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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S
DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY
USING NOVEL DISCRETION AND INFLATION BIAS
INDICATORS

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Economics

at Massey University, Manawatu,
New Zealand.

Zafar Hayat

2014

ABSTRACT

Although price and output stability have been the major goals of monetary policy, contention remained over their mutual compatibility and substitution for one another. It is challenging for monetary policy makers to maintain a balance between the price and growth objectives. The pursuit of a balance historically has led monetary policy to evolve under many guises. Discretion and commitment are the two popular monetary policy guises advocated for achievement of the twin objectives of inflation and growth. Under commitment, the long-term growth stability is assumed to be achieved via price stability, and therefore the overriding focus is the inflation objective. Under discretion, the achievement of the dual objectives requires sufficient flexibility with the central banker to adjust monetary policy as and when necessary, and as frequently as desired, to maximize monetary policy benefits. This thesis seeks to empirically investigate to what extent Pakistan's typical discretionary monetary policy strategy has benefited the economy both in terms of achievement of inflation and growth objectives as well as maintaining a balance between them for a 50-year timeframe. Using a novel discretion assessment approach, new inflation bias indicators and its determinants as well as a new discretion indicator, the thesis demonstrates that Pakistan's discretionary monetary policy strategy failed to deliver on its core mandate. Instead, the policy proved to be self-defeating as it produced results contrary to its *very purpose*. On one side, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) exercising its discretion, induced long-term excessive inflationary pressures in the economy and on the other side hindered the real growth than potentially would have been. This failure of the discretionary monetary policy on both the counts of inflation and growth objectives cast nontrivial doubts on its efficacy to fully reap the benefits of price and growth stability. The major findings of the study call for a reorientation of the focus of the SBP towards the inflation objective as against the growth objective. For this transformation to occur, monetary policy must change from the existing discretionary set-up to a commitment-based policy framework. Under such a framework, the SBP will have to commit to a certain low level of inflation and should not renege upon it to help build its credibility and capability to effectively anchor inflation expectations to ensure price stability, and hence growth-stability.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Indeed, it is the most appropriate time to comment on the common joke that PhD stands for a ‘Permanent Head Damage’. As per my experience, I would rather state that it should stand for a ‘Permanent Hair Damage’. Nevertheless, the deal is still lucrative as the corresponding gain at the expense of partial hair-loss is voluminous. I can state with confidence that the time spent over my PhD is the most progressive, fruitful and promising time ever. I feel blessed and really want to thank my creator (ALLAH almighty) for giving me endurance to pursue this long-term ambition. I now have the feeling that through my research ALLAH has enabled me to potentially benefit the 180 million people of my country Pakistan, suffering from high inflation rates since decades.

It goes without saying that PhD is a long-term iterative process and its fulfillment may not be possible without the support of a number of background players. I may not list them all extensively but to start with, I would express my gratitude to my principal supervisor Dr. James Obben for introducing me to what I intrinsically was after and letting me see straight through the problem. He encouraged me to work independently while defining the broader boundaries to keep me on track. His open door policy and patience to accommodate and help strengthen my naïve ideas to grow over time from small buds to trees have been adorable. I also want to appreciate my supervisor Dr. Faruk Balli, and wish had he been there in the panel right from the start. In a very little time he added ample value to the quality of the work. His valuable comments and suggestions on bits and pieces of the thesis furthered its strength and ensured timely completion. I would also like to thank my supervisor Dr. Shamim Shakur for always being there as a mentor, building my confidence, and for providing insights into the overall outlook of the thesis. Playing competitive badminton with him has been another lively aspect of the journey.

Apart from my supervisors, there has been a great role of my friends and colleagues in the form of initial fruitful discussions which helped me sharpen and polish the budding ideas. The very dearly Dr. Faisal Rana, no less than a brother, supported and guided through good and bad times, and him reading through my initial drafts has been commendable. The contributions of Dr. Amin Khobro, Suresh Kumar and Dr. Saqib Sharif were also profound in terms of help with methodology and feedbacks on initial write-ups as well as presentations. A word of thanks goes to my lab mates, Mr. Bob Lissington, Mr. Andres Camacho, Mr. Tanh Ngo, Mr. Sumi, Mr. Andrean, Mrs. Uzma Shahzad and Ms. Emily.

