectives on Collaboration," 5 of 17.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 3.
[126] Ibid., 17.

analysis requires an investigation into the dynamics of power and resultant practice that links the individual to the level of "state and global politics."[127] The research proposes a framework that presents the most useful insight into the paradoxes of power and control confronting public servants engaged in collaboration.

2.7   The conceptual framework and the research objectives

This study undertakes a critical discursive analysis (CDA), designed to allow a scalable study of actors who are engaged within a specific collaboration, the NMCC, to the wider context of the public sector and the impacts of its reforms. Consequently, I employ Fairclough's tripartite framework to consider what the consequences of public sector reform are for inter-agency collaboration. Despite extensive search efforts, the literature reveals a lack of CDA research undertaken in the field of New Zealand government administration. Most CDA locates within the academic fields of health and education. Exceptions include Kahu and Morgan's CDA of government policy that privileges economic growth over the needs of mothers considering returning to work, and Motion and Leitch's use of Fairclough's CDA model to explore the role of public relations in discursive struggles.[128] A broader search of the use of CDA within health and education confirms Fairclough's CDA framework is a popular choice for researchers exploring policy discourse in these fields.[129] Fairclough's framework allows researchers to scale from the discourse within written, spoken, and visual text to the actors' social practice. Applied to this context, this is the language of the NMCC collaborating actors and other non-discoursal social elements such as the pre-constituted public sector hierarchical institutions and the associated practices.

A key principle of CDA "is that it is not the size of the sample that is interesting, but the close study of nuances in…a small number of accounts."[130] This research comprises the NMCC case study, which the government founded in 2002 after the 2001 Review of the

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[127] Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb. *Understanding Foucault* (London: Sage, 2000), 82.

[128] Ella Kahu and Mandy Morgan, "A critical discourse analysis of New Zealand government policy: Women as mothers and workers," *Women's Studies International Forum* 30, no.2 (2007): 134-146, doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2007.01.003; Judy Motion and Shirley Leitch, "A Discursive Perspective from New Zealand: Another World View," *Public Relations Review* 22, no.3 (1996): 297-309, doi:10.1016/S0363-8111(96)90051-X.

[129] Frances Vavrus and Maud Seghers, "Critical Discourse Analysis in Comparative Education: A Discursive Study of "Partnership" in Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Policies," *Comparative Education Review* 54, no.1 (2010): 81, doi:10.1086/647972.

[130] Alvesson and Sköldberg, *Reflexive Methodology,* 206.

Centre, a document that initiated the whole-of-government reforms. In the use of Fairclough's tripartite CDA framework, I position the research objectives that address the research problem; that is to discern what the consequences of New Zealand public sector reform are for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration.

The first research objective is to reveal the NMCC actors' construction of their inter-agency collaboration through the NMCC (F) discourse. To do this I undertake a textual analysis of the NMCC 2006 governance text constructed by the collaborating actors using Halliday's systemic functional linguistics (SFL) approach to conduct the study. The intent is to reveal the degree of agency afforded to NMCC actors in order for them to construct their collaborative roles through their discourse.

Subsequently, I link the collaborating actors' agency with the public sector social practice. The second research objective examines how the actors produce, distribute and interpret their collaborative discourse within their institutional setting. I use an intertextual chain analysis and its associated thematic analysis to show the tensions the collaborating actors' experience because of their own agency and their respective organisation's structures.

The final research section, chapter six, discusses and explains why the events of the public sector reforms and the public sector shape the NMCC actors' interagency collaborative practice. I therefore explain why the pre-constituted institutional structures influence the NMCC collaboration. In doing so I link the institutional structure of the public sector and the events of its reforms to explain how the public sector context constrains the agency of NMCC actors' within their collaborative practice.

Fairclough explains that the critical realist ontology allows research to consider "an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching relations between agency...and structure."[131] This research adopts Fairclough's position of analytical dualism because it facilitates the analysis of the relationship between the public servants' agency, that is their construction of their collaborative processes, and their institutional structures. These relationships, when related to the events of reform, are shaped by the actors'

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[131] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies," 916.

collaborative practices that are articulated through their use of discourse.[132] Therefore, my research investigates how actors construct inter-agency practices and how their own structures constrain their discourse. Skelcher and Sullivan state, "understanding the possibilities and limitations of the structure-agency duality offers the basis for developing a more refined understanding of the performance of collaborative context."[133] Murphy, Dixon and Fairclough concur, advocating that the intersection between actors and their institutions as a focus of organisational collaborative study.[134] The research framework therefore addresses the agency structure tension observed in the debates on public sector reform and in Eppel et al's research findings.

The research's epistemological approach employs a dialectical analysis of agency and structure. According to Ieţcu-Fairclough actors "act in fields that have pre-determined structural properties and constraints, yet also enjoy a certain amount of freedom (more or less, depending on particular contexts) to change the structural properties of the field."[135] The NMCC actors operate within the political administrative field of the public sector social practice in which the public sector reforms pre-constitute the structure and practices of the public sector. The same NMCC actors enjoy a certain amount of freedom according to the structures they occupy and their roles constructed within the discourse of the NMCC (F). Therefore, they have the potential to construct the NMCC interagency collaborative relationships and the potential to change the public sector's approach to the NMCC collaboration. This dualist epistemology predicated on critical realist ontology supports the application of CDA and thereby avoids the constructivist limitation of studying collaborative discourse without acknowledging the public sector context in which it exists.

This study proposes the CDA of the NMCC (F) and its context, the public sector, illuminates the specific causes of tension. This is because the pre-constituted reality of the NMCC actors' organisations limit the NMCC actors' capacity for agency, this refers to their discursive legitimacy to act and make their own choices with respect to NMCC inter-agency

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[132] Ibid.," 935.

[133] Skelcher and Sullivan, "Theory-driven Approaches to Analysing Collaborative Performance," 768.

[134] Murphy and Dixon, "Discourse, Identity, and Power in International Non-profit Collaborations," 170; Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies," 928.

[135] Isabela Ieţcu-Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis and Translation Studies: Translation, Recontextualisation, Ideology," *Bucharest Working Papers in Linguistics, 2* (2008): 69, doi:10.17684/isn.2393-1140.

collaboration. This research uses Fairclough's CDA framework and applies the dualist agency-structure epistemology to bridge the divide between structure and agency.[136]

This research's conceptual framework addresses Bryson's observation for study that bridges the theoretical with real world practitioner experiences.[137] To the best of my knowledge, there has been no other attempt to apply this type of analytical framework in the context of inter-agency collaboration within New Zealand's public sector. Accordingly, this research will add to the existing literature concerning inter-agency collaboration within New Zealand's public sector, as well as applying a new framework to this important aspect of public sector policy through the analysis of discourse. In the use of a case study, this research makes no generalised claim about public sector collaboration, rather the analytical framework presented forms the basis on which future research can build upon.

2.8   Conclusion

The review of the relevant literature makes clear that the neoliberal public sector reforms initiated in the 1980s generated unintended paradoxical consequences for public servants. The paradoxes of control effectively stifle managerial risk taking and, significantly, the prospects for inter-agency collaboration. The later reforms in the first decade of the twenty first century centred in the advocacy of a whole-of-government approach that requires the dispersal of autonomous decision-making power. This situation is at odds with the demands of departmental accountability, the hierarchical accountability, and the growing power of the central agency organisations of government.

The review of collaborative research methods in the pertinent literature, particularly Eppel et al's research, confirms the inherent tension between agency and structure that appears to be the result of a hierarchical system of internal organisational reform practices that contradicts the inter-agency processes espoused by a whole-of-government approach to public sector practice. To address the agency structure tension, the literature corroborates that a critical approach to the analysis of relationships of power within collaboration will

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[136] Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Essex: Longman Group, 1995), 226.
[137] Bryson, Crosby and Stone, "The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature," 52.

expose the causes of tension. Moreover, such an approach considers the wider political context in which collaborative actors are situated. Accordingly, this research deems the case study of discourse – the language and signs within inter-agency policies and practices of collaboration, namely the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), an appropriate subject for the present research.

The following methodology chapter situates the research objectives within the case study and explains the methods employed within the CDA framework.

Chapter Three - Methodology

3.1   Introduction

Based on the literature reviewed in the last chapter, this research proposes that the hierarchical governance structure of the public sector endures despite the neoliberal inspired reform policies that transformed New Zealand's public sector in the late 1980s. The result is the public sector creates a working environment that causes tensions, or as Norman states "paradoxes of control"[138] for collaborating public servants. I have shown that the use of a case study which exhibited "paradoxes of control"[139] is a starting point for research into the public sector to reveal the sources of tension for collaborating public servants. The case study for this research is the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), and this research posits that its collaborating actors experience a tension between their agency and structure. Specifically, this is the tension between their causal powers to collaborate within the NMCC context and the parameters imposed by the pre-constituted public sector hierarchical institutional structure.

In order to explore the agency structure tensions, the previous chapter reviewed research approaches to collaboration. The paucity of research on New Zealand inter-agency collaboration,[140] and observations from the literature that research considers power dynamics,[141] has confirmed the study of power as a lens through which to address the research problem that is what the consequences of public sector reform are for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. I reason a critical study of power predicated on critical realism enables this research to analyse the public servants' collaborative relationships through a study of their discourse. For this reason, I adopt Fairclough's model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to conduct a scalable study to link a specific collaboration to its wider public sector context.

This chapter presents the methodology of the present research in order to explain how the research objectives situate within the CDA framework. The section explaining the CDA

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[138] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 18.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ryan et al, "Managing for Joint Outcomes," 14.
[141] Lotia and Hardy, "Critical Perspectives on Collaboration," 5 of 17.

methods will elucidate how this CDA's study of power dynamics reveals the relationships between NMCC actors' "agency"[142] to construct their collaborative practice through the NMCC discourse and the public sector structure they occupy. Lastly, the chapter considers the data, the research parameters, assumptions and my position in relation to the research.

3.2   Selection of case study

This research refers to Pettigrew who advises the researcher to consider "extreme situations, critical incidents, and social dramas"[143] when selecting a case study, in this case the NMCC. The NMCC "social drama"[144] refers to the contextual backdrop of public sector reform and its impacts on the actors and organisations involved in the NMCC collaboration. The "social drama"[145] refers to the critique of NMCC effectiveness levied in the 2010 Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) audit.[146] Pettigrew also recommends that the researcher use a case study that contains "high experience levels of the phenomena under study."[147] In this context the experience levels of the phenomena are shown in the 2002 establishment of the NMCC in response to the whole-of-government reform agenda and the fact the NMCC still exists to the present day. Pettigrew advises the selection of a study that offers greater probability for the researcher to negotiate access to data. Accordingly, I was able to gain access to NMCC data courtesy of the New Zealand Customs Service under the 1982 Official Information Act.[148] The data Customs provides gives this research a rich volume of text for analysis.

At this point, I acknowledge the NMCC organisations include the public service departments (Customs, DoC, MPI, GCSB and MFAT), non-public service departments (NZDF and NZ Police) and that MNZ is a state service crown agency. Consequently, this research refers to the NMCC members' organisations collectively as the public sector.

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[142] 'Agency' refers to an actor's 'causal powers' to shape their collaborative practices that are not "reducible to the causal powers of structures and practices". Accordingly, actors shape this practice through their language, but there are also structural constraints on their causal powers and agency to do so. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 22.

[143] Andrew Pettigrew, "Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice," *Organization Science* 1, no. 3 (1990): 275, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1.3.267.

[144] Ibid

[145] Ibid.

[146] OAG, *Effectiveness of Arrangements* (2010), 3-4.

[147] Pettigrew, "Longitudinal Field Research on Change," 276.

[148] Ibid.

3.3   Methodology

The review of the CDA literature affirms this research's use of Fairclough's framework. Fairclough's extensive research of the transformational qualities of neoliberalism and its use as a political tool to shape social structures and practices confirms this choice.[149] Fairclough explains the governance of democratic western societies abounds with hegemonic power struggles to postulate a particular ideology as the truth, which is enabled through discourse.[150] He explains that the critical analysis of discourse accounts for the social conditions that shape the production and interpretation of the discourse.[151]

Fairclough's CDA framework considers three levels of social organisation. Applied to this research these levels are first, the discourse produced in the NMCC's immediate environment represented in the discourse of the NMCC (F) text. Second, the NMCC organisations that constitutes the wider context in which the discursive practice of the NMCC actors occurs. Third, the level of the public sector as a whole, in which its pre-constituted structure and existing practices shape the NMCC collaborative discourse. [152]

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[149] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 4.
[150] Ibid., 2.
[151] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 20.
[152] Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 20-21.

Figure 3.1: The Analytical Framework. [153]

Figure 3.1 illustrates this research's application of Fairclough's tripartite framework, explaining how this study analyses the NMCC actors' discourse. First, at the level of the text from which the research interprets the collaborative relationship constructed between the producers of the NMCC (F) and the NMCC managers. Second, the interpretation and explanation of the NMCC actors' interaction, which is the study of the NMCC actors' production, distribution and consumption of their discourse within their own institutional setting of the public sector. Finally, the analysis of the social context itself - the public sector explains the relationship between the public sector reforms and the NMCC collaboration. The schematic of the CDA in Figure 3.1, incorporates the research objectives that the method section explains in further detail.

The following section discusses the instruments and tools employed in this CDA. It considers the selection of data and how its subsequent analysis addresses each research objective. The CDA phases are threefold:

1. The textual analysis of discourse as text that focuses on the micro aspect of the NMCC actors' collaborative practice. [154]

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[153] Adapted from Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 21, Figure 2.1: Discourse as text, interaction and context.
[154] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), 137.

2. The analysis of the NMCC texts intertextual properties, which is process of the NMCC actors' production, distribution and consumption of the NMCC (F) and other discourses within the public sector context.

3. The CDA of the NMCC actors' social conditions that is the existing public sector institutional context and associated practices that have evolved from the public sector reforms.

3.4   Method

NMCC Discourse as Text

The interaction between NMCC actors produces their NMCC social practice, which forms their collaborative practice. The agency structure dialectic of this analysis requires the study of the complex interaction displayed in the NMCC actors' collaboration. Chouliaraki and Fairclough explain that this interaction is founded "substantively and centrally" [155] on discourse, therefore the NMCC actors' discourse forms and transforms the NMCC structures. The same discourse also constructs the social identities and roles of the NMCC actors. It follows that the NMCC actors' discourse also has the potential to create new social structures, collaborations, and relationships.[156] The textual analysis phase of CDA enables this research to illuminate the public sector collaborative practice through analysing a moment of practice captured in the NMCC (F) text. Chouliaraki and Fairclough observe that individual texts represent "moments of a practice" [157] which internalise other moments of practices in which they exist, therefore the NMCC (F) represents a moment of practice within the NMCC collaboration that internalises the features of the public sector social practice. The choice of the 2006 NMCC (F) is deliberate as its discourse is a guide to the behaviours and practices to which the NMCC actors should observe.

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[155] Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 28.
[156] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity*, 28.
[157] Ibid.

INTERPRETATION OF NMCC (F) DISCOURSE

Textual analysis of the NMCC (F) discourse

Aligned with the critical realist ontology of this study I apply an inductive reasoning to this phase of the CDA. The textual analysis employs an agency structure dialectic in the interpretation of the interpersonal and ideational components of the NMCC (F) discourse. The interpersonal function of the NMCC (F) shows how its text producers construct the roles of the collaborating actors, specifically the NMCC managers, and the ideational function reveals how the NMCC actors' perceptions of the NMCC collaboration represent within its text. I interpret what the findings mean for the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate within their NMCC practice and consider the producers' own agency to construct the roles of the NMCC actors on account of their own position within the public sector.

To ensure a systematic approach to the textual analysis I employed Halliday's systemic functional linguistics (SFL) to interpret the analysis. Fairclough expounds SFL's functionalist approach that "analyses a language as shaped (even in its grammar) by the social functions it has come to serve."[158] Therefore, SFL allows the research to apply the agency structure epistemology and avoids the risk of the CDA reducing the NMCC (F) discourse to a singular entity unrelated to its external context.[159] Using SFL as a tool for the textual analysis addresses the first objective: to reveal the actors' construction of their roles within the collaboration through the NMCC (F) discourse.

Analysis of the NMCC Discursive Practice

The objective of this stage of the research is to show how the NMCC actors produce, distribute and interpret their discourse within their own institutional settings. Mayr observes discourse has an important role in "shaping reality," [160] which institutions and their respective members create through their use of discourse. The same institutions are also a

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[158] Norman Fairclough, "CDA as a Method in Social Scientific Research," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,* eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001), 126.
[159] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity*, 28.
[160] Andrea Mayr, *Language and Power: An introduction to Institutional Discourse* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 5.

result of existing discourses.[161] In this context, the NMCC actors' discursive cues facilitate their interpretation and subsequent production of future discourse. Accordingly, this phase of CDA illuminates how the discursive cues shape the NMCC actors' members' resources (MR), which they use to produce, distribute and interpret the NMCC discourse. Fairclough explains MR as that which actors think is common sense and routine,[162] yet actors do so without understanding their MR is socially determined and ideologically shaped within their social practice,[163] in this context the NMCC collaboration within the public sector. He sees the study of MR as crucial to understanding the "interrelations of language, power and ideology."[164] Therefore, this phase of the CDA reveals how the NMCC actors linguistically represent the whole-of-government concept within the NMCC discourses to shape the NMCC actors' MR.

The second phase employs the concept of intertextuality to undertake a CDA of the NMCC (F) and its associated NMCC texts. Intertextuality enables the research to show how the NMCC (F) discourse constitutes linguistic elements of earlier discourses. Fairclough explains the elements of an actors' discourse select certain possibilities and exclude others because of their MR.[165] Consequently, the actors involved in the production, distribution, and subsequent interpretation of the NMCC (F) shape the subsequent actions of the NMCC managers and the future of the NMCC as a collaborative entity through the discursive cues within the text. The selection of discursive cues is also dependant on the producers' agency, which this research posits is their hierarchical power within the public sector. Accordingly, the intertextual analysis reveals the collective NMCC actors' "order of discourse"[166] which is representative of the "specifically discoursal organisational logic"[167] of the public sector. Chouliaraki and Fairclough explain, "[a]n order of discourse is a socially structured articulation of discursive practices…which constitutes the discursive facet of the social

[161] Mayr, *Language and Power,* 5.
[162] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 9.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 24.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity*, 114.

order."[168] Applied to the present research, this means the NMCC actors' order of discourse represents their collaboration within the public sector context in its language aspect.

The intertextual analysis of the NMCC actors' discursive practice bridges the interpretation and explanation phase of this CDA and this phase of the CDA takes a realist turn. The chapter begins with an intertextual chain analysis combined with an analysis of the manifest intertextual features of the NMCC (F).[169] This is to formulate and verify the initial hypothesis that the source of tension between the NMCC actors' agency and their public sector structure reveals as a hegemonic struggle within the NMCC discourse. This presents as the struggle between the whole-of-government concept that the NMCC collaborative practice supports and the institutional hierarchy of the public sector to which the individual NMCC organisations' accountability practices reinforce.

A basic content analysis method is now used to conduct a thematic coding analysis of the intertextual chain. The intent is to verify the qualitative CDA undertaken to this point of the research and this section of the analysis substantiates the NMCC actors' discursive practice which the intertextual chain and manifest intertextuality analysis reveals. In the analysis of the thematic codes, I considered the issues of reliability and validity. To address the issue of reliability, I appraised the stability of the analysis in that I coded the content three times to reduce the risk of inconsistency. However, due to time constraints I could not address the issue of reproducibility, namely text coded by more than one coder and that the accuracy of the text is how its classification corresponds to a standard norm. In regards to accuracy, Weber observes that standard codes are rare for texts and generally used only for training purposes.[170] To address validity I compared the data with the external criterion of hypothesis validity.[171]

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[168] Ibid.

[169] The intertextual chain analysis is a diachronic analysis of the NMCC (F) from 2002 to the frameworks production in 2006. It also includes the NMCC organisations 2006 Statements of Intent. My data selection was limited to texts reference in the NMCC (F) footnotes and those provided under the Official Information Act 1982.

[170] Robert Weber, "Content Classification and Interpretation," in *Basic Content Analysis*, 2nd ed, ed. Robert Weber (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), doi:http://do.doi.org.exproxy.massey.ac.nz/10.4135/9781412983488.n2.P.5

[171] Weber, "Content Classification and Interpretation," doi:http://do.doi.org.exproxy.massey.ac.nz/10.4135/9781412983488.n2.P.8

Finally, the study discusses the findings through an interdiscursive analysis of the NMCC (F)'s intertextual features in order to explain the hegemonic discourse within its text. Specifically, it explains how the producers' selection of specific discursive cues shapes the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors' MR. This research proposes despite the NMCC (F)'s promotion of the collaboration as a whole-of-government initiative; its discourse is not reconstituted within the discourse of the NMCC actors' because of the competing discourse within the NMCC texts. To corroborate this claim, I employ a basic content analysis of the NMCC organisations' 2006 Statements of Intent combined with an analysis of the NMCC organisations CEs' attendance at the ODESC sub-committee, the NMCC Network of CEs. Therefore, this phase of analysis considers the resistance of agency by the NMCC managers' organisations.

The Analysis of the NMCC Actors' Wider Context, the Public Sector

The final objective of this research is to explain how the pre-constituted public sector practices influence the NMCC collaborating actors' agency and their social practice, which is the NMCC collaboration. This objective addresses the critique of CDA that structural relations such as those of state become so "reified" [172] in its social and mental works that they disappear. According to Chouliaraki and Fairclough, the practice of CDA orients the interpretation and explanation of discourse towards an analysis of its surrounding structural effects and the impact the language has on those structures.[173] Fairclough explains, "social structures are very abstract entities,"[174] this can mean the public service, public servants reporting practices, or language used by public servants. He explains social structure can define a set of possibilities, but the relationship between what is possible and what happens is complex.[175] The collaborative practice of the NMCC actors has the potential to shape the structural possibilities of the public service and its existing practices. The NMCC discourse is therefore, located in a larger network of practice, which the neoliberal public sector reforms constitute. Therefore, the final CDA chapter considers the existing public sector context and

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[172] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 9.
[173] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity*, 30.
[174] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 23.
[175] Ibid.

its relationship with the NMCC collaborative practice. In doing so, it will explain the sources of tension observed in the earlier stages of the CDA.

The exploration of the NMCC actors' larger network of practice, the public sector, considers the complications afforded to the governance of the public sector through its reforms. Ideally the neoliberal inspired reform policies of the late 1980s should present as a logic that enables the whole-of-government concept and furthermore, inter-agency collaboration. However, the reforms have appropriated, transformed, and colonised the language of neoliberalism.[176] I discuss how the discourse within the larger network of the public sector controls the structure and practices within the public service, as well as transforming the language of neoliberalism. The result is that the existing pre-constituted practices within the public sector propound to the detriment of practices more conducive to collaboration. My argument is that the NMCC (F) producers, the NMCC actors, and public servants of the public sector have re-contextualized the language of neoliberalism through their discourse in a manner that reinforces New Zealand's hierarchical public sector governance structure.

3.5   Position of the Researcher

The purpose of this research is to gauge what the impact of public sector reform are for inter-agency collaboration using the NMCC as a case study. I am the former operations manager of the NMCC and this could introduce my former experience's bias to the research findings. Fairclough remarks that all text producers write from within their discursive practices, therefore their own practice is not immune from relations of domination and one idea may dominate another.[177] Fairclough states "[n]o theory or science is immune from that possibility,"[178] claiming that no research is free from bias and explaining that CDA's strength is that it is theoretically placed to "recognise its own partiality."[179] CDA reveals ideas contained within a discourse that are covert and not recognisable to its participants.[180] I position myself in the research by explaining my own Member Resources (MR) that I draw

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[176] Ibid.

[177] Norman Fairclough, "A reply to Henry Widdowson's 'Discourse Analysis: A Critical View'," *Language and Literature: Journal of the Poetics and Linguistics Association* 5, no.1 (1996): 52, doi: 10.1177/096394709600500105

[178] Fairclough, "A reply to Henry Widdowson," 53.

[179] Ibid.

[180] Ibid., 52-53.

upon in the interpretative and explanatory stages of this CDA. Fairclough comments that during both stages of the analysis, like the study's subjects, a researcher is undertaking the same cognitive process as the discourse's participants.[181] The point of difference is an analyst's cognition must "explicate what she is doing" [182] in order for them to make common sense assumptions in their interpretation and explanation. The MR I employ to apply a common sense view to this analysis is the social theories I apply to explain the relationships of power that exist in the NMCC discourse.

I also present to the reader my identity in relation to my MR. Fairclough observes "self-consciousness is just as important"[183] for a researcher to avoid making claims about her subjects and the subjects' context that are "theory-independent or theory-neutral."[184] My own position as a public servant and former operations manager of the NMCC made me conscious that my own MR is familiar with my contemporaries currently engaged with the NMCC. Therefore, I chose not to use interview data to avoid the risk of influencing respondents' answers and my resultant interpretation; and I instead use written text for the analysis. For this justification, I refer to Van Dijk's observation that for institutional discourse "real power seems to have formal consequences only when somehow 'fixed' in writing or print."[185] In this CDA of public sector reform and the NMCC collaboration, I apply this principle to my analysis of the power relationships articulated in the written text of the NMCC actors' collaborative practice.

3.6   Data Collection

In order to decide which textual data to include, I approached the manager of the NMCC in early 2014 to discuss the history of the NMCC and the documents of import from 2002 to 2013. The conversation confirmed my institutional knowledge of existing NMCC documentation. Subsequently, I requested a list of documentation from Customs under an Official Information Act (OIA) request.[186]

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[181] Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 139.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Teun A. Van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 54.
[186] New Zealand Customs Service OIA 14-035 dated 3 March 2014. Information released on 1 May 2014

I limited the interpretative phase of the CDA (textual analysis and discursive practice analysis) to available written text between the years 2001 – 2006. (This is the period of the creation of the NMCC and the production of the 2006 NMCC (F). The study of this period is also founded on the assumption the 2006 NMCC (F) remains the NMCC's governance framework.[187] Applied to the wider public sector reforms, 2001 was the year the government published the Review of the Centre. This document is central to founding collaborative discourse that produced the 2006 NMCC (F).[188]

This CDA textual data does not include material I was directly responsible for producing during my NMCC tenure (2008 – 2011).[189] In the final stage of analysis, I use the 2013 Maritime Security Oversight Committee (MSOC) terms of reference to support my interpretation and explanation of the CDA findings in chapters four and five. Since 2011, I have been seconded to another position within Customs, which enables me to retain my public servant MR whilst creating distance from the case study. As a public servant familiar with working collaboratively under the whole-of-government construct, I consider my own position as useful in this research. However, as a precaution I solicited a public servant peer to review my CDA interpretation and explanation within this study. Where the peer found assumptions that did not link with the social theories that underpin the CDA framework, I acknowledged I had become too close to the research and omitted the observation.

