Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. Islamic State, Syria’s Civil War and the Reshaping of the Middle East A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand Michael White 2017 1 Abstract The Islamic State grew out of the ashes of a defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. The continued conflicts in Iraq and Syria have provided the catalyst for a resurgent Islamic State. Syria’s civil war has allowed the Islamic State to remerge like a terrorist phoenix, reborn from its own ashes. This thesis analyses the origins of the Islamic State, and the geo-political conditions and on-going conflicts in Iraq and Syria which have permitted the growth and expansion of the Islamic State. It also analyses how the fight against the Islamic State is changing the security environment within the Middle East. 2 The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. W.B. Yeats. The Second Coming.1 1 William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43290/the-second-coming. 3 Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................ 1 Acronyms ..................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ................................................................................................. 6 Research Objective, Organisation and Methodology............................ 11 Literature Review...................................................................................... 14 Iraq: A Butterfly Flaps its Wings ............................................................ 24 Fitna............................................................................................................ 51 Syria: A Hurricane Blows ........................................................................ 71 Internationalisation................................................................................... 83 Fragmentation and Alternative Governance ......................................... 99 Conclusion................................................................................................ 115 Appendix 1 Timeline of Iraq and Syrian Conflicts 2011 -2017 .......... 119 Bibliography ............................................................................................ 124 4 Acronyms AQ - Al-Qaeda AQAP - al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM - al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQI - al-Qaeda in Iraq CIA – Central Intelligence Agency CPA - Coalition Provisional Authority EU - European Union FSM - Free Syrian Army HSM - Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen more commonly known as al-Shabaab HTS - Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Assembly for Liberation of the Levant) ICU - Islamic Courts Union IS - Islamic State ISI - Islamic State in Iraq ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham JaN - Jabhat al-Nusra JTS - Jabhat Fatah al-Sham KNC - Kurdish National Council 5 KRG - Kurdish Regional NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO - Non-Government Organisation YPG - Yekineyen Parastina Gel - People’s Defence Units PKK - Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane - Kurdish Workers Party PLO - Palestine Liberation Organisation PMU - Popular Mobilisation Units PYD - Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat - Democratic Union Party SOFA - Status of Forces Agreement SNC - Syrian National Coalition SNF - Syrian Nationalist Front TTP - Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan TFG - Transitional Federal Government UN – United Nations UNSCR - UN Security Council Resolution UNSC - United Nations Security Council US – United States SEAL - US Navy Sea Air and Land Teams VBIED - Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Device WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 6 Introduction The Islamic State (ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah) is a symptom of those Sunnis marginalised by the structural inequalities created by the current conflicts within Iraq and Syria. Because the central authorities of Iraq and Syria cannot provide political, social and economic security to the marginalised, they then turn to the extremes for security. This is the principle reason that extremist groups such as the Taliban (from the Pashto word for students, al-Qaeda (Arabic for the Foundation or the Base), Jabhat al- Nusra (full name Victory Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahideen of the Levant on the Fields of Jihad. Arabic Jabhat an-Nu rah li-ahli ash- Mujahideen ash- -Jihad) and Islamic State have been able to establish themselves. The Islamic State is a new paradigm that has proven to be more brutal and more sectarian than the groups that preceded it.2 Although relentless and brutal in its behaviours, the Islamic State has predicated part of its propaganda on offering security and stability, purporting to provide alternative governance in the face of state weakness. For marginalised and disgruntled Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, although they may not share its ideology, the Islamic State’s sectarian violence provides a vehicle by which to exercise their grievances, and the means to reclaim political power. The Islamic State has fomented and grown on the back of sectarian violence. As a group, it has used the civil wars and ongoing unrest in the region, firstly in Iraq and then in Syria, to establish itself and to spread across the Middle East. 2 Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, Isis: The State of Terror, 1st ed. (London: William Collins, 2015), 235. 7 Although the Islamic State has its origins in the Iraqi conflict and is a product of the American invasion, the ineptitude of the US governance of Iraq, the sectarian agenda of the al-Maliki government and the fanatical desires of an obscure Jordanian national. Despite this, the group was almost defunct until the disintegration of Syria reignites the jihadist flames. The heavy-handed repression of the Syrian protests that broke out in 2011, by the regime of Bashar al-Assad enable the jihadists to regroup on the new battlefield. Syria’s porous borders and the blinkered approach of Syria’s neighbours allowed an increasing influx of foreign fighters into Syria. It was these conditions that bolstered the numbers of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), who rejuvenated would reinvent itself as Islamic State and go on to surge back into Iraq, seize Mosul and declare its Caliphate. Both Iraq and Syria have a shared history of authoritarianism and repression under their respective Ba’athist regimes. Ba’athism (Arabic al-Ba’athiyah meaning renaissance or resurrection) was a Arab nationalist ideology. The concept of 3 Syrian intellectuals, Michel Aflaq, Zaki al-Arsuzi and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. It was based on the principles of Arab nationalism, it supported one party states and rejected political pluralism. Although Ba’athism promoted socialist economics and modernisation, it would become a byword for state repression and authoritarianism. Syria would pursue a ruthless form of Arab secular nationalism that utilised the machinery of state to encourage a culture of absolutes and intolerance.3 In this environment non-arabs were repressed and Islamist movements were manipulated to achieve regime goals.4 Saddam Hussein would in the 1990s use militant Islam as a prop for his regime. Bashar al-Assad 3 William Harris, Quicksilver War: Syria, Iraq and the Spiral of Conflict, 1st ed. (London: Hurst & Company, 2018), 5. 4 Ibid. 8 would later turn jihadists loose on his own citizenry as justification for the continued repression of his regime and in a misguided attempt to align Syria with the West’s fight against Salafist-jihadist terror. Although frequently addressed in black and white terms, particularly in parts of Western and Arab media, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are anything but, neither is each conflict separate from the other, both conflicts have at various points driven and fed the other. In many respects the conflict zones of Iraq and Syrian represent a single fluid field of conflict, in which the participants represent a multi-layered stratum of competing elements. These are represented by the Syrian regime, the Iraqi government, the various rebel factions such as the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF), the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). At the regional level are attempts by the Syrian and Iraqi governments to exploit aspects of the conflicts for their own ends. Additionally, the Iraqi-Syrian battlefield represents an opportunity for the regional powerhouses of Saudi Arabia and Iran to achieve their political aims within the region. Each supporting differing factions as both struggle to pronounce themselves as a regional hegemon. The Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone has also drawn in global players such as the United States and Russia.5 The United States plays a central role in the origins of the conflict through its role in the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein, and in the chaos inflicted on Iraq in the aftermath. The ineptitude of the American administration of Iraq post- Hussein, particularly the process of De-Ba’athification, was a significant contributor to all that followed. Russia has viewed the conflict as an opportunity to build upon its relationship with the Syrian regime, to re-establish itself as a major power and to act as 5 Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, "Regional and International Factors That Prolong the Syrian Crisis," Syria Studies 8, no. 2 (2016): 5. 9 a spoiler to American ambitions.6 Within the conflict non-state actors, such as Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Kurds, have attempted to create their own alternatives to state rule. Each has used to conflict to pursue their own extra-territorial agendas, the Islamic State with its pretensions to a neo-Caliphate and the Kurds as they attempt to push autonomy into independence. Turkey’s position is complicated by its opposition to Kurdish independence, whilst protecting itself against the jihadists and pursuing a strategic aim of self-determination for the Syrian Sunnis.7 Amongst the Arab states there is considerable division. Abu Dhabi is fearful of the Islamist surge across the region. However, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar see the conflict as an opportunity to dispose the regions nationalists. The West is torn between the desire to pursue its strategic and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian goals, whilst not wishing to become further bogged in another military commitment.8 Because of the above factors the various actors, state and non-state, within the Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone are laying the foundations for the reshaping of the Middle East and for the conflicts of tomorrow. Salafist-jihadists thrive on the civil wars within the Muslim world. These conflicts shape their narrative and draws recruits to them. The conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Somalia to name a few examples, have given birth to new terror groups and have strengthened existing ones. The Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone has acted as a major recruiting tool for the Salafist-jihadists attracting large numbers of foreign and local recruits. This in turn has had an impact both locally and externally, for example the increase in Salafist-jihadist inspired attacks in Europe. 6 Ibid. 7 Dr Andres Kreig, "Surrogate War and the Illusion of State-Centrism," https://defenceindepth.co/2016/12/12/surrogate-war-and-the-illusion-of-state-centrism/. 8 Ibid. 10 Terror groups such as Islamic State have taken advantage of the voids left by the absence of the state to seize territory and present themselves as a viable alternative. Although at the time of writing the Islamic State appears of being on the verge of defeat. The risk is that the continued conflict within the region will permit it to resurrect itself again or for another to fill the space it has left behind. The continuance of the conflict also runs a risk of direct conflict between the regional powers and that of the United States and Russia. 