

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

**THE HUMANITARIAN AND THE SOLDIER:
*PARTNERS FOR PEACE?***

**A STUDY OF US AND NEW ZEALAND
MILITARY-NGO RELATIONS**

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Defence Studies

at Massey University, Manawatu, Palmerston North,
New Zealand.

**Laura M. Jacobs-Garrod
2010**

Abstract

Over the past two decades, military forces and aid workers have found themselves co-existing time and time again on unconventional battlefields. While efforts have been made to coordinate their respective missions, the relationship between the military and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remains *ad hoc*. This improvisational approach to military-NGO relations yields uneven and, often, inefficient results in responses to complex emergencies.

To gain a better understanding of the military-NGO relationship and its implications for international interventions, this study identifies the strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantages, and gaps in capabilities of the military-NGO relationship using the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and United States Military experiences. This study addresses three key questions. These are:

Does a lack of cooperation in military-NGO relations exist and, if it does, how does it inhibit the efficacious response to complex emergencies?

What impact do the structures and philosophies of both military and humanitarian organisations have on the military-NGO relationship?

Using the strategic, operational and tactical levels to evaluate the case studies, what has, and has not, worked within the military-NGO relationship and how can those successes and failures contribute to building a model for the military-NGO relationship?

While not a key question, there is a fourth area which this study briefly addresses in order to compare and contrast the military-NGO relationship of two different countries: Does the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force have a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship?

Many lessons are drawn from military-NGO experiences in the four case studies of this research: Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. The military-NGO relationship was a hot button issue in 1991 to 1993 after operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia, and it has re-emerged as a critical issue today as the international community continues to engage in complex emergencies in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan enters its ninth year, militaries and aid agencies are continuing to debate their interplay in many of the same terms they did in 1993. This study examines the collective experiences- both positive and negative- of military-NGO relations and seeks practical strategies for a cooperative relationship.

Preface

As I write, there is another complex emergency unfolding in the world—precipitated by a natural disaster. The earthquake in Haiti has further devastated a nation which has been struggling to exist for decades. I am struck by the poignancy of all of the information I have been collecting over the past six years and the question I have been seeking to answer: how can we, the international community, improve our response to complex emergencies? The answer is not an easy one; in fact, it is as complex as the emergencies themselves. We have witnessed the scenario time and again over the past two decades: absence of law and order, complete breakdown in civil administration, judicial, infrastructure, and economic systems; a critical lack of basic human needs: clean water, food, shelter, medical care and security. I am both heartened and incensed by the response of my neighbours, country, and the world's citizens: individuals are clamoring for flights to Haiti to “help” and, while their intentions may be honorable, I realize that they are clogging an already over-populated and often misappropriated response system. My concerns remain: Are the experts equipped to tackle this? Are they speaking to one another? Do they have a plan? I fear the answer is no, but they are doing the best they can.

Complex emergencies may have had different locations, different scenarios, and different actors over the past two decades; they may have been caused by people or nature, but the collective experiences have been strikingly similar. There has traditionally been a “come as you are” approach to complex emergencies; an “any help is good” outlook. But why aren't we expecting and demanding more? If we truly want to help a country and its

people get back on their feet or, in some cases, have any semblance of a chance to exist, why wouldn't we, and shouldn't we, ask ourselves how we can improve our response?

The military-NGO relationship is just one aspect of our response system to complex emergencies, but I would argue it is the most critical. The extent to which military and NGO personnel coordinate their work will set the stage for intervention planning and response. The pages that follow examine this relationship and its impact on complex emergencies. There are simple lessons, such as communication, which have remained elusive in the military-NGO relationship. When we are talking about so many different organisations, such as NGOs and various militaries, New Zealand and the United States to name a few, there are bound to be challenges in improving relations both amongst and between actors. However, as this study demonstrates, our experiences are far more similar than they are different and there are pragmatic ways we can improve the response to complex emergencies. It is my hope that the experiences in this study provide a basis for the improvement of the military-NGO relationship and, in turn, the international response to complex emergencies. We can do better, and we should do better.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the contributions of many people. First, my primary supervisor, Professor Glyn Harper, provided unwavering support, guidance, and enthusiasm toward my research. While writing a dissertation can be a lonely and isolating experience, Glyn promoted interaction with the Centre for Defence Studies and provided countless opportunities for me to engage with the Centre and his many contacts. Next, I wish to thank my secondary supervisor, Dr. Beth Greener for her constant support, candid explanations of the PhD process, and determination to get me to the finish line. I could not have wished for better supervisors than Glyn and Beth. Somehow they knew when to be patient with me and knew when I needed a push. Above all, they gave me the creative license to present my study in, what I believe to be, a compelling way.

