Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis.  Permission is given for 
a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and 
private study only.  The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without 
the permission of the Author. 
 



 

 

 

‘More than a housewife’  

Tradwives: The Influencers of Right-Wing Extremism 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 

Master of Science  

in  

Psychology 

 

at Massey University, Aotearoa New Zealand 

 

 

 

 

 

S. M. Sykes 

2023 

 



1 
 

 

Acknowledgments 

“Ehara taku toa i te toa takitahi, engari kē he toa takitini” 

My success should not be bestowed onto me alone, 

it was not individual success but the success of a collective. 

 

They say it takes a village to raise a child, and that couldn’t be more true in this 

instance. Twelve months ago, I decided to leave a budding marketing career to pursue a little 

thesis on Tradwives. Some would consider that a poor decision in the early 2020’s, but I’ve 

always considered myself a sink or swim kind of person. Here are a few of the people who 

helped me swim when I found myself floundering out at sea…  

To the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and He Whenua 

Taurikura; It was an honour and a privilege to conduct this research with your support and in 

recognition of those impacted by the March 15 attacks committed in Ōtautahi, Christchurch. 

Good research doesn’t happen in a silo - thank you to this growing research community for 

the insightful discussions, and gracious sharing of knowledge. 

To my supervisor Dr Veronica Hopner; Thank you for your guidance and genuine 

passion for this topic. I consider myself incredibly lucky to have conducted this research with 

you. We’ve been on a real journey with these women and it’s bittersweet finally coming to 

the end. I certainly hope this isn’t the last time we work together. 

My family & friends - you know who you are; From warm phone calls, genuine 

messages, and snack deliveries, to stories that make you laugh until it hurts, thank you for 

persevering through the last year where thesis was my entire identity. I am grateful to be 

surrounded by such a wonderful community of humans.. and four-legged pals.  

Finally to James; My best friend, partner in crime, and the one directly impacted by 

his wife completing a thesis on Tradwives. Thank you for supporting me every step of the 

way. All my love, always. 



2 
 

 

Abstract 

The right-wing landscape is vast with a variety of expressions, communities and cultures 

existing within its realm. Understanding the extent of Right-Wing Extremism and its 

association to not only violence, but also to ideological radicalisation is a prominent and 

important area of research for Aotearoa New Zealand and the world. Globalising anti-

globalism and modernising the anti-modern, the Tradwife phenomena is a new and uniquely 

social media-based movement. Tradwives are an influential community of right-wing women 

that espouse the traditional feminine lifestyle of being a wife and mother and capitalise on 

contemporary social media marketing strategies to promote a uniquely feminine persona that 

is equal parts ideology and aesthetic. This thesis explores a moment in time of the Tradwife 

community and seeks to conceptualise their ecosystem, understanding how Tradwives have 

attempted to mainstream their ideologies through processes of radicalisation and social media 

influencing. A Netnographical analysis positions the Tradwife phenomena within the right- 

wing landscape and presents four key findings or ‘holons’ which cohere into a holography of 

the ‘who, why, and how’ that fuels Tradwife culture. Observing the Tradwife community not 

as its individual parts, but as a whole creates in-depth understandings of Tradwife culture. As 

an alive and growing ecosystem, Tradwife culture offers women distinct norms for action, 

and actively works to grow reach through nuanced techniques of influencer marketing and 

online radicalisation. This research finds that despite a continuum of right-wing affiliation 

existing within the Tradwife Landscape, the very subscription to Tradwife culture by 

definition promotes right-wing and at times extremist thought in an attempt to influence other 

women to take up the Tradwife cause.  

  



3 
 

 

Table of Contents 

Acknowledgments...................................................................................................................... 1 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 3 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ 6 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. 8 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 9 
Expressions of Right-Wing Ideology....................................................................................... 15 

Religion ................................................................................................................................ 18 
Paganism ........................................................................................................................... 19 
The Christian Right .......................................................................................................... 22 

Table 1 .................................................................................................................................. 30 
Politics .................................................................................................................................. 32 
Figure 1 ................................................................................................................................ 33 
The Modern Militia Movement ............................................................................................ 39 
Intentional Communities and Cults ...................................................................................... 42 
Sovereign Citizen Movement ............................................................................................... 44 
Counterculture Groups ......................................................................................................... 47 
The Individual Level ............................................................................................................ 50 

The Right-Wing Landscape ..................................................................................................... 52 
Conservative Right ............................................................................................................... 53 
Alt-Lite ................................................................................................................................. 54 
Alt-Right .............................................................................................................................. 55 

Theories of Radicalisation ....................................................................................................... 59 
The Radicalisation Lifecycle, Push-Pull, and Stage Theories of Radicalisation ................. 61 
Online Radicalisation ........................................................................................................... 64 
Redpilling ............................................................................................................................. 67 

Women in the Alt-Right ........................................................................................................... 69 
Tradwives ................................................................................................................................. 72 

Rejection of Feminism ......................................................................................................... 74 
Fourth Wave Feminism .................................................................................................... 74 

Social Media and Influencer Marketing ............................................................................... 79 
Influencer Culture ............................................................................................................. 85 

Research Aim ........................................................................................................................... 87 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 88 

Data Collection ..................................................................................................................... 89 



4 
 

 

Investigation ..................................................................................................................... 91 
Immersion ......................................................................................................................... 98 

Data Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 101 
Collating ......................................................................................................................... 103 
Coding ............................................................................................................................ 103 
Combining ...................................................................................................................... 105 

Findings & Discussion ........................................................................................................... 105 
Holon 1: The Tradwife Landscape ..................................................................................... 108 

Conservative Tradwives ................................................................................................. 109 
Conversely, Alt-Right Tradwives ................................................................................... 110 
Sitting between Conservative Right Tradwives and Alt-Right Tradwives were Alt-Lite 
Tradwives ....................................................................................................................... 111 
Religious Tradwives ....................................................................................................... 112 
Political Tradwives ......................................................................................................... 120 
Militia Tradwives ........................................................................................................... 125 
The last group identified were Counterculture Tradwives ............................................. 128 
The Deepening of Commitment within Tradwives ........................................................ 132 

Holon 2: Cross-platform Influencers.................................................................................. 135 
Twitter ............................................................................................................................ 137 
Instagram ........................................................................................................................ 142 
Facebook ......................................................................................................................... 149 
YouTube ......................................................................................................................... 154 
TikTok ............................................................................................................................ 158 
Other ............................................................................................................................... 161 
Cross-Platform Influencing as a Radicalisation Pathway............................................... 163 

Holon 3: Feminine not feminist ......................................................................................... 166 
Holon 4: The Tradwife Side-Hustle ................................................................................... 181 

Goods .............................................................................................................................. 183 
Services ........................................................................................................................... 187 
Partnerships and Advertising .......................................................................................... 190 

Tradwife Culture .................................................................................................................... 194 
The Impact of Tradwife Culture ......................................................................................... 199 
Tradwife Culture in Aotearoa New Zealand ...................................................................... 202 
Limitations and Future research ......................................................................................... 204 
Concluding thoughts .......................................................................................................... 205 

References .............................................................................................................................. 207 



5 
 

 

Appendix A  Most popular social networks worldwide as of January 2022, ranked by number 
of monthly active users* ........................................................................................................ 265 
Appendix B Social Media Platform Scoring Index ............................................................... 266 
Appendix C Selection of Tradwife Dataset ........................................................................... 267 
Appendix D Tradwife Dataset ................................................................................................... 1 

  



6 
 

 

List of Figures 

Figure 1  Positioning Aotearoa, NZ’s Political Landscape (adapted from Edwards, 2009) ... 33 
Figure 2  How existential societal threats contribute to inequality and growing support for 
right-wing politics. ................................................................................................................... 38 
Figure 3  Kek........................................................................................................................... 50 
Figure 4  The Right-Wing Landscape ..................................................................................... 53 
Figure 5  The CVE Cycle (Hedayah, 2022) ............................................................................ 62 
Figure 6  Borum’s Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset (Borum, 2003) ..................... 63 
Figure 7  Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005) .................................... 64 
Figure 8  Shortened version of Hogan's Child Terrorist Socialisation Theory for online 
radicalisation to RWE groups (Liang & Cross, 2020) ............................................................. 65 
Figure 9  First, Second, and Third Wave Feminism (Vijayakumar & Maich, 2018). ............ 74 
Figure 10  The "Liberated" Feminist vs. Tradwife meme (Cooksey, 2021) ........................... 79 
Figure 11  Key methods used during social media profile scouting ....................................... 93 
Figure 12  Organising Tradwife Dataset by Extremity ........................................................... 97 
Figure 13 Immersion Journal Entry 29/04/2022 ................................................................... 100 
Figure 14  The Tradwife Holarchy ....................................................................................... 108 
Figure 15  The Tradwife Landscape ..................................................................................... 109 
Figure 16  Conservative Right Tradwife Examples - The Lifestyle Aesthetic ..................... 110 
Figure 17   Alt-Right Tradwife Examples - The Ideological Aesthetic ................................ 111 
Figure 18   Alt-Lite Tradwife Examples - The Blended Aesthetic ....................................... 112 
Figure 19  Pagan Religious Tradwife @hearthandhelm ....................................................... 114 
Figure 20  Alt-Right Pagan Tradwife Example - Lana Lokteff ............................................ 116 
Figure 21  Christian Religious Tradwife Example – @growinggoodings ............................ 118 
Figure 22  Christian Religious Tradwife Example - @_cynthialoewen ............................... 119 
Figure 23  Candace Owens sharing her views on Twitter about the overturning of Roe vs. 
Wade ...................................................................................................................................... 122 
Figure 24  Candace Owens sharing her views on Twitter about the War on Ukraine .......... 122 
Figure 25  Candace Owens sharing her views on Twitter about Transgender rights ........... 123 
Figure 26  Daisy Cousens' YouTube Channel ...................................................................... 124 
Figure 27  Militia Tradwife example - @goodpatriot ........................................................... 127 
Figure 28  Counterculture Tradwife example @tradspostingws .......................................... 131 
Figure 29  Continuum of extremity within Tradwives ......................................................... 133 
Figure 30  The Transformed Wife Tweets in one day .......................................................... 139 
Figure 31  @feminINEnotIST Twitter vs. Instagram posting in one day ............................. 140 
Figure 32  Tradwife on-feed posting offered a window into their aesthetic and positioning 
within the Tradwife Landscape .............................................................................................. 144 
Figure 33  Example of a text on-feed post by @thetradwivesclub ....................................... 144 
Figure 34  Instagram story posting - Life Updates ............................................................... 145 
Figure 35  Instagram story posting - Brand affiliation/promotion ........................................ 146 
Figure 36 Instagram story posting - Q&A/Ask Me Anything .............................................. 146 
Figure 37  Instagram Reel example - @classicallyabby ....................................................... 148 
Figure 38  Instagram Reel Example - @tradwivesclub ........................................................ 149 
Figure 39  Facebook long format post example - Girl Defined ............................................ 151 
Figure 40  Example of Tradwife Private Facebook Group ................................................... 152 
Figure 41  Example of 'Trolling' on Tradwife Facebook posts ............................................. 153 
Figure 42  Negative Sentiment on @classicallyabby wage gap Reel ................................... 153 
Figure 43  Comment section of Robyn Riley video illustrating Persuasive Arguments Theory
................................................................................................................................................ 158 



