Internal Development: The Case of Minginui Forest Village

Kim Price

Thesis Submitted for a Master of Philosophy
School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University

2003
Acknowledgements

As with any project of this nature, there are many people to whom my thanks are due, for their help, advice, encouragement and kindness. First, I would like to thank Rusty and Maureen Rangi for their contribution, time and hospitality during the winter months I spent in the Whirinaki Valley. I also offer my thanks to the people of the Whirinaki Valley and Minginui for allowing me to share in your homes and environment. I would like to acknowledge all members of the community who assisted me by providing research data, agreeing to be interviewed by me, and, most of all, by allowing me to be part of the community.

The Ngati Whare Runanga, without whose support I would not have been able to begin, let alone finish this project, I give my thanks and gratitude.

My enquiries and requests for research material have at all times been considerately answered and promptly met by the staff of Massey University, Palmerston North. Especially, my thanks goes to the staff of the Distance Library Service and the School of People, Environment and Planning. I pass special thanks to my supervisors for leading me though the process.

Mr John Hutton, your mind works way too fast, but I thank you for its speed and efficiency in your review of much of my work. Your continued positive banter kept me focused and on track, providing confidence in what I was doing. I do hope I can repay you in future times.

To my Father and Mother, who have been there to support me, I give a very special thanks in the forbearance you have shown in helping me through this journey. Cheers.

Finally, I extend thanks to my friends for their encouragement and help: Big Boy, Sarah, Marty and Rebecca, Sarah and the German, Stu and Jan, Steve and Louise and Piet. All have, in some way, contributed to this project, particularly Matt and Sarah for their continuous supply of good coffee beans.

While difficult, I have found this project worthwhile for myself. I hope too that my writing will be of benefit to Ngati Whare and the Minginui community.
Abstract

This is a study of 'Third World Development' in Rural New Zealand. A review of development theory provides this thesis with a base from which to approach 'Third World Development' with 'First World' realities. Recent Government development policy, moving toward establishing sustainable development for local (rural) communities, remains ingrained in neo-liberal economic growth strategy. Through a predominantly qualitative, fieldwork centred case study, the dynamics and impacts of development in relation to the small, isolated, rural New Zealand community of Minginui, in the Te Urewera Ranges, are examined. Historical factors for the community are also documented, particularly the impact of neo-liberal economic reforms initiated by the elected Fourth New Zealand Labour Government in 1984.

Research results show that a 'top down' development approach is still active. Historically this approach has led the Minginui community from an active robust village in the 1950s and 1960s as a developing single industry town, to a state of radical underdevelopment in the mid to late 1980s. The migration of the skills based labour (looking elsewhere for employment in a depressed labour market) in the late 1980s left the community to endure an extended period of isolation, marginalisation, social deprivation – in many ways, pure survival.

Over time, though, internal catalysts have generated a 'bottom up' participatory approach to development within the community, termed here 'internal development'. But the sustained period of marginalisation and survival (1987 – 2003) has created social and economic barriers that now hamper the development of further relationships with external organisations. In terms of alternative development theory, Minginui's 'internal development', now provides an opportunity for government to review its development policy and strategy. Uncovering an alternative approach, research has outlined the importance of a 'linking agent' that might generate more efficient use and distribution of resource as delivered by government agencies. This may be an approach to development worth researching for the achievement of sustainable livelihoods for rural communities and rebuilding their capacities.
# Table of Contents

## TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori Words:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Tables</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Figures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Introduction and Methodology</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Theoretical Aims and Objectives</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Thesis Outline</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Methodology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Fieldwork</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 The Foundations of Development</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 The Confusion of Development</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Development and Underdevelopment</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Alternative Development</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Participation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 The History of Participation in Development</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Theoretical Process for 'Participation'</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Participation the Tool</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 Poverty and Dependency</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10 Dependency</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11 Summary</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 The New Zealand System</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Introduction</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 New Zealand Economic Structure</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Government Policy Today</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Rural Maori Women</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary:</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Minginginui Background</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Geographical Location</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSERT MAP PAGE HERE - FIGURE 4.1</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 A Historical Perspective of 'The Valley'</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 The Origins of Minginginui Forest Village</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Migration</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Native Logging</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 New Zealand and 'Structural Adjustment'</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary:</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underdevelopment, 1988-1998</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The Return of Minginginui</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 The Underdevelopment of Minginginui</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Summary:</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6  MINGINUI VILLAGE TODAY – AN OVERVIEW ................................................................. 93
6.1  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 93
6.4  DEMOGRAPHICS .......................................................................................................... 94
6.2  GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ....................................................................................... 94
6.5  VILLAGE MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................... 98
6.6  SUMMARY: ..................................................................................................................... 106

