Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. 1 Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France? A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In History at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand. Alistair Clive Watts 2015 2 Acknowledgements I suspect that the more that is written in any preamble the less is read. Acknowledgements sound so clichéd but I now read them based on my new-found admiration for my teachers and supervisors. The brevity of this acknowledgement to Associate Professor Kirsty Carpenter and Professor Peter Lineham, both of the Massey University School of Humanities, for their supportive supervision, patience and forbearance is therefore a product of my wish that this acknowledgement is read, not a sign of any lack of gratitude on my part. Dr Geoff Watson also of the Massey History Department provided welcome suggestions and probing questions while Professor Michael Belgrave guided me towards some helpful but hitherto overlooked references. My wife Karen has in common with the partners of so many post-graduate students sat patiently and waited. Alistair Watts 2016 3 Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 6 Chapter One: Fashoda .............................................................................................. 33 Fashoda in Popular Culture .................................................................................................... 46 Chapter Two: The Dreyfus Affair ...................................................................... 60 Dreyfus in Popular Advertising and Culture ...................................................................... 77 Chapter Three: Reconciliation and the Path to the Entente Cordiale ............................................................................................................................................... 97 New Zealand Newspapers: German Perspectives ........................................................... 120 France: An Imperial Ally in the Pacific? ........................................................................... 122 New Zealand’s Options.......................................................................................................... 126 Chapter Four: New Zealand within the Empire ....................................... 130 The 1902 Imperial Conference: Empire Structure and Governance .......................... 135 1907 Imperial Conference: Trade, Defence and Shipping ............................................. 139 Defence ...................................................................................................................................... 141 Trade ......................................................................................................................................... 143 1909: New Zealand MPs Debate Ward’s Attendance at the Imperial Defence Conference ................................................................................................................................ 147 1909 Conference: The Outcome .......................................................................................... 151 The 1911 Conference .............................................................................................................. 152 1914: The Aftermath of the 1911 Imperial Conference ................................................. 155 War Declared ........................................................................................................................... 156 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 159 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 163 Appendix I: Allen’s Visit to London .......................................................................... 193 4 Preface There was fear of French domination of the islands themselves, and also an acute awareness of the strength of France in the Pacific, the imperialistic attitude of her missionaries, the isolated position of New Zealand, and a corresponding desire to stop further French progress.1 From the earliest days of colonisation French designs upon British (and later New Zealand) interests in the Pacific were poorly defined and non-specific but they were often cited as a motive for action or reaction as circumstances required. The strategic placement of French Catholic missions was interpreted as an underhand path to sovereignty and as a threat to British colonisation. The French were seized upon as a convenient scapegoat for Governor Fitzroy’s Northern War problem and their colonial gains in the Pacific conflicted with the Seddon-led Liberal policy of a greater New Zealand.2 As a result a prejudicial, anti-French attitude developed, dating from the earliest colonial European contacts. The mainly British colonists and their New Zealand descendants maintained a latent distrust of the French as a nation. As the entente cordiale between France and Britain metamorphosed into an alliance in the early twentieth century, these prejudicial attitudes were suppressed but not forgotten. I have used the term ‘alliance’ in its everyday sense of a loose agreement or understanding. Historical (non-legal) scholarship varies on the status of the Anglo- French entente cordiale. Keiger has argued that the entente was neither an alliance nor a treaty but simply a settlement of various differences over empires and colonies. He concluded that the British acted as if there was an alliance while claiming that there was not; the French ignored British denials and claimed that an alliance existed, using Anglo-French military consultation as evidence.3 As Germany threatened France during the Moroccan crisis of 1905 Britain’s warning in support of France, reinforced by the private assurances various British officials gave, was misread by the French as evidence of an alliance. As a result not one member of the French Cabinet present at its meeting on 6 June 1905 doubted Great Britain’s commitment to the 1 J.A. Salmond, "New Zealand and the New Hebrides," in The Feel of Truth: Essays in New Zealand and Pacific History, ed. Peter Munz (Wellington: A.H. and A.W. Reed, 1969), p.119. 2 "French and German Aggression: Importance of South Sea Possessions," Auckland Star, 10 February 1906, p.9. 3 John Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.3-11. 5 French cause. A later exchange of letters (November 1912) obliged the parties to consult if there was a mutual threat but freedom of action was still reserved. The British Government wanted to be able to tell their parliament there was no binding obligation.4 The British Generals (who despised civilian controls and political interference) militarized the entente and turned it into an alliance.5 As a result New Zealand participated in World War I as part of the British Imperial Alliance. This study investigates and reflects my own curiosity as to how this seemingly unlikely alliance came about. 4 Christopher Andrew and Paul Vallet, "The German Threat," in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.24-25, p.30. 5 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2014). pp.222-223. Robin Neillands, The Old Contemptibles: The British Expeditionary Force, 1914 (London: John Murray 2008). p.44, pp.56-57. Unofficial ‘conversations’ between Brigadier-General Wilson, Director of Military Operations, and the French military allowed the pretence that there was no British commitment. 6 Introduction Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France? But history consists entirely of contemporary references that have gone out of date …6 The generally accepted view of New Zealand’s entry into the Great War is one of enthusiastic participation alongside the Empire. King, drawing on John A. Lee’s recollections, describes a fervently positive response to the news of war with Germany.7 Although Sinclair’s description is more circumspect the conclusions are similar; the Dominion was keen to participate and do its collective duty.8 The moral certitude that came from doing the right thing by the Old Country and bolstering the collective defence of the Empire put the matter beyond doubt. The initial enthusiasm of the volunteers and their supporters was real and something no Government would have wanted to dampen or conceal. There were however concerns within the political sphere, reported in the press, regarding New Zealand’s involvement. These concerns had been raised at Imperial Conferences and discussed in the news of the day well before the war began so they do not fit well with the popular view of unsuppressed public enthusiasm. After war was declared Massey still had to brush aside the almost plaintive questions of MPs when asked when the troops would leave, where they were going, and by implication what they going to do once they got there. (Massey had both Imperial secrecy requirements and the safe passage of the troops to consider.9) I believe these concerns, although without any prospect of preventing New Zealand involvement, were based on well-founded apprehension as to the consequences of involvement in a European war. The evidence in this thesis suggests that these trepidations were strongly influenced by traditional antagonism that weakened the case for assisting the French against Germany. 6 Clive James, North Face of Soho: More Unreliable Memoirs (London: Pan Macmillan, 2006). p.105. 7 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2012). p.293. In fairness to King he does mention Ward’s poorly executed bid for a say in Imperial matters. Ibid., p.292. 8 Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, rev. ed. (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2000). pp.232-233. 9 James Watson, W.F. Massey : New Zealand, Makers of the modern world. (London: Haus, 2010). p.46.; Hansard, "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates," 169: July 22 - September 15(1914): p.553. 7 This is not a history of New Zealand’s entry into World War I, nor is it a revision of the Dominion’s attitudes towards and interaction with Germany. This is a study of the France–New Zealand interface in the relevant years 1890-1914 as it was presented to the public through the press. It adds to the picture, but it is one hue in the palette, not the complete spectrum of colours. It is nonetheless important for two reasons. Firstly, notwithstanding the use of the Belgium invasion as justification, it provides an insight into the nation’s participation in a war that was arguably not its immediate concern.10 Secondly it adds a further layer of complexity to the evolution of New Zealand as an independent nation by looking beyond a war-centred nation-building narrative.11 New Zealand’s political relationship with France in the twenty pre-World War I years has not been studied in detail probably because there were no official direct interactions with France or indeed with any other power apart from Britain.12 Seddon, Ward and subsequently Massey chose to work from within the Imperial framework rather than to challenge its authority despite New Zealand’s ambition for Pacific colonisation clashing with both French aspirations and British Empire priorities. Watson, although writing of Massey in the post-War years expressed it thus: ‘While there was a general coincidence of aims between New Zealand and Britain, there were also differences that reflected the particular interests of a small ‘White’ Dominion on the other side of the world from London’.13 The common argument that there was no alternative overlooks the evidence that other Dominions, especially Canada, were showing every sign of developing an independent national stance particularly on defence matters.14 Thus at the same time as the misplaced New Zealand dreadnought 10 New Zealand assumed any war would be fought in the northern Hemisphere, it would be brief and it would be won by the Royal Navy. 11 W. H. Oliver and Massey University College of Manawatu., The inadequacy of a dependent Utopia : the Anderson memorial lecture ([Hamilton, N.Z.]: Published by Paul's Book Arcade for the Massey University of Manawatu, 1964). p.6. Oliver made the point that complete independence in the sense of a nation without interactions with others is not possible in the modern world; he also pointed out that this does not necessarily imply a loss of national identity. 