Limitations

I am cognisant that the data I requested through the OIA was because of my Customs and NMCC 'insider' experience and knowledge, and I am aware of other documentary discourse linked to the NMCC collaboration. This study adheres to Massey University low risk ethics guidelines as I study data released under the OIA and publicly available data from official government websites. In the sort through the text for inclusion in the intertextual chain analysis of the 2006 NMCC (F), I took care to include all data that the NMCC (F) document

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[187] "Unchanged Customs/NMCC Host-Agency Governance Framework." Unknown, *Maritime Security Oversight Committee Terms of Reference* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, Version 1.2. 2013), 6.

[188] "[a] new type of governance arrangement identified in the Review of the Centre." NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework*, 4.

[189] The reader should be aware that I was questioned by OAG auditors for the initial audit of the NMCC in 2010. However, the interpretation and subsequent production of the 2010 review of the effectiveness of civilian maritime patrol derived from extensive interviews across the NMCC organisations and the review is not part of this CDA.

footnotes and references. I consider the data made available is more than sufficient to address the parameters of the study.

Ethics

This research used secondary data made available through the 1982 Official Information Act and that publicly available on the Internet. Massey University Ethics Committee approved the low risk ethics application dated 4th February 2014 and recorded in the Low Risk Database.

Assumptions

This research makes the following assumptions: first, the NMCC will continue to operate under the existing governance guidelines of the 2006 NMCC governance framework, the NMCC (F).[190] Second, that the government has made no further amendments to 1989 State Sector Act and the 1988 Public Finance Act since 2013. It addresses the 2013 amendments in the final phase of the CDA. Finally, it assumes that New Zealand's Westminster model of government will continue to administer the public sector.

3.7   Scope and limitations

This research focuses on inter-agency collaboration (between government agency institutions), it does not address collaboration between the private sector, non-governmental organisations or intra-agency collaboration (collaboration within organisations). However, I propose this research framework can apply to all types of collaboration. In the outset of this research (2013), and to the best of my knowledge at its completion (2016), there is a paucity of research approaches that use CDA to analyse public sector collaboration within the New Zealand's context. The exception was the Master's thesis produced by a colleague, Terry Johanson, who undertook a discourse analysis of New Zealand's National Security System. While our ontological, epistemological and methodological frameworks differ, both approaches use case study based discourse analysis to analyse the locations of power within whole-of-government approaches.

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[190] "Unchanged Customs/NMCC Host-Agency Governance Framework." Unknown, *Maritime Security Oversight Committee Terms of Reference* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, Version 1.2. 2013), 6.

The purpose of this CDA is an exploratory study of the impacts of public sector reform on inter-agency collaboration. In my test of the initial hypothesis derived from the analysis of the NMCC (F) and the NMCC actors' discursive practice, this CDA does not employ a large-scale empirical project.[191] In this regard, I limit the analysis to an intertextual chain analysis and thematic coding analysis. In framing the question in an exploratory manner, the intent is to explore the feasibility of the study's methodological framework as a foundation on which to build a meta-framework of analysis for further research in the field of collaboration within the New Zealand public sector.

In the use of the NMCC case study this research does not make a generalised claim about New Zealand public sector inter-agency collaboration. Rather the intent is to build on existing studies of research in this area and provide a new lens for analysing the issues associated with public sector collaboration.

3.8   Summary

This research proposes the paradoxes of control create tensions between the NMCC actors' agency to construct their collaborative practice and the hierarchical structure of the public sector that the actors occupy. To explore this observation the research employs Fairclough's tripartite CDA framework predicated on realist ontology to study the tension through an agency structure lens. Therefore, the CDA studies the relationships of power expressed in the discourse of the NMCC governance framework and its related texts to confirm the causes of the tension between agency and structure. The first phase is a textual analysis that interprets the collaborative relationship constructed between the producers of the NMCC (F) and the NMCC managers. The second phase is the interpretation and explanation of the NMCC actors' interaction. This is the study of the NMCC actors' production, distribution, and consumption of their discourse within their own institutional setting. Finally, the last stage analyses the NMCC social context that is the public sector in order to explain the relationship between the public sector reforms and the NMCC collaboration.

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[191] For example, Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London: Routledge, 1984).

The next chapter addresses the first research objective: to reveal the NMCC actors construction of their inter-agency collaboration through the discourse of the NMCC (F). The research elucidates the interpersonal function of the NMCC (F) embodied in the relationship and roles constructed by the NMCC (F) producers and their audience. The audience that I have chosen for the focus of my analysis are the NMCC managers.[192] Subsequently, the research uses the ideational function of the NMCC (F) discourse to reveal the producers' use of the NMCC (F) discourse to communicate the reality of the NMCC multi-agency collaboration. The research applies the ideational function to illustrate how the NMCC (F) producers represent who is responsible for NMCC collaboration, and how the NMCC actors' representation of the collaboration encodes within the NMCC (F) discourse. The analysis concludes by reflecting on what these findings mean for the NMCC managers, in particular their power – their agency to collaborate.

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[192] These are the managers within the NMCC and the managers of the NMCC organisations whose role is to make decisions about civilian maritime patrol and surveillance and supervise their respective staff within the NMCC and their staff who request NMCC services.

Chapter Four - Textual analysis of the NMCC (F)

4.1   Introduction

The methodology chapter proposed that this research use use Fairclough's tripartite framework to undertake a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the NMCC's inter-agency discourse to study the relationships of power between collaborating actors. The research posits that the study of the NMCC discourse reveals the sources of tension for collaborating actors. This tension arises as a function of the relationships of power that exist between public servants, their collaborative practice within the public sector hierarchical structures, and the consequences of its reform that is the context for this research.

This chapter applies the textual analysis phase of Fairclough's CDA framework to the 2006 NMCC governance framework, the NMCC (F). This phase focuses on the grammatical analysis of the NMCC actors' discourse. The term 'NMCC actor' refers to all the public servants and government ministers involved with the NMCC and its associated discourses. The purpose of the textual analysis is to interpret the causal effects of the NMCC (F) text's discourse as a contributory factor in shaping the NMCC actors' actions, collaborative relationships and their "material world," [193] the NMCC. This phase of the CDA therefore shows how the NMCC actors construct their inter-agency collaboration through the NMCC (F) discourse, which is the first research objective.

The authors of the NMCC (F) are the NMCC Working Group.[194] I have labelled the authors of the NMCC (F) as producers in this chapter because they are part of a hierarchical group of NMCC actors who contributed to the discourse contained within the NMCC (F) in 2006. This hierarchical group included the Officials Committee of Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) – chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC); the ODESC sub-committee – the NMCC Network of CEs, and finally the mid-level officials who constitute the NMCC Working Group.

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[193] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 8.
[194] The NMCC (F) title page states "[d]eveloped by the NMCC working group." NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* Title Page.

4.2   Outline of the textual analysis

To study how the NMCC actors construct their collaboration within the NMCC (F) discourse, this phase of CDA uses Halliday's theory of systemic functional linguistics (SFL). According to Fairclough, SFL highlights the multi-functionality of texts because a text synchronously represents the physical, social, and mental world of actors.[195] Applied to this research, this is the NMCC actors' actions, collaborative relationships, and the physical world of the NMCC. Therefore, the analysis of the producers' use of grammar within the NMCC (F) is representative of the NMCC actors' understanding of the NMCC collaboration within the context of the public sector and their understanding encodes in the grammar used in the construction of the NMCC (F) discourse. The application of SFL in the analysis of the NMCC (F) text reveals the interpersonal and ideational function of its producers' discourse.

The interpersonal function shows how the NMCC actors' identity within the NMCC collaborative relationship shapes the producers' construction of the NMCC (F). In relation to the earlier discussion about the paradoxes of power confronting public servants, this research refers to identity as the NMCC actors' position within the public sectors' institutional hierarchy as public servant officials. Fairclough explains that because the language of a text constructs "the self"[196] and this has a bearing on how the resultant NMCC (F) discourse contributes to the process of collaboration. The identity of the producers is important to explore if the public sector institutional structures allow the discourse of the NMCC (F) to reconstitute the collaborating actors' identities or if the status quo remains.[197] The producers' identity subsequently affects the strength of their affinity with a proposition they make within the NMCC (F) text. This affinity is evident in the type of grammar and language used by the producers within the NMCC (F) text.[198] Accordingly, the interpersonal analysis of the NMCC (F) is a method of determining the producers' agency (see below), that is their "causal power"[199] to construct the NMCC actors' collaborative roles and practices through their use of language within the NMCC (F) discourse.

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[195] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 27.
[196] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 137.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 27.
[199] Ibid., 22.

The analysis of the NMCC (F)'s ideational function explains how its producers' use language to construct the social reality of the NMCC collaboration.[200] Fairclough explains the ideational function shows how producers refer to pre-constituted objects and signify essential messages through discourse to construct their social reality, in this case the NMCC collaboration.[201] In this context, the NMCC (F) producers refer to the pre-constituted public sector institutions and practices whilst simultaneously signifying inter-agency collaboration.[202] Accordingly, the analysis of the NMCC (F) producers' ideational function is a method of determining how the pre-constituted institutional hierarchy of the public sector and the events of whole-of-government reform shape the NMCC (F) collaborative discourse.

The analysis of the NMCC (F) text's interpersonal and ideational function allows this research to apply Fairclough's analytical dualism to show the dialectical relationship between the NMCC actors' agency and structure in order to reveal the sources of tension for the NMCC collaboration articulated within the NMCC discourses.

The findings of the textual analysis focus on the causal effect of the NMCC (F)'s construction of inter-agency collaboration, specifically the NMCC managers' agency.[203] The research uses the term 'agency' to refer to the causal powers that public servants possess that allow them to act with "discursive legitimacy."[204] O'Flynn refers to this as a groups' ability to address and manage an issue in public,[205] as shown by the NMCC managers' causal powers reflecting the degree to which they can address and manage the issues of maritime coordination under the NMCC mandate. The CDA therefore refers to the public sector agencies as organisations to avoid confusion with the concept of agency and the public sector organisations that are signatory to the 2004 NMCC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as the NMCC organisations.[206]

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[200] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 168.
[201] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 60.
[202] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 64.
[203] The NMCC managers are the middle level officials who represent their respective NMCC organisations' operational planning departments.
[204] O'Flynn, "Crossing boundaries: the fundamental questions," 35.
[205] Ibid.
[206] The signatories are the New Zealand Customs Service, Ministry for Primary Industries (formally the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Biosecurity New Zealand), New Zealand Police, Maritime New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Conservation, the New Zealand Defence Force and the Government Communications Security Bureau.

4.3   Interpersonal Function

This section analyses modality to show how the hierarchy of government institutional structure influences the NMCC (F) producers' agency to articulate the NMCC managers' collaborative roles. The NMCC (F) producers' agency to construct the NMCC collaborative relationship is evident in their affinity with the NMCC (F) text, which is determined through analysing the NMCC (F)'s grammatical elements. Accordingly, the greater the producers' affinity, the greater their agency to construct the NMCC actors' collaborative roles and practices. A text that indicates a producer has a strong affinity with its contents gives the reader clarity and less ambiguity in their interpretation of the discourse.[207] I contend the NMCC (F) producers' affinity needs highlighting to provide clarity in the NMCC (F) discourse because the NMCC (F) conveys the rules that govern the NMCC organisations' behaviours that determine "the long-term success of the NMCC."[208] The producers' level of articulated affinity can empower or disempower the NMCC managers' own agency to construct their collaborative roles in order for them to operate the NMCC.[209] In doing so, I show that the producers' identity as public servant officials within the hierarchy of the public service creates more ambiguity for the NMCC managers to interpret their roles from the NMCC (F) discourse.

In order to explore how the hierarchical institutional structures impact the producers' construction of the NMCC practice and the managers' roles, this section analyses the modality of the NMCC (F) text. This type of analysis illuminates the producers' "degree of affinity with the proposition" in their discourse.[210] Within a text, the producers' level of affinity is "modalized"[211] so in order to analyse the NMCC (F) producers' degree of affinity to its text I refer to SFL, which classifies modality verbs as low, medium or high.[212] Halliday explains modality shows the producers' affinity as their "judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations they covey in their discourse."[213] The analysis of modal auxiliary verbs allows the research to show the level of affinity the NMCC (F) producers have with its text.

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[207] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 160.
[208] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[209] O'Flynn, "Crossing boundaries: the fundamental questions," 35.
[210] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 142.
[211] M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London: E.Arnold, 1994), 76.
[212] Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 76.
[213] Ibid., 75.

Furthermore, modal auxiliary verbs enable its producers to articulate the degree of obligation that the NMCC (F) recipients should infer from the text.[214]

Producers afford authority, status, and power in their use high modal auxiliary verbs such as 'must' or 'shall'.[215] Conversely, the producers' use of low modal auxiliary verbs such as 'may' or 'could' infer that their text is open to negotiation or translation.[216] This grammatical feature of the NMCC (F)'s modality textures the producers' self-identity,[217] which occurs in the course of the NMCC collaboration, the social relationship of the NMCC actors shaping the "identification process."[218] Studying the level of modality within the NMCC (F) discerns the NMCC (F) producers' identity. By using modality as the framework for the following analytical section, this section concludes by arguing that the producers' hierarchical identity explains their lack of causal powers, which is their agency to construct the NMCC collaboration within the NMCC (F). Their low affinity creates ambiguity within the NMCC (F) text, thereby detaching the managers from its contents. It also reduces the collaborative obligations of the NMCC organisations, such as the asset providers. This situation subsequently reduces the NMCC managers' own agency; their legitimacy to collaborate.

Hierarchical identity limits agency to act

The modality of the NMCC (F) discourse reveals the hierarchical identity of its producers as equivalent to the NMCC working group. This group sit at the same grade of public sector official as the NMCC managers, who are also mid-level officials. The dynamic is evident in the opening statement, which foregrounds the rank of the producers. They write, "the governance rules…guide the behaviour of all agencies."[219] The later clause reveals a medium level of modality and therefore a lower obligation for the audience to engage with the discourse presented in the NMCC (F). The power, or lack thereof, afforded to the producers is further evident in the section of the NMCC (F) that addresses dispute resolution between NMCC organisations: "[o]ther avenues for resolution can be used such as referral to

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[214] Beverly Derewiankia, *A Grammar Companion for Primary Teachers* (Newtown: Primary English Teaching Association, 1998), 66.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 166.
[218] Ibid.
[219] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.

DMPC/ODESC or the Chief Executive's own minister."[220] The low modality verb 'can' shows

the NMCC (F) producers have no power to obligate the higher-level NMCC CEs and senior

officials to this cause of action because the modality of the NMCC (F) reveals the producers'

hierarchical identity. This correspondingly limits their agency to construct the collaborative

actions of the senior NMCC CEs, the central department such as DPMC, senior official

committees such as ODESC, and finally the NMCC organisations' ministers through

discourse.

According to McNamara, the practice of collaboration should allow participant autonomy to

develop policies jointly,[221] resulting in a sharing of power between groups.[222] The NMCC (F)

discourse endorses the involvement of the NMCC organisations in developing joint policies

for the future progress of the NMCC. However, the analysis indicates the producers have a

low affinity with this particular proposition. Fifty-five percent of the NMCC (F)'s proposition

statements that contain low modality verbs are present in the section of the NMCC (F) that

explains how NMCC organisations can have input to policy development. Within the same

proposition statements, the producers use confusing descriptors for the organisations

involved in joint policy development. This further demonstrates their low affinity in this

regard. For example the NMCC (F) describes the identity of the NMCC organisations and

other organisations as "Agency", "Other Agency" (international agencies are included in the

other agency classification), "Government Agency" and "Core or Interested Agency."[223]

According to the producers of the NMCC (F) a core agency is defined in its glossary as "one

for which the NMCC's work has significant impact on its operations,"[224] yet the producers

afford the more important core agencies the same identity as an interested agency.

Consequently, the NMCC managers have to infer which organisations are able to have an

input into the future policy of the NMCC; meaning the NMCC (F) discourse producers

minimise the managers' legitimacy by removing the authority for the NMCC organisations to

decide on policy or have input in its future policies.

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[220] Ibid., 12.
[221] McNamara, "Starting to Untangle the Web," 392.
[222] Ibid.
[223] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 1-16.
[224] Ibid*.,* 15.

Limited agency reduces obligation to action

The modal adjuncts present in the NMCC (F) text further highlight the producers' degree of affinity with its text. According to Halliday, modal adjuncts confer a producer's "judgement"[225] of the relevance of their messages, and therefore the level of obligation a text's recipients infer.[226] The following examples of the NMCC (F) producers' use of modal adjuncts reveal the sections of the framework to which they stress relevance. Accordingly, the type of modal adjunct reveals the degree of the producers' agency to construct the NMCC collaborative practices through discourse. For example, the producers describe the validity of the NMCC coordination as "expected" and the working group met "regularly."[227] The fact that the producers use the modal adjuncts of both "prediction"[228] and "usuality"[229] enables their discourse to convey the NMCC's history as relevant to the text of the NMCC (F). Furthermore, the producers' reference to the development of a future maritime patrol strategy uses the presumptive modal adjunct "implicit"[230] which shows the producers place a high relevance to the future of the NMCC. Fairclough explains a producer's attribution of high relevance to a proposition may have little to do with their commitment to a statement but more to do with a show of solidarity.[231] In the case of the aforementioned future strategy it is the latter, as the 2014 Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) progress report confirms the NMCC still needs "an endorsed plan that encompasses jurisdiction, enforcement and surveillance."[232] Consequently, this research posits that the public sector hierarchical position of the NMCC (F) producers limits their agency to obligate the NMCC organisations and their ministers to agree on the content of a future strategy.[233]

The discursive style of the NMCC (F) implies its producers consider a low degree of relevance to the section entitled "Whole-of-Government Principles."[234] Their attribution of low relevance is evident in their statement "[a]ll government maritime patrol assets are

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[225] Halliday, *An introduction to functional grammar,* 49.
[226] Ibid.
[227] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[228] Halliday, *An introduction to functional grammar,* 49.
[229] Ibid.
[230] The producers state, "Implicit in this arrangement is the agreement of other agencies and Ministers on the content of the strategy." NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 13.
[231] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 160.
[232] OAG, *Effectiveness of arrangements* (2014)*,* 5.
[233] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 13.
[234] Ibid., 8.

potentially available for tasking through the NMCC."[235] McNamara argues the pooling of resources in support of collective goals is a distinguishing element of collaboration,[236] yet the producers' use of grammar reveals this not to be the case for the NMCC. The modal adjunct "potentially,"[237] is applicable to probability and therefore the producers infer a low probability to asset availability, so their use of grammar implies a low obligation for the NMCC organisations with maritime surveillance assets to pool their resource though the NMCC's collaborative practice, the monthly planning meetings. Again, I contend the hierarchical identity of the NMCC (F) producers constrains their discourse within the Framework. Despite ODESC contributing to the production of its discourse, the NMCC (F) does not direct maritime surveillance asset owners, such as the NZDF, to provide surveillance capacity to civilian organisations exclusively through the NMCC planning processes. This situation compounds the producers' lack of agency to oblige the NMCC MOU signatories to adopt the practice of collaborative patrol planning. The 2014 OAG progress report confirms this observation about the producers' lack of agency as it states the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and NZ Police continue to organise maritime patrols directly with the NZDF irrespective of the NMCC collaboration.[238]

The narrative of individual organisations' practices

So far, I have analysed modality in the context of the producers' ability to convey the degree of obligation the discourse recipients (the NMCC actors) should infer from the NMCC (F). This reveals the producers' affinity with the NMCC (F) text through the producers' use of grammar. Fairclough observes another aspect to modality: truth.[239] This is the grammatical style of the text, which shows the degree of the producers' authority to make the claim to a certain truth. In the context of the NMCC (F) text, the findings reveal this truth as the vertical accountability practice between individual NMCC organisations and their respective ministers. This section analyses the NMCC (F)'s categorical modality realisation to show how the producers' grammatical style emphasises this particular truth claim within its text. Categorical modality realisation manifests in the use of present tense words such as 'is' and

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[235] Ibid.
[236] McNamara, "Starting to Untangle the Web," 392.
[237] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 8.
[238] OAG, *Effectiveness of arrangements,* (2014)*,* 5-6.
[239] Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?*, 162.

'are' that confer an authoritative style to reinforce the producers' claim to this particular truth.[240] Accordingly, their grammatical style empowers their agency to obligate the NMCC organisations to follow the NMCC (F) guidelines concerning accountability practices.[241]

The categorical modality analysis of the NMCC (F) producers' use of the words 'is' and 'are' shows the greatest density of categorical modality realisation at 54%, and is present in the accountabilities and responsibilities chapter.[242] Of this percentage 59% of categorical modality is present in the section outlining Customs' accountabilities and responsibilities as the host organisation.[243] The analysis reveals the producers construct Customs as solely accountable to its minister for the NMCC operation and results. Consequently, the NMCC inter-agency collaboration is accountable through Customs' individual accountability practice of annual appropriation reporting. This is evidenced in the following statements: "[t]he Chief Executive of the agency hosting the NMCC…is accountable to that agency's Minister and thereby to Parliament for the operation and results of the NMCC,"[244] and "[t]he host agency is accountable for the NMCC output reporting through normal government accountability mechanisms."[245] Therefore, direct ministerial scrutiny over the NMCC performance applies to only the host organisation of the NMCC, Customs.

The above observation confirms in the analysis of the section within the NMCC (F)'s chapter five that details the responsibilities of asset providers.[246] The NMCC (F) producers explain the NMCC organisations that provide patrol assets are accountable to their minister for their respective organisations' outputs, but the outputs of the NMCC are not included. The NMCC (F) text states these particular organisations are responsible for "building in a 'whole-of-government' component to their output measures to account for NMCC-coordinated patrols and surveillance."[247] However, the producers do not explain what whole-of-government is

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[240] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 159.

[241] Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?*, 162.

[242] Throughout the NMCC (F) categorical modality realisation is distributed between the chapters as follows - Introduction: 3%, Governance structure: 19%, NMCC principles: 6%, NMCC outcomes, purpose and functions: Not present, Accountabilities and responsibilities: 54% Key planning process: 9% and Supporting documents: 9%. The analysis omitted the glossary of terms.

[243] Within the Accountabilities and Responsibilities chapter, the categorical modality realisation for responsibility is further assigned as 29% to Other NMCC Organisations and 12% to the NMCC.

[244] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.

[245] Ibid.

[246] Ibid.

[247] Ibid.

in the context of the NMCC collaboration and how the outputs are measured. On the contrary, the truth conveyed in the NMCC (F) is only Customs is accountable for NMCC performance and outcomes. The lack of clarity in the text about the responsibilities of the other NMCC organisations means the role and contribution of the NMCC managers who do not work for Customs is unclear.

The hierarchy of the public sector reduces the NMCC actors' agency to collaborate

The findings of the interpersonal analysis show that the producers' identity as well as their institutional hierarchy as public servant officials reduces their causal agency to construct the NMCC collaboration through the NMCC (F) discourse. As a result it is an ambiguous governance document that provides little clarity for the NMCC actors, particularly its managers. This is evident in the producers' lack of agency to construct the collaborative actions of senior officials and ministers to agree to a future maritime patrol strategy. The low affinity expressed through the grammatical construction of the language of the NMCC (F) infers a low obligation for the NMCC actors to engage with its contents and to commit patrol resources through the collaborative NMCC planning process. The impact for the NMCC managers is that they have to infer whether their own organisations might have input into the future policies of the NMCC. They are also to infer how their own collaborative action within the NMCC context contributes to their respective organisations' ministerial reporting practices. Accordingly, this situation reduces the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate with the legitimacy to which O'Flynn refers,[248] which is in this case the ability to act on the issues of maritime patrol under the NMCC mandate.

The interpersonal analysis of the NMCC (F) discourse shows that the public sector hierarchical structure does not reconstitute the collaborative identities of the NMCC actors through its discourse. The findings posit that the NMCC (F) discourse reinforces both the status quo and the hierarchical identities of public sector officials, which is evident in the discourse showing the NMCC producers' affinity to the vertical accountability reporting practices. The direct responsibility for the NMCC's collaborative success rests with Customs. In its introduction section the NMCC (F) explains that since the NMCC's inception its work is

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[248] O'Flynn, "Crossing boundaries: the fundamental questions," 35.

"overseen by a Network of Chief Executives on behalf of…ODESC."[249] At the time of ODESC's directive to produce the NMCC (F) the central Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) chaired the ODESC. The DPMC's chairing of the NMCC's governing structure implies an institutional culture that Flinders refers to as "a 'control freak' tendency at the centre."[250] As such, the production of the NMCC (F) reinforces the institutional hierarchy of the public service in which the producers' interpersonal function equates to the discursive power of the NMCC (F) at the bottom of its producers' hierarchical group. Stoker explains traditional governance structures tend to reinforce the political leadership to impose order and issue directives when faced with the autonomy required of collaboration.[251] Accordingly, the only agency of the producers evident in the Framework's discourse is their causal power to reinforce vertical reporting practices whilst simultaneously reducing the agency of the NMCC collaborations' actors, in particular the NMCC managers.

4.4   Ideational Function

The study of modality in the previous section of this chapter discerned how the hierarchical structure of the government departments has reduced the discursive authority of the NMCC (F) producers and consequently limits the NMCC managers' power to make decisions and collaborate with each other. The analysis of the ideational function of the NMCC (F) shows how its producers construct the social reality of the NMCC collaboration.[252] The NMCC (F) producers achieve this through signifying the essential elements of their collaboration through the grammatical construct of theme.[253] The construct of theme allows the producers to foreground clauses they consider of significance to the NMCC (F) message. The ideational function also enables the NMCC (F) producers to construct the reality of the NMCC collaboration through "generating representations" in their discourse, again through the construct of theme.[254] The producers achieve this through the discourse's reference to "pre-constituted objects,"[255] which in this context is the institutional structures and

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[249] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[250] Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 66.
[251] Stoker, "Governance as theory: five propositions," 24.
[252] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 169.
[253] The theme is the section of a clause that clarifies a sentence due to its "position in the clause." Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 37.
[254] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 134.
[255] Ibid., 60.

practices of the public sector. Consequently, the language used in the NMCC (F) enables the NMCC actors to build a mental picture of their collaborative reality.