7  CASE STUDIES .................................................................................................................. 107
7.1  INTRODUCTION: .......................................................................................................... 107
7.2  WHANAU SUPPORT: ................................................................................................. 107
7.3  THE NGATI WHARE RUNANGA ............................................................................... 114
7.4  VALLEY SCHOOLS – MINGINUI AND TE WHAITI .................................................... 119
7.5  POSSUM PROGRAMME ............................................................................................. 127
7.6  SUMMARY: ..................................................................................................................... 133

8  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 135

REFERENCES: ...................................................................................................................... 140

REFERENCE LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ............................................................................ 149

APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................... 150

APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................................ 151
  Introduction: ....................................................................................................................... 151
  MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES ................................................................................. 151
  MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ............................................................... 153
  TE PUNI KOKIRI - THE MINISTRY OF MAORI DEVELOPMENT .................................. 162

REFERENCES – APPENDIX A ............................................................................................ 168

APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................................... 169
  STATE HIGHWAY 38 ...................................................................................................... 169

APPENDIX C ........................................................................................................................ 173
  WHANAU SUPPORT – COMMUNITY SURVEY. .......................................................... 173
**Abbreviations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BoP</td>
<td>Bay of Plenty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYFS</td>
<td>Children, Youth and Family Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECN</td>
<td>Enterprise Central Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECNPRB</td>
<td>East Coast National Parks &amp; Reserves Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERO</td>
<td>Education Review Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Forest Development Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST</td>
<td>Goods and Services Tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFDA</td>
<td>International Foundation of Development Alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INZ</td>
<td>Industry New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFAC</td>
<td>Native Forest Action Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZFS</td>
<td>New Zealand Forest Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Community Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>(Economic) Structural Adjustment Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State Owned Enterprises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDC</td>
<td>Whakatane District Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINZ</td>
<td>Work and Income New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maori Words:

Hapu: Sub-tribe.
Hau Ora: Health clinic.
Hui: Meeting.
Iwi: Tribe, People, Nation.
Kaka: Native bird, Native parrot.
Kaumataua: Male elder.
Kaupapa: Strategy.
Kereru: Native bird, Native pigeon.
Kiwi: Native bird (ground dwelling).
Kohanga Reo: Language nest, Maori pre-school.
Kohanga: Nursery, Nest.
Korero: Discussion.
Kuia: Female elder.
Kura: School.
Maori Tanga: Maori culture, Maori perspective.
Marae: Meeting area of village and its buildings.
Ngati: People of ....
Pa: Stockade,
Pakeha: Non-Maori, European.
Runanga: Assembly, Management body.
Tangata Whenua: People of the land, Local people.
Te Puni Kokiri: Ministry of Maori Development.
Te Reo: The language.
Tikanga: Custom, Meaning, Criterion.
Totara: Large native tree.
Tangangiaewae: Home, Home turf, Domicile.
Whakapapa: Genealogy, Cultural identity.
Whanau: Family, Extended family.
Whare: House, Deignated building.
Wharepakau: Tribal ancestor of Ngati Whare.
Table of Tables

Table 3.1: Key Domestic & External Developments between 1974 & 1992. 46
Table 3.2: New Zealand GDP Growth rates in four Periods (% Growth – Real GDP) 47
Table 3.3: Survey - Abuse and Violence on Maori Women. 58
Table 4.1: Census figures for Minginui, Te Whaiti and Ngaputahi 1945 – 1981 (number of Maori in brackets). 69
Table 5.1: MWD Report; Summary of Engineering Services Costs. 85
Table 5.2: Population figures Minginui 86-93. 90

Table of Figures

Figure 2.1: Basic outline of Rostow’s Theory of Economic Development. 19
Figure 2.2: The Transformation of Peasantry in capital social formations (Friedmann 1992, 16). 29
Figure: 2.3: Amstein’s (1969) eight rungs of a ladder of participation moving from nil-participation to full participation at the top. 32
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Maori and Non-Maori population by NZ Dep 96 scale. 56
1 Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is a study of 'Third World Development' in rural New Zealand. Such a study may appear contradictory: New Zealand is supposedly a First World state. However, reading around the concept of 'Third World Development' (which I now term 'global development'), I was amazed by the similarity of the problems recorded by development professionals in the 'Third World', and my own personal experience of rural New Zealand communities.