7 
 

 

Figure 44  1950's approach to the Tradwife Aesthetic ......................................................... 168 
Figure 45  Suzy-homemaker (right) vs. future-Karen (left) - Characters by Jennifer Mock to 
show the irrelevance of feminism .......................................................................................... 172 
Figure 46  Bernadine Bluntly (@fearless.femininity)........................................................... 174 
Figure 47  Leaving feminism for femininity - example 1 ..................................................... 175 
Figure 48  Leaving feminism for femininity - example 2 ..................................................... 176 
Figure 49  Illustration of the Tradwife age range ................................................................. 179 
Figure 50  The Tradwives Club 'About Us' page on their website ....................................... 184 
Figure 51  @thetradwivesclub merchandise ......................................................................... 185 
Figure 52  The Postmodern Family t-shirt line ..................................................................... 186 
Figure 53  Instagram promotion for Solie's Naptime Side Hustle ........................................ 188 
Figure 54  The Darling Academy's Kitchen Management Manual ...................................... 188 
Figure 55  Examples of Amazon Affiliate Pages .................................................................. 191 
Figure 56  Madison Vining X Walli phone case partnership ................................................ 192 
Figure 57  Advertisement example including in Lauren Chen’s video ................................ 193 

  

 

 

  



8 
 

 

List of Tables 

Table 1  Religious Affiliation of the Supreme Court .............................................................. 30 
Table 2  Cognitive biases that can lead to susceptibility for conspiracy theory belief 
(Brotherton & French, 2015; Farinelli, 2021) .......................................................................... 46 
Table 3  Social Networking Platforms .................................................................................... 81 
Table 4  Social Media Sharing Platforms................................................................................ 82 
Table 5  Tradwife Signifiers .................................................................................................. 104 
Table 6  @blondeinthebellyofthebeast response to Aotearoa NZ's March 15 attacks - 
commentary............................................................................................................................ 130 
Table 7  How Tradwives Use YouTube ................................................................................ 155 
Table 8  TikTok example - @esteecwilliams ........................................................................ 160 
Table 9  TikTok example - @thereservedwife ...................................................................... 161 
Table 10  Comments Section of Mrs. Midwest video 'How to Speak Femininely' .............. 182 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



9 
 

 

Introduction 

“There is no question that ideas and language of division and hate have existed for decades, 

but their form of distribution and tools of organisation - they are new” 

 (Jacinda Ardern, 2019). 

Aotearoa New Zealand is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world 

(The Office of Ethnic Communities, 2016). Home to more ethnicities than the world has 

countries, Aotearoa New Zealand (Aotearoa NZ) strives to maintain a harmonious society 

with strong social cohesion and actively creates opportunities for cultural growth. In 2017, 

the nation ranked as the tenth most socially progressive country in the world and scored 

highly in terms of freedom, human rights, tolerance and inclusion (Social Progress Index, 

2017). However, as our population continues to diversify, we increasingly face challenges 

which threaten social cohesion and national security. Extremism is one such challenge.  

The Royal Commission of New Zealand (RCNZ) defines extremism as ‘belief 

systems that exist substantially outside the more broadly accepted belief systems in large 

parts of society’ (RCNZ, 2020; p 7). Although any belief system can result in extreme 

interpretation, some are more prominent, threatening, and influential than others. Despite 

Islamist extremism and terrorism dominating international counterterrorism efforts since 

9/11, the rising threat of Right-Wing Extremism (RWE), and resulting acts of terrorism have 

warranted increasing government and scholarly attention (Dier & Baldwin, 2022). Right-

Wing Extremism (RWE) is an increasingly dominant form of extremism that threatens 

security and stability across the world. In 2019, the Global Terrorism Index reported a global 

320% increase in acts of terrorism in the name of RWE over the last 5 years (Institute for 

Economics & Peace, 2019). Operating with fluid boundaries between ideological extremism, 

hate crime, and terrorism, the extreme right-wing is a complex milieu of movements, groups, 



10 
 

 

and individuals espousing widely different, yet intrinsically related ideologies including 

fascism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, chauvinism, nativism, xenophobia, anti-globalism, 

anti-immigration, racial or ethnic supremacy, traditional values, nationalism and threats to 

national sovereignty, patriarchal social order, reverence for individual liberty, traditional 

gender roles, anti-LGBTTQIA+1, and the sanctity of life (Agius et al., 2020; Grant, 2022; 

START, 2017).  

There are many ways the breadth of ideology and severity existing within RWE can 

be conceptualised, however for the purpose of this research the contemporarily used; 

Conservative Right, Alt-Lite, and Alt-Right has been chosen. The Conservative Right is the 

least extreme iteration of RWE and refers to those who subscribe to conservatist value 

systems including traditional gender roles, and the rejection of progressivism2. The 

Conservative Right have been included as this group holds steadfast to inflexible and 

traditional beliefs, which distinguish them from other right-leaning groups or individuals 

(Miller, 2018). The Alt-Right is the most extreme iteration of RWE and is where much of the 

contemporary acts of right-wing extremism and terrorism have risen. Existing offline, but 

increasingly influential online with its roots in social media and online meme culture (SPLC, 

n.d.), the Alt-Right are defenders of ‘white identity’ and the preservation of the white race. 

Somewhat in the middle, Alt-Lite provides an intersection between Conservative Right and 

Alt-Right and can be used to identify those more radicalised in their right-wing ideology than 

conservative individuals. Generally, the Alt-Lite are seen as promoting a hard-line version of 

                                                 
 

1 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Takatāpui, Transgender, Intersex, Queer/Questioning, Asexual. The “+” 
reflects diversity, signaling that not all people fit into one of the commonly used terms. Other commonly used 
abbreviations are LGBT, LGBT+, LGBTQIA (Outline, n.d.). 

2 Also referred to as the ‘progressive left.’ Progressivism is open-minded with subscribers espousing 
liberal views across a range of issues including ethnic, gender and sexual freedoms and equality (Pew Research 
Center, 2021). 



11 
 

 

nationalism, with a functional focus on traditionalist national identity - but they do not 

necessarily subscribe to the white supremacy, racial exclusion, and violent rhetoric of the Alt-

Right (Hawley, 2017). 

At its most severe, RWE can manifest in threatening behaviour targeted towards those 

perceived by right-wing extremists as threatening or undermining their worldview (Liang & 

Cross, 2020). This violent action is most prominently incited via racial, ethnic, faith-based, 

white identity, or political motivation and has resulted in some of the most devastating 

attacks on social cohesion in the last decade (Liang & Cross, 2020; RCNZ, 2020). Racially 

and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE) is an example of a violent biproduct 

of RWE and is defined as violence resulting from extremism regarding the role of diversity in 

society (Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate [CTED], 2020). Encompassing racist, 

Islamophobic, homophobic, xenophobic, misogynistic, and/or anti-Semitic ideology, 

subscribers to REMVE see their identity, race or ethnicity as under active threat by the very 

idea of social cohesion (Williams et al., 2022). The March 15 terrorist attacks committed in 

Ōtautahi Christchurch have been labelled as, ‘one of the most devastating REMVE events in 

modern history’, and were incited by beliefs rooted in right-wing extremist values of faith, 

racial and ethnic minorities (CTED, 2020).  

Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE) is another belief system embedded 

in RWE and is extremism that can create an anti-authority, anti-government, anti-media and 

anti-science environment that has, at times, been articulated through violent, and threatening 

rhetoric and illegal protests (Combined Threat Assessment Group [CTAG], 2022). Evidence 

of PMVE in Aotearoa NZ has been seen within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

There were restrictive and often lengthy lockdowns, vaccine mandates imposed for many 

workers, and the introduction of vaccine passes which denied unvaccinated people access to 

particular places. The overarching uncertainty around how the virus would and could spread, 



12 
 

 

and what the government and/or Ministry of Health response might be, led to social backlash 

by a minority of New Zealanders (Corlett & McClure, 2022; McClure, 2022; Trigger, 2022). 

