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**The Dark Side of Modernity: Environmental Injustice,
International Relations Theory, and the Practice of
International Politics.**

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Dedication

To my dearest friend Jeffrey White.

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to investigate the application of Habermasian and Coxian critical theory to the problem of environmental injustice. Environmental injustice is a perspective that uncovers significant inequalities with regard to the responsibility for environmental degradation such as climate change, the ability to mitigate environmental degradation, and marginalisation from environmental decision making. In order to overcome environmental injustice a significant revision of the current status quo is required, and at the forefront of maintaining the status quo at the beginning of the 21st century is the theory of neoliberalism. Tapping into the underlying desire for progress in the Anglo-American world, neoliberalism has achieved a degree of success in meeting its goal of the legal institutionalisation of individual liberty and the free market at both the national and international levels. Through contrasting practice with Habermasian discourse ethics and investigating how the clash between environmental justice movements and neoliberalism is likely to affect cooperation on issues such as climate change; it is argued here that the industrialised countries of the North will need to provide significant policy space and resources in order to overcome the dynamics introduced by climate change.

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INTRODUCTION

The Dark Side of Modernity: Environmental Injustice, International Relations Theory, and the Practice of International Politics.

Navigating the relationship between theory and practice presents a number of significant problems for the International Relations scholar. On first impressions the field of International Relations possesses a number of well established theories such as Marxism, neo-Realism, and neoliberalism that provide a seemingly objective position to explain, understand, and predict the future of international affairs. Backed by a wealth of elegant, commonsensical theories; it seems as if the International Relations practitioner does not need to look far for a vantage point that will provide the much vaunted objectivity and detachment required to claim the mantle of scientific knowledge. Upon completing ones analysis and possessing the ‘truth’ in hand, one can then ‘speak truth to power’– as the saying goes – and return to the academy content that whomever ‘power’ was in this case knows the correct course of action and should the calculations and resultant advice be correct, will survive another day.

Underneath this somewhat stylised account of the relationship between theory and practice in International Relations is that fact that implicitly or explicitly the scholar is conducting a highly political act; that is, ensuring the perpetuation of the status quo. In a world where over 2.8 billion people live on less than U.S.D.\$2 and where climate change is forcing many more to face a precarious existence due to the actions of a few, perpetuating the status quo hardly seems like a noble endeavor.¹ As Ken Booth notes, “for those who believe that we live in a humanly-constituted world the distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ dissolves: theory is practice, and practice is theory.”²

¹ Steve Smith provides some sobering statistics concerning violence in international politics based on the United Nations Development Project yet these deaths do not fit within International Relations definition of violence and are thus not considered relevant to explaining the world of international politics. See S. Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004)., 507-510

² K. Booth, "Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist," *YCISS Occasional Paper*, no. 26 (1994)., 19

Beginning in the 1980s, a number of International Relations scholars became disillusioned with the narrow range of subject matter permitted by the positivist way of knowing (epistemology) and resultant units of analysis (ontology), and from what is now commonly referred to as the 'Third Debate' of International Relations, a broad range of 'critical theories' emerged that problematised the relationship between scholar, theory, and practice.³ Making use of two influential branches of critical theory in International Relations – the Habermasian variant forwarded by Andrew Linklater and the Gramscian variant commonly associated with the work of Robert W. Cox – this essay will attempt to draw on the insights of both and apply them to the problem of environmental injustice.

As chapter one will demonstrate, environmental degradation and social injustice are two strongly interlinked phenomena. While not limited to the problem of climate change alone, climate change demonstrates that for years the developed 'North' has been socialising the costs of industrial production on the undeveloped 'South' and the ability of the biosphere to absorb the wastes of 'modern' society has by some measures been surpassed. With resources in the developing world already stretched attempting to meet basic needs; environmental justice scholarship highlights what is described as a 'double inequity' as the increase in frequency and severity of hydrometeorological events that climate change entails is placing even more pressure on the coping mechanisms of the poor, while the countries who have the most historical responsibility for the problem are in a considerably better position to mitigate both the causes and effects of climate change. The ability to mitigate the problem also highlights the problem of political marginalisation both between and within societies as it is often those who face the highest costs of environmental degradation are also those with the least ability to influence environmental decision making.

Understanding the context in which environmental injustice occurs is arguably one avenue for overcoming the problem, and a theory that has been at the forefront of shaping contemporary politics at both the national and international level is the theory of neoliberalism. Drawing on

³ In the following essay 'Critical Theory' in capitalised form will be used to denote the Critical Theory associated with what is called the Frankfurt School. The overall project of 'critical theory' and the particular variants such as Cox's critical theory will be not be capitalised. S. Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25-38

the underlying desire for progress in liberal democracies, where the previous economic orthodoxy of Keynesianism had seemingly failed to deliver, political leadership in the Anglo-American world turned to neoliberalism in order to re-start the growth process. Born from a deep hostility to Keynesianism, neoliberalism gradually built up a network of political and intellectual support to challenge (though not entirely overcome) Keynesian intervention in the economy. United by the ethical goal of individual liberty and a belief in the self-regulating free market a diverse range of views found accommodation within the neoliberal framework, and arguably the ultimate goal of neoliberalism has been the legal institutionalisation of these two principles. Backed by the seemingly impenetrable mathematics of welfare economics, the strength of neoliberalism lay in that it appealed to commonly shared values such as individual liberty and progress. From the goal of individual liberty and the belief in the self-regulating market, the three main thrusts of neoliberalism – privatisation, liberalisation, and monetarisation – as they apply to the state can be traced to their theoretical roots. Though neoliberalism is most commonly associated with national projects such as Reaganism and Thatcherism in the United States and United Kingdom respectively, what cannot be underestimated is the power these and other ‘Northern’⁴ countries have over the shaping of world order through international institutions, particularly the international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Where the early stages of the theory’s rise to prominence focused on the ‘rolling-back’ of the state, what has characterised neoliberalism as it has moved onto the global stage is what has been described as ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, where previous reforms are locked in and shielded from democratic control.

Bearing a number of hallmarks of a ‘modern’ theory in that neoliberalism encompasses all aspects of life and follows a positivist epistemology, theories such as neoliberalism tread on a

⁴ The term ‘North’ is used here to denote the countries that would have once been more accurately described as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, with the accession of states such as Chile, Mexico, Eastern European states, and Turkey the homogeneity of the organisation in terms of level of economic development has changed and hence the term is unsuitable here for use as convenient shorthand. As such the ‘North’, as used in this essay, is the term used to describe the countries of Western Europe, North America, Australasia, and Japan. The ‘South’, although not a homogenous group, is used to describe members of the Group of 77 (G77) who that are generally considered developing countries. For more on the North-South relationship, see A Najam, "Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 5, no. 3 (2005)., 304-307

familiar path and understanding the pitfalls of such an approach has been a driving force behind what is known as critical theory. Beginning with a brief discussion of the seemingly incommensurable positions of modernist and postmodernist positions in relation to the theory and practice of emancipation, chapter three moves on to outline the International Relations academic context in which the ‘critical family’ of theories emerged, at least in part, as a response to the pervasive immorality of positivist epistemology. Building on the work of the Frankfurt School of ‘Western Marxism’ who’s members sought to recover the emancipatory project of Marxism without relapsing into its classical form and without ignoring the dangerous side of modernity; Jürgen Habermas introduced the sphere of interaction to complement the sphere of production. As Communist Russia had demonstrated all too well, overcoming domination in the sphere of production by no means led to the emancipation of its citizens and so Habermas proposes ‘discourse ethics’ as a procedural standard for liberal-democracies to follow in order to ensure decisions are inclusive and based on the force of a better argument rather than demonstrations of power. Though Habermas’s discourse ethics is not necessarily suited to wholesale scaling-up to the international level (which will be discussed in chapter four), his work has nonetheless proven a fruitful line of research in International Relations – for whom Andrew Linklater is arguably the most prominent scholar – as discourse ethics highlights the deficiencies of liberal-democracies with regard to their actions at a global level.

The second part of chapter three shifts focus to another prominent branch of the critical family in International Relations, the Gramscian critical theory of Robert W. Cox. Perhaps most well known for the phrase: “theory is always *for* some one and *for* some purpose [emphasis in original]”, Cox’s *Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*⁵ is recognised as one of the central breaks with positivist International Relations scholarship and since its publication a vast array of critical approaches have found acceptance in the field. Drawing heavily on the insights of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, among others, Cox diverges from the economic determinism of classical Marxism and places ideas at the centre of analysis. Where classical Marxists had believed that the state rules by coercion

⁵ R.W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981), 128

alone and – mirroring this belief – violent revolution would be sufficient to achieve working class leadership, Gramsci found that the liberal democracies are governed through both coercion and consent, as civil society forms a second line of defence that is more or less impregnable to such tactics. As such, to achieve working class leadership would require the gradual winning-over of civil society through the incorporation of interests beyond that of the working class, and the propagation of a common culture. In other words, where the materialist theories such as classical Marxism would lead one believe a revolution would come more or less automatically, what goes on in the ‘Mind’ has particular relevance to achieving change. Complementing Gramsci’s national focus, Cox introduced ‘world orders’ in order to investigate how ideas are relevant to international politics.

Deploying both the Habermasian and Coxian variants of critical theory, chapter four focuses on the practical application of the two forms of critical theory. Where environmental (in)justice and Habermas’s Critical Theory supplies ‘a perspective from which practice can be viewed’; Cox’s research method and strategic insights provide, for the purposes of this essay, the practical component for use by scholars and social movements seeking to overcome the neoliberal world order. Through dialectical thinking, which entails the uncovering of ‘relational contradictions’, chapter four explores the contradictions inherent in attempting to rectify environmental injustice in the context of the neoliberal world order and how, united by shared experience, the movement could build bridges with others disadvantaged and overlooked by neoliberal practice. Utilising a ‘thin’ version of Habermas’s Critical Theory to contrast against the agency defeating practices of liberal democracies following neoliberalism; world order (as constructed by the aforementioned liberal democracies) is focused on as a key area where scholars and social movements from liberal democracies can achieve significant gains in creating a more equitable and just world that overcomes the oppressive nature and calamitous effects of Western modernity.

Be it through reevaluating the taken for granted routines of daily life or ensuring responsible and ethical behavior at the national and international level, this thesis will demonstrate there is considerable scope for those both inside and outside International Relations to effect positive change. While lacking the elegance of positivist theory, critical theory arguably provides a

toolkit suitable for practical application in a wide range of contexts, academic or otherwise, and when considering the problem of environmental injustice a number of insights can be garnered that can contribute to both overcoming the problem and preventing it from happening. Where positivist theory may provide for the survival and enrichment of the few, the framework constructed in this essay arguably provides for the survival and enrichment of the many, and in a world facing a global coordination problem such as climate change, this is an essential task.

CHAPTER ONE

Environmental Degradation and Environmental Justice

The central cause of the problems outlined in this essay will be described under the umbrella term of ‘environmental degradation’, a term defined by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) as:

The reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet social and ecological objectives, and needs. The potential effects of environmental degradation are varied and may contribute to an increase in vulnerability and the frequency and intensity of natural hazards. Some examples [of environmental degradation are]: land degradation, deforestation, desertification, wildland fires, loss of biodiversity, land, water and air pollution, climate change, sea level rise and ozone depletion.⁶

While climate change in itself provides a similar umbrella term, the concept of environmental degradation – of which climate change is both a cause and a symptom⁷ – provides a more far reaching framework from which to analyse issues such as non-greenhouse gas industrial pollutants that would otherwise be excluded. Industrial pollutants such as dioxins and heavy metals, for example, present no direct link to climate change but are very similar in that they bring up equity issues of who is responsible for them, differences in the ability to mitigate their effects, and political marginalisation.

Climate change, however, has provided renewed impetus to the debate surrounding the environmental degradation brought about by modern industrial civilization. Dire warnings about the significant dangers of maintaining ‘business as usual’, such as those from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the United Kingdom Treasury’s *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change*,⁸ have contributed to a considerable

⁶ UNISDR, "Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction " United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm>. (accessed May 22, 2010).

⁷ R.K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger, "Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report," in *Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC Secretariat 2007)., 37-38

⁸ Ibid; N.H. Stern, *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Executive Summary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

elevation of environmental issues in both domestic and international politics.⁹ While environmental degradation that is the result of human actions has been going on for millennia; a widely cited study estimated that these human actions reached a crucial juncture in the 1980s when the biosphere could no longer absorb the ever increasing burden placed on it.¹⁰ Using a range of measures to calculate the ecological footprint of humanity, that is the area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed and to assimilate the wastes produced; by 1999 humanity's load corresponded to 120% of the biosphere's absorption capacity meaning the earth needed 1.2 years to regenerate what had been used over that year.¹¹ Lagging, but a constructive result nonetheless, acceptance that a global environmental problem exists and deserves the full attention of the world's leaders has provided the crucial psychological breakthrough and foundation for action needed to address the material reality now confronting the species.¹² 'Business as usual' still dominates conventional thinking about how to view and mitigate the environmental crisis, however, the yawning gap between the physical reality of issues such as climate change and the theory and practice of 'business as usual' points to the need for the production of a radical alternative to the status quo. Environmental justice, this essay will argue, could be one possible avenue creating just such an alternative.

Linking human action, the environment, and social justice; environmental justice provides a framework that arguably has significant relevance to contemporary international politics. Borrowing from Lorraine Elliott's cosmopolitan environmental harm conventions, from the wide range of environmental justice issues three forms of environmental injustice will form the core focus of this essay.¹³ The first task of this chapter will be to build a picture of who

⁹ For example, the Australian government commissioned their own 'Stern Review', see H Stevenson, "Cheating on Climate Change? Australia's Challenge to Global Warming Norms," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2009), 181; the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December of 2009 brought together "nearly 120 heads of state in the same building [and] constituted the highest concentration of robust decision-making power the world had ever seen", R.S. Dimitrov, "Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance," *Global Environmental Politics* 10, no. 2 (2010), 18

¹⁰ M. Wackernagel et al., "Tracking the Ecological Overshoot of the Human Economy," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 99, no. 14 (2002), 9268

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9268

¹² A Mert, "Partnerships for Sustainable Development as Discursive Practice: Shifts in Discourses of Environment and Democracy," *Forest Policy and Economics* 11, no. 5-6 (2009), 336

¹³ L. Elliott, "Cosmopolitan Environmental Harm Conventions," *Global Society* 20, no. 3 (2006), 347-349; Holifeild, Porter, and Walker note some authors have identified over 50 environmental justice issues in the

bears responsibility for climate change, perhaps the most all-encompassing effect of environmental degradation witnessed in history. Shifting the burden of environmental degradation far from its source, identifying causal responsibility for climate change is a salient undertaking as the following section will demonstrate that it is those with the largest responsibility for climate change are also those with the largest power to mitigate the effects of climate change, whereas those with the least responsibility are those who face the most significant consequences. This inability to prevent environmental degradation also translates into an inability to participate in environmental decision making and the final section of this chapter will explore some of the outcomes this marginalisation can have on the lives of those unfortunate enough to be excluded from the environmental decision making process. At its core, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate the considerable inequity faced by those who are too often far removed from both the minds of decision makers and the tables they sit at. Moreover, should common threats such as climate change be averted, considerable amounts of resources and political determination will need to be mobilised.

The rise of the climate change discourse presents a fundamental problem for world leaders and the theories that are meant to inform them – as the spectacular failing of the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen attests.¹⁴ Since time immemorial human societies have been reaching the limits of their environments ability to withstand the material burden they impose.¹⁵ What makes today's situation different is that where environmental catastrophes were localised in the past, the effects of modern production are globally socialised by way of smoke stacks, exhaust pipes, and waste outfalls, displacing the burden of environmental harm from its source.¹⁶ The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment notes that human beings have surpassed natural processes such as glaciers and volcanic events to become “the most powerful force of environmental change ... [and] in the last 50 years, people have modified ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period

United States alone, see R. Holifield, M. Porter, and G. Walker, "Introduction Spaces of Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement," *Antipode* 41, no. 4 (2009), 597

¹⁴ K. Anderson and A. Bows, "Beyond 'Dangerous' Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New World," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences* 369(2011), 39

¹⁵ J.M. Diamond, *Collapse* (New York: Penguin 2005).

¹⁶ Elliott, "Cosmopolitan Environmental Harm Conventions.", 353; B.C. Parks and J.T. Roberts, "Globalization, Vulnerability to Climate Change, and Perceived Injustice," *Society & Natural Resources* 19, no. 4 (2006), 340

of human history.”¹⁷ Lacking any comparable historical reference of planetary-wide environmental collapse, how to go about remedying the situation humanity has found itself in is a problem that the species has little to draw on. The problem of global climate change, notes Parks and Roberts, “has confounded the conventional wisdom and forced a rethinking of ... disciplinary boundaries since its political resolution requires addressing stark inequality and injustice: in who will suffer most its effects, in who created the problem in the first place, and in who is taking action to address the problem.”¹⁸ Highlighting what individuals and states have in common as much as the differences between them; the issue of climate change and the many interrelated issues that it entails look set to become the some of the defining problems of 21st century international relations¹⁹, just as the spectre of nuclear annihilation had done so in the previous century.

Responsibility for the Problem

As the Chernobyl disaster demonstrated, the scale and technologies of industrial civilization has created an era where the impacts of environmental problems in one country are no longer limited to the community that brought them about. Having no respect for human constructions such as national borders or state sovereignty, the pollutants stemming from modern production processes have gradually accumulated to the point where humanity is nearing – or has already surpassed – the physical ability of our planet to absorb them without significant change to climate and environments we have become accustomed to.

The global scale of the problem, however, is not reflective of the intensely localised nature of the actions which brought this problem into being. Elliot notes, “affluence rather than poverty is the primary and disproportionate cause of environmental degradation.”²⁰ Described by some as ‘ecological imperialism’; by appropriating the global commons (i.e. the atmosphere and oceans) and the carbon absorption capacity of the biosphere, a relatively small number of

¹⁷ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, "Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. A Toolkit for Understanding and Action. Protecting Naturess Services. Protecting Ourselves," (Washington: Island Press, 2007)., 4

¹⁸Parks and Roberts, "Globalization, Vulnerability to Climate Change, and Perceived Injustice.", 337-338

¹⁹ U. Beck, "Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity?," *Theory, Culture & Society* 27, no. 2-3 (2010)., 258-259, 261

²⁰ Elliott, "Cosmopolitan Environmental Harm Conventions.", 348

countries are using the rest of the world to subsidise their own profligacy.²¹ Trapping heat in the atmosphere, the effects of CO₂ and other 'greenhouse gasses' such as methane are gradually becoming apparent with eleven of the twelve years between 1995 and 2006 ranking in the top twelve warmest on record (which begins at 1850).²² Already a significant health problem, Pimentel *et al* note that increases in pollution will only exacerbate the harm from environmental pollutants and malnutrition which result in an estimated 40% of the total human deaths each year.²³ As the time it takes for CO₂ to be completely sequestered ranges from three to hundreds of years, 'tracing' CO₂ to its source is almost impossible to quantify.²⁴ However, through measurements based on fossil fuel use, by some estimates approximately 76% of the anthropogenic CO₂ in the atmosphere is attributable to developed countries emissions from 1850 to 2002.²⁵ To stabilise the climate at approximately 2°C higher than current levels the IPCC estimates that the industrialised countries will need to cut emissions by 80-95% of 1990 levels.²⁶ As Foster and Clark note, "if the global commons was a sink where wastes are absorbed, the sink is clogged and overflowing."²⁷ The historical responsibility for the current levels carbon dioxide, as one example of many in regards to environmental degradation, lies firmly in the hands of the advanced industrialised economies of the North.²⁸

As well as historical responsibility for environmental degradation, Northern countries also share responsibility for *current* environmental degradation as accounting for emissions embodied in global trade presents a significantly more complex distribution of responsibility than a cursory glance at gross emission data would allude to. Particularly important to note is the relatively new line of research focusing on the spatial aspects of environmental justice as

²¹ J.B. Foster and B. Clark, "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism," *Socialist register* (2003), 194

²² Pachauri and Reisinger, "Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.", 30

²³ D. Pimentel et al., "Ecology of Increasing Diseases: Population Growth and Environmental Degradation," *Human Ecology* 35, no. 6 (2007), 654.

²⁴ L. Johnson, "The Fearful Symmetry of Arctic Climate Change: Accumulation by Degradation," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28(2010), 843

²⁵ K.A. Baumert, T. Herzog, and J. Pershing, *Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy* (Washington: The World Resources Institute, 2005), 32

²⁶ J. Von der Goltz, "High Stakes in a Complex Game: A Snapshot of the Climate Change Negotiating Positions of Major Developing Country Emitters (Working Paper)," *Center for Global Development*, no. 177 (2009), 3-4

²⁷ Foster and Clark, "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism.", 196

²⁸ For more discussion regarding historical responsibility for climate change, see E.A. Page, "Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change," *Environmental Politics* 17, no. 4 (2008), 558

achieving environmental justice at the local level may in fact be displacing the problem to the regional or global level.²⁹ Built into the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, is a focus on CO₂ production rather than consumption which results in an incentive to relocate emission-intensive industries to developing (non-Annex I) countries that have less Kyoto obligations and thus the 'true' cost of the production is never internalised.³⁰ As an example, though China is now the world's single largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions,³¹ by some estimates approximately one third of Chinese emissions are the result of production destined for export, and where developed countries have achieved emission reductions, these reductions are considerably smaller when counting the emissions embodied in imported goods.³²

The problem of responsibility for environmental degradation is also deeply entwined with the problem of how poor countries can achieve the same status and wealth enjoyed by wealthy Northern countries in an age where the planets resources are known to be finite. The history of *how* the rich countries became that way provides a development model that is almost entirely dependant on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources. Following the model set by successful agricultural economies, such as the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, for example, those looking to expand agricultural production in undeveloped states in the same way developed states have done would look to converting 'unused' land such as forests or grasslands into pasture or cropland.³³ Moreover, proceeds from logging can provide the capital needed to convert forests to agricultural production.³⁴ Forests in tropical zones in particular are under severe and globally significant pressure as relatively new crops such as Oil Palm and Rubber are pushing the intensive agriculture frontier from the temperate to

²⁹ Holifield, Porter, and Walker, "Introduction Spaces of Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement.", 595

³⁰ M. Bruckner, C. Polzin, and S. Giljum, "Counting Co₂ Emissions in a Globalised World: Producer Versus Consumer-Oriented Methods for Co₂ Accounting," (Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2010)., 17,19

³¹ P.G. Harris, "Beyond Bush: Environmental Politics and Prospects for Us Climate Policy," *Energy Policy* 37, no. 3 (2009)., 966

³² Y. Yunfeng and Y. Laike, "China's Foreign Trade and Climate Change: A Case Study of Co₂ Emissions," *Energy Policy* 38, no. 1 (2010)., 351, 355

³³ W.F. Laurance, "Habitat Destruction: Death by a Thousand Cuts," *Conservation Biology for All* 1, no. 9 (2010)., 73-79; S. Gupta and C. Martinez, "Climate Inequity," (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2009)., 3

³⁴ T.K. Rudel, "Changing Agents of Deforestation: From State-Initiated to Enterprise Driven Processes, 1970-2000," *Land Use Policy* 24, no. 1 (2007)., 37

tropical zones which had historically limited land conversion and in addition these forests are often ‘hotspots’ of biodiversity (i.e. less than 2% of the earth's surface is thought to sustain over half the world's terrestrial animals).³⁵ Producing an estimated 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions, tropical deforestation is most commonly driven by large-scale enterprises that produce food for urban populations.³⁶ In forest rich countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Cameroon, Rudel *et al* note that political elites often view old growth forests as an endless source of potential wealth and while the transition from a rural agricultural to an urban industrial economy might be expected to raise the costs of labour and thus ease pressure on these forests, it is unlikely this will occur in time to avert significant biodiversity loss.³⁷ Moreover, the economic incentives to clear forest in order to create pasture for cattle grazing are considerable as regardless of whether they provide negative long term returns in comparison to reforestation and forest protection schemes, cattle provide high liquidity (both as insurance for when financial problems arise and as an investment that can make future returns), low time demand, limited costs to set up production, lower price risks in comparison to carbon, and limited co-ordination and administrative costs.³⁸

Using human rights language, there is a sharp distinction between ‘rights holders’ and ‘duty bearers’ in relation to environmental degradation between Southern and Northern states respectively.³⁹ Southern countries have a right to undertake environmentally destructive development pathways (with all the wealth, status, and stability this would bring) just as Northern states have done, or in other words there is an opportunity cost in the conservation of ecologically important resources.⁴⁰ However, as this would be ecologically unsustainable, Northern states have a duty to provide alternative, less environmentally destructive

³⁵ Laurance, "Habitat Destruction: Death by a Thousand Cuts.", 74-76; L. Peskett et al., "Biofuels, Agriculture and Poverty Reduction," *Natural Resources Perspective* 107 (2007), <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2574.pdf>, 19

³⁶ O.T. Coomes et al., "The Fate of the Tropical Forest: Carbon or Cattle?," *Ecological Economics* 65, no. 2 (2008), 209; Rudel, "Changing Agents of Deforestation: From State-Initiated to Enterprise Driven Processes, 1970-2000.", 37-40

³⁷ T.K. Rudel et al., "Forest Transitions: Towards a Global Understanding of Land Use Change," *Global Environmental Change Part A* 15, no. 1 (2005), 28