The entire staff of the Centre for Defence Studies was enormously helpful throughout this process. I would like to especially thank Brigadier General Roger Mortlock (NZDF, retired) and Major General Piers Reid (NZDF, retired) for their support and advocacy of my research, as well as the numerous teaching opportunities they provided to me. Tania Lasenby and Pam Dolman also went above and beyond to support me in the completion of this study.

I would also like to thank the trustees of the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust and Rotary International for their scholarships and generous financial support of this research. As a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholar, I came to New Zealand to pursue my

master's degree in international relations under the supervision of Ray Goldstein at Victoria University of Wellington. Ray always went out of his way to provide assistance to me and, along with my secondary supervisor at Victoria, David Capie, helped me form the basis of the thesis that was to become my doctoral dissertation.

This research would not have been possible without the generous support from my many informants. I wish to thank all of the individuals who took time out of their busy schedules to speak with me regarding the military-NGO relationship. Their willingness to speak openly is reflected in these pages and is the reason that this study offers practical solutions to improving the military-NGO relationship. I would also like to thank the staffs of the NZDF Library System and the Grey Research Library at Quantico for their professionalism and assistance with this study.

This dissertation would certainly not have been possible without the support of my parents, who instilled in me an appreciation for life-long learning, a curiosity about the world around me, and the value of working for a greater good. My father, Roger, a retired US Marine Corps officer, helped me to develop my interest in this critical topic, continually challenged my thinking, and provided me with renewed insight in those inevitable moments of writer's block. My mother, Karen, a consummate volunteer for non-profit organisations, acted as a sounding board for new ideas and, using her grammatical expertise, reviewed all of my final drafts. Both of my parents gave me what will no doubt be a life-long appreciation for the value of public service in its many forms.

Last, but certainly not least, I thank my husband, Paul, who has endured all of the many ups and downs that are part and parcel with a dissertation. Despite having to make countless sacrifices, Paul has always encouraged me to do the best I can, challenge myself, and reach my goals. His support came in many forms-- too numerous to list. He is a true partner and friend.

It does not escape me that I am very fortunate to have so many individuals in my life, all of whom were incredibly supportive throughout this process. I must emphasize, however, that I alone bear full responsibility for any errors in this dissertation.

Laura M. Jacobs-Garrod

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Preface.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	v
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	x
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	xi
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Overview of Military-NGO Relations	10
An Introduction to Military-NGO Relations.....	10
Issues that Impact the Military-NGO Relationship	15
The Military in Complex Emergencies.....	20
Introduction to the Military.....	20
The Military and the United Nations	25
The Mission and Culture of the Military	27
Structure.....	33
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Complex Emergencies.....	36
What Are NGOs?.....	36
NGOs and the United Nations	45
The Mission and Culture of NGOs	46
Structure of NGOs	52
Conclusion	55
Chapter 2: The Military-NGO Cooperation Debate	60
Literature Review.....	60
Comparing Military and NGO Capabilities in Complex Emergencies	76
Strengths and Weaknesses	76
Different Mandates	79
Common Goals	81
Debates Within.....	83
The Military’s View of NGOs	83
NGOs’ View of the Military.....	87
“C” Words.....	90
Collaboration.....	90
Coordination	90
Coexistence.....	91
Cooperation.....	92
Applying Cooperation to the Military-NGO Relationship	92
Conclusion	95
Chapter 3: Somalia Case Study.....	98
Background of Somalia.....	100
Operations Overview: UN and US Intervention in Somalia.....	104
The US Military-NGO Relationship during Operation <i>Restore Hope</i>	108
Limited Mandate.....	111
Structure and Organisation	128
Disarmament	145