In particular I was reminded of the plight of one rural community, Minginui Forest Village, were I had worked intermittently in or close to for approximately fifteen years from 1988. Minginui is a community of approximately 75 households, sitting in the Whirinaki Valley in the central North Island. From its construction in the late 1940s by the New Zealand Forest Service, Minginui housed a community of forestry workers and their families. However, the cessation of native timber logging, combined with the corporatisation of the Forest Service in 1987, saw a transformation in the population of Minginui from one of full employment, to almost full unemployment and underdevelopment. Although a few Pakeha and Maori from other iwi reside in the village, Minginui is now a predominantly Maori community. Unemployment rates remain high.

Ideas such as 'structural adjustment' and 'economic growth' rely on the measure of Gross Domestic Production (GDP). Such measures have been the base for mainline development over the last two decades. Attention has been drawn, though, to the failure of many development and development projects globally (Korten 1990, Chambers 1999, McMichael 1996). The cause of these failures has been debated. For many critics, such failure can be attributed to state-led and/or market driven development at the expense of a policy focused on social development (Kelsey 1995, Swain 1999).

Currently the New Zealand government and allied development agencies are seeking to improve, and indeed move towards sustainable development for local communities (New Zealand Social Development Conference 1995). Yet it seems that much development policy remains wedged to an economic growth focus, which assumes that community
social development spins off solely from economic growth. Also well documented is the focus more recently given by the New Zealand government to the development of rural Maori communities, particularly under the 'Closing the Gaps' programme. Therefore, Maori economic and social growth has been singled out for special attention.

Similar problems with growth-only strategies for development have been recognised in research into Third World development. Much thinking suggests the need for greater development alternatives, such as 'participatory practices'. Research has also shown that social dynamics, such as community empowerment and a people's sense of dignity and self-confidence, are important aspects as positive in development (Scheyvens 1998). Indeed, such social aspects are being seen as fundamental to sustainable and effective community development.

Statistics show that New Zealand, although involved in forces of 'structural adjustment' since the mid 1980s (termed by Kelsey (1993) as 'the New Zealand experiment') has experienced economic growth. But personal observation of several rural Maori communities over the last decade has shown that this growth has not been evenly experienced. Indeed, as I argue below, signs of development have been minimal. In retrospect, rather than growth, the experience of many communities could be classified as underdevelopment, a situation that is experienced in many Third World countries.

In conducting research for this thesis, the key question posed was: 'What processes have been/are instituted by the Government and how effective have they been for the social and economic development of rural Maori communities?' With a focus on reviewing the dynamics of participatory theory and practice in the present development process. This thesis is constructed around this question. After a general discussion of development theory (chapter 2), I review some of the policy frameworks currently in vogue in New Zealand (chapter 3). I then turn to the study of development (or underdevelopment) of the Whirinaki Valley, especially the small and isolated village of Minginui. This is done in two parts (chapters 4 through 7): first, an analysis of the more immediate history of the area (from approximately 1948 to the present). And second, through case studies of current community development issues and initiatives. A conclusion summarises many of the key issues raised, as well as making some recommendations.
1.2 Theoretical aims and objectives

Through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, participatory practice in development have been recognised as important to the gearing of positive outcomes to development projects. The following development issues, research question and objectives have been produced as guiding parameters for this research project.

Fundamental to this thesis are the complexities of the 'top-down' or state driven approaches to development, as set out by Chambers (1996):

"Community-based rural planning has its origins in the planning experience such that, rural communities and people often suspect its purposes, processes and products. Planning practitioners find rural communities to be apathetic and unsophisticated, while rural residents find planning to be stifling and irrelevant to their needs. The result is that planners either avoid or impose planning on the community, and the community either tolerates or rejects planning altogether". (Chambers & Blackburn, 1996, 1)

Much development theory is ingrained by an ethos of 'economic growth', seemingly at the expense of growth toward 'social development' and 'empowerment'. For example, in their approach of 'alternative development', Scheyvens (1999) and colleagues argue that:

"If development is to be 'concerned with enabling people to take charge of their own lives' (Longwe, 1991,149), donors and development agencies will need to broaden their perspectives. Many people will not be able to fully participate in any process of change, let alone have any input into the direction that that change is taking, unless they have faith in themselves, a sense of dignity, and unless they have the knowledge with which to action change". (Scheyvens, 1998, 251)

To aid the review of these issues in relation to rural community and rural Maori development, the following question has been established to guide this research.

"How consciously and actively has participatory theory and practice been considered in contemporary New Zealand rural (Maori) development?"
Overall objectives of this study include:

- To examine the theoretical base of New Zealand government policy for rural (Maori) development in the light of current development trends.

- To use case study methodology to document development processes at a local level, and particularly in respect to the insights of participatory development theory.

- To ascertain the positive (and not so positive) attributes of current development processes for rural (Maori) community development.