The following analysis of the NMCC (F) ideational function reveals the NMCC (F) producers obscure the agency and responsibility of the NMCC managers by failing to signify the NMCC inter-agency collaboration, as they proffer no opinion about the subject. However, the findings show the NMCC (F) producers do refer to the pre-constituted individual public sector organisations' reporting practices. Furthermore, by making this particular reference, the producers are able to link the Framework's guiding purpose with the whole-of-government concept. In this context the NMCC managers interpret their own meaning of NMCC inter-agency collaboration, but must do so within the confines of the text, which I argue limits their agency to collaborate.

Theme

The theme is the section of a clause that makes a sentence clear, the clarity being due to the theme's "position in the clause."[256] In the English language the theme's position is usually at the start of the clause. For example, "[t]his section provides the context for the NMCC governance,"[257] in which "this section" [258] is the theme.[259] Halliday explains that the key messages foregrounded by the theme enables a researcher to understand how the producers of a text, in this context the NMCC (F), use language that relates "to the context of [the] situation in which it is being produced."[260] Exploring the themes in the NMCC (F) text shows the significance its producers place on elements of the NMCC inter-agency collaboration through their use of grammar.

Collaboration within the confines of rules

Table 4.1 illustrates the prominent themes in the first paragraph of the NMCC (F). The significant theme of the paragraph is the rules governing the NMCC organisations. The producers draw the recipients' attention to the theme of "rules"[261] to create thematic

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[256] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 37.
[257] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 179.
[261] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.

equative,[262] this being the identification of the theme of rules and equating the rules with the "rheme."[263] The rheme in this example is the behaviour of the NMCC actors. Halliday argues the use of the equative function gives a message of exclusiveness and as such focuses a discourse recipient's attention to its producers' signification of the key message. The exclusive message in this context is the framework's signification of the governance rules. The NMCC (F) producers do not explain how the NMCC operates or what the NMCC managers and its actors need to do in order to ensure the long-term success of the NMCC.

Table 4.1: Example of Nominalisation as Rheme.[264]

Key to table 4.1	
	Theme
	Rheme
•	Clause End
||	Sentence End
U	Nominalisation
Italics	Deictic Element

Line 1	*This* document sets out the context •	within *which* the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC)
	operates,	and *the* governance rules •	*which* guide the behaviour of all agencies involved with it. ||
Line 2	These Rules provide a framework for the long-term success of the NMCC. ||	

The producers reinforce their exclusive message in their use of nominalisation as rheme. The NMCC (F) producers' use of nominalisation excludes the active participant within the clause, which in this case is the NMCC actors, and specifically the managers involved in the collaboration. For example, in line one the NMCC (F) contains the rheme clause "the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC) operates"[265] followed by the rheme clause "involved with it."[266] The producers continue their message of exclusivity in line two as they nominalise the theme in their use of the phrase 'these rules', and as such the NMCC (F) producers' stress that the recipients must adhere to these rules. Nominalisation enables a

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[262] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 42.
[263] Halliday explains that the rheme is the section of a clause that gives information about the theme. Ibid*.,* 37.
[264] Adapted from NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[265] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[266] Ibid.

text producer to form a noun from a verb or an adjective.[267] Fairclough remarks that nominalisation confuses who is responsible for an action and he explains the use of nominalisation allows a producer of discourse to obscure "agency and responsibility."[268]

The NMCC (F) producers also obscure agency and responsibility in their use of deictic functional elements. Halliday explains that functional elements[269] are the words within a sentence that categorises the subject of the clause, which he refers to as the "thing."[270] For example, "these rules"[271] in which "these"[272] is a deictic functional element that functions as a demonstrative, accordingly the "rules"[273] are the "thing."[274] Therefore, a discourse producer uses the deictic element as a signal to their discourse recipient to indicate whether or not the "specific subset of the 'thing' is intended."[275] The subset to which Halliday refers is the clause that follows the deictic functional element and in this way the clause that follows the functional element foregrounds in the text. For example, the words typed in italics in Table 4.1 illustrate the use of the deictic functional element in the NMCC (F) background section. The first and second clause of line one contains the deictic functional elements: 'this' and 'which'. The use of the demonstrative 'this', creates a sense of proximity in the subset of information for NMCC (F) recipients. In this case the demonstrative allows the producers to signal the importance of the NMCC (F) document to the way in which the NMCC should operate. Accordingly, the producers signal the linkage between the NMCC (F) contents and the NMCC actors' future actions whilst simultaneously obscuring the active participants in the sentence, which in this context the producers' use of grammar obscures the actors responsible for operating the NMCC.

The producers' obscuring of the active participant is further evident in the analysis of the second and third clauses of line one, Table 4.1. The analysis shows the producers' use of the deictic functional elements: 'the' and 'which'. The use of the determinative deictic 'the',

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[267] Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?, 162-163.*
[268] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 220.
[269] The functional elements of deictic, enumerative, epithet, and classifier can be used to categorise the "thing." Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 181
[270] Ibid.*,* 180.
[271] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 181.
[275] Ibid.

which according to Halliday, informs the recipient that there is an identifiable subset of information. He further explains that the producer "will not tell you how to identify it – the information is somewhere around" [276] and it is the discourse recipients' job to search for the information. For example, in the second and third clauses of line one, the determinative 'the' is accompanied by the interrogative 'which'. In pairing the deictic functional elements, the NMCC (F) producers link the governance rules with the NMCC organisations' behaviour.

The NMCC (F) producers are clear that the NMCC organisations and managers should act in accordance with the framework's rules but they provide no clarity as to how they should act. For example, the producers end the first sentence with the phrase "agencies involved with it."[277] In doing so, the NMCC (F) producers assume that the recipients will find the subject of "it"[278] within the text. These observations reinforce the finding that the NMCC (F) producers focus on the theme of adherence to the framework's rules. In this section of the text the producers are therefore able to commit no opinion as to who is responsible for the NMCC or how the NMCC should operate in the future. The omission of the active participant allows the discourse to convey the NMCC collaboration is something that happens, rather than something in which its actors actively partake.[279] This is because the producers identify that the original shared governance arrangement from 2006, needs to change to a governance model with straightforward accountabilities.[280]

The NMCC (F) explains this straightforward accountability as Customs' responsibility to its minister for the NMCC collaboration. If the NMCC (F) discourse afforded its actors, particularly managers, the agency to collaborate within a more loosely defined set of rules then their agency could undermine the ability of Customs to account for the collaboration to its minister. This situation, in which the discourse places emphasis on rules, represents as a source of tension for the managers' agency to collaborate. Eppel et al observe that inter-agency collaboration "should be treated as a perpetual pilot" [281] and the collaboration

[276] Ibid.
[277] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[278] Ibid.
[279] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 149*.*
[280] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[281] Eppel et al, "The cross-organizational collaboration solution?," 60.

should allow actors to break rules to allow the collaboration to evolve. Therefore, discourse is a critical resource for constraining collaborative action in this case.

Who is responsible for the NMCC collaboration?

The producers' use of nominalisation has the further effect of obscuring agency and responsibility as nominalisation allows a producer to represent a process as a noun.[282] For example, in Table 4.1 above, the NMCC (F) producers nominalise "these rules,"[283] and accordingly the various aspects of practices involved in the NMCC's collaborative success equates to 'these rules'. Fairclough explains, "[n]ominalisation characteristically means vagueness - no specification of what is changing, in what ways, over what period of time, and so forth."[284] Fairclough observes a consequence of nominalisation is that agency and responsibility are "obfuscated."[285] Nominalisation is also evident in the sections of the NMCC (F) that discuss the NMCC's operation and its outcomes: in this context the omission of the active participant obscures the NMCC managers' agency and allows the NMCC (F) producers to avoid committing to the future decisions the NMCC managers must make. The producers also obscure their own responsibility in this way.

The following analysis of the use of nominalisation in the NMCC (F) illuminates the extent to which the producers have obscured "agency responsibility" in the text.[286]

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[282] Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?,* 162-163.
[283] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[284] Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?,* 163.
[285] Ibid.
[286] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 220.

Table 4.2: Example of Nominalisation present in the section of the NMCC (F) that explains the NMCC background.[287]

Key to table 4.2	
U	Nominalisation
abc	Verb of be

Line One	The arrangements on trial were not so much the validity of the coordination, which was expected to
Line Two	provide clear and measurable benefits to the Government, but how it would work in practice,
Line Three	including a new type of shared governance arrangement identified in the Review of the Centre

Line one in Table 4.2 illustrates the sentence in which the producers have omitted the agent of the "arrangements on trial."[288] Often the declinations of the verb to be, such as the words 'were' and 'was', follow nominalised clauses. A producer's use of the verb 'be' means that the words in a clause that follows add little meaning to the sentence.[289] As a result nominalisation makes the discourse in a text less clear for the recipient. The analysis shows a high degree of nominalisation in the NMCC (F) and its recipients must employ their own interpretation of the producers' message. This situation means the producers risk failing to articulate the legitimacy of the NMCC collaboration and, as Bryson et al remark, failure to legitimise collaboration can jeopardise a source of trusted interaction between the actors such as the NMCC.[290] For example, in the Framework's background section the producers do not make clear who conducted the arrangements on trial, what the arrangements on trial were, if the trial worked, what were the benefits to the Government, and what the new type of shared governance arrangements are. The analysis of the next section of the NMCC (F) text shown in Table 4.3 reveals the producers are further unable to provide their recipients a clear answer.

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[287] Adapted from NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[288] Ibid.
[289] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 42.
[290] Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, "The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature," 47.

Table 4.3: Nominalisation of the section of the NMCC (F) explaining the NMCC background continued.[291]

Key to table 4.3	
U	Nominalisation
abc	Verb of be

Line One	The operation of the NMCC pilot, with its shared governance, was successful. However, the
Line Two	increased potential arising from Defence, Police and Customs maritime asset development
Line Three	programmes and the resulting need for increased resourcing for the NMCC to manage it, including
Line Four	the purchase of capital items, highlighted the need for a governance model with straightforward
Line Five	accountabilities.

Glossing over collaborative issues

Table 4.3 line one demonstrates that the NMCC (F) producers have removed the actors involved with the NMCC pilot as they nominalise the verb 'operate'. Subsequently, who or which government department responsible for the successful trial of the NMCC pilot remains for the NMCC (F)'s recipients to infer. In line one the producers write the sentence in the style of the passive voice in their use of the words "with its shared."[292] The producers' use of the passive voice enables them to remove the active participant in the clause responsible for action, and the discourse recipient must rely on context to understand what the shared governance of the NMCC is. The NMCC (F) producers also use the passive voice in their clause "highlighted the need for a governance model with straightforward accountabilities."[293] The identity of the omitted actors responsible for the governance model is unclear from the producers' discourse. Either the producers omit the NMCC actors responsible for governance deliberately, or because they do not have the power and authority to attribute agency to the responsible NMCC actors and managers.

Fairclough observes nominalisation is an irreducible resource for government discourse and in the context of governance nominalisation "can erase or even suppress difference."[294] The difference, revealed in this research is that the NMCC actors and particularly its managers, share a dual role: they must achieve their own individual organisations outcomes *and* the

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[291] Adapted from NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[292] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 144*.*

collaborative goals of the NMCC collaboration.[295] The NMCC (F) producers' failure to draw attention to the actors' responsible for a governance model within the opening section of the NMCC (F) enables them to defer the issue of the "autonomy-accountability dilemma."[296] Thomson and Perry explain this dilemma creates conflict between individual organisational goals,[297] and in this study the NMCC collaboration's goals. Consequently, the producers suppress the NMCC actors' "autonomy-accountability dilemma"[298] through their signification of the NMCC organisational structures and processes as active participants in their own right through their use of nominalisation.[299] Therefore, the producers' omission of the NMCC actors as active participants in the discourse reduces the room for managers to query this dilemma.

This finding reinforces Eppel et al's observations about a tension between agency and structure. Despite collaborating actors creating flexible, horizontal networks between their organisations; actors and resources remain attached to their own organisations within the hierarchical structure of the public service, which unequivocally, creates tension for the actors' agency to collaborate.[300] As discussed above, the use of nominalisation can reduce conflict. However, its use also means the producers do not attempt to challenge the existing institutional practices of the NMCC organisations and their respective actors. Accordingly, the NMCC actors, specifically the managers, do not foreground as the theme in the NMCC (F)'s discourse. This is significant to the findings of Eppel et al's study that found soft issues create significant blockages to collaboration, such as "embedded organizational and sectoral cultures, values and routines."[301]

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[295] Anne Marie Thomson and James Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box," *Public Administration Review* 66, issue supplement S1 (2006): 26, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00663.x.
[296] Ibid.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Ibid.
[299] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 150*.*
[300] Eppel et al, "The cross-organisation collaboration solution?", 58.
[301] Ibid., 59.

Reference to pre-constituted practices

The issue of the "autonomy-accountability dilemma"[302] further evidences in the NMCC (F) producers' use of the ideational function to refer to "pre-constituted objects,"[303] such as the reporting practices of the public sector, in order to generate the reality of the NMCC collaboration. Accordingly, the producers use conjunctive adjuncts to contextualise the relationship between clauses within the NMCC (F) text.[304] For example, the NMCC (F) producers' use the conjunctive adjunct "however"[305] to refer the recipients' attention to the dichotomy between the shared NMCC governance and "a governance model with straightforward accountabilities."[306] Halliday explains, "[I]f there is some element expressing the relationship to what has gone on before, by putting it first we thematise the significance of what we are saying."[307] In this case, the producers signify the importance "for a governance model with straightforward accountabilities"[308] but they do not explain what this accountability means or who is answerable for its implementation until the accountabilities and responsibilities section in the NMCC (F).

The "straightforward accountability"[309] to which the producers refer is the appropriations process, which is the annual reporting practice between departmental CEs and their respective ministers, who account to Parliament for their public sector organisations' performance. Inevitably, the organisations' delivery of services to the New Zealand public contributes to the political outcomes that the government promises to its electorate. This reporting practice also holds the government accountable to parliament. Accordingly, the appropriations process enables a minister to purchase their respective public sector departments' services to meet New Zealand Government's political objectives. Eppel et al observe that New Zealand's "silo-ized"[310] reporting process is one of the constraining factors of collaboration, and explain that it reinforces public sector organisational vertical control over public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. Norman concurs; he argues that

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[302] Thomson and Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box," 26.
[303] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 60.
[304] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 83-84.
[305] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Halliday, *An Introduction to functional Grammar,* 50.
[308] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Eppel et al, "The cross-organization collaboration solution?," 59.

performance accountabilities have stifled coordination. In his words, they are responsible for "crowding out innovation and risk-taking."[311]

The NMCC (F) producers reaffirm the importance of the existing accountability practice in the section of the NMCC (F) that explains the accountabilities and responsibilities of the NMCC organisations. The producers use the adjunct "thereby"[312] to link Customs with its minister and hence use the ideational function of discourse to reference the appropriations process in order to construct the NMCC collaborative reality. The appropriations process is the reporting practice that Eppel et al and Norman identify as a constraint to inter-agency collaboration. The NMCC (F) producers state that Customs is accountable to its minister for overseeing the funding associated with the NMCC. Their use of the conjunctive adjunct "addition"[313] in relation to Customs' coordination of future business cases for NMCC funding reinforces Customs' responsibility for the NMCC collaboration. This outcome is shown in the phrase "[i]n addition to normal funding procedures."[314] The study of the ideational function shows the reality of the accountability for NMCC inter-agency collaboration falls to Customs. Customs must report the NMCC's activities to its minister, oversee NMCC funding arrangements and manage and resource the NMCC "in a way that will enable the NMCC to fulfil its role and purpose."[315]

Fairclough observes that the style of contemporary policy texts favours the "logic of appearance" over "explanatory logic."[316] Applied to this research an explanatory logic would involve the NMCC (F) producers providing a more developed analysis of the NMCC collaboration that involves tracing the causal relations of the whole-of-government reforms.[317] According to Fairclough, discourse without explanatory logic indicates no real understanding of "how changing things at one level could produce different possibilities."[318] Moreover, in the context of the NMCC this is how the inter-agency collaboration contributes to the whole-of-government reform agenda. Consequently, texts such as the NMCC (F) are

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[311] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 22.
[312] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.
[313] Ibid., 11.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.
[316] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 95.
[317] Ibid.
[318] Ibid.

promotional in their discourse design in order to persuade the NMCC actors that the contents within are the only "practicable policies" rather than allow further dialogue between actors.[319] Fairclough explains this type of discourse as a "hortatory report," in which producers can use words with "covert prescriptive intent" to encourage their discourse recipients "to act in certain ways."[320]

For example, within the NMCC (F) the producers proffer no clarification or explanatory logic of the term "whole-of-government" therefore, for the NMCC (F) recipients the term whole-of-government becomes, according to Fairclough, "an unquestionable and inevitable horizon."[321] The producers convey the NMCC (F) as the only solution that will give further context to the recipients who are trying to interpret the practicalities of NMCC inter-agency collaboration. For example, the NMCC (F) producers are able to accentuate the whole-of-government in their use of conjunctive adjuncts in the section that explains the "[r]esponsibilities of the asset providers."[322] Accordingly, the NZDF and other NMCC organisations that provide patrol resources are responsible to their individual ministers for individual performance. The producers' language states the same organisations will build in "a 'whole-of-government' component"[323] to their performance measures. Therefore, the hortatory style of the NMCC (F) text enables its producers to use the whole-of-government concept with covert intent and in order to establish the management of the NMCC collaboration as the responsibility of Customs.

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[319] Ibid., 96.
[320] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 95.
[321] Ibid.
[322] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.
[323] Ibid.

Table 4.4: Analysis of Theme prevalent in the NMCC (F).[324]

Key to table 4.4			
	Theme	Conjunction Styles:	
	Rheme	(+)	Additive
•	Clause End	(*)	Adjunct
||	Sentence End	(~)	Coordinator
abc	Passive Voice		
U	nominalisation		

Line	Contents of NMCC (F)
1	**1.2 How to use the NMCC Governance Framework**
2	The NMCC Governance Framework (the Framework) • sets out the whole-of-government aims, expectations and
3	parameters for the successful and (+) sustainable operation of the NMCC as an operationally independent
4	coordination entity.|| It • therefore (*) applies to any agency with the NMCC either (~) now or in the future.||
5	The Framework • sets out both NMCC and agency accountabilities and responsibilities to the collective NMCC effort.||
6	Agencies • involved with the NMCC need to actively use this Framework. || It • not only provides
7	guidance on the NMCC role and accountabilities, but also on where agencies can expect direct input into direction
8	setting and planning, prioritisation and the mechanisms for problem solving and dispute resolution.
9	1.3 Keeping the Framework current
10	The NMCC • is responsible for keeping this Framework up-to-date and for managing version control.||
11	Any substantive changes • to this Framework will be done in consultation with relevant agencies. ||
12	The need for change • can be identified either by agencies or the NMCC. ||

The underlying discourse

Fairclough explains that for a producer of a text the theme is the "point of departure within a clause" which foregrounds the message.[325] The NMCC (F) producers' use of the passive

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[324] Adapted from NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.

voice, shown in Table 4.4 in blue, is a feature of nominalisation that enables the object or goal of the clause in the sentence to become the theme. Lines eleven and twelve show how the producers' use of the passive voice implies they assume the recipients understand who can effect "change"[326] to the NMCC (F). The framework's producers have moved the subject, the "relevant agencies" and the "agencies of the NMCC," to the end of the clause.[327] Consequently, the noun "change"[328] backgrounds the active participants in the clause; the effect creates a vagary of agency for the NMCC actors. This is because the subjects, the "relevant agencies" and the "agencies of the NMCC" are the actual organisations that affect the goal of "change."[329] However, the producers foreground the theme of "change,"[330] so the actor responsible for the goal becomes "change"[331] and the actual agents of change are a fragment of information rather than the theme. Accordingly, the agency of the NMCC managers to contribute to change diminishes through the producers' signification of the passive participant, the noun "change."[332]

Fairclough explains that when a producer uses passive voice, the recipient must interpret the theme as either an agent or a goal in order for the discourse to make sense because the producer either places the actual agent at the end of the clause or omits them all together.[333] Further analysis of the framework, illustrated in Table 4.4, shows that the NMCC (F) producers use of voice enables them to exclude the active participant responsible for the whole-of-government aims encompassed in the NMCC management and reporting practices. For example, the producers use the passive voice to foreground the NMCC (F) as the theme. More specifically the NMCC (F), becomes the active participant or as Fairclough explains an entity in its own right,[334] as shown in line five, Table 4.4, as the NMCC (F) is articulated as the "Framework" and in lines four and six, the NMCC (F) is referred to as "it."[335] The producers have removed the active participant associated with the Framework

[325] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 183.
[326] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.
[330] Ibid.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Ibid.
[333] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 183.
[334] Ibid.
[335] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.

and "it."[336] In their use of the passive voice, the producers are able to convey the NMCC (F) as the actor that will address whole-of-government expectations. Moreover, the NMCC (F) producers do not have to commit their view of the actual actor(s) responsible for the NMCC as they either move the active participant to the end of the clause or omit the participant altogether.

The NMCC (F) producers' creation of entities such as the Framework as the active participant enables the NMCC (F) discourse to constitute the "Framework"[337] as integral to the NMCC's successful collaboration, so this idea becomes 'common sense' to the NMCC (F) actors.[338] Subsequently, the producers' use of the Framework as integral to the collaboration is an attempt to create the NMCC inter-agency practice as a collaborative reality. However, the earlier discussion about straightforward accountabilities reveals a competing narrative to the producers' construction of the NMCC collaborative reality. The analysis shows the producers signify the NMCC (F) as a governance model that guides the straightforward accountabilities through individual agencies' ministerial reporting practices. The producers' discourse also articulates Customs as the organisation accountable for the NMCC collaboration. This reality is congruent with the existing individual public sector organisational practices.

At this phase of the analysis I refer to Fairclough's application of the Gramsci's conceptualisation of power in that the hegemonic dominance of one discourse over another is not fixed; in fact, the NMCC (F) text reveals competing discourses. In this case the competition between the NMCC's collaborative reality and the reality of pre-constituted public sector practices like the annual appropriation processes. These two discourses reveal sources of tension for the NMCC actors, in particular the managers' agency to collaborate and the NMCC (F) producers' agency to construct the collaborative reality of the NMCC within the discourse of the NMCC (F). The result is that the NMCC (F) remains a site of competing discourses, particularly the discourse of collaboration and the discourse of existing institutional practices. Accordingly, within the NMCC (F) discourse about the whole-of-government and inter-agency collaboration underlies another discourse that emphasises

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[336] Ibid.
[337] Ibid.
[338] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 177.

pre-constituted practices that have evolved from the eighties reforms. The impact is a confusing paradoxical construction of the NMCC collaborative reality in which the discourse of the NMCC (F) obscures agency and responsibility of the NMCC actors, in particular its managers.

4.5   Conclusion – the implications for the NMCC managers

The textual analysis of the NMCC (F) undertakes a CDA of the interpersonal and ideational function of the language within the 2006 NMCC governance framework. The application of Halliday's systemic functional linguistics (SFL) allows the grammatical elements of the NMCC text to be analysed. Accordingly, this type of analysis allowed this research to discern the causal effects of the NMCC (F) in shaping the NMCC actors' actions, relationships and material reality that articulate through the producers of its discourse.

The findings of the interpersonal function affirm that the relationship between the NMCC actors within the hierarchical public service shape the language of the NMCC (F). Consequently, the identity of the NMCC producers equates to a hierarchical identity of a mid-level official within the public service. The effect is to reduce the causal power of the NMCC (F) discourse to oblige its recipients to participate with the contents of the text and with the actions of the collaboration, in particular the planning meetings, formulating a future patrol strategy and having input into future policies of the NMCC. The interpersonal function reveals the text does not reconstitute the identities of the NMCC actors, in particular its managers, to act with greater autonomy. Rather, the NMCC producers' use of language reinforces existing hierarchical practices, specifically the NMCC organisations' appropriations process of annual accountability reporting. The interpersonal function, therefore shows the existing hierarchical structures and practices of the public sector constrain the collaborative agency of the NMCC managers as evidenced through the producers' discourse.

The ideational function illuminates how the producers' use of language to signify the important messages within the NMCC (F) constructs the reality of the NMCC collaboration and shows how the NMCC (F) producers refer to pre-constituted objects, such as reporting practices, to construct the NMCC collaborative reality. The results are as follows:

1. the actors must collaborate within the confine of the NMCC (F) rules;

2. the use of nominalisation allows the producers to obscure the NMCC managers' agency and responsibility;

3. the text fails to legitimise the trial period of the NMCC and its purpose;

4. and it also fails to address the collaborative issue that face NMCC managers, the "autonomy-accountability dilemma."[339]

The overall reality that is constructed is a whole-of-government inter-agency initiative that is limited by the discourse of the earlier reforms pre-constituted practices, evident in the reference to individual agency responsibilities, as well as Customs' accountability for the overall success of the NMCC collaboration.

In order to discern why this is the case, the next chapter addresses the second research objective which is to examine how the NMCC actors produce, distribute, and interpret their collaborative discourse within their institutional setting. Fairclough explains that this is because both the interpretation and production of a discourse depends on the members' resources (MR). MR confirms the social conditions that "shape the way in which the texts are produced and interpreted."[340] Accordingly, chapter five employs the next phase of Fairclough's CDA Framework, the intertextual analysis of the NMCC actors' discursive practice, which generates the NMCC actors' "order of discourse."[341] This is the linguistic element of the NMCC actors' collaborative practice. The "order of discourse,"[342] Fairclough explains as the elements of an actor's discourse that selects certain possibilities and excludes others.[343] Therefore, this phase of the CDA will reveal if the NMCC actors subscribe to the whole-of-government concept through the NMCC collaboration and if there are signs of resistance to the NMCC discourse.

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[339] Thomson and Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box,"26.
[340] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 21.
[341] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*, 24.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Ibid.

Chapter Five - The analysis of the NMCC Actors' discursive practice

5.1   Introduction

The previous chapter's textual CDA revealed how the NMCC actors construct their collaboration through the NMCC (F)'s discourse. Its findings illuminated two competing discourses present in the NMCC (F) text. These competing narratives were between the whole-of-government concept that the NMCC multi-agency collaboration embodies and the existing institutional practices of the public sector. Chapter four explained that these existing practices are, in this case, the NMCC member organisations' individual accountability reporting requirements to their respective ministers; a process that has evolved from the earlier reforms of the public sector in the late 1980s.

