Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. Freyberg’s High-Command Relationships, 1939-1941 A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand Ross Keith Mackie 2014 ii Abstract This thesis analyses General Bernard Freyberg’s high- command relationships from November 1939 to June 1941. The civil-military relationship was inadequately formed and therefore incapable of functioning effectively. Coalition relations with Middle East Command became disharmonious in September 1940 because the British refused to accept Dominions as independent allies. Unable to unite his force until February 1941, Freyberg’s officers formed an independent subculture that challenged his command. The 1941 campaign in Greece brought these relationship shortcomings to the surface. The turning point in all three relationships took place in Cairo in June 1941 where, in meetings with Freyberg, Prime Minister Peter Fraser implemented remedies to the relationship failures and also initiated changes in the New Zealand Government’s alliance relationship with Whitehall. Personalities and interpersonal relations are shown to be central to effective high-command relationships. _______ iii Acknowledgements My grateful thanks to Dr John Moremon, my supervisor, for his guidance, forbearance and concern. For information, permissions and assistance, my thanks to: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington Australian War Memorial, Canberra Dr Ralph Bathurst, Massey University Dr John Bentley, Sydney Mr John Crawford, Department of Defence, Wellington Department of Defence Library, Wellington Justice Mark Derham, Melbourne Mr Uili Fecteau, Archives New Zealand, Wellington Mr David Filer, Wellington Dr Dianne Gardiner, Massey University Kippenberger Military Archive, National Army Museum, Waiouru Professor David Horner, Australian National University, Canberra National Library of Australia, Canberra Dr Negar Partow, Massey University. ________ iv Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction 1 1. Civil-military relations 14 2. Coalition relations 46 3. GOC-officer relations 76 4. Participation in Greece 100 5. The Cairo meetings and their consequences 132 Conclusion 166 Bibliography 177 _______ 1 Introduction This thesis is a departure from the concerns of most New Zealand military historians of the Second World War. It is an analysis of Major-General Bernard Freyberg’s high-command relationships: his civil-military relations with the New Zealand Government, his command relations with the officers of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF), and his relations with coalition partners. The alliance relationship between the New Zealand and British governments is also examined, but to a lesser degree. The scope is akin to the 360-degree assessment process because it provides a “full circle” perspective on Freyberg’s interaction with his immediate subordinates (senior officers), peers (coalition partners) and superiors (the Government and theatre commanders-in-chief).1 The period covered is from Freyberg’s appointment in November 1939 until June 1941 when, after New Zealand’s high-command relationships had all malfunctioned, Prime Minister Peter Fraser and Freyberg met in Cairo to change or correct the relationships. 1 Also known as multi-source assessment. The term full circle is from “360-Degree Assessment: An Overview”, US Office of Personnel Management, Performance Management and Incentive Awards Division, September 1997, 1. 2 The historiography of New Zealand’s participation in the Second World War has been dominated by the official histories, which set out to provide a record for the state, to satisfy public demand for an account of the conflict, and to serve as a memorial to those who did not return.2 The official histories also aimed to construct a consensus view that would influence tradition.3 It is likely that one (probably unintentional) influence was to focus New Zealand military history on operations and the experiences of those who took part. The postwar “new military history”, which broadened the scope of military historiography and reduced the preoccupation with generalship, has also contributed to the operational and participant focus.4 One result is that New Zealand military history has been accused of being more concerned with narrative than analysis.5 The field of high command has, it is true, been little analysed. Nor has it been narrated. As historian John Crawford observed, New Zealand military history is “notable for the comparative dearth of scholarly articles and books on … matters of high policy”. 6 Ian McGibbon recorded that there is still no 2 Ian McGibbon, “‘Something of Them is Recorded Here’: Official History in New Zealand”, in Jeffrey Grey (ed.), The Last Word?: Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth, Westport, Ct: Praeger, 2003, p. 53. 3 Rachael Elizabeth Bell, “Memory, History, Nation, War: The Official Histories of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45”, PhD Thesis, Massey University, 2012, p. 2, and p. 253. 4 See Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction”, The American Historical Review, 112:4, October 2007, 1070-1090. 5 Deborah Montgomerie, “Reconnaissance: Twentieth-Century New Zealand War History at Century’s Turn”, New Zealand Journal of History, 37:1, 2003, 62-63. 6 John Crawford, Introduction, in John Crawford (ed.), Kia Kaha: New Zealand in the Second World War, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 7. 3 “authoritative critique” of New Zealand’s role in the war.7 Many recent histories (not all of them scholarly) are dominated by oral accounts, often by other-rank participants, that frequently ignore command and strategic issues.8 A New Zealand equivalent to David Horner’s High Command (which examined Australia’s Second World War strategic relationships) has yet to be produced.9 High command is largely uncharted territory in New Zealand military historiography. Not only has high command been a neglected area of study, it has not been well served by archives, libraries and museums in New Zealand. Only one New Zealand general (Major-General Howard Kippenberger) published an autobiography, and there are few worthwhile biographies of senior military and political figures.10 Of the communications between Freyberg and the Government, only a portion has survived in archives, and there are significant omissions from other records.11 The lack of high command source material is not a uniquely New Zealand or military phenomenon. A difficulty 7 Ian McGibbon, “New Zealand’s Strategical Approach”, Kia Kaha, p. 10. 8 David Filer, Crete: Death from the Skies, New Zealand’s Role in the Loss of Crete, Auckland: David Bateman Ltd, 2010, p. 9. 9 D. M. Horner, High Command: Australia and its Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, 1982. 10 Bassett and King’s Tomorrow Comes the Song is the only scholarly biography of Fraser, and Paul Freyberg’s Bernard Freyberg VC is the best biography of Freyberg. Kippenberger had two biographers. There is one journal article about William Jordan. An edited version of Carl Berendsen’s autobiography and his letters have been published. Jones (the Minister of Defence), the two CGSs (Generals Puttick and Duigan), and all New Zealanders who held general rank in World War II (except Kippenberger) have no article- or book-length biographies. 11 Omissions of relevance to this thesis include Freyberg’s personal papers (in private ownership in the UK), Ministry of Defence communications with Freyberg, Prime Minister’s Department records, and communications between Freyberg and Middle East Command. 4 with any investigation of the performance of high-level office-holders is that most important decisions are made in private and are scantily documented.12 The five chapters in the body of this thesis examine: (1) Freyberg’s charter and the foundations of the civil-military relationship; (2) coalition relations with Middle East Command; (3) Freyberg-senior officer relations; (4) the lead up to Greece, which precipitated a breakdown in high-command relations; and (5) the meetings Fraser had with Freyberg in Cairo in June 1941, where remedies to the relationship breakdowns were made. It is contended that the reason Freyberg volunteered his services to New Zealand was because he rightly or wrongly believed that his forced retirement from the British Army in 1937 meant he would not be able to achieve the level of autonomy he desired after he returned to the British Army in 1939. New Zealand offered a better opportunity to exercise the self-determination that Freyberg, a self-made man, sought. The development of Freyberg’s charter has not been fully examined in New Zealand military history. It is usually held that Freyberg wrote his charter himself and that the Government changed not a word of it. It is here established that the draft charter Freyberg brought to New Zealand was re-written by the Attorney- 12 J. Kahl, cited in Andrew Kakabadse, Nada K. Kakabadse and Ruth Barratt, “Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO): That Sacred and Secret Relationship”, Journal of Management Development, 25:2, 2006, 135. 5 General, and was possibly re-written again. Freyberg was not the author of the approved version of his charter. It is also posited that it was during this hitherto unreported re-writing that a clause prohibiting the piecemeal use of the force (which was almost certainly in the draft charter) was lost, and that Freyberg’s right to direct communication with the Government on any matter was restricted to specific topics. The final matter chapter 1 examines is Deputy Prime Minister Peter Fraser’s failure to explain to Freyberg the kind of reporting and counsel expected from him, the reasons the Labour Government formed 2NZEF, and how it wanted it to participate in the war. In January 1940 Freyberg was allowed to go into battle without knowing the Government’s priorities, its expectations of him, or the Government’s strategic concerns. The civil-military relationship is found to have been inadequately established. Freyberg’s coalition relations with the British Army officers of Middle East Command is the subject of chapter 2. The historiography of coalition relations in the Middle East has not identified the two distinct phases in the relationship. Until September 1940 Freyberg could not form a division and with Wavell’s 90,000 troops facing over half a million Italians, Freyberg and the Government agreed to detach units to assist the hard- pressed Middle East Command. Freyberg and the Government were disturbed by General Sir Archibald Wavell’s plan to dismember 6 2NZEF in August 1940, but it was the arrival of the third echelon in Egypt in September 1940 that ignited the acrimony that marked the second phase of coalition relations in the Middle East. The arrival of the third echelon made forming a division possible. But when Freyberg requested the return of detached units (to consolidate with the third echelon and thereby form a division) he encountered resistance from Middle East Command. The British reluctance to return units Freyberg had lent out made it apparent that they did not regard 2NZEF as an independent allied force but as a resource pool within the British Army. The cause of the animosity was not, as is often contended, detaching units, but obtaining their return so that the New Zealand Division could be formed. Chapter 2 also examines Australia’s Lieutenant-General Thomas Blamey’s reactions to detachment requests, the contention that Freyberg suffered a conflict of loyalties in 1940-41, and shortcomings in inter-governmental agreements. The base cause of the coalition friction is found to have been disagreement over Dominion