³⁸ Coomes et al., "The Fate of the Tropical Forest: Carbon or Cattle?," 209, 211

³⁹ F. Seymour, "Forests, Climate Change, and Human Rights: Managing Risk and Tradeoffs," in *Human rights and climate change* (Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry, 2009), 220

⁴⁰ T. Panayotou, "Conservation of Biodiversity and Economic Development: The Concept of Transferable Development Rights," *Environmental and resource economics* 4, no. 1 (1994), 91-92

development pathways to replace the potential income Southern states have a right to, but are now unable access.⁴¹

Ability to Mitigate the Cause and Effects of Environmental Degradation

Inequity in regards to the historical responsibility for environmental degradation also translates into an inequity in the ability to mitigate the impacts of environmental change.⁴²

Commonly described as a ‘double inequity’, through the industrial production processes that have brought about environmental degradation, the industrialised West finds itself with significant resources to buffer its population from the effects of environmental crises where the undeveloped poor – who have contributed the least to the problem – have only a fraction of the capability.⁴³

Smit and Pilisova note that “many social and economic systems ... have evolved to accommodate some deviation from “normal” conditions, but rarely the extremes.”⁴⁴ The influential *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change* highlights that combined with the geographic disadvantage where most developing countries are located in the warmer regions that are already susceptible to rainfall variation and are commonly heavily dependant on agriculture, “climate change is a grave threat to the developing world and a major obstacle to poverty reduction across its many dimensions.”⁴⁵ For example, as poor individuals and families have few options to cover external shocks except to draw on their assets; this in turn creates an incentive to make sure that assets are of a secure and liquid nature to the detriment

⁴¹ E.B. Barbier, "Biodiversity, Trade and International Agreements," *Journal of economic studies* 27, no. 1/2 (2000), 70-71

⁴² Elliott, "Cosmopolitan Environmental Harm Conventions.", 348

⁴³ Füssel also notes, however, some developing countries such as Russia have undertaken extensive land use change (i.e. deforestation) are in the position of high responsibility *and* high vulnerability. In H.M. Füssel, "How Inequitable Is the Global Distribution of Responsibility, Capability, and Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Comprehensive Indicator-Based Assessment," *Global Environmental Change* (2010), 598, 608-609

⁴⁴ B. Smit and O. Pilifosova, "Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable Development and Equity," *Sustainable Development* 8, no. 9 (2003), 15

⁴⁵ Stern, *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Executive Summary.*, 7; See also Pachauri and Reisinger, "Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.", 65; Stromberg notes, “although the extreme natural phenomena causing natural disasters are not more severe in developing countries, their consequences are.” In D. Stromberg, "Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21, no. 3 (2007), 221

of expected returns and long term adaptation.⁴⁶ At the state level Parks and Roberts demonstrate from the experiences of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and the Mozambique floods of 2000 a number of commonalities that make developing countries “perfect recipes for human disaster”: “a colonial legacy of dependency on the export of a few low-value tropical crops, low levels of internal economic integration, bad geography, weak and underfinanced government, environmental degradation, and sprawling informal settlements.”⁴⁷ Adding to the already stretched coping mechanisms of the poor; shocks such as drought and floods that are the result of climate change will only compound this problem.⁴⁸

Causally linking climate change with individual climate disturbances such as hurricanes or floods is hampered by methodological issues;⁴⁹ however, the prospect of *more*⁵⁰ climatic disturbances than those that occur naturally will be a burden that will place even greater pressure on the already limited resources of governments and individuals of Southern states. Controlling for population growth and the increasing availability of information over time, Pascal Peduzzi of the United Nations Environment Programme found that where the numbers of reported earthquakes have *steadily* increased over time, due to the aforementioned increases in information and population growth, reported floods and cyclones have *dramatically* increased in comparison.⁵¹ Parks and Roberts note, “the number of major natural catastrophes was four times larger, and cost the world’s economies eight times more during the 1990s than in the decade of 1960s”, and during the 1990s, 90% of natural disaster fatalities were the result of hydrometeorological events (i.e. droughts, floods, hurricanes, and windstorms).⁵² From 1990 to 1998 the World Bank notes that 94% of the world’s natural

⁴⁶ R. Heltberg, P.B. Siegel, and S.L. Jorgensen, "Addressing Human Vulnerability to Climate Change: Toward a 'No-Regrets' Approach," *Global Environmental Change* 19, no. 1 (2009), 91

⁴⁷ Parks and Roberts, "Globalization, Vulnerability to Climate Change, and Perceived Injustice.", 350

⁴⁸ United Nations Development Programme, "Climate Shocks: Risk and Vulnerability in an Unequal World," in *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 83; For a particularly illustrative example of the ‘knock on effects’ of natural disasters that serve to compound the problems of poor countries, see C. Benson and E.J. Clay, "Developing Countries and the Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters," in *Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies*, ed. A. Kreimer and M Arnold (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2000), 12

⁴⁹ Pachauri and Reisinger, "Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.", 30

⁵⁰ UNISDR, "Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction".

⁵¹ P Peduzzi, "Is Climate Change Increasing the Frequency of Hazardous Events?," *Environment and Poverty Times*, no. 3 (2005).

⁵² Parks and Roberts, "Globalization, Vulnerability to Climate Change, and Perceived Injustice.", 341

disasters and 97% of all natural-disaster-related deaths occurred in developing countries.⁵³ To illustrate the relative comfort of life in the North as opposed to the South, “less than one-seventh of one per cent of the US population was made homeless by hydro-meteorological disasters between 1980 and 2002. By comparison, in Bangladesh 45 per cent of the population was at some point made homeless during the same period.”⁵⁴

Marginalisation

Along with the material asymmetries of power to mitigate the effects of climate change that are a result of past environmental degradation; the already marginalised subaltern groups, both within (i.e. the poor, indigenous peoples, women) and between states, face inequity through “the politics of inclusion and exclusion from the practices and structures of environmental governance.”⁵⁵ This social, institutional, and material exclusion, as noted by Heltberg, Siegel, & Jorgensen, creates a:

number of structural traps [that] reinforce poverty and marginalization: economic insecurity through exposure to shocks and absence of risk management; limited citizenship and absence of voice and rights; spatial disadvantages and remoteness; social discrimination through exploitation or exclusion; and limited job opportunities. All of these factors keep some individuals, groups, and nations poor and vulnerable.⁵⁶

Bina Agarwal uses the case of Indian women and children to demonstrate the severe burden placed on these groups that result from large scale irrigation projects and land conversion from forests to croplands that are the result of the divergent interests between men (commercial profitability) and women (e.g. firewood and water collection), and the ability to participate in decision making.⁵⁷ As women and girls make upwards of three fifths of the worlds one billion poorest people, and as natural disasters disproportionately affect those already in poverty; women and girls are a particularly vulnerable group whose social

⁵³ A. Mathur and M.K. van Aalst, "An Adaptation Mosaic: A Sample of the Emerging World Bank Work in Climate Change Adaptation," (New York: World Bank 2004)., 6

⁵⁴ B.C. Parks and J.T. Roberts, "Inequality and the Global Climate Regime: Breaking the North-South Impasse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2008)., 625

⁵⁵ Elliott, "Cosmopolitan Environmental Harm Conventions.", 349; see also S.L. Cutter, "Race, Class and Environmental Justice," *Progress in Human Geography* 19(1995)., 111-113

⁵⁶ Heltberg, Siegel, and Jorgensen, "Addressing Human Vulnerability to Climate Change: Toward a 'No-Regrets' Approach.", 91

⁵⁷ B. Agarwal, "The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India," *Feminist Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992)., 146-147

marginalisation and its significance to environmental issues related to climate change, natural disasters, and migration has only recently been recognised.⁵⁸

The dumping of toxic waste in areas with politically marginalised inhabitants is perhaps the clearest example of the displacement of environmental burdens from those responsible to those who are unable to effect environmental decision-making. Emerging from localised social movements in the United States; this variety of inequity formed a key reference point and research question during the initial construction of the environmental justice framework.⁵⁹ Empirical studies such as Bullard's oft-cited *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* have demonstrated significant bias towards the dumping of toxic waste and other environmental burdens in minority communities within the United States.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the situation of toxic sites has been found to be causally related to "demographics relating to political weakness"⁶¹ rather than minority groups moving in after the fact.⁶²

Similar stories of political weakness being exploited can be found at the international level as well. Just one of many⁶³ is the environmental catastrophe that was brought into being by the city of Philadelphia looking to dispose of its municipal incinerator ash in 1986.⁶⁴ Loaded onto a barge named the *Khian Sea*, 13,000 tons of ash containing an array of hazardous substances such as dioxins and heavy metals were shipped to Haiti where the authorities had given them

⁵⁸ L.M. Hunter and E. David, "Working Paper: Climate Change and Migration: Considering the Gender Dimensions " in *Institute of Behavioral Science Population Program*, Institute of Behavioural Science (Boulder, Colorado: University to Colorado, 2009)., 15-25

⁵⁹ Holifield, Porter, and Walker, "Introduction Spaces of Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement.", 593

⁶⁰ R.D. Bullard, *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990).; See Cutter, "Race, Class and Environmental Justice.", 113; J.P. Tiefenbacher and R.R. Hagelman III, "Environmental Equity in Urban Texas: Race, Income, and Patterns of Acute and Chronic Toxic Air Releases in Metropolitan Counties," *Urban Geography* 20, no. 6 (1999)., 520

⁶¹ M. Pastor, J. Sadd, and J. Hipp, "Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-in, and Environmental Justice," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2001)., 19

⁶² T. Maher, "Environmental Oppression: Who Is Targeted for Toxic Exposure?," *Journal of Black Studies* 28, no. 3 (1998)., 358-360

⁶³ For more examples, see G. Kocasooy, "Environmental Exploitation of Hazardous Wastes by Developing Countries," *Journal of Environmental Protection and Ecology* 4, no. 3 (2003)., 588-591

⁶⁴ J. Lloyd, "Toxic Trade: International Knowledge Networks & the Development of the Basel Convention," *International Public Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (2008)., 18

permission to unload a cargo of what they had been told was fertilizer.⁶⁵ Without permission from the Haitian government, the Khian Sea then began to dump the toxic ash on a beach near the town of Gonaives, and 3000 tons were unloaded before the authorities were alerted by a Non-Governmental Organisation to its true nature.⁶⁶ After being ordered to reload the ash, the Khain Sea disappeared under the cover of night leaving Haiti with a mountain of ash that was to take over a decade before it was finally returned back to Philadelphia.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, after leaving Haiti the Khian Sea then spent two years attempting to find a home for the remainder of its cargo, ultimately crossing the Atlantic, sailing around the coast of West Africa, through the Mediterranean, down the Suez Canal, into the Indian Ocean and “when it finally pulled into ... Singapore harbor it had a new name, the Pelicano, a new owner, and an empty hull.”⁶⁸ The captain later admitted to dumping the ash in the Indian Ocean.⁶⁹

The example of the Khian Sea demonstrates that the North-South binary is not only a distinction between ‘the haves’ and ‘have nots’ in terms of economic development but also the ability to have a say in the political decisions that, while often made within the confines of the North, can have significant implications for those in the South.⁷⁰ Summarising the pervasiveness of this inequality, Adil Najam notes, “the self-definition of the South has always been a definition of exclusion: these are countries that believe that they have been bypassed and view themselves as existing on the periphery.”⁷¹ Fresh in the memory of many developing country Copenhagen delegates, for example, would be the meetings held by a select group of Northern countries and China, India, South Africa, and Brazil that “resembled the notorious ‘Green Room’ get-togethers of heavy hitters in international trade during the ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization.”⁷² With marginalisation, disenfranchisement, and disempowerment of Southern voices being a defining feature of how

⁶⁵ H. Harjula, "Hazardous Waste: Recognition of the Problem and Response," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1076(2006)., 436

⁶⁶ Kocasoy, "Environmental Exploitation of Hazardous Wastes by Developing Countries.", 589

⁶⁷ Lloyd, "Toxic Trade: International Knowledge Networks & the Development of the Basel Convention.", 18

⁶⁸ Harjula, "Hazardous Waste: Recognition of the Problem and Response.", 436

⁶⁹ Kocasoy, "Environmental Exploitation of Hazardous Wastes by Developing Countries.", 589

⁷⁰ Najam, "Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement.", 305

⁷¹ Ibid., 305

⁷² W Bello, "China: The Prince of Denmark," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (January 20, 2010), www.fpif.org/articles/china_the_prince_of_denmark (accessed December 2, 2010).

developing countries view themselves in the international system; scholars argue that this can “influence issue definition, expectations, perceived interests, principled beliefs and ultimately the prospects for mutually-beneficial cooperation.”⁷³

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, environmental injustice operates over a wide range of scales and calls into question decision making at all levels, from those made by individuals through to the highest level of government. Arguably, in order to prevent environmental injustice, one needs both a ready framework to assess how decisions may be contributing to environmental injustice and to convince as many people as possible the ramifications of not doing so, a task this chapter has attempted to achieve. Should everyone in the world consider the three environmental injustice concepts discussed here – responsibility for the problem, ability to mitigate the cause and effects of environmental degradation, and marginalisation – as part of their everyday decision making processes a considerable amount of injustice could arguably be averted. In order to overcome environmental injustice, however, would require a considerable re-evaluation of the status quo, and a decision making process that has a powerful influence on those maintaining the status quo is the theory of neoliberalism. As such, the next chapter will provide a general overview of the theory of neoliberalism. This task is necessary in order to lay the groundwork for latter chapters where the problems environmental justice movements are likely to face will be explored.

⁷³ B.C. Parks and J.T. Roberts, "Climate Change, Social Theory and Justice," *Theory, Culture & Society* 27, no. 2-3 (2010), 146

CHAPTER TWO

Ideas at the Beginning of the 21st Century: The Contemporary Context

As the previous chapter identified, overcoming environmental injustice necessitates addressing a number of stark inequalities: responsibility for the problem, ability to mitigate the cause and effects of environmental degradation, and marginalisation both within and between communities. In order to address these issues, one could argue, significant changes are required in the way in which almost every aspect of life is conducted; from the seemingly inconsequential decisions made by individuals and businesses going about their daily affairs to the high politics of international relations.

Despite the ample evidence and political recognition of the dangers of environmental degradation, scholars and practitioners have yet to come to terms with humanity's reliance on environmental services and the fact that nature possesses the means necessary to wreak havoc on a scale far beyond wars that have preoccupied the minds of International Relations scholars since the field's inception.⁷⁴ Posing serious questions for International Relations, the three primary environmental justice concepts discussed previously are, and are likely to remain, significant features of the international relations landscape. Requiring significant revision of the ideas, material resources, and institutions that come together to form the world in which these problems need to be addressed, what will follow is a description of the context in which the concepts of environmental justice must face in order to secure the overarching goals of a fair and liveable planet now and in the future.

Often "deemed to be a merely secondary social agenda" and consequently overridden by concerns of competitiveness and growth,⁷⁵ efforts to address environment degradation and resultant environmental injustice are likely to face a quandary of entrenched interests and historical relics inherited from a by-gone era of limitless growth, unbridled capitalism, and an

⁷⁴ D Pirages, "Ecological Theory and International Relations," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* (1997), 55-56

⁷⁵ C.M. Bensimon and S.R. Benatar, "Developing Sustainability: A New Metaphor for Progress," *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 27, no. 1 (2006), 63

international system intent on ensuring little stands in the way of these two objectives. Tapping into the underlying desire for growth in the Anglo-American world, when the previous economic orthodoxy of Keynesianism had failed to deliver, people turned to neoliberalism to re-start the growth process. Neoliberalism appeared in its modern form in the mid 1970s through the gradual construction of intellectual resources by a collection of like-minded individuals – for which the Mont Pèlerin Society formed an influential focal point – who were intent on legally institutionalising individual liberty and the free-market. Backed by a wealth of seemingly objective mathematical formula such as the fundamental theorem of welfare economics; from the goals of individual liberty and the free-market, the well known policies of privatisation and commodification, de-regulation and liberalisation, and stabilisation and monetarisation can be traced to their source. Shifting focus to neoliberalism in the international arena, the final section will look at how through dominance over the international financial institutions those following neoliberalism have been able to propagate the neoliberal model in other states in a process described by Steven Gill as ‘new constitutionalism’.⁷⁶ Broadly speaking, this chapter will attempt to construct a general outline of the framework used by those following neoliberalism that circumscribes action. As latter chapters will demonstrate, this task is necessary in order to uncover the contradictions and impediments entailed by attempting to overcome environmental injustice in a context where neoliberalism is likely to be a significant feature.

Limitless growth

The two dominant ideologies of the 20th century, capitalism and communism, share a common thread in the role they ascribe to the environment. Though the collective images of the two rival social systems were opposed, intersubjective ideas – the shared expectations and habits of the two social systems – exhibited considerable agreement. Passing from the ancient Greeks, to the Christians, to the scientists, Western beliefs about the environment and nature, of which communism and capitalism both carry on, posit a distinct separation of humanity

⁷⁶ S. Gill, "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 10, no. 1 (1998), 23

from nature and indifference to natural objects.⁷⁷ In addition to the separation of humanity from nature; where the Greeks maintained a cyclical view of history, Christianity imported the linear notion of history that has become so pervasive, that White notes in an oft-cited article, “our daily habits of action, for example, are dominated by an implicit faith in perpetual progress which was unknown to either Greco-Roman antiquity or to the orient.”⁷⁸ This unyielding faith in progress was subsequently adopted by Enlightenment scholars and scientists, and has now become a defining feature of ‘modernity’.⁷⁹

A central, though often hidden, ideological premise of free-market democracies, and one which has barely changed for thousands of years in Judeo-Christian thought, is the “concept of nature as a resource, or raw material, separate from human civilization, ... [and] a willingness to exploit nature in the betterment of society.”⁸⁰ The world of Adam Smith, as noted by Richard A. Smith, was one of:

atomistic producer profit-seekers [who] paid little heed to the natural world, the common good, or the future of humanity and other species with whom they shared the planet, they lacked the technical power and scale of production to do much harm to the natural world. Modern industry is constrained by no such limitations.⁸¹

The relentless focus on growth, born out of the notion of progress, is perhaps best described as a historical structure in that it forms an intersubjective expectation, or in other words, a framework of action that is the result of particular historical circumstances.⁸² In modern democracies such as Australia, for example, Stevenson notes a relentless ‘developmentalist’ focus on economic growth, in which a governments success or failure is primarily measured in the rise and fall of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively, has become a taken-

⁷⁷ L White Jr, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Readings in Biology and Man* 155(1974)., 52; See also P Pattberg, "Conquest, Domination and Control: Europe's Mastery of Nature in Historic Perspective," *Journal of Political Ecology* 14(2007)., 5-6

⁷⁸ White Jr, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis.", 52.; A. Greeley, "Religion and Attitudes toward the Environment," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32, no. 1 (1993)., 19

⁷⁹ S Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000)., 151; See also R.W. Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context," *New Political Economy* 14, no. 3 (2009)., 325

⁸⁰ A.C. Geisinger, "Sustainable Development and the Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the Western Ideology of Nature," *Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review* 27, no. 1 (1999)., 44

⁸¹ R.A. Smith, "The Eco-Suicidal Economics of Adam Smith," *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 18, no. 2 (2007)., 36

⁸² See R.W. Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order," *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992)., 176

for-granted national episteme that has entrenched the Enlightenment principles of progress and human domination over nature.⁸³

Similarly, governments practicing communism in its various forms have internalised the quest for progress via the exploitation of nature, regardless of how far this conception was from Marx's thoughts on the role of nature in communist society.⁸⁴ In the Soviet Union under Stalin particularly, natural resources and the environment were regarded as a means to an end, with the ends being the 'Great Objectives' of catching up to the West economically (and thus militarily) in order to secure the regime.⁸⁵ While the Soviets achieved a level of industrialisation comparable with that of other developed states in a fraction of the time, this came at a heavy price with 3.3% of the Soviet territory having been damaged beyond repair⁸⁶ – a not insignificant feat considering the USSR was at the time the worlds largest country with one-sixth of the Earths surface within its territory.⁸⁷

The end of the Cold War marked for many what appeared to be the end of communism as a viable social, political, and economic system that could rival capitalism.⁸⁸ Providing a justification for the separation of the state and economy *par excellence*, the end of communism supplied renewed momentum to the neoliberal reforms that had been transforming production since they were first tested in Chile in 1975 and subsequently in

⁸³ Stevenson, "Cheating on Climate Change? Australia's Challenge to Global Warming Norms.", 169-170. See also J. Coates and T. Leahy, "Ideology and Politics: Essential Factors in the Path toward Sustainability," *Global environment: problems and policies* (2007)., 2; Since the Global Financial Crisis a number of governments such as the United Kingdom and France have begun implementing 'happiness indexes' to provide a more accurate measure of how the economy is serving society's needs, particularly in regards to quality of life and environmental concerns. For an explanation of the rationale behind the move away from GDP commissioned by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, see J.E. Stiglitz, A. Sen, and J.P. Fitoussi, *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up* (New York: New Press, 2010).; See also E Zencey, "G.D.P. R.I.P.," *New York Times* (2009, August 9), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/opinion/10zencey.html?pagewanted=1&r=1> (accessed June 12, 2010).

⁸⁴ For the debate of what Marx thought of 'domination over nature', see R Grundmann, "The Ecological Challenge to Marxism," *New Left Review* 187(1991).; P Burkett, "Ecology and Marx's Vision of Communism," *Socialism and Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2003).

⁸⁵ N. Mirovitskaya and M.S. Soroos, "Socialism and the Tragedy of the Commons: Reflections on Environmental Practice in the Soviet Union and Russia," *The Journal of Environment & Development* 4, no. 1 (1995)., 84

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 95

⁸⁷ T.S. Vinson and T.P. Kolchugina, "Pools and Fluxes of Biogenic Carbon in the Former Soviet Union," *Water, Air, & Soil Pollution* 70, no. 1 (1993)., 223

⁸⁸ F Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* 16(Summer 1989).

Great Britain and the United States under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively.⁸⁹ Becoming a truly global phenomenon in the last quarter of the 20th century, Boas and Gans-Morse note:

one of the most striking features of the contemporary era has been the waning or disappearance of alternatives to the free market. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the world witnessed the outright collapse of import substitution industrialization in Latin America and state socialism in the former Eastern Bloc, as well as the severe decline of the developmental state model in East Asia and Keynesianism in Western Europe and North America.⁹⁰

Tapping into the underlying desire, or some might say – requirement – that governments in the North deliver continual economic growth; when these governments were presented with a situation where the previous economic orthodoxy seemed unable to deliver on this obligation, both governments and electors turned to neoliberalism in order to re-start the growth process.⁹¹ Through linking the intersubjective desire for growth with neoliberalism, change from the previous orthodoxy to neoliberalism can be explained in terms of a response to threat of losing the ideal of progress that has been central to Western beliefs for generations. Moreover, as the following discussion will reveal, due to the philosophical underpinnings of neoliberalism that frames unconstrained individual liberty as a fundamental human right, even greater impetus is given to humanity's domination over nature.

Neoliberalism

With the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama declared the 'end of history', "an unabashed victory of political and economic liberalism."⁹² Coming under a number of different names, 'political and economic liberalism' is interpreted here as denoting the social, political, and

⁸⁹ M. Fourcade-Gourinchas and S.L. Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries," *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 3 (2002), 545, 549; D. Harvey, "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 610, no. 1 (2007), 23-25

⁹⁰ T.C. Boas and J. Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan," *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)* 44, no. 2 (2009), 157

⁹¹ For example, 42% of trade unionists in Britain voted for Margaret Thatcher in the 1979 election that brought her to power. In P.G. Cerny, "Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm," *The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy* 2, no. 1 (2008), 14; The concept of zero-growth or attempting to slow growth, for example, is strongly opposed by most businesses. See T.J. Kallio, "Taboos in Corporate Social Responsibility Discourse," *Journal of Business Ethics* 74, no. 2 (2007), 169

⁹² Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 3; See also R Gagnier, "Neoliberalism and the Political Theory of the Market," *Political Theory* (1997), 441

economic system that will be described as neoliberalism. Neoliberal scholars, as argued by Plant, share common features in that they seek to update ‘classical’ liberalism and have shaped their views via critique of the post World War II (WWII) welfare state.⁹³ As an update of classical liberalism, neoliberalism borrows heavily from the theories and language of liberalism (broadly defined).⁹⁴ Combining classical liberal economic ideas such as the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith and the individual rights of natural law theorists such as Locke and Hume⁹⁵ in a mutually supportive amalgamation; “by means of an intuitively plausible interpretation of the classical conception of general law, Hayek [a founding intellectual of neoliberalism,] can mobilise a rich tradition of political theorising against his political opponents.”⁹⁶ While appearing classical in its roots; the neoliberalism that will be the focus here will be the contemporary form, which sets itself apart from other liberalisms in that while it may borrow classical ideas, is distinguishable in that the form of state it sets itself against, the Keynesian welfare state, which no precedent in the classical era as European socialism was still in gestation.⁹⁷

Neoliberalism as it is known today appeared at the end of WWII with the consolidation of the Keynesian welfare state as the dominant economic policy from 1945 through to 1970.⁹⁸ In the years prior to and immediately after WWII, neoliberalism, or ordoliberalism as it was also known at the time, was a modified classical liberalism associated with the German Freiburg School who maintained humanistic, egalitarian views and an anti-naturalist analysis of the market where that the state was needed to bring about market society and protect it from anti-liberal intrusion, monopolies, and cartels.⁹⁹ The anti-naturalist analysis of the ordoliberals - that the state was needed in order to dampen some of the more negative aspects of the market

⁹³ R Plant, "Neo-Liberalism and the Theory of the State: From Wohlfahrtsstaat to Rechtsstaat," *Political Quarterly* 75, no. s1 (2004)., 24

⁹⁴ D.E. Thorsen and A. Lie, "What Is Neoliberalism?," (2000), <http://folk.uio.no/daget/What%20is%20Neo-Liberalism%20FINAL.pdf> (assessed September 15, 2010)., 2

⁹⁵ P.G. Mahoney, "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right," *The Journal of Legal Studies* 30(2001)., 511

⁹⁶ B Scheuerman, "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State: Toward a New Synthesis," *Politics & Society* 22, no. 2 (1994)., 197

⁹⁷ Boas and Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.", 152.