I have proposed that the two competing discourses reduced the NMCC managers' agency[344] to collaborate, including their capacity to plan, coordinate, and share information to effect maritime security within their interagency setting. This chapter addresses the second research objective, which is to examine how the NMCC actors produce, distribute, and interpret the meaning of the NMCC discourse within their institutional setting of the public sector. Consequently, this chapter undertakes an intertextual analysis of the NMCC actors' discursive practice, which is the second phase of Fairclough's CDA framework. In accordance with the research's ontological foundation, this chapter explains how both the NMCC actors' construction of discourse and their existing institutional context reduces the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate.

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[344] Agency is an actor's causal power; in this context this is the power afforded to the NMCC managers to collaborate. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 22.

5.2   Outline of the intertextual analysis

Figure 5.1: Analytical Outline of the Intertextual Analysis of the NMCC Actors' Discursive

Practice.

Figure 5.1 depicts the analytical schema for this chapter; it shows how this research applies the concept of intertextuality in its CDA of the NMCC texts. In this second phase the intertextual analysis encompasses the following methods: an intertextual chain analysis, an analysis of the NMCC (F)'s manifest intertextuality, and an analysis of the NMCC (F)'s interdiscursivity. The schematic should not be constructed as a closed system; as Fairclough explains

> "[o]ne can neither reconstruct the production process nor account for the interpretation process purely by reference to texts: they are respectively traces of and cues to these processes, and can neither be produced or interpreted without members' resources."[345]

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[345] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 72.

In this statement, Fairclough makes clear that members' resources (MR) are an actor's reference to what they think is common sense and routine.[346] This typically occurs without the actors consciously knowing their MR is not only socially determined, but also "ideologically"[347] shaped within their social practice;[348] as a result the NMCC actors' MR influences the actions of their collaborative practice within the public sector domain. How the linguistic cues within the NMCC discourses shape the NMCC actors' MR is therefore crucial to understanding the "interrelations of language, power and ideology."[349]

This chapter proposes that the analysis of NMCC actors' discursive practice will reveal the traces of text that constitute the production of their discourse and the discursive cues that contribute to their interpretation of the NMCC texts. This chapter also posits that the CDA of the intertextuality of the NMCC texts will reveal how their linguistic cues contribute to the constitution of the NMCC actors' "order of discourse."[350] Furthermore, I argue this 'order of discourse' is the source of tension between the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate and the pre-constituted practices of the public sector - practices that are the product of public sector reform.

The NMCC Actors' Discursive Practice

This research uses Fairclough's argument that discursive practice is a key element to reveal how the NMCC actors' process their discourse as they produce, distribute, and interpret the NMCC texts.[351] Furthermore, this process will vary according to the actors' social context.[352] In this study, the public sector institutional context influences the NMCC actors' discursive practice. Similarly, the NMCC actors' discourse also constitutes the public sector institutional context, and as Mayr explains, institutions and their actors create the style of

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[346] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 9.

[347] Ideology refers to the "significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination." Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 87.

[348] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 9.

[349] Ibid.

[350] The NMCC actors order of discourse is their collaborative practice represented in its "language aspect." Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.

[351] Fairclough, *Discourse* and Social Change, 78.

[352] Ibid.

language that they use.[353] She also observes that the same institutions and actors are also a product of the actors' language because their language also shapes the actors' reality,[354] in this context the reality shaped is the NMCC collaboration. Therefore, this phase of the CDA explores the intertextual properties of the NMCC discourses to discover how the properties of language shape the NMCC actors' members' resources (MR), which subsequently contributes to how they produce, distribute, and consume the NMCC discourse.

The intertextual analysis shows how the NMCC actors' discursive practice represents their public sector institutional setting and how this setting includes certain collaborative possibilities and excludes others within the NMCC discourses.[355] It further explicates the relationship between the NMCC actors' structure and agency in the findings reveal as their "order of discourse."[356] The NMCC actors' order of discourse represents the "specifically discoursal organisational logic of a field,"[357] in this case the field is the public sector. This research contends that the CDA's clarification of the NMCC actors' discoursal logic and how it subsequently shapes their MR explains why the NMCC discourses reduce the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate in the public sector context.

Intertextuality reveals the discoursal logic of the public sector

When applied to Fairclough's CDA framework the concept of "intertextuality"[358] is a text's constitution of the linguistic elements of other texts, which the intertextual analysis of the NMCC (F) and NMCC organisations texts reveals.[359] The importance of intertextuality to this research is the potential of the NMCC (F)'s discourse to transform the historical discourse of prior government reports and policy papers in order to construct the NMCC collaborative practice through discourse.[360] Fairclough observes, "subjects[361] are in part positioned and

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[353] Mayr, *Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse,* 5.
[354] Ibid.
[355] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24
[356] Ibid.
[357] Chouliaraki and Fairclough use Bourdieu's conceptualisation of field to explain that a field is a "bounded institutional complex," applied to this research this is the public sector field, on which its order of discourse can be mapped. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity,* 114.
[358] Intertextuality is a term Kristeva first "coined" in her account of Bakhtin's work to western audiences. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 101.
[359] Applied to this research, this includes government policy texts such as the 2001 Review of the Centre or Cabinet policy minutes of decision. Ibid., 102.
[360] Ibid.

constituted in discourse, but they also engage in practice[362] which contests and restructures the discourse structures (orders of discourse) which position them."[363] This means the MR from which the NMCC actors' draw to produce and interpret their discourse predicates on existent practices, in this case the NMCC inter-agency collaboration and the public sector context. Thus, the NMCC actors' collaborative practice shapes the way in which their discourse is produced, distributed, and subsequently interpreted by the NMCC actors within the public sector is a form of "social structuring."[364]

To show how the NMCC actors' "social structuring"[365] shapes their order of discourse the intertextual analysis comprises the following components.

First, a diachronic analysis of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain is performed in order to specify how the NMCC (F) 'enters' into the NMCC actors' discursive practice.[366] Fairclough's reasoning that an intertextual chain represents a series of texts that are "transformationally related"[367] is applied, and in this particular context, they are the discursive traces within the NMCC (F) chain of texts.[368] For example, the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review discourse is transformed through the actors' interpretation and subsequent reference to the review within the NMCC (F) text. The CDA of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain shows the NMCC (F)'s transformation of its historical texts from the beginning of the whole-of-government reform agenda in 2001 through to the NMCC organisations' subsequent consumption of the NMCC (F) discourse in 2006.[369] The intertextual chain analysis reveals the NMCC actors' production and distribution of the NMCC (F) through their discursive selection of certain linguistic

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[361] This research refers to the NMCC actors and the subject, "[i]n one sense of subject, one is referring to someone who is under the jurisdiction of a political authority, and hence passive and shaped: but the subject of a sentence, for instance, is usually the active one, the 'doer', the one causally implicated in an action." Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 32.

[362] This research refers to practice as the NMCC inter-agency collaboration. In accord with the ontological foundation of this research, "Social practice does not merely 'reflect' a reality which is independent of it; social practice is an active relationship to reality, and it changes reality." Ibid*.,* 31.

[363] Ibid*.,* 123.

[364] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 130.

[365] Ibid.

[366] Ibid.

[367] Ibid.

[368] The texts are the government policy texts, Statements of Intent and the NMCC Network of CE's and NMCC working group's documentation.

[369] Appendix 1, Table 5.1.

possibilities and exclusion of others. The actors' selection of discourse is evident through the discursive traces within the NMCC texts held in the NMCC (F) chain.[370]

Second, I augment the intertextual chain analysis with a linguistic analysis of the manifest intertextual properties of the NMCC (F). This specific analysis reveals how the NMCC actors' use their MR within their discursive practice through analysing their selection of linguistic "possibilities"[371] used to produce the NMCC (F). These linguistic possibilities further shape the NMCC actors' MR in their interpretation of its discourse. The complementary intertextual chain analysis and the analysis of the NMCC (F) manifest's intertextual properties reveal the presence of linguistic cues that signify competing discourses. These are the discourses of public sector institutional hierarchy, compounded through the series of NMCC text's reference to individual organisational reporting practices and the competing theme of inter-agency collaboration that are evident in the NMCC text's reference to whole-of-government.

Third, a basic content analysis is employed to discern further the NMCC organisations' interpretation of the NMCC (F)'s discursive cues using the basic content analysis to investigate if discursive traces of the NMCC discourse were present in the NMCC organisations 2006 Statements of Intent (SOI). Fairclough explains, "institutions have specific routines for 'processing' texts,"[372] accordingly these "routines"[373] influence how organisations "consume"[374] discourse within the public sector. Here the NMCC organisations consume the NMCC's discourse through their collective transformation of its discursive cues, which show in the textual traces of their 2006 SOI.[375] The content analysis indicates that not all of the NMCC organisations subscribe to the NMCC discourse. To expand on these findings, I undertake an empirical analysis, cataloguing the NMCC CEs' or

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[370] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.
[371] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 103.
[372] Ibid., 79.
[373] Ibid.
[374] Ibid.
[375] The SOI is a text that reports each individual NMCC organisations' accountability measures to their minister. The accountability measures specified in the NMCC organisations' SOI contribute to the success of the inter-agency collaboration through explaining that the NMCC organisations are to include a whole-of-government component to their accountability measures to report on their respective performance within the NMCC collaboration. NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.

their representatives' attendance at the NMCC network of CEs meetings between 22 Oct 2002 and 25 August 2006.

Moreover, I utilise the content analysis to investigate further the discursive themes within each text of NMCC (F) chain to substantiate the findings of the intertextual chain analysis and of the manifest intertextual properties. It confirms that out of the two competing discourses the theme of institutional hierarchy dominates the NMCC actors' order of discourse while also showing the pattern of competing discourses is repeated within the NMCC texts between the 2001-2006 period. Fairclough clarifies that the concept of hegemony explains the presence of dominant discourses within texts, which allow for certain possibilities and limits others.[376]

The final section of this chapter undertakes an interdiscursive analysis of the NMCC (F)'s intertextual cues to show how the dominant discourse has become "naturalised"[377] as the NMCC actors' order of discourse. Furthermore, the interdiscursive analysis also explains how the discoursal logic of the public sector reproduces the hegemonic struggles within the NMCC actors' order of discourse.

Hegemony, power and paradoxical discourses

The interdiscursive analysis shows that the NMCC actors' order of discourse is constrained because of its actors' position of power within the public sector that sustains the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the NMCC discourse, in particular the NMCC (F), has limited potential to contribute to the transformation of the NMCC collaborative practice.[378] This research claims that the NMCC actors' relationships of power are evident in the NMCC texts' discursive traces and cues, which reveal as competing discourses,[379] representing the hegemonic struggle that typically eventuates as the discoursal logic of the NMCC actors' collaboration within the public sector field. It is the history of reform in this specific field that has created a tapestry of conundrums for collaborating public servants, particularly

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[376] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 103.
[377] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[378] Ibid.
[379] The discourse of public sector institutional hierarchy, compounded through the NMCC (F)'s reference to individual organisational reporting practices and the competing theme of inter-agency collaboration is evident in its reference to whole-of-government.

with respect to their perceived managerial autonomy. The last section of the interdiscursive analysis therefore expands on Fairclough's adaptation of Gramsci's theory of hegemony to consider the actors' relationships of power.

Gramsci's conceptualisation of power, according to Fairclough, "depends upon achieving consent or at least acquiescence rather than using force."[380] Consequently, "ideology"[381] is an important factor in sustaining relations of power between actors.[382] This linkage suggests that the competing discourses within the NMCC actors' discursive practice contribute to the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors' MR. As such the NMCC texts' discursive cues ideologically shape the common sense assumptions and expectations of the interpreters. Furthermore, these discursive cues have become naturalised to the extent that amongst the NMCC actors they become a shared common sense and appear to lose their ideological character.[383] Therefore, CDA is a critical analytical tool for revealing the underlying "essence"[384] of the NMCC discourses, and consequently the competing discourses contribute to the paradoxical working environment for the NMCC actors' agency to collaborate. This research also claims that the same paradoxical public sector environment reinforces the NMCC actors' reproduction of their order of discourse, so that they communicate through the discursive cues within the NMCC texts. This situation creates and sustains the source of the tension between the NMCC managers' agency and structure, and subsequently constrains their ability to collaborate within the NMCC context.

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[380] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 45.
[381] Ideology refers to the "significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination." Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 87.
[382] Ibid., 45.
[383] Ibid., 76.
[384] Ibid., 77.

5.3   The Production, Distribution, and Interpretation of the NMCC Discourse

The first section of this analysis links the NMCC actors' practice[385] with the NMCC recipients'[386] production, distribution, and consumption of the NMCC discourse. This is done to show that, as Fairclough explains, the actors are "engaged in practice which contests and restructures the discourse structures (orders of discourse) which position them [the actors]."[387] Accordingly, the NMCC actors' practice enables the discourse of some texts to become colonised within the NMCC (F) to the exclusion of others. The contents of the NMCC (F) represents its diachronic relationship with the NMCC historical texts, which constitute elements of the recipients' MR. To explore further how the selected discourses within the NMCC (F) create grammatical cues that shape the NMCC recipients' MR and their subsequent interpretation of its discourse, the research augments the intertextual chain analysis with an analysis of the NMCC (F)'s manifest intertextuality. As Fairclough argues, subjects are also "in part positioned and constituted in discourse."[388] The manifest intertextuality analysis explains how the NMCC (F) discourse shapes their MR, and accordingly, how its discourse constrains their collaborative practice.

In Appendix 1 the NMCC (F) intertextual chain analysis (Table 5.1) shows the texts within the chain represent elements of the constituent discourses which produced the discourse of the NMCC (F) text. This is the NMCC (F) producers' own interpretation of the cues within the historical texts that mostly contribute to their MR they recollect to produce the NMCC (F). The historical texts include the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review: the founding documentation that led to the establishment of the NMCC, and the 2001 Review of the Centre, which promoted the need for the public sector to employ a whole-of-government approach in its delivery of "public services."[389] The chain analysis reviews the response of the Cabinet policy (CAB) and Cabinet decision (DES) minutes to the recommendations of the Maritime Patrol Review as well as the recommendations from the NMCC Network of CEs. It also shows the

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[385] The practice to which I refer is their inter-agency collaboration within the hierarchical public sector institutional setting.

[386] The recipients in this context are the NMCC managers and their respective organisations.

[387] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 123.

[388] Ibid., 123.

[389] In a report prepared for the Office of the Auditor-General, "the inclusive definition of 'public services' – reflecting concepts of public goods, services delivered in the public interest, and services delivered by (or on behalf of) central and local government." Rebecca Hollingsworth et al, *Challenges in the Delivery of Public Services: Final Report* (N.p.: Martin Jenkins, 28 November 2014), 4.

Network of CE's texts that respond to the recommendations of the NMCC working group and the directives from the CAB and DES minutes, all of which contribute to the production of the NMCC (F) text. Finally, the chain shows the NMCC (F) and the subsequent consumption of the NMCC (F) discourse in the NMCC organisations SOI.

The intertextual chain analysis in Table 5.1 includes texts specified in the NMCC (F) footnotes, some of which are available to the public online, and others released by Customs under the 1982 Official Information Act.[390] The intertextual chain analysis also includes other texts released under the 1982 Official Information Act between 2001 and 2006 that shape the textual cues within the NMCC (F). Table 5.1 illustrates the hierarchy of the New Zealand public sector on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis traces the NMCC actors' production, distribution, and consumption of the NMCC discourse over time.

The narrative of the NMCC (F) Intertextual chain

Table 5.1[391] depicts the narrative of the NMCC intertextual chain that begins with two documents. First, the 2001 Review of the Centre, and second the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review. The producers of the 2001 Review of the Centre recommend the public sector should integrate its service delivery[392] for government outcomes. The 2001 Review of the Centre presented the term "whole-of-government" as a concept that would address how the public sector could achieve integrated public services for government outcomes. It also recommended that inter-agency teams are a means of embracing the whole-of-government concept to tackle issues the government regards as intractable.[393] The 2006 NMCC (F) claims its framework's conception aligns with the 2001 Review of the Centre in that the NMCC's integrated service delivery model provides a whole-of-government approach to address the government's civilian maritime patrol coordination needs.[394]

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[390] New Zealand Customs Service, *Request for Information under the Official Information Act 1982* (OIA 14-035. dated 1 May 2014).
[391] Appendix 1, Table 5.1.
[392] "Integrated Service delivery…is the process of bringing, and fitting together government services to provide seamless services to citizens." Kernaghan cited in John Halligan, Fiona Buick and Janine O'Flynn, "Experiments in Anglophone countries," in *International Handbook on Civil Service Systems,* ed. Andrew Massey, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 81.
[393] State Services Commission, *Review of the Centre,* 4.
[394] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC governance framework,* 4.

The following is the first of two analyses of the NMCC (F)'s manifest intertextuality, both of which augment the intertextual chain analysis. This specific analysis reveals how the NMCC (F) producers overtly use grammatical cues to represent the whole-of-government concept within the text, and consequently the ways in which its producers convey the grammatical cues that shape the recipients' MR and subsequent interpretation of the NMCC (F) discourse.

The analysis of manifest intertextuality reveals competing discursive cues

'Manifest intertextuality' is a term Fairclough uses to explain how other texts are explicitly signposted within a text. Either the process of discourse representation or presupposition allows a discourse producer to provide the grammatical cues to assist in the interpretation of the text's language. In this section the analysis of manifest intertextuality explores the process of discourse representation through the NMCC (F) producers' use of quotation marks to "set off" a word or expression within its text in order to draw attention to a word of expression,[395] for example, they use quote marks around the words "whole-of-government."[396] The producers can also integrate a former text through the process of presupposition such as the NMCC (F) producers' presupposing the MPR through rewording its discourse within its text.[397] The process of representation and the insertion of previous texts enables the NMCC (F)'s discourse to shape the future discursive practice of its recipients,[398] namely the NMCC managers and the NMCC organisations. This shows that the NMCC (F)'s linguistic prompts allow its discourse to constitute ideas, such as that of whole-of government, to shape the recipients' MR when they interpret its contents.[399]

The discourse representation of whole-of-government

In the process of representation, Fairclough explains that a producer uses quotes around an expression within a text to create the effect of the discourse belonging to an outside voice.[400] I contend this is the producers' strategy to lend to the discourse an appearance of

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[395] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 104.
[396] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.
[397] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 103-104.
[398] Ibid., 102.
[399] Ibid., 90.
[400] Ibid., 119.

greater authority.[401] Furthermore, the NMCC producers' choice of the verb that precedes or follows the quote marks surrounding a word or expression is also significant to the NMCC (F) recipients' interpretation of its discourse because it contextualises the quoted expression's meaning.[402] Fairclough explains the verb used gives the discourse "illocutionary force,"[403] which in this case is a matter of the NMCC (F) producers "imposing an interpretation upon the represented discourse,"[404] thereby shaping the NMCC (F) recipients' MR, because the grammatical properties of a text contain "cues" that shape the recipients' interpretation.[405]

Table 5.2: Example of Manifest intertextuality represented in the NMCC (F) producers' use of the discourse representation process.[406]

Example	Statement in the NMCC (F)
One	"The NMCC was a small, independent unit that was physically co-located with one agency (NZDF), it's personnel and administrative arrangements carried out by another (Customs), and it's [sic] work overseen by a "Network of Chief Executives" on behalf of the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security (ODESC)."[407]
Two	"Asset providers are accountable to their Ministers for their agency's outputs. Asset providers are therefore responsible for building a "whole-of-government" component to their output measures to account for NMCC-coordinated patrols and surveillance."[408]

Table 5.2 depicts the two instances in which the NMCC (F) features quotation marks. In the first example the producers use the verb 'oversee' prior to their quotation of the words "Network of Chief Executives."[409] In doing so they linguistically cue to their recipients that CEs and senior officials were involved in the evolution of the NMCC. This serves to signpost the NMCC collaboration is of interest to officials of a senior rank. In the second example the producers use the verbs 'build' and 'account' before and after their quotation of "whole-of-government."[410] In doing so they imply the asset providers are responsible for building a

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[401] Ibid.

[402] Ibid., 120.

[403] Ibid.

[404] Ibid.

[405] Fairclough, Language and Power, 20.

[406] Adapted from the NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 2006.

[407] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 4.

[408] Ibid., 11.

[409] Ibid., 4.

[410] Ibid., 11.

whole-of-government component into their organisations' reporting processes, without explaining what the "component" is.[411]

First this analysis of the NMCC (F) suggests that its text initially provides illocutionary force to the verb 'oversee', which reinforces the public sector institutional hierarchy. Second, the NMCC (F) accords illocutionary force to the verbs, 'build' and 'account', signifying the existing public sector reporting practices. In this instance, the producers' order of discourse reveals a competing narrative that emphasises the expression "whole-of-government" while simultaneously linking this expression to the pre-constituted practice of NMCC organisations reporting to their minister on individual departmental performance. The intertextual chain confirms these competing discourses in the following section.

The narrative of the NMCC (F) Intertextual chain continued

Table 5.1,[412] shows the narrative of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain also begins with the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review (Patrol Review),[413] which is the founding document of the NMCC (F). The Patrol Review surmised that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) could not meet the civilian agency requirements for maritime patrol. It therefore recommended to the government that it establish a maritime coordination centre to manage the civil security of its maritime patrol areas.[414] The Patrol Review's discourse contributes to the recommendations of CAB Minute (Min) (01) 10/10. The CAB Min (01) 10/10 endorses the Patrol Review's recommendations that a pilot maritime coordination centre is established that later evolved into the NMCC, and with this endorsement the recommendations of the 2001 Patrol Review initiated the creation of the NMCC. The Patrol Review is also a significant document in that the NMCC (F) selects discursive elements of the Patrol Review text, and in doing so manipulates the MR of its recipients through the producers' selection of discourse from the Patrol Review's text. The second analysis of the NMCC (F)'s manifest intertextuality explores its producers' employment of presupposition to explain how this is possible.

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[411] Ibid.

[412] Appendix 1

[413] Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Maritime Patrol Review* (Wellington: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, February 2001), 1-41,
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime-patrol-review.pdf

[414] DPMC, *Maritime Patrol Review,* 25.

The analysis of the NMCC (F) manifest intertextuality and the effect of presupposition

Fairclough states that a text's producer uses presupposition to manipulate their interpreters.[415] The NMCC (F) producers use the process of presupposition to represent earlier discourses in their production of the NMCC (F) text. In this context, the NMCC (F) producers manipulate the Patrol Review's grammatical cues that they incorporate into the NMCC (F) text. The consequential effect of presupposition is to influence the NMCC (F) recipients' interpretation, more specifically their MR that they draw upon to interpret the grammatical cues within its text. Because producers can create the impression of an assumed opinion by referencing another text,[416] presupposition is difficult to challenge as it is a means of incorporating other discourses, as Fairclough explains.[417]

This analysis shows how the NMCC (F) producers achieve this presupposition through their reference to the 2001 Patrol Review within NMCC (F). The producers introduce the earlier Patrol Review text through their use of the presupposition 'that' in the section of the NMCC (F), which explains the NMCC governance structure in stating:

> "The diagram below shows how Government priorities and strategic policy together drive the principles in the maritime area and flow on through to the agency outcomes **that** are the basis of the strategies and the day-to-day work of the NMCC."[418]

In this example, the producers use 'that' as a presupposition to legitimise the hierarchical strategy map as the basis for the day-to-day work of the NMCC managers.[419] They further explain that the NMCC strategy map was "[a]dapted from the Maritime Patrol Review (Feb 2001) Appendix 1."[420] However, columns one and two in table 5.3, which contain the words of the Patrol Review's Appendix 1, reveal how the Patrol Review's text confers a different meaning the NMCC (F) text. This is the section of the Patrol Review from which the 2006 NMCC (F)'s explanation of its strategy map was adapted (column three).

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[415] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 121.
[416] Ibid., 121.
[417] Ibid.*,* 120.
[418] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[419] Ibid.
[420] Ibid.

Table 5.3 NMCC (F) wording that presupposes the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review contents.[421]

Maritime Patrol Review wording on which the NMCC (F) is based		NMCC (F) wording that presupposes the Maritime Patrol Review contents
Column One	Column Two	Column Three
Aspect of Framework	Area of Interest	
Level One	Government	Level One
Government Strategic Policy	Integrated legislative framework	Government priorities and strategic policy
Overarching context. This will provide a comprehensive and integrated management approach to all aspects of the marine environment now and into the future.		Provides the overarching context and government direction for agency outcomes. Examples of national strategic policy are Oceans Policy, NZ Biodiversity Strategy, National Drug Policy. In the absence of national strategic policies, this level includes Government-approved agency maritime outcomes.

This research posits that the NMCC (F) producers use presupposition to promote the appearance of an assumed idea that an overarching government strategic direction concerning maritime patrol exists and consequently manipulate the NMCC recipients' interpretation.[422] To corroborate this claim I compared the section of NMCC (F) column three, adapted from the corresponding section in the Patrol Review, column one. Column three shows the NMCC (F) producers use the present tense and the verb 'provide' to presuppose the idea that overarching government priorities and a strategic policy exists.[423] In comparison, column one shows the MPR producers use the future tense in the phrase 'this will.' In column three, the NMCC (F) producers also refer to "oceans policy"[424] as an example of national strategic policy. However, Mossop's research of New Zealand's international maritime law and policy perspectives reveals an oceans policy did not exist in 2006.[425] In their use of presupposition the NMCC (F) producers use grammatical cues to

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[421] Adapted from DPMC, *Maritime Patrol Review,* Appendix One, Annex Two and NMCC working group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.

[422] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 120-121.

[423] NMCC working group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.

[424] Ibid.

[425] Joanna Mossop, "Maritime security in New Zealand," in *Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand*, eds. Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald. R. Rothwell (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010), 63.

create the appearance of existing government strategic guidance and, resulting in the legitimisation of the discourse of the Framework's strategic map and its governance structure to the interpreting NMCC managers and their respective organisations.

Chouliaraki and Fairclough explain that "an order of discourse is the specifically discoursal organisational logic of a field,"[426] and in this case, the field is the public sector context. The NMCC actors' order of discourse both shapes the actors' MR and is a product of their MR because the NMCC actors refer to what they think is common sense and routine.[427] The findings show how the NMCC (F) text contains grammatical cues which infer that an overarching government strategic guidance exists and these same cues relate to the NMCC recipients' existing MR. The significance of this is in the NMCC (F) producers also stating in column three that "in the absence of national strategic policies, this level includes Government-approved agency maritime outcomes."[428] The government approved maritime agency outcomes referred to are the long-term goals the government promised to its electorate. The NMCC organisations' medium-term strategy documents articulate their maritime agency outcomes in their respective Statement of Intent (SOI) documents.