12 This is not ignore the many extra-Imperial interactions such as the rejected proposal to become part of the Australian Federation and attempts to build a greater New Zealand presence in the Pacific through annexation and Treaty. 13 Watson, W.F. Massey : New Zealand: p.65. 14 W. David McIntyre and Canterbury History Foundation., When, if ever, did New Zealand become independent? , The Jim Gardner lecture 2002 (Christchurch, N.Z.: Canterbury History Foundation, 2002). pp.5-6. Although foreign affairs were controlled by London, the dominions could not be taxed or compelled to fight. 8 offer was being reluctantly accepted by the British, the Canadians were planning to have a separate Navy. New Zealand’s place, as she saw it, was alongside Britain and by implication alongside France. New Zealand attempted to influence policy from within the Empire culminating in Ward’s abortive efforts during the 1911 Empire Conference to introduce a Round Table-like constitution. Any suggestion of official dissent was consequently muted but New Zealand clearly had the desire for an independent Pacific policy even if she lacked the will to challenge the British and implement it. As well as this suppressed desire the French Pacific presence itself was a prompt and a reminder – an aide-mémoire – of past deceits from the earliest colonial days. New Zealand swallowed hard and did not press her case or act. As a result New Zealand was enrolled by default in the Empire’s war alongside a colonial competitor. The subsequent military action of France, Britain, New Zealand and others pushed any concerns aside. Sources Secondary sources of New Zealand origin tend to overstate the importance of New Zealand within the Empire and to treat the New Zealand colonial project as if New Zealand was always aiming to become an independent nation.15 This history is quite Whiggish as it charts New Zealand’s ‘progress’ towards nationhood and assumes that a path to independence was the objective.16 These sources also tend to understate the dominant influence of the imperial link when considering the local impact of events that took place outside New Zealand’s borders. Conversely texts about the Empire assign New Zealand a minor role both politically and economically in keeping with its geographic remoteness and the small size of the country. Existing studies of British diplomacy concentrate on a personality or on a bilateral relationship, with a few notable exceptions.17 The historiography of British foreign policy between the Crimean War and World War I also reflects the dual nature of British power based as 15 While the New Zealand-British relationship has been the subject of numerous studies both in New Zealand general histories and as a leading theme in political biographies, the British-based historiography tends to an extensive analysis of the Franco-British link without considering the implications for New Zealand. 16 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand.; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand.; W. P. Morrell, New Zealand, The modern world : a survey of historical forces. (London England: Ernest Benn, 1935).The classic examples are those of King, Sinclair and from earlier times, Morrell. 17 T. G. Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," in Imperial Defence: The Old World Order: 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.9. 9 it was on two strategic blocks. The interaction of the six great powers imposed ‘systemic’ constraints through Treaties and Alliances on British actions within European affairs. Great Britain was perceived to be the most powerful of the six due to the extent of her Empire and the Royal Navy. The other strategic block was based on the Anglo-Indian axis. Russia was the most persistent and long-term enemy, challenging Great Britain in both Europe and in Asia-Pacific. This had implications for New Zealand.18 I have used newspapers as a primary source (alongside published Government documents) to reconstruct contemporary opinion. While the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives provided much useful information, the Hansard records proved less fruitful owing to the lack of any direct New Zealand government role in Imperial foreign policy beyond the adjacent Pacific. The Imperial Conferences and the relaying of information that followed them provided an official forum for discussion. Newspapers can be easily dismissed as biased and in some cases, an incorrect version of the truth, but they provide a contemporary record of views at the time of publication. The utility of the local newspapers therefore lies in the immediacy of their day-to-day reporting. They reflect the importance of current events without the benefit of time for introspection and closer examination. The reporters and editors were neither chroniclers nor historians writing for posterity. They were reporting events for tomorrow’s reader in the belief that the content would be discarded the day after. A brief reprise of the development of the newspaper industry in New Zealand gives context to these conclusions. The early British settlers understandably looked to London for news of Home. The only medium for mass distribution of reports on current events, apart from word of mouth and private correspondence, was the newspaper. Being widely disseminated, the news shaped public opinion either through re-edited versions of the printed word shipped from the United Kingdom or through local content.19 In a pattern 18 Ibid., pp.8-9. 19 Hannah-Lee Benbow, "I Like New Zealand Best: London Correspondents for New Zealand Newspapers, 1884-1942" (A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, 2009), pp.9-11.; David Hastings, Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2013). p.69.Hastings re-quotes Creighton (the Editor of the Southern Cross in 1862) that at 3p per copy, less discounts, the newspaper was available to the “poorest working man”. 10 recognisable today through the innovation of the internet the introduction of wired transmission allowed wider and quicker news circulation. Truncated news reports were quickly transmitted across the country as the network rapidly expanded in the early 1870’s; after 1876 New Zealand could receive more timely international news telegraphed via Australia from London.20 The introduction of the rotary press in 1888 and linotype machines in the 1890s meant papers could be rapidly mass produced. Because telegraphic transmissions were priced on a word count basis they were expensive and therefore brief.21 The main New Zealand newspapers shared the cost through the United Press Association and its predecessors. Although reliance on a common news source tended to mean there was less differentiation between the mastheads, divergent editorial stances and selections from the voluminous hard copy papers shipped to New Zealand led to variation.22 This discretion did not give editors a completely free hand as it was limited by commercial realities. Hastings repeatedly makes the point that newspaper publishing was a business venture and so editors had to publish content that was of interest to their readers.23 Papers that ignored this reality or pushed only their editors’ points of view often failed commercially.24 To compete newspapers had to develop their own theme or character. One important implicit conclusion from the success of this market segmentation (as it is now called) is that New Zealand newspaper readers were not the homogeneous, classless population that is sometimes assumed.25 The battle between the Herald and the Star 20 Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news: pp.165-166. 21 Glen O’Hara, "New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the ‘Networked World’ of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries," History Compass 8, no. 7 (2010): p.609. Early telegraphy was not an early version of the modern internet. Transmissions were not only ‘expensive (but also) patchy (and) unreliable’. Letter writing and physical transmission of paper remained an important conduit for news. 22 Hastings, Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news. p.166; pp.171-72. Although UPA did not have a monopoly on the use of the telegraph for news its members were banned from using alternative syndicated sources and the UPA in turn policed and punished pirated use by non- subscribers. James Sanders and Hugh Nevill, Dateline-NZPA : the New Zealand Press Association ; 1880-1980 (Auckland, N.Z.: Wilson & Horton, 1979). p.33. O’Hara, "New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the ‘Networked World’ of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries," p.641. 23 Hastings, Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news: p.5, p.14, p.51. 24 Hastings cites The Echo as a paper founded to push proprietorial views with the mistaken belief that the public could be persuaded to the owner’s view. Ibid., p.142.; Tom O'Malley Michael Bromley, "Introduction," in A Journalism Reader, ed. Tom O'Malley Michael Bromley (London: Routledge, 1997), p.2. 25 Hastings, Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news: p.139. As early as 1874 the Star was involved in a libel action that clearly positioned the paper as the champion of the less well off – there was no suggestion that New Zealand was without class. 11 in Auckland was the classic example. A morning versus afternoon/evening publication had implications for the timely delivery of local news. The Herald was opposed to Seddon and the Liberals’ agenda while the Star, although not radical, was more favourable. The Star championed the causes of the less well off. In addition anonymous letters, written in some cases by newspaper staff, were a familiar ruse to push views that may have sat less comfortably on the editorial pages.26 In the search for readers the press naturally sought out titillating stories such as the Dreyfus fiasco or the Fashoda debacle. Overseas correspondents were an important source for foreign news content and style. London-based New Zealand journalists filled the gaps between the London newspaper reports, telegraphed news and UPA (United Press Association and its predecessors) filings.27 News received by mail still remained extremely important; moreover the UPA did not have a monopoly on telegraphed news. News reports consequently evolved into a hybrid of mailed correspondence from journalists, copy extracted from London papers and telegraphed headlines. This had two important implications. Firstly a logical chronological sequence of reporting must not be assumed. As editors looked for ‘fillers’ and more detail, issues were revisited and earlier reports reprised and amplified. Secondly in a search for relevance the news developed a nationalistic theme; looking for and then highlighting news about New Zealand inflated the national sense of self-importance.28 These observations are re- visited later in this thesis because they provide context to the interpretation of the events analysed through newspaper content. Reports from The Daily Mirror have also been compared with their New Zealand equivalents to demonstrate these points.29 Finally local advertising provided an important counterpoint to the news. Advertising copy demonstrated what was publicly acceptable and what was not as an indicator of societal norms. 