Conclusions.....	158
Chapter 4 (Part I): Bosnia Case Study	163
History and Background of Bosnia.....	164
UN Intervention in Bosnia and New Zealand’s Contribution	166
The New Zealand Defence Force’s Role and Relations with NGOs.....	170
Mandate: No Peace to Keep.....	171
Inexperience Working With NGOs	180
Number of NGOs.....	187
Conclusions.....	196
Chapter 4 (Part II): Bosnia Case Study.....	199
Background of Intervention: From UNPROFOR to IFOR.....	200
US-NGO Relations in Bosnia	205
Mandate.....	206
Structure/Organisation	216
US Military Reluctance to Engage in CMA: Mission Creep.....	225
Conclusions.....	230
Chapter 5: East Timor Case Study.....	235
Background of East Timor.....	236
Operations Overview: UN Intervention in East Timor.....	239
The NZDF-NGO Relationship in Cova Lima.....	244
A Broad Mandate	249
<i>Ad hoc</i> Relations	264
Personality Driven	281
The Lack of Aid in Cova Lima.....	289
Conclusions.....	298
Chapter 6 (Part I): Afghanistan Case Study.....	301
Brief History of Afghanistan	302
Background of Intervention	307
Introduction to US Military-NGO Relations in Afghanistan.....	309
PRT: An Evolving Concept	311
Security	318
Force Multipliers.....	325
Conclusions.....	332
Chapter 6 (Part II): Afghanistan Case Study	335
Background to New Zealand’s Involvement in Afghanistan.....	335
The NZDF-NGO Relationship in Afghanistan	337
Climate of Controversy.....	339
Relative Security.....	345
Increased CMA	352
Conclusions.....	356
Conclusion	358
Bibliography	385

List of Tables

Table 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Military and NGOs in Complex Emergencies	77
Table 2: Different Mandates	79
Table 3: Common Goals	82
Table 4: Number of Humanitarian Agencies in Somalia.....	124
Table 5: Structure of a Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC)	134
Table 6: Humanitarian Agency Locations in Somalia.....	139

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Somalia	99
Figure 2: Map of Operation Restore Hope	118
Figure 3: UNITAF Area of Operations Map	133
Figure 4: Map of Western Balkans	164
Figure 5: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina	165
Figure 6: Map of NATO's three Multinational Divisions in Bosnia.....	204
Figure 7: Map of East Timor	236
Figure 8: Map of the Cova Lima District.....	244
Figure 9: Map of Afghanistan.....	302
Figure 10: Map of PRT Locations and ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan	310
Figure 11: Map of the Bamyán Province.....	337

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

1MEF	First Marine Expeditionary Force
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ADRA	Adventist Development and Assistance Agency International
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCB	Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
ANP	Afghan National Police
AO	Area of Operations
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force
CA	Civil Affairs
CARE	Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIMIC	Civil-military Cooperation
CJCMIC	Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
CJCMOTF	Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force
CMA	Civil-Military Affairs
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
CO	Commanding Officer
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CWS	Church World Services
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DoD	United States Department of Defense
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
FLOC	New Zealand Future Land Operating Concept
FOME	Focus of Main Effort
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
GAA	German Agro Action
GFAP	General Framework for Peace

GO	Governmental Organisation
GPA	Governance and Public Administration
HAC	Humanitarian Affairs Centre
HAER	Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation
HCIC	Humanitarian Coordination Information Centre
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative
HRO	Humanitarian Relief Organisation
HRS	Humanitarian Relief Sector
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation Force
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IO	International organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Refugee Committee
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
LO	Liaison Officer
MARFOR	Marine Forces
MCG	Maori Cultural Group
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MFAT	New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MND	Multinational Division
MoD	United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières (aka Doctors Without Borders)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCNI NGO	Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZFOREM	New Zealand Forces in East Timor
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OP	Observation Post
OPLAN	Operation Plans
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PKF	Peacekeeping Force
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAS	New Zealand Special Air Service
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SOF	Special Operations Forces

SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSR	Security Sector Reform Programme
TF	Task Force
TNI	Indonesian Military
UDT	Timorese Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHABITAT	United Nations Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHOC	United Nations Humanitarian Operations Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	United Nations Task Force Somalia
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
USLO	United States Liaison Office
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	WorldVision