status. Freyberg essentially fought a political battle for Dominion rights with his military commander-in-chief. Chapter 3 analyses the relationship between Freyberg and his officers. Organisational culture theory is used as the analysis methodology. The theory exposes the flaws in previous historical scrutiny of Freyberg-officer relations and reveals the hidden cause of the discontent. Unable to consolidate the division because its 7 echelons were dispersed geographically and over time, Freyberg was unable to impose his culture (command) and 2NZEF’s officers developed a subculture of their own which, by early 1941, challenged Freyberg’s command. In May 1941 the officers took their complaints to Fraser. Fraser was so alarmed by what he heard that he considered dismissing Freyberg. The contention that Freyberg’s British nationality was responsible for the officers’ disaffection with Freyberg is challenged, and the four remedial processes Freyberg used to restore harmony are identified. The lead up to and battle in Greece caused breakdowns in all New Zealand’s high-command relationships. Influenced by Wavell’s duplicity, Freyberg chose not to inform the Government of his misgivings about Greece. Officer discontent boiled over. The Government made hasty and knowingly ill-informed decisions concerning Greece, and allowed itself to be manipulated by the British War Cabinet. In addition to exposing the high command failures in civil-military, Freyberg-senior officer, coalition, and inter- governmental relations around the time of Greece, chapter 4 also exposes failures in Britain’s civil-military relations and examines how the campaign’s high-command issues have been treated differently in Australian and New Zealand military historiography. The little-documented, often-overlooked meetings Fraser had with Freyberg in Cairo in June 1941 marked a watershed in New Zealand’s high-command relationships and are the topic of chapter 5. 8 Many historians acknowledge that the meetings took place, but few recognise that the meetings constituted a turning point in all New Zealand’s high-command relationships. Angered at learning that Freyberg had withheld from the Government his reservations about Greece, Fraser made it plain that Freyberg was henceforward to keep the Government informed. Fraser and Freyberg came to a long-overdue understanding about reporting and counsel that served efficaciously for the rest of the war. Fraser learnt how Freyberg was treated by Middle East Command and that intelligence led to Fraser helping Freyberg in two ways. He set conditions on the use of New Zealand troops, and he altered the Government’s relationship with Whitehall. Three months after the meetings Freyberg repeated his pre- Greece behaviour and did not inform Fraser of his doubts about a forthcoming operation. Shortly afterwards, though, he began to refuse operations that did not meet Fraser’s conditions and, in early 1942, when Middle East Command persisted in treating him as a subordinate and wanted to split up the Division, Freyberg withdrew 2NZEF to another command. Fraser almost certainly raised the officers’ criticisms of Freyberg in the meetings and he probably influenced the shape of the resolution of them. The meetings properly aligned 2NZEF’s use with the Government’s strategic concerns, as Freyberg’s decision- making in battle in 1943-44 showed. In order to better support 9 Freyberg with Whitehall (and in response to pressure within New Zealand to be less submissive) the Government’s relations with Britain changed from acquiescence to something more equitable. Much-needed processes were put in place in Wellington to handle British requests to use 2NZEF and, after spending time in London and developing a measure of personal rapport with Churchill, Fraser became more adept in getting New Zealand’s way. In examining New Zealand’s Second World War high- command relations several themes emerge: the importance of interpersonal relations; Freyberg’s nationality; Dominion rights; and the strategic purpose of 2NZEF. That personalities affect high-command relationships may seem an incongruous assertion when the training and professionalism needed in modern warfare and the harsh nature of war generally are considered. But most conflict between politicians and soldiers in British history was, Michael Howard observed, “embittered—as such struggles usually are—by personalities.” 13 Alex Danchev determined that Churchill’s direction of the war was “supremely personal”.14 The major issue in modern civil-military relations is not armed revolt by the military but the maintenance of an effective working relationship been the soldier and the 13 Michael Howard, “Introduction: The Armed Forces as a Political Problem”, in Michael Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations, Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1957, 1978, p. 21. 14 Alex Danchev, “Great Britain: The Indirect Strategy”, in David Renyolds, Warren F. Kimball and A.O. Chubarian (eds.), Allies at War: The Society, American and British Experience, 1939-1945, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 7. 10 politician.15 Australian historian David Horner found that “the relationship between [General Douglas] MacArthur, [Australian Prime Minister John] Curtin and [General] Blamey cannot be understood without examining their personalities.” Indeed, “the problem of personalities” extends to “the command relationships between generals and politicians, and between the different national generals in allied forces.” 16 The importance of interpersonal relations has also been identified in New Zealand’s high-command relationships. Professor Frederick Wood wrote that “the personal links … between Peter Fraser and both Churchill and Freyberg were of untold importance to wartime New Zealand.” 17 Had New Zealand’s senior officers (most of them Territorials with limited command experience) been less parochial, better trained and more experienced, they would likely have appreciated Freyberg’s position in 1940-41 and been less petulant. Wavell’s intransigence soured coalition relations in the Middle East. Personalities profoundly affected all New Zealand’s high-command relationships. Freyberg’s nationality influenced the civil-military relationship. Because Freyberg was not a New Zealander, he and the New Zealand Government did not know each other well enough to have the rapport that was proven necessary. Freyberg’s 15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 20. 16 D. M. Horner, High Command: Australia and its Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, 1982, pp. xx-xxi. 17 F.L.W. Wood, Political and External Affairs, Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1958, p. 100. 11 nationality complicated coalition relations because his being British made it easier for the British officers of Middle East Command to consider him a British Army subordinate. Many of 2NZEF’s officers regarded Freyberg as too British and that perception contributed to the difficulties in Freyberg-officer relations until mid 1941. Dominion rights were fundamental to the differences of opinion Freyberg had with Middle East Command. The Government wanted 2NZEF to be an independent force but did not make that sufficiently plain to either Freyberg or Whitehall and consequently both the civil-military relationship and the Government’s alliance relations with Britain needed correcting by June 1941. The Government’s strategic intent in forming 2NZEF and their views on how it should be used were not explained to Freyberg in 1939. Freyberg was therefore unable to align his actions with the Government’s objectives. This fundamental shortcoming in the civil- military relationship influenced Freyberg’s behaviour with his coalition partners and had an effect on his relations with his officers because he was unable to show how his decisions reflected Government policy. If New Zealand’s Second World War high-command relationships display one common failing it was lack of rapport. There are three interconnected constituents of rapport: dialogue (mutual two-way information exchange), empathy, and acceptance. It was not until after the Fraser-Freyberg meetings in Cairo in June 12 1941 that rapport was established in the civil-military and Freyberg- officer relationships. Rapport was not evident in coalition relations until mid 1942, when commanders who accepted Dominion rights were appointed to the Middle East. The dispersal of New Zealand echelons in 1940 prevented Freyberg from establishing rapport with his senior officers. Laurie Barber, John Tonkin-Covell and other historians have assessed Freyberg’s performance as a divisional commander but almost no analysis of Freyberg’s conduct as General Officer Commanding (GOC) 2NZEF has taken place. (Put briefly, as commanding officer of the New Zealand Division, Freyberg was responsible for the fighting force; as GOC 2NZEF, Freyberg gained responsibility for non-divisional formations such as hospitals, education, payroll and discipline, and also for liaison with the Government and coalition partners.) Stevens’ volume of the official history, Problems of 2NZEF, is the only work that concentrates on expeditionary force rather than divisional matters. The high- command relationships that are analysed here (civil-military, coalition, command) largely relate to Freyberg’s role as GOC of 2NZEF rather than his other responsibility as Commanding Officer of the New Zealand Division. In some respects this thesis incidentally provides a partial assessment of Freyberg’s performance as GOC. The focus, however, is on examining New Zealand’s high- command relationships in 1939-41. Consequently, the performance 13 of the New Zealand Government, the British Army and the senior officers of 2NZEF are as important as Freyberg’s conduct. The figure who emerges as the saviour of the relationships is Prime Minister Fraser. The initiatives and changes Fraser implemented at, or as a result of, his June 1941 meetings with Freyberg corrected New Zealand’s high-command relationships. This thesis establishes why the relationships broke down and made Fraser’s intervention necessary, and it demonstrates that his solutions were effective because they recognised the importance of personalities and interpersonal relations in high command. ______ 14 1. Civil-military relations In 1935, Major-General Bernard Freyberg, VC, CB, CMG, DSO was a well-known hero of the First World War with a successful and promising career as a British Army officer. In January of that year he was selected as the next GOC of the Presidency and Assam District in India, a prestigious appointment. When a pre- appointment medical examination discovered that he had a heart murmur, Freyberg’s posting was cancelled.18 Freyberg argued about the medical finding but to no avail and was retired in 1937. The British Army had been embarrassed by the deaths of a number of high-ranking officers and was wary of retaining senior officers with medical conditions.19 The War Office was also concerned that with another war likely older officers needed to be replaced with younger ones.20 On the outbreak of war Freyberg returned to the British Army as GOC Salisbury Plain Area, a “sedentary”, “home only” position from which his medical status did not disqualify him. He 18 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC: Soldier of Two Nations, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991, p. 181. 19 Interview with Major-General W.G. Stevens, June 1969, ATL 2000-094-5. 20 John Moremon, “The Professional Soldier Left High and Dry: Military Pensions of the Australian Staff Corps and its Antecedents, 1903-1948”, War and Society, 26:2, October 2007, p. 44. 