The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) makes clear the SOI is an accountability document, available to the public, which explains how a public sector organisation uses taxes and rates to deliver public services.[429] The SOI articulates the CE's commitment to their respective departmental minister to achieve their organisation's annual outputs that contribute to the "agency maritime outcomes" in the NMCC (F). The SOI is a departmental medium-term, "three-year plus"[430] publication that departments can revise on an annual basis in order to meet the changing priorities of the government. This enables the NMCC (F) recipients to translate the cues in the section of its text that explains in the absence of such a strategy,

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[426] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity,* 114.
[427] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 9.
[428] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[429] Office of the Auditor-General, *Statements of Intent: Examples of Reporting practice,* (Wellington: Controller and Auditor-General, 2009) 11, http://www.oag.govt.nz/2009/statements-of-intent/doc's/statements-of-intent.pdf
[430] Jonathon Boston and Chris Eichbaum, "Financial management and democratic accountability: Lessons from New Zealand," in *Accounting in Politics: Devolution and Democratic Accountability*, eds. Mahmoud Ezzamel, Noel Hyndman, Åge Johnsen and Irvine Lapsley (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2008), 123.

individual agency maritime outcomes "are the basis for the strategies and day-to-day work of the NMCC."[431]

The key point I make here links to Fairclough's observation that "[m]anipulative presuppositions also postulate interpreting subjects with particular prior textual experiences and assumptions, and in doing so they contribute to the ideological constitution of subjects."[432] Applied to the analysis of manifest intertextuality, the use of presupposition reinforces the existing practices of individual organisation reporting performed by the interpreting subjects - the NMCC managers and their organisations. This finding supports my earlier contention made in chapter four's textual analysis of the NMCC (F)'s ideational function, that its discourse helps compound the "autonomy-accountability dilemma"[433] for the NMCC managers. The next section returns to the intertextual chain analysis of the NMCC (F) to probe the historical traces of the competing discourses within the texts of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain. The chain analysis will show how the NMCC (F) "order of discourse" is reproduced because of the existing discoursal logic of the public sector context in which the NMCC actors' collaborate.

The intertextual chain analysis substantiates the manifest intertextuality analysis

Table 5.1[434] shows that the 2001 New Zealand Ministry of Defence's (MoD) government defence statement recognises the Patrol Review's recommendations for a maritime coordination centre. The MoD's roles include advising the government on the defence of New Zealand, its interests, and to assess the NZDF's functions.[435] In their 2001 document the MoD stated the "[g]overnment has decided to establish a MCC [Maritime Coordination Centre] responsible for integrating the work of all agencies."[436] This decision is articulated in CAB Min (01) 10/10, whose producers endorse the creation of a Maritime Coordination Centre (MCC), the pilot to the NMCC. In doing so, the NMCC collaboration becomes a pre-

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[431] NMCC working group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[432] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 121.
[433] Thomson and Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box," 22.
[434] Appendix 1, Table 5.1.
[435] "Welcome to the Ministry of Defence Website," Ministry of Defence, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.defence.govt.nz.
[436] "Government Defence Statement: A modern, sustainable Defence Force matched to New Zealand's Needs," Ministry of Defence, last modified May 8, 2001, http://www.defence.govt.nz/PDF's/archive-publications/gov-def-stat.pdf.

constituted structure and practice for the NMCC (F) producers and consequently, their own discursive practice involves their MR's recollection of the existing NMCC pilot when they produced the NMCC (F) in 2006.

As the NMCC pilot evolved a group of mid-level officials formed the NMCC working group and produced the 2003 report in which they reviewed the NMCC pilots' implementation. Their recommendations included the permanent establishment of the NMCC, its relocation to Head Quarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ), and that Customs become the organisation responsible for hosting the NMCC.[437] The working group also recommend the need for a comprehensive overarching maritime security strategy. Accordingly, the 2003 report transformed the discourse of the Patrol Review, which recommended that an integrated government strategic policy would preclude a national maritime patrol strategy. The 2003 report recommends the NMCC working group coordinate the work to develop the overarching maritime security strategy, despite their observation that such an undertaking was "outside the scope"[438] of the working group's mandate.

As such, the 2003 report transforms the discourse of the Patrol Review in its recommendation that the maritime security strategy development becomes the NMCC working group's responsibility. Consequently, the discourse of the 2003 report confers on the working group of mid-level officials the responsibility for the production of a future overarching maritime strategy. However, the discourse of the 2003 report is omitted from the 2006 NMCC (F). The analysis reveals the manifest intertextual analysis of the NMCC (F) has shown how its producers use the language of the Patrol Review to presuppose linguistic cues to shape the NMCC (F) recipients' MR thereby creating the linguistic appearance that an overarching strategy exists.

The producers of the DES Minute (04) 1/3 note the NMCC pilot's progress and direct the NMCC Network of CEs making up the ODESC sub-committee to retain oversight of the NMCC. The DES Minute states that ODESC is "to report back to the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination if resolution of current coordination issues

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[437] The host agency is the agency approved by Cabinet to be formally responsible for the NMCC. NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 15.
[438] NMCC Working Group, *Report on the implementation of the National Maritime Coordination Centre* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 21 July 2003), 9.

results in major implications for the NMCC in terms of cost, functionality and location."[439] It also noted "that the individual agencies (New Zealand Customs Service, Ministry of Fisheries[440], NZDF, Police and the Maritime Safety Authority[441] will promote awareness of the NMCC among their own staff."[442] The intertextual chain analysis[443] of the respective NMCC organisations' 2006 Statements of Intent (SOI) indicates neither the Maritime Safety Authority[444] nor the New Zealand Police make mention of the NMCC in their respective annual report and SOI.

This finding is significant because neither organisation mentions the NMCC as pivotal to their organisations' outcomes despite the NMCC (F) stating that each organisation is to build a whole-of-government component into their accountability measures as their respective strategic documents communicate. The Office of the Auditor-General explains that strategic documents such as the SOI should demonstrate good management practice by linking the organisational strategy directed by their minister with the department's operational and business plans.[445] Furthermore, such documents report the annual effectiveness of the operational and business plans to its organisations' personnel, particularly its managers.[446] This research states the failure of organisations strategic documentation to link the NMCC with respective outcomes compounds the "autonomy-accountability dilemma"[447] for the NMCC managers. The next section discusses the implication for the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate and accordingly, addresses the NMCC organisations' resistance of agency.

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[439] Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination, *Minute of Decision: National Maritime Coordination Centre. DES Min (04) 1/3* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 17 February 2004), para 5.
[440] Now the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).
[441] Now Maritime New Zealand (MNZ).
[442] Cabinet Committee on DESC, *DES Min (04) 1/3,* para 6.
[443] Appendix 1, Table 5.1.
[444] Now Maritime New Zealand (MNZ)
[445] OAG, *Statements of Intent: Examples of Reporting practice,* 11.
[446] Ibid.
[447] Thomson and Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box," 22

The interpretation of the NMCC (F) discourse reveals resistance of agency

As previously discussed, the NMCC actors' collaborative practice has the potential to contest and restructure their order of discourse, which positions their collaborative agency.[448] Accordingly, how the NMCC actors' organisations respond as they interpret the NMCC (F) is of significance to the development of the inter-agency collaborative practice. However, as Fairclough explains, not all interpreters are compliant and may resist a text's discourse, unconsciously or otherwise.[449] He makes clear that an actor's pre-constituted reality, in this case the public sector institutional context, determines the conventions that influence how a text is consumed and interpreted.[450]

This research employs a basic content analysis of the NMCC organisations' 2006 SOI, which identifies phrases or words within the SOIs that show linguistic traces of the whole-of-government or inter-agency in the context of the NMCC and maritime surveillance. The result is the intertextual chain analysis only includes the SOIs that refer to the NMCC and maritime surveillance. This particular chain analysis reveals that not all the NMCC organisations "consume"[451] the NMCC (F)'s discourse. The SOIs of the NZ Police,[452] DoC,[453] GCSB[454] and MNZ[455] make no reference to the NMCC or maritime surveillance. Conversely, Table 5.1, Appendix 1 illustrates (in blue) that only the SOIs of Customs,[456] NZDF,[457] MFish[458]

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[448] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 72.

[449] Ibid., 136.

[450] Ibid., 136.

[451] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 79.

[452] New Zealand Police, *Statement of Intent 2006/2007* (Wellington: New Zealand Police, May 2006), 1-64, http://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-intent-2006.pdf.

[453] Department of Conservation, *SOI 2006-2009* (Wellington: DoC, 2006), 1-140, http://www.doc.govt.nz/Documents/about-doc/role/policies-and-plans/statement-of-intent/statement-of-intent-(2006-2009).pdf.

[454] The GSCB did not have a 2006 SOI available online; therefore, its 2006 annual report is used in the intertextual chain analysis. Government Communications Security Bureau, *Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2007* (Wellington: GSCB, 2007), 1-14, http://www.gcsb.nz/assets/GCSB-Annual-Reports/GCSB-Annual-Report-2007.pdf.

[455] MNZ did not have a 2006 SOI available online; therefore, its 2006 annual report is used for the intertextual chain analysis. Maritime New Zealand, *Annual Report 2006/07* (Wellington: MNZ, 2006), 1-98, http://www/maritimenz.govt.nz/Publications-and-forma/Maritime-NZ-Corporate-publications/MNZ-annual-report-2006-2007.pdf.

[456] New Zealand Customs Service, *Statement of Intent 2006-2007* (Wellington: Customs, 2006), 1-52, http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/documents/soi20062007.pdf.

[457] New Zealand Defence Force, *Statement of Intent of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)* (Wellington: NZDF, 18 April 2006), 1-220, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/nzdfsoi2006.pdf.

and surprisingly MFAT[459] (in light of the 2010 OAG report, see below) refer to the NMCC. These findings indicate a tension between the NMCC discourse and the NMCC organisations' wider network of practice of the public sector in which the pre-constituted discourse of individual reporting practices are reinforced in the NMCC actors' discursive practice.

The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG)'s 2010 audit findings validate these findings in that it found both NZ Police and MFAT had continued to undertake separate maritime patrol arrangements with the NZDF, independently of the NMCC monthly planning process.[460] Its 2010 audit commented these arrangements did not align with the Maritime Patrol Reviews vision of a "single, centralised, coordination model."[461] It further states that "the arrangements did not appear to have a significant effect of the NMCC's ability to co-ordinate maritime patrol from whole-of-government perspective."[462] This research refutes this statement because in 2014 the NZ Police and MFAT separate patrol arrangements with NZDF were still ongoing, and are now of concern to the OAG. For example, the OAG 2014 report states "[p]atrol co-ordination arrangements outside the NMCC risk making the NMCC's co-ordination activities less effective."[463]

In order to substantiate the OAG's observations, my research tracked attendance of the NMCC organisations' CEs at the meetings of the NMCC Network of CEs. Appendix 2, Table 5.4 plots the CEs' attendance against their own organisation's provision of a representative in the CE's place. The findings show that the NZ Police, NZDF, and MFAT are the top three organisations who predominantly send representatives to the Network meeting groups.[464] The findings suggest that this type of analysis is a useful signal for inter-agency actors to test if all actors actually subscribe to the whole-of-government collaborative discourse for a

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[458] Ministry of Fisheries, *Statement of Intent for the period July 2006 to June 2011* (Wellington: MFish, 2006), 1-84, http://www.fish.govt.nz/rdonlyres/189365EA-381E-414E-A960-8A003383c7FOD/0/mofsoi200611.pdf.
[459] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Statement of Intent 2006-2009 Incorporating the Forecast financial statements for 2006/07* (Wellington: MFAT, 2006), 1-134, http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000053936.
[460] OAG, *Effectiveness of arrangements* (2010), 31.
[461] Ibid., 32.
[462] Ibid.
[463] OAG, *Effectiveness of arrangements* (2014), 6.
[464] During the period of 22 October 2002 and 25 August 2006, the NZ Police and NZDF sent a representative for the CE 74% and 89% of the time respectively. MFAT attended the meetings from the period starting 22 August 2003 until 25 August 2006 and sent a representative for 77% of the time. Appendix 2, Table 5.4.

specific project by ensuring the correct level of official represents the organisation at such type of meetings.

The findings also suggest that if the NMCC organisations' ministerial directive does not include co-ordinated maritime patrol, then this situation creates a tension for NMCC organisations, specifically their managers, in their interpretation of the NMCC discourse against their own organisation's reporting practices. The implications for the NMCC managers is their own organisation's lack of interpretation of the NMCC (F) discourse are that they must contend with a tension between their own organisation's structures and practices and their agency to collaborate with other NMCC managers. The next section resumes and completes the intertextual chain analysis in order to illuminate that the tensions facing the NMCC managers are a function of similar tensions that face the NMCC organisations' CEs.

The discourse of individual agency accountability begins

In March of 2006, the NMCC Network of Chief Executives, the ODESC sub-committee, reported that the NMCC governance arrangements were not sustainable. This 2006 report explained that because the ODESC has no infrastructure formalising the NMCC reporting and financial arrangements is problematic.[465] The March report further discloses the NMCC governance arrangements were no longer sustainable as the NMCC Network of CEs comprising the ODESC sub-committee were unable to agree on the source of funding for the business case to develop the NMCC capacity and capability.[466] The 2006 report also discusses the concept of 'home porting' the NMCC within Customs' staffing and administrative organisational function, and Customs becoming the permanent host organisation of the NMCC. The 2006 document's discussion builds on the earlier 2003 NMCC working groups' progress report that also recommended Customs host the NMCC.

Based on these specific findings the intertextual chain analysis reveals the "autonomy-accountability dilemma"[467] facing the CEs of the NMCC organisations. The chain analysis

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[465] Network of Chief Executives, *NMCC Governance Arrangements* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1 March 2006), para 4.
[466] Network of Chief Executives, *NMCC Governance Arrangements,* para 4.
[467] Thomson and Perry, "Collaboration Process: Inside the Black Box,"26.

reveals this as the pre-constituted social practice of managerial autonomy over their own organisation's budgets to deliver ministerial outcomes that compete with joint decisions over funding.[468]

The findings of this research therefore do not corroborate with Eppel et al's research finding that state the public sector budget system was not an absolute constraint and a work around could be found.[469] The intertextual chain analysis indicates the budget system *is* a constraint, and I suggest that further CDA of the organisations within Eppel's study would be useful to substantiate their interviewees' comments. The intertextual chain analysis shows for the NMCC Network of CEs, there was no option to work around the budget system. Consequently, the NMCC discourse returns to single agency reporting accountability which is achieved through 'home porting' the NMCC in a single agency, Customs.

The concerns of the mid-level officials are exposed

On 23 August 2006, the Chair of the Network of Chief Executives (also the Comptroller of Customs) confirmed the 'home porting' arrangement. Because of this arrangement, the NMCC manager would report direct to the Deputy Comptroller of Customs to maintain the NMCC manager and their staffs' operational independence from Customs and maintain the NMCC manager's autonomy. On the same date the NMCC working group produced a minute reporting the concerns of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) about the transparency of the NMCC operation if Customs were to become the host agency. The same minute elucidates the State Services Commission's (SSC) assessment exercise in which NZDF, Customs, and NMCC representatives convened to assess the appropriate organisation to host the NMCC. The assessment was undertaken prior to the completion of the 2006 Framework.[470] Only NZDF and Customs expressed a written interest in home porting the NMCC.[471] In the SSC's assessment of a suitable host agency of the NMCC, the SSC held a strength and weakness exercise that resulted in Customs becoming the NMCC's host

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[468] Ibid.

[469] Eppel et al, "The cross-organization collaboration solution?," 58.

[470] "the Working Group recommends that Customs become the permanent host of the NMCC on behalf of the stakeholder agencies, also contingent on the following: The CE Network's (and ODESC) endorsement of the Governance Rules Framework." NMCC Working Group, *Report to Chair of the NMCC CE Network from the Project Manager of the NMCC Governance Project: NMCC host agency* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 23 August 2006), para 3.

[471] Maritime New Zealand withdrew their initial interest. NMCC Working Group, *NMCC host agency,* para 4.

agency. The working group's minute explains concerns raised by the NZDF working group representatives:

> "maintaining the current transparent process that has delivered the NMCC and its current operational processes, and secondly ensuring the revised hosting arrangements deal adequately with the potential for 'capture' and retention of its current operational independence."[472]

The document explains, "the 'objective' arrangement identified by NZDF in their case is preferable to the fully integrated arrangement proposed by Customs."[473] The NMCC Network of CEs 23 August 2006 report released on the same day does not refer to the working group's concerns, in particular the concerns of the NZDF representative.

The 2006 NMCC working group report reveals the tensions between the two NMCC organisations, both of which are powerful actors in the NMCC collaboration: Customs as the NMCC host agency and the NZDF as primary provider of maritime patrol resources. The decision of the central SSCs to determine Customs as the host agency for the NMCC supports this research's position regarding the paradoxes of power for collaborating public servants. In the case of the NMCC, it is the hierarchical decision of the central department (the SSC) to determine the NMCC's inter-agency host, which is problematic for the NMCC collaboration. As O'Flynn contends, collaboration between organisations is preferable to a mandated top down approach.[474] In this case, the SSC's decision was top down. The SSC's centralised coordinating role is an example of the evolution of the public service since the early 2000s.

Norman explains the shift towards central coordination was due to the earlier reforms that evolved from neoliberal principles of New Public Management (NPM), which gave greater managerial autonomy to public sector CEs.[475] Norman's observation supports my contention that the earlier reforms of the public sector's structure gave CEs greater capacity for agency, particularly because it gave them more power to make decisions about how their

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[472] Ibid., para 7.
[473] Ibid.
[474] O'Flynn, "Crossing boundaries: the fundamental questions," 35.
[475] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 148 - 149.

organisations met the needs of New Zealand's government. However, devolved managerial autonomy also created a climate of mistrust between ministers and their public servants.[476] Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the SSC's decision about the host agency is an example of the re-centring of power in the public sector that exacerbates the paradoxes of control for collaborating actors.

The NMCC governance arrangements developed further by the end of 2006. In December, the Cabinet Policy Committee noted that the current joint funding arrangements between the NMCC organisations were not sustainable.[477] Therefore, the minute agreed to the establishment of the NMCC output as a new output expense in the host agency's Vote Customs portfolio. The Vote Customs portfolio is the descriptor for the process of Customs' annual accountability reporting to its minister, which means Customs' annual reporting responsibility integrates the NMCC's performance and accountability, recorded as NMCC outputs by the Customs' SOI from 2006. Accordingly, the Minister of Customs is to purchase the "co-ordination services for civilian purposes that support the effective and efficient use of New Zealand's whole of government maritime patrol and surveillance assets."[478] The policy minute also stated the Minister of Customs "indicates that consultation is not required with the government caucuses of other parties represented in Parliament"[479] with respect to this new arrangement.

The hierarchical identity of NMCC Network of CE's omits the concerns

The concerns expressed by the working group had merit in that the Comptroller of Customs, in their capacity as the Chair of the NMCC Network of CEs and head of the host agency, was aware of the proposed accountability and reporting mechanisms within the earlier NMCC texts. However, the hierarchical identity of the NMCC working group means that their concerns are not colonised in subsequent texts that report to senior officials within the NMCC intertextual chain. This situation suggests that the NMCC Network of CE's chair, who in 2006 was also the Comptroller of Customs, has greater hierarchical agency to omit the NMCC working group's discourse in subsequent reports to Cabinet. Consequently, the

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[476] Ibid*.,* 149.
[477] Cabinet Policy Committee, *Minute of Decision: National Maritime Co-ordination Centre Governance Proposal: POL Min (06) 28/26* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 13 December 2006), para 1.
[478] Cabinet Policy Committee, *POL Min (06) 28/26,* para 5.
[479] Ibid., para 10.

working group that are the NMCC (F) producers would know of the impending change to the annual reporting arrangements, which this is evident in the NMCC (F) text, explaining the NMCC organisations' accountabilities and responsibilities.[480]

The concerns of the working group do in fact eventuate in the glossary of the NMCC (F) in which the producers explain the term operationally independent. They state:

> "The Chief Executive of the host agency is formally accountable for the outcomes and performance of the NMCC. In this context, the NMCC is an integral part of the host agency (the New Zealand Customs Service). In practice, the Customs Deputy Comptroller, Operations is responsible for how the NMCC goes about its functions and what it achieves, which includes both the requirements of formal output delivery and of this Governance Framework."[481]

In their use of the phrase 'in practice', the NMCC (F) producers affirm that one actor - the Customs Deputy Comptroller has been devolved full responsibility for the NMCC accountability and its operation.

The intertextual chain analysis confirms that the historical discourse of the NMCC reveals competing discourses within the production and subsequent interpretation of the discursive cues. As such, this thesis claims the NMCC (F) is a reproduction of the competing discourses. Therefore, to verify the intertextual findings, the basic content analysis,[482] reveals the discursive themes within the intertextual chain.

Verification of the intertextual analysis

Table 5.5[483] illustrates the review of the discursive themes present as a percentage density. To achieve this result, I tallied each theme as I read each text in the chain. I then reviewed the themes present overall and merged them into generic themes that are represented as a percentage density in the table. The findings show the theme of budget and accountability is a predominant theme in the discourse produced at the CE level. This feature is also

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[480] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 11.
[481] Ibid., 16.
[482] Appendix 3, Table 5.5.
[483] Ibid.

evident in the NMCC organisations' SOIs that are finalised and signed by the CEs of each NMCC organisation. At the mid-rank official level, budget and accountability remained the prominent theme (except for the 23 August 2006 report). The themes that ranked significantly after budget and accountability were inter-agency, autonomy, and transparency. The discursive themes of the central government's discourse are mixed, but most of the documents produced are in response to either central agency reviews such as the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review or the 2001 Review of the Centre, and reports from the NMCC Network of CEs.

The content analysis shows that there is a greater hegemonic struggle within the NMCC actors' wider sphere of the public sector, which is significant in this case study. Returning to Fairclough's statement that actors are "engaged in practice which contests and restructures the discourse structures (orders of discourse) which position them,"[484] the thematic analysis substantiates how the historical texts of the NMCC constitute the competing narrative within the NMCC (F) that the manifest intertextual analysis revealed. This narrative is the producers' discourse representation of the expression of whole-of-government and their use of presupposition to manipulate the Framework's discursive cues to link individual NMCC organisations' reporting practices to the concept of the whole-of-government. Accordingly, the hegemonic struggle between the two discourses represents as the discoursal logic of the NMCC actors' public sector context.

The final section therefore applies the concept of interdiscursivity to the analysis of the intertextual properties of the NMCC discourse and examines why the NMCC actors accept the NMCC "order of discourse" and reveal how ideology is an important constraint as it maintains the existing public sector hierarchical relationships of power, which ultimately constrains the agency of the NMCC managers to collaborate.

5.4   Why is the NMCC (F) order of discourses accepted by its recipients: The analysis of the NMCC (F)'s Interdiscursivity

In order to explore why the NMCC (F) recipients accept its order of discourse this section shows how the Framework's discourse contributes to the "ideological constitution of

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[484] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 123.

subjects."[485] This step predicates on Fairclough's explanation that interdiscursivity applies to the societal and institutional order of discourse as well as individual discourses.[486] Ieţchu-Fairclough clarifies that an actor's order of discourse articulates through their use of discursive genre within their social practice.[487] Accordingly, the interdiscursive analysis of the NMCC (F) genre's style and activity type shows how its discourse maintains the social relations of power between the NMCC actors through the ideological constitution of the NMCC managers and their respective organisations receiving the text. Fairclough states "[t]he elements of orders of discourse are extremely diverse,"[488] he explains that they constitute "genre," "style," and "activity type."[489] This research acknowledges that each category of genre, type, and activity type is not distinct because they interconnect through the complexities of discourse.[490] Regarding these categories, Fairclough explains that genre overarches style and activity type because he applies Bakhtinian's view of genre, which is linked to social practice.[491] Fairclough clarifies that the analysis of genre allows the researcher to probe into the ways that discursive conventions constrain the social practice of which an actor is part.[492] In this context, discourse conventions are an ineluctable constraint for the NMCC multi-agency collaboration within the public sector.

According to Locke, a text's genre is anticipative and that a producer constructs genre to account for its audiences' future response.[493] Fairclough expands this point by explaining that the construction of the textual cues within a text imposes assumptions on the recipients' interpretation and their subsequent production of future texts.[494] This imposition is an ideological ordering that typically occurs without either, the producers' or the interpreters' awareness of its happening.[495] In this context, the NMCC (F) text employs the whole-of-government idea as a governance document to represent the NMCC interagency

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[485] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 121.
[486] Ibid., 124.
[487] Isabela Ieţchu-Fairclough,"Critical discourse analysis and translations studies," 68.
[488] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 125.
[489] Ibid.
[490] Ibid.
[491] Ibid., 125-126.
[492] Ibid., 125.
[493] Terry Locke, *Critical Discourse Analysis,* (London: Continuum, 2004), 16.
[494] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 69.
[495] Ibid.

collaboration in its guidance to the NMCC managers and their organisations' actions.[496] However, this research proposes the NMCC (F)'s genre reveals textual cues that signpost the influence of the earlier reforms, which constituted the practices within the public sector that have shaped the NMCC actors' MR, and their subsequent order of discourse. Consequently, the NMCC (F)'s genre is an important concept in maintaining the social relations of power because it reinforces the existing beliefs that prevail in the public sectors that reduce the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate.[497] To explain such 'existing beliefs' I refer to Fairclough's concept of ideology, which he explains as "representations of the world which contribute to establishing, maintaining, or changing social relations of power."[498]

This research claims that the ideology of the public sector maintains the NMCC actors' social relations of power. To clarify, I employ Fairclough's conceptualisation of Gramsci's abstraction of hegemony, which Fairclough uses to explain the concept of ideology. Fairclough explains that ideas conflict, ideas overlap, and are not fixed,[499] therefore the NMCC subjects as the NMCC (F)'s recipients are constituted by an ideology, which reveals within its text as competing hegemonic discourses.[500] These competing discourses are made explicit through their producers' reference to 'whole-of-government' and their reference to the established individual organisation's accountability and reporting practices, the latter being the dominant discourse. I state that the competing discourses become implicit to the NMCC (F) recipients within their collaborative practice and consequently become common sense, Fairclough explains this concept as "naturalized."[501]

This research shows that 'naturalisation' is evident within the NMCC actors' 'order of discourse' because the competing discourses are represented as an ideology. The CDA reveals this ideology as two discourses in which the dominant discourse of the hierarchical structure of the public sector "contains"[502] the dominated discourse of the whole-of-government inter-agency practice, which the NMCC collaboration represents. As the

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[496] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC governance framework,* 4.

