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Browsing by Author "Yates TA"

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    Culpable Ignorance and Causal Deviance
    (John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2025-09-05) Yates TA
    I argue that tracing theorists of culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should reject the widely accepted principle that culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should always be traced through culpability for the ignorance itself. Two kinds of cases are considered in which culpability for ignorant wrongdoing ultimately traces back to culpability for a benighting act, but where it appears that culpable ignorance is not part of the explanation of the ignorant wrongdoing's culpability. These are (1) cases in which the ignorant wrongdoing is a foreseeable consequence of a culpable benighting act and yet the ignorance is an unforeseeable consequence of that act (making the ignorance blameless), and (2) cases in which the ignorance is the foreseeable consequence of a culpable benighting act (making it culpable) but where the connection between the ignorance and the foreseeable wrongdoing from it is itself unforeseeable. I contend that culpability for the ignorant wrongdoing in neither kind of case requires an appeal to culpable ignorance. Both kinds of cases appear to involve causal deviance. However, I draw upon recent work on causal deviance to argue that any causal deviance in these cases does not fully excuse given the lack of intervening causes.

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