15 quickly became dissatisfied with it,21 and in early September 1939 Freyberg wrote to William Jordan, New Zealand’s High Commissioner in London, offering his services to the New Zealand Government. 22 Although born in Britain, Freyberg spent his formative years in New Zealand, and his mother and brothers lived in Wellington. Freyberg could claim a connection with New Zealand. This chapter examines the reasons Freyberg wanted to command 2NZEF and why the New Zealand Government appointed him. The reasons Deputy Prime Minister Peter Fraser supported New Zealand’s participation in the war are discussed to expose his concerns and intentions regarding 2NZEF. Freyberg’s 385-word charter is shown to be an inadequate document. The contention that Freyberg wrote his own charter and that the Government changed nothing in his draft is shown to be erroneous. Freyberg’s draft gave him the right to direct communication with the Government on any matter. That right was restricted to three topics in the approved version of his charter. A clause prohibiting the piecemeal use of 2NZEF was removed. The Attorney-General is identified as the author of the approved charter, not Freyberg. The changes to and omissions from Freyberg’s charter complicated coalition relations in the Middle East and probably contributed to his silence regarding his misgivings about Greece in 1941. In addition to these documentary 21 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, pp. 196-7. 22 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 197; and NZ High Commissioner to Prime Minister New Zealand 16 September 1939, Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939 - 45, Vol. I, Wellington: War History Branch, 1949, #27, p. 23. 16 shortcomings, Freyberg was sent off to the Middle East insufficiently briefed on Fraser’s and the Government’s expectations of both him and the use of the force. New Zealand’s civil-military relationship is, therefore, found to have been poorly established. Freyberg’s offer of his services was probably received in Wellington with interest. Freyberg was a high-profile figure and the Government was searching for a GOC. Even though many Labour members of parliament had been pacifists in World War I, the Labour Government, which was elected in 1935 and recognised that a major conflict was likely, increased defence spending. The lion’s share went to the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) and the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy.23 The Army, the service many Labour politicians feared might be used against them, remained the poor relation.24 In 1938 four Territorial Army (reserve) colonels went public with their concerns about the Army’s state of neglect.25 In 1939 the Army had a permanent strength of just 556 officers and men, augmented by 10,364 Territorials.26 The Army’s officers were ageing, its equipment was out of date and training 23 Gerald Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield: New Zealand and its Allies 1939 - 45, Auckland: Viking Penguin, 2009, p. 30. The Royal New Zealand Navy was not formed until 1941. 24 F. L. W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs, Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1958, 1971, p. 23 and p. 63. The New Zealand Army was not officially instituted until 1950. “Army” is universally used in histories of the Second World War—and here. 25 Laurie Barber, “The History of New Zealand’s Army: From the Veldt to Italy”, seven radio talks of March-April 1984, p.7 of 10 April broadcast transcript, NAM. 26 Fort Dorset Conference papers, 1980, ATL MS-Papers-9030-35. Other sources give slightly different numbers for permanent staff in 1939 but all find it to be under or around 600. 17 levels were basic.27 Major-General John Duigan, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), was thought unfit for the role of GOC and there was no suitable candidate identified in New Zealand.28 A month after Freyberg wrote to Jordan, a routine medical inspection reclassified Freyberg as “forward everywhere”. The change made him eligible for active service. Freyberg promptly sent a copy of his new medical status and a request for a “training and fighting job in France” to General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).29 That Freyberg’s September offer to New Zealand preceded his October medical clearance raises a question about why Freyberg chose to volunteer his services to New Zealand. If he did so when in despair at being denied an active role in the British Army, the offer could be seen as an expediency, a fit of pique even, and in no way flattering to New Zealand. But in the first week of November, three weeks after his eligibility for a British fighting command had been restored, Freyberg accepted an invitation to meet with Fraser, who was in London for meetings, representing Prime Minister Michael Savage, who was terminally ill. Fraser and Freyberg, along with Carl Berendsen (head of the Prime Minister’s Department) and 27 Ian McGibbon, “New Zealand’s Strategical Approach” in John Crawford (ed.), Kia Kaha: New Zealand in the Second World War, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 200, p. 11; Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 51; and Freyberg to Dewing, 8 January 1940, in Miscellaneous Personal Private Correspondence, ANZ R16 700 607. 28 Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 64. 29 Letter from “Other Freyberg papers” quoted in Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 198. 18 Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. “Bill” Stevens (Fraser’s military advisor), met for dinner at the Savoy Hotel. Fraser is unlikely to have cut much of a dash in the opulent Savoy. His trousers were often so crumpled that they looked as if he had slept in them.30 Seldom smiling and in constant discomfort from haemorrhoids, Fraser had such poor eyesight that the only way he could read a document was to hold it in his enormous hands a few inches from the tip of his bespectacled nose.31 Whatever his outward appearances, Fraser was a pivotal and respected figure in the Labour Party. He served as the Minister of Education, Health and Police and was one of the principal architects of Labour’s cradle-to-grave welfare system.32 In 1939 Fraser was the de facto Prime Minister.33 (After Savage died in March 1940, Fraser became Prime Minister.) Born in the village of Fearn, Scotland, Fraser’s upbringing could be described as frugal, Spartan and Presbyterian.34 Fraser remained true to his roots and throughout his life was humourless, abstemious and prudish.35 He received the free elementary schooling that was available in Scotland and as much secondary education as the family’s limited means allowed. Fraser trained as a carpenter 30 Michael Bassett with Michael King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser, Auckland: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 75. 31 Interview with Sir Carl Berendsen, Wellington, 8 January 1971, ATL 2012-028- 150; Interview with Doris McIntosh, ATL 2000-094-2; and Alister McIntosh, “Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime”, New Zealand Journal of History, 10:1, 1976, 3 - 20. 32 James Thorn, Peter Fraser: New Zealand’s Wartime Prime Minister, London: Odhams Press Ltd, 1952, p. 124. 33 Thorn, Fraser, p. 162. 34 Ibid, p. 14. 35 McIntosh’s “Working with Fraser” is probably the best single description of Fraser’s wartime manner and conduct. 19 and for a few years worked in London, where he became a socialist.36 In late 1910 he emigrated to New Zealand and promptly became involved in trade-union and socialist-party activities.37 Fraser was a firebrand. “I am a revolutionary Socialist. I am an Industrial Unionist. Socialism is my goal” he announced in 1912.38 As left- wing political factions overcame their differences, moderated and coalesced into the New Zealand Labour Party (1916), Fraser mitigated his radicalism and sought to achieve his political objectives through parliamentary processes rather than revolutionary upheaval.39 On one point, however, Fraser remained an incendiary. He held that the conduct of conscription in the First World War was iniquitous. Fraser was neither a pacifist nor an antimilitarist and volunteered for military service in both wars.40 His objection to conscription in the First World War was specific. It offended Fraser’s socialist principles that men were being compelled to risk their lives fighting while capital and commerce were unaffected or making money from the conflict.41 As he saw it, the working class was being unfairly burdened. Fraser spent 1917 in gaol after making 36 Thorn, Fraser, p. 14. 37 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 39-43. 38 Quoted in Thorn, Fraser, p. 40. [Original capitals.] 39 Thorn, Fraser, p. 49. 40 David Grant, “Anti-Conscription, Conscription and the Referendum” in Margaret Clark (ed.), Peter Fraser: Master Politician, Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1998, p. 132; Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 120; and “King’s Fraser Notes”, ATL 2000-094-2. 41 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 69. 20 comments critical of conscription. 42 Politically unaffected by his internment, fewer than twelve months after his release Fraser was elected to the House of Representatives.43 Fraser was one of the triumvirate that effectively ran the Labour Government in the pre-war years. Finance Minister Walter Nash and, until he became ill, Prime Minister Savage were the other two. 44 Fraser was respected by senior public servants for his dedication, integrity and political acumen. These same mandarins also reviled Fraser for being chronically unpunctual, inconsiderate to staff, an incompetent chairman, and disorganised.45 In 1937 Fraser instituted the Council of Defence and its associated body, the Organisation for National Security.46 These linked entities, and the effort Fraser expended on them, prepared the country for the coming conflict and have been credited with making New Zealand’s transition to a war footing in 1939 smooth and orderly.47 One of Fraser’s duties in London was to identify a suitable GOC for 2NZEF. Freyberg met with Fraser when Freyberg knew he was eligible for a command in the British Army. It has been contended that Freyberg wanted to “serve with his compatriots”, 48 but New Zealanders were not Freyberg’s compatriots. Freyberg’s family had 42 Thorn, Fraser, pp. 46-47. 43 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 84. 44 Interview with Sir Carl Berendsen, 8 January 1971, ATL 2012-028-150. 45 Ibid; and McIntosh, “Working with Fraser”, 3-20. 46 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 168. 47 McIntosh, “Working with Fraser”, 10; and Carl Berendsen, quoted in Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 170. 48 Wood, Political and External, p. 100; and W. G. McClymont, To Greece, Wellington: War History Branch, 1959, p. 11. 21 migrated to New Zealand when he was two years old and he left when he was 24. In the 25 years between leaving New Zealand and the outbreak of the Second World War, Freyberg visited only once: a British Army-funded convalescent trip in 1921.49 He undoubtedly retained some affection for New Zealand but Freyberg was born in Britain, was married to a Briton, and had a career in the British Army. During the Second World War (and afterwards, when Governor-General of New Zealand) Freyberg sometimes claimed to be a New Zealander.50 There were valid public relations reasons for his doing so, but Freyberg was not a New Zealander and was not a member of the New Zealand Army. He remained on the British Army list and payroll, on secondment to the New Zealand Government during the war.51 While it is true that during Freyberg’s 22 years in New Zealand he represented New Zealand in swimming and went on sailing expeditions with his brothers, the idyll that is sometimes manufactured from these recreations was made by those unaware of the domestic realities of Freyberg’s upbringing. In a private letter Freyberg’s son and biographer, Paul, stated that Freyberg’s father, James, was a “Victorian martinet” and: a very nasty bit of work—a man of violence who used to beat up his wife, until his sons were old enough and big enough to 49 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 148-149. 