[497] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 45.

[498] Fairclough cited in Isabela Ieţchu-Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis and translations studies" 69.

[499] Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis,* 76; Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 92.

[500] Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis,* 76.

[501] Ibid.

[502] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.

individual NMCC organisations' practices obey this dominant discourse, this concept illuminates why the NMCC (F) recipients' MR make sense of the discursive cues of the NMCC texts without questioning the competing discourses that the CDA revealed in the earlier intertextual analysis.

Genre and Style

Fairclough proposes that genre is associated with a certain style, which is classified as tenor, mode, and rhetorical mode.[503] The study of the NMCC (F) genre style shows how its components of tenor, mode, and in particular rhetorical mode reveal the interaction between the NMCC actors.[504] He also elaborates the component of tenor in terms of "'formal', 'informal', 'official', 'intimate', 'casual', and so on"[505] with texts being written, spoken or a combination of the two as written-to-be spoken;[506] in this case the NMCC (F)'s mode is written. Fairclough explains mode and tenor can be combined in the analysis of style. In this instance, the NMCC (F) is an official document written by and for the New Zealand public service. Finally, generic style can also vary because of its rhetorical mode,[507] and in the case of the NMCC (F) the style of rhetorical mode employed is "argumentative."[508] As such, the rhetorical mode allows the interdiscursive analysis to review the rationale presented in the NMCC (F) text's order of discourse through an examination of the textual cues that consequently shape the discourse recipients' MR.[509]

Table 5.6 illustrates the discourse style of the NMCC (F) that that reveals the rhetorical mode as argumentative in style. The NMCC (F) producers use its argumentative style as a grammatical cue to influence the NMCC recipients' interpretation of its text in order that they undertake the action the NMCC (F) prescribes.

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[503] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 127.
[504] Ibid.
[505] Ibid.
[506] Ibid.
[507] Ibid.
[508] Ibid.
[509] Ibid., 77.

Table 5.6: Rhetorical Mode - Argumentative Style of NMCC (F) Discourse.[510]

NMCC (F) Discourse
The diagram shows that whilst the host agency is accountable to their Minister for the performance of the NMCC, that agency is linked to **Government's wider interests** through the ODESC and through input from agencies that have a key interest in the outcomes of the NMCC." [511]
"The NMCC supports the **Government's maritime goals**, both civilian and military. In this context, **New Zealand's collective maritime patrol and surveillance interests** reflect individual agencies' overlapping responsibilities for:" [512]
"**NMCC activities will reflect a transparent, agreed, whole-of-government approach** to relevant aspects of Government priorities in the above areas." [513]

In this instance I suggest that the NMCC (F) producers' use of rhetorical mode in an argumentative style is because their own order of discourse is constrained by their hierarchical identity within the public sector. Chapter four's textual CDA of the NMCC (F)'s interpersonal function substantiates this observation. The text also reveals that the NMCC (F) producers are able to use the style of argumentative rhetorical mode to construct a link between the NMCC collaboration and the whole-of-government concept. As a result they present the collaboration as a rationale that supports the whole-of-government concept. In the accountabilities and responsibilities section of the NMCC (F)[514] the genre style remains argumentative, however the text illuminates the producers' use of individual NMCC organisations' accountabilities and responsibilities as opposed to their use of the concept of whole-of-government to influence the recipients' interpretation of its contents.

In this section of the NMCC (F) there is also a requirement for the host agency (Customs) to inform and consult with ODESC.[515] Accordingly, in this section of the NMCC (F) the order of discourse shifts from the more abstract whole-of-government concept to the hierarchical structural reality of public sector institutions. This is the NMCC organisations' accountability process, the annual appropriation reporting process between departmental CE's and their ministers. Consequently, the NMCC managers' use their MR to interpret between the cues in the discourse that refer to the inter-agency collaborative concept and their respective organisations accountability reporting process.

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[510] Adapted from NMCC Working group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 6 and 11.
[511] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 6.
[512] Ibid., 8.
[513] Ibid.
[514] Ibid., 11.
[515] Ibid.

An important claim of my research is that the whole-of-government discourse is dominated by the earlier pre-constituted discourses of practices, such as accountability reporting, that evolved from the earlier reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, the genre of the discourse enables the discursive cues to employ a strategy of "containment"[516] rather than eliminate the discourse associated with whole-of-government. Fairclough argues that the strategy of containment credits the dominated discourse, in this case study the whole-of-government concept, with legitimacy but "with strings attached!"[517] The 'strings' in this case are individual organisational practices.

Genre and Activity Type reveals how the 'containment' of whole-of-government is 'naturalised'

Fairclough observes that genre is also associated with the compositional structure of a text.[518] The previous chapter discussed how the NMCC (F) ideational function enabled its producers to use its language to construct the NMCC actors' collaborative reality. The analysis applied Fairclough's explanation that contemporary policy texts favour the "logic of appearance" over "explanatory" logic,[519] moreover, the NMCC (F) discourse style gives the logic of appearance that presents the discourse as the only practicable option for the NMCC collaboration.[520] Fairclough calls this style of discourse a "hortatory report,"[521] which is common in government policy texts.[522] Based on this specific observation, this research states the NMCC (F) has a compositional structure, which Fairclough calls "an activity type"[523] that closely controls the NMCC actors' collaborative actions, as the NMCC (F)'s activity type is composed of a sequence of discursive cues that structure the actions of its subjects, the NMCC organisations and their managers. Accordingly, through the compositional structure of its text the NMCC subjects connect with the NMCC (F)'s activity type, the governance of the NMCC collaboration. Through the application of Fairclough's theory, it is reasonable to suggest that the composition of the NMCC (F) demarcates the

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[516] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[517] Ibid.
[518] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 126.
[519] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 95.
[520] Ibid., 96.
[521] Ibid., 95.
[522] Ibid., 96.
[523] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 126.

range of options available to the collaborative actions of the NMCC organisations and their managers. More specifically, I argue that the purposive compositional structure of the NMCC (F)'s discourse limits the range of actions available to the NMCC managers, which accordingly diminishes their agency. Examples of this can be seen in both the NMCC (F) strategy map (Figure 5.2) and governance map (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.2 shows the government priorities that "drives" [524] the work of the NMCC, indicated within the dashed outline. Conversely, the work of the NMCC collaboration "contributes"[525] to the government priorities and strategic policy and as such, the difference in language reinforces the hierarchy of the NMCC's governance structure.

Figure 5.2: NMCC Strategy Map.[526]

Figure 5.3 illustrates the demarcation of the NMCC actors' sequence of actions and reinforces the NMCC (F)'s emphasis on the activity of public sector reporting in its reference to Custom's accountability to the Minister of Customs. In relation to Figure 5.3, the NMCC (F) states "while the governance of the NMCC is within an agency, it does not operate in

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[524] Source: NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 5.
[525] Ibid.
[526] Ibid.

isolation. Dotted lines indicate an interest."[527] The NMCC (F) also states the "diagram shows that while the host agency is accountable to their Minister for the performance of the NMCC, that agency is linked to the Government's wider interests through the ODESC and through input from agencies that have a key interest in the outcomes of the NMCC."[528] The NMCC (F) makes clear it is the CE of the host agency who convenes the NMCC reference group to discuss strategic issues and trends associated with the NMCC collaboration. It also makes clear that it is the NMCC manager who convenes the NMCC working group. These observations demonstrate that NMCC actors' range of activity, in this case convening meetings, is limited to the power of two individuals: the CE of Customs and the NMCC manager. For the other NMCC organisations, however, the dotted lines NMCC "indicate an interest."[529] Consequently, the language used, limits the ability of the other NMCC organisations to have any real say in the NMCC collaborative proceedings.

Figure 5.3: NMCC Accountability Map.[530]

Fairclough explains that purposive discourses have the effect of creating distance between organisations and people because within neoliberal societies there exists a tension between flexibility and stability, an omnipresent tension that produces a "pressure towards social control."[531] Accordingly, the NMCC (F) activity type represents the NMCC collaboration in a way that enables its discourse to establish and maintain the NMCC actors' relations of power within the public sector.[532] The activity type serves to reinforce the dominant discourse of the public sector's hierarchical practices through its constraint of the NMCC

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[527] Ibid, 6.
[528] Ibid.
[529] Ibid.
[530] Source: NMCC Working Group, *NMCC Governance Framework,* 6.
[531] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 72-73.
[532] Ibid*.,* 73.

actors' actions that Figures 5.2 and 5.3 substantiate. The findings of this research posit that the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors is such that the contrast between the dominating and the dominated discourse ceases to be arbitrary to the recipients' MR.[533] This is the ideology that is the "containment"[534] of the whole-of-government discourse by the existing institutional practices of the public sector, such as accountability reporting. Not surprisingly, the consequence for the NMCC actors is that the discourse pattern of "containment"[535] becomes "natural, and legitimate because it is simply the way of conducting oneself."[536]

As suggested by Fairclough this process of naturalisation becomes the "the royal road to common sense."[537] Accordingly, the NMCC (F) presents as a "means-end-logic"[538] in that its ideology is pivotal to the NMCC actors' collaboration. Habermas explains "mean-ends logic" as neoliberal societies' predisposition towards institutions that favour goal-oriented and narrow-focused solutions to address their wicked problems, regardless of wider political or ethical implications.[539] The effect, in this case is to diminish the NMCC actors' questioning of the discoursal logic of the public sector context in which their collaborative practice occurs.[540] The result is that this discoursal logic is reproduced through the NMCC actors' discursive practice, which is significantly represented as the NMCC (F)'s order of discourse. Consequently, it is the reproduction of the NMCC order of discourse that creates the specific source of tension between the NMCC actors' agency and structure.

5.5   Conclusion

The intertextual chain analysis revealed the hegemonic struggles between two discourse types that relate to well-intended attempts to make operational the concept of whole-of-government within the existing hierarchical practices of the public sector. These competing discourses were substantiated in the manifest intertextual analysis of the NMCC (F). Furthermore, the diachronic analysis of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain affirmed that the

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[533] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[534] Ibid.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Ibid.
[537] Ibid.
[538] Alvesson and Sköldberg, *Reflexive Methodology,* 116.
[539] Ibid*.,* 115-116.
[540] Ibid*.,* 116.

NMCC (F) reproduces competing discourses from the earlier NMCC texts' discursive cues. The basic content analysis of the NMCC texts' thematic density within the chain not only empirically confirmed the intertextual analysis, but also revealed which of two discourses dominated. The dominating discourse was the pre-constituted reporting practices that evolved from the 1980s reforms, the reporting practices that Norman observed reinforce individual organisations to focus inwards at the cost of collaboration.[541]

The examination of interdiscursivity revealed how the whole-of-government concept is "contained"[542] within the discourse of the existing public sector practices. The containment of the less dominant discourse is an ideological construct that became "naturalized"[543] to the extent that the NMCC actors' no longer questioned the competing discursive cues within the NMCC texts. The result is the NMCC discourses continue to reproduce the hegemonic struggle between the two discourses that is the NMCC order of discourse. The findings suggest that the NMCC order of discourse represents the discoursal logic of the public sector in which the NMCC actors conduct their collaborative practice. The impact of their order of discourse reveals through the NMCC organisations' subsequent interpretation of the NMCC (F) discourse in which the basic content analysis confirmed that some NMCC organisations, NZ Police, DoC, GCSB, and MNZ do not prescribe to the NMCC's discourse.

The devolution of managerial autonomy associated with the late 1980s reforms should have created ideal conditions for CEs to work collaboratively. Nevertheless, ministers, who typically require the accountability of the public service also need innovative public servants to address the wicked problems of the neoliberal, globalised world. However, perhaps the unintended consequence of the adaptation of neoliberal theories such as New Public Management (NPM) to transform the public sector has created a structural legacy, which constrains the NMCC actors due to the reporting practices that have evolved to ensure intra-organisational accountability to ministers. Despite the advent of the whole-of-government approach espoused in the next wave of reforms, the earlier pre-constituted practices that have evolved from the earlier reforms of the late 1980s still prevail and

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[541] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 21.
[542] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[543] Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis,* 76.

continue to "contain"[544] the whole-of-government discourse that creates challenging paradoxes for public servants.

Chapter six will explain why the competing discourses have become "naturalized"[545] within the NMCC actors' institutional setting of the public sector. According to the ontology on which this research is predicated, the final phase of the CDA will explain why the NMCC actors' pre-existing practices and their material realities within the public sector context continue to constrain the NMCC actors' agency to reconstruct the NMCC "order of discourse." Therefore, it considers the "specifically organisational logic of the [public sector] field"[546] to explain why the order of discourse continues to repeat in the NMCC collaboration. The discussion will also consider the possibilities for NMCC actors to employ their agency to change the organisational logic of the public sector in order to restructure the existing practices and material realities that currently constrain their collaborative discourse. Accordingly, chapter six discusses New Zealand's constitutional style of governance and the reform policies that have shaped the NMCC actors public sector context.

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[544] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[545] Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis,* 76.
[546] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 72.

Chapter Six - The NMCC actors' context and the logic of the public sector field

6.1   Introduction

Chapter five's intertextual analysis revealed the NMCC actors' discursive practice through the linguistic study of the discursive traces and cues within the NMCC chain of texts. These traces and cues made explicit the common sense assumptions the NMCC actors recollected from their "members' resources"[547] (MR) in their production and interpretation of the NMCC discourses.[548] Furthermore, the intertextual chain analysis revealed that since the NMCC's establishment the NMCC actors selected linguistic cues within their discursive practice that sustained the NMCC "order of discourse,"[549] this order of discourse representing the discoursal logic of the public sector context.[550] The analysis of the NMCC (F)'s manifest intertextuality and its interdiscursive properties revealed the logic of the NMCC actors' order of discourse. This logic "contained" [551] the whole-of-government discourse within the hegemonic discourse of the pre-constituted accountability reporting practices of the hierarchical public sector.

The chapter proved that the NMCC actors were unaware of the "containment"[552] of the whole-of-government discourse because the NMCC actors' order of discourse had become "naturalized"[553] and made common sense to their members' resources (MR). This suggestion builds on the basic content analysis of the NMCC (F) intertextual chain and the subsequent thematic analysis, which corroborated the dominance of this discourse and establishes it as a reoccurring theme throughout the NMCC actors' discursive practice in the period 2001-2006. The consequence is that the NMCC actors no longer question or are aware of this hegemonic discourse within the produced texts. Accordingly, the

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[547] An actor's internalised structure and conventions they draw upon according to the logic of their field, in this context the public sector field. Fairclough, *A social theory of discourse,* 80.
[548] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 135.
[549] The NMCC actors' collaborative practice in its "language aspect." Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.
[550] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in late modernity,* 114.
[551] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.
[552] Ibid.
[553] Ibid.

"naturalization"[554] of the competing discourses serves to maintain the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors. Furthermore, this situation sustains the NMCC actors' hierarchical relationships because the NMCC texts continued to reproduce their "order of discourse,"[555] as proven by both the content and the intertextual chain analyses. However, chapter five's intertextual analysis cannot explicate the hierarchical relations of power between the NMCC actors, which maintain their ideological constitution.[556] Therefore, the final stage of this research discusses the findings of the textual and intertextual CDA in relation to the pre-existing practices and realities within the NMCC actors' public sector context.

6.2   Chapter Outline

This chapter addresses the third research objective: to explain why the public sector structure, specifically the practices that evolved from the initial public sector reforms, affects the NMCC collaborative practice. Figure 6.1 illustrates the final phase of the CDA that discusses the relationship between the sector's institutional context (in blue) and the discoursal logic of the public sector field. I posit this CDA has revealed the specific order of discourse that is the source of the tension between the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate and the structural constraints of the public sector. Furthermore, predicated on the previous chapter's findings that revealed how the NMCC order of discourse reproduces, this chapter proposes that the repetition of this discourse will continue contributing to the reported failings of the NMCC collaboration unless the NMCC actors change their order of discourse.[557]

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[554] Ibid.
[555] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.
[556] Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 135.
[557] The reported failings are the ongoing 2014 OAG's concerns about separate patrol arrangements arranged outside the NMCC process and the need for the NMCC to review its performance information. They also include the failure of Customs to meet the 2014/2015 NMCC performance measures as the host agency and meet the standards that led to the subsequent questioning of the Comptroller of Customs by the Select Committee in December 2015. OAG, *Effectiveness of Arrangements* (2014), 2-7; New Zealand Customs Service, *New Zealand Customs Service: Annual Report 2014/15* (Wellington: Customs, 2015), 44, http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/Documents/AR20142015.pdf; New Zealand House of Representatives, *Transcript: 2014/15 annual review of the New Zealand Customs Service. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee* (Wellington; New Zealand Government, 3 December 2015), 12-15, http://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/515CFDT_EV1_OODBSCH_ANR_66267_1_A498266/20c43d750ab199d7be4b701afe8436fe9b519c56

Within the figure:

- Institutional setting: Public Sector Context (Field)
- Discoursal logic of the public sector field
- Members' Resources
- Discursive Practice: The production, distribution and consumption of the NMCC texts (Intertextual Chain Analysis)
- Manifests as the NMCC actors' Order of Discourse (Interdiscursivity)
- Select and constrains possibilities for the NMCC collaborative practice (Manifest Intertextuality)

Key to Figure 6.1	
←→	Discourse

Figure 6.1: Outline of the Analysis of the NMCC Actors' Context – the Public Sector Field

The findings in this chapter suggest that all the NMCC actors engaged in collaboration need to employ their "active agency"[558] to change their order of discourse and so reshape the logic of the public sector context in which they collaborate. I posit that NMCC actors with an awareness of the discursive cues that shape their MR can engage their agency to reconstruct their order of discourse and create change in their collaborative practice and in so doing change the existing hierarchical relationships of power and improve their inter-agency collaborative practice.[559] The chapter proposes NMCC actors employ their active agency to adopt the changes to their structural reality within the public sector, and the 2013 amendments to the Public Sector Finance Act offer such an opportunity.[560]

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[558] Bill Ryan, "A new way of operating," in *Rethinking the State Sector Act,* ed. Shelly Farr Biswell (Wellington: Public Service Association Te Pūkenga Here Tikanga Mahi and the New Zealand Fabian Society, February 2014), 28, http://www.psa.org.nz/assets/Campaigns /Rethinking+the+State+Sector+Act+final.pdf

[559] Ieţchu-Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis and translation studies," 69.

[560] These are the 2013 amendments to the 1988 State Services Act and 1989 Public Finance Act.

This discussion about the actors' institutional settings completes the final phase of the CDA analytical framework and concludes to answer the research question, which is to explicate what the consequences of public sector reform are for public servants engaged in interagency collaboration.

6.3   Exploring the material impact of the NMCC actors' reproduction of the dominant discourse

This section of the discussion observes that the 2013 change to the NMCC governance structure replicates the NMCC actors' order of discourse. These governance changes are the 2013 Maritime Security Oversight Committee (MSOC) Terms of Reference - henceforth the MSOC (ToR). Consequently, this section of the discussion explains the material impact of the NMCC order of discourse to the vertical and horizontal relationships of power between the NMCC organisations and the subsequent inefficiencies that hinder the NMCC collaboration.

Figure 6.2: MSOC (ToR) "Proposed Structure."[561]

Chapter four's textual analysis of the NMCC (F) interpersonal function proposed that the hierarchical identities of the NMCC (F) producers created ambiguity in its discourse, which

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[561] Source: Unknown, *MSOC: Terms of Reference,* 6.

failed to clarify the collaborative roles of the NMCC actors, specifically its managers. Figure 6.1 shows that the MSOC (ToR)'s proposed structure for the governance of the inter-agency maritime security collaboration replicates the same hierarchical identities of the officials who produced and interpreted the NMCC (F) discourse. For example, the Joint Maritime Advisory Group (JMAG) is a mid-level group of officials who have a seniority - that is an equivalent in state sector hierarchy as the NMCC managers and the former NMCC working group. Furthermore, the MSOC is a sub-committee of ODESC like the NMCC Network of CEs. Accordingly, this research concludes that the ambiguities for collaborating managers that chapter four discussed will remain because the MSOC (ToR)'s order of discourse has the unintended consequence of preserving the hierarchical identities of public officials within the NMCC collaboration.

The MSOC (ToR) explains that the role of the MSOC has a wider remit because its members have "oversight of civil-maritime strategy and policy development."[562] The MSOC also retains oversight for the NMCC's operation to ensure the "NMCC-coordinated operational performance is effective and meets national strategic priorities."[563] The MOSC (ToR) clarifies that the MSOC's maritime security objectives are intended to align with the requirements of the State Services Commission's Better Public Services (BPS) programme,[564] and that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's (DPMC) National Security System (NSS) programme of work will both inform and be informed by the MSOC's oversight efforts.[565] The MSOC (ToR)'s discursive representation of the central departments, the SSC and DPMC's, growing involvement in the governance of maritime security and the coordination of the MSOC corroborates my earlier discussion, as well as Goldfinch and Wallis's view, about the growing power of key central departments,[566] in this case, the SSC and DPMC. Goldfinch and Wallis argue the whole-of-government reform agenda is an adaptation of the earlier 1980s reforms.[567] Indeed, this growing control compounds the structural hierarchy of the public sector, which I argue reinforces the paradoxes of control for actors engaged in inter-agency collaboration, specifically creating ambiguity for the NMCC managers.

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[562] Unknown, *MSOC: Terms of Reference*, 2.
[563] Ibid., 3.
[564] Ibid., 4.
[565] Ibid., 2.
[566] Goldfinch and Wallis, "Two myths of convergence in public management reform," 1103-1104.
[567] Ibid., 1109.

The proposed MSOC (ToR) governance structure for the NMCC and maritime security reveals "new layers"[568] of organisational membership, which includes oversight of the NMCC. To explain I use Flinder's observation to contend that the later reforms do not substitute old structures but merely impose new layers of control.[569] Chapter four's textual analysis of the ideational function of the NMCC (F) confirmed that its discourse constructed the NMCC collaborative reality via linguistic reference to the existing practice of individual organisations' accountability requirements to respective ministers. Furthermore, chapter five's analysis of the NMCC (F)'s interdiscursivity revealed how the discursive cues within its text shapes the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors' MR. These cues are the competing hegemonic discourse, in which the NMCC inter-agency collaborative discourse is contained by the initial discourse which typifies the individual NMCC organisations' accountability process, which were a product of the late 1980s reforms.

Paradoxically, within the MSOC (ToR) discourse, the accountability and reporting mechanisms for maritime security remain unchanged. For example, in Figure 6.1 the enclosed dashed rectangle shows that the "funding"[570] remains within the vertical structure entitled: "unchanged Customs/NMCC Host-Agency Governance Framework,"[571] the governance framework to which it refers is the NMCC (F). Thus, the MSOC (ToR) constitutes another layer of governance over the existing NMCC (F). These observations suggest that the NMCC discourses' ongoing references to existing practices perpetuates the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors' MR. As a result, the dominant discourse of the individual agency reporting practices continues to contain the discourse of the NMCC collaboration and, despite another "layer" of discourse, the situation for the NMCC collaboration remains unchanged.

Why the dominant discourse prevails

To explain why the NMCC order of discourse remains unchanged and prevails, this section applies a realist lens to discuss the NMCC actors' structural reality. To do this I discuss the

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[568] Matthew Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 67.
[569] Ibid.
[570] Unknown, *MSOC: Terms of Reference,* 6.
[571] Ibid.

accountability "dilemma,"[572] which the NMCC inter-agency collaborative practice presents to the appropriations process, New Zealand's constitutional accountability arrangements, which holds its political executive accountable to Parliament.[573] Boston and Eichbaum explain that the late 1980s reforms instituted a new financial management system that included the appropriations process.[574] They also observe that the management system's founding principles remain "largely unchanged."[575] Gregory's research of the public sector's response to the fragmentation resulting from the earlier reforms expands on this fact. He observes that the late 1980s reforms were underpinned by the Treasury's "body of theoretical analysis…and this analysis in turn provided a conceptual blueprint for the radical transformation of the state sector."[576]

The public sector's key accountability mechanism is the financial management system, which is inaugurated in the 1989 Public Finance Act,[577] an Act inaugurated by the Treasury in the first wave of reforms in the late 1980s. The Treasury explains that "[t]he public sector financial management system supports [New Zealand's] constitutional structure,"[578] which is implemented through the appropriations system that ensures government's accountability to parliament. Appropriations are the basis on which parliament authorises the Executive arm of the government to spend public money. Parliament also approves a group of appropriations to a "Minister responsible for an appropriation."[579] The public sector departmental CEs such as the Comptroller of Customs administers the group of appropriations that fall under her department's vote[580] - Vote Customs. Consequently, she reports Customs' performance to the Minister of Customs, the minister responsible for

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[572] Ling, "Delivering joined-up government," 628.
[573] Boston and Eichbaum, "Lessons from New Zealand," 111.
[574] Ibid., 109.
[575] Ibid., 110.
[576] Gregory, "All the King's horses and all the King's men," 45.
[577] In mid-2013, the government amended the Act; the last section of this chapter discusses the potential future implications for the NMCC inter-agency collaboration.
[578] The Treasury, *Introducing public sector financial management: The purpose of New Zealand's public sector financial management system and the structures within which it operates* (Wellington: The Treasury, 2011), 7, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/guidance /public finance/pit/pit-ch1.pdf
[579] The Treasury, *Putting it Together: An Explanatory Guide to New Zealand's State Sector Financial Management System* (Wellington: The Treasury, September 2011, Version 1.1), 16, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/downloads/pdfs/pit-2011.pdf
[580] Typically, there is one vote per Ministerial portfolio but there are exceptions. A department may administer more than one vote and therefore, have more than one responsible Minister, for example the Ministry of Justice. Alternatively, a Minister may oversee a group of appropriations that fall under different vote structures. The Treasury, *Putting it Together,* 17.

Customs to whom the Public Finance Act designates as the "Responsible Minister."[581] The Treasury documents substantiate this accountability in a Vote document for each department; for example, Vote Customs or Vote Defence Force.

Under this departmental Vote structure, each Votes grouping of appropriations describe the scope and nature of the departments' contribution to its minister's objectives for government. Under each appropriation's description heading is a series of output performance measures and standards that clarify for the Minister of Customs, and therefore parliament, how Customs spends the approved public money to achieve the government's overarching outcomes. Furthermore, the government determines the type and priority of these outcomes in order to meet the long-term results it promises to New Zealand's electorate. The Treasury explains an outcome as the "state or condition of society, the environment or the economy, or a change in their state or condition,"[582] which becomes attributed to the government's activities. Therefore, a single or series of appropriations inevitably affects the government's achievement of its promised outcomes.