⁹⁸ Thorsen and Lie, "What Is Neoliberalism?," , 8

⁹⁹ A Munro, "Following the Market: Rational Choice Theory and Neo-Liberal Governmentality" (paper presented at the “20 Years after Foucault” Conference, New School University, New York, April 16 2004)., 8; Boas and Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.", 146

- aligns closely with and was shaped by the widely accepted belief at the time that *laissez faire* was the source of the Great Depression and Europe's collapse into WWII.¹⁰⁰ While opposed to the more extensive intervention proposed by Keynesian economists, the ordoliberalists nonetheless saw the need for a 'Keynesian consensus' that was a third-way between the anarcho-capitalism of 19th century *laissez faire*, and the command economies of fascism and communism.¹⁰¹ Within this group of scholars was the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek who while playing a major role within the ordoliberal group through means such as serving on the editing board and contributing to the journal *Ordo*, maintained an unyielding faith in *laissez faire*.¹⁰² He therefore eventually split off from the ordoliberalists to become, along with Milton Friedman, one of the key intellectuals of neoliberalism in its modern form.¹⁰³

While Hayek maintained a naturalist view of the market, the law (and thus a form of state) was still seen as necessary to "preserve competition and make it operate as beneficial as possible", and holding a law degree himself, Hayek was a principal founder of the Mont Pèlerin Society, which was intended to facilitate the synthesis of legal and economic scholarship necessary for the renewal of classical liberalism.¹⁰⁴ The Mont Pèlerin Society deserves mention as carries out a crucial function as part of the neoliberal *nèbuleuse*, a central organ of the "unofficial and official transnational and international networks of state and corporate representatives and intellectuals who work to produce policy consensus for global capitalism".¹⁰⁵ Plehwe and Walpen describe the key features of the Mont Pèlerin Society as being a pluralistic frame, albeit neoliberal pluralistic, to bring together the various strands of neoliberal thought, such as the ordoliberalists, anarcho-capitalists, and libertarians; and to

¹⁰⁰ S.L. Mudge, "What Is Neo-Liberalism?," *Socio-Economic Review* 6, no. 4 (2008), 711.; Boas and Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.", 146; Thorsen and Lie, "What Is Neoliberalism?," , 10

¹⁰¹ R Sally, "Review Article: The Economics and Politics of the German Miracle," *Government and Opposition* 30, no. 4 (1995), 547, 552

¹⁰² Boas and Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.", 147

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 147

¹⁰⁴ Z. Thüringen and S. Kolev, "F.A. Hayek as an Ordo-Liberal," *Hamburg Institute of Interantional Economics Research*, no. 5-11 (2010), http://www.hwwi.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/HWWI_Research_Paper_5-11.pdf (assessed December 16, 2010), 14

¹⁰⁵ W.A. Knight, "Coexisting Civilizations in a Plural World," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 3 (2003), 404; See also R.W. Cox, "Problems of Power and Knowledge in a Changing World Order," in *Political Economy and the Changing World Order*, ed. R. Stubbs and G. Underhill (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 355

provide a network for the generation and dissemination of neoliberal scholarship, for which the society is credited as a driving force behind development of the think-tank.¹⁰⁶ Bringing together influential journalists, editors, intellectuals (of which the Chicago School of Economics is perhaps the most well known), politicians, and businesspeople from across the globe; the Mont Pèlerin Society, though counting eight Nobel Prize winners as current or former members, achieved success not only through purely academic work, but through the incorporation of both practical and academic members united under a set of core principles and all working to achieve their 'liberal utopia', a nomocratic (as opposed to democratic), law-governed society based on individual liberty and the free-market.¹⁰⁷

With varying degrees of comprehensiveness, neoliberalism has come to achieve what can be described as a semi-hegemonic¹⁰⁸, 'orthodox', position in that neoliberalism alone, for a number of people, is the 'operating software' that delineates the 'art of the possible', "a kind of self-imposed disciplinary code, calling for no less than monastic restraint".¹⁰⁹ Paradoxically despite neoliberalism becoming so wide-spread and in-grained in almost every aspect of late 20th and early 21st century life, Thorsen and Lie note:

An initial mystery facing anyone who wants to study neoliberal ideology in more detail is that there does not seem to be anyone who has written about neoliberalism from a sympathetic or even neutral point of view. Practically everyone who writes about neoliberalism does so as part of a critique of neoliberal ideology.¹¹⁰

As such, compiling a definition or list of prescriptions of neoliberalism from original sources who openly profess allegiance to neoliberalism is problematic and as the previous discussion

¹⁰⁶ D. Plehwe and B. Walpen, "Between Network and Complex Organization," in *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, ed. D. Walpen D. Plehwe, G. Neunhoffer (London: Routledge, 2006)., 153

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 157; S. Gill, "Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (2002)., 54-55

¹⁰⁸ Full hegemony would require the incorporation of subordinate interests and the absence of coercion which, as this essay will detail, neoliberalism has yet to achieve to the same degree as the other hegemonic projects such as the 'embedded liberalism' period which lasted from the end of WWII till the mid-1970s, see S. Gill, "Grand Strategy and World Order: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective" (paper presented at the ISS's Grand Strategy Series, Yale University, April 20 2000)., 2-4

¹⁰⁹ J George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989)., 273; J. Peck and A. Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (2002)., 380, 381

¹¹⁰ Thorsen and Lie, "What Is Neoliberalism?," 2.; for analysis of this phenomena, see Boas and Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan."

on the Mont Pèlerin Society demonstrated, there is a wide variety of perspectives accommodated within the umbrella term neoliberalism.¹¹¹ Arguably, however, the two central tenets from which neoliberalism proceeds and which unites the range of neoliberal views, in no particular order, is firstly the achievement and protection of individual liberty as its ethical goal and, secondly, the belief in the self-regulating free market.¹¹²

Individual liberty, as understood by neoliberals, can be described using human rights language as negative rights. Citing the arguments of Kasel Vasak and Steven Marks, Susan Koshy provides a concise overview of the historical “trigenerational process” in which three different revolutionary movements have come to produce present-day human rights norms:

the first generation of civil and political rights, associated with Western liberal democracies, developed out of the bourgeois revolutions in France and America in the late eighteenth century; the second generation of social and economic rights were the product of socialist revolutions in the early decades of the twentieth century; and the third generation of solidarity rights, like the right to development, emerged from the anticolonial revolutions that gathered momentum after World War II and culminated in the independence of most of these nations by the 1960s.¹¹³

Where invoking positive rights – which includes both second and third generation rights – entails a call for “the provision by some individual or institution of a valued service”, such as healthcare and basic living standards, or in other words, ‘resource claims’ that highlight what government is required to do for the individual; invoking negative, first generation rights entails “a call for the prohibition of some action or the right not to be interfered with”, such as the protection of property rights, individual autonomy, and freedom.¹¹⁴ The elevation of individual, negative, rights above the equality-focused, positive rights is defended in that “the

¹¹¹ Thorsen and Lie, "What Is Neoliberalism?," 12-13; local contexts and international pressures have significant effects on the ability of individuals and states to proceed with a consistent programme, see A.C. Drainville, "Monetarism in Canada and the World Economy," *Studies in Political Economy* 46(2009).; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries."

¹¹² A Franceschet, "The Ethical Foundations of Liberal Internationalism," *International Journal* 54, no. 3 (1999)., 465

¹¹³ S Koshy, "From Cold War to Trade War: Neocolonialism and Human Rights," *Social Text*, no. 58 (1999)., 8

¹¹⁴ R Hirschl, "" Negative" Rights Vs." Positive" Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order," *Human Rights Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (2000)., 1071, 1072; See also, Koshy, "From Cold War to Trade War: Neocolonialism and Human Rights.", 8; A Sen, "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms," *Oxford Economic Papers* 45, no. 4 (1993)., 524

attempt to achieve the latter would erode the former.”¹¹⁵ The converse of this being that “no one can fully enjoy or exercise any right if she or he lacks the essentials for a healthy and decent life in the first place, because basic needs are more fundamental than property rights.”¹¹⁶

Concern for freedom from interference and human autonomy also provides justification for the other core belief of neoliberals, that is the assumption self-regulating markets are the most efficient way to allocate resources and hence well-being overall. From a libertarian perspective, such as that held by Robert Nozick, as well-being is in essence defined as freedom from interference (i.e. to chose ones own ‘end’ rather than being forced to pursue another’s conception)¹¹⁷ and hence the ability to exchange and transact freely without the interference of others, “markets are then defensible on grounds of the rights that people have (*viz* [emphasis in original], that they should be free to transact), rather than because of their welfare-generating effects.”¹¹⁸ Providing a particularly strong philosophical defence for neoliberal policies, “details of empirical or theoretical analysis do not ultimately count; what counts is a commitment to freedom” and “thus, even if economic theory does not prove that ‘free market processes’ are the most efficient, the free market outcome is still to be preferred a priori over government interventionism on philosophical grounds.”¹¹⁹

To make sense of the economic argument in favour of self-regulating free markets, which will be discussed below, one arguably needs to understand the epistemological and ontological foundations from which economic *science* derives its theories, and particularly the theory of rational choice which forms a core component of neoliberalism. Firstly, economic theory postulates that particular activities, most notably war and contracts, involve an ‘economical

¹¹⁵ Z.F.K. Arat, "Human Rights Ideology and Dimensions of Power: A Radical Approach to the State, Property, and Discrimination," *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (2008), 909

¹¹⁶ Hirschl, "" Negative" Rights Vs." Positive" Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order.", 1072; See also Plant, "Neo-Liberalism and the Theory of the State: From Wohlfahrtsstaat to Rechtsstaat.", 25-26

¹¹⁷ R Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 30

¹¹⁸ Sen, "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms.", 526

¹¹⁹ S. Lall and W. Latsch, "Import Liberalization and Industrial Performance: The Conceptual Underpinnings," *Development and Change* 29, no. 3 (1998), 442; See also Plant, "Neo-Liberalism and the Theory of the State: From Wohlfahrtsstaat to Rechtsstaat.", 36-37

calculus'.¹²⁰ In war and contracts, agents (i.e. states and individuals respectively) are actuated by self-interest.¹²¹ Predicting the outcomes of wars and contracts from a scientific, positivist, point of view requires *objectivity* and mirroring the behavioural revolution in psychology, *observation* of the external action of individuals rather than internal, subjective, thoughts becomes paramount.¹²² As such economics (and you could also argue war) is devoid of any considerations of morality and humans are reduced to the 'homo economicus' caricature where all action is explained by the rational self-interest of egoistic individuals and where well-being is defined as the satisfaction of preferences.¹²³

For example, coupled with the positivist methodology (i.e. only actions that can be observed can be considered data) Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen explains how 'rational choice' economists gather data:

If you are observed to choose x rejecting y, you are declared to have "revealed" a preference for x over y. Your personal utility is then defined as simply a numerical representation of this "preference," assigning a higher utility to a "preferred" alternative. With this set of definitions you can hardly escape maximizing your own utility, except through inconsistency....The rationale of this approach seems to be based on the idea that the only way of understanding a person's real preference is to examine his actual choices, and there is no choice-independent way of understanding someone's attitude towards alternatives.¹²⁴

From this conception of humans being rational self-interested egoists and with the only data that can be analysed being their observable actions, economists have been able to develop an 'objective' argument in favor of self-regulating markets without the need to resort to the subjective arguments of libertarians. Furthermore, such a methodology permits for the

¹²⁰ A.K. Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 6, no. 4 (1977)., 318.; See also M Sagoff, "Values and Preferences," *Ethics* 96, no. 2 (1986)., 301-305

¹²¹ Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.", 317

¹²² A Sen, "Description as Choice," *Oxford Economic Papers* 32, no. 3 (1980)., 355, 362; LA Boland, "Current Views on Economic Positivism," *Companion to contemporary economic thought* (1991)., 5; S.B. Lewin, "Economics and Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early Twentieth Century," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34, no. 3 (1996)., 1293-1294

¹²³ Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.", 332, 336;E. Diener and E. Suh, "Measuring Quality of Life: Economic, Social, and Subjective Indicators," *Social Indicators Research* 40, no. 1 (1997)., 190

¹²⁴ Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.", 322-323

mathematisation of information (in this case, behaviour) and in turn the creation of complex formulae, bringing economics into line with the much vaunted ideal set by the ‘pure’ science of theoretical physics.¹²⁵ Taking pride of place in the neoliberal arsenal is the fundamental theorem of welfare economics.

Where the libertarian sub-group of neoliberalism invoke moral arguments in favour of self-regulating markets, Sen notes “the foundational evaluation of the market mechanism in modern economics is based to a great extent on the so-called ‘fundamental theorem of welfare economics’.”¹²⁶ Made up of two parts, the first proposition of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics, described by Sen as the ‘direct theorem’, holds that under certain conditions, such as an absence of externalities, every competitive market equilibrium is ‘Pareto efficient’ or ‘Pareto optimal’ in that “compared with it, no one’s utility can be raised without reducing someone else’s utility”,¹²⁷ utility here being a numerical descriptor of choice.¹²⁸ Through individual buyers and sellers acting in their self-interest, “competition will produce a unique set of prices and quantities that will create a perfect match between the supply and demand of every good and service and every input used in production.”¹²⁹ Prices, it should be noted, are considered the “only information appropriate for social coordination” and it is assumed that prices convey all the information relevant to market participants which along with a lack of externalities, is a core assumption of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics.¹³⁰ Attempting to redistribute wealth in a system that is in equilibrium, for example, would result in no increase welfare as welfare is as high as it could possibly be and

¹²⁵ G Debreu, "The Mathematization of Economic Theory," *The American Economic Review* 81, no. 1 (1991)., 2; S.M. Jacoby, "Economic Ideas and the Labor Market: Origins of the Anglo-American Model and Prospects for Global Diffusion," *Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal* 25(2003)., 48; S. Bowles and H. Gintis, "The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, no. 1 (1993)., 84

¹²⁶ Sen, "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms.", 520

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 521; See also A Sen, "The Moral Standing of the Market," *Social philosophy and policy* 2, no. 02 (1985)., 9-11

¹²⁸ Sen, "Description as Choice.", 363

¹²⁹ R Herrera, "The Neoliberal 'Rebirth' of Development Economics," *Pesquisa & Debate* 17, no. 2 (2006)., 207

¹³⁰ Boland, "Current Views on Economic Positivism.", 10; J.E. Stiglitz, "Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent Crises," *The Journal of Finance* 54, no. 4 (1999)., 1513

redistribution would result in a zero-sum situation where gains for one would come at the expense of another (i.e. all non-zero-sum options have already been realised).¹³¹

The second proposition, otherwise known as the ‘converse theorem’,¹³² “asserts that [under certain assumptions] any Pareto optimal outcome may be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with the proper lump sum transfers.”¹³³ As the name ‘converse theorem’ alludes to, considering every Pareto optimal state (i.e. if a *benevolent* government is given a set of policies, the best possible choice would be at least Pareto optimal as everybody’s welfare is maximised) is a competitive market equilibrium at a given set of prices, it is possible to achieve the greatest welfare through market mechanisms.¹³⁴ Sen notes that “the converse theorem points to the possibility that, if we get the initial distribution of resources right, we can reach the very best state of affairs through the competitive market mechanism *without requiring any political interference with the market mechanism* [emphasis in original].”¹³⁵ Considered the more significant of the two theorems as it points to the market being the most efficient way of distributing utility; the converse theorem also has a revolutionary side in that it implies an initial redistribution of resources and thus the converse theorem has limited real-world applicability.¹³⁶ However, what is important is that *this theorem provides the key mathematical proof that markets are the optimal way of arranging a social system.*¹³⁷

From these points of departure - that markets are the most efficient distributor of welfare (the first proposition), and that markets should be free from government intervention (the second proposition) – the broad package of neoliberal policies can be linked back to their theoretical roots. Despite the seemingly impenetrable mathematics and language in which economics

¹³¹ Boland, "Current Views on Economic Positivism.", 10

¹³² Sen, "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms.", 521

¹³³ J.M. Gowdy, "Altruism, Evolution, and Welfare Economics," *Journal of economic behavior & organization* 53, no. 1 (2004)., 70

¹³⁴ Sen, "The Moral Standing of the Market.", 10; P.J. Boettke, "Why Are There No Austrian Socialists? Ideology, Science and the Austrian School," *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 17, no. 01 (1995)., 50

¹³⁵ Sen, "The Moral Standing of the Market.", 11

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 12

¹³⁷ ———, "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms.", 521-522; ———, "The Moral Standing of the Market.", 12

bases itself, the overall vision for society espoused by neoliberals can be presented in an apolitical, concise, and commonsensical way, as noted by Hockett:

Pareto's attractions for their part are not altogether mysterious. If a shift from one law or policy set to another stands to render one or more people better off and nobody worse off, why *wouldn't* [emphasis in original] 'we' undertake it? ... So-called "Pareto Indifference" is thus often taken to give fair expression to widely accepted, modern "liberal" or "individualist" values.¹³⁸

Providing a "rigorous interpretation of Adam Smith's invisible hands, the conditions under which and the sense in which markets lead to efficient outcomes",¹³⁹ neoliberals are able to use the fundamental theorem of welfare economics to formulate a policy programme that appears free of subjective and ideological influence, and appeals to a seemingly uncontroversial vision of human values, not to mention appealing to the desire for economic growth.¹⁴⁰ These beliefs in objectivity are so powerful that economics is often described as the 'queen of the social sciences' as it chooses *solved political problems* as its domain.¹⁴¹ Using the fundamental theorem of welfare economics as a starting point, the definitional issues highlighted earlier arguably become less of a problem. Where critics of neoliberalism had predominantly focused on the effects of neoliberal policy in various countries during the emergence and consolidation of the theory, with the two propositions in mind this essay will make a contribution to the contemporary focus on questioning the taken-for-granted theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism in order to provide a clear link between theory and practice and provide an analytical framework for those seeking to understand the hybrid and contextual nature of the theory as it applies to specific times and places.¹⁴² Often grouped as

¹³⁸ R.C. Hockett, "Pareto Versus Welfare," *Cornell Law Faculty Publications* 115 (2008), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lrsp_papers/115 (assessed June 14, 2010)., 1-2; See also J.E. Stiglitz, "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-Washington Consensus" (paper presented at the WIDER Annual Lectures 2, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland, January 7 1998)., 3

¹³⁹ J.E. Stiglitz, "Post Washington Consensus Consensus" (paper presented at the 'From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance Conference', Barcelona, Spain, September 24-26 2004)., 3

¹⁴⁰ Boettke, "Why Are There No Austrian Socialists? Ideology, Science and the Austrian School.", 52

¹⁴¹ A.P. Lerner, "The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty," *The American Economic Review* 62, no. 1 (1972)., 259; L.I. Rudolph and S.H. Rudolph, "Economics' Fall from Grace," *Political Science and Politics* 43, no. 4 (2010)., 747

¹⁴² W. Larner, "Neoliberalism, Mike Moore and the WTO," *Environment and Planning A* 41, no. 7 (2009)., 1577; For examples of studies that catalogue the effects of neoliberal policy, see D Nayyar, "Globalisation, History and Development: A Tale of Two Centuries," *Cambridge journal of economics* 30, no. 1 (2006)., 153-

the three main characteristics of neoliberal policy;¹⁴³ privatisation and commodification, deregulation and liberalisation, and stabilisation and monetarisation can be understood as an expression of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.

Privatisation/Commodification

From the first proposition (which holds that markets are the optimal way of distributing resources) many of the functions of government that had been established under the previous economic orthodoxy of Keynesianism, such as public healthcare, education, and nationalised industry became targets for privatisation and commodification in order to subject them to market logic and thus produce greater efficiencies.¹⁴⁴ As inefficient industry also passes losses to government and thus contribute to fiscal deficits, “privatization would kill two birds with one stone, simultaneously improving economic efficiency and reducing fiscal deficits.”¹⁴⁵ Government spending (particularly the aforementioned social spending) is considered especially inefficient and government taxes and bureaucracies should be fiscally austere and pared down to the minimum necessary to guarantee the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts, and the maintenance of territorial integrity, through, as David Harvey notes, “with force if needs be.”¹⁴⁶ Fiscal policy such as personal and corporate taxes should also be pared down to a minimum in what is known as supply-side economics where the *supply* of money for investment can be increased by simply reducing the tax burden imposed by the state.¹⁴⁷ As individuals and firms should be able to pursue their interests in the market place, the role of state agency here is to leverage open new markets and in the case of

158; H.J. Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 128-129

¹⁴³ For example, Roland notes “at the start of this new millennium, few serious economists dispute the need to liberalize, stabilize, and privatize.” In G Roland, “Ten Years After... Transition and Economics,” *IMF Staff papers* 48(2001), 36; See also Boas and Gans-Morse, “Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.”, 143; L Balcerowicz, “Understanding Postcommunist Transitions,” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 4 (2008), 80

¹⁴⁴ W. Larner, “Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” *Studies in Political Economy* 63(2009), 5; D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 160

¹⁴⁵ Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-Washington Consensus”, 8

¹⁴⁶ S Straub, “Informal Sector: The Credit Market Channel,” *Journal of Development Economics* 78, no. 2 (2005), 28; Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 2

¹⁴⁷ Cerny, “Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm.”, 21; J. Tobin, “The Monetarist Counter-Revolution Today-an Appraisal,” *The Economic Journal* 91, no. 361 (1981), 33

natural resources such as forests, these are most “likely to be conserved when their functions are valued and priced through market mechanisms.”¹⁴⁸

De-regulation/Liberalisation

From the second proposition (which holds that markets should be free from government intervention) comes the deregulation and liberalisation imperative. As prices are the only information appropriate for social organisation, government regulation distorts the market and thus leads to sub-optimal outcomes. As Gore notes, the barriers to economic development are understood by neoliberals through a methodologically nationalist form of explanation where underdevelopment can be attributed to national factors and policies.¹⁴⁹ Development policies intended to shield domestic producers from competition, such as import substitution, are charged with manipulating prices and causing a lack of pressure to innovate.¹⁵⁰ Regulations regarding labour, for example, distorts the labour market as interventions such as minimum wage laws raises the cost of labour resulting in less overall employment (especially, one could argue, when coupled with competition from low wage economies that is the result of open-trade policies).¹⁵¹ Flexible labour markets are thus the overall vision neoliberals have for the relationship between capital and labour as this allows capital to react to price signals with the minimal amount of friction, a stark contrast to the tripartite capital-state-labour relationship that had existed during the Keynesian era.¹⁵² Along with deregulation of labour laws, other domestic regulation such as environmental and tax laws – especially progressive income taxes – are targeted as inefficient due to the compliance costs involved and because they produce a sub-pareto outcome.¹⁵³ From a purely libertarian outlook, progressive taxes are considered especially sinister as they discriminate between individuals by placing the burden of helping

¹⁴⁸ D Humphreys, "Discourse as Ideology: Neoliberalism and the Limits of International Forest Policy," *Forest Policy and Economics* 11, no. 5-6 (2009), 320-321

¹⁴⁹ In combination with methodological nationalism Gore also notes that this is combined with a normative economic internationalism; this point will be discussed in more detail below as it relates to the International Relations branch of neoliberalism. C Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries," *World Development* 28, no. 5 (2000), 792

¹⁵⁰ Stiglitz, "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-Washington Consensus", 8

¹⁵¹ Jacoby, "Economic Ideas and the Labor Market: Origins of the Anglo-American Model and Prospects for Global Diffusion.", 74; J.E. Stiglitz, "Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor," *Perspectives on Work* 4, no. 1 (2000), 31-38

¹⁵² M Neufeld, "Theorizing Globalization: Towards a Politics of Resistance," in *Trent International Political Economy Centre Working Papers* (Peterborough, Canada: Trent University, 2001), 100

¹⁵³ G. Ventura, "Flat Tax Reform: A Quantitative Exploration1," *Journal of Economic dynamics and Control* 23, no. 9-10 (1999), 1426

the needy only on those who require money to achieve their ends, yet leave individuals who might choose looking at the sunset as their desired end completely free from such burdens.¹⁵⁴

Stabilisation/Monetarisation

A central component of liberalisation (read removal of political interference), otherwise known as stabilisation, has been the adoption of monetarist macroeconomics.¹⁵⁵ Monetarism holds that “prices grow exclusively because of growth in the money supply” and as such, notes Anna Schwartz, a primary collaborator of the late Milton Friedman¹⁵⁶ who is widely credited with laying the foundations of monetarism, “monetary restraint is a sufficient conditions for controlling inflation.”¹⁵⁷ To understand why inflation is of such significance to monetarists one only needs to refer to the context in which it emerged, like most other neoliberal theory, as a critique of Keynesian welfare state.

