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THE EVOLUTION OF 
ADOLF HITLER'S 

WELTANSCHAUUNG: 
A CRITICAL STUDY OF 

HIS RHETORIC, 
1920 - 1926 

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts at Massey University 

CAROLYN READ 

MASSEY UNIVERSITY 
1997 



For Max 



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This year has been a learning experience, especially in respect of self motivation, but I 

made it! I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those people who helped me 

bring this thesis to completion. 

The Staff of Massey University History Department, in particular my supervisor Dr. 

Joel Hayward for first suggesting the topic, for his generosity with time and resources, 

and for his guidance and support in my frequent moments of uncertainty. Also a 

special thanks to the History Department Secretaries, Mary Lou Dickson and 

Lynne Coates. 

To Dr. Axel Laurs, my second supervisor, for patiently reading numerous drafts and 

always having a bottle of red wine on offer. Also to Jiirg Br6nnimann for all his 

assistance. 

Annette Holm at Massey University Library lnterloans for her unbelievable speed in 

acquiring books, articles, and microfilm from all over New Zealand, Germany, and 

America. 

To my family and friends, for making me hang in there and get it finished . A special 

thanks to the crew at George St. Deli, especially Jo, for keeping me sane and for the 

constant supply of caffeine. 

And last, but definitely not least, to my class mates: Sue, Nick, Tom, Warren, Daiman, 

and Donna who shared their ups and downs and for just being there to listen to me 

complain. 



ABSTRACT 

This thesis tests the "orthodox perception" that Adolf Hitler was driven by a 

Weltanschauung which remained fundamentally constant from the outset of his 

political career. It argues that his theories and concepts underwent continual change 

and development. The evolution of the Nazi leader's world view is traced by 

examining his thoughts and reactions as expressed in his rhetoric during the period 

from 1920 to 1926, the era of his so-called "political apprenticeship" . 

In order to demonstrate how Hitler's Weltanschauung evolved eight facets of his 

ideology are examined. These themes: the emphasis the Nazi leader placed on current 

event topics, the parliamentary system, the use of propaganda, the principle of 

leadership, the Nazi leader's equation of Jews with Marxism, his theory of 

Lebensrqum, his belief in Aryan supremacy, and the role of faith, were selected either 

because of the prominence given to them in Hitler's own rhetoric, or because historians 

repeatedly identify them as central facets of his world view. 

This thesis establishes that acceptance of the received wisdom is an oversimplified 

means of explaining the genesis of Hitler's world view. The Nazi leader's ideology 

developed according to his own personal experiences as well as the political, 

economic, and social climate of the era. Hitler's Weltanschauung was far from 

complete at the outset of his political career and, in fact, some aspects first developed 

with the writing of his political autobiography, Mein Kampf 



CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION: 1 
THE EVOLUTION OF ADOLF HITLER'S 
WELTANSCHAUUNG: A CRITICAL STUDY 
OF HIS RHETORIC 1920 - 1926 

CHAPTER ONE: 6 
FRANCE, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 
AND "THE NOVEMBER CRIMINALS" 

CHAPTER TWO: 14 
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 

CHAPTER THREE: 23 
PROPAGANGA TECHNIQUE 

CHAPTER FOUR: 33 
THE FUHRERPRINZIP 

CHAPTER FIVE: 42 
JEWS AND MARXISTS: A COMMON EVIL? 

CHAPTER SIX: 51 
THE THEORY OF LEBENSRAUM 

CHAPTER SEVEN: 59 
ARY AN SUPREMACY 

CHAPTER EIGHT: 67 
THE ROLE OF FAITH 

CONCLUSIONS 76 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 80 



INTRODUCTION: 
THE EVOLUTION OF ADOLF HITLER'S 

WELTANSCHAUUNG, 1920 - 1926: 
A CRICTICAL STUDY OF HIS RHETORIC 

Adolf Hitler stated in his political autobiography Mein Kampf "In this period 

[ referring to the six years he spent in Vienna from 1907 until 1913] there took shape 

within me a world picture and a philosophy which became the granite foundation of all 

my acts. In addition to what I then created, I have had to learn little; and have had to 

alter nothing." 1 This study tests the "orthodox perception", that Hitler was 

ideologically driven by a Weltanschauung which remained fundamentally constant 

from the outset of his political career. It argues that his theories and concepts 

underwent continual change and development. The evolution of the Nazi leader's 

world view is traced by examining his thoughts and reactions as expressed in his 

rhetoric during the period from 1920 to 1926, the era of his so-called "political 

apprenticeship" . 

The notion that Hitler's Weltanschauung remained fixed began with his own 

comments in Mein Kampf However, Alan Bullock's biography, Hitler: A Study in 

Tyranny, first published in 1952, actually created what has become the "orthodox 

perception" . In their study, Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third 

Reich, John Hiden and John Farquharson explain that "Bullock's Hitler, particularly as 

delineated in the chapter called 'The dictator', has exerted a powerful spell on a whole 

generation of historians in Europe and America. 112 Bullock summarised, concerning the 

formation of the Nazi leader's ideology, that: 

it would be an exaggeration to suppose that Hitler had 
already formulated clearly the ideas he set out in Mein 
Kampf in the middle of the 1920s. Nonetheless the greater 
part of the experience on which he drew was already 
complete when he left Vienna, and to the end Hitler bore 
the stamp of his Austrian origins. 3 

1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim, London: Pimlico, 1995, p. 21. 
2 John Riden and John Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich, 
London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., 1983, p. 10. 
3 Alan Bullock, Hi tier: A ~in Tyranny, rev. ed. , New York: Harper and Row, 1962, p. 41. 

1 



Bullock's biography, still often called the standard work on Hitler, has served as the 

starting point for many historians who simply took his views at face value or expanded 

on them. In fact, Barbara Miller Lane stated: "Alan Bullock's tendency to stress 

Hitler's demagoguery and deemphasise his ideas has been echoed in most subsequent 

biographies and in many studies of the Third Reich. 114 Wolfgang Horn is one of many 

historians who has employed Bullock's thesis. He states: "The preserved documents 

are sufficient to trace the fundamentals of his political concepts since 1919. His book, 

Mein Kampf, .... contains hardly any new thoughts . 115 Werner Maser's biography, 

Hitler, is another apt example, as it merely expands Bullock's argument whilst adding 

little. He states: 

[Hitler's] Weltanschauung had been formed by his early 
environment, by his parental home and his schooling and 
studies in Linz, Steyr, Vienna, and Munich. Other 
determining factors were his study of literature from 1905 
onwards, his exposure during the last three years in Vienna 
to the often very extreme views of his variegated fellow 
lodgers in the men's hostel, and his experience as a soldier 
in the field during the First World War, then as a political 
agent in the service of the Reichswehr and finally as leader 
of a political party. His reading after 1919, and particularly 
during his detention which he described as 'higher 
education at the state's expense', merely served to give him 
a deeper knowledge on certain subjects upon which he had 
long since made up his mind.6 

Bullock's thesis emphasised that Hitler had formed the basis of his 

Weltanschauung by the beginning of his political career, implying thereby that Mein 

Kampf represented the final version. Again, this feature of Bullock's argument is 

apparent in the works of other historians. For example, Ian Kershaw wrote: "Exactly 

when, how, and why Hitler's fanatically held ideas took their hold on him is far from 

clear. But the gradual forging of various strands of his thinking into a composite was 

complete by the time of the writing of Mein Kampf in 1924, and scarcely wavered 

thereafter. "7 Walter Laqueur also adopted this view, commenting: "in the case of 

Hitler, the age from 20-3 5, that is the years 1909-1924, contain the real crucial process 

4 Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp, (eds), Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation , 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978, p. 154. Lane lists Wilfried Daim, Ernst Notle, 
Joachim Fest, Joseph P. Stern, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Martin Broszat, Rudolf Binion, Walter C. 
Langer and Robert G.L. Waite as examples. 
5 Wolfgang Horn, "Ein Unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers aus dem Frtihjahr 1924", Vierteljahreshefte for 
Zeitgeschichte [hereafter VJZ] , vol. 16 (1968), p. 280. 
6 Werner Maser, Hitler, trans. Betty and Peter Ross, London: Penguin Books, 1973, p. 117. 
7 Ian Kershaw, Profiles in Power: Hitler, London: Longman, 1991, p. 19. 

2 



of personal and political formation. 118 Mein Kampf came to be regarded by many 

historians as the first and by far the most important source of Nazi ideology. 9 

Thus, the "orthodox perception" is that Hitler had formulated his world view 

by the time he became involved with the German Workers' Party, and, without adding 

or changing anything significant, outlined it in detail in the first volume of Mein Kampf 

Hiden and Farquharson conclude that: "It is indeed a feature of the historiography of 

Adolf Hitler that he is invariably expected to be consistent in every respect of his 

ideology". They continue by emphasising that this is "asking too much of any human 

being and is not expected of any other major historical figures ." lO This study likewise 

contends that it is neither useful nor accurate to explain the evolution of Hitler's 

Weltanschauung by merely employing received wisdom. Recognising and explaining 

the origin of ideas and their development into political strength and consequence is too 

complex for this. The notion that Hitler's world view remained fixed from the 

beginning of his political career ignores his pragmatic nature . His personal experiences 

and his reactions to the changing political, economic, and social climate of the era 

receive insufficient analysis, as if they have not had an effect on the development of his 

world view. In his study, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power, Eberhard 

Jackel queries blind acceptance of the orthodox view by asking: "How are we to pose 

the question of Hitler's Weltanschauung? The problem here lies in the fact that Hitler 

did not define it systematically and step by step, it may also have developed and 

changed." 11 An awareness of this development and change is necessary because "the 

formation and translation of Hitler's ideology remains the central problem of any 

analysis, and the question of the revolutionary role of Hitler and his politics can only be 

answered in this context. 11 12 

In order to reveal and illustrate the evolutionary nature of Hitler's 

Weltanschauung this thesis undertakes a critical study of his rhetoric. As Wolfgang 

Sauer explains, the only way to follow the course of Hitler's thought and his response 

to political change is to examine his public oratory.13 The Nazi leader permitted only 

one small group of speeches, Ernst Boepple's Adolf Hillers Reden, to be published 

8 Walter Laqueur, (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991 , p. 222. 
9 H. Holbom, "Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
134 (1964 ), p. 543 . 
10 Hiden, p. 13 . 
11 Eberhard Jackel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power, trans. Herbert Arnold, 
Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1972, p. 25 . 
12 Laqueur, p. 219. 
13 Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism", American Historical Review, 
vol. 73 (1967), p. 419. 