From February to March 2022, Aotearoa NZ’s parliament grounds were occupied by 

protestors from a wide variety of groups, mobilised under the common goal of an opposition 

to government imposed COVID-19 restrictions (Trigger, 2022). Extreme right-wing groups 

frequently subscribe to conspiracy theories and anti-government sentiment that can typically 

be linked back to the exclusionary, xenophobic, and at times racist roots of their beliefs 

(Grant, 2022). Amongst the protest organisers there were people, communities, and groups 

who openly espoused white supremacist and fascist ideals (Manhire, 2022). There were calls 

for the murder of government officials, and an intentional sharing of COVID-19 

dis&misinformation that in turn promoted both widespread mistrust in Mainstream Media 

(MSM), and strengthening of extreme right-wing ideologies (UnderstandingNZFarRight.com, 

2022; Manhire, 2022).  

It is important to emphasise that RWE does not always involve or evoke violence. 

Those who subscribe to extreme right-wing ideology often exist in small pockets or echo 

chambers of internalised messaging oriented specifically towards that group’s particular 

right-wing expression (Grant, 2022). Encompassing the characteristics of RWE mentioned 

above, expressions of right-wing ideology act as vehicles for members to communicate their 

beliefs and values. Fierce defenders of their worldview, those who subscribe to the extreme 

right often uses hypermasculinity as an important defence against the perceived left-wing 

agenda and often racialised  “other”. The “natural” gendered hierarchical order of men and 

women based on ideas of biological sex differences has traditionally limited women roles to 

reproduction and for the Alt-Right - preservation of the genetic heritage of the “white race” 

(Blee, 2003; Dier & Baldwin, 2022). Yet, from as early as 1920, women have held significant 

positions in some of the world’s longest standing Alt-Right movements. Occupying familial, 



13 
 

 

social, and operative roles (Blee, 2003), women may not have been publicly acknowledged in 

these movements, but that does not negate their activity and commitment. In modern times, 

women appear to be increasingly taking on positions of influence within RWE, providing a 

so-called ‘soft face’ for the movement’s often violent and hateful rhetoric (Ebner, 2020). 

Consequently, women’s roles in RWE have received greater attention over the last decade in 

particular (Blee, 2020; Kisyova et al., 2022; Llanera, 2023; Zahay, 2022). A significant role 

that contemporary extreme right-wing women appear to be adopting in increasing numbers is 

that of the Tradwife.  

Tradwives are an influential community of women that espouse the traditional 

feminine lifestyle of being a wife and mother (Couric, 2022). A portmanteau of the words 

‘traditional’ and ‘wife’, Tradwives adopt and promote a housewife persona to highlight their 

commitment to heteronormative gendering where the man protects and provides for the 

family, and the women cooks, cleans and bears children (Proctor, 2022). Adopting feminist 

rhetoric to combat outside criticisms of misogyny, Tradwives position their identity as the 

product of choice and promote this choice through personal blogs and social media (Proctor, 

2022). Although the concept of the ‘Tradwife’ has been around for decades, the 

contemporary understanding of the term and distinguishable persona has only recently gained 

traction. Thought to have originated from a 2020 BBC interview, where well-known British 

Tradwife Alena Pettitt described her lifestyle as “submitting to and spoiling her husband like 

it’s 1959”, the contentious elements of the term have since generated widespread media 

discussion and debate (Sitler-Elbel, 2021). Although some elements of Tradwife culture are 

controversial and extreme in nature, increasingly it appears Tradwife communities are as 

varied as the right-wing landscape they exist within. The Tradwife phenomena can be found 

across the right-wing landscape, adhering to varying ideologies and levels of extremity. It is 



14 
 

 

important to note that not all right-wing women are Tradwives, but all Tradwives are right-

wing women.  

Although its popularity is evident across much of the English speaking world (Couric, 

2022; Iovine, 2022; Kato, 2023; Kelsey-Sugg & Marin, 2021; Kilgallon, 2023; Lang, 2022; 

Mandel, 2023; Pigg, 2023; Rottenberg & Orgad, 2020), the number of active Tradwives 

remain unknown. What is known, is the global success of the contemporary Tradwife 

movement is largely driven by Tradwives’ clever use of social media and unique positioning 

as an online influencer. Capitalising on contemporary social media marketing strategies, 

Tradwives curate uniquely feminine online identities that are equal parts ideology and 

aesthetic. Active across a variety of platforms, Tradwives cleverly navigate theories of social 

media and influencer marketing to cement their ideologies and grow their audience. With 

social media increasingly the most dominant space people access information (Ortiz-Ospina, 

2019), the impact of the Tradwife movement on both online and offline social cohesion is 

undefined but undoubtably present. Leading followings of thousands to millions, Tradwives 

as social media influencers have globalised the idea of right-wing traditional living in an 

increasingly liberal online sphere. With women from all ages, stages, and backgrounds in 

their followings, the virality and transnational nature of social media has facilitated the 

mainstream growth of Tradwife ideology.  

Tradwives actively attempt to extend not only their personal influence, but the right-

wing cause more broadly. Taking place largely online (Bamsey & Montasari, 2023), the 

recruitment and radicalisation of individuals through the right-wing landscape can occur 

fluidly. Odag et al (2019) argue that “one of the most pronounced features of right-wing 

extremist websites is their potential for a collective identification that goes beyond local 

geographies” (p. 268). Tradwives actively engage in attempts at online radicalisation through 



15 
 

 

techniques such as Redpilling3, which is slang for coming to believe something 

counterfactual to mainstream consensus (Marwick & Furl, 2021). Threaded with 

conspiratorial thinking, ‘redpillers’ believe the mainstream population (referred to as 

‘normies’) are caught up in an illusionary world created by the ‘global establishment’, with 

supporters going to extreme lengths to expose the ‘truth’ about the society we live in. 

 This research examines the role of Tradwives within the growing global threat of 

RWE. As Tradwives are not directly engaged in violent action, this research will explore how 

ideological radicalisation may impact social cohesion, with Tradwives using techniques of 

online radicalisation and marketing to curate idealised online identities that are attractive and 

compelling despite being often rooted in extreme right-wing belief and value systems.  

The following chapter uses key literature to position this research within the context 

of right-wing ideology and extremism, highlighting how RWE has developed and is 

contemporarily expressed in society. Following the introduction of key theories and processes 

of radicalisation to RWE, the researcher unpacks how women have extended the RWE cause 

to date before introducing Tradwives as the key subject of research. 

Expressions of Right-Wing Ideology 

Ideology is a highly flexible concept used to coordinate one’s dynamic belief systems. 

There are a number of definitions, but for the purpose of this research ideology is defined as; 

a consistent integrated pattern of thoughts and beliefs that explains one’s attitude towards life 

and existence within society (Lowenstein, 1953). Right-wing ideologies are complex and 

                                                 
 

3  Redpilling is an extreme right-wing radicalisation technique in reference to a scene from the Matrix 
where the character of Morpheus offers Neo (the protagonist) the option of taking a red or blue pill. By taking 
the red pill, Morpheus shares the ‘truth’ about the Matrix. Redpilling is seen as a euphemism for radicalisation, 
with recruiters using the above Matrix metaphor as a persuasion technique  (Ebner, 2020) 



16 
 

 

fluid, centred around a number of characteristics including fascism, anti-Semitism, anti-

immigration, chauvinism, nativism, xenophobia, anti-globalism, anti-immigration, racial or 

ethnic supremacy, traditional values, nationalism and threats to national sovereignty, 

patriarchal social order, reverence for individual liberty, traditional gender roles, anti- 

LGBTTQIA+, and the sanctity of life (Agius et al., 2020; Grant, 2022; START, 2017). 

Although the adoption of these characteristics is unique to each individual’s ideological 

framework, it can be argued the fundamental premises of right-wing ideologies are broadly 

based on a broad set of intrinsic value systems. Two value systems pertinent to the right-wing 

ideologies of Tradwives are heteronormativity, and notions of sovereignty.  

Heteronormativity refers to the social and hierarchical ordering of gender and 

protection of traditional forms of masculinity and femininity (Butler, 1990). It encompasses 

biological differences between men and women and advocates for distinct gender roles in 

relation to these biological differences (i.e. men as breadwinners, women as homemakers). 

Labelled as the ‘division of public and private life’, under heteronormativity, men hold social 

and political power, and women are confined to the home (Klein, 1995). Accordingly, the 

continuation of patriarchy – and by extension, heteropatriarchy - is facilitated and 

encouraged. Combining the patriarchal (male) and heterosexual dominance, heteropatriarchy 

is defined as “the social, political, and economic system in which heterosexual men are the 

dominant group in a society or culture” (Kelley & Trigatti, 2021, p. 256). Within a 

subscription to heteropatriarchy, indoctrinated levels of gender-based discrimination such as 

misogyny and sexism are inherently regarded within right-wing ideologies as acceptable and 

normal core elements of society. Sexuality is also dictated within the fundamental premise of 

heteronormativity, with subscribers to right-wing ideologies employing a prescribed and 

dominant version of heterosexual gender roles, sexual identity and sexual practices - ideas 

which are often expressed through religion.  



17 
 

 

Sovereignty refers to the notions of autonomy and protection of freedoms and rights 

that are intrinsic to right-wing ideology. It can be understood in a variety of ways including 

the protection of national sovereignty. Rooted in one’s cultural identity, national sovereignty 

is bound up in support of border controls and economic protectionism which safeguards 

goods and services produced by citizens. Those who value national sovereignty (i.e. their 

way-of-life is tied to their national identity) tend to support the implementation of policies 

and practices characterised by anti-immigration, anti-globalist and nationalist ideas. 