1.3 Thesis Outline

The following chapters outline theoretical concerns, fieldwork results, and more particularly seek to answer the research objectives set out above.

Chapter Two provides a theoretical discussion of development and the influence of Western economic systems, from Keynesian economics to neo-liberalism, on development theory. It outlines some of the changes that have occurred over time. The relationship between development, poverty and dependency is reviewed, as is the trend toward alternative development concepts.

Chapter Three reviews New Zealand's more recent economic structure and the situation today. Looking at Government development policy, a case study of rural Maori women provides an example of the impacts of these policies.

Chapter Four provides the background history of development of the fieldwork case study, Minginui Forest Village in Te Urewera Ranges of the central North Island. The chapter reviews the Village's establishment, growth and slide into underdevelopment as influenced by the country's economic and political climate, and changes in primary resource production.

Chapter Five looks at the fourth Labour Government's economic reform policies and the impact they had on the residents of Minginui Forest Village. The Government's role in 'gifting' the village back to the local iwi, Ngati Whare, is reviewed.
Chapter Six looks at Minginui Forest Village today. The material presented is based on
fieldwork conducted by the researcher. It acknowledges the positive energy created by
residents to direct change in their community. Past problems, still influencing the
functioning of the village today are discussed, as are ongoing contradictions and
difficulties in development.

Chapter Seven sets out five case studies of local development initiatives. These show
the 'internal development' which has been generated from within the community.
Problems with these initiatives are reviewed. The contrast of examples of Government
initiated programmes to local initiative are explored.

Chapter Eight reviews the difference between the format of development over the past
decades with the philosophy of 'alternative development', the key to which is people's
participation. The chapter reviews the dialogue and comments on the development
structure that is projected by the New Zealand government and how this has impacted
on the community of Minginui.

Chapter Nine summarises the research and provides some limited recommendations.

1.4 Methodology

My methodology has been built around the following observation:

"There is no such thing as one best research method ... research should always
be tailor made". (Davidson & Tolich 1999, 21).

A major part of the research entailed a review of primary and secondary literature. This
provided information on development theories, and particularly alternative development
thinking. It also enabled a review of some recent New Zealand Government
development policy. The second part of the research was a three and a half month
period of fieldwork in the community of Minginui (between July and October 2002).
Fieldwork focused on aspects of current development, such as the establishment of local
organisations, work programmes and peoples' participation in both locally or externally
initiated processes.

Due to the bicultural nature of this study it was important to establish the cultural,
traditional and correct determinants in the research process. Put simply, I am Pakeha,
and Minginui is a predominantly Maori community. It was therefore important to think through the implications of this situation. First, my research proposal was vetted, and approved, by the Massey University Ethics Committee. Second, I sought and received endorsement for my project from Te Runanga o Ngati Whare. (I note that a separate body, the Ngati Whare Trust, owns the land on which Minginui sits, although it is not currently functioning as a Maori organisation, being managed under a court appointed trustee). Third I made contact and discussed my project with local Minginui organisations, particularly Whanau Support. I also introduced myself to members of the community as I met them, explaining the kaupapa of my research.

A useful set of guidelines to consider in Maori focused research have been set out by Davidson and Tolich (1999):

- Who should do the research?
- The concept of the research as a partnership.
- The issues of accountability, and to whom one is accountable.
- The question of what is going to come out of the research.

Other writers such as Bishop and Glynn (1992), Durie (1992), Mahuika (1973) Soutar (1991), Stokes (1985) and Walker (1993), have explained that while an understanding of Maori tikanga is important, 'Maori' is an umbrella term that covers iwi with differing tradition and tikanga. A total understanding of tikanga is not necessary, therefore: indeed it would be impossible to acquire. An understanding and awareness of the principles of Maori custom is sufficient.

All in all, I worked using my personal philosophy of having respect, sensitivity, maturity, honesty and authenticity when working with people. I sought to be open and honest when approaching and dealing with other groups or individuals. As Denzin (1997) states:

"The ideal researcher informed by this ethic is a morally involved, self-aware, self-reflexive and interacting individual who holds the self responsible for the political and ethical consequences of their actions". (Denzin 1997, 277, cited in Laine 2000, 28).
I also worked to remain aware in an ongoing manner of the moral and ethical problems that may arise from my presence in the community. I avoided the rigidity of a strictly objective research model, one I believe is sterile in its approach and which leaves little option for addressing problems. Rather, I sought to maintain both qualitative and quantitative aspects of research – understanding both what people thought or felt, but also being aware that views could differ between individuals in the same community or that external forces or processes could simply be misunderstood by informants.