3 



before 1933. After 1933 he made no attempt to compile his early speeches. The short 

collection, Adolf Hitler in Franken: Reden aus der Kampfzeit, edited by Heinz Preiss, 

appeared soon after but without his endorsement. The two best-known English 

collections of the Nazi leader's speeches are Norman H. Baynes' The Speeches of Adolf 

Hitler April 1922 - August 1939 and Gordon W. Prange's Hitler's Words: Two 

Decades of National Socialism, 1923 - 1943. However, neither provide a complete 

survey of the speeches from Hitler's early political career. These speeches can be 

studied in the pages of the Volkischer Beobachter, the official newspaper of the 

National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) from December 1920 until April 

1945. The speeches Hitler made prior to December 1920 can be found in the Munich 

police files . Two articles, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920" by Reginald Phelps 

and "Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr" by Ernst Deuerlein, as well as 

microfilm from the NSDAP Hauptarchiv, provide a near-complete collection of the 

speeches the Nazi leader made in 1920. A compilation of Hitler's articles, which he 

began writing in 1921 for the party newspaper, has never been attempted. This means 

that the Volkischer Beobachter provides the only collection of this information. These 

sources as well as Mein Kampf, published in two volumes, the first on 19 July 1925 

and the second on 11 December 1926, have all been employed below as primary 

source material, providing a reasonable sample of the Nazi leader's rhetoric during this 

period. 

The time frame, from 1920 to 1926, encompasses the first seven years of the 

Nazi leader's political career, in which the most concentrated historical debate 

surrounding the formation of his Weltanschauung occurs. Thus, this study analyses 

Hitler's rhetoric from his first appearance before a mass audience on 24 February 1920 

when the National Socialist German Workers' Party announced their political program, 

referred to as the 25 Point Programme, to the publication of Volume II of Mein 

Kampf on 11 December 1926. The period also includes a number of important events 

in the Nazi leader's early political career, such as: the purchase of the party's official 

newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter, on 16 December 1920; his promotion to 

Chairman of the party on 29 July 1921; the Hitler Putsch which took place on 9 

November 1923; the subsequent trial from 26 February 1924 to 1 April 1924; his 

imprisonment at Landsberg from 1 April 1924 to 20 December 1924; the 

re-establishment of the party on 26 February 1925; and Hitler's ban on public speaking 

lasting from 9 March 1925 to 5 March 1927 in Bavaria (and as late as September 1928 

in other states). 

To determine how Hitler's Weltanschauung evolved during the early years of 

his political career this study examines eight facets of his ideology. The themes have 

4 



been selected either because of the prominence given to them in Hitler's own rhetoric 

or because they are repeatedly identified by historians as central aspects of his world 

view. 

Writings on the Nazi leader typically do not accredited him with the formation 

of ideas. The studies that do tend to concentrate either on M ein Kampf, the so-called 

Secret Book, or his writings and speeches after 1933. It is also common for historians 

to explain the origin of Hitler's world view outside the party, in Vienna, in the volkisch 

movement, or even in the broadest patterns of German intellectual development, rather 

than simply examining his own words. In contrast, this study concentrates specifically 

on the Nazi leader's rhetoric as it was expressed at the time. Thus, this work hopes to 

provide new insights into the formation and development of the Weltanschauung that 

Hitler later used as his guiding principles during his time as Germany's Fuhrer between 

1933 and 1945 . 

While it is true that a great deal of research has been undertaken on Hitler and 

the Third Reich, the first years of his political career have not been the focus of so 

much attention. Obvious exceptions are the works of such historians as Wolfgang 

Hom, Albrecht Tyrell, Charles Bracelen Flood, Ernst Deuerlein, Reginald Phelps, and 

Hellmuth Auerbach, who examine aspects of the Nazi leader's life during this period. 

Yet, apart from fackel's study, which ignores the first and most formative years of 

Hitler's involvement with the Nazi Party by concentrating primarily on his 

autobiography, the evolution of Hitler's Weltanschauung has not been examined in any 

depth . 

5 



CHAPTER ONE: 
FRANCE, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, AND 

"THE NOVEMBER CRIMINALS". 

"[Hitler was the] most effective agitator against the Jews, the Allies, the Treaty of 
Versailles and all of the Berlin Government". 

Hellmuth Auerbach, 'Hitlers Politische Lehrjahre und die Miinchener Gesellschaft 
1919 -1923', 1977. 

Adolf Hitler spent the last days of World War One at Pasewalk Military 

Hospital in Pomerania. He was recovering after the British launched a mustard gas 

attack against his regiment south of Ypres on 13 October 1918. While he was 

recovering his vision, in hospital, he first heard of the armistice, Kaiser Wilhelm II's 

abdication and the subsequent collapse of the monarchy, the Berlin revolution, the Kiel 

sailors' mutiny, and that Allied occupation troops had moved into the Rhineland. This 

news caused a relapse of his condition, during which he claims to have had a vision 

summoning him to reverse Germany's defeat. In Mein Kampf he associates this vision 

with his decision to enter political life: "I, for my part, decided to go into politics. 111 

However, the verity of this story is debatable. Hitler's immediate post-war 

experiences led him to enter politics, not horror at news of Germany's collapse. At the 

end of the war he had little other prospect than to remain in the army. On returning to 

Munich his first task, as a member of a Propaganda Unit, was to guard a large 

demobilisation camp at Lechfeld. The Propaganda Unit was the idea of Captain Karl 

Mayr, who wanted to stop the Communist and Independent Socialist revolutionaries 

from influencing returning front-line soldiers. Hitler's success within the Propaganda 

Unit led Mayr to use him as a political agent and adviser (Vertrauensmann) on the 

various political groupings of the right wing in Munich. In this capacity he attended a 

meeting of the German Workers' Party, led by Karl Harrer and Anton Drexler, on 12 

September 1919. Less than a week later he joined the party as a propagandist 

(Werbeobmann) . His first public appearance as a speaker took place a month later. 

Hitler recalls this event in Mein Kampf 

1 Hitler, p. 187. 

In this first meeting that could be called public I had been 
granted twenty minutes' speaking time. I spoke for thirty 

6 



minutes, and what before I had simply felt within me, 
without in any way knowing it, was now proved by reality: 
I could speak! 2 

It is uncertain exactly when Hitler came to his decision to become a politician, yet it is 

clear that by the beginning of 1920 his political career had begun in earnest. 

Hellmuth Auerbach describes Hitler during the early phase of his political life 

as the "most effective agitator against the Jews, the Allies, the Treaty of Versailles and 

all of the Berlin Government"3 but went on to state that: "In what Hitler said and 

wrote between 1919 and 1923, no original thoughts whatsoever can be found . . . . Only 

in Mein Kampf did he develop other ongoing concepts. 114 In order to ascertain 

whether Auerbach's bold claim is correct, this chapter will examine Hitler's speeches 

and articles on France, the Treaty of Versailles, and the "November Criminals" 

throughout the period from 1920 to 1926. This chapter will establish whether he 

emphasised these topics to the detriment of his own world view in the early phase of 

his political life . It will also determine whether, after the writing of Mein Kampf, 

contemporary issues remained a dominant aspect of his rhetoric. 

An investigation of Hitler's articles and speeches during the period from 1920 

to 1923 illustrates that hatred towards France, the Treaty of Versailles, and the 

"November Criminals" was already dominant in his rhetoric . In fact , he made these 

issues the "scapegoat" for Germany's suffering; that is a focus for the nations' anger. 

This was possible because these issues were at the forefront of the political, economic, 

and social climate of the era. Germany was then trying to cope with the disillusionment 

of defeat in the Great War, attempting to comprehend the Treaty of Versailles, dealing 

with general impoverishment and rising inflation, occupation troops and loss of 

territory, as well as the political instability of the new democratic government . 

Hitler's verbal attacks on France began with his political career and remained 

consistent throughout the period from 1920 to 1923 . This seems to have had a 

profound influence on Nazi thinking in general. As Gordon Prange states: 

Hatred of France was quite deeply ingrained in the whole 
of the early National Socialist movement. Even a casual 
perusal of the Nazi press in the twenties discloses a 
plethora of propagandist devices designed to stir up 

2 ibid. , pp. 322-23. 
3 Hellmuth Auerbach, "Hitlers Politische Lehrjahre und die Miinchener Gesellschaft 1919-1923 ", 
VjZ, vol. 25 (1977), p. 14. 
4 ibid. , p. 15. 

7 



anti-French feeling and to demonstrate the necessity of 
stripping France of her power as a great nation. 5 

The Nazi leader viewed France as the mortal enemy of the German nation. He insisted 

that: "France remains our enemy" .6 He accused France of formulating the Treaty of 

Versailles in the spirit of revenge 7, claiming that France wanted to destroy Germany 

militarily8 , economically9, and politically.10 He stated that: "The persistent aim of 

France is the annihilation of the last possibilities of a reawakening of national pride in 

Germany" 11 , and that: "Living side by side with the French is possible only if we are 

constantly ready for action and if our pistols are loaded. 1112 Hitler also stated that: 

"France does not want reparations; she wants Germany's destruction. This means the 

realisation of an age-old dream, namely, the hegemony of France over Europe. "13 

The Treaty of Versailles also featured prominently in Hitler's articles and 

speeches, especially prior to the writing of Mein Kampf In fact, Reginald Phelps 

claims that the Treaty of Versailles was his favourite topic in 1920. 14 The Nazi leader 

himself confirmed this statement in his autobiography by remarking: "I considered 

these two lectures on 'The True Causes of the World War' and on 'The Peace Treaties 

of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles', the most important of all, and so I repeated and 

repeated them dozens of times, always renewing the form". 15 Hitler's speech, 

"Versailles, Germany's Destruction", given on 24 July 1920, provides a typical 

example of this oratory: 

We do not need nor want at this time a price and wage 
reduction, first we demand the cancellation of the peace 
Treaty, because afterwards everything will get better on its 
own. It is our duty to inform our people totally about this 
Treaty, until they pluck up courage to undermine this 
Treaty wherever possible. 16 

5 Gordon W. Prange, Hitler's Words: Two Decades of National Socialism, 1923 - 1943, 
Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, p. 54. 
6 Reginald H. Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920", VjZ, vol. 11 (1963), p. 318. 
20 September 1920. 
7 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner" p. 304. 6 July 1920. 
8 Volkischer Beobachter [hereafter VB] , 12 May 1921. 
9 VB , 1 November 1922. 
10 VB , 28 February 1923. 
11 VB, 22 March 1923 . 
12 VB, 15/16 April 1923 . 
13 VB, 6/7 May 1923. 
14 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", p . 275. 
15 Hitler, p. 426. 
16 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", p. 329. 24 July 1920 

8 



The Nazi Party felt so strongly about the Treaty of Versailles and its effect on 

Germany that it included the following point in it's 25 Point Programme. Point Two 

states: "We demand equality of rights for the German people in its dealings with the 

other nations, and abolition of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. 1117 

Throughout 1920, Hitler insisted that the Treaty of Versailles was not only unable to 

be fulfilled, but that it was detrimental to Germany's recovery. For example, on 15 July 

1920 he stated: "We cannot fulfil the peace treaty, the people continue to suffer more 

and more. What is not possible, is simply not possible." 18 

The Nazi leader persisted with this claim throughout 1921, 1922, and 1923. 