50 Robert Halsey, “The Greek Campaign: Freyberg’s Circus Enters a Balkan Imbroglio”, MPhil thesis, Massey University, 2005, p. 11. 51 Correspondence, ANZ R16 700 677. 22 stop him. His mismanagement of his life and his finances made him and his family badly off, and his poverty made him mean and vindictive.52 Paul Freyberg chose not to include mention of James Freyberg’s wife-bashing in his 1991 biography of his father, but did include a description of the insensitive and penny-pinching way in which, in December 1904, James Freyberg plucked his 15-year-old son out of school before the end of the year and, as James had done with his other sons, forced him into a career that he (James) had selected. Freyberg was apprenticed to a dentist, the training method then in use. It was a financial expediency on James’s part. After the New Year, the apprenticeship would have cost James more.53 Although Freyberg acceded to his father’s wishes, he loathed being a dentist.54 Domestic violence blighted Freyberg’s youth and adolescence. He spent the first half of his twenties living and working in provincial New Zealand towns—not the most stimulating environments for a young man with ambition—disinterestedly “peering into yawning mouths” and filling his leisure hours with sporting and Territorial Army activities.55 Accounts of Freyberg’s early-adult life paint a picture of a restless young man who longed for adventure but, stuck 52 Paul Freyberg to Brigadier Fuller, 19 November 1988, ATL MS-Papers-1619- 145. 53 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC: Soldier of Two Nations, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991, pp. 19-20. 54 Paul Freyberg to Brigadier Fuller, 19 November 1988, ATL MS-Papers-1619- 145. 55 Matthew Wright, Freyberg’s War: The Man, the Legend and Reality, Auckland: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 16. 23 in a career he disliked, was fretting that life was passing him by.56 Sensing Freyberg’s frustration, an older friend who had travelled abroad advised Freyberg to leave New Zealand: He was so obviously chafing at the limitations of his job and of the small town environment, that I strongly urged him to do as I had done—to cut adrift and find his feet in a wider world. He did not take much urging.57 Freyberg left New Zealand in March 1914. In his youth he had witnessed, and later had to physically intervene to mitigate, the physical violence his father inflicted on his mother. Freyberg’s father forced him into a career that Freyberg hated and, even after he left the family home, he found life less than satisfying. It would be going too far to say that Freyberg regarded New Zealand with animosity, but any affection Freyberg felt for New Zealand was surely mitigated by the unhappiness he experienced there. Freyberg’s desire to lead 2NZEF was not from fondness for New Zealand. The most likely reason for Freyberg accepting Fraser’s invitation is found in his unfinished, unpublished autobiography. Recounting training exercises with the second echelon of 2NZEF in Britain in September 1940, Freyberg remarked: I have always wanted to train an Army for war but it seldom falls to your lot in the regular army to have an entirely free hand in what you do. Either there is not any money in the 56 Singleton Gates, Freyberg, pp. 20-25; and Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 24. 57 J.O.C. Neill, quoted in Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 25. 24 training grant or the Commander in Chief wants quite naturally, a plan of his own carried out. Anyway this was the first time in my twenty-six years service in which I have been responsible to nobody except my own Minister for the training and efficiency of a Force.58 Freyberg’s desire for military self-determination is entirely in keeping with the narrative of his adult life. From the moment he left New Zealand in 1914, Freyberg set about remaking himself. He secured a commission in the Royal Naval Division (a Royal Navy infantry formation) and helped by the connections he made there— the turning point of his life, according to his son—made the most of the opportunities that came his way.59 By the end of the First World War Freyberg had succeeded. He held the Victoria Cross and had been awarded the Distinguished Service Order and two bars. He was the youngest general in the British Army, a friend of politicians and nobles, was well-placed financially, and had met Barbara McLaren (née Jekyll), who became his wife in 1922.60 Through his own efforts, Freyberg had made it. The only discordant note in Freyberg’s life in 1939 was his medical status. Had Freyberg not had the heart condition that prevented him from taking up the posting in India, Freyberg would have been well placed for a role at the pinnacle of the British Army. In 1935, when the heart murmur was detected, Freyberg was senior to Gort, 58 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS-Papers-9030-36, p. 69. [Errors as in source.] 59 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 37. 60 Ibid, p. 102 and p. 145; and Singleton Gates, Freyberg, p. 62 and p. 85. 25 Auchinleck, Alan Brooke, Alexander, O’Connor and Wilson, and his “fighting record and his ability to get on with Churchill … would probably have ensured that he was considered for the top appointments.”61 In 1939, however, Freyberg apparently felt that he had missed out, and would never achieve in the British Army the level of control and autonomy he sought. For the self-made man to have an “entirely free hand”, Freyberg would need to look beyond the United Kingdom. The New Zealand Army was the non-British service with which he could claim some connection. Independence of command was also a concern for the New Zealand Government. The Labour Government was not entirely comfortable with needing to appoint a non-New Zealander as GOC 2NZEF. There was a concern that in the First World War, when New Zealand had handed over complete control of its force to Imperial command, New Zealand troops had, Bassett and King reported, “been sacrificed at the whim of decision-makers from northern-hemisphere countries”.62 In 1939 the Government wanted to ensure that they, not the theatre commander-in-chief or the British War Office, would decide how and where 2NZEF was used. Freyberg’s desire for independence and to report only to a Minister fitted with New Zealand Government objectives. 61 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 188. 62 Christopher Pugsley, “New Zealand: ‘From the Uttermost Ends of the Earth’ ” in Dr Peter Liddle, Dr John Bourne, Dr Ian Whitehead (eds.), The Great World War 1914 - 45, Vol. II, The Peoples’ Experience, London: Harper Collins, 2000, p. 218; and Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song,, p. 177. 26 Fraser was also concerned to find a GOC who would not squander the lives of New Zealanders and, he reported: was at once struck not only by his [Freyberg’s] personality and by his obvious experience, but particularly by the supreme importance which he clearly attached to the proper treatment of the troops … to ensure their welfare and their safety.63 Fraser’s concern for the care and welfare of the men of 2NZEF is central to the relationships discussed in this thesis. The high casualty rates of the First World War, to some extent magnified in Fraser’s mind by his suspicions over the purpose of the conflict, offended Fraser.64 2NZEF eventually constituted over half of New Zealand’s able-bodied male workforce, and most of them were from Labour-voting households. It was not in the political interests of the Labour Party or the New Zealand economy to neglect the welfare of New Zealand troops.65 The care of others, whether soldiers, workers or the needy, was also fundamental to Fraser’s system of beliefs. A soft touch for anyone in need, Fraser gave away most of his money and died leaving a very modest estate.66 For ethical, political and personal reasons, Fraser was determined that while New Zealand would do its bit in the war, it would not allow its troops to be used recklessly. 63 Fraser, Report on Visit to England, Documents I, # 29, pp. 29 - 30. 64 Thorn, Fraser, p. 44. 65 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 177. 66 Interview with Alister McIntosh, 21 March 1978, ATL 2000-094-2. 27 In the days after the dinner, Fraser sought opinions on Freyberg from British military and political leaders. 67 Winston Churchill, again First Lord of the Admiralty, championed his friend Freyberg with Fraser.68 General Ironside also endorsed Freyberg and his approval may have sealed the matter for Fraser.69 Ironside also set the New Zealand Government a deadline by explaining that while the Army list was open to Fraser, Freyberg would be given a division the following week if New Zealand did not take him.70 Fraser wired his recommendation to Wellington, the Cabinet approved and Freyberg was invited back to the Savoy and offered the command. 71 Stevens recorded that on leaving Fraser’s room Freyberg “took me by the shoulders and well-nigh danced me round in his delight”.72 One of the first tasks Freyberg accepted was to develop a charter that would describe how 2NZEF was to be commanded and how 2NZEF would operate with coalition forces. Providing a charter to a force commander who will fight under the command of an allied commander-in-chief has been common since at least the American War of Independence. In the First World War charters were used by the United States and Britain when formations fought under allied 67 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 210. 68 Singleton-Gates, Freyberg, p. 102. 69 Hugh Templeton (ed.), Mr Ambassador: Memoirs of Sir Carl Berendsen, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009, p. 132. 70 Interview with Major-General W.G. Stevens, June 1969, ATL 2000-094-5. 71 Nash to Fraser, Documents I, # 33p. 27. 72 Major-General W.G. Stevens, Freyberg, VC: The Man 1939 - 1945, Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1965, p. 17. 28 superiors.73 A charter serves two purposes: it defines the rights and responsibilities of the commander in relation to his government; and it describes the coalition warfare arrangements that will exist between the commander and the allied military superior. All the Dominions qualified how their troops could be used in the Second World War. Canada, Australia and New Zealand did so through charters, and South Africa placed restrictions on how and where its forces could operate.74 In London in November 1939, Freyberg claimed that there was no template charter available from the War Office to guide him.75 Freyberg’s assertion is curious given the British use of charters and that Freyberg was sufficiently familiar with the War Office to know where to look and whom to ask. Irritated at having to “start from bedrock”, as he put it, Freyberg went to see Major-General Richard Dewing, the Director of Military Operations.76 In the First World War Dewing had served in the Middle East, a theatre where British commanders were often given charters, and had attended the Camberley Staff College with Freyberg in 1919.77 Freyberg recalled that Dewing warned him: 73 McClymont, To Greece, pp. 18-19. 