In regard to accountability, I hold that I am ultimately accountable for the contents of this thesis. Chapters have been made available to members of Te Runanga o Ngati Whare Iwi Trust for comment. Feedback has in some cases resulted in changes to the text, but the work and my conclusion remain my own. In saying this I acknowledge that communities are complicated things. Institutions or interests may conflict; individuals may disagree with one another. My role, however, is not to document purely personal views, or to take sides, but to try to understand and explain the development experience, or lack of it, of the Minginui community. I hope that in some way my work will be of use to that community.

1.5 Fieldwork

I steered the fieldwork part through a process of case studies, these being a recognised and preferred process for examining contemporary events. As Yin states, case studies have the strength to incorporate documents, interviews and observations (Yin 1994, 8).

The research process involved drawing from the literature establishing the context to the Government’s perspective and policy on development. Collating the historical documentation on the case studies was followed with the majority of the information coming from discussion and observation in the field. Interpretations that evolved from the information gathered from interviews have set the course for this research, being the views and opinions of the people of Minginui, on the approach and format of development that they have experienced.

After gaining consent from the Ngati Whare Runanga I spent three and a half months living and participating in activities with the community of Minginui. One resident couple graciously allowed me to park a caravan on their back lawn, where I was able to use
their electricity and facilities. Besides cutting firewood for elders and driving the school bus, I formally interviewed 21 people. Of these people, 14 were residents aged between 18 and 70. Three interviewed subjects were members of the Runanga, and 4 were government employees. Of the residents interviewed two were principals of the schools, two were trustees of Whanau Support and one was the operations manager/youth worker for Whanau support. I had numerous other discussions with village residents, either at the local club or elsewhere.

One of the government employees I had to interview by phone. With one of the Ngati Whare Runanga members I had various informal discussions over time while living in the village. All the other interviews were audio-taped consisting of 30 minutes to an hour and a quarter discussion.

Discussion covered a range of subjects, including:

- **Views on community**
  - People’s interaction
  - Wants and needs
  - Future ideas or community-vision
  - Resources available to community
  - Knowledge
  - Preferences & problems

- **Views, experiences and opinions on:**
  - Development for community – village management
  - Government agencies
  - Runanga
  - Schools
  - Whanau Support
  - Possum Programme
  - Village history
  - Culture
  - Industry
  - Identity
  - Activities
• As Village member
  • Self determination
  • Resources
  • Wants and needs
  • Family responsibilities
  • Community responsibilities
  • Problems

The Highway 38 case study (appendix B), while not directly linked to the Minginui community, has, in my view, a degree of impact on the community that needs considering in regards to development. Being a Government controlled asset, the road significantly influences the rural communities.

To gain accurate recent demographic data on the Minginui community was difficult. I have used figures from a household survey carried out by Whanau Support (appendix C). The Whanau Support Household Survey was carried out to update their database of the village demographics, which is necessary for them to apply for government funding. The acquisition of Statistics New Zealand results from the 2001 census, due to requiring a breakdown from the regional Bay of Plenty, Whakatane District figures, was beyond the financial scope of this study. I was quoted a figure of approximately $800 to acquire this information, an unfortunate result of the 'user-pays' policy of many government departments today.
2 The Foundations of Development

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at development theory over the second half of the twentieth century. It gives an overview of modernisation theory, particularly the dominance of western-economic theories. Modernisation theory, whether based on Keynesianism or neoliberalism (aligned with neo-classical economics) has had considerable impact on both Third and First (Western) World development. Keynesian economics dominated until the late 1960s. In the 1970s, in the context of global fuel and debt crises, there was a swing toward neo-liberalism. Development slipped into crisis. New Zealand's development was no exception to this pattern. The crisis, however, also initiated thinking about alternative development. Third World development focused on the elimination of poverty through growth and saw 'people's participation' in development as an important corollary. Western development, which also faces problems of poverty and dependency, has been much slower in reviewing alternative development processes.

2.2 The confusion of Development

Development, mainstreamed into dominant structures of the socio-economic powerful of the world, has been extrapolated, fragmented, termed positive, found to be negative, to have enhanced communities, or to have destroyed peoples. Mainstream development has a long history, one that is closely aligned to Western/First World development. However, in recent years many questions and contradictions have been voiced. The idea of development has been questioned by various authors, from tame critics to prominent comment from critical theorists. The following shows the varied views and ideology on development.

The seeming flux in development theory can be best explained through a historical review of the process. Prior to World War II, development was defined purely in terms of Western, or capitalistic, economic activity, itself based on the technical and industrial development and the expansion of states (colonisation) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These economic principles of development, while seen as
mainstream today evolved from Adam Smith's (1840) economic concepts. They were later vitalised and modified by Keynes' and Rostow's philosophy of economic growth.