He frequently referred to the Treaty as the "Treaty of Shame" (Schandvertrag) , and 

made remarks such as: "We want the reconstruction of the German fatherland, this is 

however only possible with the abolition of the Treaty of Versailles" 19, and "The 

Peace Treaty is unbearable. Its economic implementation means inevitably our political 

enslavement. 1120 As Prange comments, none of Hitler's oratorical offensives surpassed 

his attacks on the Treaty of Versailles. He never tired of complaining that the Treaty 

was France's revenge, that it violated ancient historical traditions, increased tensions 

among nations, and destroyed the whole structure of the German economy.21 

Hitler's hatred of France and his disregard for the Treaty of Versailles 

remained constant features of his articles and speeches during the period from 1920 to 

1923 . However, his attack on the Weimar Government, or the "November Criminals", 

was based on current developments. He believed that: "It [was] the fault of the 

revolution that we signed the shameful peace Treaty. 1122 This was part of the "stab in 

the back" claim (Dolchstoss) that both General Ludendorrf and General Hindenburg 

openly supported after the first World War. According to this claim the Reichswehr 

was not defeated in the Great War, but forced to surrender because revolutionary 

elements in Germany had dealt it a fatal blow from behind the lines. Hitler bore a 

grudge against the Government in Berlin, which he claimed had acted shamefully by 

signing the Treaty of Versailles. His disregard for the so-called "November Criminals" 

is illustrated by the following mockery he makes of State Secretary Mattihas 

Erzberger, who was responsible for signing the Treaty: "Erzberger: 'Just give me four 

17 Norman H. Baynes, (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 103 . 
18 ibid., p. 307. 15 July 1920. For example; 4 March 1920 (Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", 
p. 275), 6 July 1920 (ibid., pp. 304-05), 27 July 1920 (ibid., p. 308), and 22 September 1920 (ibid., w· 320-21). 

VB, 17 February 1921. 
20 VB, 22/23 April 1923. 
21 Prange, p. 198. 
22 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", p. 322. 22 September 1920. 

9 



hours in Switzerland and you'll get your peace' . Never has the German population 

been so lied to and deceived. 1123 The Nazi leader came to identify the entire Weimar 

Republic with the "November Crime", often referring to members of the Reichstag, 

especially Social Democrats, whether the individuals were involved with the signing of 

the armistice or not, as "November Criminals" . 

In 1921 Hitler focused a great deal of attention on the plight of Upper 

Silesia.24 As a condition of the Treaty of Versailles, Upper Silesia went to Poland. 

Allied troops were to define the frontier in Upper Silesia, taking into account the 

geographic and economic situation, as well as the wishes of the local population as 

expressed in a plebiscite. The plebiscite, taken on 20 March 1921 , demonstrated that 

60% of the population wanted to remain German. However, Polish volunteer troops 

invaded Upper Silesia on 2 May 1921 . Thereafter Upper Silesia remained in Polish 

hands. The Nazi leader blamed Reichskanzler Konstantin Fehrenbach and Foreign 

Policy Minister Walter Simons for the loss of Upper Silesia. He believed that they had 

not put up a fight to save Upper Silesia in order to prevent the threatened occupation 

of the Ruhr region.25 For, at the London Conference on Reparations, held from 29 

April to 5 May 1921 , Germany was given an ultimatum: to pay one billion gold 

marks, which it could not afford, on penalty of occupation of the Ruhr region. In an 

article printed in the Volkischer Beobachter, "Statesmen or National Criminals", Hitler 

explained that Simons knew that Upper Silesia was in danger of being taken as 

compensation but did nothing to protect it. 26 Fehrenbach resigned after the Upper 

Silesian incident and was replaced by Joseph Wirth. However, Wirth fared no better 

than Fehrenbach. In Hitler's opinion, Wirth, with the help of Walter Rathenau, the 

new Minister of Foreign Policy, tried to fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty of 

Versailles to the disadvantage of the German nation. In an article written in early 

June, Hitler had the following to say about Wirth: 

Because of Germany's freedom, Mr. Wirth has said yes. 
This is probably the freedom Upper Silesia is enjoying in 
such abundance nowadays. Or do they not belong to 
Germany? Do the Rhineland, Rhineland Palatinate, the 
Saarland not belong to Germany? And anyway, do you call 
the condition the rest of Germany is in, freedom? Is a 

23 ibid., p. 318. 5 September 1920. 
24 For example; VB, 15 March 1921 , VB, 14 April 1921, VB, 5 May 1921, VB, 8 May 1921, VB, 12 
May 1921, VB, 15 May 1921, VB, 19 May 1921, VB, 26 May 1921, VB, 29 May 1921, VB, 2 Jw1e 
1921, and VB, 28 July 1921, 
25 VB, 8 May 1921. 
26 VB, 15 March 1921. 

10 



people that is every year sucked dry and raided to the last 
drop of its blood, free? 27 

He claimed that the way the "November Criminals" had handled the Upper Silesian 

incident marked the beginning of the end for Germany. 28 

The Nazi leader's attack on Wirth continued throughout 1922 with such 

comments as: "do these people idolise a name that is synonymous with the eternal 

disgrace of Germany, Joseph Wirth?"29, and "That Germany is at the end of its 

strength nobody could deny, because even the man himself, Mr. Wirth, who is 

responsible for this state has recognised it" . 30 Yet Hitler's main concern in 1922 was 

Wirth's policy of fulfilment; in other words the payment of reparations. He argued that 

workers were bearing the brunt of the payments: "Today the labourer works in order 

to pay off the reparations, and he only earns one third of his peace wages, the rest is 

slave labour. 1131 He also claimed: "Today we fight for the 45 hour week. All right. 

But the labourer slaves for 30 hours simply for the Allies". 32 Hitler viewed rising 

inflation as a direct result of reparation payments, because up until 1923 Germany had 

financed the purchase of foreign currency needed for its reparation payments by simply 

printing more currency. Inflation was yet another disaster to blame on the Weimar 

government: "The paper money economy itself originates from the bad conscience 

and the cowardice of the revolution criminals" .33 

Similar to the loss of Upper Silesia in 1921 , the occupation of the Ruhr region 

was a major theme in Hitler's articles and speeches throughout 1923 . Due to a delay 

in delivering 100,000 telegraph poles, France declared that Germany had formally 

breached the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, French and Belgian troops 

marched into the Ruhr region in order to take the necessary steps to ensure further 

reparation payments were made on time. In retaliation, Reichskanzler Wilhelm Cuno 

adopted a policy of passive resistance. Hitler viewed this as preposterous. He said 

that: "Cuno was then of the opinion that the occupation of the Ruhr happened for 

economic reasons and therefore called for passive resistance. 1134 Instead, he 

proclaimed: "France has no intention of evacuating the Ruhr region or of giving back 

the Saar region or the Rhineland. The reasons for her occupation policy are political, 

27 VB, 2 June 1921. 
28 VB, 15 May 1921. 
29 VB, 22 February 1922. 
30 VB, 1 November 1922. 
31 VB, 19 August 1922. 
32 VB, 26 April 1922. 
33 VB, 1 November 1922. 
34 VB, 6/7 November 1923. 

11 



not economic. 1135 As a consequence, Hitler's speeches during the period of French 

occupation, delivered on 1 August 1923, 21 August 1923, 5 September 1923, and 12 

September 1923, are full of angry tirades against Cuno. 

As has been illustrated, Hitler frequently used the pages of the Volkischer 

Beobachter, as well as his role as a public speaker, to give ideological clarification and 

interpretation to current political issues throughout the period from 1920 to 1923 . 36 

While he maintained this tactic during his Putsch trial, focusing in particular on the 

detrimental effects of the Treaty of Versailles, it was not the case after his release from 

Landsberg prison. During his incarceration, Hitler wrote the first volume of his 

political autobiography Mein Kampf, completing the second volume during the 

summer and autumn of 1925 . However, while Mein Kampf contained Hitler's violent 

anti-French views, similar to that of his previous rhetoric, it did not centre on the 

Treaty of Versailles and the "November Criminals" as major themes, instead 

mentioning them only as events which occurred during the period he was writing. It 

seems that Hitler was more intent on developing other, and in some cases entirely new, 

facets of his Weltanschauung. 

To sum up, then, Auerbach's theory, that Hitler only began developing his 

political theories and concepts with the writing of Mein Kampf, is an exaggeration. It 

is more accurate, as Wolfgang Horn clarifies, that Mein Kampf was not the first 

representation of the Nazi leader's Weltanschauung, but rather the first extensive 

development of many of the thoughts and ideas which he had been forming since the 

beginning of his political career. 37 Prior to Hitler's imprisonment he did emphasise 

contemporary issues in his rhetoric. However, Martin Broszat explains this by saying: 

"The crisis-ridden years of the Weimar Republic from the Treaty of Versailles to the 

occupation of the Ruhr and the inflation were the background to the early history of 

the NSDAP; the years of the party's first political successes.1138 After the Nazi leader's 

release from Landsberg there is a noticeable lack of interest in contemporary issues, 

but this change in focus can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, the speech 

ban which Hitler incurred at his first public appearance after the Putsch trail, on 27 

February 1925, which severally curtailed his public political activity. Second, the 

stabilisation of the political climate with the adoption of the Dawes Plan, meaning that 

35 VB, 28 February 1923 . 
36 Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, 1919 - 1933, Devon: David and Charles 
Publishers Ltd. , 1971, p. 21. 
37 Horn, "Ein unbekannter Aufsatz" , p. 280. 
38 Martin Broszat, The Hitler State. The Foundations and Development of the Internal Structure of 
the Third Reich, trans John W. Riden, London: Longman, 1981, p. 1. 

12 



hatred towards France, the Treaty of Versailles, and the actions of the "November 

Criminals" was no longer at the height of public and political debate. Third, Hitler's 

decision to enter the Reichstag "legally". This gave him increased responsibility within 

the party, as he had to concentrate on rebuilding the NSDAP and developing a 

national political platform. Nevertheless, what this change in focus does illustrate, 

contrary to received wisdom, is that Hitler's world view was far from complete in 

1920. Many of the subjects incorporated in his articles and speeches during the first 

four years of his political career reflect the climate of the era as well as his own 

interpretation of contemporary issues rather than his own ideology. The shift away 

from this emphasis on contemporary issues occurs only after Hitler's imprisonment. It 

is likely that the time the Nazi leader spent in Landsberg gave him time to reflect on 

his previous experiences enabling him to produce his first serious political theorising in 

the form of his political autobiography, Mein Kampf 

13 



CHAPTER TWO: 
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 

"I beg you not to forget that the parliamentary principle of democratic majority 
rule has by no means always dominated mankind, but on the contrary is to be 
found only in brief periods of history, which are always epochs of the decay of 

peoples and states. " 

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, vol. II, 1926. 