11 Research Objective, Organisation and Methodology The purpose of this thesis is to examine the rise of the Islamic State, from its origins as al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq to mid-2017 where its appears to be on the cusp of defeat. This thesis will do so by examining those factors which have contributed to the rise of the Islamic State. The thesis examines the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, with the primary focus being on the Syrian civil war. It also examines the split between al- Qaeda and the Islamic State. By breaking with the dictates of al-Qaeda’s central command Islamic State in Iraq and later Islamic State, were free to pursue their goal of seizing territory and establishing a Caliphate The later part of the thesis examines the impact of the internationalisation of the Syrian conflict and how in the absence of the state, non-state actors have attempted to establish alternative forms of governance. The actions of the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, have done much to directly and indirectly aid in the rise of Islamic State. Rather than examine a single aspect of the rise of the Islamic State, this thesis takes a more holistic and strategic overview of the rise of the Islamic State. It does so in order provide context to the rise of Islamic State through examining the structural and contingent socio-political and geo-political aspects that have contributed to the Islamic State’s existence. It aims to demonstrate that Islamic State is a contemporary phenomenon; a product of the conditions within the region. There are limitations to any study of the Islamic State and the conflicts that have given rise to it. Firstly, is that the situation in Iraq whilst stabilising is still unsettled and the civil war in Syria is an ongoing and highly dynamic situation. It is difficult to draw 12 firm conclusions from a constantly changing landscape. Secondly, local reporting from within Iraq, Syria and the wider can be subject to the biases of the author and their personal affiliations. Local media reporting is also subject to the political outlook of their respective patrons. Secondly, in comparison to al-Qaeda, there is a lack of primary source material on Islamic State. By its very nature and that of the conflict in Syria, the group has not encouraged study by outsiders. Very few have taken the risky step of seeing and conducting first hand reporting of the Islamic State. Those that have sallied forth such as the German reporter Jurgen Todenhofer, have been subject to restrictions and consequently have only witnessed what they have been permitted to see.9 Consequently, this thesis draws primarily upon secondary sources written by academics, journalists and other subject matter experts. Chapter 1 is an examination of the current literature on Islamic State and traces the underlining factors that gave rise to the group. Chapter 2 focuses on Islamic State’s early development as a product of the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgencies. It examines some of the key geo-political factors that led to the rise of Islamic State. It argues the security environment in post-invasion Iraq laid the foundations for the rise of Islamic State. Chapter 3 examines the split between Islamic State and its parent, al-Qaeda. It examines some of the ideological differences between Islamic State and al-Qaeda. It does so through an examination of Islamic State and its Salafist-jihadist rival in Syria, al-Nusra. It argues that the split with al-Qaeda was a critical development in the expansion of the Islamic State. Chapter 4 traces the development of the Syrian Civil War. It provides an analysis of how the actions of the 9 Ahmed S. Hashim, The Caliphate at War: The Ideological, Organisational and Military Innovations of Islamic State, 1st ed. (London: Hurst & Company, 2018), 15. 13 Syrian government allowed the Salafist-jihadists to grow and become a dominant force within the conflict. Chapter 5 examines the impact of both international and regional actors, on the Syrian conflict. It examines how the actions of external actors in the Syrian conflict have created the conditions which have both allowed the growth of Salafist-jihadists and have prevented effective action against such groups. Chapter 6 examines how the region is becoming fragmented, and examines using the Kurds, al- Nusra and Islamic State as examples, how alternative forms of governance are being shaped and applied within the region. Chapter 7 summarises the thesis and draws conclusions as to how the conflicts are shaping the region, and what the future of the region may be. 14 Literature Review The Islamic State is a symptom. It is not the disease. It does not, and has not, posed an “existential threat” to anyone, beyond those in its immediate geographical environment. The term existential threat has become so over used that much like the phrase “Global War on Terror”, it has lost all meaning.10 But for those in Iraq and Syria, that have found themselves under the control of Islamic State, it is an all too real prospect. Islamic State, and its predecessors have unleashed a wave of violence and ethnic cleansing across the two states. Furthermore the rise of Islamic State has directly threatened the existence of both the Iraqi and Syrian states, and has indirectly threatened the security of many other states within the Middle East and North Africa.11 For those living within Iraq and Syria, Islamic State does pose an existential threat at both the individual and community level. As Patrick Cockburn observed: “Iraq and Syria moved closer to disintegration as their diverse communities – Shia, Sunni, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians, found they were fighting for their very existence.”12 The Islamic State and others of its ilk, originates, exists and grows, in the shadow of civil conflict formed from weak or failed states.13 As Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger note recruits to Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and later Islamic State were often not motivated by ideology, but because it represented a rallying force against regimes that had failed them.14 Paul Rogers argues that groups such as Islamic State represent a “revolt from 10 Patrick Cockburn, The Age of Jihad: Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East, 1st ed. (London: Verso, 2016), 434. 11 Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Was the Rise of Isis Inevitable?," Survival 59, no. 3 (2017). 12 Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of the Islamic State: Isis and the New Sunni Revolution, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2015), xi. 13 Barak Mendelson, The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of Al-Qaeda and Its Consequences, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 98-99. 14 Stern and Berger, 223. 15 the margins”.15 He argues that economic marginalisation and the effects of climate change, such as the 2011 Syrian draught that occurred prior to the revolution, are the fundamental drivers of conflict.16 Rogers further states that increasing literacy and education is making people far more aware of their marginalisation. Additionally, he argues that the West’s reliance on military force is a key factor in exacerbating conflicts such as Iraq and Syria.17 Citing the example of the 9/11 attacks and al-Qaeda, Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall state that post 9/11, terrorism and groups such as al-Qaeda were treated as existential threats to the United States and Western values.18 They further expand on this stating that both sides drew the wrong conclusions from the attacks. The Bush administration was mistaken in the belief that the attacks were indicative of al-Qaeda’s capability, and were repeatable.19 Hal Brands and Peter Feaver argue that the emergence of the Islamic State was not inevitable but can in part be attributed to the decision to invade Iraq in 2003.20 It is their contention that the 2003 either “unleashed or exacerbated many of the forces that drove ISIS’s ascendancy”.21 Al-Qaeda saw the American over-reaction as being indicative of America’s weakness and impending defeat.22 These same errors are being repeated in Iraq and Syria. The reality is that neither side has been defeated nor has either achieved victory. Hamid and Farrall state that by relying on the use of military power to defeat Salafist-jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, it weakens all involved in the conflict. If in thinking that power and force will solve the issue: “…it brings more weakness for the 15 Paul Rogers, Irregular War: Isis and the New Threat from the Margins, 1st ed. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), 5. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, 1st ed. (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 308. 19 Ibid. 20 Brands and Feaver. 21 Ibid. 22 Hamid and Farrall, 308. 16 user of power, and more weakness to those who respond to the user of power. Depending on power and power from the gun only means that eventually you will lose your position”.23 Military force alone cannot defeat violent non-state actors; groups like Islamic State thrive in an environment of weak governance and perpetual conflict. Treating terrorist attacks as an act of war, and groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as existential threats. Only provides further oxygen to such groups, and endows them with a political legitimacy they otherwise may not have had.24 Likewise, the rise of Salafist-jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, has led to a rigidity of thought, and in the militarisation of jihad (meaning striving or struggling, a complex term in Islam which has both spiritual and military connotations).25 This has also come about, in part, because of “the unspoken elephant in the room”, the support structure offered to the Salafist-jihadist groups from financiers in the Gulf States.26 This militarisation of jihad has meant that it has been reduced to acts of violence, often without restraint or responsibility, for the private purposes of the financiers.27 In a similar fashion, regional and international powers have sought to harness proxies to carry out their agendas within conflict zones. Sami Moubayed points out that many are blamed for the rise of Islamic State in the complex geo-political dynamics of the Middle East, both regionally and internationally.28 The use of proxies by regional and international powers, the rise in the use of special forces by the US, Russia and Iran, and proliferation of non-state actors such as militias like the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation 23 Ibid., 309. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 310. 26 Ibid., 311. 27 Ibid. 28 Sami Moubayed, Under the Black Flag: An Exculsive Insight into the Inner Workings of Isis, 1st ed. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), 209. 17 Units (PMUs), has reduced the transparency of how these conflicts are being waged at both the tactical and strategic levels.29 The Iraqi-Syrian battlespace is particularly marked by the extensive use of proxies as surrogate actors on the battlefield. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia fund and support armed rebel factions within Syria, Russia has supported the al-Assad regime with its own non-state actors.30 The US support of its proxy in the form of the Kurds, adds an additional layer of complexity. By using the Kurds as its proxy, the US not only risks alienating its Sunni allies within the region but of also changing the regional security dynamics in unforeseen ways (the US support for Afghan Mujahedeen is a primary example of the law of unintended consequences).31 Paul Rogers echoes this stating that the secrecy surrounding the use of special forces allows state actors to claim there are no “boots on the ground”.32 As a result, there is increasing concern that international and regional powers, such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran, are taking steps to be unaccountable for their actions and are conducting operations beyond the scope of international law.33 For instance, the reliance of the US on drone strikes to carry out extra-judicial killings, especially against its own citizens overseas, such as Anwar al-Awlaki.34 A further example is the use of chemical weapons by the al-Assad regime in violation of international conventions.35 As Andrew Mumford points out the idea of “plausible deniability” and the lower direct risks associated with proxy warfare as made it an attractive concept to states seeking to defend or expand their interests.36 Although the use of proxies offers advantages in 29 Hamid and Farrall, 311. 30 Alex Marshall, "From Civil War to Proxy War: Past History and Current Dilemmas," Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (2016). 31 Ibid. 32 Rogers, 162. 33 Hamid and Farrall, 311. 34 Scott Shane, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone, 1st ed. (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015), 220-21. 35 Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, "Syria Chemical Weapons Attack Toll Rises to 70 as Russian Narrative Is Dismissed " The Guardian. 36 Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict," The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (2013). 18 bypassing the potential public backlash of directly committing military forces to conflicts in which the legitimacy of intervention is in question. The use of proxies runs the risk of exacerbating and prolonging conflict through the injection of external funding, weapons and personnel.37 Nicolas Henin, journalist and a former hostage of the Islamic State, suggests that the rise of the Islamic State can be attributed to a complex mix of: “discrimination, marginalisation and sectarianism”.38 In Iraq and Syria, the breakdown of these states, along with the associated violence and deprivation, have created the conditions in which violent non state actors can thrive.39 Barak Mendelson echoes this idea in his study of the expansion of al-Qaeda.40 Mendelson attributes the growth of Salafist-jihadist groups, to the weakening of states ability to enforce laws and provide border security. He argues that weak states are less able to secure their borders and prevent such organisations from carving out safe havens for training and launching operations.41 He suggests state weakness frequently manifests in an inability to provide basic services for its citizens; well-resourced groups, such as the Islamic State, can present themselves as an alternative.42 Shiraz Maher points to the Islamic State as being what he describes as “violent rejectionists”.43 Maher argues that such groups present themselves as an alternative to the current modern state: 37 Ibid. 38 Nicolas Henin, Jihad Academy: The Rise of the Islamic State, 1st ed. (India: Bloomsbury, 2015), xiii. 39 Ibid. 40 Mendelson, 98. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 99. 43 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, 1st ed. (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 11. 19 violent-rejectionists are irreconcilably estranged from the state, regarding it as a heretical and artificial unit. The entire notion of the modern nation-state is a heterodox affront to Islam whereby temporal legislation usurps God’s sovereignty. The system therefore needs radical overhaul and reordering while its agents must be confronted.44 By offering some alternative, insurgent groups can attract recruits and supporters, whilst consolidating and expanding, their hold on territory and populace.45 Moubayed continues this theme arguing that the situations in Iraq and Syria provided fertile ground in which the Islamic State could grow.46 He argues that the situation, such as government repression, competing sectarian factions and the breakdown of law and order within Syria and Iraq, created an environment that was ready to accept a group such as Islamic State, that the population had grown weary of the old regime and “were desperate for a break with the past.”47 Fawaz A. Gerges adds to this, arguing that the reliance on tyranny, corruption and coercion by governments across the region, led to a breakdown of the state-society relationship.48 He further states that whilst Islamic State presents a threat to regional security, its ability to do so is due to the weakness of the Arab states, rather than Islamic State’s strength as a strategic actor.49 Moubayed states that the bulk of those that joined the Salafist-jihadists frequently have done so, not necessarily out of a shared belief but because the previous political systems had failed them.50 Islamic State offered an alternative, it laid claim to the provision of public 44 Ibid. 45 Mendelson, 99. 46 Moubayed, 209. 47 Ibid. 48 Fawaz A Gerges, Isis: A History, 1st ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 5. 49 Ibid., 4. 50 Moubayed, 210. 20 goods such as law enforcement, health care and education, but most of all a return to the glories of the past; the reconstruction of a Sunni Caliphate. Prior to the death of bin Laden, al-Qaeda was seen as the leading alternative for Salafist-jihadists, however, it has been surpassed by Islamic State, whose rejection of the international system and constitutional politics, has seen the enactment of policies that defy civilizational standards.51 Richard Sokolsky and Perry Cammack state that: “History has shown that the longer localized Middle East conflicts fester the more likely they are to metastasize into geopolitical contests which empower and embolden the most radical actors.”52 The current conflict and unrest in Syria and Iraq, cannot and will not be resolved by the defeat of the Islamic State. By concentrating efforts on the defeat of the Islamic State, we marginalise the other larger geo-political conflicts that feed the growth of the Islamic State. The defeat of the Islamic State requires the acknowledgement of the complex conditions that allow such groups to take root.53 As Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle point out that Islamic State has emerged in a time of political turmoil across the Middle East.54 As people struggled to meet their basic needs, Islamic State promised food, shelter and security.55 Additionally, the turmoil felt across the region opened long standing cleavages across the region.56 Political actors, both state and non-state, seized upon this climate of fear of the other to securitise sectarian division to achieve power and dominance. A primary example of this would be the 51 Maher, 11. 52 Perry Cammack and Richard Sokolsky, "Doubling Down on America's Misadventure in Yemen," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/doubling-down-on-americas-misadventure-in-yemen/. 53 Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle, The Origins of Isis: The Collapse of Nations and Revolutions in the Middle East, 1st ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 4. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 21 actions of the al-Maliki government in Iraq, which demonstrated a willingness to exploit sectarian tensions for its own political advantage. Islamic State has built strategic alliances with Islamists, tribes and military staff such as former commanders from Saddam’s army, whose knowledge of irregular warfare and Iraq would be valuable to the groups expansion. Whilst many of these alliances are marriages of convenience entered to ensure a group or tribe’s survival.57 The extent to which Islamic State has embedded itself in the region presents long term challenges. As Mabon and Royle state: “Given how embedded the group is within the political, economic, social, and religious landscapes of Syria and Iraq, defeating the group – and Sunni militancy generally – will be difficult.”58 Furthermore, any analysis of Islamic State must be grounded in the realities of the geo-political environment that gave rise to it. Islamic State is a contemporary phenomenon and a product of the current Middle Eastern security environment. It is necessary to ground any analysis of the group within the environment in which it exists and operates.59 Peter R. Neumann argues that Salafist- jihadist groups represent a movement.60 Neumann states that: “…organizations such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State have only been the manifestations of a wider social, political and religious movement.”61 Robin Yassin–Kassab and Leila al-Shami argue that the growth of Salafism, a puritanical form Islam that seeks a return to the ways of the first Muslims, is due to the projection of 57 Ibid., 7. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., 7-8. 60 Peter R Neuman, Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West, 2nd ed. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), xvii. 61 Ibid. 22 Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia.62 But as Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami further state this does not fully explain the expansion of Salafism. Because Salafism has a literal rather than mystical tone it appeals to modernising populations, whilst its millenarian political vision offers solace to the oppressed or alienated.63 For the marginalised Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria, the Salafist ideology espoused by the Salafist-jihadist groups such as Islamic State, had great initial appeal. The 2003 invasion of Iraq reshaped that country’s political and economic environment. Marginalised segments of Iraq’s society found themselves holding the reins of power, and the powerful found themselves on the fringe. Sectarian violence became the weapon of choice as each sought to retain or regain their status. In Syria, the hope for democratic freedom and improved economic conditions were crushed under the counter-revolutionary reactions of the deep-state. The initial hope that Bashar al-Assad - young and western educated - may have ushered in a new era of prosperity, was crushed when al-Assad and the Syrian security apparatus turned upon the protestors. Syria and Iraq have become the battlefields for local and international actors, as each attempt to gain tactical or strategic advantage over others. A key risk in the fight against Islamic State is that by focusing exclusively on one group we marginalise the potential future regional security threats from the rise of other violent non-state actors in the region. Furthermore, is the risk of overlooking the fallout from the proxy wars of regional powers.64 Iran and Hezbollah (Party of Allah/God) believe their partnership’s survival is at stake.65 For the Gulf States, the conflict is about containing Iran’s growing 62 Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War, 1st ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 119. 63 Ibid. 64 Henin, xiv. 65 Ibid. 23 influence within the region, and for Saudi Arabia, maintaining its primacy as an ally of the West.66 Turkey seeks to re-establish itself as a regional power, whilst simultaneously attempting to curtail and contain Kurdish hopes for independence.67 The roots of the Islamic State lie in Iraq and it is in Iraq that we can examine how Islamic State came to be and how regional and international actors, state and non-state, created the conditions for the Islamic States rise and expansion. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 24 Iraq: A Butterfly Flaps its Wings Although the Syrian conflict allowed Islamic State to expand, its roots lie in Iraq. This chapter aims to explore those factors in Iraq that led to the creation of Islamic State and its predecessors. It traces how the Hussein regime was willing to exploit political Islam, the impact of the US invasion and the subsequent decisions made during the US administration of Iraq particularly the impact of De-Ba’athification. It also aims to show how the sectarian policies of the Iraqi government fed the insurgency and opened a door for the Salafist-jihadists amongst others. Iraq is a populous country of some 32 million people, divided amongst Arabs (75-80 percent), Kurds (15-20 percent) with the remainder being other smaller ethnic groups, such as Turkmen.68 Of the majority Islamic sects in Iraq, the Shia are in the majority – some 65 percent, with the Sunni’s (Arab and Kurd) making up the remaining 35 percent.69 Iraq is also made up of 150 recognised tribes, which consist of some 2000 smaller clans.70 Although a ruthless Ba’athist dictatorship, Iraq, under the thumb of Saddam Hussein, was a stable multi-sectarian nation. Kurds, Shia and Sunni had lived together, and intermarried.71 Since 2003, the altered power situation in Iraq has permitted long standing grievances to resurface, along with disputes over land and resources.72 68 Mabon and Royle, 20. 