26 Ibid.p.14, 103, 139, 185, 191, 227-228, 238 27 Sanders and Nevill, Dateline-NZPA : the New Zealand Press Association ; 1880-1980. 28 Benbow, "I Like New Zealand Best: London Correspondents for New Zealand Newspapers, 1884- 1942," p.12. This tendency is still prevalent today as editors seek a local connection for apparently independent events elsewhere in the world. 29 Trinity Mirror PLC, "Our Company," http://www.trinitymirror.com/our-company/history. The Daily Mirror has been chosen because of its frequent use of photographs, a feature missing from the local press over much of the period under study, and because in its metamorphosis from an experimental journal for women into a popular news source it became a peoples’ paper. 12 Statistics and Trading Relations It is easy to generalise in the absence of specific knowledge or first hand experience. Negative attitudes were easy to maintain because New Zealanders did not know the French as a people. Generalised characterisations help to make sense of a complex world but in so doing the nuances of the individual and their circumstances are lost. The table below shows the proportion of people of French nationality, by gender, present in New Zealand at the time of the Censuses of 1911, 1906, 1901 and 1896. Selected Census Results: 1896-191130 Gender as a % of Total Total Males Females % of Total Population 1911 TOTAL FRENCH 647 422 225 0.06 By Gender: French Nationality (%) 100 65% 35% NZ Population (%) 100 52% 47% 1906 TOTAL FRENCH 624 417 207 0.07 By Gender: French Nationality (%) 100% 67% 33% NZ Population (%) 100% 53% 47% 1901 TOTAL FRENCH 609 409 200 0.08 By Gender: French Nationality (%) 100 67% 33% NZ Population (%) 100 53% 47% 1896 TOTAL FRENCH 698 494 204 0.10 By Gender: French Nationality (%) 100 71% 29% NZ Population (%) 100 53% 47% Regardless of residential status, the total number of French nationals present was only between six hundred and seven hundred on each occasion. They constituted less than 0.1% of the population count meaning less than one person in every one thousand present on census day was French. The gender bias in favour of males was greater than that for the overall population. This suggests that the few French nationals present in New Zealand were more likely than not to have been present in some 30 New Zealand Government, "Census Results," (New Zealand Government). http://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1901-census/1901-report-on-results-census/1901- report-results-census.html#idpreface_1_1042 13 capacity other than residency, be it as seamen, visitors, religious personnel or in other transient occupations requiring their temporary presence. Year Book data from 1892 to 1914 recorded a cumulative total of 6,161 naturalisations between 1892-1914. Just under160 French nationals became New Zealand citizens in the same period.31 The French thus compromised a miniscule 2.5% of the total foreign residents who became naturalised citizens. There were so few French citizens resident in New Zealand that the probability of a New Zealand resident knowing a French man or woman on a personal basis was low. The thousand or so French residents in New Zealand were not a community and had quickly ‘merge(d) into the populace’ and assumed a New Zealand identity.32 By 1914 trade with France - another point of contact and a source of mutual knowledge - still comprised less than 1% of New Zealand’s imports and exports. Yet, despite antipathy at ‘man-in-the-street’ level and an absence of recorded trade, French retail goods were still freely available in retail outlets.33 31 New Zealand Government, "New Zealand Official Year Books," (Wellington1890-1914). See bibliography for online references. 32 "A report from the French Consul to the Minister in France," in 60 Years Ago : Celebrating The Anniversary Of Diplomatic Relations Between New Zealand And France (Wellington, N.Z.: The French Embassy, 2005), p.29. Jessie Munro, "Mother Aubert," in New Zealand and the French : two centuries of contact, ed. John Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1997, 2nd., Updated ed), p.93. For New Zealanders the occasional glimpses of the Sisters of Mother Aubert’s Order with their prams collecting goods for the poor are touching in their simplicity and convey a sympathetic French-related image. 33 "A report from the French Consul to the Minister in France," pp.29-36. New Zealand Government, "New Zealand Official Yearbook," (Wellington1915). Trade statistics from1914 are reflective of the pattern seen in the preceding twenty years. The vast bulk of the £26, 261,447 of New Zealand exports went to the United Kingdom (£21,383,891 or 81%). Imports from the United Kingdom, valued at £11,985,946, were 56% of the total. Additional trade via the United Kingdom hub was not recorded. Natives of France ALL 1892 3 63 1893 14 596 1894 3 257 1895 0 57 1896 9 351 1897 1 65 1898 8 113 1899 27 651 1900 13 267 1901 13 238 1902 11 322 1903 5 276 1904 5 219 1905 7 607 1906 4 338 1907 4 282 1908 18 572 1909 7 217 1910 7 166 1911 9 526 1912 8 299 1913 3 406 1914 2 165 Past 20 years 159 6161 14 There was no three-way liaison between France, Britain and New Zealand. Instead three bilateral relationships evolved concurrently and changes in any one of the interactions influenced the third country. Perceived distance and size were important contextual elements. A Conceptual View of the World from a New Zealand Perspective Although France and Britain are geographically equidistant from New Zealand, for the colonising British New Zealanders, France was culturally and racially distinct whereas Britain and New Zealand were close neighbours. Distance therefore had dimensions that pre-World War I New Zealand failed to reconcile. The emotional, subjective distance between Britain and New Zealand was small. This New Zealand was an island adjacent to the British homeland but far from France. Felicity Barnes’ work neatly encapsulates the essence of it when she refers to London as a New Zealand metropolis.34 On the other hand while the telegraph arguably shrank the world it also increased the importance of those metropolitan centres, such as Auckland, where the cable news was received.35 Despite cable communication and modern shipping the geographic distance between New Zealand and both France and 34 Felicity Barnes, New Zealand's London : A Colony and its Metropolis (Auckland, N.Z. : Auckland University Press, 2012). p.7. Oliver and Massey University College of Manawatu., The inadequacy of a dependent Utopia : the Anderson memorial lecture: p.7. This concept was also mentioned by W.H. Oliver when he said ‘London has been our sole metropolis …’ 35 O’Hara, "New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the ‘Networked World’ of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries," p.612. Britain New Zealand France 15 Britain remained vast.36 New Zealand was not a British offshore island.37 Belich makes the point with his description of the Pacific as an impediment between Britain and New Zealand.38 The geographical distance that made Europe seem of little relevance to New Zealand could not be ignored by Britain, an island nation in the North Atlantic with a clear view of continental France across the English Channel.39 Mutual distrust had been a feature of pre-entente political relations between Britain and France. Anglophiles were a definite minority amongst the French public, intellectuals, and the power elite.40 Distrust of England was fuelled by ‘Napoleonic nostalgia’ and the colonial situation. Arguably the only real threat to the British Empire between 1856 and 1918 had been the possible emergence of a ‘Napoleonic superstate’. Keeping Europe quiet, if not unsettled, became a British objective because a continental power attempting to attack the peripheries of the British Empire would be vulnerable at home. The Royal Navy could therefore secure both Home and Empire. The success of this strategy is shown by the absence of any significant attack on British interests between 1814 and 1914.41 36 Frances Steel, Oceania Under Steam : Sea Transport and the Cultures of Colonialism, c.1870-1914 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2011). p.9. Steel refers to the possibility of further examining ‘…the ways in which transport operations were vital to the formation and maintenance of regional colonial history’. I would put it more broadly to include the idea that innovations in communications were what counted. Trade was a by-product or indeed a volumetric gauge of the magnitude of bi-lateral relationships. P. M. Kennedy, "Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914," The English Historical Review 86, no. 341 (1971): p.121. Kennedy claims that the French considered cable communications more important than the Navy to the UK’s power 37 Michael King, God's Furthest Outpost: A History of Catholics in New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1997). The front piece quotation from Father Theo Wanders MHM refers to his transfer to New Zealand. He uses the term ‘farthest’ to mean the farthest place from Europe. Such descriptions of distance were common. Tom Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister (Auckland: Penguin, 2014). p.28. Seddon referred to migrating via ‘… the world’s longest sea journey to the “farthest promised land” ’. 38 James Belich, Paradise Reforged : A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Press, 2001). p.86, p.237. Salmond, "New Zealand and the New Hebrides," p.133. Salmond attributed New Zealand’s concerns regarding the French to the realization that New Zealand and Australia were part of the Pacific world. 39 Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," pp.10-11. New railways in Europe undermined the importance of sea transport and therefore British trade pre-eminence built on a merchant navy protected by the Royal Navy. The United Kingdom was left with an insignificant army (c.f. the conscripted armies of Europe) and a consequent reduction in the ability of the Royal Navy to apply pressure. 40 Christophe Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," in Anglo- French attitudes : comparisons and transfers between English and French intellectuals since the eighteenth century, ed. Christophe Charle, Julien Vincent, and J. M. Winter (Manchester, UK ; New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), p.237. 41 Andrew Lambert, "The Royal Navy and the Defence of Empire, 1856-1918," in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.114-116. 