Germany's authoritarian monarchist state collapsed with the abdication of 

Kaiser Wilhelm II on 9 November 1918. In the midst of the revolutionary unrest 

which followed, elections were held for a constituent National Assembly which was to 

be responsible for establishing the new political order. The election result confirmed 

social democracy as the leading political force and the so-called Weimar Coalition, led 

by the first Reichskanzler, Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert, set about drafting the 

Weimar constitution. Strongly influenced by the liberal and democratic tradition of 

1848, the constitution established the Reichstag as the central political organ. The 

Reichsrat, the body representing the constituent states, was to have little influence, but 

the Reichskanzler was given considerable powers, enabling him to act as a 

counterweight to parliament. Accepted on 11 August 1919, the constitution ended 

the transitional period of almost one year following the abdication of the Kaiser and 

laid the foundations of the Weimar Republic . Thus, parliamentary democracy became 

the system of government, guaranteeing direct popular influence on the political 

decision-making process. 

Kurt Sontheimer explains that "anti-democratic" thought is an overall term 

used to describe the manifold intellectual currents which developed during the course 

of the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic. All opposition to the Weimar Republic 

was considered opposition to democracy, and so deemed anti-democratic in nature.1 

Therefore, as Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party opposed the Weimar Republic their 

actions were viewed as anti-democratic. It is popular for historians to perceive the 

Nazi leader's rejection of democracy and parliamentarianism as a central facet of his 

Weltanschauung. In order to ascertain the verity of this perception, this chapter 

1 Kurt Sontheimer, "Anti-Democratic Thought in the Weimar Republic", in The Path to Dictatorship 
1918 - 1933: Ten Essays by German Scholars, John Conway (ed.), New York: Anchor Books, 1936, 
pp. 36-37. 

14 



examines the formation and development of Hitler's views on de,rnocracy during the 

period from 1920 to 1926. 

Mein Kampf is the most concentrated source of information on Hitler's views 

concerning democracy and the parliamentary system. Volume I, Chapter 3, "General 

Political Considerations Based on My Vienna Period", written in 1924 while he was in 

Landsberg prison, explains, in hindsight, how he developed his anti-democratic 

theories. He stated: "I had always hated parliament, but not as an institution in itself 

On the contrary, as a freedom loving man I could not even conceive of any other sort 

of possibility of government". 2 He insisted that he attended sessions of parliament in 

Vienna regularly "and little by little formed [his] own ideas"3, admitting that after 

observing for two years he "could no longer accept the parliament as such. 114 

The most thought-provoking of Hitler's observations was that no single person 

held responsibility for any policy or decision in the Austrian government. He 

explained: 

The parliament arrives at some decision whose 
consequences may be ever so ruinous nobody bears any 
responsibility for this, no one can be taken to account. For 
can it be called an acceptance of responsibility if, after an 
unparalleled catastrophe, the guilty government resigns? 
Or if the coalition changes, or even if parliament is itself 
dissolved?5 

Hitler blamed this lack of responsibility on the majority vote, because the majority vote 

was needed for securing any policy. This meant that no one individual could be held 

accountable for a decision. He asked: "Can a fluctuating majority of people ever be 

made responsible in any case? Isn't the very idea of responsibility bound up with the 

individual?"6 The Nazi leader continued by explaining that the parliamentary principle 

of majority led to the demolition of any idea of leadership. The task of a leader was 

reduced "to making the brilliance of his projects intelligible to a herd of sheep and 

blockheads, and subsequently begging for their kind approval" . 7 He questioned: "Is 

the incapacity of a leader shown by the fact that he does not succeed in winning for a 

2 Hitler, p . 70. 
3 ibid. , p. 71. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. , p. 73. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 

15 



certain idea the majority of a mob thrown together by more or less savoury means?"8 

The Nazi leader concluded his discussion on the evils of the parliamentary system and 

democracy by offering his readers an alternative. This would become known as the 

Fiihrerprinzip: 

Juxtaposed to this is the truly Germanic democracy 
characterised by the free election of a leader and his 
obligation fully to assume all responsibility for his actions 
and his omissions. In it there is no majority vote on 
individual questions, but only the decision of an individual 
who must answer with his fortune and his life for his 
choice. 9 

While Mein Kampf clearly reveals Hitler's anti-democratic views it does not 

explain how they evolved, especially during the period before his imprisonment when 

the Weimar Republic experienced terrible instability One of the earliest documents 

relating to this period is the 25 Point Programme, announced on 24 February 1920. 

This political agenda, which Hitler helped draft, contains two points critical of the 

parliamentary system as it was then practiced. Point 6 states: "We oppose the corrupt 

parliamentary custom of state of filling posts merely with a view to Party 

consideration, and without reference to character or capacity. 1110 Point 25 states: "we 

demand the creation of a strong central power of the Reich. Unconditional authority 

of the politically central parliament over the entire Reich and its organisation in 

general. 1111 Both points highlight weakness in the parliamentary system and are little 

more than an unveiled criticism of the Weimar Republic. However, what is interesting 

to note is that there is no insistence on another form of government at this stage. 

The government's lack of authority was a key issue for Hitler in 1920. It is not 

only included in the 25 Point Programme, but was the focus of his speech, "Power or 

Justice" given on 20 September 1920: 

8 ibid. 

Now the government seems to have no authority and only 
because it has no power, the power to show justice to 
advantage . . . . The government is only able to attain 
authority, when it is able to save national pride internally 
and externally. Only then will the laws be obeyed again.12 

9 ibid., p. 83 . 
10 Baynes, p. 103. 
ll ibid., p. 107. 
12 Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr", VjZ, vol. 1 O ( 1959), p. 215 . 
20 September 1920. 

16 



Another aspect of Hitler's anti-democratic rhetoric in 1920 was the effect democracy 

had on the German people. He asserted that the parliamentary system of rule was not 

helping the people: "No party majority can save the people." 13 The Nazi leader felt 

the parliamentary system divided rather than united the people: "Everywhere one hears 

the slogan: 'Here bourgeoisie, here proletariat'. But nowhere was the slogan issued: 

'You Germans join together, fight for your own freedom'." 14 

The first, and only detailed opinion of the parliamentary system that Hitler 

expressed prior to Mein Kampf dates from 3 February 1921. In an article printed in 

the Volkischer Beobachter the Nazi leader stated that democracy was a failure: "the 

democratic principle in Germany is an infertile one. A resurrection of the German 

people cannot be expected from it. 1115 He viewed the parliamentary system as 

un-democratic in nature because of the principle of majority rule, stating: 

it is not only worthless today, in fact it is non existent. 
Because if in a state a small group only, or let's say one 
class or party refuses to accept the principle of democratic 
subordination of the minority under that of the law binding 
accepted will of the majority, then in practice the 
democratic principle as such is dead. 16 

Although Hitler's discussion on the democratic system remained limited, 1921 saw 

Hitler demand more accountability and responsibility from members of parliament. 

Perhaps, because between 19 January 1919 and 26 October 1921 there had been no 

fewer than six changes to the office of Reichskanzler. This concern is best emphasised 

by the speech he gave in October 1921 , in which he said: "We demand responsibility 

from parliamentarians and ministers. It should not be allowed that somebody can 

destroy the people and then retire as if nothing has happened. He who leads the 

people, has to lead with his head and his head is the pledge." 17 More importantly, it 

was only in mid 1921 that the Nazi leader made his first public connection between 

Jews and democracy. He stated on 15 May 1921 in an article written for the 

Volkischer Beobachter: "Germany is only able to live if the pigsty of Jewish 

corruption, democratic hypocrisy, and socialist betrayal is swept away with an iron 

broom." 18 While it is hard to be certain what prompted Hitler's sudden equation of 

Jews with democracy it is likely that the election of the Centre Party on 10 May 1921 

13 ibid., p. 223. 26 October 1920. 
14 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", p. 303. 27 April 1920. 
15 VB, 3 February 1921. 
16 ibid. 
17 VB, 26 October 1921 
18 VB, 15 May 1921. 

17 



had some influence. For when Joseph Wirth became Reichskanzler he appointed 

Walter Rathenau Minister of Reconstruction, and by 31 January 1922 had made him 

the new Foreign Policy Minister. Rathenau was a man of exceptional stature and 

brilliance, but in the eyes of many Germans, especially Hitler, he was first and foremost 

a Jew. A Jew who now held a prominent position within the democratic system of the 

Weimar Republic. 

The Nazi leader re-emphasised many of his earlier arguments against 

democracy in the few speeches and articles he presented on the subject in 1922. 

However, most prominent was the association he drew between Jews and democracy. 

Hitler saw democracy as a Jewish invention, believing that, like Marxism, democracy 

was yet another means by which Jews would gain world domination. For example, on 

12 April 1922 he said: "Democracy is fundamentally not German. It is Jewish. It has 

been completely forgotten that this Jewish democracy with its majority decisions has 

always been, without exception, only a means towards the destruction of any existing 

Aryan leadership." 19 In September 1922 he said: "who rules in the so-called 

democracies, in France, England, and America ... ? The Jew I 1120 A few months later he 

remarked: "Democracy is Jewish domination, for the people do not rule; public 

opinion is manufactured by the press, which is owned by Jews. At the same time 

democracy is not an end in itself, but the means to an end. The end is the achievement 

of Jewish domination" . 21 Hitler also repeated his concern that the German people 

were suffering under the democratic system. This is illustrated by a question he posed 

in his speech, "Can Parliamentarians Save Germany?": "And who is suffering under the 

conditions brought about by the parliament? Everybody. 1122 The democratic principle 

of majority rule was again attacked with such comments as: "We the National 

Socialists declare here and forever that we shall no longer tolerate this betrayal of the 

people. We do not believe in majorities, but in the energy of the minority. 1123 

Hitler's attack on the parliamentary system became more prominent in 1923 as 

the political situation within Germany worsened due to the threatened occupation of 

the Ruhr region, rising inflation, and crippling reparation payments. His now well 

established arguments; that the Germans were suffering under the parliamentary 

system of government because it was not adequately providing for them, that 

democracy was a Jewish invention designed to acquire world domination, and that in 

19 VB, 22 April 1922. 
20 VB, 30 September 1922. 
21 VB, 1 November 1922. 
22 ibid. 
23 VB, 6 December 1922. 

18 



general democracy was a failure, singling out the government's lack of authority and 

majority rule in specific continued. Increasingly common were such comments as: "the 

German parliamentary system is digging its own grave"24, and "German 

parliamentarianism is today the downfall and the end of the German nation. 1125 

However, by the beginning of 1923 the Nazi leader was also suggesting alternatives to 

the parliamentary system. This was something he had done only occasionally during 

the first years of his political career. In a speech given in late February 1923 Hitler 

stated: "In parliament the call for the strongman won't be welcomed. Today's 

strongman would first have to destroy parliament. As long as Germany's destiny is in 

the hands of parliamentary gossipers, our people cannot be saved. 1126 A month later 

the Nazi leader explained: 

What our people needs is not leaders in parliament, but 
those who are determined to carry through what they see 
to be right before God, before the world, and before their 
own consciences and to carry that through, if need be, 
against majorities . And if we succeed in raising such 
leaders from the people, then once again a nation will 
crystallise itself 27 

It can be summarised from Hitler's negative remarks about the parliamentary system 

throughout the pre-Putsch period that he was ardently against the Weimar Republic . 