69 Ibid., 21. 70 Ibid. 71 Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 190. 72 Mabon and Royle, 21. 25 In April 1991, at American urging the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UN Resolution 867. The sanctions not only effected the Hussein regime, but also acted as a collective punishment on all the Iraqi people; life become hard for the Iraqi people.73 The strategic aim of the resolution and the US was that by placing pressure on the Iraqi people, they would seek to overthrow the Hussein regime. The sanctions regime was harsh, certain medications and foodstuffs were blocked on the grounds they may be used in manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).74 Seeking to shore up support for his regime, Hussein turned to the one constant in the Middle East; Islam. Up until the early 2000s the Iraqi Ba’athist regime was secular. Although many of the Hussein leadership were practicing Muslims, political Islam was considered a threat to the regime. At the peak of the UN sanctions, Hussein launched the “Return to Faith Campaign”.75 This campaign was given physical shape in 2001, when Saddam inaugurated the Mother of All Battles Mosque (Jami’ Umm al- Ma’arik).76 The mosque was a cynical attempt to portray him as an Islamic leader. Construction of the mosque had commenced in 1993, the mosque architecture was dominated by anti-American slogans and references to Saddam’s biography.77 Prominent amongst the mosques features was a handwritten Qur’an, purportedly written in Saddam’s own blood.78 Iraq, has a history of political Islam dating to the formation of the Islamic Brotherhood Society in the 1940’s. Initially, like many Islamic societies, the Society was largely preoccupied with social welfare and community outreach.79 In 73 Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, 1st ed. (California: University of California Press, 2015), 33. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Amatzia Baram, "From Militant Secularism to Islamism the Iraqi Ba'th Regime from 1968 - 2003," (United States: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2011), 15. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Atwan, 34. 26 1960, the more politically orientated Iraqi Islamic Party was established. However, once the Ba’athists seized power in 1968, both the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood were persecuted and driven underground.80 As the second American invasion of Iraq loomed, Saddam Hussein sought to use Islam as a key element in developing an effective resistance.81 John Nixon, a former CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) senior leadership analyst who interrogated Saddam Hussein, states that Hussein: “…was not hostile to religion per se; he just demanded that he be allowed to control whatever religious activity there was in Iraq”.82 Saddam Hussein was prepared to tolerate Islamist groups, if by supporting them they would assist Hussein in achieving strategic goals and did not challenge his own regime. An example is the support that the Hussein regime provided to the Muslim Brotherhood (al- Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in Syria. Hussein backed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood because they opposed Hafez al-Assad, who was Saddam’s rival for leadership of the wider Ba’ath movement.83 As such the Hussein regime tolerated the presence of jihadists in the border regions of Iraq and Iran, as the jihadists were strongly anti-Shia, and provided a buffer against Iran. These elements were under the control of Ansar al-Islam (Helpers of Islam) imposing Shari’a law on the towns and villages under its control.84 Ansar al-Islam also provided a gateway for al-Qaeda operatives to enter Iraq.85 That Ansar al-Islam was tolerated was a cynical ploy by Hussein’s regime, as the group was in conflict with Iraq’s Kurdish population.86 Human rights reports from the time 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 John Nixon, Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein, 1st ed. (London: Bantam Press, 2016), 3. 83 Ibid., 6. 84 Andrew Hosken, Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, 2nd ed. (London: Oneworld Publications, 2016), 26. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., 26-27. 27 indicate that Ansar al-Islam was carrying out atrocities, such as beheading prisoners, that were to foreshadow Islamic State in its brutalities.87 It was reported at the time that up to 57 Arab-Afghans had entered into Iraq through areas controlled by Ansar al- Islam, staging through Iran on their way from Afghanistan.88 Ansar al-Islam would also later provide al-Zarqawi with a model for how jihadi governance could look like, as the group was an early adopter of the social media platforms that help make the Islamic State possible.89 The al-Qaeda members had entered Iraq with instructions to contact sympathetic members of the Iraqi military. The newly Islamised members of the Iraqi army would, following the fall of Saddam Hussein, be invaluable to the Iraqi insurgency. Their combat experience and strategic expertise would be key to both the insurgency and to the rapid rise, and success of the Islamic State.90 The presence of Ansar al-Islam would lead to accusations that Saddam Hussein’s regime was colluding with al-Qaeda. Accusations by the United States that Iraq was harbouring al-Qaeda operatives and manufacturing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) would lead to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.91 Although al-Qaeda members had entered Iraq, there were no direct linkages between them and the Hussein regime. In the aftermath of 9/11, there were those within the corridors of power in the US, who sought to draw such links.92 Whilst such claims have since proved to be demonstrably false, the US invasion of Iraq did create a space for al-Qaeda.93 As examined below, the decisions made by the US post 87 Ibid., 27. 88 Ibid., 26. 89 Brian H Fishman, The Master Plan: Isis, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory, 1st ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 23. 90 Atwan, 34. 91 Hosken, 28. 92 Mabon and Royle, 48. 93 Ibid. 28 invasion weakened the authority of the Iraqi state and created the conditions that gave rise to instability and insurgency. This created an unstable security environment that al- Qaeda could exploit. In its latest iteration, the rapid rise of the Islamic State can be attributed partly to former Ba’athist military officers. For example, the Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi’s two deputies Abu Ali al-Anbari and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani were both former Iraqi military officers. Al-Anbari was a major general, and Al-Turkmani was a lieutenant colonel in Iraqi military intelligence, skill sets that are invaluable for an insurgency.94 Being native Iraqi, they had the established social and tribal links that would allow an insurgency to gain support from the local population. However, current research has begun to question the degree of influence these and other former regime members truly had on the expansion of ISIS/Islamic State. Craig Whiteside points to research that indicates, at least in the case of al-Anbari, some had long been associated to Iraqi Salafist-jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Islam.95 However, Whiteside does state that Islamic State’s leadership did, during 2003-2006, deliberately recruit capable, and religiously acceptable, former regime members to address a skills shortfall in military tactics and intelligence.96 As Islamic State matured, and attracted experienced jihadists to its ranks there was less of a need to draw on the experience of former regime members.. The US invasion of Afghanistan also was to have significant consequences for the future of Iraq and later Syria. Following the bombing of Tora Bora in 2001, many 94 Atwan, 50. 95 Craig Whiteside, "A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017). 96 Ibid. 29 surviving al-Qaeda members filtered their way through Iran into Ansar al-Islam controlled areas.97 In 2002, this influx included the Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. Whilst linked to al-Qaeda, both al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda had held each other at arm’s length. In Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi had maintained an independent training camp near Herat.98 Al-Zarqawi named his group Jama’at Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad), situated away from the main al-Qaeda camps in eastern Afghanistan the group operated independently from al-Qaeda central. It was here that al-Zarqawi and his group became proficient in the art of infiltrating foreign fighters into an operational theatre, a skill set that would prove invaluable to the group establishing itself in Iraq and in Syria.99 Al-Zarqawi had quickly realised the porous and insecure nature of the Iraq-Syria border, and the opportunity that it presented. Shortly after the US led invasion began, al-Zarqwai took a meeting with Mohammad Ibrahim Makkawi (an al-Qaeda military strategist), agreeing to help al-Qaeda recruits enter Iraq via Syria.100 The US invasion was a military success; shock and awe at its height. The invasion of Iraq had taken just 21 days, with very little resistance from the Iraqi Army.101 The US had been hoping to repeat the success of their initial invasion of Afghanistan, in which their tactical success had transitioned quickly to an interim government.102 The Bush administration was quick to declare “Mission Accomplished in Iraq.”103 The UNSC (UN Security Council) passed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1511 to guarantee international support for restoring stability and security in 97 Atwan, 40. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., 41. 101 Mabon and Royle, 43. 102 David Kilcullen, Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror, 1st ed. (Carlton: Black Inc, 2016), 18. 103 Mabon and Royle, 43. 30 Iraq.104 What followed was something beyond mere hubris, with the American occupation being the catalyst for the rise of insurgent groups and their spread. Post invasion, the US took control of the Iraq state, and established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), an organisation that would prove to be ideologically driven, and disconnected from reality.105 The purpose of the CPA was to provide a provisional government until a new Iraqi government could be formed. Formed from nothing and staffed often by inexperienced personal, who frequently had little to no experience of Iraq or the Middle East, the CPA was underprepared for, and isolated from, the realities of the situation in Iraq. As demonstrated below, decisions made by the CPA would play a leading role in creating the conditions that would lead to insurgency and the eventual rise of the Islamic State. Headed by the “contemptuous” Paul Bremer, the CPA set about dismantling the remnants of the Hussein regime.106 As Emma Sky, a former advisor to the US military, suggests Bremer felt that there were no credible Iraqi leaders, and that it would be up to the US to directly administer Iraq.107 Orders were issued for the “De-Ba’athification” of Iraq the effect of which was to render unemployed large sections of Iraq’s military and civil service.108 CPA Order Number 1: “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society” provided the authority for the dismantling of Iraq’s military and civil society.109 The intent to remove all remnants of the Ba’ath party from Iraqi society had been articulated at the creation of the CPA, with the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld stating in a memo that the Coalition 104 Ibid. 105 Henin, 65. 