Sovereignty can also manifest in racial sovereignty, which  refers to the protection of ethnic 

identity and manifests in exclusionism for fear of losing the fundamental identities of one’s 

race and culture, or even believing in the superiority of one’s own race or ethnicity. A final 

way sovereignty can manifest in right-wing communities - and one particularly pertinent to 

Tradwives - is sovereignty of the foetus. Intrinsic right-wing beliefs and values regarding the 

sanctity of life extend sovereignty to the unborn, where the rights of the foetus are seen as 

separate and autonomous from the mother. This is a particularly fervent debate for the 

extreme right-wing and women in these movements more specifically with sovereignty of the 

foetus underpinning both politically and identity motivated acts of violent extremism such as 

protesting and vandalism at abortion clinics (Gonzalez, 2022; Lourgos, 2023), and at the most 

extreme instance in the stealing of aborted foetuses (The Associated Press, 2022). 

 Interestingly, this intrinsic value of sovereignty of life typically only applies to issues 

of conception, pregnancy, and situations relating to vulnerable members of society and thus is 

conditional upon state of being and moral behaviours - i.e. the death penalty for certain 

crimes is typically considered appropriate for adults who transgress against the freedoms and 

rights of another individual (Costello, 2014). Taken broadly, these right-wing ideas of 

sovereignty are intrinsic to many of the systems we use to construct our society. For example, 

economic systems such as capitalism operate on notions of autonomy and freedom whereby 



18 
 

 

“private actors own and control property in accord with their interests, and demand and 

supply freely set prices in markets” (Jahan & Mahmud, 2023, para. 1). Similarly, right-wing 

political doctrines such as classical liberalism advocate that individual freedom is the 

fundamental centre of political activity and that while governments may be necessary to 

protect the individual, there is also recognitions that governments themselves can pose threats 

to freedom and personal sovereignty (Robertson, 2018).  

In order to conceptualise how premises such as heteronormativity and sovereignty 

have intrinsically linked the multitude of right-wing ideologies within the right-wing 

landscape, the following unpacks the contemporary ‘rise of the right’ as it pertains to some of 

the core expressions of right-wing ideologies; religion, politics, the modern militia 

movement, intentional communities and cults, sovereign citizens movement, counterculture 

groups, and at the individual level. 

Religion 

Existing in every global culture, and espousing some form of affiliation for more than  

85%  percent of the world’s population, religion has survived and thrived in human society 

for thousands of years (Peoples et al., 2016; Wiebe, 2008). Offering existential meaning to 

life on earth, the foundational roots of religion exist within much of modern history, 

influencing global cultures and societal norms. The uniting factor of every religion is theism, 

the belief in and worship of supreme beings or a divine power that exists for the creation and 

goodness of humankind (Johnson, 2005). Typically centred around a God, or multiple gods or 

deities that are seen as the creator(s) of the universe, these divine figure(s) are believed to be 

capable of influencing, guiding, and directing the daily lives of mankind. Two ways theism 

can be contextualised are polytheism and monotheism. Monotheism refers to the most 

traditionally understood form of religion where followers believe in the existence of one 

single and supreme being, deity, or God. Christianity, Islam and Judaism are classified as 



19 
 

 

monotheist faiths where followers confess to and worship ‘God’, a divine being that offers 

everlasting life after death (Nomads, 2021). The emphasis in monotheist faiths is on the 

oneness or uniqueness of God and the affirmation that there are no other gods existing in the 

divine world (Assmann, 2009; Muscato, 2021). Conversely, polytheism refers to belief in the 

existence of multiple deities, gods, and/or goddesses (Assmann, 2009). In polytheist faiths, 

the universe is believed to be filled with many divine forces who have designated roles of 

influence over humankind. For example, the ancient Greeks were largely polytheist and 

worshipped a pantheon of both gods and goddesses. Rather than praying to a single God, the 

ancient Greek would offer worship to specific deities known to guide or offer assistance on 

specific issues. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Paganism are popular polytheist religions of today, 

each worshipping a complex pantheon of deities (Muscato, 2021).  

Religious extremism can be defined as theism underpinned by uncompromising 

religious identity and extreme devotion to a chosen deity and/or religious movement (Saada, 

2023). Arising in response to historical circumstances, societal threat, and/or politically and 

racially motivated challenges to one’s sense of self, religious extremism exists in both 

monotheist and polytheist faiths and can manifest in acts of violence to protect the dignity of 

the religious belief system in question (Wibisono et al., 2019; Saada, 2023; Wong, 2011). 

Typically fuelled by perceived salvation and everlasting reward, acts of violence in the name 

of religious extremism have influenced some of the most devastating racially and politically 

motivated terrorist events in modern history. The following outlines the most prominent 

polytheist and monotheist faiths pertinent to this research; Paganism and the Christian Right. 

Paganism 

Paganism (also known as Neopaganism, Modern Paganism and Contemporary 

Paganism) is an umbrella term for polytheist religious and spiritual movements influenced by 

prehistoric beliefs of pre-modern people. There is no official guiding doctrine within 



20 
 

 

Paganism and followers instead are aligned by common beliefs including the aliveness and 

divine presence in nature, and support for non-authoritarian religion (Jones & Pennick, 2003). 

Pagans use rituals, fantasy, and visionary activities to advance their beliefs and have an 

overarching aim of living in harmony with nature (Adler, 2006). In modern times, Paganism 

has become most strongly associated with the concept of ‘Pagan Witchcraft’ (also known as 

Wicca). Wicca is based on a revolt against Christianity and the Christian belief that witches 

are guided by or followers of Satan. Wiccans are believers in pre-Christian religion and 

emphasise ritual and spiritual experience (Berger, 2021). They refer to themselves as 

‘practitioners’ rather than believers to further distinguish themselves from Christianity and 

emphasise their active role in guiding their spirituality (Berger, 2021). Druidism is another 

form of Paganism that identifies as a loosely connected spiritual movement which reveres 

nature and aims to offer a ‘way of being in the world that avoids many of the problems of 

intolerance and sectarianism that the established religions have encountered’ (Carr-Gomm, 

2019).  

Nature is the guiding feature in most Pagan faiths and is celebrated through a yearly 

cycle of rituals and festivals (known as ‘sabbats’) which worship the divinity in the living 

world. Each ritual and/or festival encourages followers to engage with how nature changes 

with the seasons, noting the importance of taking time to reflect on how these seasonal 

changes influence every day and spiritual life (Berger, 2021). Litha (also known as the 

summer solstice) is an example of a sabbat and celebrates the sun and its divinity. Falling on 

the longest day of the year, Litha is a time for pagans to search for their inner power and 

brightness. It is often commemorated with fire ritual (Bhaget, 2019).  

Two hallmark features of Pagan faiths are animism and pantheism. Animism is the 

belief that inanimate objects, places, and sometimes even creatures possess spiritual essence. 

Pantheism understands God as only existing within the fabric of the universe, that is, there is 



21 
 

 

no God or deity which exists beyond the combined substance, forces, and laws of our world 

(Adler, 2006). Pagan gods and goddesses are therefore more human than the God depicted in 

monotheist faiths. Pagan deities are known to have complicated relationships, often revealing 

flawed personalities, just like humankind (Routes North, 2022). The most commonly 

worshipped Pagan deities can be classified into three distinct groups; Aesir, Vanir, and 

Jötunn. Aesir are deities of social realities; Vanir are deities of sexuality, fertility and magic; 

and Jötunn are deities of chaos and destruction. In some Pagan traditions (i.e., Norse 

mythology), Carl Jung’s theory of “archetypes” is also used to understand and describe the 

roles represented by Pagan gods and goddesses (Auryn, 2017). For example, Odin is the lord 

of all Aesir deities and represents the archetype of ‘wise old man.’ In Odin’s likeness, 

followers are guided by Odin’s wisdom as the superior master and teacher. His function is to 

offer guidance, instruction, and motivation (Luo, 2022). 

Politically, there are two sides to modern Paganism. On the one hand are left-leaning 

Pagans who often turn to Pagan movements for their more inclusive core values. On the other 

is the history and influence of Paganism in the extreme right (Koronka, 2022).  

Right-wing Paganism (also known as Ethnic Paganism, and Racist Paganism – 

Gardell, 2003) can be traced back to Vikings and the Germanic people of the Iron Age who 

believed Paganism – then named Norse Paganism – to be Europe’s ‘true heritage’ (Strmiska, 

2018). Adherents to right-wing Paganism classify Christianity, Judaism, and Islam as 

imported religions, and as such often have strong ties to extreme right-wing rhetoric, 

nationalist identity, and ideas of racial purity. Odinism is the branch of Paganism most 

overtly associated with RWE, with many Odin followers sharing beliefs that Paganism is an 

essentially ethnic phenomenon derived from European ethnic culture. Similarly, many right-

wing Pagans are reconstructionist, and share a desire for society to return to supposedly 

simpler, more traditional times. Greater ethnic, lifestyle, and religious homogeneity, 



22 
 

 

alongside traditional family roles are all key values of right-wing Pagans (Strmiska, 2018). 

With this long standing relationship between Paganism and ethnic exclusion, Paganist ties 

can subsequently be seen in many of the world’s most recent acts of racially and politically 

motivated extremism. Events such as the 2011 terror attack in Norway where Anders 

Breivik’s gun was named Gungnir after Odin’s spear; the 2017 Unite the Right rallies in 

Charlottesville where many protestors carried flags showing Thor’s hammer; the perpetrator 

of the 2019 terror attack in Aotearoa NZ who wrote ‘see you in Valhalla’ at the end of his 

manifesto; and most recently the QAnon Shaman (a prominent figure in the conspiracy 

circles involved in the 2020 Capitol Attack and known user of Norse Pagan symbology) 

(Koronka, 2022), all show the dangerous potential of Paganism when interpreted through the 

lens of both racial and religious extremism. 