In fact , a police report made in 1923 states: 

The party refuses to use the institution of parliament for 
the implementation of its ideas. An institution based on the 
popular elected council thinking. It does not want to be a 
party in the parliamentary sense, for its leaders refuse to 
accept the mandate principle. 28 

By August 1923, when the French began moving into the Ruhr region without 

resistance because of Reichskanzler Cuno's policy of passive resistance, the Nazi 

leader's criticism of the Weimar Republic became even stronger. He stated: "We will 

no longer bow down before an institution which is founded on the delusory majority 

principle, we want a dictatorship. 1129 It seems that Hitler meant what he said, because 

on 9 November 1923 he proclaimed a national revolution and the deposition of 

24 Baynes, p. 72. 4 May 1923. 
25 ibid. 
26 VB, 28 February 1923. 
27 VB, 29/30 April 1923. 
28 Hoover Institution Microfilms, NSDAP Hauptarchiv , John W. Blodggett Collection, Folder 1474. 
29 Baynes, p. 73 . 21 August 1923 . 

19 



governments of Bavaria and the Reich. His Putsch ended in failure . Police opened fire 

on the Nazi Party, killing sixteen. Many others, including Hitler, were arrested. 

Hitler suffered trial for high treason in February of 1924. He openly admitted 

that he had wanted to overthrow the state, but rejected the charges of high treason. In 

his concluding speech, he stated: "I cannot declare myself guilty. True, I confess to the 

deed, but I do not confess to the crime of high treason. There can be no question of 

high treason in an action which aims to undo the betrayal of this country in 1918.1130 

However, as Charles Bracelen Flood explained: 

This was treason: an open call for armed insurrection 
against the Berlin government. In case anyone did not 
understand that he wanted immediate, violent, bloody 
change, his concluding words at the Putsch left little doubt: 
'We must have a new dictatorship. We need no parliament, 
no government like the moment. We cannot expect 
Germany's salvation from the present condition, but only 
through a dictatorship brought through the sword' .31 

During his subsequent imprisonment at Landsberg, Hitler continued his 

condemnation of the parliamentary system by expounding his anti-democratic views in 

Mein Kampf Yet after his release from prison he seemed to show a complete 

turn-around. He renounced revolutionary violence and repeatedly insisted upon the 

"legality" of his new tactics. This so-called "legality" required the party to seek the 

support of a majority of voters through the use of "democratic" campaign methods: 

participation in local and national elections was now viewed as a necessary method of 

gaining political power. It is likely that this change originated in Hitler's terror of 

deportation to Austria, with which he had already twice been threatened. The "Law 

for the Protection of the Republic" automatically required that any foreigner convicted 

of high treason be deported from Germany. The Austrian-born Hitler was still not a 

German citizen, despite his wartime military service, so this law was of considerable 

concern to him. However, as Flood notes, although, Hitler was pragmatically 

committed to gaining power through the ballot box, the German state he envisioned 

had nothing to do with democracy. 32 Karl Dietrich Bracher reiterates this view by 

commenting: "The defeat of democracy by pseudo-democratic means was the new 

3o Der Hitler Prozess vor dem Vo/ksgericht im Munchen , Zweiter Teil, Munchen: Knarr und Hirth 
G.m.b.H. , 1924, p. 90. 
31 Charles Bracelen Flood, Hitler: The Path to Power, London: Harnish Hamilton, 1982, p. 408. 
32 ibid. , p. 596. 

20 



course to which Hitler now devoted himself, even though voting one's opponents 

down would prove more laborious than shooting them down. 1133 

The Nazi leader was banned from public speaking after the speech he gave on 

27 February 1925. The fact that the ban originated from seditious remarks is ironic. 

Yet it is hard to determine whether this speech set the tone for Hitler's views on the 

parliamentary system over the next two years, because, as a consequence, he rarely 

appeared in public. However, according to the limited existent information, he did in 

fact speak at closed party meetings and in the few states which had not imposed a 

speech ban, a mixed picture is presented. At a closed party meeting in August 1925 

Hitler criticised the fickle nature of parliamentary parties. He said: 

He, who can no longer belong to a party through inner 
conviction, has to resign from his mandate. The voters 
elect representatives of their worldview, not persons. He 
who transfers his mandate to another party is a thief, and a 
party who accepts such traitors sacrifice their trust and 
belief just for an increase in numbers. 34 

In an article printed in the Volkischer Beobachter on 14 April 1926 Hitler described 

the German system of government as "nothing more than an instrument in the hands of 

foreign power. 1135 However, in early June 1926 the Nazi leader finished a speech with 

the following words: 

Give your vote in the upcoming election to whoever you 
want, but if you are looking for freedom for your people, 
and believe that the National Socialists will give it to you, 
then join our ranks as a fighter for our people and work 
with us to create a new state, a state of justice, a National 
Socialist free Germany. 36 

The impression these comments give is that while Hitler tried to enter the Reichstag 

legally and abide by the parliamentary system he still did not hold the democratic 

system in high regard. 

33 Karl Dietrich Bracher, trans. Jean Steinberg, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, 
and Effects of National Socialism, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970, p. 130. 
34 VB, 12 August 1925. 
35 VB, 14 April 1926. 
36 VB, 3 June 1926. 

21 



It is clear from a survey of Hitler's written and spoken words on the 

parliamentary system that the subject was not a dominant feature of his rhetoric. In 

fact, apart from the article he wrote for the Volkischer Beobachter in 1921 and 

Volume 1, Chapter 3 of Mein Kampf, he has very little to say on the subject. Yet from 

the articles and speeches which do deal with the parliamentary system, it can be 

established that the Nazi leader's views did evolve, especially during 1920 and 1921; 

the first years of the Weimar Republic's existence. Hitler emphasised, in particular, the 

suffering of the German nation under the parliamentary system and specific aspects of 

the democratic process such as the majority vote and the lack of responsibility and 

authority within parliament. He continually re-emphasised these themes throughout the 

pre-Putsch era. However, new themes also emerged. Denouncing democracy as a 

Jewish curse became popular by mid 1921 , and the idea of replacing the Weimar 

Republic with a dictatorship became pronounced by 1923 . Hitler's attempted Putsch, 

the comments he made at the subsequent trial, his opinion as expressed in Mein 

Kampf, and the speech ban he incurred because of seditious remarks, illustrate the 

conviction of his anti-democratic views. His decision to enter the Reichstag through 

legal means, although seemingly contradictory in nature, was in fact, very pragmatic. 

He did not alter his opinion on the parliamentary system, but wanted merely to prevent 

being charged with high treason, which might have caused his deportation. Also, in 

order to become a politically-recognised party he decided not to promote publicly his 

disregard for the Weimar Republic and everything it stood for . 

22 



CHAPTER: THREE 
PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE 

"But the power which has always started the greatest religions and political 
avalanches in history rolling has from time immemorial been the magic of the 

spoken word, and that alone. " 

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, vol. I, 1925. 

Propaganda is the art of persuasion. It attempts to change attitudes and ideas 

by reinforcing existing trends and beliefs through manipulation of already existing 

opinions.1 Traditionally, when thinking of Nazi propaganda the name that comes to 

mind is Joseph Goebbels. Adolf Hitler appointed him leader of the Reich's propaganda 

in 1929, and made him Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in 

1933 . However, Hitler was in fact the Nazi Party's first propagandist. The earliest 

reference to Hitler in this role appears in a Munich police report made on 13 

November 1919.2 

Historians emphasise propaganda as an important feature of the Nazi Party, 

especially during the first years of the movement's development. For example, Z.A.B. 

Zeman stresses that the growth of the NSDAP from "insignificant beginnings" to a 

truly mass movement was due to the skilful exploitation of propaganda techniques. 3 

Similarly, David Welch states: "it would appear that one of the most important factors 

contributing to the Nazis' rise to power was the cumulative effect of their 

propaganda. "4 This chapter will, therefore, examine Hitler's position as a propagandist 

between 1920 and 1926, highlighting the importance of propaganda during the early 

phase of the Nazi Party's development and to the Nazi leader's overall 

Weltanschauung. It will investigate the evolution of his ideas concerning propaganda, 

focusing in particular on "the mass meeting" and the "party newspaper", as well as 

examining his first theoretical discussion on propaganda technique in Mein Kampf 

After the war Hitler joined the Reichswehr Propaganda Unit, attending a series 

of training courses (Aujklarungskurse) run by Captain Karl Mayr. He quickly gained 

1 David Welch, Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, New York: Routledge, 1993, p.5. 
2 Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt" , p. 206. 
3 Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 9th ed. , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 2. 
4 Welch, Third Reich, p. 10. 

23 



promotion to the role of educator, presenting propaganda lectures to the troops . 

From this employment he obtained the skills needed to become a political adviser for 

the Reichswehr. 5 It was with this background experience that Hitler joined the 

German Workers' Party. From the beginning he saw himself as responsible for the 

party's propaganda. This is reflected by the following comment from Mein Kampf 

"After my entrance into the German Workers' Party, I at once took over the 

management of propaganda. I recognised this department as by far the most 

important. 116 

It was as a propagandist, an agitator, and an unusually talented public speaker 

that Hitler first won attention. In fact, Martin Broszat sees Hitler's talent as a public 

speaker as literally forming the foundations of his political career.7 Likewise, Werner 

Maser describes Hitler as owing his political career in large measure to the power of 

propaganda.8 The Nazi leader's skill as a public speaker not only won him attention, 

but also the Nazi Party. With Hitler in charge of the party's promotion, membership 

reached 2, OOO by late 1920 and 3, OOO by August 1921. The party continued to 

expand, and had 20,000 members by the end of 1922, with an additional 35,000 

members by the time of the Putsch in 1923. 9 This was achieved principally because of 

the emphasis Hitler placed on public meetings. 

Hitler gradually increased the Nazi Party's membership by insisting that public 

meetings be held on a regular basis, at first every month and later fortnightly. The first 

success the Nazi Party had occurred on 16 October 1919 at what the Nazi leader 

described as the "first meeting which could be called public" .10 He recalled in Mein 

Kampf that: 

After thirty minutes the people in the small room were 
electrified and the enthusiasm was first expressed by the 
fact that my appeal to the self-sacrifice of those present led 
to the donation of three hundred marks. This relieved us 
of a great worry. For at the this time the financial 
stringency was so great that we were not even in a position 
to have slogans printed for the movement or even 
distribute leaflets. 11 

5 Deuerlein, "Hitler's Eintritt" , p. 186. 
6 Hitler, p. 527. 
7 Broszat, The Hitler State, p. 23 . 
8 Maser, Hitler, p. 259 . 
9 Kershaw, Pro.files in Power, pp. 40-41. 
10 Hitler, pp. 322-23. 
11 ibid. , p. 323. 