During the Keynesian post-war period until the early 1970s the importance of monetary policy to the economy was considered negligible by Keynes and defined in terms of its ability to support fiscal expansion.¹⁵⁸ To illustrate, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb note:

In practice, Keynesian macroeconomic policies took the form of the famous ‘stop-go’ cycles. Typically, the government would initiate a ‘go’ process by cutting taxes, increasing public spending, and moderately loosening interest rates, thereby stimulating demand. When the expansion of activity ran into a trade deficit, and consequent balance-of-payment problems, the government would reverse its strategy and implement a bout of ‘stop.’¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*., 6

¹⁵⁵ J Kelsey, "The Denationalization of Money: Embedded Neo-Liberalism and the Risks of Implosion," *Social & Legal Studies* 12, no. 2 (2003)., 159

¹⁵⁶ See M Friedman, "Monetarism in Rhetoric and in Practice," *Monetary Policy in Our Times* (1984)., 3

¹⁵⁷ R.S. Grinberg, "Fifteen Years of a Market Economy in Russia," *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences* 77, no. 4 (2007)., 358; A.J. Schwartz, "Monetary Policy and the Legacy of Milton Friedman," *Cato Journal* 28, no. 2 (2008)., 260

¹⁵⁸ Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries.", 550; Drainville, "Monetarism in Canada and the World Economy.", 23

¹⁵⁹ Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries.", 550

Central to the monetarists' success against the Keynesian establishment was the reigning evil of the time, inflation.¹⁶⁰ The avowed goal of stability placed monetarists in a prime position during the 1970s as inflation and stagflation (inflation of prices coupled with deflation of wages) was reeking havoc on countries such as Great Britain and the monetarist critique of the activist demand management of Keynesianism – which worked to “amplify rather than dampen natural fluctuations, [while] misallocating resources in the process”¹⁶¹ – provided a response where Keynesianism seemed to have none.¹⁶²

Key aspects of the monetarist programme includes the adoption an independent central bank overseeing strict monetary targets through the manipulation of interest rates – originally decided by aggregate measures of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index but broadened out in the 1980s to include other measures such as growth – and cutting government spending as government spending creates inflation (i.e. through printing money).¹⁶³ Furthermore, as noted by De Long:

The monetarist policy recommendations of a stable growth rate for nominal money and a constrained, automatic central bank were then seen as having an added bonus: they were tools to advance the libertarian goal of the shrinkage of the state. After all, a central bank not constrained by the constant nominal money growth rate rule can get itself into all kinds of mischief. It could use the inflation tax to gain command over goods and services. It could try to stimulate aggregate demand and manipulate the business cycle in order to create a favorable economic climate at election time.¹⁶⁴

Removing political control of monetary policy is perhaps the key motive behind monetarism as this has the effect of providing credibility and transparency to central bank operations and

¹⁶⁰ Tobin, "The Monetarist Counter-Revolution Today-an Appraisal.", 35

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 34

¹⁶² J.K. Galbraith, "The Collapse of Monetarism and the Irrelevance of the New Monetary Consensus" (paper presented at the 25th Annual Milton Friedman Distinguished Lecture at Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio, March 31 2008)., 4; L.C. Bresser-Pereira, "The Global Financial Crisis, Neoclassical Economics, and the Neoliberal Years of Capitalism," *Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs*, no. 7 (2010)., 5

¹⁶³ Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries.", 538, 555; Drainville, "Monetarism in Canada and the World Economy.", 33; C. Bloor et al., "The Use of Money and Credit Measures in Contemporary Monetary Policy," *Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin* 71, no. 1 (2008)., 6

¹⁶⁴ J.B. De Long, "The Triumph of Monetarism?," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 1 (2000)., 90

the ability for markets to anticipate change.¹⁶⁵ The notion that low inflation should be the primary goal of central bank policy has been a lasting influence of monetarism.¹⁶⁶ While the popularity and form of monetarism has ebbed and flowed over the years as new developments and crises eventuated, the policy has retained considerable influence and remains at the forefront of central bank policy options.¹⁶⁷

Neoliberalism in International Relations

While the previous section outlined the policy programme of neoliberalism at the national level, neoliberalism is also a powerful force in international politics and this section will explore how through material power those following neoliberalism at home have been able to transmit the ideology abroad through a process known as 'new constitutionalism'.¹⁶⁸ Before embarking on this section, however, the term neoliberalism in the context of International Relations scholarship requires clarification, as although it shares many of the same assumptions with neoliberalism at the national level, neoliberalism in International Relations represents a fundamentally different theory. Broadly speaking, neoliberalism in the international context is an outward expression of a theory closely tied to specific countries and their ability to influence global decision making.

In conjunction with Realism and more recently Constructivism, neoliberalism - or Neoliberal Institutionalism as it is also known¹⁶⁹ - forms the 'mainstream' of International Relations scholarship.¹⁷⁰ Originating in Keohane and Nye's theory of complex interdependence and subsequently developed into regime theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism; just as the liberalism of Woodrow Wilson had attempted to overcome the role of power politics through the creation of international institutions, neoliberal institutionalism carries on this project in the belief that there is considerable unrealised potential for mutual cooperation despite the

¹⁶⁵ R Jha, "Inflation Targeting in India: Issues and Prospects," *International Review of Applied Economics* 22, no. 2 (2008), 261-262; Friedman, "Monetarism in Rhetoric and in Practice.", 3, 4-5

¹⁶⁶ S. Williamson and R. Wright, "New Monetarist Economics. Working Paper," (2008), http://research.stlouisfed.com/conferences/policyconf/papers2009/Williamson_Wright.pdf (accessed March, 15 2010), 4; Bloor et al., "The Use of Money and Credit Measures in Contemporary Monetary Policy.", 6

¹⁶⁷ Galbraith, "The Collapse of Monetarism and the Irrelevance of the New Monetary Consensus", 4-6, 13

¹⁶⁸ Gill, "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy."

¹⁶⁹ There are significant differences between the neoliberalism outlined previously and neoliberal International Relations scholarship and as such Neoliberal Institutionalism will be used to describe the latter.

¹⁷⁰ S.M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* 110(Spring 1998).

anarchical nature of world politics.¹⁷¹ Particularly relevant to the previous discussion on Pareto optimality, Robert Jervis notes:

When a realist such as Stephen Krasner argues that much of international politics is "life on the Pareto frontier," he implies that states already have been able to cooperate to such an extent that no further moves can make all of them better off. For neoliberals, in the absence of institutions we are often far from this frontier, and much of international politics resembles a prisoner's dilemma or a market failure in producing suboptimal outcomes for all concerned. Although neoliberals are strongly influenced by neoclassical economics, they reject the idea that the free play of political forces will capture all possible joint gains.¹⁷²

Lacking external enforcement mechanisms to overcome unilateral defection as is predicted by the prisoners dilemma, Neoliberal Institutionalists believe that international institutions are required to shift states closer to the Pareto frontier (i.e. all possible avenues of mutual cooperation being realised) and provide guarantees against behavior such as cheating and opportunistic abrogation through providing information, reducing transaction costs, providing focal points for coordination, and facilitating the operation of reciprocity.¹⁷³

Though neoliberal institutionalism provides an argument in favour of international institutions and may therefore have provided some of the impetus towards the creation of international institutions; Cerny notes:

neoliberalism in Keohane's sense is fundamentally distinct from, even opposed to, the concept of neoliberalism as a hegemonic, globalizing political doctrine and discourse cutting across the inside/outside divide.... [This economic neoliberalism] has also

¹⁷¹ One must note, however, that neoliberal institutionalism takes a significantly different approach to Wilsonian liberalism in that according to the former cooperation occurs when states (who are rational egoists in conditions of anarchy) can mutually benefit from the creation of an institution whereas the latter believe that through cooperation a qualitative transformation in the nature of world politics can be achieved. See C.G. Thies, "Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 2 (2002); R.O. Keohane and L.L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995); L. Weiss, "Globalization and National Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence?," *Review of International Studies* 25(1999).

¹⁷² R Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International security* 24, no. 1 (1999), 47-48

¹⁷³ B.A. Leeds, "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (1999), 980; R. Axelrod and R.O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 38, no. 1 (1985), 386-387

become more widely accepted and has increasingly supplanted “neoliberal institutionalism” as the main way the word is used, not only in academic, but also in policymaking and journalistic circles.¹⁷⁴

As such, Neoliberal Institutionalism cannot be ascribed the same normative motivations such as the goal of liberty and the belief in the self regulating market which form the basis of the neoliberalism described in the preceding sections. Rather, as the following section on new constitutionalism will demonstrate, neoliberalism in the international context should be thought of as an outward expression of domestic social forces, often understood as the Washington Consensus, who by virtue of being in a commanding position in world politics, are able to shape global governance in their chosen image.

New Constitutionalism

Demonstrating how social forces can generate a world order and how a world order can generate a form of state, as amalgamations of ideas and material capability, international financial and trade institutions are perhaps the most exemplary link between the national and the international. The social forces in rich countries that have actively pursued neoliberalism at home also possess the organisational capacity to spread their ideology – the Washington Consensus – in other parts of the world through what Steven Gill describes as ‘new constitutionalism’, a “process [that] involves dominant state apparatuses in the Group of Seven, the international financial institutions, and transnational corporations, and it seeks to reproduce, politically and legally, disciplinary neo-liberalism and ... a market society on a world scale.”¹⁷⁵

Perhaps what one could describe as the one of the founding intellectuals of the new constitutionalists, “Friedrich von Hayek viewed constitutionalism as the general political means by which individual freedom could be defended against the collectivising tendencies of

¹⁷⁴ Cerny, "Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm.", 9-10

¹⁷⁵ Gill, "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy.", 37; Though not the focus here, the neoliberal world order was preceded by what was described by John Gerard Ruggie as ‘embedded liberalism’ which was based on Keynesianism. The changes made to international institutions from the 1970s onwards can be considered as a reflection of the rise and demise of neoliberalism and Keynesianism respectively. See J.G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982), 404

social democracy.”¹⁷⁶ While neoliberalism is often characterised as the ‘rolling back of the state’ in regards to, for example, public healthcare and education; some core functions, particularly the rule of law, remain necessary to maintain subjugation of labour and the environment over capital in what Peck and Ticknell describe as ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism.¹⁷⁷ As well as setting up and maintaining the indirect market forces necessary for the reproduction of capital, “direct power is also needed in the form of state action to ensure social control, and in the provision of laws and coercive potential to ensure that the owners of capital determine how production takes place.”¹⁷⁸ Brenner and Theodore note, “while neoliberalism aspires to create a ‘utopia’ of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life.”¹⁷⁹ Implemented both passively, as in the case of developing countries wanting to accede to the WTO or the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and actively in the form of structural adjustment programmes; developing countries face significant pressure to conform to a standard developed countries rarely conform to themselves, but nonetheless consider the key to a successful economy.¹⁸⁰ While the rights to sovereignty and democratic decision making are often taken for granted in the North; beyond the formalities of national governments legislating through reforms as a condition of membership to or aid from international financial institutions,¹⁸¹ these institutions in which the North hold almost overwhelming control have done little to extend such rights to those in the South.

At a general level, through the control of voting rights and policy formation, dominant states and allied capital are able to impose far reaching reforms (known as conditionalities) on states seeking financial assistance or inclusion in global governance via international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World

¹⁷⁶ G Strange, "The Left against Europe? A Critical Engagement with New Constitutionalism and Structural Dependence Theory," *Government and Opposition* 41, no. 2 (2006)., 205

¹⁷⁷ Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space.", 389-390

¹⁷⁸ S. Gill, "The Constitution of Global Capitalism" (paper presented at the British International Studies Association, Manchester, United Kingdom, December 20-22 1999).

¹⁷⁹ N. Brenner and N. Theodore, "Cities and the Geographies of" Actually Existing Neoliberalism", *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (2002)., 352

¹⁸⁰ R.H. Wade, "What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking Of development Space", *Review of international political economy* 10, no. 4 (2003)., 622

¹⁸¹ Larner, "Neoliberalism, Mike Moore and the WTO.", 1585

Bank.¹⁸² During the early years of the IMF, for example, conditionalities attached to loans reflected the fact that the creditors (i.e. the industrialised North) were also the potential debtors; but as the likelihood of this happening became more remote in the 1970s, the fund began to impose a much more rigorous conditionality regime.¹⁸³ Gill notes:

The *external* [emphasis added] locking in both liberal policies and protection of property rights is a key aspect of the work of the World Trade Organisation. Much of its focus is on the institutionalisation of such rights in the Third World where basic legal frameworks may not be fully developed, or where there may be a threat to capital and to property rights from 'above' for example the threat of expropriation or nationalisation by state elites.¹⁸⁴

Along with removing the threat of nationalisation, the second chief objective of these policies, noted by Grewal, is to protect investors from government oversight (i.e. regulation) that may endanger profitability.¹⁸⁵ Described by Hirschl as "arguably one of the most significant developments in late twentieth and early twenty-first century government" this 'locking in' of liberal policies and protection of property rights has been achieved through the transfer of "an unprecedented amount of power from representatives to judiciaries."¹⁸⁶ Exemplifying the considerable power Northern countries have, or have attempted to have in the case of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), over the decision making capabilities of the South, the following section will detail how the MAI, WTO, and Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and World Bank) both actively and passively work to spread new constitutionalism on a global scale.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸² Brenner and Theodore, "Cities and the Geographies of" Actually Existing Neoliberalism"., 350; E. Hartwick and R. Peet, "Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the WTO," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 590, no. 1 (2003)., 192

¹⁸³ D. Kapur and M. Naím, "The IMF and Democratic Governance," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (2005)., 90

¹⁸⁴ S. Gill, "New Constitutionalism and the Reconstitution of Capital" (paper presented at the Globalisation, State, and Violence University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom, April 15–18 1998)., 4

¹⁸⁵ D.S. Grewal, "Network Power and Global Standardization: The Controversy over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment," *Metaphilosophy* 36, no. 1-2 (2005)., 128

¹⁸⁶ R Hirschl, "The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 11, no. 1 (2004)., 71

¹⁸⁷ New constitutionalism also operates via bilateral, multilateral, and regional trade agreements. However, in order to maintain a level of generality in that international institutions such as the WTO aspire to universal membership, trade agreements will not be focused on in this essay. For an example of new constitutionalism operating at the regional level, in this case the North American Free Trade Agreement, see D. Schneiderman, "Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism," *Law & Social Inquiry* 25, no. 3 (2000)., 759, 765

The Multilateral Agreement on Investment

A key motivating factor of the ‘battle of Seattle’, the ‘coming out party’ of global civil society and electronic activism, was the attempt by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to institutionalise the MAI.¹⁸⁸ Although the agreement failed to materialise, due to the aforementioned activism, the experience of the MAI nonetheless provides a classic example of the passive pressure placed on developing countries to transfer decision making from national governments to international tribunals and to conform to the standards set behind closed doors in the comfort of the North.

Intended to liberalise capital flows and provide judicial protection for investors overseas in a manner similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the MAI was formulated under closely guarded secrecy by the members of the OECD.¹⁸⁹ While ostensibly an agreement between ‘like minded’ states¹⁹⁰ (i.e. the developed countries of the OECD), an explicit goal of the OECD was the gradual extension of the MAI to developing countries.¹⁹¹ The choice of fora is indicative here as the creation of such an agreement *could* have been undertaken through the WTO where both developing and developed countries could have input and where, at least numerically, developing countries could have some form of bargaining power.¹⁹² Instead the OECD was chosen as it provided the ability to shut out countries potentially wary or hostile to a binding agreement until it had been drawn up, “at which point it will be ‘gradually extended’ to them based on the need to ‘attract foreign capital.’”¹⁹³ David

¹⁸⁸ E Smythe, "Repolicitizing Globalization in Canada: From the MAI to Seattle," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 1 (2001), 153; R.J. Deibert, "International Plug'n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy," *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 3 (2000), 257-258

¹⁸⁹ Grewal, "Network Power and Global Standardization: The Controversy over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.", 128-129; E.V.K. FitzGerald, R. Cubero-Brealey, and A. Lehmann, "The Development Implications of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment," in *A report commissioned by the Department for International Department, Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford* (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1998), 35; S.J. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Policy*, no. 112 (1998), 98, 102

¹⁹⁰ 'Like minded' being a very loose term considering one draft contained almost 50 pages of country specific exemptions. See Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations.", 98

¹⁹¹ FitzGerald, Cubero-Brealey, and Lehmann, "The Development Implications of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.", 35; Z. Drabek, "A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics," in *The Policy Challenges of Global Financial Integration*, ed. J.J. Teunissen (The Hague, Netherlands: Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD), 1998), 57, 68

¹⁹² B Cassen, "Wielding Power Behind the Scenes," *Le monde diplomatique* (1998), <http://mondediplo.com/1998/03/07ami>

¹⁹³ Grewal, "Network Power and Global Standardization: The Controversy over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.", 139

Singh Grewal describes this strategy as ‘network power’ where through the ability of powerful countries to set a global standard, in this case the MAI, weaker countries are made to either join the agreement or face increasing costs from isolation from international capital flows.¹⁹⁴

While the MAI never achieved ratification; these same process of exclusion, one-sidedness, lack of transparency, and placing ever-increasing costs on those not party to the drafting of the agreement continue to this day in the form of the WTO.

The World Trade Organisation

In a similar vein to the MAI, ascension to the WTO relies on prospective entrants submitting to a raft of measures decided for them by existing members, which are often deeply at odds with developing countries local contexts, developed countries own historical experiences, and enforced through powerful international laws and judiciaries. While the WTO prides itself on being a rules based and universal system; as Rodrik notes, many of the agreements “lack any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups in advanced industrial countries.”¹⁹⁵ Conforming to the pattern of locking in liberal policies and investor protections as highlighted by new constitutionalism, the WTO arguably represents the one of the peak bodies representing neoliberalism at the international level, and one which both actively and passively prevents any deviation from the narrow set of neoliberal objectives.

As the MAI would have passively forced the adoption of liberal policies and investor protections through the network power of setting a global standard; so too does the WTO ensure the spread of neoliberalism through the threat of being left out of global governance and trade. Where under the forerunner to the WTO – the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – developing countries were free to benefit from tariff cuts made by developed countries while having to give up little themselves; WTO membership entails a complete

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 140

¹⁹⁵ D. Rodrik, "Trading in Illusions," *Foreign Policy* (2001), 58

reversal of this “asymmetric” relationship.¹⁹⁶ From the moment prospective members begin the ascension process incumbent members begin forcing applicants to liberalise trade, often significantly more so than the incumbents have agreed to among themselves, leading to charges of double-standards and severely compromising the universal character of the WTO.¹⁹⁷ Both the time it takes to accede and the ‘cost’ in terms of how far acceding governments are expected to liberalise their economies increases as time passes.¹⁹⁸ Grynberg, Ognivtsev, and Razzaque note that: “if Lithuania, Kyrgyz Republic, Albania and Georgia were original WTO founder members, they would have commitments at least as low as 15 per cent of what they actually undertook during accession.”¹⁹⁹

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the double standards of the WTO is that adopting WTO requirements rule out utilising the development strategies developed countries old and new have used to reach their position. Besides the time and opportunity costs of the estimated \$150 million USD it costs developing countries to implement just three of the WTO agreements (those regarding customs, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS)) which could otherwise be spent on development projects; doing so cuts off what have been the staple development strategies of numerous countries throughout history.²⁰⁰ As Wade explains, restrictions such as the TRIPS agreement:

leaves in place a much more restrictive environment for technology transfer than the older industrialized countries enjoyed during the early stages of industrialization and the new industrialized countries of East Asia enjoyed during theirs. Recall that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were each known as ‘the counterfeit capital’ of the world in

¹⁹⁶ ———, “The Global Governance of Trade: As If Development Really Mattered. Report Submitted to the United Nations Development Programme,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001)., 32-33; See also J.E. Stiglitz, “Development Policies in a World of Globalization,” in *Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and Ifis*, ed. K.P. Gallagher (London and New York: Zed Books, 2005)., 19; Other non-reciprocal trade agreements that followed the same formula as the GATT could include the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between Australia, New Zealand and 13 Pacific States, and the Lomé Agreement between European powers and their former African, Caribbean, and Pacific colonies. See J Kelsey, “Big Brothers Behaving Badly,” in *The implications for the Pacific Islands of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations* (Suva, Fiji: Pacific Network on Globalisation, 2004)., 9

¹⁹⁷ R.J. Langhammer and M. Lücke, “WTO Accession Issues,” *The World Economy* 22, no. 6 (1999)., 9

¹⁹⁸ S.J. Evenett and C.A. Primo Braga, “WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience,” in *World Bank Trade Note* 22 (Washington: World Bank, 2005)., 3-4

¹⁹⁹ R. Grynberg et al., *Paying the Price for Joining the WTO: A Comparative Assessment of Services Sector Commitments by WTO Members and Acceding Countries* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002)., 40

²⁰⁰ Rodrik, “Trading in Illusions.”, 57, 58

their time. And the US in the nineteenth century, then a rapidly industrializing country, was known – to Charles Dickens, among many other aggrieved foreign authors – as a bold pirate of intellectual property.²⁰¹

The effect of TRIPS, like many other WTO agreements, has resulted in what Ha Joon-Chang describes as ‘kicking away the ladder’.²⁰² Market forces, the core of explanation of development in neoliberal thought, simply does not reflect historical experience and Beeson goes so far to argue that ‘the degree of collective amnesia about their own historical development ... makes the advocacy of economic liberalisation and a winding back of the developmental state ... hypocritical at best, self-serving and discriminatory at worst.’²⁰³

Should a country stray from the course set out for them, direct pressure can be applied through the WTO Disputes Settlement Body. The Disputes Settlement Body is an institution that Hartwick and Peet note as having “a ‘lack of serious democratic controls ... because the views of ad hoc panelists and Appellate Body members becomes international ‘law’ without effective means for legislative intervention, while in addition, open hearings, open decisions, rights of affected parties to be heard, and many other democratic procedures are absent.”²⁰⁴ Constrained by costs, lack of technical expertise, and the prospect of retaliation; developing countries are unsurprisingly hesitant to make use of the Disputes Settlement Body.²⁰⁵ This leads Todd Allee to conclude there is a general bias against developing countries in the initiation of disputes and this can be explained in part by developing countries only initiating cases they are likely to win whereas developed countries are much more likely to initiate cases to boost political standing.²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ Wade, "What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking Of development Space'." , 626

²⁰² Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective.*; For a similar argument, see Rodrik, "Trading in Illusions."

²⁰³ M Beeson, "Politics and Markets in East Asia: Is the Developmental State Compatible with Globalisation?," (2004), http://espace.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:10690/mb_cwo_04.pdf (accessed May 12, 2010)., 9

²⁰⁴ Hartwick and Peet, "Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the WTO.", 206

²⁰⁵ T Allee, "Developing Countries and the Initiation of Gatt/WTO Disputes" (paper presented at the 1st Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Monte Verità, Switzerland, 2008)., 1, 34

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 34-36

The Bretton Woods Institutions

The Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and World Bank (originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), were created following WWII with the intention of providing a lender-of-last-resort for governments facing balance of payments crises²⁰⁷ and development assistance respectively.²⁰⁸ While the MAI and WTO present a comparatively passive approach to integrating countries into the neoliberal architecture, the IMF and World Bank take a distinctly aggressive approach, performing the role as a “principal conduit for the transmission of neoliberal ideas to the developing countries.”²⁰⁹ As noted previously, since the developed countries began to feel relatively safe from needing IMF support and had access to international and domestic lines of credit, from the late 1970s the Bretton Woods institutions began a trend towards a much more stringent conditionality regime which authors such as Buria argue is leading to a growing chasm between the creditors (i.e. developed countries) who make the rules and the debtors (i.e. developing countries) which are subject to these rules.²¹⁰

In order to receive IMF or World Bank assistance, which from the early 1980s came under the banner of ‘structural adjustment’ and closely following the prescriptions of what was to be later designated as the Washington Consensus,²¹¹ debtor nations are expected to meet a number of conditions that have been met with widespread opposition for their socially regressive effects, the most prominent examples being the ‘lost decade’ in Latin America and

²⁰⁷ The alternative being countries devaluing their currencies which would result in instability of exchange rates.