Modernisation theory, as suggested by Bernstein (1979), developed from the understanding of the sociologists' need to determine social and cultural change in conditions arising from designated economic growth models. As claimed by Rostow (1956) in his 'Take-Off' analysis, development was an evolutionary process, a "unilinear" change moving a society from pre-modern to modern (Fig 2.1). Modernisation was thus both economic and social adjustment moving society from what was termed a 'traditional' base to 'modernity' (Kabeer 1999, 14).

![Figure 2.1: Basic outline of Rostow's Theory of Economic Development.](image)

In terms of economics, modernisation theory drew significantly on the growth theory (also called 'International Keynesianism'). Growth theory works on the principles of capital acquisition and growth. It maintained that long-term development could not be attained through pure neo-classical economics and/or microeconomic processes related to a free market and export-led growth based on 'comparative advantage'. Rather, growth theory maintains that, to develop true macroeconomic stability market fluctuation needs to be addressed by the state and/or by external sources.

It remained implicit, though, that industrialisation along European lines would form a fundamental component of growth. Rostow's (1956) 'stages of growth' model hinged on raising the rate of domestic savings in order to generate investment in the manufacturing industry. In the process, societies would move through various stages of development,
from a 'traditional' existence to capitalisation and mass consumption; historically, the path the west moved through. Rostow (1956) maintained that the critical point, termed 'take-off', was when large capital investment was injected to kick-start the development of self-sustaining growth:

"The take-off is defined as the interval during which the rate of investment increases in such a way that the real output per capita rises and this initial increase carries with it radical changes in production techniques and the disposition of income flows which perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate thereby the rising trend of per capita output". (Rostow 1956, 25)

Take off is also where state intervention is critical, particularly to maximise investment through state or foreign means. Keynesian theory maintained that neo-classical economics would not be sufficient to move states through this structural transformation (Brahman 1996, 14).

At the theoretical level Keynesian economics and growth theory fell from favour by the late 1950s. However, the concepts remained in the modernisation theory and mainstream development processes, these being:

- Economic growth based on industrialisation
- The critical role of saving and investment.
- State intervention in development planning.
- Development based on the Western development experience. (Brahman 1996, 14)

In practice Keynesian development doctrine was prominent in New Zealand until the late 1970s, driven by state investment in infrastructure and a policy of 'public works' to ensure full employment (Elise 2000, 51).

From a sociological point of view, modernisation theory recognises the impact on socialisation and culture due to the extent of change experienced by society in the transition from 'traditional' to 'modern'. For modernisation to be achieved, all social and cultural barriers need to be removed. For example, tribal, village and community authoritarian systems need to be replaced by political parties, party representation and
the creation of the public service. The family units, such as those based on extended kinship, would necessarily lose their effect and status. Instead, individualisation and social mobility caused by industrial specialisation would develop. Subsistence agriculture or basic cash cropping would be replaced by export led production (Smelser 1966, 120). As Brohman (1996) states:

"Modernisation Theory claimed a high correlation existed in the Third World societies between the degree of modernisation and the diffusion of Western-style cultural and attitudinal traits". (Brohman 1996, 15)

It is worth noting that while Brohman make this claim in reference to the Third World, the situation experienced by the Maori through the colonisation and development of New Zealand is similar.

The classical form of the modernisation theory can be summarised as follows:

- Modernisation involves a mixture of economic, technological and social change. The priority is in social change such as values, norms, beliefs and customs, as this would lead to prompting changes in other areas;

- The modernisation process divides societies into 'traditional' and 'modern'. This brings about the breakdown of the 'traditional' society;

- Modernisation, built on the model of Western capitalist industrialisation, offers a framework that purportedly is beneficial to all. Different rates of change should occur at different times and certain groups will experience social dislocation. However, modernisation is inevitable;

- Development factors (investment capital, change in values and attitudes and technological innovation) were generated internally over time in the West. For the Third World, these factors are gathered from outside sources and/or state infrastructure, which will enable a quick change to modernisation, thus allowing the gap between rich and poor to close;

- This modernisation process is dependent on the social elite being well educated. It is important that, for rapid change, development policy must target this sector
initially so as to establish the social elite as the 'change agents', which will result in a quicker adaptation to structural reform and modernisation;

- Structural change is critical for a speedy shift to modernisation. Therefore, the removal of social and cultural barriers that may prevent modernisation is imperative for the development process to be achieved. These barriers are the major causes of underdevelopment. (Brohman 1996, 16-17)

Reflecting critically on modernisation, the driving force seems to be to by-pass human behavioural instincts, local traditions and culture, for the advancement of technology and productivity. With the speed of advancement in technology and production of the industrialised system, social parameters are apparently not considered as important.