24 



The 300 marks donated to the Nazi Party made it possible for Hitler to organise 

another public meeting. At this public meeting Hitler introduced an idea that was 

entirely new on the Baravarian political scene: They would charge admission. 12 The 

Nazi Party's second public meeting held at the Eberlbriiukeller on 13 November 1919 

was a success. It was attended by more than 130 people all paying an admission fee of 

fifty pfennigs. 13 The high attendance level and the amount of money being made 

provided the catalyst for more daring ventures to larger halls. The first large scale 

meeting at the Deutsches Reich was not well attended, but the next meeting showed 

more promise. In fact , Hitler commented in Mein Kampf that: "The attendance had 

risen to over two hundred; the public as well as financial success was brilliant. 1114 

The success rate of the Nazi Party's first public meetings was largely due to 

advertising. Hitler noted in Mein Kampf "I still remember how I myself in this first 

period once distributed about eighty .. . slips of paper, and how in the evening we sat 

and waited for the masses who were expected to appear. 1115 The next attempt, when 

"invitation slips written on a machine and mimeographed in a Munich stationery 

store" 16 produced a slightly better result . However, the first noticeable success 

occurred when, as Hitler explained in his autobiography, "by little collections among 

us poor devils the funds were raised with which at last to advertise the meetings by 

notices in then independent Munchener Beobachter. 1117 

The first truly mass meeting, attended by more than 2,000 people18, was 

organised by Hitler on 24 February 1920 at the Hofbrduhaus in Munich in order to 

announce the party's 25 Point Programme . In preparation for the party's first mass 

meeting placards and leaflets were used to advertise the event. Hitler determinedly 

used the colour red, stating: "On principle the colour red was chosen; it is the most 

exciting; we knew it would infuriate and provoke our adversaries the most and thus 

bring us to their attention and memory whether they liked it or not." 19 Although the 

report in the Volkischer Beobachter concerning the meeting noted that Hitler was not 

even a main speaker20 his description of events four years later in Mein Kampf over 

12 Flood, p. 76. 
13 John Toland,AdolfHitler, New York: Doubleday, 1976, p. 94. 
14 Hitler, p. 325. 
15 ibid., p. 322. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
18 VB, 28 February 1920. 
19 Hitler, p. 322. 
20 ibid. 

25 



looked this, presenting the meeting as an important historical date in the Nazi Party's 

and his own development. 21 

The success of 24 February 1920 together with the healthier financial state of 

the Nazi Party meant that mass meetings became a common event for the movement. 

A typical meeting in 1920 lasted between two and four hours and was attended by 

between 800 and 2,500 people. Police reports on the meetings held in 1920 noted that 

most speakers received a quiet reception, but that when Hitler took the podium the 

audience became "lively" and often quite "unruly". 22 Reginald Phelps claims: "One 

thing is for sure: Hitler was the igniting spark, he alone could attract the people week 

in and week out".23 Broszat argues that Hitler was not a novice to the art of speech 

making. He changed the speed and volume of his voice, constructed simple and 

repetitious speeches, and studied the technique of creating the appropriate atmosphere. 

Flags, popular music, intentionally late arrival, crowded halls, planted supporters to 

cheer at appropriate points, and even organised squads to prevent meetings being 

broken up by rival political parties were all features of Hitler's mass meetings. 24 The 

following description gives an impression of his speech style: 

Hitler moves quickly to the front of the stage. He speaks 
freely, first with a slow intonation, later his words come 
out all in a rush, his voice is suppressed and hardly 
understandable when he gets to passages recited with 
exaggerated emotiveness. He gesticulates with arms and 
hands. He jumps about in great excitement and tries 
constantly to fascinate his numerous public. 25 

Mass gatherings of particular note in the pre-Putsch period were: the Nazi 

leader's mass meeting on 3 February 1921 in the Zirkus Krone (at that time Munich's 

biggest conference centre); the 14-15 October 1922 German Day in Coburg 

(perceived as the greatest event in the movement's history at that date26); and the first 

Nazi Party Day held in Munich on 28 January 1923. Throughout 1920 Hitler spoke 

more than 30 times at public gatherings. 27 In 1921 he began to hold several mass 

meeting on the same evening making short appearances at all. 28 During the last two 

21 Hitler, p. 336. 
22 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", pp. 275-330. 
23 ibid. , p. 284. 
24 Broszat, p . 23. 
25 Ernst Deuerlein, Aufstieg der NSDAP 1919-1933 in Augenzeugenberichten, Diisseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 1968. pp. 271-72. 
26 Flood, p. 310. 
27 Kershaw, Profiles in Power, p. 40. 
28 DetlefGrieswelle, Propaganda der Fried/osigkeit: Eine Studie zu Hitters Rhetorik 1920-1933, 

26 



months of 1922 he held 10 mass meetings, and in the summer of 1923 he appeared on 

average twice weekly before large audiences. 29 These accomplishments demonstrate 

that the "mass meeting" became a central feature of the Nazi Party's propaganda 

technique. 

The failure of Hitler's Putsch in 1923 temporarily put a stop to his mass 

meetings. However, his best orchestrated public appearance, in terms of propaganda 

value, took place during this period: his concluding speech at his 1924 Putsch trial, 

which brought him to the attention of the entire German nation. Hitler's first major 

speech after his release from Landsberg prison on 27 February 1925, which re-asserted 

his position as leader, was another masterpiece. This speech immediately catapulted 

him to new prominence on the Munich political scene. However, this success also 

caused concern. A speech ban (Redeverbot) was imposed on 9 March 1925, first by 

Bavarian authorities and later by other states. This did not mean that the party entirely 

lost its most effective means of agitation. Meetings were arranged in the three states 

that had not placed a ban on Hitler, Thuringia, Braunschweig and Mecklenburg. If 

they took place elsewhere they were advertised as closed meetings for party members 

only. Hitler was well aware of the necessity of propaganda in the first years of the 

party's reformation. In fact, he announced a new statute at the refoundation of the 

NSDAP which outlined the importance of propaganda. 30 This statute prompted 

Greiswelle to make the following comment: "For the first time in the history of the 

NSDAP propaganda was represented in an organised fashion in the party hierarchy. 1131 

Also, by 1925, in contrast to the earlier period when Hitler presented more than half of 

the Nazi Party's mass meetings, there was a large number of trained public speakers, 

such as Rudolf Esser, Wilhelm Frick, Gregor Strasser, Gottfried Feder, and Joseph 

Goebbels, who were not restricted by the speech ban. This enabled 2,370 mass 

meetings to take place during 1925, and approximately 20, OOO in 1928. 3 2 Another 

example of the Nazi leader at his propagandist best during this period was the speech 

he gave at the Bamberg Conference on 14 February 1926. This was the speech which 

finally reunited the warring fractions of the Nazi Party, convincing the Northern 

fraction led by Gregor Strasser to remain loyal to the movement, and more 

importantly, to accept Hitler as its leader. 

Stuttgart: Ferninand Emke Verlag, 1972, p. 24. 
29 ibid., p. 25. 
3o VB, 26 February 1925. 
31 Grieswelle, p. 27. 
32 VB, 26 May 1926. 

27 



The move by the Nazi Party to mass media occurred in December 1920 when 

Hitler discovered that the Volkischer Beobachter, a nationalist-racialist journal which 

recorded the operations of approximately twenty right-wing organisations in Bavaria, 

was for sale. He wanted the Nazi Party to acquire the paper as sole owner because he 

realised that ownership of the newspaper would greatly strengthen any group that 

could afford to buy it. However, the party treasury did not have sufficient funds. 

Nevertheless, on 16 December 1920, spurred by the threat of a proposed sale to 

Gottfried Feder, Hitler was forced into action. He enlisted the help of Dietrich Eckart 

who convinced Augsburg industrialist Dr. Gottfried Grandel to put up 56,000 marks. 

A further 60,000 marks came from Colonel Franz Ritter von Epp, the most right wing 

of Barvaria's Reichswehr officers. This money enabled the purchase of the newspaper. 

Under the joint editorship of Dietrich Eckart and Alfred Rosenberg, the newspaper 

appeared twice weekly until 8 December 1923, thereafter it became a daily newspaper. 

The Volkischer Beobachter's circulation in January 1921 was 11,000, and while the 

monthly circulation figures varied during the year they never dropped to less than 

7,500 and even reached 17,000 in early 1922. By 1923 the paper had a readership 

large enough to place it in the league of major Munich newspapers. The Volkischer 

Beobachter was shut down between 9 November 1923 and 26 February 1925, but on 

4 April 1925 it appeared again as a daily newspaper with an ever expanding 

readership. 33 

The Volkischer Beobachter became the main propaganda organ of the Nazi 

Party, with members of the party being encouraged to subscribe to it. In fact , Hitler 

commented at a party meeting held in January 1922: "The Press, our only weapon, 

our light artillery, must soon be able to act as heavy artillery. Every member is obliged 

to subscribe to the 'Beobachter' and help spread it, not only in Munich, but all over the 

German Reich. 1134 The newspaper was an indispensable ideological and organisational 

link between the party's central leadership and its local and provincial membership. 

The column Aus der Bewegung (Notes about the Movement) was a valuable means of 

keeping party members informed of up and corning membership meetings, reporting on 

the outcome of these meeting, and especially for announcing public meetings. 

However, it was not just for advertising and reporting that the newspaper was 

valuable. Hitler soon realised that he could communicate with his followers through 

open letters, articles, and reprints of speeches, thereby reaching a large audience on a 

regular basis. In a speech given on 23 May 1926 Hitler said: "If you consider that one 

33 Charles F. Sidman, "Die Auflagenkurve des Volkischer Beobachter und die Entwicklung des 
Nationalsozialismus", VjZ, vol 13 (1965), pp. 112-18. 
34 Hoover Institution Microfilm, NSDAP Hauptarchiv, John W. Blodgett Collection, Folder 1480. 