²⁰⁸ N. Woods, "The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves," *World Development* 28, no. 5 (2000), 826; N. Chorev and S. Babb, "The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Future of International Institutions: A Comparison of the IMF and the WTO," *Theory and Society* 38, no. 5 (2009), 464

²⁰⁹ M. Beeson and I. Islam, "Neo-Liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus," *Journal of Development Studies* 41, no. 2 (2005), 198

²¹⁰ A. Buira, "The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?," in *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper No. 180/05* (Warwick, United Kingdom: University of Warwick, 2005), 18-19; As these institutions employ qualified majorities of 85% the U.S., European Union, and Japan effectively hold the ability to veto policy, see J.E. Lane and R. Maeland, "Global Financial Crisis and International Institutions: Challenges, Opportunities and Change," *Public Organization Review* 11, no. 1 (2011), 5

²¹¹ The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined by John Williamson in 1989 to describe a core set of policies that would be agreeable to ‘Washington’. By Washington he is referring to: “the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US executive branch, the Federal Reserve Board, the Inter-American Development Bank, those members of Congress interested in Latin America, and the think tanks concerned with economic policy”. In J. Marangos, "The Evolution of the Anti-Washington Consensus Debate: From 'Post-Washington Consensus' to 'after the Washington Consensus'," *Competition and Change* 12, no. 3 (2008), 227

the amplifying effects attributed to IMF actions during the Asian Financial Crisis.²¹² IMF intervention, for example, typically involves a significant injection of capital to prevent government default, accompanied by monetary and fiscal tightening to improve investor confidence.²¹³ How much is loaned is decided by a small group of countries known as the ‘Paris Club’ – the main creditors of the fund – and have been criticised for being highly politicised and debt levels are often based on how much debt can be tolerated without due recognition of the wider implications conditionality will have on development and poverty.²¹⁴ Originally precipitated by the 1982 Third World debt crisis and featuring prominently during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, through the policy known as “shock Therapy”, during the 1980’s and 1990’s the IMF and World Bank would “use early windows of opportunity or periods of ‘exceptional politics’ to push reforms through as fast as possible and to create irreversibility.”²¹⁵

However, beginning 1998 following a World Bank report entitled *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter*, the Bretton Woods institutions embarked on a significant shift away from the Washington consensus that had guided their decisions during the 1980s and 1990s.²¹⁶ Recognising the effects the reforms were having on social cohesion and political stability,²¹⁷ the Bretton Woods institutions broadened their focus from the narrow set of prescriptions to create what Rodrik describes as the ‘Augmented’ Washington Consensus which complemented existing policy by adding reforms focusing on ‘good governance’ and

²¹² R. Grinspun and R. Kreklewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: Free Trade" as a Conditioning Framework," *Studies in Political Economy* 43(2009), 38, 58; R. Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment," *New Political Economy* 3, no. 3 (1998), 346-350; S. Friel et al., "Global Health Equity and Climate Stabilisation: A Common Agenda," *The Lancet* 372(2008), 1678; Stiglitz, "Post Washington Consensus Consensus", 4

²¹³ M.M. Hutchison, I. Noy, and L. Wang, "Fiscal and Monetary Policies and the Cost of Sudden Stops," *Journal of International Money and Finance* (2010), 2

²¹⁴ Y. Akyüz, "Policy Response to the Global Financial Crisis: Key Issues for Developing Countries," *South Centre*, no. 24 (2009), 24; IMF requirements for an independent central bank targeting inflation may provide investor confidence, for example, but this in turn requires high interest rates which decreases domestic investment and raises unemployment, see S. Babb, "The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Current Debates," *Sociology* 31, no. 1 (2005), 212

²¹⁵ Roland, "Ten Years After... Transition and Economics.", 31, 33; Babb, "The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Current Debates.", 200

²¹⁶ S.J. Burki and G. Perry, *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter* (Washington: World Bank Publications, 1998). P. Abrahamson, "European Welfare States Beyond Neoliberalism: Toward the Social Investment State," *Development and Society* 39, no. 1 (2010), 68

²¹⁷ Roland, "Ten Years After... Transition and Economics.", 33

mechanisms to promote ‘ownership’ of the reforms.²¹⁸ Staying true to the methodological nationalism of neoliberalism, Stiglitz notes “by this point, the IMF/US Treasury/Washington consensus advice was ringing hollow: ex post, they could always find something that was wrong, and add something to the increasingly long laundry list of what countries should do.”²¹⁹ Moreover, as noted by Babb, “because these lenders simultaneously require reductions in government spending, deflationary monetary policy, and the repayment of external debts, the effects of these poverty reduction strategies may be cancelled out.”²²⁰

Despite the broadening of the policy programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions, underneath lies the structural imperative of providing loans so that countries can repay creditors – which in itself is argued to create a moral hazard²²¹ as creditors do not take any risk – remains central to the actions of the institutions.²²² In turn, debtor countries are expected to repay the loans to the Bretton Woods institutions who, as in the case of the World Bank, fiercely guard their Triple A credit rating, and thus transfer the costs of the adjustment onto the general population through cuts to public spending backed by the threat of loss of access to capital – both from private and the multilateral institutions as the institutions undertake important surveillance duties – if reforms are not adhered to.²²³ Borrowing from Held, Kaldor, and Quah who note “it was Max Weber who said institutions are determined by their sources of revenue”,²²⁴ one could argue that since the advent of structural adjustment the Bretton Woods institutions have consistently reflected this notion.

²¹⁸ D. Rodrik, "After Neoliberalism, What?" (paper presented at the New Paths of Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, September 12-13 2002)., 1

²¹⁹ Stiglitz, "Post Washington Consensus Consensus"., 5-6

²²⁰ Babb, "The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Current Debates.", 205

²²¹ For the argument and counter-argument, see H.J. Chang, "The Hazard of Moral Hazard: Untangling the Asian Crisis," *World Development* 28, no. 4 (2000)., 783-784

²²² Grinspun and Krekewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: "Free Trade" as a Conditioning Framework.", 38-39

²²³ Gill, "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy.", 38-39; D. Neu et al., "The Sign Value of Accounting: IMF Structural Adjustment Programs and African Banking Reform," *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 21, no. 5 (2010)., 406

²²⁴ D. Held, M. Kaldor, and D. Quah, "The Hydra-Headed Crisis," in *London School of Economics Global Governance Pamphlet* (London London School of Economics, 2010)., 14

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide a general framework of action that is likely to influence the decision making processes of those following neoliberalism at both the national and international levels. Through appealing to the underlying desire for progress in the Anglo-American world, those following neoliberalism have achieved a significant degree of success in legally institutionalising their goals of individual liberty and the free market at the national and international levels. Paraphrasing Marx, ‘people make their own history, but not under conditions of their choosing’;²²⁵ the previous two chapters have focused on describing those conditions, that is, environmental injustice and neoliberalism. In order to overcome environmental injustice, the next chapter will lay the theoretical foundations of two varieties of what is known as critical theory, both of which hold emancipation as their central goal. Upon laying this theoretical foundation in chapter three, chapter four will return to environmental injustice and neoliberalism to demonstrate how critical theory can provide insights for political practice.

²²⁵ K. Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1851)* (New York: International Publishers, 1963)., 15

CHAPTER THREE

Critical Theory: Between a Problem Solving Rock and a Postmodern Hard Place

Holding emancipation as its central goal, critical theory presents a possible avenue for overcoming environmental injustice.²²⁶ Though explicitly seeking practical solutions to real world situations of domination and oppression, Richard Wyn Jones notes; critical theory “has thus-far failed to provide a convincing account of its own relationship this emancipatory praxis.”²²⁷ While critical theorists have always held the goal of a ‘better world’, if one takes the position of the Foucault where “reason, knowledge, and truth can never escape from relations and effects of power”,²²⁸ making the jump from critiquing the status quo to providing emancipatory strategies in turn leads one to utilising instrumental rationality in order to reach ‘the better world’.²²⁹ Thus critical theory finds itself between two seemingly incommensurable positions.²³⁰ On one hand critical theory has a postmodern element that seeks to throw light on the workings of power in the international arena, as summed up in Cox’s infamous phrase “theory is always *for* some one and *for* some purpose [emphasis in original].”²³¹ On the other hand, where critical theory differs from postmodernism is that where the latter focus on how a particular social phenomena is constructed and whose voices are being privileged, critical theory takes one step further to predict ‘alternative pathways’ to a more emancipated future.²³² As prediction must be grounded in some form of knowledge of the world, critical theory risks the dangerous fallacy in the eyes of the postmodern theorist in that overconfidence in ones theory could lead to undemocratic and closed forms of instrumentalism.²³³ Alternatively, as there is no possibility of a universal philosophy in

²²⁶ Emancipation being the achievement of human autonomy and self-understanding, see R.K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981), 208

²²⁷ R. Wyn Jones, "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies," *Contemporary Security Policy* 16, no. 3 (1995), 305

²²⁸ D.P. Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," *Public Culture* 11, no. 1 (1999), 9-10

²²⁹ J.G. Finlayson, "The Theory of Ideology and the Ideology of Theory: Habermas Contra Adorno," *Historical Materialism* 11, no. 2 (2003), 166-169

²³⁰ Or in other words “unhelpful dichotomies”, see K. Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 04 (1991), 322

²³¹ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 207

²³² S Inayatullah, "Causal Layered Analysis:: Poststructuralism as Method," *Futures* 30, no. 8 (1998), 817-827

²³³ N.J. Rengger and B. Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. S1 (2007), 13; M Fluck,

postmodern thought, “the more one accepts contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects, the less guidance emerges for concrete political action”.²³⁴ Thus critical theorists attempt to position themselves between the ‘open’ project of postmodernism that views any attempt to ‘create’ a better world as undemocratic, and the ‘closed’ project of technocratic rationalism, or problem solving theory as it is otherwise known,²³⁵ that seeks only to “make the existing machine work better”.²³⁶

This contradiction was perhaps best summed up in Theodor Adorno’s famous quote that the best he could hope for his writing would be for it to provide a ‘message in a bottle’ for future generations.²³⁷ As Rengger notes, Adorno “effectively abandoned any search for a way of getting to such a world because he realised that with his own analysis, he could get there only by using the methods that would forever block his passage”.²³⁸ In the process of critiquing the status quo, however, critical theorists naturally question whose interests are being privileged and whose interests are being ignored, something “critical theories of all descriptions are especially alert to”.²³⁹ Though the postmodern branch of critical theory would stop short of providing strategies to overcome the structures of domination they uncover, critical theorists in general are “resolutely modernist” in the belief that some form of emancipatory knowledge can be generated.²⁴⁰

In responding to Richard Wyn Jones concerns about how to apply critical theory to practice, this chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical framework of two prominent branches of critical theory in International Relations: the Habermasian-inspired Critical Theory

"Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* (2010)., 2

²³⁴ Rengger and Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations.", 13; C. Mouffe and P. Holdengräber, "Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?," *Social Text*, no. 21 (1989)., 31-32

²³⁵ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 128

²³⁶ Rengger and Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations.", 16

²³⁷ R.J. Antonio, "Locating the Civil Sphere," *Sociological Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (2007)., 601-602, 608; Wyn Jones, "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies.", 306-307

²³⁸ N.J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. R. Wyn Jones (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)., 105

²³⁹ A. Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. R. Wyn Jones (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2001)., 36.; See also G. Delanty, "Thesis Eleven: Civilizational Analysis and Critical Theory," *Thesis Eleven* 100, no. 1 (2010)., 47

²⁴⁰ K. Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies," *Cooperation and conflict* 33, no. 3 (1998)., 299

commonly associated with Andrew Linklater, and the Gramscian-inspired critical theory of Robert Cox. Building upon this theoretical foundation, the following chapter then seeks to link theory with practice by analysing how proponents of environmental justice could use critical theory to analyse and combat neoliberalism.

The Critical Turn in International Relations

Though the Realist school of International Relations has been open to one aspect of the Enlightenment, the scientific method,²⁴¹ when combined with Cold War thinking the dominance of classical and neo-Realism in International Relations seemingly destroyed the broader project of the Enlightenment that sought ethical and moral progress.²⁴² As the scientific method dictates the separation of facts from values,²⁴³ only material facts (such as the size of a country's army) could have any relevance to action in the international arena for neo-realists, as opposed to taking into account whether a country is considered a friend or not.²⁴⁴ Matthew Fluck notes:

In modern positivist thought this subjectivism is manifested in the detachment of language from reality which produces a closed 'system of detached signs'. Any attempt to transcend this system is seen as meaningless. Positivism may believe itself to represent 'the court of judgement of enlightened reason', but this reason maintains its power by placing a 'taboo' on any reference to that which cannot be represented by 'detached signs' or concepts.²⁴⁵

Described by Ken Booth as the "utter dominance of structure over agent",²⁴⁶ the lack of a Leviathan at the inter-state level meant that consideration of "morality in foreign policy is

²⁴¹ O Waver, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zaleski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162

²⁴² Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory.", 42

²⁴³ M Fluck, "Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* (2010), <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/10/16/0305829810385963> (assessed December 10, 2010), 3-4

²⁴⁴ Linklater notes that through the evolution of ethical constraints on the use of force, such as the international norm that 'forbids' colonialism, for example, foreign policy decisions can no longer be reduced to simple "Machiavellian calculations of opportunity". In Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory.", 36; See also Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11.", 509, 513-515; A. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992), 396-397

²⁴⁵ Fluck, "Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory.", 14

²⁴⁶ Booth, "Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist.", 15

impossible, or at least unusually dangerous”.²⁴⁷ Referred to as the condition of anarchy,²⁴⁸ Tesón notes, “except as an occasional political tool, concern for freedom or human rights does not belong in the realm of international relations because there is no centralised authority or super-state that can guarantee the rights of subjects.”²⁴⁹

This lack of a global enforcer to hold a mediating position between individual states in a similar way that a state mediates between individual citizens reinforced a strong dichotomy between the inside and outside and hence a very narrow role for the state in international affairs.²⁵⁰ Within states there is arguably some measure of “common political culture in which the various actors engaged in negotiations operate within ‘common value orientations and shared conceptions of justice’, which enable agreements to be made beyond the limits of instrumental rationality.”²⁵¹ At the interstate level, however, no such transformative site exists and thus international relations is reduced to the imperatives that exist in the state of nature – security and survival – and “on behalf of those ends any means can be used”.²⁵² With action in the international arena reduced in scope, the subject matter of International Relations scholarship was similarly reduced.²⁵³ Research during the Cold War on race, gender, or morality, for example, therefore faced a hostile academic environment that marginalised and disciplined dissenting views outside of the positivist epistemology and resultant ontology.²⁵⁴

However, despite the dominance of positivism in International Relations Theory, a crucial turning point came in 1981 with the publication of Robert W Cox’s ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ and Richard Ashley’s ‘Political

²⁴⁷ J. Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 162

²⁴⁸ For an influential conception of anarchy, see K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

²⁴⁹ F.R. Tesón, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," *Columbia Law Review* 92, no. 1 (1992), 73

²⁵⁰ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 73-76

²⁵¹ L. Wilde, "Europe and the 'Re-Regulation of World Society': A Critique of Habermas," *Capital & Class* 31, no. 3 (2007), 93

²⁵² S. Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 11-12

²⁵³ Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11.", 513-514

²⁵⁴ Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies.", 299; Waver, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate.", 165; Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 322; W. Wallace, "Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (1996), 308; Smith, "Positivism and Beyond.", 18

Realism and Human Interests', followed in 1982 by Andrew Linklater's *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*.²⁵⁵ Described as the 'critical turn' or 'third debate' of International Relations; following the lead of Cox, Ashley, and Linklater a vast array of contemporary social theory found acceptance within the academy such as constructivist, Habermasian, feminist, neo-Gramscian, postmodern, and post-colonial perspectives.²⁵⁶ Breaking the hegemony of Western modernist discourse in International Relations, Jim George credits the third debate with opening up "thinking space" for this wide range of heterogeneous perspectives thematically linked to an overarching 'critical' purpose of challenging the traditional reference points for understanding the contemporary world.²⁵⁷

With such a wide variety of perspectives available, Kimberly Hutchings notes in order to develop proscriptive critical theory (which will be attempted in chapter four) it is important to make explicit the fundamental assumptions on which it rests.²⁵⁸ The two variants of critical theory that will form the theoretical foundations of this essay – the Frankfurt School inspired Habermasian 'discourse ethics' and the Coxian method inspired by Antonio Gramsci – were chosen as they approach the broad 'critical purpose' in two very different ways. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, they can be used to complement each other as Habermasian Critical Theory essentially delineates an 'ideal-type' that can be used to contrast against environmental injustice and neoliberalism, while Coxian critical theory provides a strategy to overcome these forms of domination. Though the two approaches developed independently, a

²⁵⁵ Rengger and Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations.", 4; Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory."; Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests."; A. Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1982).

²⁵⁶ Rengger and Thirkell-White, "Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations.", 4; F. Kratochwil, "Looking Back from Somewhere: Reflections on What Remains 'Critical' in Critical Theory," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. S1 (2007)., 27; Fluck, "Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," , 4; D.S.L. Jarvis, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000)., 21; R. Price and C. Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons?," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998)., 260; For a particularly influential text considering the implications of the third debate see Y. Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989).

²⁵⁷ George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate.", 269-271

²⁵⁸ K. Hutchings, "The Nature of Critique in Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. R. Wyn Jones (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)., 90

reappraisal of classical Marxism is a common feature of both Habermasian and Coxian schools of critical theory.²⁵⁹

Habermas's Discourse Ethics

In order to overcome the tension between universality and diversity Jürgen Habermas – considered one of the most influential scholars of the critical project – developed discourse ethics in an attempt to reconcile the necessity of universalist principles with its inherent propensity to extinguish diversity.²⁶⁰ In the International Relations community, “Habermas’s work was embraced because it provided a useful guide to how beliefs and actions could be made accountable to others and how they could then be subjected to scrutiny and accepted or contested by participants engaged in dialogue”.²⁶¹ To achieve this Andrew Linklater, a prominent International Relations scholar of the Habermasian tradition, regards the normative project of Habermasian critical theory is:

to increase the spheres of social interaction that are governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force; to expand the number of human beings who have access to a speech community that has the potential to become universal; and to create the socioeconomic preconditions of effective, as opposed to nominal involvement for all members of that community.²⁶²

Broadly described as Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’, the central task of critical theorists following Habermas’s lead has been to “facilitate the development of institutional arrangements that concretised this dialogic ideal”.²⁶³ At its core, according to Linklater, discourse ethics consists of three main points: that human beings have a right to belong to communication communities where they can participate in decisions that affect them or at a minimum their interests should be included in the deliberative process, that all participants should enter into dialogue with the conviction that no-one knows who will learn from whom,

²⁵⁹ A. Linklater, "Critical Theory," in *International Relations for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. M. Griffiths (New York: Routledge, 2007), 54-55; J Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas* (Greenwood Pub Group, 1995), 99

²⁶⁰ Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics.", 96-98; Fluck, "Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," , 6

²⁶¹ T. Diez and J. Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 01 (2005), 132

²⁶² Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory.", 31

²⁶³ Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 132

and that all participants should strive to reach agreements relying as far as possible on the force of a better argument.²⁶⁴ As Andrew Linklater notes, the “gulf between actual social practices and discourse ethics provides an immediate rationale for political critique”.²⁶⁵

Discourse ethics arose within what is known as the Frankfurt School tradition, which takes its name from the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt where a group of Marxist scholars, interrupted by WWII, coalesced and built what is characterised by Anderson as a “social-theoretic approach employing methods of qualitative social science to expose the ideology responsible for various societal pathologies.”²⁶⁶ The rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s had a profound effect on early Frankfurt scholars.²⁶⁷ The ease of which universal principles could be put to totalitarian ends, as exemplified by Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, created the intellectual roadblock that stymied the research of the ‘first generation’ Frankfurt scholars, as indicated by the pessimism inherent in Adorno’s ‘message in a bottle’.²⁶⁸ Intent on breaking through the problems encountered by his predecessors, Jürgen Habermas, a second generation Frankfurt scholar, undertook a significant reappraisal of classical Marxism in light of the totalitarianism engendered by “actually existing socialism”.²⁶⁹ Classical Marxism had long held assumptions such as labour processes being the key to social and political organisation, that class struggle was the driving force behind social change, and that the conquest of nature

²⁶⁴ A. Linklater, "Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 01 (2005), 147; For the expanded versions of discourse ethics, see also P. Gilabert, "Cosmopolitanism and Discourse Ethics: A Critical Survey," *New Political Science* 28, no. 1 (2006), 17; J. Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), 198; H. Wiklund, "In Search of Arenas for Democratic Deliberation: A Habermasian Review of Environmental Assessment," *Impact assessment and project appraisal* 23, no. 4 (2005), 285; H.R. Nilsen, "The Joint Discourse 'Reflexive Sustainable Development' — from Weak Towards Strong Sustainable Development," *Ecological Economics* 69, no. 3 (2010), 498

²⁶⁵ A. Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 293; It should be noted that discourse ethics is not without its detractors. However, as this essay has no aim to institutionalise an ideal speech situation directly, discourse ethics will be primarily used here to contrast against existing political practice with the purpose of using discourse ethics to inform decision making processes rather than provide a blueprint for the creation of institutions that would meet this ideal. For an overview of some of the criticisms based on empirical studies that have sought to create an ideal speech situation, see D.F. Thompson, "Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science," *Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008), 498-499

²⁶⁶ J. Anderson, "The Third Generation of the Frankfurt School," *Intellectual History Newsletter* 22 (2000), <http://www.phil.uu.nl/~joel/research/publications/3rdGeneration.htm>. (accessed June 21, 2010), 49-50

²⁶⁷ Linklater, "Critical Theory.", 51

²⁶⁸ D. Kellner, "Critical Theory Today: Revisiting the Classics," *Theory, Culture & Society* 10, no. 2 (1993), 47-49; See also Wyn Jones, "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies.", 307

²⁶⁹ A. Whitworth, "Communication with the Environment? Non Human Nature in the Theories of Jürgen Habermas," *Politics* 20, no. 3 (2000), 146

(i.e. abolishing material scarcity) is the goal of emancipation.²⁷⁰ For Habermas, classical Marxism failed as it elevated labour processes as the single most important explanation for the evolution of human societies.²⁷¹ What was missing from this conception of historical materialism was the significance interaction, the place in which actual societies negotiate the principles of coexistence.²⁷²

For classical Marxists, overcoming domination in the sphere of production would lead to emancipation.²⁷³ However, as Communist Russia had made all too clear, this narrow definition of emancipation in turn led to the legitimisation of technocratic activity and centralised control by ‘experts’ within the communist leadership where the end could justify almost any means.²⁷⁴ Though recognising that fulfilling the material needs of society is of fundamental importance to the reproduction of that society; Habermas contended that reproduction is also reliant on language or ‘communicative action’ where members reach an understanding about what binds them together as a community.²⁷⁵ Where classical Marxism focuses almost solely on labour processes, in particular, “the incessantly developing forces of production and outmoded forms of relations of production” such as that which occurred between feudalism and capitalism, to explain the evolution of humanity and proposes technical-instrumental solutions such as communal ownership of the means of production in order to reproduce a classless society;²⁷⁶ Habermas’s revised historical materialism introduced communication as a complementary explanation for the reproduction of society.