In the latter part of the twentieth century development theory changed from ideas of independent state-led growth, to one of global economic doctrine based on the free market. This had varying success (McMichael 1996, 9). The idea of 'globalisation', is initially connected to the rise of the neo-liberal theory. Neo-liberalism rejected Keynesian doctrine of state intervention, delivering instead a strategy of open market forces for the stimulation of economic growth (Brohman, 1996, 26-27). Neo-liberalism also paid little attention ot social development. Rather, money was set as the sole measure of value. If the wealth in financial terms of a community or individual increased, then the result would necessarily be positive. Arguably, this resulted in the fragmentation of both social and environmental circumstances (Korten, 1996, 69).

Coming from a neo-liberal position, Korten (1996) outlines the primary components of neo-liberal theory:

- Economic growth is the pathway to human progression and is measured in the 'gross national product' (GNP);
- Free markets provide the most optimal and efficient allocation of resources and avoid government interference;
- Economic globalisation provides the free flow of goods, services and money (if freed from trade barriers), to enhance competition, economic efficiency, job creation, lowers consumer prices and increases consumer choice;
- Privatisation improves the efficiency by moving the functions and assets from the government sector to private means.

However, the reality of the social dynamics of modernisation/neo-liberal philosophy can be construed as meaning:

- People are motivated primarily by greed;
- The drive to acquire is the highest expression of what it means to be human;
- The relentless pursuit of greed and acquisition leads to socially optimal outcomes;
- It is in the best interest of human societies to encourage, honour and reward the above values.

A clear example of such neo-liberalism is seen with the economic restructuring enforced on Costa Rica by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank by a 'structural adjustment' programme. Costa Rica, prior to IMF and World Bank intervention, was seen as an egalitarian society made up of many small farmers producing for local markets. IMF intervention caused the decay of smallholdings, the displacement of farmers and the generation of large-scale agricultural units producing for export. The outcomes of this is a noticeable gap in income discrepancy between rich and poor and an increase in crime and violence. The country is now reliant on imports for general food goods. The foreign debt that structural adjustment programming was meant to reduce has doubled (Korten 1996).

However, the IMF and the World Bank quote Costa Rica's structural adjustment programme as a success as the country's GDP has increased (indicating economic growth). It is now supposedly capable of meeting debt servicing payments (Korten 1996, 49). For how long and for whose benefit has this change occurred is the question? A similar example of 'structural adjustment' will be made of New Zealand's experience in economic reform in the following chapter.
2.3 Development and underdevelopment

In mainstream development terms the example of Costa Rica’s enforced economic structural adjustment programme is regarded as a positive development. However, a critical review of mainstream development by economists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, has painted a rather different picture (Sachs 1992, 46). Similarly, a neo-marxist analysis highlights the way that process of colonial capitalism and mainstream development (based on modernisation) can lead to exploitation and ‘underdevelopment’ (Plange 1996, 152).

One writer, Plange, maintains that:

"Underdevelopment, as a socio-economic state, is seen as a socio-historical construction, which occurred after the establishment of a colonial capitalist economic system; and may be defined as a process by which a country’s realistic possibilities for economic growth and development are thwarted and distorted, usually by contact with and the intrusion of a more ‘highly’ developed economic system” (Plange 1996, 153).

Neo-Marxists conclude that the socio-economic history of many developing countries has resulted in the economic shift from an undeveloped economic status to the ‘development of underdevelopment’.

McMichael (1996) describes underdevelopment as part of of the process of colonisation. Much of the colonial labour force was forced into export production, mining, plantation and large scale agricultural projects to sustain the urban and industrial needs of distant Europe, and out of producing for domestic markets. This economic structure is still prevalent globally today, and depended on the active disorganisation of the colonies, which many critics now term ‘underdevelopment’.

Another prominent critic Immanuel Wallerstein (1983) has drawn connections between the work by Andre Gunder Frank (1969) on underdevelopment and to the world-systems theory. His proposition is that a world-system, structured by the division of labour that evolved in Europe in the sixteenth century, is, in modern terms, a capitalistic world-economic process based on the endless accumulation of capital. The world-system, dominated by these economic parameters, functions on the relationship of a core (the
powerful) region surrounded by the periphery (less powerful). In order for the core to stay profitable, the connection between it and the periphery must always increase. This has the effect of spreading the 'world system' (Wallerstein 1999, 35). Frank's historical-structural approach creates the picture of exploitation of the colonies by the metropolitan states of Europe and the USA. The core develops to the detriment of the periphery. Indeed, these contradictory economic processes, produced by the same capitalistic mode of production, shows that one exists as a condition of the other (Plange 1996, 183).