28 



single special edition can reach a circulation of 200,000 copies ... then you must admit 

that our propaganda activity is rather extensive. 1135 Welch asserts that, unlike the long, 

detailed, and academic discussion of other political newspapers, the Volkisher 

Beobachter encouraged short pieces on typical National Socialist themes with the 

repetition of commonly recognised slogans, thus attracting a wider reading audience. 36 

The broad outlines along which Hitler felt Nazi propaganda should operate 

were first developed in Mein Kampf between 1924 and 1926. Perhaps because of his 

incredible gift of oratory, the Nazi leader believed strongly in the power of the spoken 

word. The emphasis he placed on the spoken word is apparent from the preface of 

Mein Kampf, where he presents an apology for using the written word: "I know that 

men are won over less by the written than by the spoken word, that every great 

movement on this earth owes its growth to great orators and not to great writers . 1137 

Hitler viewed the spoken word as more valuable than the written word for educating 

the masses, because, unlike the writer, the speaker "gets a continuous correction of the 

speech from the crowd he is addressing" . 38 This enables the speaker to gauge the 

extent to which his listeners are following his argument, whether they understand what 

is being said, and if the desired goal of the speech has been achieved. 39 He quickly 

realised that it was impossible to reach the "broad masses" through the written word. 

He stated in Mein Kampf "there is the fact that the mass of people as such is lazy; 

that is they remain inertly in the spirit of their old habits and, left to themselves, will 

take up a piece of written matter only reluctantly". 40 In fact , he acknowledged the 

Catholic Church and the Marxists as achieving success with the masses primarily 

because of their emphasis on oral propaganda. 

The Nazi leader saw the primary function of propaganda as attracting 

supporters. Supporters were then made amenable to the movement though 

propaganda, because the object of propaganda was to enforce a doctrine. Effective 

use of propaganda made certain that this doctrine disrupted the existing state of affairs 

and at the same times continued to attract additional supporters to the movement. 41 

Hitler argued that propaganda had to be repetitious and consistent because of the slow 

intellect of the masses. He emphasised repeatedly the importance of simple slogans, 

35 VB, 26 May 1926. 
36 Welch, Third Reich, p. 12. 
37 Hitler, preface. 
38 ibid. , p. 427. 
39 ibid., p. 428. 
40 ibid., p. 427. 
41 ibid., pp. 529-31. 

29 



how unwise it was to diverge from the main theme or a few precise points, and the 

overall stupidity of the audience. The following is a typical example of what Hitler had 

to say about propaganda technique in Mein Kampf 

The receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their 
intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is 
enormous. In consequence of these facts all effective 
propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must 
harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public 
understands what you want him to understand by your 
slogan.42 

Hitler considered propaganda a means to an end.43 The object of propaganda was not 

the scientific education of the individual, but rather the indoctrination of the masses. 

Therefore, the Nazi leader saw the task of propaganda as appealing primarily to the 

emotions rather than reason. He said: "The art of propaganda lies in understanding 

the emotional ideas of the great masses and finding, through a psychologically correct 

form, the way to the attention and thence to the heart of the broad masses. 1144 He also 

explained that propaganda should not always be objective or seek to establish the 

truth. Rather, it should present the masses with a position that does not favour the 

enemy, but the party's stance.45 

An interesting feature of the Nazi leader's discussion on propaganda in Mein 

Kampf is that unlike, many other facets of his Weltanschauung, he attributes his 

knowledge on the subject to certain influences. In Volume I, Chapter 6, "War 

Propaganda" he admitted: 

42 ibid., p. 165. 
43 ibid., p. 162. 
44 ibid., p. 165. 
45 ibid., p. 166. 
46 ibid., p. 161. 

Ever since I have been scrutinising political events, I have 
taken a tremendous interest in propagandist activity. I saw 
that the Socialist-Marxist organisations mastered and 
applied this instrument with astounding skill. And soon 
realised that the correct use of propaganda is a true art 
which has remained practically unknown to the bourgeois 
parties. Only the Christian Social movement, especially in 
Lueger's time, achieved a certain virtuosity on this 
instrument, to which it owed many of its successes. 46 

30 



As well as the Marxists, the Christian Social Party, and the Catholic Church Hitler 

asserted that he learnt much from the war propaganda of Germany's enemies.47 He 

categorically stated that anything of value to be learnt about propaganda could only be 

done by studying the other side, mainly because he regretted that Germany did not 

have anything that could be called propaganda. He even went so far as to say that 

Germany had mainly lost the war in 1918 because its propaganda had been a total 

failure . 48 The only example of a great orator that Hitler gave was Lloyd George, 

Prime Minister of Britain between 1918 and 1922. He stated that: "the speeches of 

this Englishman were the most wonderful performances, for they testified to a 

positively amazing knowledge of the soul of the broad masses of the people. And their 

effect was truly powerful. 1149 Although the Nazi leader makes no reference to Gustave 

Le Bon's The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind and William McDougall's The 

Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology, they are commonly 

cited as two early sources from which the he derived many of his propaganda 

techniques. In fact, Robert Waite believes that Hitler's indebtedness to Le Bon 

borders on plagiarism, because of the number of key ideas he took directly from his 

work. 50 

In conclusion, it can be seen that the emphasis Hitler placed on propaganda 

during the period from 1920 to 1926 was substantial, illustrating that it played a 

significant role within his overall Weltanschauung In fact , he even designated two 

chapters to the subject in Mein Kampf, in which he outlined in great detail his views 

concerning propaganda technique, in particular the importance of the spoken word. 

However, by examining the development of two of the most prominent features of the 

Nazi leader's propaganda, the "mass meeting" and the "party newspaper" , it is difficult 

to establish with certainty whether the theory behind his use of propaganda actually 

evolved. It seems that the greatest influence on the growth of Nazi propaganda was 

finance . For, as has been described above, Hitler's mass meetings were not always a 

feature of Nazi propaganda. It was only when the party had enough money to 

advertise and hire large halls that first, public meetings, and then mass meetings took 

place. Likewise, the Nazi Party's move to mass media was not a well planned 

undertaking. Rather, it was a more pragmatic decision, as it was the proposed sale of 

the Volkischer Beobachter which first gave Hitler the idea that a party newspaper 

would be valuable. Money was again the most important issue, for, due to insufficient 

47 ibid. 
48 ibid., p. 169. 
49 ibid. , p. 433. 
SO See Robert G.L. Waite, The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler, New York: Basic Books, 1977, 
pp. 122-23. 

31 



funds it was nearly not possible to purchase the newspaper. In fact, the sum total of 

the Volki$cher Beobachter had to be borrowed. 

32 



CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE FUHRERPRINZIP 

"We need a dictator, who is a genius, if we ever want to rise up again. " 

Adolf Hitler, Speech, 1920. 

Prior to the advent of Adolf Hitler the word "Fiihrer" simply meant leader. 

Connotations now attached to the word "Fiihrer" , however, are but another legacy of 

the Nazi regime. The Fiihrerprinzip, or the principle of leadership, is a complex 

concept derived from many sources, including the messianic principle of Christianity, 

the thaumaturgic kings of the Middle Ages, the Prussian military tradition, and the 

Nietzschean "superman" of volkisch mythology.1 Ernst Huber, a Nazi political 

theorist explains the Fiihrerprinzip: 

The Fuhrer is the bearer of the people's will: he is 
independent of all groups, but he is bound by laws inherent 
in the nature of his people. In this twofold condition, 
independence of all factional interest but unconditional 
dependence on the people, is reflected the true nature of 
the Fiihrerprinzip . . . . He shapes the collective will of the 
people within himself and he embodies the political unity 
and entirety of the people in opposition to individual 
interest. 2 

The leadership principle is the term used to describe the governing structure 

and inner functioning of the Nazi Party. The Nazi theory of the state, like that of 

Italian fascism, was a product of the party's war against democracy. It is a form of 

direct rule, with all decisions coming from the top and being made by the leader who 

commands absolute obedience and remains responsible for all key decisions. Thus, the 

position ofleader commands not only total authority, but also total responsibility. 

Preference for an authoritarian form of rule within the German public did not 

originate with the Nazi Party. In fact, "a Fuhrer cult was emerging within middle-class 

circles during the First World War ... quite independently of Hitler. 113 Also, the 

1 David Welch, Propaganda and the Gemian Cinema 1933-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983, p. 146. 
2 D .M. Phillips, Hitler and the Rise of the Nazis, London: Penguin Books, 1975, p. 26. 
3 William Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, London: Edward Arnold, 1978, p. 11. 

33 



deteriorating political, economic, and social, state of Germany after World War One as 

well as the defeat and humiliation caused by the Treaty of Versailles meant that many 

Germans quickly lost faith in the new democratic system the Weimar Republic offered, 

preferring instead to place their faith in an authoritarian system of rule. As William 

Carr summarises: the Fuhrerprinzip merely represented the culmination of all the 

political aims, economic demands, and ideological views existing since 1871. 4 

This chapter will explain Hitler's rise to Fuhrer of the Nazi Party and the 

development of the Fuhrerprinzip as an important facet of his Weltanschauung. A 

survey of Hitler's writings and speeches between 1920 and 1926 illustrates that his 

thoughts on the Fiihrerprinzip and his role within the Nazi Party underwent continual 

adjustment. This is contrary to earlier studies which invariably stressed his 

determination from the outset of his political career to assume leadership of the Nazi 

Party (in keeping with his own statements in Mein Kampf) . Biographers such as 

Alan Bullock and Hugh Trevor-Roper certainly did not change this perception and 

most subsequent writers have preserved the impression more or less intact. However, 

in a study of major importance, Albrecht Tyrell argues that Hitler made his reputation 

within the Nazi Party as a propagandist or "drummer", not as a "leader of men" . This 

theory is not only plausible, but demonstrates that Hitler's conception of the 

Fuhrerprinzip evolved as his self-awareness grew and his circumstances changed. 

No evidence suggests that before July 1921 Hitler saw himself as a contender 

for the position of Fuhrer of the Nazi Party, although evidence does reveal that he was 

beginning to form a Fuhrer ideology. In fact, historian, Cameron Watt believes that it 

was more than likely during the period from November 1918 to June 1919, when 

Germany first experienced political, economic, and social disaster under the Weimar 

Republic, that the Nazi leader began to develop his ideas on "German democracy"; 

that is, an authoritarian system of rule as opposed to parliamentarianism. 5 It is in this 

context that Hitler's earliest mention of the Fuhrerprinzip occurs. In a speech given at 

the Hofbrauhaus-Festsaal on 27 April 1920 Hitler stated: "It should not be a question 

of Monarchy or Republic, but there ought to be for us a type of state that is at any one 

time best for the people. We need a dictator, who is a genius, if we ever want to rise 

up again.116 

4 ibid. 
5 D. Cameron Watt, "Introduction", in Mein Kampf, p. xxxviiii. 
6 Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner", p. 299. 27 April 1920. 

34 



On 11 July 1921 Hitler resigned from the Nazi Party because of a proposed 

merger with the Augsburg German Socialist Party; a merger which Anton Drexler in 

particular had been discussing for several months. In an ultimatum written three days 

later Hitler said he would only agree to rejoin the party if certain conditions were met. 

This conduct is seen by some historians, for example Ernst Nolte7 and Charles 

Bracelen Flood8, as the date when the Fiihrerprinzip first came into practice. 