16 Trade displays and exhibitions from the mid-nineteenth century onward provided a visual metaphor for the developing Franco-British engagement. The Great Exhibition of 1851 had been a highpoint for the United Kingdom that set the benchmark for judging technical supremacy compared to others. Thereafter exhibitions were used to simultaneously measure national progress and impress rivals.42 When the United Kingdom won only ten out of ninety category prizes at the 1867 Paris Exhibition this failure, as it was seen, became linked to wider societal ills leading to a religious revival and an obsession with morals, sex and drinking.43 Despite the festive mood occasioned by the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations, when the 1897 Colonial Conference was held, fears of foreign rivalry particularly from Germany, France, and Russia were in the ascendant. So too were concerns about industrial and diplomatic competition from the United States.44 From the French viewpoint the reasons for the assumed Anglo-Saxon superiority were varied. The education system came in for scrutiny, particularly what was seen as French concentration on theory in comparison with the English emphasis on practical skills, teamwork, and self-reliance.45 Leftish French opinion saw hope for social reform in France in the way England had reformed itself. Building on the past through evolutionary, long-term, inter- generational change rather than destruction through more or less continual revolution would advance the French nation.46 42 Anthony Edwards, The Role Of International Exhibitions In Britain, 1850-1910: Perceptions Of Economic Decline And The Technical Education Issue (Cambria Press, 2008). p.4. 43 Isabelle Tombs and Robert Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present (London: William Heinemann, 2006). p.392-393. 44 Brian P. Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856- 1919," in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.264; Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister: p.65.; Edwards, The Role Of International Exhibitions In Britain, 1850-1910: Perceptions Of Economic Decline And The Technical Education Issue: pp.1-13. Seddon was an advocate for technical education and night classes. Victorian-era ‘Technical Educationists’ blamed an under valuing of technical and scientific education for the failure to maintain supremacy. There were however alternative opinions that suggested British supremacy was coincidental, rather than by design, and that free trade was just as important, if not more so, than education. 45 Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present.pp.410-11. 46 Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," p.244. This thinking followed Max Leclerc’s ideas. The conservatives trusted and controlled the institutions of both state and church. To change France and French thinking these leading institutions needed to reform. Therefore the leading conservative French bourgeoisie had to change. By changing family relationships and schooling, the bourgeoisie would change and then be receptive to (and available for) reform of the state’s institutions. 17 By the time of the joint London Exhibition of 1908 the display of goods and cultural harmony was being used as a symbol of entente inspired goodwill (although the idea came from the French not the free-trading British).47 Some interpreted the emblematic joining of France and Britain in friendship as a deliberate distraction from the major issues of the day.48 This interpretation suggests more forward planning would have been required than the volatile political environment of the times suggests was possible. Conversely the idea that Exhibitions were United Kingdom-centric and focused on the Home market overlooks the importance of the French presence and the display of industrial power for the observation of envious rivals.49 The assumed superiority of Britain over France extended to their respective colonization projects. A common view was that France as a nation was colonizing to improve the lot of humanity whereas the Anglo-Saxons directed their nationalism to improvement through practical goals that profited nation and individual.50 The truth lay somewhere between the two. Exploitation and commercial gain was veneered with the benevolent benefits of civilization for the indigenous population. The ultimate destiny for a French colony was becoming part of France itself, whatever the geographical distance between the lands of colonizers and colonized.51 For the British an independent state was the logical colonial outcome. Furthermore, the Empire carried within it from birth an ideological bacillus that would prove fatal. This was Edmund Burke’s paternalistic doctrine that colonial government 47 "The Franco-British Exhibition ", Nelson Evening Mail, 21 December 1907, p.2.; "London Chat," Otago Daily Times, 6 June 1908, p.4. The Olympic Games were held nearby with a new railway capable of bringing seventy-five thousand visitors per hour to the London site. Armand Fallières, Président de la République visited the Exhibition from 25-29 May 1908. Three thousand French children were brought to England to view the Anglo-British exhibition. The intent was to impress the youngsters with the ‘charming’ English, thus reinforcing their perceptions of the entente. 48 Martyn Cornick, "The White City, 1908," in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.17-21. The Irish question, reform of the House of Lords, social inequality, and women’s emancipation were cases in point for the British while for France there were the riots and related strikes of July and August 1908 (violently suppressed by Clemenceau). 49 John Griffiths, Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880-1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). p.20. 50 Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," p.259.;Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.444. 51 Robert Aldrich, "European Expansion in the Island Pacific: A Historiographical Review," in The French and the Pacific world, 17th-19th centuries : explorations, migrations and cultural exchanges, ed. Annick Foucrier, The Pacific World: Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific, 1500-1900 (Aldershot, Hampshire, England Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), p.94. 18 was a trust. It was to be exercised for the benefit of subject people that they would eventually attain their birthright – freedom.52 The relationship between France and Britain was irrevocably altered in the twenty years prior to World War I by a numerically small but highly influential power elite.53 Although it seems unlikely that Otte is correct when he asserts that most British cabinet members did not know or did not care about foreign policy in general it was true that only a small number of politicians were involved. Only eleven served as British Foreign Secretary from 1856-1914.54 Sir Edward Grey was in office from 1905-16. With a small group of supporters and confidantes, as well as general Conservative support, the Liberal Grey could pursue his course independently and dictate Imperial foreign policy with the Prime Minister’s approval.55 Although relations between the British Foreign and Colonial Offices were not intimate they were not distant either and the two could work in tandem, thus extending Grey’s influence.56 From 1905-16 France had fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs so power was effectively in the hands of the Quai d’Orsay as the high turnover of minsters and factional strife within the cabinet left senior French officials with a free hand. Sensitive information was ‘rarely’ passed on to senior cabinet ministers and sometimes not even the President was informed.57 Poincaré has been quoted as saying that only ‘… two or three ministers…’ were aware of the major foreign policy issues arising in the Balkans. In the absence of central direction French Ambassadors grew more powerful and made policy themselves.58 Grey’s ambiguity in public about 52 Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997 (London: Vintage, 2008). p.xviii. 53 Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest- serving Prime Minister: pp. 300-301.p.309. Brooking refers to Seddon establishing links with the ‘ruling classes’ during his UK visit. The latter apparently had doubts about the ability of Seddon and his colonial brethren to govern others. 54 Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," p.13-15. 55 Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914: pp.211-213. 56 Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," p.15. For example the Colonial Office ‘worked’ on the Australian Government to accept the Anglo-French agreement made by the Foreign Office to settle the New Hebrides’ dispute. 57 Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914: pp.300-301. Clark re-quoting Raymond Poincaré. 58 Ibid., pp191-193; pp.300-101.; James F. McMillan, Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991 (New York: Routledge, 1985; repr., 1992). p.41. McMillan compares the French policy makers to a small closed shop of politicians and officials. The Deputies knew little and (in his view) the public did not care. 19 British support for France leading up to 1914 added a further complication. While publicly disavowing commitment, Grey was privately giving assurances to France. This was not an independent initiative. Asquith’s secret talks with France began in 1905, but neither the Dominions nor most of the British cabinet were aware of this until 1911.59 Théophile Delcassé the French Foreign Minister for six years after the Fashoda confrontation believed that Germany and not Britain was the real threat to France.60 His insight was that colonial rivalry did not prevent a friendship in Europe between France and the United Kingdom. Germany’s Naval Law of 1900 was a threat to both countries on separate fronts. A strengthened Germany simultaneously challenged French colonial aspirations and Britain’s isolationist stance secured by the Royal Navy.61 While France wanted the security of an alliance as a deterrent to Germany the British wanted to avoid an open-ended commitment to a possible European conflict. Each therefore operated within the loose agreement of the entente to achieve their objectives while avoiding the final step of a treaty-like agreement. While denying an alliance the British acted as if there was one while the French ignored Great Britain’s claims to the contrary and comforted themselves that there was an agreement based on war planning conducted out of the public gaze. French insistence on a written version of whatever was agreed contrasted with the British resolve to rely on verbal assurances. This has been interpreted as a lack of British commitment.62 The British leadership avoided forcing the issue for fear of provoking public protest both at Home and within the Empire, especially given the concerns of New Zealand and the other Dominions (see Chapter Four) regarding potential involvement in a European conflict. Public displays of fraternal affection and joint military demonstrations with France were one thing - positioned as they were to achieving peace through strength. An alliance with the explicit threat of a European war if certain pre-conditions were met was quite another. Moreover a direct acknowledgement of an alliance would have 59 Brian P. Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856- 1919," in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.278. 60 Christopher M. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan, 1968). pp.203-205. 61 Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," p.5. 62 Ibid., pp.8-9. 