106 Ibid. 107 Sky, 11. 108 Henin, 66. 109 Ambassador L Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, 1st ed. (New York Threshold Editions, 2006), 40. 31 would eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime.110 CPA Order Number 2: “Dissolution of Entities” articulated which entities were to be disestablished.111 These included the Ministry of Defence, all national security ministries and the Republican Guard; it also terminated the service of all members of the former military.112 The vacuum left in the wake of the orders created a space for the emergence of various militias, both Shia and Sunni, for whom the skills of the former soldiers would prove invaluable.113 A further error was made by the CPA, when they sought to create a new Iraqi government out of members of the Iraqi diaspora, many of who had been absent from Iraq for decades and lacked the capability, and most importantly, the legitimacy needed to govern.114 With Iraq’s security apparatus dismantled, looting became widespread.115 Iraq’s already precarious infrastructure was further degraded, as looters stole telephone lines, electrical lines and anything that could be turned to profit on the black-market.116 Emma Sky quotes an anonymous Iraqi, whom she met in an art gallery shortly after she arrived in Iraq: “All Iraqis are happy to see the end of Saddam. But we are frustrated with the lawlessness – and the lack of electricity and water.”117 The US Administration was incredulous at such reports, mocking journalists who reported on the worsening security situation.118 On the ground the American forces were exhausted, were constrained in numbers, skills, and left without the necessary command guidance to 110 Ibid., 39. 111 Ibid., 57. 112 Ibid. 113 Mabon and Royle, 49. 114 Henin, 66. 115 Andrew J Bacevich, America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2016), 253. 116 Ibid. 117 Sky, 12. 118 Bacevich, 253. 32 contain the insurgency.119 A significant cause for some of the instability was the CPA itself.120 Subject to the inter-agency rivalries that plague the US government, the CPA was created from nothing, having to develop processes, procedures and structures as it developed.121 It was also chronically undermanned with military staff, in roles they weren’t trained for, filling in for civilians.122 The civilian staff that were available to fill positions, were on short term contracts, often young, inexperienced and lacked the necessary experience in post-conflict reconstruction.123 As the security situation deteriorated, the violence increased. In the latter half of 2003, insurgents carried out attacks against embassies and NGOs (Non-Government Organisation), culminating in the August 19 attack on the UN offices in Baghdad, which killed the UN special envoy for Iraq, Vieira de Mello.124 The invasion had collapsed the Iraqi state, Iraq had become an example of Hobbes’ “state of nature” thesis in which everyone used violence to achieve their goals.125 Iraq’s new political process was birthed in a state of violence and occupation.126 Government posts, allocated on the basis of sect and ethnicity, institutionalised sectarianism.127 In respect to the effects of the invasion and rule of the CPA, Mabon and Royle state: “ This left Iraq as a state that failed to maintain control over its borders, failing in its responsibilities in terms of territoriality, lacking a monopoly over the use of the legitimate use of force and with a government that would soon embark on a programme 119 Ibid., 254. 120 Sky, 102. 121 Ibid., 103. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Henin, 67. 125 Sky, 153. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 33 of exclusionary policies.”128 Andrew J. Bacevich cites Operation Cyclone, the American’s covert operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan: “Operation Cyclone illustrates one of the central ironies of America’s Greater War for the Middle East – the unwitting tendency, while intently focusing on solving one problem, to exacerbate a second and plant the seeds for a third.”129 It is worth noting that this is a key feature of American intervention in the Middle East, that the United States has a propensity to concentrate on resolving one issue without giving much regard to the second, and third order effects. So, it was with the de-Ba’athification of Iraq. From its inception, the insurgency in Iraq was never a single monolithic entity, but instead consisted of multiple actors and constantly shifting alliances. The Iraqi insurgents were a mix of local secular nationalists, former Ba’athists, former Iraqi military and members of the security services.130 Some such as Haji Bakr, a former Brigadier-General in Saddam’s intelligence services would later be crucial in the formation of the Islamic State.131 Documents located after Bakr was killed in Syria in 2014, show him as the architect of Islamic States intelligence network.132 Whilst it is easy to point to former members of the Ba’athist regime as instigators of the insurgency, as the US administration at the time did, this isn’t entirely accurate.133 As Jason Burke points out, many of the attacks on coalition forces were spontaneous, and involved groups of friends, worshippers at the same mosque, even men whose children attended the same school.134 Former Ba’athists and the Salafist-jihadists formed short term 128 Mabon and Royle, 49-50. 129 Bacevich, 52. 130 Hosken, 40. 131 Ibid., 41. 132 Ibid. 133 Jason Burke, The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy, 1st ed. (New York: The New Press, 2015), 61. 134 Ibid. 34 strategic alliances as both sought to use the other as a vehicle to power. At the time, there were up to seven major Sunni Islamist groups in active conflict in Iraq; Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad with its large numbers of foreign fighters being the most dominant.135 Shia groups also proliferated, the most significant of which was Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Soon after the insurgency commenced, the Sunni Islamist groups were merged under the umbrella group Jaish Ansar al- Sunna (Army of the Followers of the Teachings).136 Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad remained outside of this alliance, even though both groups espoused a similar ideology. Iraq had quickly become an ideal place for jihad: a chaotic security situation, porous borders, especially with Syria, and an almost constant stream of foreign fighters. As one US general described it, Iraq had become a “terrorist magnet” with American forces considered a “target of opportunity”.137 American military tactics were also adding fuel to the insurgency. Night raids, and the detention of suspected insurgents, were causing a deepening resentment amongst the Iraqis.138 In a culture in which honour and respect are held high, the humiliation of men in front of their wives and families would create many of what David Kilcullen refers to as “accidental guerrillas.”139 Uncomfortable parallels were also being drawn between the actions of the US military, and the methodology of Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza.140 Military detention centres had become places of wanton criminal abuse; Abu Ghraib later becoming the symbol of such abuses.141 The international community began to express its concern 135 Atwan, 46. 136 Ibid., 47. 137 Bacevich, 259. 138 Ibid., 263. 139 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Scribe, 2009), xiv. 140 Bacevich, 264. 141 Ibid. 35 over the American approach in Iraq, with political and military figures regularly airing their concerns in the media.142 Bacevich states: “War is inherently a political act. Abu Ghraib represented a political setback of monumental proportions, so much so that we may date the failure of the Third Gulf War from this point.”143 Iraq also held symbolic value for the jihadists as well, as the seat of the Abbasid dynasty.144 Ruling for five hundred years, the Abbasid Caliphate arguably represents a pinnacle of Islamic success.145 After it was conquered in 1258 C.E, Baghdad, also represents a low point in Islam’s history, with the Mongol conquest a historical memory of internal weakness and of invasion by external powers.146 Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have used this theme of foreign powers assaulting Islam and invading Islamic lands, to recruit supporters and attract fighters to their organisations. 147 For the jihadist groups Iraq, following the American invasion, was rife with symbolism. For the jihadists, the belief held by many Iraqi Sunnis that the Mongol overthrow of the Abbasid Caliphate was aided and abetted by the Shia, provided an ideological framework.148 The jihadists could frame the American occupation, and the ascent of Shia, as a repetition of this historical moment. For the jihadists, this confirmed the idea of Shia antagonism, and underlined the need for them to confront the American occupation.149 As Barak Mendelson states: “It served as a rallying cry for Sunnis to join the insurgency in Iraq and led the most radical elements – al-Zarqawi and his followers – to view all Shia as collaborators and enemies who could be legitimately killed.”150 142 Sky, 100. 143 Bacevich, 266. 144 Mendelson, 88. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., 89. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 36 This isn’t a viewpoint that was unique to al-Zarqawi and his acolytes, but also shared by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, who take the view that Shia beliefs are contrary to the tenets of Islam.151 The Sunni Islamists’ strategy revolves around the intention to drive out the US and Coalition forces, and then create an Islamic state in Iraq. Iraq, for them, was a much more attractive battlefield, Arabic speaking and culturally familiar. The presence of the Arabs in Afghanistan, in particular the Salafist- jihadist Arabs, caused many difficulties.152 The principle differences laid in the differing schools of Islam. Afghans in the main belong to the Sufi and Hanafi schools of thought, the Salafists view both as heretics.153 At times, the differences came close to fighting. For example, Hamid and Farrall cite an incident in Kandahar in which the Afghans almost came to blows with the Arabs.154 The Arabs had gone to the tombs of fallen Afghans, and remove all the flags marking the tombs of the martyrs, the flags being considered shirk (idolatry) by the Arabs.155 It was only through the intervention of the leadership of both sides that armed conflict was prevented.156 The rigidity of the Arabs Salafi doctrine created tensions amongst the Taliban leadership. The Arabs were viewed as being a corrupting influence on the Taliban youth, turning them away from the traditions and cultural practices of Afghanistan.157 The cultural and language differences which had caused difficulties in Afghanistan now allowed the foreign fighters to easily blend into the ethno-political 151 Hosken, 69. 152 Hamid and Farrall, 37. 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid., 74. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid., 201. 