For Habermas, there is no automatic relation between labour and interaction – and as the example of Communist Russia attests – “liberation from hunger and misery does not

²⁷⁰ Linklater, "Critical Theory.", 51

²⁷¹ A. Linklater, "Towards a Sociology of Global Morals with an ‘Emancipatory Intent’," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. S1 (2007), 145

²⁷² J. Livesay, "Normative Grounding and Praxis: Habermas, Giddens, and a Contradiction within Critical Theory," *Sociological Theory* 3, no. 2 (1985), 66-67

²⁷³ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 284

²⁷⁴ D. Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 269

²⁷⁵ Linklater, "Critical Theory.", 51; Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas.*, 271

²⁷⁶ C. Douzinas and R. Warrington, "Domination, Exploitation, and Suffering: Marxism and the Opening of Closed Systems," *American Bar Foundation Research Journal* 11, no. 4 (1986), 804, 822

necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and degradation".²⁷⁷ Crucially, both labour processes and communication are two interrelated but logically distinct learning processes.²⁷⁸ Just as humans are able to learn about the natural world and how to exploit it through technical-instrumental learning, so to are they able to learn in the communicative realm the immanent possibility of higher levels of freedom through moral-practical learning.²⁷⁹

Habermas also makes a distinction between the system-world and life-world where technical-instrumental and moral-practical learning are employed respectively. The system-world operates much in the same way as expected by positivist theories such as neoliberalism, neo-Realism, and classical Marxism where technical-instrumental knowledge is used to achieve the economic and administrative goals of the dominant actor.²⁸⁰ The system-world is characterised by the use of 'strategic action' where positive or negative sanctions are used to shape the behaviour of others.²⁸¹

A life-world, on the other hand, is created via communicative action orientated towards the goal of mutual understanding.²⁸² Where strategic action in the system-world allows for *material* reproduction of society, communicative action in the life-world allows for *symbolic*

²⁷⁷ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 104

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 111

²⁷⁹ Habermas also delineates a third form of learning, strategic learning, where human beings learn how to manipulate and control others. In Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 285

²⁸⁰ H. Baxter, "System and Life-World in Habermas's "Theory of Communicative Action", " *Theory and society* 16, no. 1 (1987)., 39-43; Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 117; J.V. Femia, "Gramsci's Patrimony," *British Journal of Political Science* 13, no. 03 (1983)., 333

²⁸¹ Habermas delineates two forms of strategic action, open and concealed, where actors make no attempt to communicatively justify their actions or attempt to conceal strategic action via normative discourse respectively. See Baxter, "System and Life-World in Habermas's "Theory of Communicative Action".", 40-43

²⁸² Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 134; Where the system-world is driven by technical instrumental interests to gain control over ones environment, the life-world is driven by the practical-cognitive interest that seeks to maintain cultural traditions which is based on a historicist and hermeneutic epistemology, and the emancipatory interest which is based on a critical epistemology and seeks to achieve autonomy and self-understanding. See Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests.", 208; Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order.", 504-505; J. Habermas, "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective," in *Continental Philosophy of Science*, ed. G. Gutting (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2005)., 308-311

reproduction of society.²⁸³ In pre-conventional societies, for example, tradition (symbolism) provides legitimacy for the distribution of material power and wealth in a process known as the colonisation of the life-world.²⁸⁴ Habermas notes:

The life of the totemistic tribe, the clan, the church of the Middle Ages, the nation in the era of the bourgeois revolutions, followed the ideological patterns shaped through historical developments. Such patterns—magical, religious, or philosophical—reflected current forms of social domination. They constituted a cultural cement even after their role in production had become obsolete; thus they also fostered the idea of a common truth.²⁸⁵

Compliance of the general population is generated via symbolic, mutually understood concepts, such as group loyalty or threats of retribution by higher authorities.²⁸⁶ Universal uncontested symbolic knowledge serves as the glue that holds these societies together as this knowledge “specified principles that rendered individual relationships both ethical in themselves and functional for social stability.”²⁸⁷ However, as societies develop complexity, tradition (and hence distribution of wealth and power) becomes increasingly contested as “actors stand back from authority structures and group membership and ask whether they are complying with principles which have universal applicability”.²⁸⁸ Where members of society grow disenchanted with meaning taken from the life-world, systemic crises can occur.²⁸⁹ Described by Habermas as post-conventional morality, when agents develop the capacity for ethical reflection and recognise that moral codes are malleable social products, they also realise that that no moral standpoints have universal validity.²⁹⁰ Knowing that there can be no universal conception of the good life in turn leads agents to seek universal procedures for

²⁸³ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 114

²⁸⁴ T.L. Jacobson, "Cultural Hybridity and the Public Sphere," in *Redeveloping Communication for Social Change: Theory, Practice, and Power*, ed. K.G. Wilkins (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2000)., 61

²⁸⁵ J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985)., 349

²⁸⁶ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 285

²⁸⁷ M. Leet, "Democracy and the Individual," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 29, no. 6 (2003)., 684

²⁸⁸ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 285

²⁸⁹ For example, in liberal democracies social movements are born out of the colonisation of the life-world by the administrative and economic imperatives of the state. G Edwards, "Habermas and Social Movements: What's New?," *Sociological Review* 52, no. s1 (2004)., 114-115; Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 114

²⁹⁰ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 286

dealing with moral and political disputes as it is through how an agreement is achieved that decisions gain their authority.²⁹¹

Circumventing postmodernisms distaste for closed political projects where human action is guided by instrumental (i.e. ideological) reason alone, Habermas's ideal speech situation has no telos or final purpose to guide and regulate human conduct.²⁹² Instead the ideal speech situation sets the context in which rational consensus formation can be achieved through the force of a better argument.²⁹³ As such, legitimacy is achieved through the progressive and open-ended formation of laws, rules, and cultural norms rooted in rational deliberation.²⁹⁴ Through a self-reflective deliberation process participants would have to open their assumptions and habits to interrogation and evaluation and thus knowledge could achieve a 'historically self conscious' universal status that applies to members of the deliberation and the historical context in which the knowledge was created.²⁹⁵ Though the process of deliberation may be a path towards achieving some measure of universal knowledge, a crucial requirement is, in Habermas's words, that while deliberation may "point out the common and the shared among strangers" it must do so "without depriving the other of otherness".²⁹⁶ Andrew Linklater describes this dual goal as "difference sensitive universalism".²⁹⁷ As self-reflective agents of a deliberation must justify their validity claims in terms that apply to all, individuals learn to take on the position of the other and are therefore unable to justify actions based on exclusion or demonstrations of power.²⁹⁸

²⁹¹ B. Cannon, *Rethinking the Normative Content of Critical Theory: Marx, Habermas, and Beyond* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 101

²⁹² S.C. Roach, *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 197; Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 134

²⁹³ Roach, *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader.*, 197 ; D. Kellner, "Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention," in *Perspectives on Habermas*, ed. L.E. Hahn (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Pub Company, 2000), 270

²⁹⁴ Roach, *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader.*, 197

²⁹⁵ Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 134-135

²⁹⁶ M. Haller, *Jurgen Habermas, the Past as Future, Interviews with Michael Haller*, trans. Max Pensky (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 119-120

²⁹⁷ A. Linklater, "Transforming Political Community: A Response to the Critics," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999), 168

²⁹⁸ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 109

In order to transcend the role of power in international politics, critical theorists have employed Habermas's discourse ethics in order for beliefs and actions to be guided by consensus rather than demonstrations of power.²⁹⁹ Where a life-world, or in other words mutual understanding, does not exist within or between societies, the rationality of the system-world predominates and instrumental knowledge such as the application of material power is employed in order to modify the behaviour of others and achieve mastery.³⁰⁰ Where individuals or societies develop post-conventional morality, the construction of a life-world becomes a rational course to take as reflective participants will realise that coercively modifying the behaviour of others leaves one open to the possibility of others acting in the same way.³⁰¹ Marc Lynch notes:

when two states recognize that neither can act effectively without taking into account the other, communicative engagement aims at establishing common interpretations and mutual expectations governing both cooperative and competitive behavior. The ideal of communicative engagement is a dialogue in which both actors enter into an open-ended discourse across multiple levels aimed at arriving at communicative consensus on these foundations. This does not mean, of course, that dialogue produces an automatic harmonization of preferences. It does mean, however, the construction of a thin common lifeworld within which it becomes possible to maintain more cooperative interaction.³⁰²

Through the process of constructing the life-world, intentions are made clear and actors develop common knowledge that stabilises the intersubjective understandings and expectations of their interaction.³⁰³ While not necessarily leading to agreement on distributive outcomes, strengthening the life-world through communicative engagement and encouraging the development of a working consensus on the underlying principles of interaction offers, in Marc Lynch's view, the "route most conducive to establishing cooperative and mutually

²⁹⁹ Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 128

³⁰⁰ E.J. Palti, "Patroklos's Funeral and Habermas's Sentence," *Law & Social Inquiry* 23, no. 4 (1998)., 1020

³⁰¹ M.E. Casullo, "Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reason," *Documento de Trabajo* 19(2007)., 40; Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.*, 128

³⁰² M. Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 2 (2002)., 190

³⁰³ T. Risse, "' Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000)., 15

beneficial relations”.³⁰⁴ Strengthening the life-world could thus be considered a primary goal of Habermasian inspired critical theory.³⁰⁵

Cox’s Gramscianism

Working within a separate Marxist tradition known Gramscianism, Robert Cox developed a critical theory considerably different from that of the Frankfurt School. Beginning his career in the International Labour Organisation and then moving into academia, Robert Cox’s unconventional career path and subsequent approach to studying world politics has left a significant impact on the field of international relations.³⁰⁶ In a similar vein to Habermas – and perhaps unsurprising considering his former career in the International Labor Office – Cox’s work takes what could be described as an unorthodox Marxist approach.³⁰⁷ Labour and production *is* the first departure point of his analysis, however, as the realm of international politics forms a core aspect of his theory labour and production is considered neither more or less influential than state power or the structure of world order in shaping society and politics.³⁰⁸ While parallels exist between the writings of Cox and that of the Frankfurt School – such as Horkheimers distinction between traditional and critical theory and Cox’s distinction between problem solving and critical theory³⁰⁹ – Cox does not cite the work of Frankfurt School scholars in his essay that traced the roots of his ideas.³¹⁰

A central theme of Cox’s research is the study of change – or in other words – the ‘really big question’: “where is the world going and how can we influence its direction?”³¹¹

³⁰⁴ Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement.", 193

³⁰⁵ Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 134

³⁰⁶ M. Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1999), 133-114; In the 2008 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey Cox is ranked the 10th most influential scholar of the last 20 years. See R. Jordan et al., "One Discipline or Many? Trip Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries," in *Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project* (Williamsburg, Virginia: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, The College of William and Mary., 2009), 43.; For an overview of Cox’s career path see R.W. Cox, "Influences and Commitments," in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-40

³⁰⁷ F. Kratochwil and J.G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40, no. 04 (1986), 766; M. Cox, "Rebels without a Cause? Radical Theorists and the World System after the Cold War," *New Political Economy* 3, no. 3 (1998), 447

³⁰⁸ Linklater, "Critical Theory.", 55

³⁰⁹ See *Ibid.*, 54

³¹⁰ Cox, "Influences and Commitments.", 19-40; J. Ravenhill, "In Search of the Missing Middle," *Review of international political economy* 15, no. 1 (2008), 20

³¹¹ Cox, "The ‘British School’ in the Global Context.", 315

In Robert W. Cox's seminal article, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, he made the distinction between 'problem solving' and 'critical' theory.³¹² Problem solving theory is distinguished by taking existing structural characteristics as a given and moves on to developing solutions to problems arising within the system.³¹³ Realism, for example, maintains that the world is characterised by anarchy as violence is endemic and structural and thus proposes the use of force, or the threat of force, as a means to survive.³¹⁴ On the other hand, critical theory "is concerned with how those structures emerged and how their existing forms may be liable to change".³¹⁵

The model of the natural sciences, particularly Newtonian physics and behaviourism, provides an attractive foundation from which one can study international politics 'out there' as an objective social scientist.³¹⁶ Positivism, as this epistemology is known, "holds that the only means by which claims to knowledge about the world can be sustained is through experience, observation, and testing."³¹⁷ However, far from providing an objective viewpoint, positivist scholarship within International Relations in practice serves to validate the status quo. As Brian C. Schmidt notes, "the school of realism that Morgenthau and others helped found provided foreign policy-makers with the rationale and justification they needed to defend America's new role as a global superpower."³¹⁸ Cox's observation that knowledge is always for some one and for some purpose highlights the fact that theories such as realism take the world order as it is and scholars undertaking positivist research are in reality serving to maintain that order, something that has far-reaching moral implications.³¹⁹ While laying claim to value neutrality, positivists fail to recognise that maintaining the current order also equates

³¹² ———, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory."

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 128

³¹⁴ J. George and D. Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990), 284

³¹⁵ Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 316

³¹⁶ T.J. Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order," in *Approaches to world order*, ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7; R.W. Cox, "On Thinking About Future World Order," *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 28, no. 2 (1976), 176; R.K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38, no. 02 (1984), 215; Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11.", 503

³¹⁷ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 7

³¹⁸ B.C. Schmidt, "The Historiography of Academic International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 20, no. 4 (1994), 361

³¹⁹ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 281

to maintaining the current distribution of wealth, power, and opportunity.³²⁰ Thus, when one undertakes positivist research they are in effect reflecting their own pre-existing social purposes and interests, which in turn reproduces and legitimates the prevailing world order.³²¹

A central pillar of positivist social science is the creation of timeless, immutable truths that essentially form a general theory of society.³²² In the case of neo-Realism, “communities cannot escape the logic of power inherent in the condition of anarchy”.³²³ As problem solving theory works to smooth the functioning of the existing system, and in effect posits a continuing present, problem-solving theory cannot comprehend either its own historically conditioned awareness of certain issues and problems or the possibility of structural change.³²⁴ Cox notes:

Having arrived at this view of underlying substances, history becomes for neorealists a quarry providing materials with which to illustrate variations on always recurrent themes. The mode of thought ceases to be historical even though the materials used are derived from history. Moreover, this mode or reasoning dictates that, with respect to the essentials, the future will always be like the past.³²⁵

In addition, by converting humanly produced circumstances into quasi-natural forces, neo-Realism and other positivist theories such as neoliberalism perform an ideological task of producing political subjects who accept that relations between political communities must be as they are.³²⁶

While Cox’s approach may seem hostile to problem solving theory, this is not the case. Rather Cox does indeed see value in problem solving theory, only he dismisses the claims to value-neutrality, or the belief that the world system is unchangeable.³²⁷ The ‘essentials’ (read ontology) of theories such as neo-Realism come from a very specific time and place, the Cold

³²⁰ ———, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory.", 26

³²¹ Wyn Jones, "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies.", 303-304

³²² Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 7

³²³ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 282

³²⁴ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 131

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 131

³²⁶ Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory.", 282

³²⁷ R.W. Cox, "Realism, Positivism, and Historicism (1985)," in *Approaches to World Order* ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)., 53, 56-57; Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 316; ———, "Multilateralism and World Order.", 169, 179

War, and the choice of data in neo-Realisms case, the technological capacity and leverage of actors, is understandable considering the circumstances of the time.³²⁸ After all, “ontologies are not arbitrary constructions; they are the specification of the common sense of an epoch.”³²⁹ Cox notes, “It was not to say that one was better than the other [between problem solving and critical approaches], although my own interests lay in the critical theory approach because I am concerned with the kind of future that might be latent within the present.”³³⁰

Moreover, Cox’s research approach includes problem solving theory by using it to gain a static, synchronic understanding of how a relationship, institution, or process operates in narrow, day-to-day terms.³³¹ Cox notes:

The political world at the outset is a *given* [emphasis in original] world. Men make their own history, as Marx wrote, but not in conditions of their own choosing. To have any influence over events, or at the very least to forestall the worst eventualities, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the conditions not chosen by oneself in which action is possible.³³²

From the initial synchronic understanding the critical scholar can then move onto a dynamic, diachronic understanding of the developmental potential of the whole.³³³ This is achieved through seeking out the characteristics of emerging social forces, the contradictions and conflicts inherent in a social structure, and the nature and extent of structural change that is feasible.³³⁴ In addition to the dialectical approach to understanding change, Cox’s method makes use of the historicist and hermeneutical methods to uncover historical structures, the persisting patterns of thought and action that delineate the frameworks that inform how people and states act.³³⁵ These structures are important to the study of change as they can be understood as responses to particular historical circumstances and are transformed when

³²⁸ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 6-7; Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 317

³²⁹ R.W. Cox, "Critical Political Economy," in *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, ed. B. Hettne (London: Zed Books, 1995), 35

³³⁰ Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 316

³³¹ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 8

³³² Cox, "Realism, Positivism, and Historicism (1985).", 50

³³³ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 8

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 8

³³⁵ Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order.", 168-169, 176-177

material circumstances have changed or when new practices challenge prevailing meanings and purposes.³³⁶

Cox developed a considerable amount of his method from the work of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Communist leader whose outspoken criticism of fascism led him to be imprisoned by the government of Benito Mussolini. As Femia notes, “in a remark which would prove ironic, the Fascist prosecutor declared at Gramsci’s trial: ‘We must prevent this brain from functioning for twenty years’.”³³⁷ Shifting from the “ephemeral outpouring of the political diatribist and pamphleteer” to producing “one of the most significant contributions to twentieth-century Marxist thought”, while in prison from 1929 to 1935, Gramsci wrote what was to become his seminal work, the *Prison Notebooks*, a collection of fragments and code-words reflecting constraints of only being able to write in whatever notebook was at hand and the desire to escape the prison censors respectively.³³⁸ The two central questions Gramsci pondered while in incarceration were why the communist revolution had failed to take hold in Western Europe as expected by orthodox Marxism, and what made the states of Western Europe so durable and able to withstand the most debilitating crises.³³⁹ Lenin, a significant influence on Gramsci’s thinking, provided the initial groundwork from which Gramsci developed his answer to these problems.

Lenin’s revision of Marxism, according to Michael Burawoy, consists of three main points.³⁴⁰ Firstly, the determinism of Marx’s writings, that the conflicts and contradictions of capitalism will secure its demise, failed to predict that capitalism could reconstitute itself in different forms through actions such as the de-radicalisation of trade unions by the use of

³³⁶ Ibid., 176

³³⁷ Femia, "Gramsci's Patrimony.", 328

³³⁸ Ibid., 328; T.R. Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (1975)., 351; M. Donaldson, "Gramsci, Class and Post-Marxism," *Research Online* (2008), <http://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/182>, 1-2.; A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and translated by, Q. Hoare, and G.N. Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

³³⁹ J.A. Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society," *Boundary 2* 22, no. 3 (1995)., 11

³⁴⁰ M. Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi," *Politics & Society* 31, no. 2 (2003)., 210

concessions.³⁴¹ Quite simply, there is no pre-determined final crisis of capitalism. Capitalism, in Lenin's view, was moving into a new stage and projecting itself unevenly across the globe as monopoly capitalism at home and plundering abroad had combined to form imperialism, initiating a new global era dominated by finance capital.³⁴²

Secondly, this form of capitalism worked to dampen class conflict by creating an "aristocracy of labour in the metropolis – where workers and capitalists forge a common interest in the exploitation of the colonies."³⁴³ Nationalism and militarism had forged a harmony of interests – the ideology of national grandeur – between national proletariat and the bourgeois in which sharing the profits of colonial exploitation superseded class antagonism.³⁴⁴ Lacking an effective vanguard party, the advanced countries could not achieve anything more than trade union consciousness and anti-imperialistic sentiment would only arise in the undeveloped periphery.³⁴⁵ Furthermore, while liberal democracy offers the best conditions for the expansion of class consciousness, it also works to mystify capitalism, however temporary, that capitalism offers real choices (i.e. such as through the polling booth).³⁴⁶ Rather than revolutionary forces arising in the most advanced countries first, as predicted by Marx and Engels, Lenin saw that it was where capitalism was most backward that communist revolutions had the most potential to develop.³⁴⁷

Finally, Lenin saw that capitalism does not automatically lead to socialism; it is a process that requires direct input by proletariat.³⁴⁸ Femia notes:

³⁴¹ R. Mayer, "Lenin, Kautsky and Working-Class Consciousness," *History of European Ideas* 18(1994), 673; L. Salamini, "Gramsci and Marxist Sociology of Knowledge: An Analysis of Hegemony-Ideology-Knowledge," *Sociological Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1974), 363

³⁴² B. Beckman, "Imperialism and the 'National Bourgeoisie'," *Review of African Political Economy* 8, no. 22 (1981), 15-16; Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi," 210

³⁴³ Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi," 210

³⁴⁴ A. Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 80

³⁴⁵ Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi," 210; See also Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, 61

³⁴⁶ Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," 363

³⁴⁷ Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi," 210

³⁴⁸ Alway (1995), 16 [book CT and pol possibilities]

Marxist-Leninists took as their point of departure the presupposition that the foundation of social order was force, not consensus. As a result, they conceived the struggle for socialism in pure paramilitary terms: to the concentrated violence of the bourgeois state, they would counterpose the concentrated violence of the revolutionary party. The attainment of power was construed as a technical problem, a matter of effectively deploying one's legions for a military style assault on the apparatus of coercion.³⁴⁹

As Lenin believed there was no final crisis of capitalism and that capitalism did not inherently produce a revolutionary working class, the passage to socialism must not be automatic.³⁵⁰ Without these laws to bring about the destruction of capitalism, socialism would only come about from deliberate, collective effort, and so Lenin turned his attention to politics and ideology as it was only through determined leadership that workers would be able realise their revolutionary potential.³⁵¹

While Lenin's adapted Marxism elevated politics and ideology to new significance within Marxism, Gramsci believed he had failed to truly comprehend the reasons communism had failed to take hold in Western Europe.³⁵² Lenin's theories were still a form of economism in that early-capitalist countries had more revolutionary potential than advanced-capitalist countries.³⁵³ What Gramsci demonstrated was that Lenin and his ideas were a reflection of the world in which he was engaged – that being an absolutist regime in a country with weak forces of production, lacking any significant 'civil society'.³⁵⁴ In Western Europe the key to understanding why communism had failed was not due to the advanced nature of its economy but the advanced nature of its civil society.

³⁴⁹ Femia, "Gramsci's Patrimony.", 349

³⁵⁰ Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.", 360

³⁵¹ Mayer, "Lenin, Kautsky and Working-Class Consciousness.", 673, 676; Beckman, "Imperialism and the 'National Bourgeoisie' "., 359

³⁵² Salamini, "Gramsci and Marxist Sociology of Knowledge: An Analysis of Hegemony-Ideology-Knowledge.", 368

³⁵³ P. Piccone, "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," *Theory and society* 3, no. 4 (1976)., 498-497

³⁵⁴ K. Nield and J. Seed, "Waiting for Gramsci," *Social History* 6, no. 2 (1981)., 217, 502; R.W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983)," in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)., 128; Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.", 211

Substantially revising the base-superstructure metaphor, Gramsci is argued to have rejected the economism of classical Marxism where the political superstructure was almost entirely dependent on the economic base, such as the level of development in Lenin's view.³⁵⁵ Rather what had greater utility in periodising capitalism – and hence what revolutionary tactics are appropriate³⁵⁶ – was the development of the superstructure (or in other words 'the state'), defined by Gramsci as encompassing political and civil society.³⁵⁷ Where classical Marxism holds that the political superstructure is derived from a linear, unidirectional, relationship with the economic base; for Gramsci "the link between the two realms is not linear causality but circular interaction within an organic whole" and one that defies solely materialist explanation.³⁵⁸

Taking "Machiavelli's image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of coercion and consent" political society is made up of the various coercive state apparatuses such as the government, courts, police, and the army.³⁵⁹ Civil society, the consensual aspect of the state, on the other hand, is made up of the "schools, churches, clubs, journals, and parties ... which contribute in molecular fashion to the formation of social and political consciousness."³⁶⁰ Communism was able to take hold swiftly in Russia as although the coercive apparatus of the state was formidable; when it was overcome the revolutionaries met little resistance from civil society as the "social order was founded on ignorance, apathy, and repression, not voluntary consent".³⁶¹

³⁵⁵ R.D. Germain and M. Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians," *Review of International Studies* (1998), 9; Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.", 211

³⁵⁶ As Cox notes, "His concern with civil society was, first, to understand the strength of the status quo, and then to devise a strategy for its transformation." In R.W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 01 (1999), 4

³⁵⁷ Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians.", 15; Burawoy, "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.", 211

³⁵⁸ T.J.J. Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (1985), 570

³⁵⁹ Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 127; H.W. Park, "A Gramscian Approach to Interpreting International Communication," *Journal of Communication* 48, no. 4 (1998), 91; Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.", 353

³⁶⁰ Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.", 353

³⁶¹ Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 128; Femia, "Gramsci's Patrimony.", 349

In Western Europe, on the other hand, communism was faced with a *hegemonic* state where “political leadership [is] based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class.”³⁶² Though the application of force remains a latent power within the government, “hegemony [in Gramscian terms] meant leadership rather than domination”³⁶³ and in Femia’s view it is here Gramsci makes a break from the Marxism’s that had come before in that he did not regard the state as analogous to a dictatorship that ruled by coercion alone.³⁶⁴ As hegemony requires the consent of the masses, the ideas and institutions that maintain the power of the hegemonic class are shaped by the incorporation of both the interests of the hegemonic class and subordinate classes into an ideology that can be expressed in universal terms.³⁶⁵ Through the state (i.e. both political and civil society), the ruling classes in Western Europe had created what Gramsci described as a ‘historic bloc’ which maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture.³⁶⁶ As the ruling hegemonic class rules “with and over, rather than against, subaltern classes” hegemony can be measured by the existence or lack of social strife and the degree of legitimation which the social order and body politic enjoy, all of which contribute to the stability of the capitalist system.³⁶⁷

As Western Europe and Russia presented two radically different circumstances, Gramsci drew on the military analogy of the war of position and the war of movement to elaborate how communism might achieve success in hegemonic states.³⁶⁸ A war of movement – where a revolutionary vanguard party seizes control of the coercive apparatuses of the state – follows the model of the Bolshevik Revolution where a small group of individuals is able to

³⁶² Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.", 352; The term ‘class’ should be understood as any relationship of subordination and domination. See C. Berry, "Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE," *Political Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (2007)., 19

³⁶³ R.W. Cox, "Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order," *New Political Economy* 9, no. 3 (2004)., 311

³⁶⁴ Femia, "Gramsci's Patrimony.", 347

³⁶⁵ There is also a counterpart to the concept of hegemony that Gramsci described as a ‘passive revolution’ where no dominant class has been able to establish a broad hegemony. Though this concept is important in states that have yet to achieve the same level of hegemony as many democracies enjoy, as the focus of this essay is achieving change in the Northern democracies and thus the concept of passive revolution does not apply here.

Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 129-133

³⁶⁶ ———, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order.", 4; ———, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 132

³⁶⁷ Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians.", 17; Park, "A Gramscian Approach to Interpreting International Communication.", 90

³⁶⁸ Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order.", 7

overwhelm the state due to the lack of any significant civil society allied to the ruling classes.³⁶⁹ In Western Europe, bourgeois hegemony of civil society created an ideational bulwark complementing the coercive apparatuses of the state, meaning that a simple war of movement would be unsustainable in the long run as the vanguard party would face a civil society that neither shares their vision nor views their rule as legitimate.³⁷⁰ Consequently, communist revolutionaries would have to undertake an alternative strategy in the form of a war of position which would build up the social foundations of a new state through “the organization and deployment of ideological and cultural instruments of struggle” to ‘win over’ civil society, which in turn would create the context suitable for ceasing control over political society.³⁷¹ As the consent of civil society rests on ideas, achieving working class leadership and the basis to an alternative state requires actively building a counterhegemony by creating alternative institutions and intellectual resources, closely tied with ‘the masses’, and through the building of bridges between workers and subordinate classes.³⁷²

Highlighting the social basis of the state could be considered one of the primary theoretical contributions of Gramsci. While the state is generally considered the principal unit in International Relations, the social basis of the state and its relevance to international politics, as noted previously, has suffered almost complete neglect. Expanding to the international level, Robert Cox introduced the concept of ‘world orders’ to complement Gramsci’s analysis.³⁷³

Where Gramsci had focused on social forces within a state, Cox delineates three *interrelated* levels, or spheres of activity, that combine to form the overall image of a particular structure:

³⁶⁹ B. Fontana, "State and Society: The Concept of Hegemony in Gramsci," in *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, ed. M. Haugaard and H.H. Lentner (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2006), 34

³⁷⁰ Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 128

³⁷¹ B. Fontana, "Logos and Kratos: Gramsci and the Ancients on Hegemony," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, no. 2 (2000), 319; W.L. Adamson, "Towards the Prison Notebooks: The Evolution of Gramsci's Thinking on Political Organization 1918-1926," *Polity* 12, no. 1 (1979), 46

³⁷² Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 128-129; Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society.", 14, 20; Adamson, "Towards the Prison Notebooks: The Evolution of Gramsci's Thinking on Political Organization 1918-1926.", 64

³⁷³ Berry, "Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE.", 2

social forces, forms of state, and world orders.³⁷⁴ To each of these levels Cox applies his method of historical structures where the material capabilities, ideas, and institutions are investigated to uncover weakness in the prevailing structure and possible alternatives to it.³⁷⁵

Considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions ... Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving toward a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others.³⁷⁶

Described by Cox as “the political-economy perspective of the world: power is seen as *emerging* [emphasis in original] from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of material capabilities that is the result of these processes”, as in the case of neo-Realism.³⁷⁷ For Cox, social forces generated by changing production processes form the starting point of his analysis; but these phenomena are not considered any more influential than state power or the structure of world order in shaping society and politics.³⁷⁸ State power and the structure of world order can and do shape social forces; however, state power and the structure of world order represent the outward expansion of an internal (national) hegemony of a ruling class and so to investigate alternatives to the prevailing world order (i.e. the dominant mode of production) requires investigation into the social forces generated by the dominant mode of production.³⁷⁹ Crucially, notes Payne, “people are not just bearers of structures, they create them”, “for Coxian political economy, historical structures mean no more – but no less – than persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity.”³⁸⁰

Production, as understood by Cox, should not be considered solely as the production of material life. Criticism of Cox’s has often focused on the materialist and reductionist premise

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 15

³⁷⁵ A. Payne, "The Global Politics of Development: Towards a New Research Agenda," *Progress in development studies* 1, no. 1 (2001), 12-13

³⁷⁶ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 138

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 141

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 113; Linklater, "Critical Theory.", 55

³⁷⁹ Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method (1983).", 137

³⁸⁰ Payne, "The Global Politics of Development: Towards a New Research Agenda.", 13

that labour relations effect social relations, the primary departure point in his early work.³⁸¹ Cox himself recognised the legitimacy of the criticism, his awareness of certain issues and not others being a reflection of a time where he considered capitalism was in crisis.³⁸² However, labour relations are just one aspect of a much wider analytical focus that, while perhaps underemployed in his early work, was alluded to in *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*.³⁸³

Drawing on Gramsci's distinction between historical materialism and historical economism,³⁸⁴ production, for Cox, entails the production of ideas, of intersubjective meanings, of norms, of institutions, and of social practices.³⁸⁵ In addition to Gramsci, Cox draws on the work of the 18th century philosopher Giambattista Vico, among others,³⁸⁶ to provide an ontological foundation for ideas.³⁸⁷ Vico, according to Berry:

sought to show that people's ideas were developed in the process of becoming aware of their material existence. Crucially, he believed that structures and institutions are made by human action, but to understand structural and institutional change we need to understand changes in 'mind', that is, in people's understandings of and attitude towards their environment.³⁸⁸

Concerned with the rise, transformation, and decline of the social and political structures people created; for Vico, the methods used to study the physical world were entirely unsuited to the task.³⁸⁹ Where the methods of the natural sciences would lend itself to the reduction of human nature and human institutions to essentialist and universal terms; Vichian historicism instead calls for "a philosophy of authority", in which social relations combine to create rules

³⁸¹ R.W. Cox and M.G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization* (London: Routledge, 2002), 30

³⁸² Ibid., 30-37; Berry, "Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE.", 18

³⁸³ Berry, "Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE.", 17

³⁸⁴ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 134

³⁸⁵ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 9

³⁸⁶ Germain and Kenney note "Robert Cox, for instance, has come to his mature views on world order as much through a prolonged engagement with the thought of Vico, Sorel, Carr, Braudel and Collingwood as with that of Gramsci." See Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians.", 4

³⁸⁷ Berry, "Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE.", 16

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 16

³⁸⁹ Cox, "The 'British School' in the Global Context.", 316-317

and norms that appear to facilitate forms of universal justice”.³⁹⁰ Human nature (‘the mind’) and human institutions cannot be considered fixed, rather, they are shaped and reshaped due to the changing social relations through the course of history.³⁹¹ Instead of attempting to uncover what human traits and institutions are universal across time; to understand how one pattern of social relations succeeds another one must attempt to reveal the “coherence of minds and institutions characteristic of different ages[,] ... what is most general and common in the sequence of changes undergone by human nature and institutions”.³⁹²

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, the revised Marxism of the Habermasian and Coxian traditions provide a radically different approach to the study of politics than both orthodox Marxism, and the positivist research programme that orthodox Marxism and a number contemporary political theories adhere to. Broadening the focus of International Relations scholarship significantly, the critical theories discussed here arguably create a research position that is both sensitive to the concerns of postmodernism while maintaining a research programme that has emancipatory purpose and relevance to contemporary politics. Where totalitarian ideology had seemingly destroyed the ability of human beings to live in a community without dominating each other, through the formulation of discourse ethics Habermas was able to create a standard that could possibly remedy this situation. Moreover, as the next chapter will demonstrate, discourse ethics prompts one to think of the wider implications of ones actions, whether or not the ‘other’ whose interests are affected are officially recognised as part of the community. Providing the central methodological insights that have informed this essay, Robert Cox’s work has contributed both a convincing understanding of positivist methodology and an alternative methodology that allows for the

³⁹⁰ C. Farrands and O. Worth, "Critical Theory in Global Political Economy: Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?," *Capital & Class* 29, no. 1 (2005), 51; See also Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 132-133

³⁹¹ W.B. Paterson, "Altering World Order: The Alter-Globalization Movement and the World Trade Organization" (PhD diss., University of Stirling, 2006), 33; Hobson makes a relevant point regarding the influence of identity on the exercise of great power by highlighting how the Chinese identity led to a minimally imperial international system during the height of its power while the British identity took the opposite course. A purely materialist analysis would not be able to recognise how identity “inscribes power with moral purpose and thereby channels great power in specific directions.” See J.M. Hobson, "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-Racist Critical Ir," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. S1 (2007), 107

³⁹² Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.", 94

study of change. Through placing ideas and the necessity of building inclusive social movements at the centre of analysis, Cox's methodology has arguably significant relevance to scholarly and political practice. Making use of the insights gained from both the Habermasian and Coxian approaches, the next chapter will attempt to apply these insights to the problem of environmental injustice.

CHAPTER FOUR

Looking at Environmental Justice through the Lens of Habermasian and Coxian Critical Theory: A Framework for Intellectuals and Social Movements

While the Habermasian and Coxian critical approaches developed relatively independently, the shared goal of emancipation warrants investigation of how they could be deployed concurrently in order to achieve this goal. As such, the previous section of this essay has been an attempt to deliver the foundations of a ‘philosophy of praxis’ that draws strength from wide lens of Habermas’s Critical Theory and its sensitivity to overlooked perspectives while making use of Cox’s methods to give an understanding of what people holding these perspectives may face on their path to emancipation. Based on the understanding of environmental injustice and neoliberalism provided by chapters one and two, this final chapter will explore how the both Habermasian and Coxian critical theory can inform social movements and scholars seeking to rectify environmental injustice.

The contrasting but complementary viewpoints of the two critical theories, for example, can be seen in Gramsci’s relative optimism in comparison to the early Frankfurt scholar’s pessimism in regards to revolutionary parties. As noted by Richard Wyn Jones, the two cases provide an example of critical theory becoming more attuned to social reality; broadening the possibility of axis of domination arising beyond class relations alone, resulting in a deprivileging of the role of the proletariat, and drawing theorists’ attention to the dangers of fetishising parties.³⁹³ Being a product of time and place, Gramsci’s thoughts on the primacy of the vanguard party and the use of terms such as ‘achieving working class leadership’ in themselves elicit the possibility of replacing one form of domination for another and this is perhaps where the discourse ethics of Habermas’s Critical Theory has value.

³⁹³ R. Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1999), 155-156

Discourse Ethics and Environmental Justice

In order to lay the foundation of a broad, yet difference sensitive social movement, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School tradition can be used to draw attention to domination in all its forms, which in turn provides the basis of social movement that cuts across divisions of class or nationality. After all, as noted by Linklater, “human beings, Adorno argued, ‘may not know’ what counts as the ‘absolute good’, but they have reached some shared understandings about ‘inhuman’ behaviour and about conceptions of the ‘bad life’ which should be resisted and opposed.”³⁹⁴ As Habermas believes that advanced capitalist societies have developed administrative and economic systems that are impregnable to revolution, the practical intent of his writings shifts to “the creation and protection of spaces within which a radical concept of democracy, as a process of shared learning carried out in and through communicative action, might flourish.”³⁹⁵ By highlighting the equal value of all participants, who and who is not part of discussion, and the duty of those committed to enlarging personal autonomy have to refrain from assimilationist and exclusionary politics;³⁹⁶ Habermas’s Critical Theory, for the purposes of this essay, provides a complementary ‘cold bath’ to any notion that one group (or class) has exclusive ownership of subordination or legitimate rule.³⁹⁷

Though Habermas considers himself a Marxist, his rejection of the revolutionary agency of the proletariat all but destroys the reassuring comfort Marxists might have enjoyed having a seemingly objective position to research from, and agent to address.³⁹⁸ Class as a radical source of change, in Habermas’s view, has been placated and absorbed into the instrumental-rational procedures of the system through the welfare state and ‘jurisdiction’ of conflicts (i.e. fought through legal channels) respectively.³⁹⁹ With class struggle relegated to the position of an ‘old’ social movement, Habermas centres his attention on the ‘new’ social

³⁹⁴ Linklater, "Towards a Sociology of Global Morals with an ‘Emancipatory Intent’.", 143

³⁹⁵ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 127

³⁹⁶ Linklater, "Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process.", 143, 153.

³⁹⁷ It should be noted that Cox’s work is closely aligned to the Habermasian position when considering subordinated groups. See George and Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations.", 284

³⁹⁸ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 125

³⁹⁹ Edwards, "Habermas and Social Movements: What's 'New'?", 114-115

movements of the post-1960s whose focus is not on “*what we should get* but those asking about *who we are, how we live, and who is accountable* [emphasis in original].”⁴⁰⁰ Joan Always notes:

In late capitalist societies ‘boundary conflicts’ have replaced class conflict, and structurally generated anger now emerges at the seams between the system and the lifeworld, where it finds expression in new social movements ... They arise out of the lifeworld domain and are concerned with protecting identities and life-styles; they express the lifeworlds resistance to colonization. Drawing support from the middle class, the educated, and the young, they coalesce as sub-institutional, extra-parliamentary movements.⁴⁰¹

The ‘seam’ between the system and the life-world forms the primary location of conflict in Habermas’s conception of ‘new’ politics as the ‘seam’ is where new social movements come into existence in their efforts to resist colonisation by the state and economy.⁴⁰² Though Habermas more or less excludes the possibility of fundamental revolution of the administrative and economic system; by placing unconstrained discursive will formation at the centre of analysis, agency and the aim of emancipation can be derived from and developed through the process of reaching a mutual understanding.⁴⁰³

Be it scholarly focus or trade policy, discourse ethics provides an immediate set of questions to any decision making process, particularly in regards to the reproduction of environmental injustice. The three environmental injustice concerns – the source of the problem, the ability to mitigate the problem, and exclusion from decision making process – highlight the inability for victims to participate and the interests of these people warrants significantly more attention, a task this essay has attempted. When considering the discourse ethic of openness to discussion, chapter two drew attention to the way in which a particular social force, neoliberalism, submits all aspects of life to the technical-instrumental logic of the market. Locking-out alternatives, through process such as new constitutionalism and budgetary and

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 115

⁴⁰¹ Always, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 121

⁴⁰² Edwards, "Habermas and Social Movements: What's New?.", 113

⁴⁰³ Always, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 127

regulatory austerity, the range of options available to prevent environmental injustice may be overridden by the institutionalisation of individual liberty and the free market as the sole legitimate concern of national and international governance.⁴⁰⁴ Defending against the closing-down of discussion (i.e. where every decision is based solely on maintaining individual liberty and the free market) presents an immediate task, particularly for those in the powerful democracies with the ability to directly influence global-scale decision making processes.⁴⁰⁵

Whether making a decision that has consequences beyond local or national boundaries or when choosing ones scholarly interest, preventing environmental injustice prompts one to identify who is not participating in a decision or action and where the state and the economy encroach on the life-worlds of others. While discourse ethics is a “thoroughly anthropocentric” theory,⁴⁰⁶ when juxtaposing the problem of environmental justice with discourse ethics there is arguably a clear link between responsible social action and the natural world, even if humans remain the ultimate unit of concern. Furthermore, gaining understanding of environmental injustice is a task that arguably requires the input of both the natural and social sciences and as such deserves significant attention from the scholarly community in order to help the wider public navigate the intricacies of the problem and further collapse the nature-humanity dichotomy. Well known in German politics,⁴⁰⁷ one could take the example of Habermas in how scholarship should focus itself. Informed by the model of indirect influence in both his academic and public lives; Habermas holds that responsible intellectual activity becomes a task of clarification and interpretation; a task distinct, and necessarily separate from, discursive will formation and the self-reflection of participants, as

⁴⁰⁴ One could contrast the assumption that markets have ‘perfect information’ with campaigns such as the ‘International Right to Know’ led by 200 non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and the Sierra Club that is lobbying for U.S. companies to conform to domestic reporting requirements of environmental and working conditions in their activities abroad. See D. Faber and D. McCarthy, "Neo-Liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice," in *Just Sustainabilities: Development in an Unequal World*, ed. Robert D. Bullard Julian Agyeman, and Bob Evans (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2003)., 53-54; D.V. Carruthers, *Environmental Justice in Latin America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008)., 4, 11-13, 17

⁴⁰⁵ For those not in democracies or the powerful democracies this statement is by no means intended to preclude agency over the problem. Rather, as will be discussed below, it is through linking social movements across borders via the dissemination of information that any individual has the ability to effect change.

⁴⁰⁶ The problem being that nature cannot participate in discourse. See A. Krebs, "Discourse Ethics and Nature," *Environmental Values* 6, no. 3 (1997)., 274

⁴⁰⁷ H.J. Kleinstüber, "Habermas and the Public Sphere: From a German to a European Perspective," *The Public* 1(2001)., 101-102

the correct interpretation of an ambiguous situation will not only advance truth but in turn may also affect self-understanding and thus political orientation.⁴⁰⁸ Democracy, one must remember, lies at the heart of Habermas's Critical Theory and achieving anything more than indirect influence would entail both a logical and moral contradiction.

Keeping this democratic focus in mind; at the international level Habermas's Critical Theory represents a normative standpoint intended to guide the actions of *liberal-democratic* societies and thus attempting to pursue discourse ethics as the global standard by which all societies must conform in itself would entail the extinguishing of diversity and yet another 'civilising' project. To illustrate, Andrew Linklater delineates the two positions that could be taken in regards to the application of discourse ethics:

The thick version maintains that all individuals are equally entitled to live in societies which recognise an equal right to representation, a right which implies that all societies should evolve in a liberal-democratic direction. The thin version is that all individuals have a right to be consulted about decisions made outside their society which disadvantage them. According to the thin version the members of society (x) have a responsibility to consult other peoples about decisions which may affect them, but this does not mean that (x) has the right to press others to accept liberal-democratic principles of government. The members of (x) should be less concerned with passing normative judgment on domestic practices elsewhere than with investigating the ways in which their own actions destroy, frustrate, demean or in other ways harm other peoples.⁴⁰⁹

As such, both theoretically and normatively only a 'thin' version of Habermas's Critical Theory can be considered appropriate at the international level. This, however, does not diminish the legitimacy or moral force of the Habermasian position. As a standard liberal-democratic societies can be measured against,⁴¹⁰ or as Ricardo Blaug regards it, "a kind of training for our eyes",⁴¹¹ the previous discussion on environmental justice highlights just how poorly most, if not all, liberal-democracies fail in meeting even a thin conception of discourse ethics.

⁴⁰⁸ Alway, *Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.*, 127

⁴⁰⁹ Linklater, "Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process.", 144

⁴¹⁰ Casullo, "Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reason.", 37

⁴¹¹ R. Blaug, *Democracy, Real and Ideal: Discourse Ethics and Radical Politics* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999)., 49

Furthermore, Hobson identifies a subliminal racism in the Gramscian concept of hegemony which presents global capital as having an almost unstoppable power (especially since the working class in the West is often presented as overwhelmed by neoliberalism) with little prospect for the creation of a successful counter hegemonic movement, and thus for those outside the West, little prospect for exercising agency.⁴¹² As Kathleen O'Reilly notes, a "smothering blanket" critique of neoliberal development fails to make room for the agency of local actors".⁴¹³ Denying agency could be considered as a way in which liberal-democracies (and their scholars) harm other people and a way of countering this tendency, perhaps, would be to identify where liberal-democracies contribute to this problem, particularly at the international level.

Gramscian Strategy and Social Movements

Cox's *methodology* in particular provides basis for a philosophy of praxis here as though it has roots in ideology, that of Gramsci's communism, its value lies in that it provides a guiding strategy for social movements arguably regardless of ideological persuasion, and that the strategy specifically addresses contradictions. Indeed the two interrelated issues of diversity and the contradictions diversity entails feature prominently in contemporary environmental justice scholarship as the idea has developed over the years from its initial highly-localised focus on communities in the United States during the 1990s to being picked up by those in other countries and applied to different scales.⁴¹⁴

An important insight of Gramsci that could be of use to environmental justice movements is that he demonstrates states with highly developed civil societies, such Western liberal democracies, are impregnable to revolution of the state without a prior revolution of civil society and thus to achieve change requires building a social movement from the bottom

⁴¹² Hobson, "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-Racist Critical Ir.", 93; A similar concern is raised in T Hansen, "Critical Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2008), 409

⁴¹³ K O'Reilly, "The Promise of Patronage: Adapting and Adopting Neoliberal Development," *Antipode* 42, no. 1 (2010), 185

⁴¹⁴ As an example, environmental justice movements would be self-defeating by taking a 'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) approach as this would only displace the burden of environmental injustice. See Holifield, Porter, and Walker, "Introduction Spaces of Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement."

up.⁴¹⁵ Keeping in line with the thin version of Habermas's critical theory identified earlier, when thinking at the international level the Western intellectuals role is not to lay out a policy programme for those in other countries to take up as this would be a task in which local knowledge and participation would be a prerequisite.⁴¹⁶ Rather, as Cox notes, "in today's context, the challenge is to bridge the differences among the variety of groups disadvantaged by globalisation so as to bring about a common understanding of the nature and consequences of globalisation, and to devise a common strategy towards subordinating the world economy to a regime of social equity."⁴¹⁷

Chapter one laid out an axis of domination – environmental injustice – whose victims lay both at the margins of society and societies. Coming from a wide, yet closely related, variety of social groups; much the difficulties encountered by victims of environmental justice can be understood as a symptom of the 'operating software' – the overriding focus on individual liberty and the free-market – of neoliberalism and chapter two laid out how neoliberalism is expressed as an idea and institution (backed by material power) which in turn has created a context, or at least partial context, that will be likely to influence any attempt at overcoming this domination. Linking subjectivity (the idea of progress) with objectivity (neoliberalism), a central key to the success of neoliberalism was that it is a theory that provided a plausible avenue for maintaining the historical structure – the idea of limitless growth – that creates a framework in which people think and act, particularly in the Anglo-American world. Though neoliberalism is an ideology intended to preserve the dominance of capital over labour; as chapter two demonstrates, like labour, capital (i.e. those following neoliberalism) has little regard for environment and it is from this point of departure that one can envision the foundation of a social movement consisting of not only workers, but women, indigenous

⁴¹⁵ Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order.", 7-8, 18; R.W. Cox, "Globalization, Multilateralism, and Democracy (1992)," in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)., 535

⁴¹⁶ David V. Carruthers, for example, notes the language barriers between North and South America coupled with the specific political-cultural-historical experiences that brought about environmental justice movements has led to a considerable degree of differentiation of hypotheses, assumptions, images, and political ramifications between the continents. See, Carruthers, *Environmental Justice in Latin America.*, 4-6; For Habermasian perspective, see A. Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 1 (1996)., 87; Fluck, "Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," , 18; See also Krebs, "Discourse Ethics and Nature.", 271

⁴¹⁷ Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order.", 26

groups, leaders of poor states, and many more in opposition of domination in all its forms.⁴¹⁸ In order to provide a “perspective from which practice can be viewed”⁴¹⁹ chapter three outlined Habermas’s Critical Theory as an ‘ideal type’ to contrast against neoliberalism and environmental justice; with Cox’s Gramscianism providing a methodology for both research and practical application in order to bring practice more closely aligned to this ideal. The present chapter will be an attempt to bring all these parts together: opening political space for victims of environmental injustice to develop their own alternative conceptions of politics, directing attention to those with a shared experience, and uncovering the tensions that may be involved with attempting to rectify environmental injustice.

While very much focused on the ascendancy of the working class, Gramsci does, however, lay the foundation of a strategy for the harnessing of potential change and ensuring it moves in the direction of emancipation, a goal by no means the exclusive preserve of, and applicable to, the working class alone.⁴²⁰ Following Richard Wyn Jones’ view that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position offers an appropriate model for proponents of his area of interest – critical security studies – this essay has been undertaken from the position of an ‘organic intellectual’ where the goal has been to undermine the ‘natural’ and ‘commonsensical’ nature of the status quo through an exploration of environmental injustice and how the ideas of neoliberalism legitimate this form of injustice.⁴²¹ By “providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views”, it is hoped, this will “create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created”.⁴²²

Following Cox’s lead, Mark Neufeld employs the ‘dialectical approach’ to question the dominant framework and clarify possibilities for oppositional practice through attentiveness to ‘relational contradictions’.⁴²³ These are “not ‘logical’ contradictions (i.e., $a=b$; $a=c$;

⁴¹⁸ As Nancy Fraser notes, these “axes of injustice cut across one another” such as being gay and a working-class. See N Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age," *New Left Review*, no. 212 (1995), 92-93; See also Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order.", 517

⁴¹⁹ Wiklund, "In Search of Arenas for Democratic Deliberation: A Habermasian Review of Environmental Assessment.", 282

⁴²⁰ Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory.*, 160, 163

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 160

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 161, 160

⁴²³ Neufeld, "Theorizing Globalization: Towards a Politics of Resistance.", 15

b≠c)”,⁴²⁴ rather historical change is seen as the result of contradictions arising from conflict between “ascendant and descendant social forces”⁴²⁵ and “one can only say, given the contradictions, that the status quo is unsustainable and that fundamental change will come about in time.”⁴²⁶ Borrowing from Weber, Cox notes, “it is impossible to predict the future; but it may be possible to construct a partial knowledge that can be helpful in making a future”.⁴²⁷ These ‘ideal types’ are not intended to represent the thought of any historical actor in particular, rather, they can be viewed as expressive of general orientations to action and historical change is a result from conflict between two contrasting conceptions.⁴²⁸ From the initial synchronic understanding of how environmental injustice and neoliberalism operate on a day-to-day basis; one can then move on to a diachronic understanding of the developmental potential of the whole through seeking out the contradictions and conflicts embedded in the social structure, the characteristics of the emerging social forces, and potential these social forces have in achieving structural change.⁴²⁹ As Cox notes, “the method set forth here is thus both dialectical in its explanation of change, and hermeneutic insofar as it enquires into purposes and meanings and links subjectivity and objectivity to explain a socially constructed world order”, this “mode of reasoning moves from an appraisal of the forces that have historically developed to interact in the present, towards an anticipation of the points of crisis and the real options for the future.”⁴³⁰

By juxtaposing the problems outlined by environmental justice and the neoliberal social forces – namely the overriding concerns for limitless growth, individual liberty and the free market – environmental justice movements are likely to face; three primary contradictions come to light that contain both constructive and destructive potentialities for the movement. These contradictions can be grouped under the categories of: social forces, forms of state, and

⁴²⁴ Ibid., 15

⁴²⁵ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 14

⁴²⁶ Neufeld, "Theorizing Globalization: Towards a Politics of Resistance.", 22

⁴²⁷ R.W. Cox, "Towards a Posthegemonic Conception of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in *Approaches of World Order*, ed. R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 150; Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 9

⁴²⁸ Cox, "On Thinking About Future World Order.", 182

⁴²⁹ Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order.", 8

⁴³⁰ Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order.", 514, 519

world orders. As Cox's critical theory identifies that subordinate states are pressured to conform to the dominant state(s) norms⁴³¹ and the 'thin' version of Habermas's Critical Theory maintains that democracies should focus on the way their own actions negatively effect others, it makes sense to begin with the latter – world order – and how this filters down to influence forms of state and social forces.