20 simply provoked Germany to even more vigorous militarization, the very chain of events that Britain and France were hoping to avoid. The conventional and most misleading view of the British Empire was that used in the mid-late nineteenth century: that of a ‘… tightly knit power resting on free association’.63 From this interpretation came the common but incorrect New Zealand- centric view of New Zealand as a significant Dominion at the heart of a firmly managed pre-War Empire. On the contrary most scholarship now argues that New Zealand was not significant and the Empire was not tightly controlled. … when we talk about the British Empire we are really referring to a loose and often accidental association of units, embodying in their disorganization the worst features of the feudal and federal systems.64 It has been said with at least the spirit of truth that the British Empire was founded in a fit of absence of mind, and that the largely ad hoc development of the overseas extensions of Britain owed more to traditional British pragmatism than to any master plan emanating from the corridors of Whitehall.65 The Empire was based on an ad hoc mix of British stock, moral purpose and free trade. Certainly some initiatives were planned, such as pre-World War I colonisation in Africa, but elsewhere actions were largely ad hoc. It was Lord Roseberry who had called it a ‘… commonwealth of nations’.66 There were many unanswered questions about the status of the members as far as nationality and allegiance were concerned. Especially concerning was the issue of whether the members could remain neutral in the event of war.67 The Empire was at best a loose association of interests with a variety of agendas beneath a coating of solidarity. If the ‘… tightly knit power …’ version of the Empire was never true the image certainly stayed. The Empire was neither cohesive nor a well-ordered organization heading towards economic independence as the description suggests. It was the opposite of all those things, but it would be unreasonable to blame British Governments of whatever political persuasion for that being the case. Colonisation 63 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.258. 64 Ged Martin, "Was There a British Empire?," Historical Journal 15, no. 3 (1972): p.562. 65 Robert A Huttenback Lance E Davis, Mammon and the pursuit of Empire: The political economy of British imperialism, 1860-1912, Online ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). p.7. 66 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.258. 67 W. David McIntyre, The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). p.21. 21 was most likely to be the result of private enterprise (as was the case for New Zealand) or penal settlement (in the Australian example) or the pursuit of strategic defence interests.68 As a consequence the Empire lacked a comprehensive purpose. Once this collection of historical sovereignty claims, private ventures and conquests from indigent inhabitants was established its reasons for being were justified by a mix of emotive appeals and self-serving interests. Post hoc justifications for colonization included social engineering, ridding Britain of her surplus population and protecting the local inhabitants whether indigenous or colonists.69 Raw materials for industrialisation were sourced from extractive enterprises.70 Whatever the intent, the collective result was a geographic pattern of trade best likened to radii originating from London through which flowed the collective wealth, both physical and economic, of the world’s greatest industrial and financial power. Attempts to retain this Empire included developing a British culture and character within the (white- ruled) Dominions and Colonies.71 There were organisations for just this purpose.72 As a result of these initiatives intra-Empire trade and defence of the Empire became central concerns of British foreign policy. In that sense British diplomacy was not so much orientated towards achieving a specific goal as it was about preventing the collapse of the system. As Seddon said, ‘Our first duty was preservation of the Empire’.73 The opposing foreign pressures for change were reactive. Externally there was envy and a desire to equal or exceed British power and prestige. Russia, France and Germany were particularly (at different times) so motivated. Internally the forces for change were potentially equally damaging for the Empire as the domestic pressure 68 Claire Tomalin, Samuel Pepys: The Unequalled Self (London: Penguin, 2002). p.144, p.335. Samuel Pepys’ diaries provide an insight into a case of the latter in Tangiers. Pepys was part of the expedition sent to destroy and abandon the colony and naval base that he had helped establish there, in favour of a better Mediterranean alternative: Gibraltar. 69 K. R. Howe, Singer In A Songless Land : A Life Of Edward Tregear, 1846-1931 (Auckland [N.Z.]: Auckland University Press, 1991). p.61. 70 George Peden, "The Treasury and Defence of Empire," in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.73-74. This argument was self- fulfilling as during World War I the Empire did prove to be a strategic asset for the supply of raw materials, manufacturing capacity and manpower. 71 Unattributed, "The Queen's Empire: A Pictorial and Descriptive Record (1897) " in Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain : A Reader, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.278-279. This essay promoted the model of Englishmen (sic) scattered throughout the world. One day they may become a separate race but that would be far in the future owing to the ‘ingrained … qualities inherent in the blood …’ Other races and cultures were simply a pleasant diversion to the mono-Anglo culture. 72 Griffiths, Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880-1939: pp.1-2. 73 Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest- serving Prime Minister: p.335. ‘Our’ in this context means ‘we British’, not ‘we New Zealanders’. 22 at Home for social reform, wealth redistribution and universal suffrage grew. From 1867 to 1928 as the number of electors in the United Kingdom rose from 1.4 million to 28.5 million the rulers were forced to govern for the many, not the few.74 The argument that New Zealand was a child expressing almost filial piety towards England misses these points.75 Some historians argue New Zealand was so entangled with Empire and Home there was no viable alternative.76 On the other hand, having rejected Chamberlain’s 1902 vision of a closed trade bloc governed by a Round Table-like arrangement New Zealand, along with the other Dominions, was left without alternatives when the crisis came. It had rejected shared governance and it did not seek independence. Angus Ross et al gave a good summary of this view when describing New Zealand’s concerns at the turn of the nineteenth century as those of isolated islands located in the Pacific but desiring some kind of federation with Britain as protection from a non-specified Asian or European threat.77 In that sense the Pacific was a geographic impediment between New Zealand and London, the metropolitan centre of the British world. Through increased domestic enfranchisement and the influence of world events the United Kingdom was moving on from a parental role regardless of New Zealand’s wishes. The problem was exemplified when the 1889 Naval Defence Act introduced the Two Power Standard as a strategic benchmark to assess British naval strength. This raised the issue as to 74 Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose, "Citizenship and empire, 1867-1928," in At home with the empire : metropolitan culture and the imperial world, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.175-176. 75 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand: p.281. King talks of New Zealand as the most loyal of ‘Britain’s children’, while Sinclair of the ‘… most dutiful of Britain’s daughters’. The difficulty New Zealand and to a lesser extent Australia faced in having a say in their own destiny was their relative unimportance to Britain, compounded by British disinterest in the South Pacific in general. The rich mineral wealth of South Africa, the strategic location of Egypt, the exotic prestige, produce and manpower of India and the potential of Canada as a second chance for an American success were all self-evident. While not without a few of these advantages, location did not make the Antipodes an easy substitute for any of them. Britain was therefore not particularly interested in the Pacific and France was similarly minded, probably owing to the British lack of interest. Sinclair’s depiction of a troublesome, expensive and un-needed colonial appendage is an appropriate summary. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand: p.215. 76 Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest- serving Prime Minister: pp.284-285. Brooking makes the important point that Britain cannot be studied in isolation from the Empire. New Zealand’s pre-war history is firmly rooted in that of the Empire. Any nation seeks to maximise its position within existing alliances and so too did pre-World War I New Zealand. 77 A. D. McIntosh and W. David McIntyre Angus Ross, The Commonwealth : its past, present and future, Pamphlets - 25 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch Branch, 1973). p.5.; K. R. Howe, "Two Worlds?," New Zealand Journal of History 37, no. 1 (2003): p.237; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand: p.212. 23 whether or not this included the Empire and therefore whether the Empire was de facto a closely tied ‘constructionist’ Federation. The ‘constructionist’ viewpoint was of an Empire that was planned and directed as against a traditional, liberal, free trade model based simply on common moral values and bonds. The conflict in the historiography on these points arises because the argument was never clearly defined at the time and therefore went unresolved. The events of 1914 overtook the debate meaning it never had to be decided. By extension the impasse between the Liberal ideal of colonial (dominion) defence forces controlled by their domestic Governments and the Federationalists’ view - that central control was preferable - was in a continual state of flux.78 The South African (Boer) War served as a test-run for the Empire’s governance and defence arrangements. French (and German) sympathies were with the Boers. The latter were idealized as simple sons of the land without intellectual pretensions confronting an English force, armed with new weapons, using massacre and torture to oppress a small, morally pure nation.79 The French saw the Boer resistance as a fight against tyranny, oppression and rampant capitalism. If successful the Boer rebellion would destroy the United Kingdom’s power in South Africa and shake the supposed British position as the predominant world power. Conversely a British win would help build an Empire strong enough to withstand any rival power with or without France. The 1902 British victory did strengthen the Empire and its links with Australia, New Zealand and Canada. France needed such a power as an ally not an adversary. Although Britain now controlled the Cape sea route what looked impressive from the outside was in fact militarily vulnerable and expensive to defend.80 The general lessons the British learned from the Boer War and the reaction of New Zealand and the other dominions to it were sobering. Firstly the lack of intelligence in the military sense was a major shortcoming that needed to be urgently addressed.81 78 Barnes, New Zealand's London : A Colony and its Metropolis: p.7.; Peden, "The Treasury and Defence of Empire," pp.74-75. 79 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.263. 80 Christophe Prochasson, "Fashoda and the Boer War," in Anglo-French attitudes : comparisons and transfers between English and French intellectuals since the eighteenth century, ed. Christophe Charle, Julien Vincent, and J. M. Winter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp.264- 265. 