The Christian Right 

The other group connected to right-wing ideology and extremism explored in this 

thesis is the Christian Right. A coalition of conservative Christians, the Christian Right can 

be characterised by support for socially conservative, traditionalist ways of life and family, 

and an opposition of progressivism, feminism, reproductive rights, LGBTTQIA+ rights, and 

gender equality (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017; Stoeckl, 2020). Existing within various 

denominations, the Christian Right has a longstanding history of influence in society, and 

have contributed to the advocation and advancement of conservative issues such as state 

sanctioned creationism and prayer in public education, religiously influenced sex education, 

restrictions around contraception, abortion, and euthanasia, as well as suppression of 

LGBTTQIA+ rights (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Durham, 2000; Edis, 2020). Broadly, the 

mission of the Christian Right is to influence society, politics, and policy with a traditionalist 

interpretation of the teachings of the Bible. Whilst academic literature identifying the 

denominations, groups, and movements involved in the Christian Right is both vague and 



23 
 

 

varied (Coleman & Hackett, 2015), those perceived to have the greatest influence, and which 

are most relevant for this research are; Evangelicalism, alt-Catholic, and Russian Orthodox 

Christianity.  

Evangelicalism 

With various theological streams influencing its inception, Evangelicalism (also 

known as Evangelical Christianity and Evangelical Protestantism) is one of the most dynamic 

forms of Christianity in the modern world (Shoemaker, 2021). Encompassing Baptist, 

Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and some Anglican and Pentecostal Christian movements, 

Evangelicalism is an umbrella Christian identity that takes on many forms, but its core 

commitments emphasise four key things: The Bible’s authority; crucicentrism or Jesus’ 

supremacy as saviour; the belief that lives can be changed by Christian conversion and a 

‘born again’ experience; and the importance of active Christian service and preaching – also 

referred to as ‘Evangelising’ (Noll, 2003; Noll et al., 2019; Shoemaker, 2021). Initially 

centred in Europe and then North America (Coleman & Hackett, 2015), the roots of 

Evangelicalism trace back to the eighteenth century and have influenced much of the English 

speaking world. Today, Evangelicalism is a global movement existing in various iterations 

across Christian communities and cultures (Noll, 2003).  

Unlike denominations such as Catholics who have one centralised authority (The 

Pope), Evangelicals exist fluidly, functioning across a network of largely conservative 

spokespeople (Shoemaker, 2021), and as such offer a spectrum of extremity. One of the most 

conservative subsets of Evangelicalism is Evangelical fundamentalism. Characterised by a 

strict and literalist view of Christian scripture, fundamentalists aspire to replicate society 

based on the religious principles of their faith. Motivated by social, ethnic, and nationalistic 

grievances, fundamentalists largely reject secular modernity, instead practicing ‘separatism’, 

the act of choosing to live minimalist traditional family lives, often away or protected from 



24 
 

 

modern society (Jelen, 1987; Kellstedt & Smidt, 1991; Taylor, 2016). It is believed the 

growth and appeal of fundamentalism in the twentieth century is attributed to the 

encroachment of progressivism, scientific theory, modernity and secularism into religious 

spheres (Sargisson, 2007).  

An example of Evangelical fundamentalism in action is the transnational non-

governmental organisation World Congress of Families (WCF) which exists largely in 

perpetuating America’s Christian Right, but also has strong foundational roots in Russia. 

Formally founded in 1997 and currently run by RWE influential figure, Brian Brown, WCF 

has become one of the primary Evangelical influences for fundamentalism, promoting 

conservative gender roles and a traditional, heterosexual family model (Stoeckl, 2020). 

Claiming it wants to “help secure the foundations of society”, two of the core pillars of WCF 

are defending the “natural family” founded on marriage between a man and a woman, and a 

strong anti-LGBTTQIA+ stance (Michel, 2017).  

Alt-Catholic 

Also fundamentalist in their action, the alt-Catholic is another key influence in the 

Christian Right. Mobilised between the 1980’s and 1990’s, alt-Catholics (also known as 

fundamentalist Catholics, traditional Catholics and trad-Caths) are an extreme right-wing 

classification of Catholicism (Wetzel, 2020). Most prominently standing for nativism, 

nationalism, male supremacy, anti-feminism and the demonisation of the LGBTTQIA+ 

community, members of alt-Catholic groups are motivated by society’s return to the 

teachings and law of the Bible. Rather than practising separatism or Christian 

reconstructionism (as is the case with fundamentalist Evangelicals), fundamentalist Catholics 

instead practise dominionism. Dominionism is an extension of Christian reconstructionism 

that seeks to more vividly develop a Christian society based on a literal interpretation of the 

Bible, biblical law, and when adopted in a Catholic environment – the specific teachings of 



25 
 

 

Catholicism (Aho, 2013). In subscribing to this ideology, individuals are required to seek 

dominion over cultural and political aspects of society including government, education, 

business, media, and the family unit. Naturally, dominionism manifests itself and influences 

the individual’s communication with and action within everyday life including religious 

belief and political affiliation (Clarkson, 2016), but its influence at the family level is most 

relevant for the present research. Male supremacy is a key pillar of dominionism where 

men’s assertion over their wives is foundational and traditional family roles are thought to 

represent the truest depiction of the teachings of the Bible (Roberts, 2020). The adoption of 

traditional gender roles by traditionalists can be traced back to the Bible, namely their 

interpretation of Genesis 2:20 “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a 

helper fit for him” (English Standard Version Bible, 2001, Genesis 2:20; Peterson, 2005). 

Some fundamentalist Christian followers who subscribe to dominionism, take their 

interpretation of traditional gender roles and wifely submission one step further and practice 

the act of Christian Domestic Discipline.  

Christian Domestic Discipline (CDD) advocates an extreme form of traditional gender 

roles through disciplinary wife submission and male dominance as head of household (HoH) 

(DeGroot et al., 2015). The wife and namely her body is seen as belonging completely to her 

husband and she is completely under his control so he can ‘better her’, both as his wife and in 

her devotion to family and spiritual life. Manifesting in the use of disciplinary tactics such as 

spanking, time out, the removal of privileges, and/or lecturing, followers of CDD are 

reinforced in their belief through a perceived interpretation that the Bible authorises a man to 

spank one’s wife in order to encourage her submissiveness (Audet, 2008; Beusman, 2013). 

While behaviours within the realms of CDD can be associated with sadomasochism (BDSM), 

the difference with CDD is the fact sex is not the main objective, it is the creation of a 

submissive wife through corporal punishment tactics (Rubio, 2013).  



26 
 

 

Church Militant is a rising media network and key driver of fundamental Catholicism 

which proudly espouses male supremacy and the perceived value of the traditional family 

unit. Founded in 2008 by former Fox News reporter Michael Voris under the name ‘Real 

Catholic TV’, Church Militant holds an annual Men’s Conference during which social, 

political, and cultural issues of the time are discussed. Voris opened the fifth annual 

conference in 2019 with the following quote from his talk titled Confronting Toxic 

Femininity (Wetzel, 2020); 

“Are you being the man God is calling you to be? The salvation of your family, your 

peers and Western civilization itself depend on it. The forces of evil are attacking true 

manhood, and it’s up to you to live it and pass on the Catholic faith. Bring your son, your 

father, your brother, your uncle or your nephew—especially if they have only known what the 

world calls ‘manhood’.”  

Alongside ‘confronting toxic femininity’ (discussed later), alt-Catholics also reject 

homosexuality and are at the forefront of the pro-life movement. ‘Resistance’, the activism 

branch of Church Militant, has been known to attend pro-life protests and counter-protest 

Planned Parenthood marches across the United States (Joyce & Lorber, 2022; Kennerly & 

Rogers, 2022). Similarly, in the weeks after the overturning of Roe v. Wade, many within the 

alt-Catholic movement flocked to their local church to express their thanks to God. One 

member exclaimed the below outside the Basilica of St. Patrick’s Old Cathedral, an act which 

was captured on video and went viral across social media; 

“I am the people. The people have decided, the court has decided. You lose. You have 

no choice. Not your body, your choice. Your body is mine and you’re having my baby” 

(Bachom, 2022). 



27 
 

 

This protester was also a member of the Groyper movement, a collection of white 

nationalists whose broad goal is to normalise their extreme views by aligning them with 

Christianity and its traditional values (MacDonald-Evoy, 2022). While Groyper started within 

meme culture with members using targeted online trolling tactics to share and lighten their 

extremist content, increasingly they have become more mobilised and affiliated with groups 

like Church Militant. Most recently and as noted above, the Groyper movement worked with 

Church Militant to confront pro-abortion protesters at American pro-choice rallies with the 

aim of growing their subsequent influence and followings (Joyce & Lorber, 2022).  

Orthodox Christianity 

With a similar anti-abortion stance and subscription to traditional family values, 

Orthodox Christianity (also known as Eastern Christianity, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and 

the Orthodox Catholic Church) is the most widely professed faith in Russia, and the third 

largest brand of Christianity globally (Pew Research Center, 2017). Coexisting with the 

Roman Catholic Church for its first thousand-year existence, Orthodox Christianity broke 

away from Catholicism in 1054 A.D (an event known as the Great Schism) due to theological 

and political disagreements, and contention over papal supremacy (Diamant, 2017). Today, 

Orthodox Christians follow an ecclesiastical governance where churches either have their 

own head (autocephalous) or are self-governing (autonomous). United in faith through a 

common approach to worship and theology, each church is unique and defined by its 

geographical location and the cultural tradition of its believers, a characteristic which often 

leads to strong nationalist values (Makrides, 2013).  