The responsible minister's department's statements of intent (SOI) and annual report publishes the government's outcomes that its outputs are intended to achieve. The intertextual chain analysis included the 2006 NMCC organisations SOIs and annual reports,[583] however this analysis revealed that only four of the eight departments reference the NMCC inter-agency collaboration's contribution to their responsible ministers' outcomes.[584] Chapter four's textual CDA of the NMCC (F)'s interpersonal function revealed the dominant discourse of accountability reporting affirms Customs as the department specifically accountable for the NMCC's performance and outcomes. Further research of these four NMCC organisations' vote documents reveals that only the NZDF and Customs have specific output performance measures that account for the NMCC in Customs' case and the civilian maritime patrol in the NZDF's case. Consequently, while the MFAT and MPI (formerly MFish) SOIs reproduce the NMCC discourse, they are not formally accountable to

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[581] Ibid.

[582] "Putting it Together: An Explanatory Guide to New Zealand's State Sector Financial Management System 2 Explaining Key Concepts," The Treasury, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/guidance/publicfinance/pit2011/08.htm

[583] The NMCC organisations are signatories to the NMCC memorandum of understanding (MoU).

[584] They were MFAT, NZDF, Customs, and the former MFish (now MPI).

their respective ministers for the NMCC or maritime patrol performance through the appropriations process. This situation was such in 2006 and remains the case for the relevant departments' 2014/15 vote documentation.

According to Skelcher et al, the "disjunct" between the doctrines of primary politics and the institutional design for collaborative practices "raise important questions about the nature of power, authority, legitimacy and accountability within collaborative spaces."[585] Chapter four's textual analysis of the interpersonal function of the NMCC (F) showed the hierarchical identity of its producers meant they used low modality verbs in the sections of texts that referred to the collaborative actions of the NMCC actors. This situation reduced the obligation of the NMCC organisations to subscribe to the NMCC (F)'s collaborative discourse, as verified by the intertextual chain analysis. In the context of Skelcher et al's observations, the NMCC producers do not have the hierarchical legitimacy to redefine the public sector's financial management system. Accordingly, the collaborative space of the NMCC and the reality of its respective organisations' legislative obligation to account for their performance to the democratically elected parliament raises questions about the authority and legitimacy of the NMCC (F) and MSOC (ToR) governance frameworks. I also state that this situation raises a larger question about the authority and legitimacy for all inter-agency collaboration that the whole-of-government reforms promoted.

The 2013 MSOC (ToR) states that both the Office of the Auditor-General's 2010 audit and its 2012 review of the NMCC progress repeat the need for strategic guidance for the NMCC and that all-of-government arrangements must be better coordinated.[586] Furthermore, the MSOC (ToR) explains the MSOC will lead "the development of an effective performance measurement framework for all-of-government maritime security; including accountability for the analysis of the overall performance of the system."[587] I contend that as long as two of the NMCC organisations supply the output performance measures then only two out of the eight NMCC organisations are held to account to parliament for the outcomes of maritime patrol and security. This finding suggests the pre-constituted vote practice

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[585] Chris Skelcher, Navdeep Mathur and Mike Smith, "The public governance of collaborative spaces: Discourse, design and democracy," *Public Administration*, 83, no.3 (2005): 574, doi: 10.1111/j.0033-3298.2005.00463.x
[586] Unknown, *MSOC: Terms of Reference,"* 2.
[587] Ibid., 3.

continues to reinforce the existing NMCC order of discourse within the MSOC (ToR). Without joined up ministerial outcomes for maritime security the appropriations process will continue to reinforce the vertical silos between public sector departments involved in maritime security and subsequently diminish the collaborative agency of the actors. Furthermore, I suggest that the later whole-of-government reforms propounded in the 2001 Review of the Centre have done little to address this specific issue and fail to offer any real, substantial alternative to the pre-constituted reporting practices of the earlier reforms.

The prevailing NMCC order of discourse compounds the vertical ideological constitution of the NMCC actors

In his analysis of the 2001 Review of the Centre, which "advocated"[588] significant changes to the state sector, Gregory critiques the Review's failure to match the original 1980s reforms theoretical underpinning with any serious contra theory; in his words its observations were "superficial responses to fundamental problems."[589] He argues that the theoretical framework that laid the foundations for the "conceptual blueprint" of the earlier reforms remains uncontested by the 2001 Review of the Centre and "reflects the enduring ideological force of that [earlier] framework."[590] Gregory's research supports chapter four's textual analysis of the NMCC (F) ideational function and chapter five's interdiscursive analysis of the NMCC (F) genre and activity type. Both phases of the CDA argued contemporary policy texts such as the NMCC (F) exhibit a preference for the "logic of appearance" over "explanatory logic."[591]

Gregory's research substantiates the claim that like the 2001 Review of the Centre, the NMCC (F) presents the whole-of-government and inter-agency collaboration in a way that favours a "logic of appearance."[592] Furthermore, the Review of the Centre, which constituted the whole-of-government reforms, failed to offer robust "explanatory logic."[593] In the application of Fairclough's concept of the "hortatory report,"[594] it is reasonable to suggest that the compositional structure of modern policy texts like the 2001 Review fail to

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[588] Gregory, "All the Kings horses and all the Kings men," 41.
[589] Ibid., 53.
[590] Ibid., 45.
[591] Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 95.
[592] Ibid.
[593] Ibid.
[594] Ibid.

provide actors with an opportunity to engage in robust discussion about possible alternatives to the pre-constituted practices inaugurated by the 1980s reforms.[595] I state this is also the case for the NMCC actors, as evidenced in chapter five's discussion of the NMCC (F)'s interdiscursive properties that revealed its genre style was a hortatory report. Indeed, I suggested that the effects of the earlier reforms' order of discourse remain dominant and circumscribe the later whole-of-government discourse within the NMCC (F). Gregory observes that the earlier reforms present an "enduring ideological force."[596] This same logic applies to the findings of this research, which shows that the consequence for the NMCC collaboration has been a repetition of the hegemonic struggle between the two discourses within the NMCC texts, as proved by chapter five's thematic analysis of the NMCC chain and the current chapter's discussion about the 2013 MSOC (ToR).

The prevailing NMCC order of discourse compounds horizontal paradoxes – organisational 'scapegoats'

Chapter five's intertextual chain analysis discussed that in 2006 the Minister of Customs agreed for Customs' vote portfolio to account for the NMCC's performance as a new NMCC designated output expense. The Minister of Customs approved this accountability under the justification for "a key accountability mechanism for protecting the whole-of-government focus of the NMCC."[597] The NMCC appropriation first appeared in the 2007 Vote Customs document under the descriptor "[c]o-ordination services for civilian purposes that support the effective and efficient use of New Zealand's 'whole-of-government' maritime patrol and surveillance assets."[598] However, the simplification of Customs' vote structure in 2011 resulted in the merge of the NMCC specific appropriation into the Customs information and intelligence services appropriation.[599] The new descriptor no longer mentioned the whole-of-government purpose the NMCC serves. Instead, it states "[t]his appropriation is limited to the provision of information, intelligence and risk assessment services to external clients,

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[595] Ibid.; Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change,* 126.
[596] Gregory, "All the Kings horse and all the Kings men," 45.
[597] Martyn Dunne, *Report to the Minister of Customs. National Maritime Coordination Centre: New Output and Measures: OR 07/042* (Wellington: New Zealand Customs Service, March 2007), 3.
[598] The Treasury, *The Estimates of Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for the Year Ending 30 June 2008: Vote Customs* (Wellington: The Treasury, 2007), 284,
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2007/estimates/est07cust.pdf
[599] The Treasury, *The Estimates of Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for the Year Ending 30 June 2012: Vote Customs*, (Wellington: The Treasury, 2011), 73,
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2011/estimates/index.htm/est11cust.pdf

and the operation of the National Maritime Coordination Centre."[600] In 2015 the scope of the appropriation and its descriptor remained unchanged. This situation supports the intertextual chain analysis, which highlighted the concerns of the NMCC working group who report to the Network of CEs the need for the host agency to maintain the NMCC's operational independence in a transparent manner.[601] This evolving lack of transparency in the Vote Customs descriptor was exacerbated by the temerity of the 2006 Minister of Customs who indicated to Cabinet when approving the new output expense "that consultation is not required with the caucuses of other parties represented in Parliament."[602]

Flinders observes that the "ministerial responsibility to parliament was never designed to cope with multi-organisational fragmented policy systems."[603] Mulgan supports this view to explain that the whole-of-government public sector reform agenda placed a strain on the current accountability framework.[604] Indeed, the agenda challenges the "specified departmental outputs and outcomes which remains at the heart of the structure." [605] The structure in this case being New Zealand's constitutional system founded on the Westminster model. Flinders expands Mulgan's observations to argue that the governance of modern Westminster systems is challenged by a government's need to reform and transform the mechanisms of managing its country in response to internal and global pressures while maintaining and operating through the existing governmental framework.[606] He further argues that traditional modes of accountability need to change to accommodate the future needs of governance in Westminster systems.[607]

This section therefore focuses on how the disjuncture between the democratic accountability requirements of government and the public sectors' design of its governance over collaborative practices such as the NMCC creates the effect of organisational scapegoats. In this context, the NMCC output expense granted to Customs has made

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[600] Ibid.

[601] NMCC Working Group, *NMCC host Agency,* para 7-8.

[602] Cabinet Policy Committee, *POL Min (06) 28/26,* para 10.

[603] Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 67.

[604] Richard Mulgan, "Public sector reform in New Zealand: Issues of public accountability," 28.

[605] Ibid.

[606] Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 63.

[607] Ibid., 67.

Customs a parliamentary scapegoat for the NMCC's reported failings. To explain why the following section examines the role of the select committee process.

The budgetary process of public sector departments like Customs comprises two phases – the executive and the legislative phase.[608] Boston and Eichbaum explain, "the Constitution Act and the Public Finance Act prohibit government from spending public funds without prior authorisation from Parliament."[609] As part of the government's accountability to its electorate and the budget process, a specific parliamentary select committee convenes to review the draft budget of the responsible ministers and their respective departments.[610] The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) assists the select committee in its deliberations while providing a briefing that includes information about the department's statements of intent (SOI) and annual report of performance to its responsible minister.[611] The OAG will also suggest lines of enquiry for the select committee to pursue with the department's CEs, senior officials, and its minister. These questions "usually relate to performance, authority, waste, probity, and accountability within public entities."[612]

On the advice of the OAG[613] the 2014/15 select committee's annual review of Customs questioned the Customs department about the consequences of its failure to meet one of its targets: to provide maritime patrol resource to "80 percent or more of New Zealand's high-risk marine areas."[614] The study of this particular select committee's transcript reveals that opposition parliamentary members the Hon. Phil Goff from Labour, and Fletcher Tabuteau from New Zealand First, extensively questioned the Comptroller of Customs, Carolyn Tremain and the Deputy Comptroller Bill Perry, about the NMCC. Both select

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[608] Boston and Eichbaum, "Lessons from New Zealand," 125.
[609] Ibid., 128.
[610] In the case of Customs this is the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee
[611] "Support the Auditor-General can give to members of Parliament and select committees," Office of the Auditor-General, accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.oag.nz/2012/MPs-guide-to-the-auditor-general/support.htm
[612] Ibid.
[613] Office of the Auditor-General, *Annual Review briefing to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: 2014/15 Financial Year* (Wellington: Office of the Auditor-General, 2015), 7, http://www.parliamnet.nz/resource/en-NZ/51SCFDT_ADV_00DBSCH_ANR_66267_1_A458149/094348ea656b21cb81ca9b0b2fbe07
[614] New Zealand House of Representatives, *2014/15 Annual Review of the New Zealand Customs Service: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015), 4, http://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/51DBSCH_SCR68500_1/5af7b2614dd34129c8292fbdacd06dd6044ef56a

committee members queried the Customs officials why only 57.6% of patrol resources were allocated to the top 5% of maritime patrol areas that civilian agencies classify as high-risk areas for maritime security incursions.[615] The Hon. Phil Goff pursued this line of enquiry further to ask Customs what patrol assets they are short of and the consequences of only hitting the 57% target.[616] He also asked "[g]iven those are serious things what are you now doing about the fact you're only hitting 57 percent?"[617] These queries prevailed despite the Comptroller's first answer to the initial question to which she included in her reply that the NMCC is a whole-of-government function that Customs hosts.[618] Significantly, during the select committee no mention was made of the Vote Defence 2014/15 estimates of appropriations. This document specifies its new departmental output expense-resource and border protection operations, and the new assessment of NZDF performance is for it to meet no less than 90% of total agreed pre-planned and response tasks requested by the NMCC.[619]

This research states that the select committee procedure exacerbates the silo mentality of the public sector because of the politicisation of its processes. Opposition parties exploit the select committee processes as a political device to pose questions to CEs that seek to embarrass their department's minister,[620] or to criticise the current government's existing policy.[621] In this case, the Hon. Phil Goff was the former Labour government's Minister of Defence, and is reported as critical of the current government's management of the New Zealand Defence Force.[622] For example, in the 2014/15 Customs Select Committee the Hon.

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[615] New Zealand House of Representatives, *Transcript: 2014/15 annual review of the New Zealand Customs Service*, 12-15.

[616] Ibid., 13-14.

[617] Ibid., 14.

[618] Ibid., 12.

[619] New Zealand Defence Force, *Vote Defence Force: The estimate of appropriations 2014/15 – External Sector* (Wellington: The Treasury, 2015), 94, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2014/main-estimates-2014-vote-defence-force.pdf

[620] For example, the Hon. Phil Goff's questioning to Carolyn Tremain, Comptroller of Customs includes the statement "And I also notice that the Minister, when Customs was last before this committee, said that she's still finding further savings. In other words, your volumes are going up your resources aren't, and now she wants to get further savings out of you. Is that a factor putting such pressure on staff that half the staff don't have confidence in where the organisation is leading them?" New Zealand House of Representatives, *Transcript: 2014/15 annual review of the New Zealand Customs Service*, 9.

[621] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 161.

[622] "Hundreds of Defence Force jobs set to go," New Zealand Herald, accessed December 17, 2015, http://www.nzhearald.co.nz/NZ/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid+11520942

Goff made the statement "[n]ow, I know for a fact that the inshore patrol vessels are sitting tied up at the dock most of the time, partly because of staffing shortages."[623]

Norman explains that under the 1992 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system a mixture of parliamentary representatives represents the select committee from majority and minority parties.[624] While the independence of the select committee enhances the democratic nature of this practice of accountability such that it can force a department's CE and its minister to take action for underperformance.[625] Norman also suggests that the practice is politically divisive, as revealed in the 2013/14 Customs Select Committee transcript. The impact for departmental CEs is to ensure their organisation's managers have a "sense of accountability," and that systems are in place to capture accountability.[626] This research applies Norman's observations to suggest that the 1980s neoliberal founded reform accountability doctrine is contextualised within the public sector in a manner that not only holds individual departmental CEs and ministers to account, but also provides a platform for governments to postulate underlying political agendas.[627] In this context, I posit the NMCC host agency and its respective minister became scapegoats, not only for the underperformance of this specific whole-of-government inter-agency collaboration, but also for the government's management of the NZDF. The result is that the Comptroller of Customs faces a tension between her commitment to the NMCC whole-of-government function and juggling Customs' reputation at the select committee hearing.

6.4   Change the logic – change the order of discourse

The preceding discussion applied a realist lens to explain why the existing practices within the public sector continue to constrain the NMCC actors' order of discourse and consequently limit their collaborative actions. The discussion studied the MSOC (ToR) in order to expand on chapter five's intertextual chain analysis to show that even to date the NMCC actors continue to draw upon their existing members' resources (MR). Their MR is shaped by the existing logic of the public sector "field" that according to Ieţchu-Fairclough is

[623] New Zealand House of Representatives, *Transcript: 2014/15 annual review of the New Zealand Customs Service*, 13.
[624] Norman, *Obedient Servants?,* 156.
[625] For example, the "cost over runs and quality problems with the Police computer system INCIS." Ibid., 157.
[626] Ibid., 159.
[627] Ibid., 162.

shaped by its "pre-determined structural properties and constraints."[628] She also suggests because a specific field (i.e. a political or an administrative field) has its own logic that presents in the discoursal logic of its actors, the logic of the field shapes the actors' order of discourse.[629] The CDA of my research analysed how the discursive cues of the logic of the public sector's field shapes the NMCC actors order of discourse through their MR. Consequently the dominance of the earlier reform agenda's discourse compounds the vertical and horizontal paradoxes for collaborating actors through the ideological constitution of their MR which subsequently sustains their order of discourse.

Fairclough comments that Members' Resources (MR) are an actor's internalised structures and conventions that they draw upon according to the logic of their field and reproduce as their order of discourse.[630] Also pertinent is Ieţchu-Fairclough's argument that while actors' orders of discourse are pre-determined by their field's structural properties, the same actors can "also enjoy a certain freedom (more or less, depending on particular) contexts to change the structural properties of the field."[631] The following section now applies Ieţchu-Fairclough's observation to show how the NMCC actors operating within an awareness of their order of discourse revealed in this CDA can use discourse to assimilate new practices within the public sector field to change the structural properties of the public sector field, specifically the accountability reporting practices.

This section argues that the NMCC actors' and the wider members of MSOC adopt the 2013 amendments to the 1989 Public Finance Act (PFA) because the discursive recognition of the new structural properties of the public sector field will help reconstitute the NMCC actors' hierarchical relationships of power. Indeed, it is possible that because these amendments are an existing reality, if employed, they could change the discoursal logic of the NMCC actors' public sector context and break the cycle of their existing order of discourse. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest that the use of the actors' existing 'structural' reality to break the cycle is a useful tool for actors currently constrained within the pre-constituted hierarchy of the public sector. This research proposes that although the changes

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[628] Ieţchu-Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis and translations studies," 69.
[629] Ibid.
[630] The NMCC actors' collaborative practice in its "language aspect." Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.
[631] Ieţchu-Fairlcough, "Critical discourse analysis and translations studies," 69.

are not radically new, earlier amendments to the Act[632] would not have met the overarching outcome of national maritime security in whatever form it eventually takes.

The Treasury explains that the 2013 amendments to the 1989 Public Finance Act (PFA) include the establishment of a Multi-Agency Appropriation (MCA) to replace the existing Multi Category Output Expenses Appropriations (MCOAs).[633] Under a MCA, departments contribute to a single overarching outcome, unlike the current process in which output classes group under a single appropriation. In this context, I propose the MSOC Actors should actively lobby for ministerial agreement to create a MCA for New Zealand's maritime security outcome. Such an agreement would make a structural reality of the MSOC (ToR)'s aspiration to lead "the development of an effective performance measurement framework for all-of-government maritime security; including accountability for the analysis of the overall performance of the system."[634] This action would also accord with the ongoing recommendations of the OAG and the MSOC (ToR)'s that is to develop a measurement framework of an all-of-government approach to maritime security.

Under the 2013 amendments to the Public Finance Act, an MCA will remain under the responsibility of a responsible minister because one department will administer the MCA.[635] However, the Treasury explains that the CEs of the administrative department as well as other departmental users are responsible for the end of year performance reporting.[636] Users of the MCA must apply to the responsible minister or can formulate a memorandum of understanding with the department that administers the MCA. As discussed above, there is a risk that the changes are merely a new structural layer imposed on an old structure.[637] Accordingly, it is reasonable to posit that if the MSOC actors do not employ their agency to make changes they risk repeating the same order of discourse, which my discussion of the 2013 MSOC (ToR) reveals as an ongoing issue.

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[632] The Act was substantially amended in 2004. "Public Finance Act 1989 and Amendment Act 2013," State Services Commission, accessed December 27, 2015, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/node/8522.
[633] The Treasury, *What is changing in the Public Finance Act: Multi-category appropriations* (Wellington: The Treasury, July 2013), slide 7, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/2013reform/pdfs/sspfr-mca.pdf
[634] Unknown, *MSOC: Terms of Reference*, 3.
[635] The Treasury, *State Sector, Public Finance and Crown Entity Legislative Changes Overview and Summary* (Wellington: The Treasury, 28 June 2013), 5, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/2013reform/pdfs/sspfr-factsheets.pdf
[636] Ibid.
[637] Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 67.

It is also important to consider the recommendations of the State Services Commission (SSC) to the Cabinet about the 2013 amendments to the 1988 State Services Act (SSA). The exclusion of Sector Boards under a new schedule to the amended 2013 SSA has excluded further opportunities for change to the structural properties of the public sector field. In the SSC's paper that explicates the 2013 SSA amendments, the SSC makes clear that it recommended to Cabinet to consider in the 2013 amendment the establishment of a body of Sector Boards. The SSC explained these Boards could enable the public sector to mobilise collaboratively towards achieving outcomes that bridge departmental accountability portfolios,[638] in this context being the NMCC organisations' vote structures. The SSC proposed to Cabinet that the public sector form Sector Boards that are groups of administrative units comprised of departmental CEs and it also proposed such units become a statute in order to ensure the Sector Board's decisions become legally binding.

The SSC proposed this amendment to the State Sector Act (SSA) to avoid the ongoing issue of individual CE's responsibilities overriding a collective decision that was non-binding under the existing provisions of section 32 of the SSA and section 34 the Public Finance Act.[639] The SSC paper called the proposal a genuine "step change"[640] however, Cabinet declined, reasoning that the proposed changes to the SSA would legally bind sector boards.[641] Nevertheless, the Cabinet did consent to the establishment of Sector Boards under agreed terms of reference with the proviso that Board decisions would not be legally binding and that Cabinet would determine the establishment of such Boards, but not include this action under the 2013 SSA amendments. Cabinet also noted that the changes would have implications for ministerial organisation and "the responsibility arrangements between boards, Ministers, and parliament."[642] This research posits that the legally binding proposal was a 'step change' too far for the Westminster system of government. Consequently, the newly proposed Sector Boards constitute merely another of Flinders "new layers."[643] First, because it gives no real legitimate authority to the new Sector Boards; and second, a new

[638] State Services Commission, "State Sector Act 1988: Explanation of Amendments in 2013" (Wellington: State Services Commission, 2013), 22, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/statesectoract2013amendments.pdf
[639] Ibid.
[640] Ibid.
[641] CAB Min (12) 16/10 para 45 cited in Ibid., 23.
[642] Ibid.
[643] Flinders, "Governance at Whitehall," 67.

external discourse can only have "substantive" effect on an existing institution if it incorporates within existing successful strategies.[644] Accordingly, the present structure of government and its ministers would face a significant constitutional challenge had Cabinet approved SSC's initial recommendations concerning State Sector Boards.

The findings of my research suggests that the 2013 reform of the Public Finance Act (PFA) and State Sector Act (SSA) are not enough to address the twenty first century thinking and debates about democratic governance. In Ryan's critique of the 2013 changes to the PSA and SSA, he observes that public officials, civic leaders, and citizens need to engage in their active agency to construct New Zealand's future.[645] He contends there is "[a]n extraordinary sense of passive determinism [that] operates throughout the public sector in New Zealand – a belief that structure fixes all."[646] Yet this CDA explicates how and why the structural reality of New Zealand's rules of law limits the public servants' active agency for constructing new discourse. While I agree with Ryan that in this context the NMCC actors need to shy away from passive determinism, in order to do so they must be aware of the public sector field's respective logic that only CDA can show through revealing its field's discoursal logic. The insight CDA affords to the NMCC actors is to illuminate the source of tension within their order of discourse. Only then can they employ their active agency to discursively restructure the logic of the public sector to re-determine the constituted practices and structural realities created by the 80s reform agenda which currently constrains their collaborative practice.

6.5 The consequences of public sector reform for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration and the utility of CDA

Based on the findings of the CDA, this research posits that the discourse of the earlier neoliberal reform agenda pervades in the public sector's accountability process. This discourse, to use Gregory's words, presents as an "enduring ideological force"[647] that attests to the theoretical veracity of the neoliberal theories such as New Public Management (NPM) which underpinned the first wave of reforms. As a result, public servants continue to

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[644] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies," 934.
[645] Ryan, "A new way of operating," 28.
[646] Ibid., 29.
[647] Gregory, "All the King's horses and all the King's men," 45.

reproduce the earlier reform's discourse to "contain"[648] the discourse of the later reform's whole-of-government agenda. The research evidences this situation in the CDA of the NMCC texts.

Fairclough promotes the use of CDA within organizational studies to first examine what discursive struggles are present in the text, and second "how the discourse figures within strategies pursued by groups of social agents to change organizations in particular directions."[649] Accordingly, how the NMCC actors' discursive practice determines the success or, as evidenced in this case study, the constraint of the NMCC collaboration. As Fairclough explains, some discourses are more 'resonant' than others; in this case the NMCC actors' MR finds common sense in the containment of the whole-of-government discourse by the earlier reforms' discourse. I argue that their resultant order of discourse became 'naturalised' to the extent that the NMCC actors no longer question the hegemonic struggle within their discursive practice. Fairclough observes that often an order of discourse is a "distinctive articulation of discourses, often organized around a dominant 'nodal discourse' (the discourse of 'new public management'…might be [an] example) which organizes relations between other constituent discourse."[650] Furthermore, an order of discourse can endure because of the existing institutional structure, that may be resistant to change, and its existing discourses embed,[651] as shown in the earlier reform agenda.

The dominance of the discourse of the earlier reform agendas is a key issue in this exploration of the consequence of public sector reform for public servants engaged in multi-agency collaboration. The particular complication applies to the government's initial attempts to restructure the public service by adapting neoliberal based theories.[652] Beer et al explain neoliberalism as a political philosophy predicated on principles of free market economics,[653] as well as the crucial obligation of New Zealand's government to ensure its electorates' civil liberties, security, and economic wellbeing while simplifying its hierarchical

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[648] Fairclough, *Language and Power,* 76.

[649] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies," 933.

[650] Ibid., 933.

[651] Ibid., 933.

[652] For example, public choice theory, agency theory, transaction cost economics, and New Public Management (NPM). Boston et al, *Public Management: The New Zealand Model,* 29.