World Order

Hegemony at the international level allows for the dominant state(s) to impose on subordinate states a world order that both actively and passively works to conform domestic policy to suit the needs of ruling hegemony. As identified in chapter two, the 'window of opportunity' to pursue state-led development in poor countries grows smaller as time passes through pressure from wealthy countries to conform to the neoliberal form of state, leading to polarisation of the international community, and a race to the bottom in terms of individual, group, and environmental protections. As Kasperson and Kasperson note, "global environmental risks will not be the first insult or perturbation in the various regions and locales of the world; rather, they will be the latest in a series of pressures and stresses that will add to (and interact with) what has come before, what is ongoing, and what will come in the future."⁴³²

As identified earlier, ascension to the institutions of global governance such as the WTO comes at a heavy and constantly growing price, as new entrants face an accession process that gives incumbent members almost free-reign over their domestic policy which, as noted by Evenett and Primo Braga, "is creating a two-tiered world trading system in which recently-acceded countries have higher obligations and more limited 'rights.'"⁴³³ Reforming such a system faces two significant contradictions as noted by Grynberg, Ognivtsev, and Razzaque as acceding countries are by definition outside the multilateral trading system and the "losers" of such reform would be the WTO members themselves as they would no longer be able to extract concessions from applicants.⁴³⁴

⁴³¹ Social forces 107-108; See also approaches to world order p 137

⁴³² J. Kasperson and R. Kasperson, *Global Environmental Risk* (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2001), 275-276

⁴³³ Evenett and Primo Braga, "WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience.", 9

⁴³⁴ Grynberg et al., *Paying the Price for Joining the WTO: A Comparative Assessment of Services Sector Commitments by WTO Members and Acceding Countries.*, 42

Contrasting with the principles of discourse ethics – the right of actors to participate in decisions that affect them, maintaining openness to discussion, and relying on the force of a better argument – the WTO accession process demonstrates the complete disregard member states, and more importantly, democracies, have for the interests of subordinated states and peoples. Moreover, as noted by Evenett and Primo Braga, “paradoxically for a ruled-based organisation, the WTO has no clear rules governing the ‘price’ of membership. Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, the legal instrument covering the accession process, merely states that new members may join the WTO ‘on terms to be agreed.’”⁴³⁵ Combined with the lack of capacity to effectively participate, or when help is provided, impartial and timely advice to be put forward to the citizens of the acceding country for discussion,⁴³⁶ and the highly secretive accession process where “folklore” replaces hard facts for those not privy to the negotiations;⁴³⁷ as an institution in which democracies hold significant control, the WTO represents a highly significant and direct way in which democracies cause harm to others.

By erecting barriers to autonomous, locally-specific development; multilateral trade and financial institutions have worked to remove both the rights of communities to decide what suits them best and the freedom to explore alternatives beyond the formula laid down by neoliberalism. People choosing not to develop in the traditional sense⁴³⁸, for example, could be the only way the disproportionate resource consumption in the North can be sustained in light of the environmental disaster that would surely ensue if the entire world’s population achieved the same level of consumption.⁴³⁹ Doing so, arguably, would require the ability to take actions such as mediating the flow of foreign products, particularly the subsidised

⁴³⁵ S.J. Evenett and C.A. Primo Braga, "WTO Accession: Moving the Goalposts?," in *Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues*, ed. R Newfarmer (Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2006), 232-233

⁴³⁶ Grynberg et al., *Paying the Price for Joining the WTO: A Comparative Assessment of Services Sector Commitments by WTO Members and Acceding Countries.*, 42

⁴³⁷ Evenett and Primo Braga, "WTO Accession: Moving the Goalposts?," 232

⁴³⁸ See, R. Peet and M. Watts, "Introduction: Development Theory and Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism," *Economic Geography* 69, no. 3 (1993), 238

⁴³⁹ Including wilderness areas there is 1.5 hectares of land per person available globally. The typical North American has an ecological footprint of 4-5 hectares and if the worlds populations were to achieve this same level by some estimates another three planets would be required to live sustainably. When factoring in population growth, the estimated global population of 10 billion in 2040 will only have 0.9 hectares available per person. See M. Wackernagel and W.E. Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth* (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers, 1996), 13

agricultural products from the North, so that domestic production – and the communities supported by domestic production – is maintained. One such example could be the non-monetised barter markets of the Peruvian Andes noted by Argumedo and Pimbert, which offer households the ability to buffer themselves from the price fluctuations inherent in the global marketplace and build community and ecological resilience through crop diversification; all the while “adapt[ing] traditional forms of cooperation and reciprocity to maintain self-management of production and decentralised governance of local subsistence.”⁴⁴⁰ Where the actions of international institutions and foreign investors from the North encroach upon such communities, it is here that environmental justice movements in the North have the ability link with local groups and pressure them to reconsider,⁴⁴¹ bypassing the state altogether,⁴⁴² and perhaps just as importantly, escape the pitfalls of relativism.⁴⁴³

Building freedom of action into the “world scale mega-policies”⁴⁴⁴ of the International Financial Institutions, the WTO, and international financial markets and resisting/reversing any reduction in agency these institutions impose on others (i.e. those resembling new constitutionalism), are significant areas where environmental justice movements in the North can defend against biased and agency-defeating practices of their governments. Moreover, the next section will demonstrate the one-sided nature of international politics is argued by authors such as Parks and Roberts to have considerable influence on the decision-making processes of Southern actors, and if cooperation on environmental problems is to be achieved, Northern states will need to provide support for a form of state that is significantly more adaptable and well resourced than the present model informed by neoliberalism.

⁴⁴⁰ A. Argumedo and M. Pimbert, "Bypassing Globalization: Barter Markets as a New Indigenous Economy in Peru," *Development* 53, no. 3 (2010), 344, 348

⁴⁴¹ J.F. Gerber, "Conflicts over Industrial Tree Plantations in the South: Who, How and Why?," *Global Environmental Change* (2010), 8

⁴⁴² Argumedo and Pimbert, "Bypassing Globalization: Barter Markets as a New Indigenous Economy in Peru.", 348

⁴⁴³ This is due to such objections being based on procedural rather than substantive issues. See Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations.", 134

⁴⁴⁴ J.N. Pieterse, "My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development," *Development and Change* 29, no. 2 (1998), 369

Forms of State

The neoliberal form of state is reducing both Southern countries ability to mitigate environmental degradation and the prospect of Northern countries providing the resources needed to combat the problem the Northern countries themselves have created. As holders of a key resource in the fight against climate change – the rainforests – Southern countries are caught between developing the resource to enable resilience to climate disruption (i.e. the emergency management tools that enable developed countries to effectively respond to natural disasters), which in itself will contribute to the problem; or foregoing the potential monetary gains, while leaving their population more vulnerable through reduced ability to respond to climate disruption. At the heart of the first option, which is essentially building the capacity for emergency management, lies maintaining the status quo, as Handmer, Dover, and Downing note, “if maintaining the status quo was unimportant then much emergency management as it is now practised [sic] would be unnecessary.”⁴⁴⁵ Climate change thus introduces a self-reinforcing dynamic whereby developing countries face a choice between development, with the resultant amplification of climate change, or the opportunity cost of forgoing development, with the resultant loss of adaptive capacity and hence social stability. Preventing environmentally destructive development will arguably require significant concessions on the part of the Northern countries, both financially and politically, if the environmental services provided by the South are to remain functioning.

The North-South deadlock in climate change negotiations, according to authors such as Parks and Roberts, is due in large part to the internalisation of ‘dependency’ and ‘structuralist’ perspectives by those in the South.⁴⁴⁶ Dependency and structuralist theories posit that the world is divided between the industrialised ‘core’ and an undeveloped ‘periphery’, in which international trade further entrenches this distinction by the formers comparative advantages that allow them to flood the latter with cheap goods.⁴⁴⁷ Born out of what theorists saw as

⁴⁴⁵ J.W. Handmer, S. Dovers, and T.E. Downing, "Societal Vulnerability to Climate Change and Variability," *Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change* 4, no. 3 (1999), 273

⁴⁴⁶ Parks and Roberts, "Globalization, Vulnerability to Climate Change, and Perceived Injustice."; ———, "Inequality and the Global Climate Regime: Breaking the North-South Impasse."; ———, "Climate Change, Social Theory and Justice."

⁴⁴⁷ Dependency theory and structuralist theories are essentially two variants of the ideas first put forward by a group of Latin American economists under the leadership of Raul Prebisch. Immanuel Wallerstiens’ world

significant development gains stemming from the isolation of the Great Depression and the World Wars and hence a global economic *structure* that hindered rather than helped development, Parks and Roberts note:

Radical 'dependentistas' argued for near complete separation from the global economy, which they saw as inevitably driving positions of subordination for developing nations. Structuralists, by contrast, argued that developing nations needed to very strategically maneuver themselves with selective state involvement in the economy, and through strategic 'insertion' in the global economy.⁴⁴⁸

Just as the intersubjective idea of limitless growth informs the actions of many in the North; the significance of dependency and structuralist theories to climate change and any environmental problem that needs to be addressed at the global level is arguably quite substantial. As prominent leaders such as Brazil's former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso have identified themselves as holding the structuralist worldview the theory provides a crucial insight into what conditions some world leader's willingness and ability to participate in environmental regimes.⁴⁴⁹ Overall, although significant progress towards bringing Southern voices to the table has been achieved and developing countries have shifted away from the more hard-line dependency worldview with the incorporation of 'sustainable development' into the global environmental discourse, the creation of environmental regimes or programmes, with or in, Southern countries respectively, will require significant concessions on behalf of the more powerful partners for them not to be viewed as 'pulling up the development ladder'.⁴⁵⁰ Should the Northern countries decide to maintain the current one sided approach to international politics (i.e. the active and passive approaches outlined in chapter two), the 'race to the bottom' in terms of environmental protections could be a very real possibility as developing countries would be left with no options⁴⁵¹ other than exploiting

systems theory is a further adaptation which added an intermediate category between the core and the periphery called the semi-periphery, see Parks and Roberts, "Climate Change, Social Theory and Justice.", 140.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 137, 140.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 139.

⁴⁵⁰ Najam, "Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement.", 308, 315.

⁴⁵¹ Official Development Assistance (ODA) from industrialised countries, for example, peaked in 1982 at 0.36% of GDP and in 2011 is at 0.32% of GDP, significantly lower than the 0.7% commitment made in 1970 as a general resolution at the UN. While U.S.D.\$100 billion by 2020 was pledged by industrialised countries for clean energy and climate-adaptation initiatives made at the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun,

their natural resources in order to build the capacity necessary for the mitigation of the effects of climate change.

Social Forces

The belief of continual progression (i.e. limitless growth) is at conflict with environmental concerns in that the wealthy are able to shield themselves from the burden of environmental degradation as neoliberalism legitimises the continued exploitation of nature, the displacement of the burden of environmental degradation onto others, and creates fissures within society in poor countries that cannot be closed while these countries are subject to a solely neoliberal framework of action. It will be argued here that the neoliberal framework of action and the idea of limitless growth form the two central drivers of the climate change crisis in the contemporary era and to overcome these issues the North will be required to provide the South the resources and autonomy needed for both North and South to effectively respond to climate change.

It is no accident that those with the greatest capacity to mitigate the causes and effects of environmental degradation are also those with the greatest historical responsibility for the problem. Environmental justice movements are likely to face governments and electors whose concern for economic growth is likely to override environmental concerns leading to conflicts over the distribution of the gains and burdens between and within countries.⁴⁵² The burden of environmental degradation in human terms and the proportion of GDP required to recover – as opposed to absolute monetary terms – is one that falls on the weakest and most vulnerable, reducing even further their ability to meet basic needs at an individual and population level.⁴⁵³

should ODA remain at the same levels developing countries will still be owed over USD\$68 billion in ODA by 2020. See M. Hulme, "Will Foreign-Aid Pledges Materialize?," *Nature* 469(2011)., 299

⁴⁵² China's relentless focus on economic growth, for example, is leading to significant internal and external issues that are the result of the pressure this focus places on the environment. See E. Economy, "The Great Leap Backward?," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 5 (2007)., 40-42

⁴⁵³ I. Burton, E. Diringer, and J. Smith, *Adaptation to Climate Change: International Policy Options* (Arlington, Virginia: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2006)., 3; See also I. Alcantara-Ayala, "Geomorphology, Natural Hazards, Vulnerability and Prevention of Natural Disasters in Developing Countries," *Geomorphology* 47(2002)., 113

Reliance on disaster-vulnerable agriculture and the proportion of income spent on food, for example, are two variables that make states and people particularly vulnerable.⁴⁵⁴

In the case of access to food, 2008 saw an unprecedented price spike in basic food items, sparking riots across the developing world.⁴⁵⁵ While the Global Financial Crisis in theory should have taken the edge off prices; in 2009 they remained above the five-year average in 29 of 32 countries considered vulnerable to high food prices.⁴⁵⁶ By 2010, after a series of extreme weather events spanning many of the world's key agricultural zones, prices have once again reached unprecedented levels according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.⁴⁵⁷

Developing countries – already fiscally hobbled by the Global Financial Crisis – face a multifaceted problem ranging from WTO and bilateral trade rules, currency depreciation, volatile world prices driven by speculation, and continued diversion of food crops to the biofuel industry.⁴⁵⁸ Where developed countries might have been able to make use of border controls and subsidies to maintain domestic agricultural production, international trade agreements and aid conditionality can essentially eliminate the possibility of using the former, while the latter (if not already precluded by the aforementioned trade and aid agreements) remains a luxury only the North can afford.⁴⁵⁹ Combined with the asymmetries of information, economies of scale, and financial security, the lack of finance to convert from domestic to export production, and the ongoing chemical and energy costs required to

⁴⁵⁴ Benson and Clay, "Developing Countries and the Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters.", 18; S. Sinha and M. Lipton, "Damaging Fluctuations, Risk and Poverty: A Review. Background Paper for World Development Report 2000/2001," (Brighton, United Kingdom: Pverty Research Unit at Sussex (PRUS), University of Sussex, 2000)., 40; H.C.J. Godfray et al., "The Future of the Global Food System," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 365, no. 1554 (2010)., 2775

⁴⁵⁵ M. Lacey, "Across Globe, Empty Bellies Bring Rising Anger," *New York Times*, April 18 2008.

⁴⁵⁶ S.H. Swan, S. Hadley, and B. Cichon, "Crisis Behind Closed Doors: Global Food Crisis and Local Hunger," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 1 (2010)., 107

⁴⁵⁷ J. Blas, "U.N. Group Warns of Potential 'Food Price Shock'," *Washington Post*, January 5 2011.

⁴⁵⁸ Food importing countries are especially vulnerable. See J Ghosh, "The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 1 (2010)., 2, 18-19

⁴⁵⁹ K.L. Preibisch, G.R. Herrejón, and S.L. Wiggins, "Defending Food Security in a Free-Market Economy: The Gendered Dimensions of Restructuring in Rural Mexico," *Human Organization* 61, no. 1 (2002)., 69

industrialise agriculture;⁴⁶⁰ it is no wonder that when developing countries open their borders to subsidised produce from the North, domestic production can be priced out of the market as farmers are expected to compete with produce being sold for less than it costs to produce.⁴⁶¹ Perhaps the most high-level admission of this problem came from former U.S. president Bill Clinton who reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 3, 2010 in regards to the liberalisation of Haiti's agriculture:

It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else.⁴⁶²

With little resources to spare, climatic and environmental disturbances in developing countries will compound these issues through the interrelated effects of "reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of regular and legitimized social relations."⁴⁶³ By 2050, for example, without climate change wheat prices are expected to rise by approximately 40%, but when climate change is factored in they are expected to rise between 170-194%, and this pattern is similar for rice and maize with prices of both expected to at least double by 2050 when climate change is factored in.⁴⁶⁴

While wealthy countries will be able to fare considerably better in terms of social stability than developing countries with regards to the direct effects of climate change due to, for example, having the resources necessary to respond to natural disasters and the low proportion of income spent on food in rich countries when compared to developing countries

⁴⁶⁰ Ghosh, "The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance.", 9; J. von Braun, "Overcoming the World Food and Agriculture Crisis through Policy Change and Science" (paper presented at the Trust for Advancement of Agricultural Sciences (TAAS), Fourth Foundation Day Lecture, New Delhi, India, March 6 2009)., 5-7

⁴⁶¹ For example, wheat and sugar is often sold on the international markets for 40-60% less than the cost of production. See D. Sharma, "Agricultural Subsidy and Trade Policies," *Ethics, Hunger and Globalization* (2007)., 270

⁴⁶² M. Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: Impact of Ngos on Human Rights for Port-Au-Prince's Internally Displaced People," (Jamaica, New York: York College, 2010)., 6

⁴⁶³ T.F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International security* 16, no. 2 (1991)., 78

⁴⁶⁴ G.C. Nelson, "The Perfect Storm," *Significance* 7, no. 1 (2010)., 15

resulting in price spikes having considerably less influence on political stability.⁴⁶⁵ Climate change presents, however, “multiple threats” – for which climate-forced migration is perhaps the most obvious – that has clear potential to destabilise the status quo and according to Denise Garcia, is beginning to initiate security instincts in the United States and United Kingdom, forcing a reevaluation of conventional military-centric definition of threats to international security.⁴⁶⁶ As the Bangladeshi Atiq Rahman, of the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies stated: “If climate change makes our country uninhabitable, we will march with our wet feet into your living rooms.”⁴⁶⁷

Demonstrating how an idea, in this case Realism, which has formed a persistent framework of action over the 20th century is transformed by both material conditions and new practices (i.e. the realisation that the status quo is unsustainable), environmental justice movements can make use of such knowledge to point out that community survival is being endangered by the historical structure of limitless growth. This does not necessarily require the wholesale rejection of progress, rather, a redefinition that maintains the practical necessity of survival that is informed by the new material conditions of climate change and the practices that are likely to exacerbate the problem. Two such practices that form key drivers of the problem of climate change are arguably the lack of resources being directed at Southern countries and the inability for states to ensure the global economy meets the needs of their entire population.

At the individual, group, and country level, the relationship between wealth and climate change arguably points one in the direction: that to overcome the issues stemming from the latter requires achievement of the former. Achieving the wealth necessary to mitigate the effects of climate change, however, is likely to amplify the effects of climate change thus creating a self-reinforcing dynamic,⁴⁶⁸ especially when considering that those following

⁴⁶⁵ Z. Haq, H. Nazli, and K. Meilke, "Implications of High Food Prices for Poverty in Pakistan," *Agricultural Economics* 39(2008)., 478-479; H. Buhaug, N.P. Gleditsch, and O.M. Theisen, "Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008)., 42

⁴⁶⁶ D Garcia, "Warming to a Redefinition of International Security: The Consolidation of a Norm Concerning Climate Change," *International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2010)., 285

⁴⁶⁷ M Zakzouk, "Development Aid in a Changing Climate: The Challenge of Fragility in the Least Developed World (Background Paper)," (Ottawa, Canada: Library of Parliament, 2010)., 8

⁴⁶⁸ See D.N. Pellow and R. Brulle, "Power, Justice, and the Environment: Toward Critical Environmental Justice Studies," in *Power, Justice, and the Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement*, ed. D.N. Pellow and R. Brulle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005)., 4-5

neoliberalism in wealthy countries are likely to resist attempts to provide poor countries with the resources necessary to break such a cycle.⁴⁶⁹ The erosion of worker, environmental, and indigenous protections, for example, will mean little to those struggling to meet even the most basic consumptive needs and thus transnational capital and domestic elites have a ready constituency in those on the edge of existence. Noted by Cox, the categories of people relevant to social change need to be rethought and one of these categories he offers, *consumptive needs*, presents a particularly salient grouping when considering environmental injustice as organic intellectuals linked to groups that forward women's or indigenous rights, for example, will face a difficult task of transcending the immediate needs of those seeking to maintain consumption.⁴⁷⁰ Lacking the means to develop self-help communities – such as owning suitable land at the individual and group level, or in the case of political leaders, access to credit – as a way to shield themselves from the vicissitudes of the market and corrupt political systems; Cox notes, “For many people, clientelism may seem preferable to revolutionary commitment, especially when backed by the force of state and economic power.”⁴⁷¹ Providing the material resources to prevent consumptive needs overriding environmental concerns is thus a salient task for Northern countries and an additional task for Northern countries is to provide the policy space necessary for Southern countries to short-circuit consumptive interests.

Within countries, divergent interests between subordinated groups abound when considering economic and environmental concerns – such as between indigenous groups and precariously employed forestry and mining workers,⁴⁷² for example – and thus overcoming these contradictions arguably requires significantly more policy space than that laid down by neoliberalism. The divergent issues that are the result of consumptive interests such as between urban poor and rural poor, for example, would make leaders in Southern countries wary of closing down the import of subsidised agricultural products from the North due to the effects such a move would be likely to have on the urban poor. On the other hand,

⁴⁶⁹ An overview of the ideological nature of American policy towards the environment both domestically and internationally, and the resultant unwillingness to provide resources to developing countries, particularly during Republican administrations, can be found in Harris, "Beyond Bush: Environmental Politics and Prospects for US Climate Policy.", 967-970

⁴⁷⁰ Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order.", 26

⁴⁷¹ Ibid. 11

⁴⁷² Ibid., 26

maintaining an open border with no support for rural poor (i.e. guaranteeing a price to make up for having to compete against subsidised produce) would be likely to depress the rural economy as it did in Haiti. As the example above alludes to, Southern countries need the space to be able to make use of the global economy for the benefit of the *entire* population as while the global economy may benefit some, such as providing cheap food for the urban poor, it can also have significant negative consequences for others. Moreover, as discussed previously with the example of the barter markets of the Peruvian Andes, it is in the interests of Northern countries to maintain communities and ways of life that are relatively self-sufficient and do not impose the same high level of burden on environmental services that the Northern communities and ways of life do. While providing the policy space and resources necessary to maintain these communities may encroach on individual liberty and the free market; cooperation at the state and individual levels on global problems such as climate change arguably cannot be met through a solely neoliberal framework of action.

Conclusion

Through applying critical theory to the problem of environmental injustice, this chapter has attempted to ensure scholarly and political practice moves in the direction of emancipation. Through providing a set of standards that throw light on the process of environmental degradation, Habermas's Critical Theory achieves the emancipatory purposes of forwarding autonomy and self-understanding. Self-understanding of ones relationship to nature, in light of the ideas of environmental injustice and Habermas's Critical Theory, also presents a possible avenue for the collapse of the nature/humanity dichotomy through prompting scholars from both the social and natural sciences to work together in order to inform the general public of the true consequences of their actions. As the liberal-democracies of the North present the most significant obstacle to preventing environmental injustice, Habermas's Critical Theory has particular value through appealing to what are arguably taken-for-granted notions of democracy: the right to participation, openness to discussion, and relying on the force of a better argument. These standards present social movements both in and outside the Northern democracies a framework that can be used to draw strength from the democratic tradition in order to rectify environmental injustice in the past, present, and future.

Providing a complementary strategy for achieving change within these democracies; Cox's critical theory points to the necessity of developing a broad-based social movement that incorporates all those disadvantaged by neoliberalism and provides a method for uncovering what is necessary to achieve such a movement. Through the dialectical approach the tensions invoked by neoliberalism in the context of climate change can be investigated so that social movements are able to identify the relational contradictions inherent in the social structure and plan accordingly. As the final sections demonstrated, the one-sided nature of world order places growth, individual liberty, and the free market above all else, and this presents a fundamental problem for achieving cooperation on global interests such as stopping climate change. To prevent climate change from spiralling out of control, the final section argued that what is required is for the North to re-evaluate long held assumptions about progress and to accept both a greater role in ensuring the countries of the South have sufficient resources to prevent the burden of maintaining social stability or basic consumption from falling on the environment, and to provide the autonomy needed to ensure the economy meets the needs of the all. Meeting these conditions will arguably go some way to overcoming the three environmental injustice concepts of responsibility for the problem, ability to mitigate the problem, and marginalisation.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the opening theme of this essay, it is hoped that what has been demonstrated here is the ability for scholars to undertake research that meets the primary aspiration of critical theory in general, creating a better world. In doing so, this essay has also provided the theoretical foundations of a research programme that can help stimulate discussion and decision making at multiple levels of everyday life, be it the high-politics of international relations or the routine multitude of individual and collective decisions made in the course of any given day. Informing decision making arguably presents the single most important contribution of critical theory to political practice.

By highlighting the considerable gap between the processes of environmental injustice and ethical political practice, Habermas's discourse ethics can be used to draw attention to the significant blind-spots in the decision making of democracies, particularly with regard to the exclusion of Southern voices from environmental decision making. Raising awareness of how far removed the neoliberal world order created by those democracies is from the discourse ethics of openness to discussion and relying on the force of a better argument, Habermasian Critical Theory presents a stark picture of international politics. Although this distance between discourse ethics and the realities of international politics may seem to render Habermasian Critical Theory as ineffectual, bridging this divide presents a salient undertaking as the Coxian analysis demonstrated that it is precisely this one-sided reality of world politics that forms one of the crucial barriers to achieving cooperation on global problems such as climate change. Through the dialectical and hermeneutic approach of Cox, important insights into the tensions involved with attempting to overcome environmental injustice in the context of contemporary politics can be garnered. Demonstrating the significant role Northern countries have in providing the resources and autonomy necessary to combat climate change; the Coxian method complements the Habermasian approach by highlighting that provided there is political will, there is the ability to transition from a world of environmental injustice to a world of environmental equity.

As it is through the process of overlooking environmental injustice that environmental injustice is reproduced, this essay has sought to provide a clear framework of thought and action that can guide future scholarship and political practice to overcome the problem. Demonstrating the significant scope that exists for International Relations scholars to contribute finding to a solution to the significant contemporary problem of climate change, critical theory offers a practical theory that overcomes the negative aspects of modernity. Steering humanity away from the dark side of modernity, after all, is the only way environmental injustice can be resolved, and with a rich tradition to draw on, critical theory is in a prime position to offer directions.

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