81 Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.432, pp.436-437. 24 Secondly fighting wars in distant lands was costly and therefore a significant drain on the public purse.82 This should have sounded a warning for New Zealand: if fighting in southern Africa was expensive for the British (and for New Zealand) then the cost for New Zealand sending troops to Europe would be even more so. Thirdly, notwithstanding the Royal Navy’s power, prestige, and cost, the navy could not win against a land-based force employing predominantly guerrilla tactics. Fourthly, diplomacy was a necessary component of war if only to prevent other powers intervening.83 Fifthly the Dominions would help by active participation but their assistance would be subject to their own circumstances. While the British establishment had cause to reassess, New Zealand was gleeful at the outcome. Despite criticism of the British tactics from within the United Kingdom what little opposition there was in New Zealand was ‘diverse and ineffective’.84 Isolated incidents of dissent, such as the exchange between Seddon and the Chief Hansard reporter who in his capacity as a private citizen questioned the legitimacy of New Zealand’s role in the Boer War, (or the views of the M P Tommy Taylor) were exceptional.85 New Zealand’s interests then were to preserve a strong Great Britain that would continue with the undefined Imperial project. The Boer war increased the colonial sense of self-importance as well as New Zealand’s pride in the Empire.86 Seddon was ‘profoundly moved’ that the United Kingdom would commit to war to defend a colony.87 Perhaps more importantly the Boer War established the precedent of New 82 Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," p.18. 83 Peden, "The Treasury and Defence of Empire," p.74. 84 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.266- 267. 85 New Zealand Government, "Correspondence Between The Rt. Hon. The Premier And The Chief Hansard Reporter. Relative To Letters Written By The Latter Commenting On The Despatch Of Contingents To The Transvaal," (Wellington: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1900 Session I, H-29, 1900, 1900), pp.2-3. J. Grattan Grey, Chief Hansard Reporter, had written an article published in the New York Times that criticised New Zealand’s hasty offer of assistance and the despatch of troops. At issue was whether he did so in a private capacity. 86 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.267. ‘Imperial duty forced New Zealand to act’. Seddon in Brooking’s view, ‘… had little alternative but to support the British case…’ The motivation was both an enhanced standing for New Zealand and economic (trade) while currying support for New Zealand’s Pacific ambitions. Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister: pp.304-306. 87 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.267. 25 Zealand involvement in wars beyond the immediate national interest to ‘… uphold imperial power …’.88 So with the British Government controlling diplomacy and external relations on behalf of her colonies and dominions, New Zealand entered a state of friendship with France when the entente began.89 The lack of direct contact highlighted both the New Zealand dependence on British diplomacy and the reciprocal redundancy of any French approaches. From the French point of view New Zealand’s opinion of the entente would have been irrelevant. The frustration with this situation, as it applied to New Zealand interests in the Pacific, goes some way to explaining the New Zealand reaction to events because a residual Francophobia, based (as discussed below) on imported thinking from Britain persisted. A fear of further French colonization in the Pacific became an on-going theme in the New Zealand narrative.90 This inherited background of continual paranoia, described as a ‘… central tenet of the British Empire, unthinking hostility toward the French’, had to be abandoned virtually overnight, even at the geographical fringes of the Empire, when the entente came into being.91 While considerable effort was put into establishing an engaging public façade for the entente in Britain and France, this was not done in New Zealand. Hence the importance of newspaper reports in creating an image of the enthusiasm shown at ‘Home’.92 The Agent-General in London was the nearest New Zealand had to a representative diplomat during the period under study. Francis Dillon Bell, who was French born and fluent in the language, appears to have been the only incumbent who engaged in direct diplomacy with France prior to 1900.93 On the other side of the world French 88 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand: p.286. King, in common with other general New Zealand histories, does not address what constituted defending a colony as opposed to suppressing what could be seen as either a colonial rebellion or a fight for independence. 89 ibid., p.290. It was not until 1943, when the Department of External Affairs was created, that the administration of Foreign Affairs was anything more than a section within the Prime Minister’s Department. 90 Leslie Lipson, The Politics of Equality : New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2011). p.380. 91 Garry Clayton, "Francophobia in New Zealand," in 60 Years Ago : Celebrating The Anniversary Of Diplomatic Relations Between New Zealand And France, ed. France. Ambassade (N.Z.) (Wellington: The French Embassy, 2005), p.49. 92 Chapter Three contains a fuller discussion of this issue. 93 Clayton, "Francophobia in New Zealand," p.46. Raewyn Dalziel, The Origins of New Zealand Diplomacy : the Agent-General in London, 1870-1905 (Wellington: Price Milburn for Victoria 26 Consular representation in the Pacific was based on the volume of trade.94 In 1890 the French Consul made a detailed report to his Minister, mainly lamenting a lack of resources. His report characterized New Zealanders as practical people who purchased goods based on need rather than on country of origin. He was unable to give trade figures because ‘… almost all of the trade items pass via London …’. However many French goods were in the shops that ‘… return 25 million (Francs) in the North Island alone …’.95 Although direct diplomatic contact was miniscule the New Zealand newspapers made what they could of the little there was. A British report in the Daily Mirror for example announced the arrival of British M.P.s and the Agents-General of the Colonies in Paris for an exchange visit.96 The anticipated program included a banquet with the Premier and a speech by the French Foreign Minister on the entente cordiale. The party numbered 197, including wives. The Times report listed the participants, including the Empire Agents-General, without commenting on the New Zealand absence.97 The Auckland Star covered the event nearly a month later under the headline ‘Personal Notes From London (From Our Special Correspondent)’. The title and description fit the scenario of the newspaper’s own correspondent or their ‘stringer’ as the source but the copy was dated 13 November. It was therefore apparently prepared before the United Kingdom equivalent but owing to being mailed or perhaps on the whim of the editor it was not published until much later. The article content was clearly adapted to reflect the New Zealand angle in an attempt to convey relevance and interest. The invitation was to the New Zealand Agent-General University Press, 1975). p.96, pp.99-103. This was in reaction to the introduction of a bill in the French legislature in 1882 allowing recidivists to be sent to New Caledonia. Bell went to Paris in June 1883, to meet ‘… with French Ministers …’ and discuss the bill with the French Under- Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Bill however passed in May 1885. Bell’s concern highlighted the importance of New Hebrides’ sovereignty as an issue for New Zealand whereas it was not so for Britain. Only two other examples have been found. Ibid., p.107.; "The Funeral," Wanganui Chronicle, 29 April 1908, p.5.; "New Zealand Dinner," Press, 20 July 1912, p.8. 94 C. W. Newbury, "Aspects of French Policy in the Pacific, 1853-1906," in The French and the Pacific world, 17th-19th centuries : explorations, migrations and cultural exchanges, ed. Annick Foucrier (Aldershot, Hampshire, England Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), p.48. Earlier French Consuls were present in New Zealand in 1868 and 1872. 95 "A report from the French Consul to the Minister in France," pp.29-36. Footnote 15: New Zealand’s direct trade with France was miniscule as a proportion of the total but an unknown volume passed through the United Kingdom, then the primary global trading hub. 96 "M.P.s' Visit to Paris: Preparations for Their Cordial Welcome To-day.," The Daily Mirror, Nov. 25, 1903; "Personal Notes from London," Auckland Star, 22 December 1903. 97 "The British Parliamentary Visit To Paris," The Times, 26 November 1903, p.3. 27 (Reeves) but mentioned the likelihood he would not participate. The latter point is stated from first-hand knowledge (“I understand … ”) suggesting communication between Reeves and the writer. The King is reported as being pleased that the invitation includes the Agents-General and by implication the New Zealand Agent- General. To the New Zealand reader New Zealand’s invitation was a central feature whereas for his or her British equivalent the Empire representatives’ inclusion was a minor point. The New Zealand Press had fulsome praise for the 1908 Anglo-French Exhibition.98 It was seen for what it was, namely highly significant in the context of the entente with the symbolism of the two great countries working side by side to create an event that reflected the camaraderie between them. More important than the commercial success of the venture was the public demonstration, presumably for those below the political elite, of the newly ‘allied’ nations. Noteworthy in the context of the developing relationship was the use of the word ‘allied’ for a relationship that was not formally recognised as such. The earliest recorded New Zealand Exhibition in Dunedin in 1865 included an exhibit by France.99 After various provincial efforts another exhibition was held in Dunedin to commemorate the national Jubilee in 1889-1890. Given New Zealand’s propensity to follow Britain’s lead, especially under Ward’s premiership, it was not surprising that New Zealand replicated the earlier Dunedin Exhibition with another in Christchurch in 1906-7. A year earlier an envoy (T. E. Donne) had reported to Parliament the results of his visits to establish support for an International Exhibition opening in November 1906 in Christchurch. His report noted that France and Germany, amongst others, had been approached to attend. Pamphlets had also been distributed from the New Zealand Pavilion at the Crystal Palace Exhibition.100 The New Zealand Exhibition preceded the 1907-08 Franco-British event. It was the 98 "The Anglo-French Exhibition," Auckland Star, 16 May 1908, p.4. 99 There was criticism ‘…in an elitist intellectual tradition…’ of exhibitions as merely a visual distraction for the masses. Elizabeth M L Gralton, "Lust of the Eyes: The Anti-Modern Critique of Visual Culture at the Paris Expositions Universelles, 1855-1900," (Paris: Rude Seminar Proceedings, 2014), p.72. 100 New Zealand Government, "New Zealand International Exhibition (Report Of The Official Representative Of New Zealand In Great Britain, Europe, And The United States Of America).", ed. House of Representatives (Wellington: Government Printer, 1905), pp.1-2. 