Popular also in Greek, Middle Eastern, and Slav culture, expressions of RWE in 

Orthodox Christianity date back to the 18th and 19th centuries (Kelaidis, 2016). Supporting 

traditional family values, traditional gender roles, male supremacy, anti-abortion, the 

promotion of large families, a firm intolerance of liberal values including LGBTTQIA+ 



28 
 

 

rights (referring to members of this community as ‘Sodomitics’), and the secularism of the 

West, the influence of RWE in Orthodox Christianity is profound and rigid (Riccardi-Swartz, 

2021). Most notably, the Orthodox Church is highly visible in Russian extreme right-wing 

groups and is used to add legitimacy to their anti-Semitic, traditionalist perspectives, with 

members citing their faith as the founding pillar for their conservative political and societal 

beliefs (Yousef, 2022). In Russia, the ties between Orthodoxy, the rise of Vladimir Putin’s 

political regime, and the end of religious repression by the Soviet Union is particularly strong 

with many extreme right-wing views of Orthodox Christian’s etched into Russian politics 

(Kelaidis, 2016; Makrides, 2013). With the implementation of a societal value system based 

on patriotism, God, and family, Putin alongside Patriarch Kirill of Moscow have brought the 

Russian Orthodox Church increasingly closer to the Russian State. 

Whilst pronouncing open disagreement with the Western World, the reach of the 

Orthodox Christian faith and right-wing Orthodox views can also be found in the West. There 

exists a community of converted Evangelical Christians and Catholics who have joined the 

Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) (Yousef, 2022). Forming due to 

widespread disillusionment with perceived social and demographic changes occurring in 

other Christian faiths, ROCOR hail Putin as a king-like figure whose political regime is 

‘making the world great’ (Riccardi-Swartz, 2021). Extremely fundamentalist, with strong ties 

to ideas of nativism, pro-authoritarianism, and rejection of diversity, members of ROCOR, 

especially in America, increasingly have no Russian affiliation and instead conversion is 

based on an alignment with ROCOR’s conservative traditional values (Riccardi-Swartz, 

2021).  

Amalgamation of Church and State 

Influences of the Christian Right and conservative Christian values are increasingly 

seen beyond the religious sphere, in politics. Scholars have argued traditionalism in particular 



29 
 

 

has become a religo-political ideology that continues to influence the political governance of 

many nations (Riccardi-Swartz, 2021; Zhuravlev, 2017). Post-Soviet Russia and 

contemporary America are two key examples of how extreme right-wing religo-political 

ideologies have become prevalent in the actions of government.   

Russia 

Over the last decade, the amalgamation of Church-state relations in Russia has seen 

the Russian State invested in the promotion of interests and values held by the Russian 

Orthodox Church. Clergymen and those in significant papal power have received wide-

ranging support from all governmental levels including funding for the development of new 

churches, mass media attention, and access to President Vladimir Putin himself (CSIS, 2016). 

In 2010, the Law on the Transfer of Religious Property to Religious Organisations was 

passed, allowing religious organisations to claim state-owned property of religious 

significance. In 2017, domestic violence was decriminalised in Russia, a move argued to be 

influenced largely by the Russian Orthodox Church and their promotion of traditional gender 

roles (Chamusco, 2017; Rollins, 2022). Putin and the current regime have even gone so far as 

to introduce an official government medal for ultra-fertility titled the Mother Heroine award 

which is given to families who “birth and raise” ten Russian citizens (Reid, 2022). Putinism 

has largely allowed and supported the return of Orthodoxy to mainstream Russian culture in a 

way not seen since the Soviet Revolution. In turn, the Church has had greater influence in the 

shaping of societal values in Russia as noted by the recent creation of a specific Christian 

media outlet that is increasingly given more mainstream airtime (Lassin, 2022). As time goes 

on, these right-wing values where traditional family and gender roles are celebrated, and 

liberal secularism is condemned are increasingly broadcast to the Russian public. 

United States of America 



30 
 

 

Influences of Christian traditionalism as a religo-political ideology can also be seen in 

contemporary American politics. Underpinned by the belief that Christianity is a fundamental 

pillar of American national identity, American conservative Christians and members of the 

Christian Right actively promote the amalgamation of Church and State. Since the 1980’s, 

the Christian Right have worked to establish a foothold in the American legal system with the 

intention of reversing legal secularism, and promoting law rooted in an understanding of 

Christian theology (Lowe, 2022). Conservative Christian legal organisations such as the 

Federalist Society and the American Centre for Law and Justice have seen increasing success 

in their lobbying for the appointment of conservative and religious judges (Stolzenberg, 

2020). The history of the Supreme Court judges’ religious affiliation shows that of the 116 

judges appointed to the Court, 92 have had protestant denomination affiliations, 15 have been 

Catholic, eight have been Jewish, and only one with no known religious affiliation. Table 1 

outlines the religious affiliation of the currently sitting Supreme Court, the highest court in 

the land (Coyle, 2022; McCammon & Montanaro, 2018; Newport, 2022).  

Table 1  

Religious Affiliation of the Supreme Court 

Name Religion Appointed By Year Appointed 

Clarence Thomas Catholic G. H. Bush 1991 

John Roberts 

(Chief Justice) 

Catholic G. W. Bush 2005 

Samuel Alito Catholic G. W. Bush 2006 

Sonia Sotomayor Catholic Obama 2009 

Elena Kagan Jewish Obama 2010 



31 
 

 

Neil Gorsuch Catholic turned 

Episcopalian 

Trump 2017 

Brett Kavanaugh Catholic Trump 2018 

Amy Coney Barrett Catholic Trump 2020 

Ketanji Brown 

Jackson 

Nondenominational  

Protestant 

Joe Biden 2022 

 

The Christian Right’s impact on American politics and law also exists beyond those 

sitting in positions of influence. Many everyday Americans who subscribe to conservative 

Christianity also take up political activism, believing the state must be subservient to God 

(Conger, 2019). Christian Nationalism is based upon traditional Christian and fundamentalist 

ideals. Referred to by members as a ‘movement of gospel patriots,’ the Christian Nationalist 

movement is driven by the belief that Christian identity is being lost in America, and that the 

only way to “make America great again” is a return to Christian hegemony (Gashaw, 2021). 

Often Republican, often white, and traditionalist, Christian Nationalist’s espouse strong 

fundamentalist values, and preach the need for society to go back to the fundamental 

teachings of the Bible, believing biblical scripture to be infallible, uncompromising, and all-

encompassing (Coleman & Hackett, 2015). Key Christian fundamentalist groups are 

lobbyists in promoting their ideologies and interests at political levels. This blurring of 

religious and political lines is particularly evident between the Republican party and 

American Christianity. In August 2020, on the closing night of the Republican Party’s 

National Convention, Donald Trump proudly pronounced the following; “In America, we 

don’t turn to government to restore our souls. We put our faith in the almighty God” 

(Gashaw, 2021). For many American Christians, the Republican vote is innate – a support for 

the Republican party is a support for a Christian America. The Christian vote in America 



32 
 

 

makes up 64% of the total voting population, with an estimated 79% of those leaning 

Republican (Gramlich, 2020). 

Politics 

Analogous to religion, politics is as much social as it is governmental (Gashaw, 

2021). In Aotearoa NZ, the political landscape is relatively small compared to other regions 

of the world. Largely centred with the most prominent parties sitting between centre-left and 

centre-right, a simplified representation of Aotearoa NZ’s current political landscape is 

shown below. The democratic constructs of ‘left,’ ‘right,’ and ‘centre’ contain a variety of 

ideological beliefs and societal issues that position the political parties in relation to each 

other (Edwards, 2003). Broadly, Aotearoa NZ’s ‘left-wing’ political parties are ideologically 

positioned with a focus on equality, larger government intervention and collectivism, and 

worker’s rights; while ‘right-wing’ political parties in Aotearoa NZ concentrate on efficiency, 

smaller government, individualism, and laissez faire capitalism. As a nation, Aotearoa NZ is 

considered to be fairly socially liberal (Di Maio, 2018; McDonald, 2020). Most political 

parties are generally in favour of people being able to engage their rights to achieve social 

equality, the difference is how left-wing and right-wing parties perceive the best way to 

achieve equality is. Centre-right parties, National and Act lean towards social equality 

through principles of meritocracy. They believe an individual’s right should – in many cases -

be determined by their individual merit. Conversely, centre-left parties, Labour and Green 

believe social equality should consider group differences and thus resources should be 



33 
 

 

allocated to reduce the disadvantages experienced by certain groups in society (Sibley & 

Wilson, 2007).   

Figure 1  
Positioning Aotearoa, NZ’s Political Landscape (adapted from Edwards, 2009) 

 

Globally, the political spectrum is much broader, with right-wing and conservative 

politics having considerable influence throughout modern history (Gale, 2022). Beginning 

with Italy’s National Fascist Party in the quake of World War I, the 1920’s and 1930’s saw 

the rise of extreme right-wing political movements across much of Europe as Mussolini 

sought to overcome democracy and re-establish an authoritarian state (Albanese & Del 

Hierro, 2016). Peaking in the 1940’s with the rise and fall of Hitler’s Nazi Germany, interest 

in fascism wavered, with many of the world’s most conservative leaders adapting their 

approach to remain relevant to a society swinging to the left (Wright, 2019). In the 1950’s 

extreme right-wing politics began its second rise to popularity. Anti-democratic, neo-fascist 

parties including France’s Front National, Austria’s Freedom Party, and the UK’s National 

Front were all developed during the 1960’s and 1970’s in response to perceived threats of 

communism, and the belief that foreigners threaten national homogeneity (Norrell, 2008). In 

Aotearoa NZ, extreme right-wing groups also mobilised over the 1960’s and 70’s, becoming 

more prominent and mainstream (Spoonley, 1987). Similar themes of anti-immigration, anti-

communism, and white nationalism were supported, with the first explicitly racist and 

distinctly neo-fascist groups developed during this time, such as the National Socialist Party 

and New Zealand’s National Front (Spoonley, 1987). 