74 W.E. Murphy, “Blamey’s and Freyberg’s ‘Charters’: A Study in Civil-Military and Commonwealth Relations”, Political Science, 16:2, 1964, 31 and 41 - 45. 75 Lord Freyberg, House of Lords 17 March 1952, hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1954/mar/17/the-statement-on-defence, accessed 17 May 2014. 76 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS-Papers-9030-36, p. 13. 77 John McLeod, Myth & Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II, Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986, p. 172; and biography in Dewing’s records at kingscollections.org/ catalogues/lhcma/collection/d/de80-001, accessed 21 September 2014. 29 You are in for a very difficult time. The history of the integration of these forces has not been a happy one. You will have friction. You will have hard words. What is more, I must warn you that you should reserve for yourself certain powers, and your Government should also reserve certain powers for themselves. You should decide the channels of communication between yourself and the New Zealand Government.78 Freyberg and Dewing together constructed a draft charter. Unfortunately no copy of that draft is known to exist but Freyberg later recollected it as: The New Zealand Government should at all times have access to my opinion direct. The administration, discipline, promotion and pay of officers and men should be completely under the NZ Govt. The NZ Forces should not be committed to any active operations until they were adequately equipped. And finally, that the New Zealand Expeditionary Force should be employed as a complete formation and should not be split up and used piecemeal.79 In the charter the Government approved on 5 January 1940, there were some changes: Freyberg’s direct access to the Government was limited to training, administration and policy matters only; and the necessity to equip the force before deployment and the prohibition on piecemeal use were both omitted. (See approved charter at end of chapter.) These changes were important. Australia’s Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell wrote in his memoirs that the unauthorised dismembering of formations was “the most critical problem facing a force operating in an overseas theatre of 78 Lord Freyberg, House of Lords 17 March 1952. 79 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS-Papers-9030-36, pp. 13-14. 30 war under the command of a superior Allied commander”.80 In 1940- 41 Freyberg would have sometimes momentous rows with Middle East Command about consolidating the New Zealand Division and, in 1941-42, about maintaining the Division’s integrity. Restricting Freyberg’s direct access to the Government was also an ill-considered amendment that, as later discussion shows, contributed to coalition partner difficulties in 1941.81 In November 1939 Freyberg also sought advice on his charter from Lord Birdwood, who had commanded the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) at Gallipoli in 1915, and General Sir Alexander Godley, the Anglo-Irish GOC of 1NZEF in the First World War. Both men recommended that Freyberg meet with General Sir Cyril Brudenell White, who, they maintained, was an authority on charters. White had been Chief of Staff to Major-General William Bridges in 1st Australian Imperial Force in 1914.82 Freyberg would see White, who lived in Melbourne, while on his way to New Zealand later in the year. On 4 December 1939 Freyberg began the first stage of his journey to New Zealand by flying to Cairo to select sites for and to arrange the construction of 2NZEF’s bases. In Egypt he linked up with Fraser’s group from London and an Australian Government party headed by Richard Casey, the Minister for Supply. They all 80 S.F. Rowell, Full Circle, Clayton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1974, pp. 48- 49. 81 These matters are discussed in later chapters. 82 Lord Freyberg, House of Lords 17 March 1952. 31 shared the multi-leg flying-boat journey to Sydney, Australia.83 It has frequently been stated that Freyberg wrote his charter during the flights from Cairo to Australia, but Freyberg maintained that he had written the first draft in London with Dewing.84 Freyberg had intended to see only White in Melbourne. But when Casey recommended that Freyberg also speak with Lieutenant-General E. K. Squires, Australia’s CGS, and Lieutenant-General Thomas Blamey, the recently appointed GOC 2AIF (2nd Australian Imperial Force), Freyberg arranged meetings with both men.85 It is likely that Squires and Blamey told Freyberg of some of their experiences in the First World War, probably including the advantages of Dominion forces fighting as integrated formations and a warning that British officers tended to regard Dominion formations as colonial units they could use however they saw fit.86 Freyberg and White met at the Menzies Hotel in Melbourne on the evening of 20 December 1939.87 White was the first Australian Military Force officer to attend the Camberley Staff College, and had served in the First World War.88 In 1914 White and General Bridges had urged the Australian Government to make it clear to Britain 83 Wright, Freyberg’s War, p. 32. 84 Interview with General W.G. Stevens, June 1969, ATL 2000-094-5; Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 68; and Wright, Freyberg’s War, p. 32. 85 Freyberg to Dewing, 8 January 1940, ANZ R 16 700 607. 86 David Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939 - 1945, Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, 1982, p. 43. 87 Brudenell White diary 1939, Papers of Sir Brudenell White, Folder 17, Box 17, NLA 1096442. 88 Jeffrey Grey, “White, Sir Cyril Brudenell (1876-1940)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, adb.anu.edu.au/biography/white-sir-cyril-brudenell-1032/text15983, accessed 22 September 2014 32 that Australia would not contribute forces to backfill British units. Rather, it would provide a national army that would serve as a discrete unit under an Australian-appointed commander who would have the right of direct communication with the Australian Government.89 Freyberg asked White to review the charter he had drafted with Dewing and recalled that White thought the draft not strong enough and re-wrote it.90 Given White’s First World War experiences and that White had, just a week earlier, also advised on Blamey’s charter (which had a force-integrity clause), it is almost inconceivable that White deleted the piecemeal use ban.91 Adding further weight to the likelihood that White retained the clause is his post-meeting letter to Freyberg advising that Freyberg’s charter should include “the avoidance, as far as the exigencies of the service allow, of splitting up formations and units”.92 Freyberg arrived in Wellington on Christmas morning 1939 with a draft of his charter “in his back pocket.”93 The preceding discussion has established that that draft almost certainly contained a clause prohibiting the piecemeal use of 2NZEF. Dewing and White had both recommended it. No such clause appeared in the approved 89 John Bentley, “Champion of Anzac: General Sir Brudenell White, the First Australian Imperial Force and the Emergence of the Australian Military Culture 1914-18”, PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003, p. 147 and p. 170. 90 Lord Freyberg, House of Lords 8 November 1955, hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1954/mar/17/the-statement-on-defence, accessed 17 May 2014. 91 David Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998, p. 135. 92 Brudenell White to Freyberg, 21 December 1939, quoted in Bentley, “Champion of Anzac”, p. 327. 93 Alister McIntosh, interview, 20 March 1978, ATL 2000-094-2. 33 charter. Few historians have noticed the omission. Only Murphy recognised that Freyberg’s charter lacked a reference to piecemeal use.94 A requirement that 2NZEF not be broken up and used piecemeal would have been in sympathy with Government wishes. By 1939 “the Dominion had come of age”95 and the disappearance of 2NZEF personnel “into the general mass of British troops would be an offence to New Zealand’s sense of nationhood”.96 There was, therefore, no reason for the Government to reject a piecemeal use prohibition. There is no record of any objection to clauses in Freyberg’s draft. The only change that has been identified previously was Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens’ addition of the last sentence limiting the rank of new officers.97 The 12 days Freyberg spent in New Zealand (25 December-6 January) were crowded with visits to camps, public occasions, interviews, meetings, and getting the charter approved. Had the sailing date for the first echelon not been brought forward by a need to join a convoy of ships carrying Australian troops, Freyberg would have had a month or more in New Zealand.98 In the rush that eventuated, errors and oversights were to be expected, especially so considering that the Government was not well-suited to making 94 Murphy, “Charters”, 11. 95 McClymont, To Greece, p. 18. 96 Wood, Political and External, p. 102. 97 Interview with Major-General W.G. Stevens, June 1969, ATL 2000-094-5. 98 Savage to Fraser, 20 November 1939, #50, pp. 42-41 establishes that the first echelon’s training was not due to conclude until 20 January 1940; Fraser to Savage, 29 November 1939; #60, p. 49; and Fraser to Savage, 5 December 1939, #63, p. 52, Documents I, describe the circumstances that resulted in the 6 January 1940 departure date. 34 important military decisions. The Labour Government of 1939, Keith Sinclair found, “could scarcely be in worse shape to lead the nation in war”. No Cabinet member had military experience, and most public servants and Ministers were quite poorly educated and lacked executive management experience.99 The Minister of Defence, with whom Freyberg would have considerable dealings throughout the war, was Frederick Jones. Jones trained as a boot clicker (cutter of the uppers for shoes), became involved in trade union affairs and in 1916 joined the Labour party. He was popular because “he was just working class—one of us.” 100 As Minister of Defence, Jones was as an “absolute washout”.101 Often regarded as a nobody, Carl Berendsen, Fraser’s head of department, noted that Jones “disliked anything military and this did hamper him in his work as Minister of Defence … But he was a good man and a likeable fellow.”102 Freyberg’s opinion was that Jones: is a quiet sensible man with whom I was on cordial terms. He has no reputation, however, in New Zealand, and he is popularly supposed to be nothing more than a cypher, an opinion in which I do not concur. My opinion, however, may be 99 Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976, p. 190 and p. 154. 100 Unattributed quotation cited in Erik Olssen, “Jones, Frederick”, from The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara - the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, updated 29-Oct-2013, te.ara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4j8/jones-frederick, accessed 25 July 2014. 101 Alister McIntosh interview, 6 April 1978, ATL 2000-094-2. 102 Carl Berendsen interview, January 1970, ATL 2000-094-5 35 influenced by the fact that so far I have managed to get everything I wanted from Mr Jones.103 Jones’s intellectual and managerial shortcomings were compensated to a significant degree by the concentration of power in the hands of just two men. Peter Fraser (the de facto, and shortly to become actual, Prime Minister) and Walter Nash (the Minister of Finance, soon to be Deputy Prime Minister) made all major decisions.104 Jones took care of day-to-day matters only.105 Alister McIntosh stated that “the real Minister of Defence was Peter Fraser”.106 It is known that Freyberg discussed the draft of his charter with Jones, Duigan (CGS), Stevens, and Henry “Rex” Mason, the Attorney-General. 