However, as Ian Kershaw explains: "everything indicates that Hitler's actions in the 

crisis arose from a heated, spontaneous reaction to circumstances he could not control, 

rather than from a premeditated strategy to acquire dictatorial power. 119 This 

motivation is clearly evident in his ultimatum: 

I make these demands, not because I am hungry for power, 
but because recent events have convinced me that without 
an iron leadership, the party inwardly would stop to be in 
no time what it ought to be: A National Socialist German 
Workers' Party and not an occidental alliance. 10 

Hitler's demands for dictatorial powers were accepted because he played a 

major role within the party. This role is aptly illustrated by Rudolf Hess' article, which 

states: "Are you really blind to the fact that this man is the Fuhrer, who alone will see 

the fight through? Do you believe that without him the masses would flow to the 

Zirkus Krone. 1111 Thus, on 29 July 1921 Hitler was elected Chairman in a vote 543 to 

1 in his favour .12 His Satzung des Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Vereins 

(Statues of the National Socialist German Workers' Association), described as: "a first 

draft, the birth certificate so to speak, of the new type of leadership party" 13, was 

accepted. The statute provided the first outline of the Fiihrerprinzip; the new 

organisational and political structure of the Nazi Party. It stipulated that Hitler was to 

be Chairman with dictatorial powers, that the Executive Committee had to resign, that 

the party be purged of all alien elements, that the name or programme of the party 

could not be changed, that there could be no union with other parties, and that the 

absolute precedence of the Munich branch of the party had to be preserved. 

7 Flood, p. 204. 
8 Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, Miinchen: R. Piper, 1963, p. 446. 
9 Kershaw, Profiles in Power: Hitler, p. 41. 
10 Georg Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegung I: Der Ursprung 1919-1922, Hamburg: RV. Deckers 
Verlag, 1962, p. 110. 
11 VB, 11 August 1921. 
12 Auerbach, p. 24. 
13 Albrecht Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Fuhrer', Miinchen: Wilheim Fink Verlag, 1975, p . 148. 

35 



Most debate surrounding Hitler's self-awareness and his role within the Nazi 

Party occurs during the period from July 1921 to November 1923 . An examination of 

how he was referred to during this era is revealing. Already in 1920/1921 Hitler was 

occasionally referred to as Fuhrer within the party, although usually only as one of the 

party's leaders together with Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer. 14 Thus, the title was 

quite explicitly linked to Hitler's leading position within the Nazi Party. The title 

"Fuhrer" or the phrase "our Fuhrer" became more popular after Hitler's election to 

party Chairman15, with the first public reference to Hitler's new role: "The Fuhrer of 

the NSDAP" appearing in the Volkischer Beobachter on 7 November 1921 . 16 

However, the meaning of the word Fuhrer, leader or chairperson, did not change until 

after Mussolini's March on Rome in October 1922. At this point the term gained its 

new connotations. A direct comparison between Mussolini and Hitler was made by 

other members of the Nazi Party: "We also have Italy's Mussolini. He is called Adolf 

Hitler" . 17 This idea was repeated at Hitler's birthday celebrations in April 1923 by 

Herman Goring: "Many hundreds of thousands are already imbued with the conviction 

that Adolf Hitler is the only man able to bring Germany back up once more. 1118 

Wolfgang Horn makes the observation that: "National Socialist propaganda 

began the year 1923 by portraying the Fuhrer as the herald and embodiment of 

German freedom" . 19 This observation is pertinent for it explains such remarks as: 

"shining in everybody's eyes Hitler stood as the idea of the whole movement. 1120, 

Hitler is "the appointed leader of the new national Germany"21 , as well as Alfred 

Rosenberg's April 1923 article, "Germany's Leader", which stated: 

Crowds of despaired people have once again found a 
support in their lives, and men, who have been looking for 
a leader for the German people, are looking more and more 
expectantly to the man in Munich .... Today we can say the 
name Adolf Hitler has . . . assumed for us this mystical 
sound. 22 

14 VB, 9 September 1920. 
15 VB, 4 March 1922, VB, 13 March 1922, VB, 17 May 1922, and VB, 23 August 1922. 
16 VB, 7 November 1921. 
17 VB, 8 November 1922. 
18 VB, 22/23 April 1923. 
19 Wolfgang Horn, Fuhrerideo/ogie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP 1919-1933, Dusseldorf: 
Droste Verlag, 1972, p. 101. 
20 VB, 22 March 1923 . 
21 VB, 8/9 April 1923. 
22 VB, 20 April 1923. 

36 



It seems this propaganda did have an effect on the Nazi leader. For, in a speech given 

on 4 May 1923 Hitler emphasised his faith in the Fiihrerprinzip, and his role as a 

propagandist paving the way for the arrival of the Fuhrer, but, more importantly, 

(foreshadowing the remarks he was later to make in Mein Kampf) he alluded to 

· himself as a suitable person for role of Fuhrer: 

What could save Germany is the dictatorship of the 
national will and the national determination. Then the 
question arises: is there a suitable personality present? It is 
not our task to look for this person. He is either sent from 
heaven or he is not sent. Our task is to create the sword, 
which a person would need, when he arrives. It is our task 
to provide the dictator, should he come, with a people that 
is ready for him. 23 

Carr concludes that, prior to the November Putsch, Hitler had reached an 

intermediate position in his political development. He was certainly more than a 

"drummer" for the Nazi Party but had not yet reached the point where he was 

absolutely sure of himself as Germany's strongman of the future . 24 Hitler's superiority 

as an orator, his already dominant position in the Nazi Party, and the role in which the 

movement seemed to be casting him were all factors in this uncertainty. 25 The failure 

of the November Putsch, which had been foreshadowed by the failed Pittinger coup of 

August 1922, made Hitler realise that he could not put his trust in other people, even 

in General Ludendorff or General Hindenburg, both whom he had viewed as a possible 

leaders for the NSD AP. In fact, Kurt Ludecke warned after the Pittinger incident: 

"Gone was Hitler's conception of himself as the advance agent, the drummer-boy. On 

that day of disappointment he became the Fuhrer . . . . This failure also altered his entire 

regard for the 'great' people toward whom he had previously shown a certain 

deference and humility. 11 26 

By the beginning of the Putsch trial, on 26 February 1924, Hitler's 

self-awareness had increased remarkably, revealed by the fact that he used the trail as a 

political platform. The prosecution, anxious to spare Ludendorff, whose prestige 

made him an unwelcome defendant in the dock, depicted Hitler as the prime mover in 

the Putsch. Hitler was only too happy to be identified as the real driving force behind 

23 VB, 6/7 May 1923. [Hitler's own italics]. 
24 Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, p. 20. 
25 Riden, p. 22. 
26 Kurt Ludecke, I Knew Hitler: The Story of the Nazi Who Escaped the Blood Purge, London: 
National Book Association, 1938, p . 61 

37 



the uprising, claiming full responsibility. This is illustrated in the following summary of 

his concluding speech before the Munich Civil Court: 

By stylising himself as the executor of the people's will, 
dramatically accepting all the blame of history and blaming 
the failures simply on the errors of Lossows and the 
Bavarian commissioner von Kahr, he succeeded in bringing 
about not only a very mild and honourable judgement, but 
also creating the platform that right wing radicalism in 
Germany would still have to see in him one of its most 
prominent leaders. 27 

With his claim to sole responsibility and the publicity that the trial received Hitler 

thrust himself past Ludendorff into the vacant position of leader of the entire Volk 

movement. 28 

The Nazi Party disintegrated into chaos soon after Hitler's imprisonment and 

his subsequent decision to give up the position of Chairman. This confirms his 

indispensability to the NSDAP. During his absence most of his followers lost interest 

in party activities, and those who remained active split into two main factions : In 

Bavaria the Greater German People's Association (GDVG) and in northern Germany 

the National Socialist Freedom Party (NSFP). The Nazi Party which Hitler confronted 

on his release from Landsberg was in a state of decline and organisational disaster. He 

had to decide whether to start rebuilding the party first in the north or in Bavaria. The 

GDVG had two assets which Hitler could not ignore: it controlled the remains of the 

Nazi movement in Munich, and it administered what was left of the party newspaper, 

the Volkischer Beobachter. Hitler therefore decided to create order in Bavaria first. 

Two months after his release from pnson Hitler gave his first public 

appearance presenting a speech entitled "A New Beginning" . At the end of his speech 

Hitler asked that the Nazi Party to accept him as its unconditional leader for one year 

with the following words: "I am not willing to accept any conditions. Once again I 

take the responsibility for everything that happens in this Movement" . 29 Hitler made 

rapid progress winning over the rival Bavarian leadership. By March 1925 the GDVG 

voluntarily dissolved itself, and within a few months Hitler had complete organisational 

control of the party in Munich. 

27 Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, p. 20. 
28 Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1974, p. 193 . 
29 VB, 27 February 1925. 

38 



Hitler's next decisive move was to discredit Ludendorff, whom the NSFP 

looked upon as their leader. By endorsing Ludendorff in a hopeless campaign, the 

Presidential election of 1925, Hitler underlined his respect for the General, but at the 

same time, because of Ludendorff s certain defeat, highlighted his political 

impotence. 30 Hitler's last act in establishing himself indisputably as Fuhrer of the 

Nazi Party took place at the Bamberg Conference on 14 February 1926. After a 

debate lasting five hours, in which Hitler was the only speaker, the NSFP, led by 

Gregor Strasser, was forced to choose between rejection of Hitler's leadership or 

acceptance of his self-deification. Without a meaningful alternative, the northern 

leaders had no choice but to accept Hitler's leadership. 

The most valuable source of evidence on the Fiihrerprinzip of the period from 

1924 to 1926 is Mein Kampf, the first volume of which Hitler wrote while in 

Landsberg prison, and the second volume of which he wrote during the summer and 

autumn of 1925. Apart from his July 1921 statutes, Mein Kampf is the most 

concentrated source of information, although written in hindsight, which exists on the 

Fiihrerprinzip . Most of his remarks on the topic are found in Volume II of his work, 

either in Chapter 8, "The Strong Man is Mightiest Alone" , or Chapter 11 , 

"Propaganda and Organisation" . Hitler's thoughts on the principle of leadership can be 

broken into four main categories. First, he discussed the structure of the Nazi Party 

prior to July 1921 , making the comment that "Strange as it may seem, this committee 

actually embodied what the party most wanted to combat, namely 

parliamentarianism" . 31 Second, he outlined the way he thought the party should be 

structured: 

The young movement is in its nature and inner organisation 
anti-parliamentarian; that is, it rejects, in general and in its 
own structure, a principle of majority rule in which the 
leader is degraded to the level of a mere executant of other 
people's will and opinion . . . . The leader is always elected, 
but thereby he is vested with unlimited powers of authority 
. . . . He makes the decisions and hence bears the 
responsibility on his shoulders. 32 

Third, he commented on the qualities he felt a leader required, including such 

stipulations as the need for a "basic