34 
 

 

In the 21st century, the global presence of RWE has moved further into the political 

mainstream. Since the mid-2010’s, democracies across the world have increasingly turned 

towards more conservative, right-wing political parties and governments. Standing in contrast 

to the parties and governments that promoted globalisation, international cooperation and 

widespread social cohesion two decades earlier, right-wing populism has gained significant 

momentum (Merelli, 2019). American populist leader Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral win 

with his ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ campaign slogans sparked the 

resurfacing of previously dormant extreme right-wing groups, and increased the prevalence 

of overt Islamophobia, xenophobia, extreme nationalism, and nativism (Butt & Khalid, 

2018). The pro-Trump American culture has subsequently created a unique environment for 

RWE to thrive not only politically with the Republican party holding office from 2016 – 

2019, but also ideologically, with extreme right-wing movements such as Paleo-conservatism 

seeing a notable rise with Donald Trump’s election and administration. Coined in the 1980’s 

as a way to classify the political affiliation of conservative Catholics, Paleo-conservatism is a 

conservative political ideology that emphasises tradition and limited government intervention 

alongside religious, nationalist, and ultimately Western identity ideology (Spoonley, 2022).  

Equally influential in the global rise of right-wing politics and in some ways 

intrinsically linked to Trump’s rise to political success, the 2016 vote in favour of Brexit saw 

the separation of Europe from the United Kingdom and a win for nationalist and populist 

ideology (Langlois, 2021; Merelli, 2019). As quoted in the Financial Times, “The Brexit vote 

and the election of Donald Trump will forever be linked in history. The two events took place 

within a few months of each other. Both were populist revolts that appealed to similar 

constituencies” (Rachman, 2018). Populism as an anti-establishment movement refers to the 

idea that society is divided into two separate groups; ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ 

(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). While it has been used across the political spectrum, populism 



35 
 

 

is increasingly used to describe right-wing political parties and leaders working against 

progressivism. Right-wing populists often combine the core ideology of populism with other 

ideologies such as nativism and authoritarianism to create unique and radically right 

expressions of populism (Molloy, 2018). At its core, Populism is essentially about a belief in 

the will of the people, and rejecting the elite (often termed the ‘liberal elite’ in right-wing 

politics). Both the vote for Trump and the vote for Brexit communicated a growing anti-elite, 

anti-establishment attitude, and populist vote (Langlois, 2021). Among the societal concerns 

fuelling these votes were ideas of mass immigration, growing unemployment, a growing 

living crisis, and a feeling among conservatives that citizens were increasingly being 

marginalised in their country. As quoted by right-wing populist and leader of France’s 

National Front Party, Marine Le Pen on the news of Brexit, “Victory for Freedom! As I have 

been asking for years, we must now have the same referendum in France and EU countries” 

(Le Pen, 2016, as cited in Chrisafis, 2016). Le Pen and her National Front Party are one of a 

growing number of right-wing European parties lobbying for their own anti-immigration and 

anti-European Union stances (Chrisafis, 2016). In 2022, Le Pen gained over 41% of the 

French election with a record 13.3 million votes (Voce & Clarke, 2022).  

The growth of right-wing politics, populism, and fascism in Europe has become 

strong enough that extreme right-wing parties in the European Parliament have formed a new 

‘Identity and Democracy (ID)’ bloc, cementing the notoriety of their increased political 

influence (BBC, 2019). In Germany, right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has 

become the biggest opposition party since their inception into the federal government in 

2017. Equally, Spain has seen a sudden rise in populist and nationalist influence as the far-

right Vox party doubled its seats at the 2019 election to 52. Before Vox, only a single seat 

had been won in Spain by an extreme right-wing candidate (BBC, 2019). In Italy, Giorgia 

Meloni has become not only the first female prime minister, but also the first right-wing 



36 
 

 

leader elected since Mussolini in World War Two (McDonnell & Ammassari, 2022). Meloni 

rose to popularity for her right-wing values and intention to “govern for everyone.” A 

historical move considering her party – Brothers of Italy – achieved only 4.4% of the vote in 

2018 (Kirby, 2022; McDonnell & Ammassari, 2022). The historically fascist belief held by a 

growing number of Italians that immigrants are an existential threat to native populations and 

the growing motivation to suppress immigration has been cited as one of the reasons for 

Meloni’s success (Guglielmi, 2021). Sweden has also seen a rise in anti-immigration 

sentiment. The Swedish Democrat party leader Ulf Kristersson is quoted saying, “Muslim 

immigration is our biggest threat to democracy since the second World War” (as cited in 

Ahlander, 2020). Sweden’s Democrats Party began polling in contention for the country’s 

most popular party in 2016 and won a surprising 20% of the vote during their 2022 election, a 

first for this traditionally social democratic country (Ahlander, 2022; Polyakova, 2014). 

The rise of the political right and extreme right-wing political ideology can also be 

found beyond America, the United Kingdom, and Europe. South American political leader 

Jair Bolsonaro rose to power in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election campaign with a populist 

agenda and contentious values on gender, race, ethnicity, and religion (Layton et al., 2021). 

His desire to “liberate Brazil from socialism and political correctness” rallied right-wing 

voters, a support which has continued well into Bolsonaro’s tenure, and further highlights the 

reach and resurgence of right-wing, conservative politics (Foggin, 2019). In India, right-wing 

leader Narendra Modi was elected in 2014 and then again in 2019. Modi’s most recent 

government appears to overtly threaten minorities in India, rallying for a Hindu majority and 

promoting the abandonment of secularism (Merelli, 2019). 

Although it is difficult to pinpoint what is driving the apparent global shift to more 

extreme right-wing political ideologies like populism, it is thought contributing factors lie 

within existential societal threats such as rising crime rates, rising cost of living, economic 



37 
 

 

and social consequences of the global COVID-19 pandemic, and the recent War on Ukraine. 

Societal inequality, particularly in the West has continued to grow with the top 1% of 

American households holding, on average, 30% of the country’s wealth (Beer, 2020; Tanzi & 

Dorning, 2021). In response to inequalities and other existential threats, increasingly, it 

appears people are adjusting to more inward and individualistic perspectives of society so as 

to protect individual interests and the interests of national identities. In times of threat people 

tend to cling to the security of their known identities, or their in-group (McNerney et al., 

2022; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Theories of social psychology can be used to conceptualise 

how a societal existential threat can highlight inequalities, leading to more defined in-group 

and out-group barriers of society.  

Coined by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner, Social Identity Theory 

offers a continuum of how an individual perceives their belonging and association with others 

(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). With extremes of association positioned on each end of the 

continuum, the extent to which an individual lies nearer to one end is theorised to determine 

the degree they will alter their behaviours to align with others at a similar position; the ‘in-

group’ (McNerney et al., 2022). By extension, this continuum of association is thought to be 

an important factor in the level of adversity one treats those who identify with the opposite 

end of their continuum; the ‘out-group.’ In politics, these heightened group alliances coupled 

with existential societal threats can be exploited by influential political leaders. Right-wing 

politics can offer clear and comfortable solutions for citizens that further clarify and protect 

in-group affiliation at the expense of out-group minorities. Modified from Jay et al. (2019), 

the below offers a flow chart of how inequality and societal threat can lead to increased 

affiliation with extreme right-wing political ideologies.   



38 
 

 

Figure 2  
How existential societal threats contribute to inequality and growing support for right-wing 
politics. 

 

With much of the world experiencing economic and social inequalities in the last five 

years in particular, Social Identity Theory offers an explanation for why people may be more 

likely to sway towards identities that can provide a sense of social security. Extreme right-

wing political leaders can use these societal feelings of insecurity to their advantage by 

clearly conceptualising the problem (i.e., as society is in decline), distinguishing a clear 

community of blame (elite politicians, migrants, and minority communities), and offering a 

simple solution that feels comfortable (strengthened social security and national identity 



39 
 

 

through right-wing political policies and traditional value systems) (Davidson & Saull, 2016; 

Kinnvall, 2004; Jay et al., 2019). 

Although right-wing ideological affiliation appears to be globally increasing in 

politics, most movements, players, and organisations operate openly as non-violent. Extreme 

right-wing politics contributes to the subversive shift in societal perspective, however it does 

not directly contribute to violent action which causes acts of RMVE and PMVE. There are 

however groups existing behind the mainstream of pluralism that actively prepare to respond 

with violence to a perceived attack on society. The perspective of these groups is a firm 

disagreement with the actions of government, and belief that key members of the public are 

better equipped to address societal concerns. More recently capturing the public’s attention 

with their presence at the 2021 Capitol Attack, the modern militia movement is one such 

group and has been operating in the United States for the past three decades (Doxsee, 2021).  

The Modern Militia Movement 

Formed in 1990 and inspired by previous militia groups such as the Christian Patriots 

Defence League and Posse Comitatus, the modern militia is predominantly an anti-

government, anti-law enforcement movement built around preparation for an existential 

violent threat (Doxsee, 2021). While the nature of this threat varies between militia groups 

and over time, the unifying factor which ties members together is their support for second 

amendment rights4 and opposition to government authority. Defining themselves as 

defenders of the social order and a last line of defence against perceived threats of 

immigrants and liberals, militia members typically live in insular family or community 

                                                 
 

4 A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed (U.S. Constitution, n.d.). 



40 
 

 

environments, consistently preparing for the perceived approaching conflict. With strong 

constitutional and nationalist identity ideology, violence from the group is not promoted nor 

overly common, with members instead fitting a more armed survivalist demeanour (ADL, 

2020). For example, in a blog post by Three Percenters founder Mike Vanderboeh, the anti-

violent stance of the militia movement is clear: “We don’t fire first, nor second, nor perhaps 

even third. This does not mean we can’t defend ourselves. We must. What it does mean is that 

the rest of [us] don’t react until everyone understands that it is collective self-defence. We 

must not cede the moral high ground” (as cited in Doxsee, 2021). 