107 Stevens said that Freyberg’s charter was “almost entirely Freyberg’s own work” and that the Government “did not alter a word” of Freyberg’s draft. 108 On another occasion, however, Stevens recorded that Freyberg’s charter was approved “with slight alterations.”109 Gerald Hensley found that Freyberg reviewed his charter with Fred Jones, had it “looked over” by the Attorney-General, and that the charter was approved “without any 103 Freyberg to Major-General Dewing, 8 January 1940, Miscellaneous Private Correspondence, ANZ R16 700 607. 104 Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 153. 105 Arnold Nordmeyer interview, 14 August 1978, ATL 2000-094-2. 106 Alister McIntosh interview, 12 August 1978, ATL MS-Papers-0212-31. 107 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS-Papers-9030-36, p. 30 and p. 31A; and Stevens, Freyberg, p. 19. 108 Interview with Major-General W.G. Stevens, June 1969, ATL 2000-094-5. 109 Major-General W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2NZEF, Wellington: War History Branch, 1958, p. 93. 36 change.”110 Paul Freyberg told a similar story.111 Stevens, Hensley and Paul Freyberg did not recognise that a prohibition on piecemeal use was absent from the approved charter or that Freyberg’s right to direct communication with Wellington had been restricted to just three topics. In his last days in Wellington in January 1940, Freyberg appointed as his personal assistant (PA) a young lawyer, John White, who had been a judge’s associate in the Supreme Court in Wellington.112 In the mid 1980s White stated that the first task Freyberg gave him to do was: to look at some documents which he [Freyberg] said he had received from the Government setting out his powers and … he commented that they had been drawn up by the Solicitor- General, a lawyer, and he would be glad if I would look through them and make a summary of them for him… I duly read the legal powers as set out in the documents, which of course are now able to be read, and put them in short form.113 White’s comments raise the existence of a previously unknown version of Freyberg’s charter that casts doubt on the historical orthodoxies that Freyberg wrote the approved version of his charter himself and that the Government changed nothing in his draft. His remarks also imply that hitherto unknown rewriting processes took place, potentially providing the circumstances for the loss of a clause 110 Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, pp. 68-9. 111 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 209. 112 Lieutenant-Commander Chris Griggs, RNZN, “The Honourable Sir John White, MBE [sic], QC”, New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review, October 2001, 25. 113 Interview with Sir John White, David Filer, “Interviews for the ‘Freyberg, VC’ Television Series” (MS), n.d., NZ Defence Force Library, pp. 2-3. 37 relating to piecemeal use and to a limit on Freyberg’s right to direct communication with the Government. As Freyberg remembered it, the draft he developed with Dewing gave him unfettered, direct access to the Government.114 The approved charter limits that right to only training and administration matters, and “details leading up to and arising from policy decisions”.115 The reason for the change has never been explained, but the restriction may have contributed to Freyberg’s decision to keep his reservations about Greece from the Government in 1941.116 It is unlikely that White was asked to précis and simplify the approved version of Freyberg’s charter, the text of which is neither long nor abstruse. The only Cabinet member with legal skills who is known to have reviewed the draft charter was Attorney-General Rex Mason.117 Mason was very intelligent. The dux of his school, he received an honours MA in Mathematics before completing his LLB, and served as President of the Labour Party. 118 Freyberg’s recollection of his meeting with Mason is confused: “[I] discussed with him the powers that I sought, and I asked him to examine them so that he would be able to put any questions to me later on.”119 Freyberg implied that Mason had no questions about the draft, but 114 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), pp. 13-14. 115 Clauses 1 and 2, see charter at end of chapter. 116 See chapter 4. 117 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, p. 210; Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 68; Wright, Freyberg’s War, p. 34; and Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS- Papers-9030-36, p. 31A. 118 Jonathan Hunt, Mason biography, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4m45/mason- henry-greathead-rex, accessed 30 September 2014. 119 Freyberg, “The World War” (MS), ATL MS-Papers-9030-36, p. 31A. 38 Mason nevertheless rewrote it. In a letter forwarding copies of his charter to Dewing, Freyberg advised that his draft differed: slightly from the documents [the charter and an accompanying letter outlining financial arrangements] which are the product of the New Zealand law offices. I put forward a very much shorter and clearer document which they have been pleased to put into legal form. I do not defend their form of words.120 Contrary to the assertions by Stevens, Hensley and Paul Freyberg that the approved charter was Freyberg’s own work and that the Government made no changes, Rex Mason rewrote Freyberg’s draft. That finding, though, has not quite resolved the authorship of the approved version, and does not explain how a piecemeal use prohibition was lost or why the GOC’s right to direct communication with the Government was limited. At Freyberg’s request, White shortened and simplified the charter document Freyberg had received from Mason. The approved charter is short and simple. The approved charter is, therefore, unlikely to be the “legally drafted” document Freyberg gave White. The approved charter might, however, be White’s condensed, simple- language rendering of the Attorney-General’s version. At no time, however, did White claim to have written Freyberg’s charter. David Filer, the interviewer to whom White spoke in the 1980s, said that he gained no impression that White was admitting that he had written the charter. Filer also made the sensible comment that 120 Freyberg to Dewing, 8 January 1940, ANZ R16 700 607. 39 White would have been reluctant to rewrite such an important document, and that in January 1940 White had no experience of the military or military law.121 What is certain is that the approved charter was not written by Freyberg. Mason (and, if he were involved, the same would apply to White) was a trained lawyer and aware of the need for accuracy and checking. He is unlikely to have accidentally lost or summarily deleted a clause. The inevitable conclusion, though, is that hitherto unacknowledged re-writing of Freyberg’s draft created the circumstances whereby changes were made. Freyberg was apparently unaware that the approved charter differed from his draft. While at sea on 8 January 1940 he wrote to his brother-in-law: The New Zealand Government, whom I liked, and who in spite of their red tendency showed me every consideration ... [gave] every help that was necessary. I have come back with the most complete powers, financial and military, which I shall use broadmindedly when the time arrives.122 In the 12 days between Christmas morning 1939 and 6 January 1940, Freyberg was in “perpetual motion”.123 Fraser had been out of the country for three months and was busy catching up. Savage was hospitalised and there had been strife in the Labour party.124 No time was found for Fraser and Freyberg to meet and discuss what each of them expected from their civil-military 121 Telephone conversation with David Filer, 26 August 2014. 122 Freyberg to McKenna, 8 January 1940, ANZ R16 700 677. 123 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 179. 124 Ibid, pp. 179-181. 40 relationship. Such a discussion was, however, needed. Freyberg had no experience of commanding a Dominion force or of being subordinate to an Allied commander-in-chief, and had very little knowledge of New Zealand’s expectations of the force or Labour Government thinking on its use. Fraser had developed some conception of how 2NZEF would be controlled and should be used, but did not share his thoughts with Freyberg. What Fraser did not discuss with Freyberg were the reasons for and limitations on New Zealand’s participation in the war. New Zealand backed Britain in 1939 because public sentiment demanded it and because of Imperial Defence commitments. Fraser supported the fight against Nazi Germany because fascism was undemocratic, anti-trade unions and anti-socialist.125 He saw victory in the war as an opportunity to institute a new and fairer world order with a “stronger form of collective security” than the League of Nations offered.126 Historian Ian Wards described Fraser’s attitude as being: the purpose of the war, the consequence of victory, was not to maintain the status quo—it was to make possible an advance in the social condition of people. Fraser implicitly held to this view in all he did throughout and immediately after the war.127 If New Zealand were going to have a say in shaping the postwar world order, it would have to make a military contribution 125 Thorn, Peter Fraser, pp. 162-163. 126 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 174, and p. 187. 127 Ian Wards, “Peter Fraser—Warrior Prime Minister”, in Margaret Clark (ed.), Peter Fraser: Master Politician, Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1998, p. 146. 41 to the conflict. The commander of New Zealand’s primary contribution to the conflict needed an appreciation of the Government’s justifications in order to align the military effort with the political intentions, but Fraser did not share his “implicitly held” rationale with Freyberg. Freyberg probably intuited the sentimental and Imperial justifications and New Zealand’s abhorrence of fascism. What Fraser most needed to explain to his GOC was that 2NZEF had not been formed to win battles so much as to win New Zealand a seat at the peace-conference table. New Zealand needed to be seen as doing its bit. In some ways Fraser saw to it that New Zealand did more than its share. He introduced conscription, and two-thirds of New Zealand men of qualifying age served in the forces.128 But with such a sizeable portion of the workforce in uniform, New Zealand could not risk its service personnel unnecessarily. It was not until mid 1941, in the conditions Fraser imposed on the use of 2NZEF, that Freyberg learnt that there were limitations on New Zealand’s participation the war. In addition to leaving the nature of New Zealand’s contribution to the war unexplained, Fraser did not describe the type of communications he expected from Freyberg. The “dour and solemn” Fraser lacked charm.129 He had little warmth and few friends, and never called Walter Nash, a colleague for over 20 years, anything but 128 Nan Taylor, “Human Rights in World War II in New Zealand”, New Zealand Journal of History, 23:2, 1989, 109. 129 Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 75. 42 “Mr Nash”. 