It won't be just not to mention the names of other faculty members and staff who deserve a word of appreciation, namely Dr. Hatice Ozer-Balli, Dr. Stuart Birks, Professor Hans-Jürgen Engelbrecht, Professor Rukmani Gounder and Dr. James Alvey for their comments and suggestions. I would thank Cameron Rhodes for the IT support, Maryke Bublitz for administrative support and most importantly Sue Edwards for helping me find an easily manageable part-time job to support my finances.

I would extend my gratitude to the Head of School of Economics and Finance Professor Martin Young and Associate Head of School Associate Professor David Tripe for their guidance, and for being supportive and generous in providing financial help both for domestic and international symposia and conferences. A word of thanks go to participants and discussants for their valuable feedback, comments and suggestions at: Western Economic Association International (WEAI) 89th Annual Conference 2014 held at (Denver, USA); International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences (IIES) 2nd Economics and Finance Conference 2014 held at (Vienna, Austria); 47th Canadian Economic Association (CEA) Annual Conference 2013 held at (Montreal, Canada); New Zealand Association of Economists (NZAE) 54th Annual Conference 2013 held at

(Wellington, New Zealand); 4th School of Economics and Finance (SEF) Research Symposium 2013 held at (Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand); 5th School of Economics and Finance (SEF) Research Symposium 2012 held at (Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand); 3rd Massey University Pakistani Students Association (MUPSA) Doctoral Symposium 2012 held at (Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand); School of Economics and Finance Seminar Series 2014 held at (Massey university, Palmerston North, New Zealand) and Pakistani Students Association (PSA) Seminar Series.

The facilitative role of Dr. Zulfiquar Butt in dealing with the Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan is worth mentioning. I am also pleased to acknowledge financial support of HEC as otherwise this journey won't have been possible. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother (Ghazala Yasmeen), father (Muhammad Karam), wife (Mariam Zaman), son (Azhar Hayat), daughters (Manaal Hayat and Shanzay Hayat), brothers (Anwar Hayat and Khizar Hayat), sisters (Shabina Yasmeen, Sofia Nosheen, Salma, Benish and Kiran), brothers-in-law (Nek Muhammad, Ajmal Khan, Akbar Zaman, Muhammad Ajmal Anwar and Majid Khan) and all the relatives, especially, my uncles (Muhammad Amin, Muhammad Ayub, Minhaj and Qasim Jan) and aunts for their encouragement, patience and unconditional support in one form or another, which kept me steadfast during this entire journey.

At the end, I dedicate this thesis to my parents (Muhammad Karam and Ghazala Yasmeen) and grandparents (Momin Khan, late Mutabahan, late Muhammad Hayat, and late Sakeena Bibi) and hope to truly make them feel proud of myself as I am the very first in the whole family to have completed the terminal educational degree – especially with a sense of self-fulfilment given that the thesis has been recommended for the 'Dean's List' after the oral defence.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	-	Augmented Dicky-Fuller
AIC	-	Akaike information criterion
ARDL	-	Autoregressive distributed lag
ARMA	-	Autoregressive moving average
ARIMA	-	Autoregressive integrated moving average
CB	-	Central bank
CPI	-	Consumer price index
CUSUM	-	Cumulative sum of squares of residuals
CUSUMQ	-	Cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals
C.V	-	Critical value
DF-GLS	-	Dicky-Fuller generalized least squares
DW	-	Durbin Watson
ECB	-	European central bank
ECM	-	Error correction model
e.g.	-	Exempli Gratia (for example)
i.e.	-	Id Est (that is)
FDI	-	Foreign direct investment
FIML	-	Full information maximum likelihood
GARCH	-	Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
GDP	-	Gross domestic product
GNP	-	Gross national product
GMM		Generalized method of moments
HP		Hodrick and Prescott

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HQC	-	Hannan and Quinn criterion
LSM	-	Large scale manufacturing
MLE	-	Maximum likelihood estimation
NLLS	-	Non-linear least squares
OECD	-	Organization of economic cooperation and development
OLS	-	Ordinary least squares
PP	-	Phillips Perron
RPI	-	Retail price index
RPIX	-	Retail price index (excluding mortgage interest payment)
SBC	-	Schwarz Bayesian criterion
SBP	-	State bank of Pakistan
SPI	-	Sensitive price index
SUR	-	Seemingly unrelated regressions
U.S	-	United States
U.K	-	United Kingdom
VECM	-	Vector error correction model
WDI	-	World development indicators
WPI	-	Wholesale price index
2SLS	-	Two-stage least squares