Events such as the Ruby Ridge stand-off in 1992, and the 1993 WACO stand-off 

incited the militia movement, with many members travelling to support and witness WACO 

in particular. The subsequent gun control laws; 1993 Brady Bill & 1994 Federal Assault 

Weapons Ban, which were enforced in light of these incidents increased militia membership 

(ADL, 2020). In 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing further raised the profile of the militia 

movement more broadly. Although lone actors involved in these attacks were not directly 

affiliated to a particular militia group, many were inspired by pro-militia rhetoric and their 

violence subsequently reflected the movement’s cause. While white supremacist ideology is 

not a compulsory belief system of militia, the 2008 presidential campaign of Barack Obama 

and his subsequent election sparked a supremacist resurgence. Driven initially by the militia’s 

white supremacist members, the resurgence was also driven by concerns regarding the 

Democrat’s position on gun control and immigration. Further, increased involvement in Tea 

Party events and rallies across the country legitimised the perceived importance of the 

militia’s cause (ADL, 2020; Doxsee, 2021). 

Donald Trump’s 2016 election win further excited and encouraged the militia. Many 

members saw the Trump campaign, policy changes, and rhetoric as indicating a mainstream 

validation of their ideology. Some groups even patrolled United States (U.S.) borders for 



41 
 

 

unauthorised immigrants and subsequently developed relationships with some law 

enforcement agencies, viewing them as allies. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic allowed 

militia to lean into conspiracy propaganda and find a niche audience with vaccine sceptics 

(Thomson-DeVeaux, 2020).  

Conspiracism is a common thread in much of RWE, and prominent in the militia 

movement. Conspiracism is the idea that most major historic events have been orchestrated 

by secret conspiracies and plots that benefit only elite individuals and groups of society 

(Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). For the militia, common conspiracies subscribed to include that 

the federal government is preparing to confiscate privately owned firearms for the purpose of 

seizing more power and stealing freedom from citizens. Another theory proposes the 

existence of a malevolent and diabolically clever cabal who will be used by the United 

Nations (UN) to erode Americans’ individual liberties and national sovereignty through the 

creation of international laws that make the U.S. Constitution redundant. A further popular 

theory is the ‘false flag’ conspiracy which believes that violent incidents of mass killings and 

terrorist attacks are orchestrated by the government to justify the aforementioned 

encroachments on civil liberties (Jackson, 2017). 

Apocalypticism is another common conspiracy followed by the militia and goes a 

long way to explaining their ‘prepper’ mentality. Apocalypticism (sometimes termed the 

‘New World Order’ conspiracy theory) is the belief that there is an approaching and 

catastrophic event that will end the world as we know it (O’Leary, 1997; Primiano & Boyer, 

1997). Manifesting in conspiracy theories of both natural and made-made disasters, 

apocalypticism tends to catastrophise change and often puts the elite ‘cabal’ as the 

mastermind (Barkun, 2013). The concept of apocalypticism has a longstanding religious 

affiliation traced back to interpretations of the Bible’s book of Revelation that makes this 

form of disinformation common place in RWE. In general, apocalyptic beliefs of those who 



42 
 

 

subscribe to RWE predict a fast-approaching confrontation between good and evil. While the 

groups on each side of the confrontation vary, common classifiers within extreme right-wing 

groups include evil as being people of colour, Jews, race traitors, migrants and the left-wing 

(Farinelli, 2021).  

The militia’s lack of trust in the government, resistance to government authority, ideas 

of national identity, shared group identity, and purpose are not unique and have also led other 

groups to turn towards similar values of off-the-grid living. Secluded, self-governing 

communities that represent a general rejection of modernity are another way right-wing 

ideology and extremism can be expressed. 

Intentional Communities and Cults 

Named for their intentional shift away from societal norms (Mariani, 2020), an 

intentional community (also known as a commune or egalitarian community and sometimes 

cults) is a modern descendant of utopian colonies and communes. Members of intentional 

communities generally destabilise the nuclear family unit, instead sharing domestic 

responsibilities and resources with like-minded people to live a life separate from materialism 

(Howard, 2021; Potok, 2013; Smith, 2002). Varying greatly in degree of intensity, interest in 

intentional community living has seen a unique peak since the COVID-19 pandemic with the 

reprioritisation of work-life balance and associated value systems having an impact (Bushey, 

2021; Howard, 2021; Klocke, 2020). What started in the quake of World War II as a 

community promoting peaceful, cooperative living arrangements in the hope of eradicating 

war altogether, is now a global phenomenon existing across ideological spectrums (i.e., right-

wing and left-wing; religion and politics) of groups living off-the-grid of mainstream society 

(Mariani, 2020).   



43 
 

 

Members of intentional communities exist across the world and generally hold a 

common political, religious, social, environmental or spiritual set of values. They 

consequently follow a secluded and alternative lifestyle based on those values. Reasons for 

joining an intentional community vary across time and culture, but contemporary 

membership is thought to be founded in response to the influences of industrialism, 

globalism, and capitalism on modern society. Potok (2013) argues membership to an 

intentional community occurs from four key motivations: A desire to live with like-minded 

people with like-minded views and values; A desire to escape feelings of ostracism and/or 

hostility; A (typically religious) awaiting of a future, often apocalyptic, event; And/or a (more 

secular) desire to survive a catastrophic future event.  

While many different types of intentional communities exist, from liberal and 

environmentally conscious eco-villages, to historical long-standing communes, a distinct 

subsection of intentional community culture is thought to present a strong extreme right-wing 

influence. Although largely secretive in nature and difficult to offer a generalised definition 

(Barker, 2014), some of the most prominent defining factors of intentional community culture 

can be interpreted as inherently right-wing. Many communities are conservative in nature, 

supporting traditional gender roles, family values, male supremacy, and rejecting 

technological advancement, globalisation, and capitalism. Encompassing militias within the 

militia movement, examples of extreme right-wing intentional communities include Waco 

and Intentional Aryan Communities (Futrell & Simi, 2004). Religious intentional 

communities (sometimes referred to as new religious movements) often follow an influential 

leader or group of leaders who are authoritative and dictate much of how members conduct 

their lives from dress and lifestyle, to income earning and relationships (Barker, 2014; 

Burmeister, 2020; Hurring; 2021). While most members of right-wing religious intentional 

communities appear to be born into the lifestyle, those who have chosen to leave discuss 



44 
 

 

traumatic and oppressive experiences justified by an inherently right-wing political, religious, 

or conspiratorial perspective (Brettkelly, 2021; Comer, 2022). 

Gloriavale Christian Community is an example of an intentional community with 

extreme right-wing views about gender and religion. Located on the West Coast of the South 

Island of Aotearoa NZ, the Gloriavale community has lived secluded from the rest of the 

world since 1969 (Tarawa, 2017). Described as a “withdrawn separatist community” and 

compared to Amish and the Hutterities movements, Gloriavale families often consist of more 

than 10 children, with women taking on traditional household duties and men holding more 

leadership and manual labour roles (Hurring, 2021; Sargisson & Sargent, 2017). Religiously 

fundamentalist, traditional, and exclusive, the foundational purpose of Gloriavale’s separatist 

lifestyle is the belief that modern society increasingly excuses things the Bible considers to be 

sinful (Gloriavale Christian Community, 2022).  

Equally exclusive and often rooted in extreme perspectives that go against the grain of 

societal norms, the sovereign citizen movement are another prominent expression of right-

wing ideology and extremism that also use ideas of self-governance to perpetuate their 

ideology. 

Sovereign Citizen Movement  

The sovereign citizen movement (also known in the UK and Canada as freemen-of-

the-land or FOTL) is another extreme right-wing force who have recently converged with 

militia and other patriot movements in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and connected 

conspiracy theories including; one world government, vaccine scepticism and danger, the 

origin of Coronavirus, government mind control, and geoengineering (Farinelli, 2021; Reeve, 

2021). Representing an innate challenge to law enforcement and the criminal justice system, 

they are most known for committing acts of ‘paper terrorism’ which involves filing pseudo-



45 
 

 

legal claims often aimed at government officials (Sarteschi, 2020). Sovereign citizens have a 

somewhat overlapping ideology with the modern militia movement and are characterised by 

distrust of governmental authority, paranoid about individual security, and strongly subscribe 

to conspiratorial thinking (Douglas et al., 2017; Hodge, 2019). 

In Aotearoa NZ, the sovereign citizen movement is based largely on the same 

ideology as global iterations, but adapted to encompass Aotearoa NZ’s unique culture and at 

times ideas of tino rangatiratanga – which prioritises sovereignty, self-determination and 

governance, and autonomy for Māori. The national Māori (Tino Rangatiratanga) flag is often 

flown by those involved in the sovereign citizen movement as a symbol of Māori sovereignty 

(Reeve, 2021). Central to the Aotearoa NZ sovereign citizen movement is the belief that the 

Government is inherently illegitimate and is actually a corporation – therefore its laws and 

regulations are redundant. The common law movement is a key action of this group and 

depicts the rejection of modern laws. Sovereign citizens instead invoke historical laws and 

principles including the King James Bible and the 1215 Magna Carta (Mitchell, 2022).  

Although anti-authority, and often conspiratorial views have existed in Aotearoa NZ 

for some time, most notably in history through the anti-1080, anti-5G and anti-UN 

movements (Spoonley, 2022), the amalgamation of these ideas with politics and other 

coordinated groups and/or movements is relatively new. Beginning to form and surface 

around the 2020 Aotearoa NZ general election, previous conspiratorial thoughts which 

existed in silos such as; China’s influence, the overreach of government, the influence of 

large international organisations like the UN and/or World Health Organisation (WHO) on 

Aotearoa NZ society, and the role of the global elites/a cabal in world domination have 

increasingly garnered more mainstream support (Donnell, 2020; Porter, 2022; Spoonley, 

2022). The pressurised environment of the COVID-19 pandemic combined with the human 

desire for control, pattern finding, and predisposition for bias (table 2) provided fertile 



46 
 

 

grounds for these different conspiracies to be combined together to create an equation for 

greater suppor