[653] Andrew Beer, Terry Clower, Graham Haughtow, and Alaric Maude, "Neoliberalism and the institutions for regional development in Australia," *Geographical Research* 43, no.1 (2005): 57, doi: 10.1111/j.1745-5871.2005.00292.x

governance structure.[654] Scholars observe that within democratic states governance is a process, method, or system of managing a complex social system in which boundaries between public and private actors have become increasingly blurred.[655] Accordingly, collaborative governance requires power distribution, not centralisation, and autonomy for actors to self-govern.[656] Thus, governments should enable actors and not dictate how the desired outcomes should be achieved.[657] However, the CDA of the NMCC collaboration undertaken in this research implies that the governance of the state maintains the hierarchical structure of New Zealand's public sector through its accountability legislation. Furthermore, the later whole-of-government reform discourse has the unintended consequence of compounding hierarchy through its emphasis on the growing role of the central state sector departments, namely the State Services Commission (SSC) and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).

To explain this phenomenon this chapter applies Fairclough's adaptation of Berstein's concept of recontextualization. It proposes that in the NMCC's context the Westminster system of governance has recontextualized the neoliberal theoretical underpinnings that revolutionised the public sector in the late 1980s in a manner that seemingly serves the government's hierarchical interest rather than the neoliberal agenda of hierarchical simplification.[658] My argument is predicated on Fairclough's observation that the issue of recontextualization is linked with hegemony because an external discourse, such as neoliberalism, can only have 'substantive' effect on an existing institution (i.e. the public sector) if it is incorporated within successful strategies.[659] Therefore, I contend that the Westminster system of democratic governance that hails from Locke's era of the glorious revolution is unlikely, in its current condition, to concede to a project that flattens hierarchy and grants autonomy to its actors without preserving the accountability of the legitimate authority that society demands. Accordingly, while the institution of the public sector has

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[654] Beer et al, "Neoliberalism and the institutions for regional development in Australia," 50-51.
[655] Rhodes, "Understanding Governance: Ten Years On," 1246; Stoker, "Governance as theory: five propositions," 17; Flinders, "Governance in Whitehall," 51.
[656] Agranoff and McGuire, "Collaborative public management," 23; Stoker, "Governance as theory: five propositions," 18.
[657] Stoker, "Governance as theory: five propositions," 18.
[658] Pete Thomas, "The recontextualization of management: A discourse-based approach to analysing the development of management thinking," *Journal of Management Studies*, 40, no.4 (2003): 785, doi: 10.1111//1467-6486.00360.
[659] Fairclough, "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies," 934.

"appropriated"[660] neoliberal theory to embark on the reforms of the late 1980s, the enduring logic of the public sector hierarchy has "colonized"[661] the theoretical construct of neoliberalism in a manner that supports the constitutional structure of New Zealand. According to Fairclough, recontextualization can lead to "unpredictable transformations and outcomes."[662] Applying this theory of recontexturalisation to the research, I reaffirm Gregory's observation regarding the enduring logic of the initial reforms, which I posit has compromised the successful implementation of the whole-of-government reforms and more specifically public sector inter-agency collaboration.

6.6   Conclusion

The present application of CDA has provided evidence that illuminates the enduring logic of the earlier reforms of the 1980s that maintain the existing relationship of power between the NMCC actors. The use of an analytically dualist epistemology has enabled this case study to also reveal the tension between the structural permanence of the public sector, and the practical activity of public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration.[663] Chouliaraki and Fairclough comment that "the former constitute both the conditions of possibility and the limitations of possibility for the latter; the latter both depend upon and contest/transform the former."[664] Accordingly, this dialectical account reveals the constraints the reforms have brought to bear on public sector initiatives that require inter-agency collaboration. Furthermore, because the CDA framework adopts an analytically dualist account it not only identifies the specific tension for NMCC actors, it also suggests possibilities for change.

In this regard, reference to the critical realist ontology on which this research's CDA framework predicates is essential. It has revealed that while the NMCC actors construct their discourse, which is also a product of the actors' public sector context or field, its logic reveals in its discoursal logic that shapes the actors' order of discourse.[665] As previously stated the NMCC actors draw from their internalised structures and conventions, which are their members' resources according to the logic of their field. This process produces and, as

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[660] Ibid., 933.
[661] Ibid.
[662] Ibid.
[663] Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse in late modernity,* 32.
[664] Ibid
[665] Ieţchu-Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis and translations studies," 68.

the CDA revealed, has reproduced their order of discourse.[666] Subsequently, while the structural properties of the field determine their order of discourse, the NMCC actors can also employ their active agency to change these structural properties through discourse.[667]

The conclusion of this research draws together the significant findings of this research. It considers the limitations of the study and it proposes the further application of this research in the wider context of the logic of the public sector field.

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[666] The NMCC actors' collaborative practice in its "language aspect." Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse,* 24.
[667] Ieţchu-Fairlcough, "Critical discourse analysis and translations studies," 69.

Chapter Seven - Conclusion

The motivation of this research draws from my own experiences and that of my peers in the public sector's inter-agency environment. The inter-agency collaborative approach is a practice advocated by the 2000s whole-of-government reform and that which the public sector continues to promote as an approach to deliver 'Better Public Services.' Inter-agency collaboration presents a logical and pragmatic solution to delivering integrated public services that address the challenges facing democratic states, yet in practice it has proven to be difficult to implement. The premise of this research was that wider structural issues could be the source of impediment for collaboration rather than its construction by public servants' alone. The initial stage of the research attended to the context of the public sector, specifically the evolution of the whole-of-government reforms that promoted multi-agency coordination as a tool for public sector departments to address the 'wicked problems' of a democratic state.

The aim of the research was to explicate what the consequences of public sector reform are for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. The development of the overarching research question from the literature affirmed my initial hypothesis: that since the 1980s reforms the subsequent eras of public sector reform created paradoxes for decision-making power amongst public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. Specifically, this paradox challenges public servants' agency - their perceived discursive legitimacy to make decisions within their collaborative practice. A situation the era of whole-of-government reform exacerbated for public servants in respect to tensions between their collaborative agency and the structural reality of the public sector that remained palpably hierarchical.

The existing literature on the whole-of-government reforms drew attention to the possible unintended consequence of the creation of another layer of control within the traditionally hierarchical system of the public sector and government. More specifically, the literature concerning collaboration indicated that decision-making autonomy, and therefore issues of power, were factors that collaborative research should give greater regard. The State Services Commission's promotion of the whole-of-government reform, particularly inter-

agency collaboration, piqued the idea for this research to examine how public servants involved in inter-agency practices fared in the hierarchical environment of the public sector, which had undergone a series of transformations through reform. The research question queries the degree to which the later reforms have made any real impact on public servants' decision-making autonomy when faced with the paradoxes of power corroborated in the literature referring to the impacts of public sector reform.

The scope of this research was delineated by the case study of the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC). Rather than attempting to propose a generalised claim about the public sector as a whole, the aim was to analyse this specific case using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a methodology suited to generate an initial understanding of the NMCC situation that could be tested and replicated in further research of the same or varying contexts.

I chose the NMCC as a case study after reviewing primary data from the 2010 Office of the Auditor-General's audit of the effectiveness of civilian maritime patrol. The 2010 OAG audit recommended greater strategic guidance, which as this research argues, supports the central departments' growing power over the public sector and consequently reinforces its existing hierarchy. Paradoxically, the NMCC was to review the individual departmental reporting measures and to address the ongoing issue of individual departmental transactions that occur independently of the NMCC collaboration. The OAG's subsequent 2012 and 2014 reports of progress stated that whilst strategic guidance had improved, the NMCC had not reviewed reporting measures and partner agencies were still conducting separate patrol arrangements.

The literature on collaborative research clarified the need for more research attention on power within inter-organisational collaborative studies. The research literature and the issues of power revealed in the initial study of the case study supported the development of an analytical framework that illuminates the relationships of power between collaborating actors, which was a critical factor to address in the research question. Mindful of the need for more research on the nature of power within inter-organisational studies, the NMCC attested as an environment permeated by the same paradoxes of decision-making power revealed in the literature review.

The key methodological feature of the research design, CDA, was to make a significant departure from previous approaches employed for analysing inter-agency collaboration within New Zealand's public sector. The critical examination of the NMCC discourse was to make clear the relationships of power contained within its discourse that had been previously opaque to the NMCC actors. Fairclough's extensive use of CDA in his study of the transformational qualities of neoliberalism and its use as a political tool to shape both social structures and practices confirmed the choice of his CDA framework as the methodological approach. The literature concerning inter-organisational studies commented on research design frameworks that emphasised either structural variables beyond collaborating actors' control or the actors' construction of their collaboration that collapses into an analysis of language without acknowledging the organisational environment in which the actors interact. To counter such views the adoption of the ontological underpinning of critical realism was an important feature of my research design. The use of Fairclough's CDA framework enabled a scalable study of the NMCC collaboration at both the micro level and the macro level of the public sector, as well as the reforms that enabled the framework to embed this research's ontological foundation.

The CDA of the NMCC discourse applied a dialectical analysis of the NMCC actors' agency and public sector structure. This epistemological approach stemmed from the literature that advocated the study of the limitations created by the agency-structure duality in the context of collaboration. Furthermore, Eppel et al's study of collaboration within New Zealand's public sector confirms that actors often experience a tension between their collaborative role and pre-existing organisational structures that control their working environment. The dialectical approach to the analysis of the NMCC discourses enabled this research to analyse whether the actors' agency shapes the NMCC discourse to the extent that it instigates change to the structural component of the public sector, or whether the structural hierarchy of the public sector prevails despite the eras of reform. Consequently, the CDA research design incorporated the following research objectives and methods to address the research question.

The first research objective addressed the *what* component of the research question. The use of CDA would show what linguistic cues the NMCC actors constructed within their inter-

agency practice through the NMCC (F)'s discourse. Chapter Four's textual analysis component of the CDA employed Halliday's construct of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) to study the NMCC (F)'s linguistic cues. The application of SFL revealed the NMCC actors' interpersonal and ideational function.

The CDA of the interpersonal function of the NMCC (F) discourse revealed that its text constructs the hierarchical identity of its producers through the concept of modality. The findings of this section suggest that the predominately low to medium modality of the NMCC (F) reduced the obligation of the NMCC actors' organisations to regard the guidance of the NMCC (F). (A document produced through a hierarchy of actors: ODESC, the ODESC-subgroup – the NMCC Network of CEs, and the authors of the text – the NMCC working group.) These findings indicate that the linguistic style of the NMCC (F) reinforces the hierarchy of the public sector and places emphasis on existing practices by emphasising the process of individual departmental reporting.

The ideational characteristics of the NMCC (F) discourse showed how its language constructs the social reality of the NMCC collaboration through its grammatical reference to pre-constituted structures and practices. Through the analysis of SFL's construct of theme, the findings revealed that the NMCC (F)'s discourse limits the actors' actions through emphasis on collaboration within the rules of the NMCC (F). The language of its text also obscures the responsible agent for the operation of the NMCC through the producers' use of nominalisation. As the research posited, nominalisation has exacerbated the autonomy-accountability dilemma for the NMCC managers. However, the ideational function revealed that the NMCC (F) makes continual reference to the pre-constituted requirements for individual departmental to report to their responsible minister. The chapter concluded that the CDA of interpersonal and ideational analysis illuminated two competing discourses, which consequently limits the NMCC managers' agency to collaborate.

Gramsci's conceptualisation of power proved useful to interpreting this finding in two ways. First, that the competing discourses indicate that the NMCC collaboration was a site of struggle over power. These competing discourses have taken place between the of whole-of-government discourse which the NMCC collaboration supports and the underlying discourse of individual agency reporting, a practice that evolved from the earlier neoliberal

motivated era of reform. Second, the struggle between the two existing discourses in the 2006 NMCC (F) was not fixed over time. This situation could potentially change over the history of NMCC collaboration and evidence of this change would therefore be present in other NMCC texts, had it occurred. To ascertain if change had occurred or if the domination of one discourse over another was an enduring feature of the NMCC actors' order of discourse, the second phase of the CDA investigated the NMCC actors' discursive practice.

The second research objective employed a diachronic CDA of the NMCC texts over the period of 2001-2006, which addressed the *how* component of the research question. The diachronic CDA substantiated the ontology of the research design and ensured the CDA did not approach the study of the NMCC discourse as a static entity. The second research objective was to explain how the actors produced, distributed and interpreted the NMCC (F)'s discourse over time within the hierarchical context of the public sector - a process Fairclough calls discursive practice. The second phase of the CDA employed a series of steps to analyse the intertextuality of the NMCC texts in order to link the micro-level of the NMCC (F) textual analysis with the actors' pre-constituted institutional setting. The resulting intertextual methods of analysis illuminated the NMCC actors' members' resources (MR), which selected the linguistic traces and cues in their discursive practice. The linguistic cues revealed if their order of discourse had maintained the status quo or re-constituted the NMCC actors' MR over the period examined.

The findings revealed the NMCC actors select and reproduce linguistic cues that sustained their order of discourse over the period examined. To explain this phenomenon, the research argued that the NMCC actors' order of discourse represented the field of discoursal logic of the public sector context. The findings showed that the logic of the public sector irrevocably contains the whole-of-government discourse within the hegemonic discourse of the pre-constituted accountability practices that sustained the hierarchical structure of the public sector. The basic content analysis of the NMCC intertextual chain confirmed the containment of the NMCC's collaborative discourse is a reoccurring theme throughout its texts examined in the 2002-2006 period.

The application of Fairclough's concept of ideology that enabled discourse to sustain power relations suggested that the NMCC actors are unaware of their repeating order of discourse

because the hegemonic struggle between the competing discourses has become naturalized. The use of Fairclough's theory affirmed that such naturalisation contributes to the ideological constitution of the NMCC actors to the extent they no longer query the competing linguistic cues within the NMCC discourse. Consequently, the NMCC actors' order of discourse continues to perpetuate their collaborative practice and reinforces the NMCC organisations' structural constraints. The basic content corroborated this finding in the analysis of the 2006 NMCC organisations' Statements of Intent (SOI). The organisations' reproduction of the NMCC discourse in their 2006 SOIs revealed only Customs, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry for Primary Industries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade subscribed to the NMCC discourse. The research proposed the result limits the collaborating actors' agency to collaborate with the required degree of autonomy within the institutional structure of New Zealand's public sector.

The concluding phase of second research objective examined the genre of the NMCC (F) through an interdiscursive analysis. To interpret the findings I applied Fairclough's concept of the hortatory report to posit the NMCC (F) favoured the logic of appearance over explanatory logic and this was how the NMCC (F) has naturalised the containment of the collaborative discourse. The genre style of the hortatory report enables the discourse of the NMCC (F) to manifest as a means-end-logic, which Habermas explains as the predisposition of neoliberal societies to adopt expedient institutional solutions without due consideration of their long-term implications and the possibility of unintended consequences. Furthermore, the final phase of the CDA revealed this means-end-logic remains an enduring ideological force throughout the NMCC discourse.

The final research objective was to explain *why* the pre-constituted structure of the public sector and its practices affected the NMCC collaborative discourse. The application of a realist lens indicated the NMCC actors' order of discourse remained unchanged in the new 2013 MSOC (ToR). This document explained the MSOC's governance responsibilities, which included oversight of the NMCC operation. I surmised that New Zealand's political field of logic is entrenched in the structural conventions of ministerial responsibility. The CDA of the NMCC case study supported the argument that the 2000s reform, which expounded a

whole-of-government approach, created an additional layer of bureaucracy that reinforces the existing hierarchical governance structure over the public sector.

Finally, the findings of this research revealed what are the consequences of public sector reform for public servants engaged in inter-agency collaboration. Despite Gramsci's observations that discursive struggles are not fixed over time, the case of the NMCC reveals that its actors create an order of discourse that prevails throughout the ongoing reforms, which has sustained the paradoxes of control. Specifically, the research revealed the NMCC order of discourse to be the discourse of the earlier reforms that even as late as 2013 continued to contain the later whole-of-government discourse to such an extent that it has become *naturalised* to the NMCC actors – an order of discourse that compounds the vertical relationships of hierarchy and the horizontal constitution of individual agency scapegoats.

The research findings suggest that the intention of the neoliberal based theories, which underpinned the first wave of reform policies, was to create conditions that simplified the governance structure of the public sector. However, the CDA revealed that the external discourse of neoliberalism has been recontextualised through the discourse of policies that sustain the accountability and performance requirements of New Zealand's Westminster constitutional structure. These findings, supported by the literature, showed how this repetitive order of discourse continues to constrain the agency of the NMCC actors because it inexorably reinforces the existing structural hierarchy of the public sector. In particular, it represents an enduring ideological force that perpetuates throughout eras of reform.

The aim of my research was to demonstrate the useful application of CDA to explicate *what* happened through the textual analysis of discourse, *how* it happened through the intertextual analysis of discourse, and *why* it happened through the investigation of the 'logic' of the public sector field. Another significant contribution of this methodological framework was to employ a positivistic view to demonstrate how CDA could elucidate the NMCC actors their dynamics of power within the collaborative discourse. This insight enables the actors to recognise and negotiate such dynamics through their subsequent production of discourse.

The first contribution of this research is to demonstrate CDA as a potent analytical resource for the NMCC actors, or any public servant, to identify the power dynamics within their collaborative relationships through its revelation of their order of discourse. Armed with insight and clarity, an actor can employ their active agency to catalyse change to the public sector's field of logic in order to generate new orders of discourse to re-constitute the existing hierarchical relationships of power. It is therefore possible, as the findings of this case study show, that in order to change the logic the NMCC actors needed to adopt the 2013 changes to the 1989 Public Sector Finance act within their discourse to break the cycle of repeating their existing order of discourse. These findings suggest that the application of this conceptual research framework in other public sector case studies, in private organisations and non-government organisations could prove useful for researchers to understand not only what has happened, but also why it happened and to ask the question what we should do now.

The second contribution of this research is to propose that the replication of its methodological framework to multiple case studies could reveal whether this pattern of reproduction and containment of discourse between the reform eras prevails, particularly in case studies that report collaborative difficulties. Furthermore, a comparative CDA with case studies of successful inter-agency collaboration could potentially reveal if the order of discourse revealed in this case study is a reoccurring theme, showing a pattern of constraint across the public sector for the whole-of-government inter-agency collaboration reform agenda. I posit that this methodological framework has further utility in the study of the discoursal logic of other collaborative actors in organisations from different contexts, which Ieţchu-Fairclough terms 'fields of logic'. It can be utilised to study power relations in collaborative contexts. Pertinent examples could include public-private sector partnerships or civilian-military operations such as disaster response, peacekeeping or post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

In concluding the research, it is vital to refer back to the observation that in the context of this research the concept of neoliberalism as a political project, has to date been a step too far for the existing democratic system of New Zealand, whose governance structure demands transparency and accountability of the public sector. The advocacy of the whole-

of-government reforms for inter-agency collaboration continues to present challenges for collaborating public servants such as the NMCC actors. The research suggests that a significant re-think from all sectors of society about the structural condition of New Zealand's Westminster system of power would be an ineluctable requirement when bringing about any significant process for reconfiguring the ongoing efforts to promote a whole-of-government approach. Without further consideration, multi-agency initiatives will continue to present an overwhelming challenge to collaborating public servants who resolve to tackle the wicked problems that face New Zealand.

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Appendix One.

Table 5.1:   NMCC (F) Intertextual Chain Analysis: The NMCC Actors' Discursive Practice – their Production, Distribution, and interpretation of the NMCC discourse

	Timeline:	MCC pilot	becomes	the NMCC				
Level of government	2001	2001	2003	2004	2006	2006	2006	2006
Cabinet	CAB Min (01) 10/10[668] [Interprets central agency text – the MPR]			DES Min (04) 1/3[669] [Interprets from CEs network and Produces direction to ODESC]	CAB Min (06) 28/26[670] Dec 2006 [Interprets from CEs network]			
Central agency Work groups **(CE and senior officials level)**	Maritime Patrol Review (MPR) Feb 2001 Lead Agency: DPMC [Produces CAB Min (01) 10/10 agreement to establish an MCC]	Review of the Centre[671] (RoC) Nov 2001 Lead Agency: SSC [Produces and is interpreted by all text in this intertextual chain]						
NMCC Agency working group **(CE level)**				NMCC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 2004[672] [Produces]	NMCC Governance Arrangements 1 Mar 2006[673] [Produces]	NMCC CE Network response 23 Aug 2006[674] [Produces]		

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[668] OIA Document. Cabinet, *Minute of Decision: Sustainable Capability Plan for the New Zealand Defence Force. CAB Min (01) 10/10* (Wellington: Cabinet Office, 30 March 2001), 1-5.

[669] OIA Document. Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination, *Minute of Decision: National Maritime Coordination Centre. DES Min (04) 1/3* (Wellington: Cabinet Office, 17 February 2004), 1.

[670] OIA Document. Cabinet Policy Committee, *Minute of Decision: National Maritime Co-ordination Centre Governance Proposal. POL Min (06) 28/26* (Wellington: Cabinet Office, 13 December 2006), 1-4.

[671] State Services Commission, *Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre* (Wellington: State Services Commission, November 2001), 4, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/review_of_centre.pdf.

[672] OIA Document. Unknown, *Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between Reference Group Members and Subsidiary Parties Government Agencies Covering the Operation of the National Maritime Coordination* Centre (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2004), 1-6.

[673] OIA Document. NMCC Network of Chief Executives, *NMCC Governance Arrangements* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1 March 2006), 1-5.

[674] OIA Document. Martyn Dunne, *Comment from Customs about proposed hosting arrangements for the NMCC* (Wellington: New Zealand Customs Service, 23 August 2006), 1-2.

| | Timeline: | MCC pilot | becomes | the NMCC | | | | |
Level of government:	2001	2001	2003	2004	2006	2006	2006	2006
NMCC Agency working group **(Mid-level officials)**			Report on the implementation of the NMCC 2003[675] [Interprets and Produces]			NMCC Working Group Report 23 Aug 2006[676] [Interprets and produces]	NMCC(F) 2006[677] [Interprets and Produces]	
Individual agency text	Ministry of Defence (MoD) Government Defence Statement[678] [Interprets from MPR and Produces NMCC(F)]				Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Statement of Intent (SOI)[679] 2006-2009 [Interprets]	Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) SOI[680] 2006-2011 [Interprets]	New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS) SOI[681] 2006-2007 [Interprets]	New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) SOI[682] 2006-2009 [Interprets]

[675] OIA Document. NMCC Working Group, *Report on the Implementation of the National Maritime Coordination* Centre (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 21 July 2003), 1-10.

[676] OIA Document. NMCC Working Group, *Report to Chair of the NMCC CE Network from the Project Manager of the NMCC Governance Project: NMCC host agency* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 23 August 2006), 1-2.

[677] OIA Document. NMCC Working Group, *National Maritime Coordination Centre Governance Framework* (Wellington: New Zealand Customs Service, 2006), 1-16.

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Appendix Two

Table 5.4: **Resistance of Agency - Chief Executives' and their Representatives' Attendance at the meetings of the NMCC Network of CEs for the Period of 22 October 2002 to the 25 August 2006**

NMCC Organisation	22-Oct-02	5-Dec-02	25-Feb-03	24-Mar-03	22-May-03	28-Jul-03	22-Aug-03	29-Oct-03	2-Dec-03	19-Apr-04	30-Jul-04	29-Sep-04	16-Nov-04	9-Feb-05	7-Apr-05	4-Nov-05	23-Mar-06	12-Jun-06	25-Aug-06
NZ Customs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	-1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NZDF	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
MSA (Later MNZ)	-1	-1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1	1
NZ Police	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Mfish (later MPI)	-1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1
MFAT							1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
DoC										1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
GCSB												1	1	1	-1	1	-1		1

NMCC Network of CE's attendance (22 October 2005 to 25 August 2006) (Sparkline view)

Key CE present — CE Representative Sent

NMCC Organisation	Attendance as a Percentage Ratio	
	Chief Executive	Representative sent in CE's absence
NZDF	11	89
MFAT	23	77
NZ Police	26	74
DoC	50	50
Mfish (later MPI)	61	39
MSA (Later MNZ)	68	32
GCSB	71	29
NZ Customs	89	11

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Appendix Three

Table 5.5:   **Basic Content Analysis of the NMCC (F) Intertextual Chain Analysis: Discursive Themes and their Density Percentage (%)**

	Timeline:	MCC pilot	becomes	the NMCC				
Level of government	2001	2001	2003	2004	2006	2006	2006	2006
Cabinet	CAB Min (01) 10/10 **Review and further study (30%)** Budget & Accountability (26%) Capability (24%) Civilian Requirements (20%)			DES Min (04) 1/3 **Funding & Accountability (56%)** Capability (22%) Governance (22%)	CAB Min (06) 47/3 **Accountability (50%)** Interagency (50%)			
Central agency Work groups **(CE and senior officials level)**	MPR Feb 2001 **Budget and Accountability (45%)** Civilian and Government requirements (28%) Inter-agency (15%) Capabilities and Capacity (10%) Other (2%)							
NMCC Agency working group **(CE level)**				MoU 2004 **Interagency (50%)** Budget & Accountability (29%)	Governance Arrangements Mar 2006 **Budget & Accountability (69%)**	**CE response** **23 Aug 2006** **Accountability and Reporting (100%)**		

	Timeline:	MCC pilot	becomes	the NMCC				
Level of government	2001	2001	2003	2004	2006	2006	2006	2006
				MOU 2004 (Cont) Other (13%) Autonomy & Transparency (8%)	Governance Arrangements Mar 2006 (Cont) Governance (17%) Autonomy and Transparency (6%) Other (8%)			
NMCC Agency working group **(Mid-level officials)**			Report 2003 **Budget and accountability (43%).** Interagency (26%). Government and Civilian requirements (17%). Autonomy, trust & transparency (14%)			Report 23 Aug 2006 **Autonomy and Transparency (60%).** Governance (40%).	NMCC(F) 2006 **Budget and Accountability (45%)** Interagency (28%). Governance (18%). Autonomy & Transparency (5%). Other (4%).	
Individual agency text	MoD 2001 **Budget & Accountability (48%).** Interagency (25%). Civilian & Government requirements (15%). Capabilities & Capacity (12%).				MFAT SOI 2006-2009 **Interagency (52%).** Accountability & Budget (33%). New Zealander's & Government requirements (14%).	MFish SOI 2006-2011[683] Interagency. Shared outcomes.	NZDF SOI 2006-2009 **Accountability & Budget (71%).** Multiagency (25%). Government and Civilian Requirements (4%).	NZCS SOI 2006-2007[684] Autonomous. Interagency Accountability. Civilian & Government requirements.

Key	
	Documents referenced in the NMCC(F)
	Future documents referenced in the NMCC(F)
	Documents obtained through the OIA request process

[683] The % density is omitted on account of the document only containing a paragraph on the subject. However, similar themes are included here.
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