130 It should, therefore, be no surprise that Fraser established little personal rapport with Freyberg. The lack of understanding in their relationship mattered. As the chairman of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force Bombing Committee contended, the political direction and high command of a war are “concerned so essentially with personalities and those antinomies of human nature … that all other considerations are secondary”.131 Fraser sent the commander of what would eventually constitute close to half New Zealand’s able-bodied male workforce off to fight on the other side of the world (where their only means of secure communication was enciphered telegrams) without describing how he expected his GOC to behave, what his priorities were, and without attempting to establish a degree of intimacy in their relationship—the sort of affinity that would enable a subordinate (Freyberg) to raise issues and doubts with a superior. As later discussion establishes, Fraser’s failure to institute rapport and to lay down operating procedures were serious oversights. Effective civil-military relationships, Horner and others have established, are built upon personal understanding. November 1939 until early January 1940 was the window available to Fraser and Freyberg to establish their relationship. Despite having compatible desires regarding an independent expeditionary force and mutual 130 Alister McIntosh interview, 16 March 1978, ATL 2000-094-2. 131 Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, quoted in Horner, High Command, p. xx. 43 agreement on the care and welfare of the troops, Freyberg and Fraser made little progress in deepening their understanding of each other. Freyberg, who knew next to nothing of the New Zealand Labour Government and who had no experience of commanding a Dominion force in coalition warfare, drafted his own charter. Freyberg’s draft was re-written and in the process important provisions that would have bearing on his conduct as GOC were omitted or changes. Other matters that could have been stipulated in the charter, such as whether Wellington or the theatre commander-in-chief had priority, were left unresolved. The reporting and advice that the Government expected from Freyberg was not explained to Freyberg in the limited opportunities for discussion that a crowded schedule in New Zealand allowed. The shortcomings of the approved charter, and the lack of explanation and discussion, meant that the civil-military relationship was only partly constructed. Although Fraser and Freyberg had travelled together and had met several times, little rapport was established. The relationship between Fraser and Freyberg remained formal and impersonal, and therefore ill-suited to the kind of information exchange Fraser tacitly expected and that Freyberg would have benefited from. The diversion of the second echelon to Britain meant that the consequences of an only partly established civil-military relationship 44 did not surface until nine months after Fraser and Freyberg parted company in January 1940. When things did come to a head, the use of 2NZEF, the priority of Wellington over the commander-in-chief, and communication with the Government—matters that were omitted from or restricted in Freyberg’s charter—were the issues involved. _________ The GOC’s Charter 5 January 1940 The General Officer for the time being commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force Overseas The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand. He will, in addition to powers appearing in any relevant Statute or Regulations, be vested with the following powers: In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions to the New Zealand Government, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of communication indicated in the following paragraphs and which for greater clearness are also indicated in an attached diagram. [Not included here or in source.] 45 1. To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government and the Army Department concerning any matter connected with the training and administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. 2. To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government or with the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, in respect of all details leading up to and arising from policy decisions. 3. In all matters pertaining to equipment, to communicate with the War Office through normal channels, and through the liaison officer of the High Commissioner’s office in London, the former to be the official channel. 4. In matters of command, to adhere to the normal military channels between the War Office and the General Officer Commanding 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas. 5. To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation and administration with which he has been vested. 6. To organise, change, vary or group units and formations in such a manner as he considers expedient from time to time. 7. To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as exigencies of service may in his opinion require from time to time. After the Third Echelon has left New Zealand no officer above the substantive rank of captain will be sent overseas without the concurrence of the General Officer Commanding. M. J. Savage Prime Minister ________________________________________________________________ Source: Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second Word War, Vol. I, Wellington: War History Branch, 1949, #39, pp. 31-32. (The text above is the charter as was approved on 5 November 1940 and excludes later amendments that were included in square brackets in Documents.) ______ 46 2. Coalition relations When Freyberg left New Zealand on 6 January 1940 he was confident that all the powers he needed were in his charter.132 Aboard ship he wrote to Fraser that he doubted he would need to use his charter “because I know the British Military Authorities will treat us with the greatest possible consideration.”133 Freyberg was wrong on both counts. His charter proved inadequate, and the manner in which he was treated by the British Army was not considerate but peremptory. There were two distinct phases in the coalition relationship in 1940-41: agreement in the first nine months of 1940; and from September 1940 onwards conflict over the return of detachments and about British treatment of Dominion commanders. The disharmony that surfaced was sparked by military issues but was fuelled by differences of opinion on Dominion rights. The importance of Dominion status has been insufficiently emphasised in New Zealand military historiography, but the one dedicated analysis of Middle East coalition relations identifies Dominion status as the base cause 132 Freyberg to McKenna, 8 January 1940, ANZ R16 700 677. 133 Freyberg, quoted in McLeod, Myth & Reality, p. 173. 47 of the rancour.134 In seeking to establish the type of coalition relations the Government wanted, Freyberg wound up fighting a political battle to have Dominion rights recognised. For the first nine months of 1940 Freyberg had only one brigade (the first echelon) in the Middle East, plus portions of non- divisional 2NZEF units (medical, railway, entertainment, education, etc.). The second echelon, which had been expected to arrive in Egypt in late May, was diverted to Britain. Freyberg was therefore unable to form a division and, with Middle East Command facing serious troop shortages and gravely outnumbered by Italian forces, Freyberg agreed to lend units to other formations. The Signals Corps was sent to the Western Desert, machine gun battalions and ambulance units joined other forces, some personnel served in the Long Range Desert Patrol, and troops unloaded ships, dug anti-tank ditches and were given security duties.135 The Government agreed to these detachments.136 In the same period, Blamey, Australia’s GOC 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2AIF), was having difficulties with Middle East Command about maintaining the integrity of his forces.137 Just two weeks after his arrival in the Middle East, Blamey received notice to 134 Lance McMillan, “The British Middle East Force, 1939-1942: Multi-Front Warfare with Coalition Forces”, Naval War College, RI, 1994. 135 Christopher Pugsley, A Bloody Road Home: World War Two and New Zealand’s Heroic Second Division, Auckland: Penguin, 2014, p. 53. 136 See, for example, Freyberg to Jones, 14 June 1940, and Jones to Freyberg, 18 June 1940, Documents I, #s 240 and 241, pp. 183-184. 137 David Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998, p. 144. 48 detach an infantry brigade and a cavalry regiment from 2AIF. Blamey objected but “sheer strategic necessity” meant he shortly afterwards acquiesced.138 It frustrated 2AIF’s senior officers that when units were detached, the British Army became uncommunicative about them. Eventually a staff officer had to be sent with each detachment, and direct radio contact with that officer put in place, in order that Blamey and the Australian Government might be kept informed. 139 Unlike Freyberg, Blamey had experienced British Army treatment of Dominion commanders in the First World War and knew to expect differences of opinion with the British.140 Blamey frequently complained about his exclusion from the “club of British generals” in the Middle East that, he believed, sought to limit the influence of Dominion commanders. 141 Fortunately, Blamey’s charter contained a clause that forbade the piecemeal use of 2AIF and that probably gave him confidence.142 He certainly knew how to use such documents to effect. When Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police (1925-1936), Blamey “knew his statutory powers to the last comma, and more than once a state ministry … capitulated when he sailed into the attack with a copy of 138 Norman D. Carlyon, I Remember Blamey, South Melbourne, Vic: Sun Books, 1980, 1981, pp. 12-13. 139 S.F. Rowell, Full Circle, Clayton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1974, p. 56. 140 Horner, Blamey, p. 135; and Gavin Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, Sydney, NSW: William Collins, 1953 1986, p. 21. 141 Carlyon, Blamey, p. ix. 142 Clause (a) of Blamey’s charter states “No part of the Force to be detached or employed apart from the Force without his [2AIF’s commander’s] consent.” Quoted in Horner, High Command, p. 45. 49 the Police Regulations in his hand.”143 Blamey’s experience, his assertive nature and his charter contributed to his tendency to refuse detachment requests, but the principal reason he declined them was that he had consolidated formations (whole divisions) and did not want to break them up. The New Zealand Division was not formed until February 1941.144 For most of 1940 Freyberg had no division and therefore few reasons to decline detachment requests. 2NZEF was quite different to New Zealand’s air and naval contributions to the war. There was no Royal New Zealand Navy until September 1941. Prior to that time, New Zealand’s two cruisers, Achilles and Leander, formed the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. The ships were crewed by New Zealanders, the officers were supplied by the Royal Navy, and Wellington had little say in how or where the naval division was used—though it did request that one warship be kept in or close to New Zealand waters. The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) was established in 1937 and, on the outbreak of war, the bombers New Zealand was about to receive from Britain, along with the crews to operate them, were handed over to the Royal Air Force (RAF). Additionally, over 7,000 New Zealand air crew were to pass through the Empire Air Training Scheme. Some of these served in the seven New Zealand squadrons 143 John Hetherington, Thomas Blamey, Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 15. 144 Freyberg to Jones, 23 February 1941, Documents I, #274, pp. 207-207. 