Browsing by Author "Queirolo R"

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Assessing options for cannabis law reform: A Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) with stakeholders in New Zealand
(Elsevier B.V, 2022-07) Wilkins C; Rychert M; Queirolo R; Lenton SR; Kilmer B; Fischer B; Decorte T; Hansen P; Ombler F
Background A number of jurisdictions are considering or implementing different options for cannabis law reform, including New Zealand. Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) helps facilitate the resolution of complex policy decisions by breaking them down into key criteria and drawing on the combined knowledge of experts from various backgrounds. Aims To rank cannabis law reform options by facilitating expert stakeholders to express preferences for projected reform outcomes using MCDA. Methods A group of cannabis policy experts projected the outcomes of eight cannabis policy options (i.e., prohibition, decriminalization, social clubs, government monopoly, not-for-profit trusts, strict regulation, light regulation, and unrestricted market) based on five criteria (i.e., health and social harm, illegal market size, arrests, tax income, treatment services). A facilitated workshop of 42 key national stakeholders expressed preferences for different reform outcomes and doing so generated relative weights for each criterion and level. The resulting weights were then used to rank the eight policy options. Results The relative weighting of the criteria were: “reducing health and social harm” (46%), “reducing arrests” (31%), “reducing the illegal market” (13%), “expanding treatment” (8%) and “earning tax” (2%). The top ranked reform options were: “government monopoly” (81%), “not-for-profit” (73%) and “strict market regulation” (65%). These three received higher scores due to their projected lower impact on health and social harm, medium reduction in arrests, and medium reduction in the illegal market. The “lightly regulated market” option scored lower largely due its projected greater increase in health and social harm. “Prohibition” ranked lowest due to its lack of impact on reducing the number of arrests or size of the illegal market. Conclusion Strictly regulated legal market options were ranked higher than both the current prohibition, and alternatively, more lightly regulated legal market options, as they were projected to minimize health and social harms while substantially reducing arrests and the illegal market.
Market Revenues and Economic Opportunities in the Legal Cannabis Market in Uruguay
(LSE Press, 2025-08-12) Rychert M; Pardal M; Queirolo R
Background: The regulated cannabis market in Uruguay has received international attention as an alternative to profit-maximising cannabis legalisation models. However, relatively little is known about how this market has been operationalised. The goal of our policy commentary is to identify the key actors with a role in the legal regulated cannabis market, provide estimates of the annual revenues, discuss the existing market opportunities, and consider the implications for the economic aspects of social justice. Methods: Our commentary is informed by a review of key relevant literature and other documentary sources, as well as insights from qualitative fieldwork in Montevideo. Results: Licensed production companies and pharmacies are key for-profit organisations involved in the recreational cannabis market in Uruguay. With prices, products, and market size controlled by the government, the entrepreneurial decisions of licensed producers are limited, resulting in a focus on cost reduction. The production sector is characterised by a small number of companies that operate at economies of scale, illustrating a ‘commoditised’ cannabis market model. The pharmacy-only retail framework has created new revenue for community pharmacists but may hinder the participation of small-scale legacy players. The not-for-profit Cannabis Social Club (CSC) sector has lower entry barriers and fewer requirements regarding products and prices, but only a few key individuals may benefit financially due to the sector non-profit regulation. Estimates of annual revenues in the licensed production (4–4.8 million USD), pharmacy point-of-sale (1.1–2.2 million USD) and CSC sectors (8–17.7 million USD) are provided. Conclusions: Despite not being designed to pursue economic objectives, the state-controlled cannabis market in Uruguay has created commercial opportunities for several actors. Our analysis suggests that this regulation may represent a compromise from an economic and social justice perspective.