37 landscape of the burgeoning Iraqi insurgency. Iraq’s Sunni population, paralleling the Taliban’s support for al-Qaeda, initially offered support to Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad. Al-Zarqawi’s fighters were given safe passage, money and shelter in the Sunni heartlands.158 From the outset of the insurgency, al- Zarqawi’s strategy was more than just fighting the US occupation. Al-Zarqawi believed that fomenting a conflict between the new Shia led government and Iraq’s Sunni population can create a sectarian conflict and the necessary ungoverned space/weak state that extremists need to consolidate and expand. Having sworn bayat (allegiance) to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in late 2004, Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad changed its title to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organisation of Jihad’s Base in Mesopotamia) also called al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, but more commonly known as, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).159 As Mendelson points out this would later prove to be a self-destructive act on the behalf of al-Qaeda. AQI would undermine al-Qaeda’s ideological coherence and its sectarian violence would permanently stain al-Qaeda’s reputation.160 Mendelson further states that al-Zarqawi sought to merge his Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad group with al-Qaeda for two reasons. One, was out of necessity for the implementation of al-Zarqawi’s strategy of sectarian conflict.161 Al-Zarqawi and Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad’s strategy for a sectarian war in Iraq, required considerable resources, in terms of finances and human resources.162 By becoming al-Qaeda’s official regional branch, al-Zarqawi would be able to tap into al-Qaeda’s network, resources and brand recognition.163 In many respects 21st 158 Atwan, 48. 159 Mendelson, 116. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid., 118. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 38 Century terrorist organisations are businesses for which marketing and brand recognition are as important as it is for a legitimate business. By joining al-Qaeda, al- Zarqawi gained brand recognition, strengthened legitimacy, access to al-Qaeda’s logistical and propaganda capabilities, and al-Qaeda’s network of donors, which led to more resources and foreign recruits.164 The second aspect was that al-Zarqawi maintained his independence. Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad had become an al-Qaeda franchise under the condition that it was free to continue its sectarian strategy in Iraq.165 Although this strategy ran counter to al-Qaeda’s which had focused on confronting the United States, there was little the al-Qaeda leadership could do to alter the situation.166 Al-Zarqawi took control of al-Qaeda’s narrative at a point in time where the groups founders were immobilized, challenging their ability to lead the jihad.167 As an organisation, AQI, was vastly different from its parent in Afghanistan. Al- Qaeda central reflected Osama bin Laden, an economics major and international businessman, and as such was very bureaucratic in its structure and recruitment. AQI, was the sum of al-Zarqawi’s experience, and more closely resembled a criminal organisation, a gang, and as such was a model easily replicated elsewhere.168 It accepted all comers, with its recruits not needing to prove their jihadist credentials to the same extent. For a period, the group flourished and enjoyed a degree of support from within Iraq. But al-Zarqawi continued to pursue a sectarian agenda, directing much of the group’s activities to instigate violence against Iraq’s Shia population. 169 Although al- 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Lawrence Wright, The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 192. 168 Ibid. 169 Mendelson, 123. 39 Qaeda’s principal leadership were opposed to al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda, the group helped rally support for their Iraqi affiliate, with a constant stream of new recruits seeking to join AQI.170 Al-Zarqawi’s ruthless violence and continuous targeting of fellow Muslims was quickly losing him and his group support from al-Qaeda’s leadership. Following the November 2005 attempted triple suicide bombing in Jordan, al-Zarqawi drew a rebuke from al-Qaeda’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.171 Al-Qaeda’s leadership were deeply concerned that al-Zarqawi’s brand of violence was damaging al-Qaeda’s image in Iraq. Because of concerns with al-Zarqawi’s strategy, senior leaders within al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Atiyatallah al-Libi, wrote letters to al-Zarqawi expressing their concerns.172 Al-Zawahiri was diplomatic in addressing al-Zarqawi, but was critical of al-Zarqawi for his violence against Iraq’s Shia. Instead of pursuing his sectarian strategy, al-Zawahiri extolled al-Zarqawi to redirect his energies to the expulsion of American forces from Iraq.173 As analysts would later remark, al-Zarqawi had selected targets that would confound American ambitions in Iraq, and which would ensure American entanglement in the insurgency.174 Al-Zawahiri objected to the targeting of the Shia on both strategic and doctrinal grounds. In his opinion, Iraq’s Shia should be treated as fellow Muslims. They were not to be treated as heretics if their actions were out of ignorance, and rather should be educated and guided to the truth.175 170 Atwan, 50. 171 Ibid. 172 Mendelson, 120. 173 Ibid., 121. 174 Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of Isis, 1st ed. (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 113. 175 Mendelson, 121. 40 Whilst al-Zawahiri had couched his criticism in a way as not to target al- Zarqawi, al-Libi was much blunter in his critique.176 Al-Libi pointedly told al-Zarqawi that he needed to change tack, and adhere to the instructions from al-Qaeda central.177 Al-Libi stated that al-Zarqawi should do more to win the hearts and minds of Iraq’s Sunni population, and should be careful not to target respected religious scholars or tribal leaders.178 Al-Libi also rebuked al-Zarqawi over the attacks in Jordan, stating that the conduct of operations into a new region was a strategic decision that could only be made by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.179 Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership had believed that by adopting Jama’at al-Tawid wal Jihad as its affiliate, it would give al-Qaeda’s leadership control of the jihadist narrative in Iraq. This was both naive and to no avail. It was perhaps symptomatic of the isolation of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership that al- Zarqawi chose to ignore them, and independently launched a devastating attack in Samarra against the Shia al-Askari Mosque.180 To address concerns that al-Zarqawi was imposing his wider agenda on what was still at its core an Iraqi civil war, an umbrella group of Sunni insurgent groups was formed. Named the Mujahideen Shura Council and headed by a native Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the council aimed to ease concerns that foreigners had subverted the Iraqi insurgency.181 Although the Mujahideen Shura Council was billed as an ally of al-Qaeda and six other minor jihadi groups, it was dominated by members from AQI.182 The other groups making up the council were relatively small, with no real operational 176 Ibid., 122. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid., 123. 181 Ibid., 124. 182 Ibid. 41 impact. Their main purpose was to be a shield against any claim that al-Zarqawi had made a unilateral power grab.183 Some groups refused to join the Council out of opposition to the sectarian violence embraced by al-Zarqawi, some such as Jaysh al- Islam (Islamic Army in Iraq), spoke out against al-Zarqawi.184 Al-Zarqawi continued to fall from favour with al-Qaeda’s leadership, and was demoted from leadership of AQI in April of 2006.185 Al-Zarqawi’s savagery had made him a marked man, and a target for the American counter-insurgency machine. By June of 2006, al-Zarqawi had been tracked and killed by the Americans.186 In October 2006, not long after the death of al- Zarqawi, the Mujahideen Shura Council rebranded itself as the Islamic State in Iraq (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyyah - ISI), under the leadership of an Iraqi Abu Omar al- Baghdadi.187 Al-Baghdadi was introduced as the Amir al-Mu’minin, a title which declared him as the “Commander/Prince of the Faithful”, an honorific that laid claim to leadership of the entire Muslim ummah (community, short for ummat al-Islamiyah the Islamic Community).188 By declaring himself as such al-Baghdadi implicitly announced himself as the Caliph of the Islamic State of Iraq, and changed his name to Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi.189 By using al-Qurayshi in his name al-Baghdadi was claiming to be descended from the tribe of the prophet Mohammad (PBUH).190 Such claims drew criticisms from Salafist-jihadist intellectuals and theorists who stated that al-Baghdadi had gone too far in his claims.191 The announcement of the formation 183 Ibid. 184 Hosken, 83. 185 Atwan, 51. 186 Ibid. 187 Hosken, 84. 188 Ibid., 87. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid., 88. 42 of ISI and its intentions to form a Caliphate, caught the al-Qaeda senior leadership off guard. Al-Qaeda communications from the time, indicated that the senior leadership was unfamiliar with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and were displeased with the groups intentions.192 According to Mendelson: “ISI leaders insisted they were justified in announcing the state, because during wartime, a Muslim who overpowers enemies is allowed to establish an Islamic state through imposition, alluding to (and embellishing) the group’s military success.”193 Mendelson points to ISI as issuing a direct challenge to al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s mantle of leadership for the jihad. ISI claimed that only the fighters directly involved in the jihad could select a Caliph, not the scholars and other Muslim leaders.194 Like its offspring the Islamic State, ISI established ruling councils and imposed Shari’a law in those areas of western Iraq that were under its sway.195 ISI had become the dominant force in large segments of Western Iraq, becoming the dominant actor in an area from Samarra and Mosul to Kirkuk.196 ISI quickly become the destination of choice for foreign fighters and Iraqi jihadists.197 The bulk of these fighters were from within the Middle East, from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, most of whom had infiltrated across the Syrian border.198 The United States and the Iraqi government sought to counter the jihadist threat by reaching out to disaffected Sunni tribes in the Anbar province.199 The US invasion of Iraq created dramatic changes in the structure of the Iraqi state.200 It was expected that the Iraqi 192 Mendelson, 123. 193 Ibid., 124. 194 Ibid. 195 Fishman, 218. 196 Atwan, 51. 197 Hosken, 105. 198 Ibid. 199 Atwan, 51. 200 Ronen Zeidel, "Tribes in Iraq: A Negligible Factor in State Formation," in Tribes and States in a Changing Middle East, ed. Uzi Rabi (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 171. 43 tribes would step in to fill the political vacuum left in the wake of Saddam’s removal, and yet this did not happen.201 Saddam had sought to fill the ranks of the Army, the Republican Guard, and other security services with members of his own tribe, the Albu Nasir of ‘Auja, later expanded to include others from the Tikriti region.202 However, much of this tribalisation by the Ba’athists came during periods of political instability; the 1958 revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf war, and the subsequent Shia Intifada in 1991.203 But whilst the tribes were trusted as members of the security apparatus, true political power was retained solely by Saddam.204 Tribes that supported the Hussein regime were rewarded for their loyalty and at times were heralded as bastions of the state.205 For the Hussein regime, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the impact of the sanctions imposed in its wake, tribal loyalty was a means of ensuring stability.206 By the time of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq’s tribes had experienced over a decade of empowerment.207 As a consequence, the tribes were too conspicuous to ignore. Made up of Sunni extremists, former Ba’athists and Iraqi nationalists, the basis of the resistance was religious and sectarian in nature.208 But within the provinces, predominantly the Anbar province, the resistance took on a tribal aspect. Operational zones were based upon tribal regions and secured by militias from the tribe and sub-tribal groups.209 As this structure spread across Iraq, other militias were also formed across social and religious lines. In response to the sectarian nature of ISI, Iraq’s Shia also formed 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid., 180. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid., 181. 205 Mabon and Royle, 83. 206 Ibid. 207 Zeidel, 182. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 44 militias, the results being that by early 2006, Iraq had been plunged into a sectarian civil war.210 In briefings produced by the US military at the time, Iraq was openly considered as being a failed state, or on the verge of becoming one.211 It was a five-way split, between Sunni, Shia, the Iraqi government, the Americans, and ISI. The Sunni tribes of Anbar suffered extensively, as their tribal members and leadership were targeted by ISI.212 Mabon and Royle cite the example of Sheikh Nasr al-Fahdawi of the Albu Fahad tribe.213 He was killed by one of his own tribesmen on the orders of AQI, because of his involvement in negotiations with the Americans.214 As Mabon and Royle state: “This tactic, commonly used by AQI, ensured that they were able to control and restrict tribal coordination, but it also paradoxically triggered the survivalist instincts of the tribes around them.”215 It was within Anbar, and under the leadership of the Abu Risha subtribe of the Dulaim, that the Americans were approached by the regions tribes.216 The Sahwa (Awakening/Resurgence) campaign was launched in 2006. Sunni tribes, tired of the abuses inflicted by ISI were encouraged to side with the Americans and contribute forces to a new Sunni militia group, Abnaa al-Iraq (the Sons of Iraq).217 Led by tribal leader Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the movement spread to other areas and by 2007 had an estimated 100,000 men under arms. 218 In response to the successful co-option of Anbar’s Sunni tribes, the United States committed an additional 21,500 ground troops to the Iraqi campaign under what was to become known as the 210 Zeidel, 183. 211 Bacevich, 276. 212 Zeidel, 183. 213 Mabon and Royle, 87. 214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Zeidel, 183. 217 Ibid. 218 Atwan, 52. 45 “Surge”.219 The campaign was largely successful with significant inroads made against ISI throughout 2007 and into 2008. However, the success of the “Surge” is debatable; it can be argued that all it achieved was a continuation of a temporary decline in violence.220 Whilst the security situation in Iraq had improved temporarily, violence and the insurgency persisted.221 The success of the Sahwa did not come lightly. Sheikh Abu Risha was killed in September 2007 at the hands of ISI, but by 2008 both the American and Iraqi governments were confident that they had broken the back of the insurgency.222 So confident were the Iraqi and American administrations, that in late 2008 the two governments began negotiating the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed on 27 November 2008, the US began a staged withdrawal from 2009, departing Iraq completely by the end of 2011.223 The US withdrawal is an example of what happens when a conflict is drawn out. The Iraq conflict had reached a point whereby domestic politics outweigh strategic considerations.224 Elected on a campaign promise to get US forces out of Iraq, the Obama administration attempted to withdraw from Iraq as quickly as it could.225 A critical error was made in late 2008, when the US handed control of the Abnaa al-Iraq over to the Maliki government. Having received extensive military training from the US, these fighters had been led to believe that they would be adsorbed into the new 219 Ibid. 220 Bacevich, 286. 221 Ibid., 290. 222 Atwan, 52. 223 Ibid. 224 Bacevich, 291. 225 Ibid. 46 Iraqi government, and would be given position in either the public administration or within the security forces.226 It was now that the optimism of the American strategy in recruiting tribal militias was exposed. The Shia dominated Maliki government dismissed the Abnaa al-Iraq without compensation and on sectarian grounds. Only a small number of the Abnna al-Iraq were able to secure employment within the Iraqi government.227 This posed a threat to the very provinces, which had been secured from the predatory advances of ISI.228 Without hope of securing their future and without means to provide for their families, the remnants of the Abnaa al-Iraq were absorbed into the insurgency.229 These men, having been trained by the US, having gained combat experience alongside the Americans, in 2014 became the backbone of the Islamic State’s army.230 Throughout 2009, ISI carried out a series of attacks on the Maliki government. For instance, in August of 2009, a combined mortar and VBIED (Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Device) attack against the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance killed 122 people.231 Although renewed efforts were made to quell the insurgency, 2010 remained a period of political instability. It created a security vacuum that ISI sought to fill. Al-Maliki’s second term was marked by increasing corruption and allegations of authoritarianism. Al-Maliki sought to centralise control under himself and trusted cronies. He appointed new army and security chiefs without parliamentary approval, and appointed himself Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior and National Security.232 Maliki had become increasingly remote and isolated, neither trusting the Sunni, nor his fellow Shia in the Sadrist Shia Party.233 Maliki made 226 Zeidel, 183. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 230 Atwan, 53. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid., 54. 233 Henin, 72. 47 attempts to play the nationalist card to garner support, but was constrained in this by the risk of alienating the Kurds.234 Al-Maliki took steps to ensure that former Ba’athists were excluded from the corridors of power by passing new legislation.235 In addition to running his own militias, al-Maliki’s administration was suffering from accountability and transparency issues. American commanders had expressed doubts about al-Maliki’s suitability with some, such as General David Petraeus’s executive officer Colonel Peter Mansoor, holding the viewpoint that al-Maliki’s only goal was looking after himself.236 Some US$100 billion in foreign aid had been poured into Iraq during al-Maliki’s reign, much of which was unaccounted for.237 Many of the security forces were ghosts, in that they appeared on the books and were paid salaries but no one knew if they reported for duty, or even if they existed.238 In a secret cable Peter Crocker, the US Ambassador to Iraq in 2007, expressed concern about the al-Maliki administration and the concentration of power in the hands of Shia Islamists, which was beginning to mirror Hussein’s authoritarian regime.239 By the summer of 2010, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated. Insurgent and sectarian attacks were on the rise and the Iraqi public were losing confidence in the ability of the state to protect them. As the result, many turned to local and often sectarian militias for security.240 Little heed was taken to warning signs that al-Qaeda was increasing its influence in Iraq. With no truly representative, or competent, government in place by the completion of the US withdrawal in December of 2011, Iraq 234 Ibid. 235 Atwan, 54. 236 Hosken, 147. 237 Atwan, 55. 238 Ibid. 239 Hosken, 150. 240 Atwan, 55. 48 collapsed back into violence. As Nicolas Henin described the situation: “the departure of the last American troops paradoxically initiated a new period of instability, under the leadership of the highly authoritarian and sectarian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. As a result, in much of Iraq, US occupation was replaced by a much more insidious phenomenon – self-occupation by the country’s own security forces.”241 Fomented by the corrupt and exclusionary policies of the al-Maliki government, Iraq was subjected to a renewed and deeply sectarian insurgency.242 With the fabric of Iraqi society torn asunder and divided into enclaves dominated by Sunni and Shia militias; any protests were ruthlessly supressed.243 Adding fuel to the fire was the merging of ISI with al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate the Salafist-jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra in April 2013.244 Declaring itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi ‘l-Iraq wa-sh-sham - ISIS) the group announced its arrival by launching a series of raids against the Iraqi prisons in Abu Ghraib and Taji. The raids released hundreds of al-Qaeda leaders and fighters and was a massive blow to the al-Maliki government. ISIS bolstered its ranks with hundreds of experienced Salafist-jihadists who sought revenge on those that had imprisoned them.245 ISIS was to strengthen and consolidate its grip on the Iraqi insurgency, expanding its violence to carry out massacres of Christians, Kurds and Yazidis. ISIS aimed to gain control of Iraq’s economic resources, and launched campaigns to wrest control of Iraq’s lucrative oilfields away from the central government and the Kurdish administration in the North.246 In the summer of 2014, ISIS 241 Henin, xiii. 242 Atwan, 55. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid., 56. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid., 57. 49 launched an offensive with the aim of seizing Mosul and securing the northern oilfields.247 Gutted by the reckless, sectarian policies of the Maliki regime, unable to pose a credible, or any real defence, the Iraqi army melted away.248 The poorly equipped, badly led soldiers voted with their feet; why should they die for a corrupt regime?249 On 11 June 2014, ISIS seized Tikrit; by 29 June, ISIS had declared its Caliphate.250 Throughout 2013 and 2014, Iraq’s political crisis escalated. Al-Maliki had become increasingly isolated, losing the support of both the Kurds and the United States. Many blamed al-Maliki for Iraq’s situation, journalist Patrick Cockburn quotes Iraqi political scientist Ghassan al-Attiyah: “He may have won over the Shia, but he has lost Iraq.”251 The fatal blow for al-Maliki came when Iran withdrew its support.252 ISIS made the most of the chaotic scene, forming alliances with local Sunni groups, tribes and former Ba’athists. The situation in Iraq had deteriorated to such an extent, that in 2014 when ISIS forces entered Mosul, they were greeted by cheering crowds.253 In May 2014, al-Maliki managed to secure re-election, but it was short lived; by August 2014 Iraq’s president Fouad Massoum had removed al-Maliki from office.254 The realisation that the al-Maliki government had created a security vacuum came too late. By the summer of 2014, al-Maliki had been unseated. His replacement Haider al-Abadi, offered hope for change and began to institute reforms.255 Al-Abadi aimed to address 247 Wright, 313. 248 Ibid. 249 Atwan, 57. 250 Wright, 313. 251 Cockburn, The Age of Jihad: Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East, 332. 252 Atwan, 57. 253 Ibid., 58. 254 Ibid. 255 Mabon and Royle, 51. 50 the socio-economic conditions that were the cause of much of Iraq’s instability.256 However, by late 2014, ISIS was well on its way to establishing itself as the lead Salafist-jihadist group in the region. In summary, we can see that even under the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein there was a deep strain of political Islam within Iraq. One that the Hussein regime was willing to exploit for its own ends against perceived rivals. As discussed, this link to Salafist-jihadists along with Iraq’s suspected WMD program was used as justification for the invasion of Iraq. The US invasion would prove to be a trigger for the events that followed. De-Ba’athification and the failure to provide for the security of the Iraqi population post-invasion would lead to a deterioration of the Iraqi security environment. In the period post-invasion, Iraqis would turn to others for their security; tribal and sectarian militias along with the Salafist-jihadists would become the arbiters of security. The sectarian policies of the al-Maliki government would create a situation that was exploited by ISI and later Islamic State. ISI/Islamic State deliberately exacerbated the sectarian tensions. It was this willingness to target other Muslims that set ISI/Islamic State apart from al-Qaeda. It was these factors; exploitation of political Islam, the US invasion and De-Ba’athification and increasing sectarian divisions that created the conditions that led to the emergence of Islamic State. 