28 subject of an extremely detailed report by Cowan.101 The value of French goods for display was recorded as £2,924, Germany as £3,853 and Britain as £178,107. 102 Despite the entente there was no special emphasis given to the French exhibit. Other French-related activity in New Zealand was sparse and occasional, based on the volume of newspaper articles. It was claimed that there were 2,000 French speakers in New Zealand, as well as several French clubs.103 A Monsieur L. Duflou gave a well- attended lecture on ‘L’entente Cordiale’ to the Wellington French Club. He referred to the harmony shown during the 1908 Exhibition in London and the subsequent cordiality between the two nations but regretfully any further substance from his talk was not reported.104 With the war threat incipient France’s 1914 National Day was celebrated at the French Consulate with the entente duly praised and noted.105 French writers, artists and intellectuals visited New Zealand to observe, record and write. The significance of their work lies in the impact of any direct observations (typically through interviews) reported while they were here. There is also the contemporary impact of their finished work on New Zealanders’ self-perceptions. This aspect seems largely unexplored, possibly because of the language barrier. The public record from this period has little on the first point and virtually none on the second. Rognvald Leask writes of four French visitors: Albert Émile Métin, Louis Vigouroux, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu and André Siegfried. The latter visited during his 1898 world tour to see for himself the Liberal reforms occurring in New Zealand. His views are preserved in Democracy in New Zealand (La Démocratie en Nouvelle- Zélande). In Leask’s view, Siegfried saw New Zealand as a living museum of democracy whose governing system had developed on practical foundations. New Zealand politics were adaptive and shaped by events, rather than through strictly adhering to a political theory. He considered New Zealanders to be well informed, interested in current affairs and having newspapers of good quality that were well 101 James Cowan, Official record of the New Zealand International Exhibition of Arts and Industries held at Christchurch, 1906-7 : a descriptive and historical account (Wellington: Govt. Print, 1910). pp.13-14. 102 Ibid., p.113.Also see 'Preface' 103 "France and Frenchmen," Evening Post, 25 January 1910, p.8. 104 "Cercle France," Dominion, 7 June 1913, p.14. 105 "Frances' (sic) National Day: Consular Reception," New Zealand Herald, 15 July 1914, p.6. 29 read.106 If so, the lack of debate on Imperial Foreign Affairs seems even more exceptional.107 Hamer has a slightly different interpretation of Siegfried. New Zealand was ‘already a nation’ and ‘looking to the Pacific’ but still very attached to England. Siegfried, using the themes of the period, was fascinated by the dynamism of the Anglo-Saxon race as exhibited in New Zealand and wanted to know why it was so. In Hamer’s words, Siegfried found in New Zealand ‘… English forms animated by a new spirit’.108 The people were somewhat naïve but practical; not daunted by problems but nonetheless with a predilection for appealing to the State for help. Siegfried saw middle-class aspirations in those he classified as working class. They did not fit the political theory, as they were not socialists in the European sense, being a practical people apparently without class jealousy.109 The interest in these observations lies in the disjuncture between the rugged, independent, national individuality that was shaping domestic policy and New Zealand’s reputation for almost slavish conformity and adherence to British foreign policy. Of the last three pre-war Prime Ministers, Seddon personified the former psyche both physically and politically but remained an Imperialist. Ward took the second, more loyalist stance while neither advancing nor repudiating the homegrown, independent, Liberal domestic agenda. Massey straddled the two poles. His domestic political conservatism was consistent with his first muted Parliamentary reaction that revealed a dutiful rather than an enthusiastic response to a new Imperial adventure, World War I (see Chapter Four).110 The events described in the following two 106 Rognvald Leask, "Andre Siegfried and the Discovery of the New Zealand Democracy," in 60 Years Ago : Celebrating The Anniversary Of Diplomatic Relations Between New Zealand And France, ed. France. Ambassade (N.Z.) (Wellington: The French Embassy, 2005), pp.55-59. 107 "Britain's Watchdog' in the Pacific? Seddon's Imperialism as Seen by the French," in New Zealand, France and the Pacific: Studies in New Zealand Culture, ed. Ian Conrich and Dominic Alessio (Nottingham: Kakapo, c2011), p.28. Leask saw a ‘…young country…wanting to take its place on the international stage’, suggesting some nascent interest in off-shore events. 108 David Hamer, "Andre Siegfried and New Zealand," in New Zealand and the French : two centuries of contact, ed. John Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1997), p.112-113. 109 Ibid., pp.112-114. 110 History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, "New Zealand Premiers and Prime Ministers," in Biographies (2012). The brief tenures of Mackenzie and Hall-Jones are insignificant in this context. Watson, W.F. Massey : New Zealand: p.41.Massey was probably as much uncertain as he was unenthusiastic. ‘Despite his long apprenticeship in opposition, Massey was very much a newly 30 chapters are set against this background of mixed New Zealand opinions of France and an emerging national self-awareness of a unique identity and the possibility of independent policy. This thesis has four Chapters that discuss in chronological order selected events relating to the question posed. Chapter One uses the Fashoda incident as an example of New Zealand newspaper reporting of an event involving French colonial activity that conflicted with Empire ambitions.111 All such incidents have their own unique circumstances but Fashoda has been selected because it involved direct intervention by the British and it immediately preceded the entente. The same or similar world circumstances and many of the more influential politicians were involved in both Fashoda and the entente and the juxtaposition of the two reveals how attitudes changed within just five years.112 The one-sided views of colonial France presented to the New Zealand public in the press as a result of Fashoda shaped New Zealand’s views of France as a colonial competitor in the Pacific and thereby justified objections to French ventures long after bilateral British-Franco discussions resulting in the entente cordiale had decided the outcome. Chapter Two is based on the extensive local press scrutiny of the Dreyfus Affair. The French were depicted as culturally and politically dissimilar to the British races. They were rendered as a people apart from the sturdy, reliable, and temperamentally stable Anglo-Saxon stock from which the pre-World War I colonial New Zealanders of British origin were derived.113 A decline in the French birth-rate and an increase in minted Prime Minister in August 1914. Although having previously shown little interest in foreign affairs … Massey was now … leader of a country at war … “ 111 Although largely overlooked, the Fashoda incident resulted in local preparations for a possible war with France. See: "War Preparations," New Zealand Herald, 26 October 1898, p.5. 112 In selecting Fashoda I am mindful that any example must be typical of others. Fashoda includes all the relevant factors in support of my argument whereas other possibilities build the case but are less comprehensive. The uproar over the French annexation of Tahiti was largely contained within the Pacific while the brutal suppression of the Algerian rebellion was widely reported but had little local relevance. "Algeria," Thames Star, 24 October 1881, p.2.; Newbury, "Aspects of French Policy in the Pacific, 1853-1906," p.36-39.; Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: pp.341-342. The controversy over the New Hebrides is a background theme in Chapters Two and Three. 113 Such views were common. Although, for example, Brooking did not believe that Seddon was a Social Darwinist, Leask re-quoting Andre Siegfried who in turn was quoting Seddon from Tregear has Seddon saying, “…we are the dominant race…” Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister: p.312. Leask, "Britain's Watchdog' in the Pacific? Seddon's Imperialism as Seen by the French," p.29. Papers Past has seven exact matches to this phrase, none of which are attributed directly to Seddon: 31 ‘decadence’ were evidence of a ‘demographic decline’ and loss of national vitality compared with the German and British races.114 This diagnosis had distinct Darwinist overtones, as if the French were a separate species on the path to decline and extinction.115 The disorderly state of French domestic politics in the 1890s was symptomatic. Such views were not restricted to editorial opinion. In academic and political circles race (in a genetic sense) was misinterpreted as a cause of cultural and political difference. Although these interpretations raised severe doubts as to the suitability of France as a potential imperial ally, the shocked comments of various academics visiting from France belied the popular portrayal of France in decay. Chapter Three covers the re-alignment amongst the major powers as a result of the entente and discusses how this was presented within New Zealand. Post-1904 a major colonial competitor and potential enemy became an imperial ally. Despite the outward manifestations of the entente in the Northern Hemisphere – joint Exhibitions, reciprocal visits by the heads of state, and military displays - there was no replication in New Zealand of the considerable effort put into selling the entente in France and Britain. France remained (in New Zealand eyes) a threat to local colonial ambitions. New Zealand stifled her local interests for the greater good but the dissonance from the issue aroused early, fragile thoughts of a more independent New Zealand stance.116 http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi- bin/paperspast?a=d&cl=search&d=WT18811101.2.12&srpos=5&e=-------10--1-byDA--- 2we+are+the+dominant+race-- 114 Elisa Camiscioli, "Reproducing the "French Race": Immigration and Pronatalism in Early- Twentieth-Century France," in Bodies in contact : rethinking colonial encounters in world history, ed. Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M. Burton (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), p.220-222. Civilization apparently led to declining birth rates while the fecundity of the ‘uncivilized’ races appeared to increase unabated. Apparently the falling birthrates in pre-War France were a result of greater civilization, thus leaving the French and other civilized nations vulnerable to the less developed nations. 115 Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," pp.235-236. For the English, Victorian-era ideas around natural characteristics, culture, civilization, and what constituted progress was often judged by comparison with France. The use of comparisons did not cease with the end of the period under study. Lipson, The Politics of Equality : New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy: p.49. First published in 1948, Lipson has eleven entries in the Index, many of which use France as a reference point. For example: ‘The weaknesses that have beset the French Republic and other continental European democracies could be paralleled from mid-nineteenth-century New Zealand’. 