50 of the RAF, the bulk were dispersed through RAF units.145 Like the sailors in the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, RNZAF personnel served under British commanders and the Government did not determine their use—though it did take steps to ensure that the welfare and care of the men met New Zealand standards.146 Not only was 2NZEF unlike New Zealand’s naval and air contributions in being an independent force under New Zealand command, it was also the first time that a New Zealand military force would remain under the control of the New Zealand Government.147 In the First World War, New Zealand passed control of its army to the British.148 Wellington had informed Whitehall of the terms of Freyberg’s charter, but the charter’s terms were apparently not communicated to British Army commanders. Even if senior British commanders had been informed of Freyberg’s charter, the opening paragraph’s statement that the GOC is subordinate to the commander-in-chief “subject only to the requirements of His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand” fails to make Wellington’s primacy plain. There were, therefore, reasons for senior British officers to expect that, like New Zealand’s air and naval contributions, in keeping with past practice, and in the absence of 145 Ian McGibbon (ed.), The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 8-9, pp. 459-461 and pp. 465-466. 146 Andrew Stewart, “At War with Bill Jordan: The New Zealand High Commission in Wartime London”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40:1, March 2012, 77. 147 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 177. 148 Christopher Pugsley, “New Zealand: ‘From the Uttermost Ends of the Earth’”, in Dr Peter Liddle, Dr John Bourne and Dr Ian Whitehead, The Great War 1914- 45, Vol 2: The People’s Experience, London: HarperCollins, 2001, p. 218. 51 advice to the contrary, command of 2NZEF would pass to the British Army. In the period until September 1940 there were, though, occasions on which New Zealand control of 2NZEF was made apparent. In February 1940 the War Office asked that 2NZEF’s officers be allowed to serve in British formations and British officers be permitted to serve in 2NZEF. The New Zealand Government refused.149 When Italy entered the war in May 1940, Wellington agreed that, so long as they were sufficiently trained and equipped and, it was stipulated, under New Zealand command, 2NZEF troops could be used in the defence of Egypt.150 In June Freyberg obtained the Government’s help to stop the second echelon in the United Kingdom being dispersed through British formations.151 Also in June, Middle East Command acknowledged “the desire of Australian and New Zealand forces to operate as formations”.152 Freyberg responded by explaining that this was not merely a desire, and that the use of 2NZEF was determined by New Zealand Government- imposed conditions.153 By mid 1940 the British Army had a clear understanding of the arrangements relating to the use of 2NZEF. General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, had also learnt of the limitations on the use of other Dominion forces. In February 1940 Blamey informed Wavell that the Australian 149 Communications, #s 73, 74 and 76, Documents I, pp. 62-63. 150 Fraser to Freyberg, 26 May 1940, Documents I, #78, pp. 64-65. 151 Communications, Documents I, #s 157-162, pp. 115-120. 152 GHQ Middle East to HQ 2NZEF, 8 June 1940, Documents I, #238, p. 182. 153 Freyberg to GHQ Middle East, 11 June 1940, Documents I, #239, p. 183. 52 Government had prohibited the dispersal of 2AIF into British formations, and by August 1940 (at the latest) Wavell was aware of the restrictions on the use of South African forces.154 Accord marked the pre-September 1940 phase of 2NZEF-British Army relations. Freyberg and the Government empathised with Wavell’s plight and allowed units to be detached to aid him. Relations between GHQ Middle East and 2NZEF’s headquarters were “good from first to last.”155 Middle East Command was informed of the rules New Zealand had imposed on the use of 2NZEF. Ideally, strategic and high-command policy should be created from agreements between allied nations.156 Political-level agreement is necessary because coalitions, although usually seen as mechanisms for coordinated military action, are essentially political arrangements.157 In the Second World War, true high-command cooperation and mutual development of strategy did not exist amongst Allied or Axis governments except in the “Grand Alliance” between Britain and the United States.158 In late 1939 Fraser asked the British Government for a set of war aims. The request failed to secure a response and, when the other Dominions declined to support 154 Carlyon, Blamey, p. 12; and McMillan, “The British Middle East Force”, p. 16. 155 Major-General W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2NZEF, Wellington: War History Branch, 1958, p. 167. 156 Kjeld Hald Galster, “Introduction” in Neils Bo Poulson, Kjeld Hald Galster, and Søren Nørby (eds.), Coalition Warfare: An Anthology of Scholarly Presentations at the Conference on Coalition Warfare at the Royal Danish Defence College, 2011, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2013, p. 5. 157 Andrew Pierre, quoted in Thomas Stow Wilkins, “Analysing Coalition Warfare from an Intra-Alliance Politics Perspective: The Normandy Campaign 1944”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:6, December 2006, 1123. 158 Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, London: Hodder Arnold, 2005, p. xx, p. 37 and p. 43. 53 his later attempt to obtain them, Fraser dropped the matter.159 The New Zealand Government entered into agreements with the British Government concerning equipment, costs and provisioning, but not about coalition cooperation or war strategy.160 Freyberg’s charter was forwarded to Britain and signed by Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, in January 1940.161 There was, however, no alliance-partner agreement and Freyberg had to improvise. The “irretrievably complex” problem of coalition coordination was left to military commanders to work out between themselves.162 Wellington apparently assumed that New Zealand’s Dominion status was sufficiently understood to make its control of 2NZEF, and Freyberg’s independence as a national commander, accepted facts. It was not. As Wood noted, Dominion status “was by no means easy to translate into terms of military cooperation.”163 Britain saw little need to cooperate with the Dominions. When asked to institute an Imperial war cabinet (at which Dominion representatives would have had a say in the direction of the war) Churchill responded “You can easily turn the War Cabinet into a museum of Imperial celebrities, 159 Bassett with King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 174-175. 160 The details of how 2NZEF was to be funded were not worked out in until April 1940. Stevens, Problems, p. 62. 161 Wood, Political and External, p. 102. The date Wood gives (5 January 1940) is same as the date the charter was approved by the Cabinet in Wellington. It is possible that the charter was immediately cabled to Whitehall where Chamberlain might have been able to sign it when it was still 5 January in Britain. Wood gives no source for the date. 162 Wood, Political and External, pp. 102-103. 163 Ibid, p. 2. 54 but then you have to have another body to manage the war.”164 British Government attitudes to the Dominions were evident in the invitation list for a 1941 meeting of allies. Representatives from nine countries, including Luxembourg and Ethiopia, were invited.165 No Dominion was invited to send a representative. Churchill was opposed to Dominions having a say in Imperial policy and New Zealand’s voice was “only rarely raised and even more rarely heard”. 166 One reason for New Zealand’s failure to influence Whitehall was the ineffectiveness of its representative in London, William Jordan. Jordan was a cockney and former London policeman who had emigrated to New Zealand, been elected a Labour Member of Parliament and, in 1935, returned to Britain as New Zealand’s High Commissioner. 167 Although liked personally, Jordan’s lack of education and sophistication, together with a tiny entertainment budget, made him incapable of earning any serious regard for New Zealand in Whitehall. 168 In September 1940 Churchill terminated the Dominions Secretary’s automatic attendance at War Cabinet meetings.169 Without notifying, let alone obtaining the permission of, the Dominion government concerned, in September 1940 Churchill had Australia’s flagship, HMAS Australia, 164 Churchill quoted in John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1945, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985 2004, p. 351. 165 Colville, The Fringes of Power, p. 345. 166 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War, London: Continuum, 2008, p. 73. 167 Stewart, “Bill Jordan”, 69. 168 Stewart, Empire Lost, p. 39, p. 73 and p. 33; Budget information from Carl Berendsen’s memoirs MS, p. 180, ATL MS-Papers-6759-463. 169 Stewart, Empire Lost, p. 46. 55 take part in the ill-fated Dakar expedition, and in May 1941 made Freyberg, who was on secondment to New Zealand, commander on Crete.170 Australia’s Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, told his War Cabinet “Mr Churchill has no conception of the British Dominions as separate entities.”171 Blamey recognised much the same attitude amongst British Army officers: There was a curious element in the British make-up which led them to look upon the Dominions as appendages of Great Britain. They had difficulty in recognising the independent status of the Dominions and their responsibility for the control of their own Forces.172 Blamey’s opinion was endorsed by Freyberg. Commenting after the war on the friction between the Dominions and Middle East Command, Freyberg stated: “It is the old story of the father not realising, and I believe not wanting to realise, that his sons have grown up and want full partnership in the family business.”173 Senior British officers frequently resented the charters that Dominion governments gave their GOCs. In 1941, General Sir Alan Brooke recorded that the Canadian charter “renders the use of 170 David Horner, Defence Supremo, Sir Frederick Sheddon and the Making of Australian Defence Policy, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000, p. 88; and Tuvia Ben-Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 265. 171 Prime Minister’s Visit Abroad, Australian War Cabinet minutes, 28 May 1941, AWM 67 5/17. 172 Menzies’ recollection of Blamey’s statement in Discussions with General Officer Commanding AIF, Australian War Cabinet minutes, 28 May 1941, AWM 67 5/17. 173 Lord Freyberg, House of Lords, 15 April 1953, hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1953/apr/15/defence#S5LV0181PO_19530415_HOL_43, accessed 17 May 2014. 56 Dominion troops even more difficult than that of allies!”174 (Alan Brooke’s comment is further evidence that, to British eyes, Dominions and allies were separate beings.) Middle East Command was condescending towards Dominion officers and “an undercurrent of resentment” developed that caused “major difficulties in British- Dominion relations.” 175 While the British officers cannot be commended for the attitude they adopted towards Dominion commanders, they should not be held entirely responsible for it either. Their attitude mirrored that of their government. In June 1940 Freyberg left Egypt for Britain to oversee the second echelon’s training and deployment there.176 In August, and while still in the United Kingdom, Freyberg learnt that Wavell intended breaking up 2NZEF and distributing the portions throughout British, Indian and Australian formations. Had the plan been carried out, Freyberg would have been left with just his headquarters staff in Cairo. 177 The Government feared that if broken up and used in a piecemeal fashion, New Zealand’s largest co