256 Ibid. 51 Fitna Both Iraq and Syria provided the conditions that led to the rise of the Islamic State. However equally important is the division that occurred between al-Qaeda and Islamic State. The following chapter examines the split between the two Salafist-jihadist groups. It looks at how and why such a split occurred and how it has impacted on the rise of Islamic State. It also examines the divisions and changing alliances amongst the Salafist-jihadist communities considering the rise of Islamic State. In Arabic, the term fitna refers to a period of revolt, disturbance or to a civil war which leads to a schism, it is a fitting description for the split that occurred between Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra/al-Qaeda. Just as significant as the political instability in Iraq and Syria is to the rise of Islamic State, so is the ideological and physical rivalry between Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The groups differ extensively from each other, not only because of the personal animosity between al-Baghdadi and al-Zawahiri over the claims of leadership of the jihad, but the strategy that each group pursues.257 Islamic State is focused on the creation of its own Caliphate, and it is far more ruthless in doing so.258 Both organisations are competing for the hearts and minds of the existing jihadist networks. The ties are broad, stretching from the tribal regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, across the Middle East, into the Sahel (transitional region between the Sahara and the Sudanian savanna) and into South East Asia.259 Neither group can exist without the long-term support of these networks. Al-Qaeda has been the 257 Burke, 17. 258 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, The Global Jihad Movement, 1st ed. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 366. 259 Burke, 18. 52 primary architect and beneficiary of these networks, much of which has been based on personal relationships and shared combat experience. In the Syrian case Jabhat al- Nusra is perceived as being more authentically Syrian than Islamic State, which is considered a foreign imposition upon the Syrian uprising.260 As Charles Lister points out al-Nusra had acquired broad acceptance and admiration amongst the opposition and had attracted many Syrians to its ranks.261 Islamic State has rejected the al-Qaeda strategy of targeting the “far enemy”, instead choosing to pursue targets much closer to home.262 Broadly speaking the ideological split can be likened to the difference between old school mafia (al-Qaeda) and new urban street gang (ISIS). This phenomenon in which Salafist-jihadi beliefs mix with gang culture was noted by Jason Burke in the wake of the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013. Described as “Jihadi- Cool”, Burke noted the propensity for youth gangs in Muslim majority areas in England to blend the language and dress of the Salafists with gang culture.263 Laura Huey also points the extensive use of social media by Salafist-jihadists in which online communities have become a primary means of radicalisation.264 The members of such groups often had a superficial relationship with Islam, and even after some had chosen the militant path, they retained their criminal links.265 Fawaz A. Gerges also points to a generational difference between Islamic State and its predecessors. He states the previous waves of jihadists during the 70s and 90s drew their leaders from the “social 260 Gunaratna and Oreg, 366. 261 Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 115. 262 Burke, 17. 263 Ibid., 179. 264 Laura Huey, "This Is Not Your Mother’s Terrorism: Social Media, Online Radicalization and the Practice of Political Jamming," Journal of Terrorism Research 6, no. 2 (2015). 265 Burke, 181. 53 elite”, such as bin Laden, and al-Zawahiri, and were supported by the educated middle class.266 Gerges argues that Islamic State lacks the same intellectual and theological base, drawing the bulk of its support and combatants from the lower middle class and rural poor.267 Islamic State has developed its propaganda to appeal to a younger generation, one that sees political violence as being part of its counter culture.268 The old guard, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, believed in a slower approach, seeking to remove foreign influence and those Arab regimes that they saw as being apostate.269 Al-Zarqawi, in perhaps a reflection of his background as a petty thug and criminal, sought a quicker more violent route to achieving his goals. Islamic State holds firm to its belief in the doctrine of takfir (pronouncement that a person is an unbeliever (kafir) used by Islamic State to sanction violence against all those it deems to be insufficiently religious), in that the Muslim ummah must be purged of murtad (deviants and unbelievers).270 This belief that the ummah must be cleansed of those that do not adhere to the Islamic States ideal of the one true faith has led to widespread brutal, often sectarian, violence. As an overall strategy, Islamic State has followed the guidelines outlined in Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery which advocates a three-phased campaign.271 Firstly, is ‘nikayah’ a period in which insurgents would wage a terror campaign to compel opposing forces, military and civil to withdraw from an area. The second phase, ‘tawahhush’ is a mix of unconventional and conventional warfare designed to foment civil unrest and sectarian violence. The last phase, ‘tamkin’ is a 266 Gerges, 10. 267 Ibid. 268 Huey. 269 Atwan, 61. 270 Ibid. 271 Abu Bakr Naji and William McCants, "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass," (John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies: Harvard University, 2006). 54 phase of consolidation, in which the militants take control of an area and establish their authority.272 Al-Zarqawi’s approach to jihad led to admonishment from al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, who rebuked al-Zarqawi for his attacks on fellow Muslims.273 Whilst al-Qaeda’s central leadership has advocated minimising attacks on fellow Muslims, Islamic State has no such compunctions, and is committed to carrying out sectarian attacks on its co-religionists.274 Before his assassination by the US, bin Laden had begun to express concern at the direction that al-Qaeda had taken, worried that the organisation was perceived as nothing more than a terror group and arbiter of extremism. Amongst the notes and papers found in his compound in Abbottabad following his death, were a collection concerning possible name changes for al- Qaeda.275 For example, some of the possible name changes under consideration were: Taifat al-Tawhed wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad Group); Hizb tawhid al-Umma al- Islamiya (Islamic National Unification Party) and Jama’at I’Adat al-Khilafat al- Rashida (Restoration of the Caliphate Group).276 The proposed new titles were cumbersome, but reflected the ideological direction that bin Laden had wanted al- Qaeda to take.277 Sensing its time had come, ISI stepped up its campaign of terror though 2009. A series of attacks were directed at government facilities, embassies and Shia targets.278 The attacks against Iraq’s Shia population were targeted and deliberate.279 In a letter 272 Burke, 81. 273 Mendelson, 122. 274 Burke, 17. 275 Atwan, 63. 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 Atwan, 65. 279 Michael Griffin, Islamic State: Rewriting History, 1st ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 8. 55 written in 2004 to bin Laden, al-Zarqawi describes Iraq’s Shia’s as being lurking snakes and malicious scorpions.280 He further stated that by targeting the Shia’s religious, political and military symbols, he hoped to foment a civil war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia.281 Seeking to reduce Iraq to a state of chaos and fragmentation, ISI conducted a campaign of sectarian cleansing. Political Analyst Michael Griffin states that “al- Zarqawi was effectively proposing that Iraqi Sunnis should rediscover their religious purity through a campaign of collective suicide.”282 In scenes reminiscent of the Bosnian conflict, Iraqis divided along sectarian lines. Iraq split amongst the three major groups, Shia in the South, Sunnis in the middle, and Kurds in the North. Whilst this division largely reflected the pre-conflict populations, many of the towns and cities that had mixed populations became sharply divided.283 Chronic food shortages exacerbated the sectarian divisions, rampant inflation, and the loss of critical infrastructure.284 Lacking a credible government to address these concerns, many Iraqis turned to traditional religious groups for support. As the violence in Iraq increased, Islamic extremism became an acceptable alternative for Iraq’s Sunni.285 With al-Qaeda’s leadership isolated in the Pakistani hinterland and out of touch with the situation on the ground in Iraq, a generational shift was taking place.286 For many of this new generation of jihadists the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 9/11 were history. Whilst the veterans of Afghanistan were respected, the new generation bristled against what they saw as the ponderous leadership of the 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid. 282 Ibid., 9. 283 Atwan, 65. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 286 Ibid. 56 Afghan-Arab veterans.287 Building upon the initial success of al-Qaeda central, several franchise groups made their appearance on the global scene. Foremost amongst these, and arguably the most successful of the al-Qaeda offshoots, was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).288 Formed in early 2009 in Yemen, AQAP was closely linked to al-Qaeda; its leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, also known as Abu Bassir had been bin Laden’s private secretary.289 AQAP’s rapid rise was the result of a population sympathetic to al-Qaeda and of close links to Yemeni tribal groups.290 In a precursor to the Islamic State’s sophisticated use of social media, AQAP pioneered the use of social networking. In this respect, AQAP had a significant advantage in the form of Anwar al- Awlaki. Al-Awlaki was a US citizen, born in Yemen but had spent much of his adult life in America.291 Well-educated, articulate and a popular Imam, al-Awlaki was sought after as a speaker and commentator.292 Like al-Zarqawi, al-Awlaki had a criminal past (prosecuted for soliciting prostitutes in 1996 and 1997).293 In both cases, rather than being reviled for their past behaviours, their perceived repentance was seen as an example for Muslim youth who sought a means of redemption for their own indiscretions. Al-Awlaki reached out to Islamic youth through social media platforms and launched al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.294 Inspire was a major step beyond previous jihadist propaganda pamphlets. It was glossy well-written and importantly, it was in English. As Scott Shane describes it: “With its breezy style, how-to features, and celebrity promotion, Inspire was a dead-on imitation of American consumer magazine rack, Maxim for the jihadi set.”295 It was this accessibility that gave al-Qaeda and later 287 Ibid., 66. 288 Gunaratna and Oreg, 120. 289 Ibid., 133. 290 Atwan, 66. 291 Shane, 51. 292 Ibid., 145-46. 293 Ibid., 107-09. 294 Ibid., 247-48. 295 Ibid., 248. 57 Islamic State ideologues the ability to spread their message to disaffected Muslims across the globe.296 This digital jihad is also exceptionally hard to counter. As one social media platform