116 "Ministers on Tour: Mr. Massey and Mr. Allen at Milton," Evening Post, 19 June 1913, p.10. 32 Chapter Four considers New Zealand’s interaction with the Empire prior to 1914. Defence and governance were frequently debated although the entente itself was not. Despite the dreadnought-related defence scare of 1909 the overall tone suggests an implicit certainty that the Empire was secure. The lack of British support for Ward’s Empire Federation and joint governance initiative and the distinct unease with New Zealand’s attempts at competitive colonisation in the Pacific suggests that New Zealand was a less than essential Empire member slightly out of step with the British direction. It must have been a relief to Britain that New Zealand (and to a lesser extent Australian) concerns about the Empire’s relationship with France manifested as issues of local interest within the Pacific, such as colonisation in the New Hebrides and other islands states. Because the Southern Pacific hemisphere was relatively unimportant to both the British and the French these concerns could be placated or ignored. 33 Chapter One: Fashoda From a contemporary assessment the Fashoda confrontation appears as a farcical episode of nineteenth century colonial rivalry acted out in a remote location that was of little immediate value to either France or Britain. At the time however it was a significant influence on both foreign policy and public opinion in France and England.1 The actions of France and the United Kingdom involved an important premise of the period; that colonisation was an essential activity for industrialised states.2 In the aftermath of the depression of the 1860’s colonies were seen as potential export markets although national prestige was not overlooked as a further motivation.3 ‘Conquest’ followed by ‘exploitation ‘ was the colonialists’ mantra.4 Recent historiography is divided on the legacy of the Fashoda confrontation. One view holds that French colonial expansion in Africa was simply a failed policy of Gabriel Hanotaux, the immediate predecessor of Foreign Minister Delcassé. Hanotaux’s initial confidence in new colonial ventures was based on his belief that the Franco-Russian alliance would preserve European peace and thus allow France to pursue her overseas ambitions.5 This view attributes the Fashoda occupation to an ill- judged initiative resulting from the disarray in French foreign policy rather than being a colonial venture based on sober reflection with a realistic objective. In this version the French occupation was easily thwarted by a coherent and adroit British response.6 1 James F. McMillan, Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991 (New York: Routledge, 1992; repr., 1992). p.42.; Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," p.6.; Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.443. In July 1898 a French expedition took possession of Fashoda fort in North Africa in an attempt to regain some control over Egypt and to provide a land passage between French colonies in East and West Africa. This conflicted with British ambitions for a North-South axis with contiguous territories from Egypt to South Africa. 2 A better understanding of demography, economic growth and technological progress now shows that the world is not a zero sum system wherein one country’s progress must be equalled by another’s territorial losses. 3 Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905: p.27. 4 Ibid., p.31. 5 Jerome Greenfield, "Gabriel Hanotaux and French Grand Strategy, 1894–8," The International History Review (2015): p.3. 6 E. Berenson, "Fashoda, Dreyfus, and the myth of Jean-Baptiste Marchand," in Yale French Studies (2007), pp.135-136. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.pp.132-5, pp.190-196. Théophile Delcassé on becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1898 attempted to re-order the directionless state of French foreign affairs that had resulted from the domestic political turmoil. 34 The failure was interpreted as a signal that confronting the British Empire was futile.7 Once this was apparent the obvious solution for the French was to simply withdraw. This however raised domestic political complexities since the Government of the day depended on Colonial Party support. France, desperate to save face, did seek German backing for her African claims but was told that the price was acceptance of the status quo in Alsace-Lorraine.8 That was too much for any French Government to accept and effectively forced a politically isolated France to order Marchand to retire. Thereafter the Colonial Party was less keen to confront the British and in that respect the door for the entente was opened although the venture ‘… left hostility towards Britain … (that) endued for most of the pre-war period.’9 The alternative view links this simplified narrative to the concurrent domestic turmoil in France caused by the Dreyfus affair. Out of the tangled strands of anti-Semitism, anti-Dreyfus sentiment and anti-British emotions the Fashoda expedition leader (Marchand) emerged as a success, positioned in the French press as a victim whose withdrawal was simply a temporary setback on the path to eventual French colonial glory.10 He was, in this version, a Napoleon-like hero, acting in the best interest of France without self-interest. In the same month (October, 1898) that Esterházy was exposed as the true traitor of the Dreyfus Affair (and ironically retreated into exile in England), and Madam Dreyfus launched a further appeal on her husband’s behalf, Marchand’s public status progressed from hero to ‘martyr’. He bravely traversed Africa (rather than retreating down the Nile through British territory) on his way back to France. He was welcomed home, acclaimed as a victor and championed by both political right and left as a unifying distraction from the domestic political turmoil surrounding the Dreyfus matter.11 The press in both France and Britain had an extensive part in developing their respective national narratives of the Fashoda confrontation. Victorian press commentators were not naive and realised that the new telegraphic technology could spread lies as well as truth through the press. Aside from publishing their own version 7 Greenfield, "Gabriel Hanotaux and French Grand Strategy, 1894–8," p.1. 8 Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914: pp.132-135. 9 Greenfield, "Gabriel Hanotaux and French Grand Strategy, 1894–8," pp.14-15. 10 Berenson, "Fashoda, Dreyfus, and the myth of Jean-Baptiste Marchand," p.131. 11 Ibid., pp.131,132,137-138. 35 of very newsworthy stories that would be popular with their readers, the press narratives were themselves subject to manipulation by ‘jingoes’ and politicians.12 For the British, Fashoda was reported as a vindication of her territorial ‘rights’ in Africa, an exhibition of Britain’s excellent colonizing ability, and a demonstration of her military superiority. The French withdrawal, under threat from the British, was reported as a humiliating backdown.13 As Kitchener advanced up the Nile towards Fashoda he built both railway and telegraph lines. He therefore controlled the information flow: even the isolated Marchand depended as much on Kitchener’s sources as he did on his own for information. Kitchener in that respect held all the cards.14 Although Kitchener found a well-resourced and confident Marchand at Fashoda his reports stated the opposite - that he had found a demoralised expedition in a hopeless position that he then ‘saved from massacre’. Kitchener gave the French expedition some Paris newspapers filled with the ‘… terrible Dreyfus affair …’. Their isolation and demoralization was complete.15 When there was no news there was speculation, rehashed stories and opinion to fill the gaps. Without direct access it was therefore possible for Marchand to be recast by the French press as a hero in a country desperate for a unifying figure. In the cultural vacuum between the revolutionary ideal of a nation of equals and the reality of individual achievement Marchand assumed the ‘mythic image’ of a hero of French imperialism and glory.16 He became the personification of France herself just as Kitchener’s image embodied all the self-assigned characteristics of the British. Given that the disputed African claims were settled just four months after the crisis had passed the evidence suggests that the Fashoda incident assumed a significance in the press far beyond its immediate geographic implications.17 12 S. J. Potter, "Jingoism, public opinion, and the new imperialism: Newspapers and imperial rivalries at the fin de siècle," Media History 20, no. 1 (2014): pp.34-36. 13 In that respect the narrative succeeded as the term ‘Fashoda’ was used extensively in advertising thus perpetuating memories of the incident beyond the immediate events. 14 Potter, "Jingoism, public opinion, and the new imperialism: Newspapers and imperial rivalries at the fin de siècle," pp.37-38. 15 Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905: p.93. 16 Berenson, "Fashoda, Dreyfus, and the myth of Jean-Baptiste Marchand," p.130. 17 McMillan, Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991: p.42.; Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," p.6.; Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.443. 36 Despite being headline news in New Zealand it is doubtful whether many newspaper readers knew exactly where Fashoda was or what the implications of its possession by France may have been. However the African location did lend a certain exotic element enhanced by a dramatic plot, a hero (the British Army under Kitchener) and a villain (France). The New Zealand audience received a locally re-written selection of Fashoda news sourced from both the British and French press. The content suggested inept French colonial politics, an inability to successfully annex territory and a lack of fortitude to match that of the British. Having been presented with this version of the British response to the French actions in Africa, the New Zealand public’s support for Liberal (anti-French) attempts to emulate those positions in the Pacific is understandable. Because news editorials treated the New Zealand identity as synonymous with that of the British, the incident reinforced the common citizenship and protection of the Empire.18 Moreover, since colonial and diplomatic actions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally interpreted as competitive, not unlike a representative sports event, the competitors were ‘us’ against ‘them’ without (in this case) local costs or sacrifice.19 New Zealand was a partisan spectator. The news reports illustrate the paradigms the Victorians and Edwardians used to view foreign colonisation, race and culture.20 The prejudices aroused against the French eventually had to be reversed for King Edward’s visit to Paris in 1903 to become a celebration of unity between Paris and London because popular support in the United Kingdom would be a necessary precursor if the entente cordiale was to succeed. The evidence suggests that the case presented in New Zealand in favour of the entente (to be discussed in Chapter Three) was not delivered with nearly the vigour that was 18 Hobson’s announcement at Waitangi in 1840 can probably be interpreted in this context: ‘now we are one people’ meant (in his century) one people within the British Empire but each in their ordered