Robbins further states that the economic policies of wealthy countries are not designed to benefit poor countries, but rather to further benefit political and corporate agendas. It has been recognised that humanitarian initiatives, such as food aid programmes, increase the profits of agribusiness sometimes causing, economically, more harm, than good (Robbins 1999, 207). This phenomena also exists internally within developed countries.

Such critiques of the modern economic world-system paint a pessimistic view, one that is not outwardly encouraging for the long-term future. As Wallerstein (1999) points out:

"Critiques are destructive; they intend to be. They tear down, but they themselves do not build up. [He] called this ... the process of clearing the underbrush. Once one has cleared the underbrush, however, one has only a clearing, not a new construction but only the possibility of building one" (Wallerstein 1999, 197).

Critics often provide the counter argument to what economically we have functioning today. But they do not always supply the solution or give impetus for the initiation of alternatives for development. We will look at this in the next section.

2.4 Alternative development

Are the theories and practices of aid and development in crisis? An increasing volume of literature looking at the outcomes of development projects certainly portrays a grim picture. But reviewing development in terms of 'crisis' begs a definition of 'crisis'. For use here, the idea of crisis is that the present processes, situations and concepts are in dispute with one another. The present is no longer working effectively to provide
opportunity or solutions in the context of social life. The use of 'crisis' as opposed to 'problems' also suggests the adoption of more unconventional solutions and a change in the direction of development. As explained by Hettne:

"Radicals in favour of structural change tend to see 'crisis' where defenders of status quo see problems of adaptation. The multdimensionality of the crisis and the discontinuities in the development process force us to take a new look at development theory" (Hettne 1990, 10).

A crisis for mainstream development, as illustrated by Brahman (1996), was acknowledged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Development through the 1950s and 1960s, based on economic growth models, resulted in a significant section of Third World populations experiencing major inequalities in income distribution and growing labour underdevelopment. This led to growing impoverishment and a further decline in already poor standards of living. Discussions by development theorists and practitioners turned to focus on people and qualities of life, rather than development being determined by an economic growth cycle and material production as measured by figures of GNP and GDP.

Successful development thus required the introduction of new approaches, founded on basic human needs, social equity and an understanding of the capacity of communities to meet their own development expectations. Development should take place at local community level, with the emphasis of development for people not people for development (Brahman 1996, 203).

In a similar manner, Hettne (1990) argues for the development of greater freedom of speech, self-realisation in work, and the need for the elite to take a measure of overconsumptive types of development. Hettne holds that people-centred development took place under the Cocoyoc Declaration of Mexico in 1974 (Hettne 1990, 152).

'Alternative development' refers more to 'content' (social, traditional, cultural etc) in development rather than 'form' (the measurement of production) of development:

- Need-oriented (being geared to meeting human needs);
- Endogenous (stemming from the heart of society, defining values and future vision);
• Self-reliance (each society relies on its own strengths and resources in terms of culture and environment);

• Ecologically sound (in relation to stewardship for future generations);

• Based on structural transformation (so as to establish the conditions of self-management and full participation in decision-making by all stakeholders).

(Hettne 1990, 153-154)

With alternative development theory a major aspect was the introduction of people’s participation at all the stages of development. If correctly administered, the development was envisaged as linking both donors and beneficiaries at all stages, from conception and planning to monitoring and evaluation.

In practice, however, the implementation of alternative development programmes from the mid 1970s was hindered. Donors generally remained stuck to the old regime of mainstream development, only paying lip service to ideas of beneficiary participation. Development was still administered in a top-down, paternalistic and bureaucratic way, where beneficiaries had no role in the conceptualisation, planning or decision-making processes. As the World Bank acknowledged in its annual report for 1998:

"The principles guiding beneficiary participation in Bank-financed projects have been quite abstract and of limited operational impact. Beneficiaries were not assigned a role in the decision-making process, nor was their technological knowledge sought to designing project components" (World Bank 1988, 60).

The potential voiced by early alternative development theory was thus stunted in its growth. Through much of the 1980s and 1990s ‘top-down’ approaches remained characterised by:

• Allowing state governance to encroach further into the remote rural areas giving increasing control and manipulation;

• External influences paying little attention to local social dynamics, cultural traditions, land reforms and environmental/ecological conditions;

• Outside professionals denying local people’s empowerment and imposing their own ideas and concepts;
• The state control, questioning political stability if transfer of power was to be allowed;

• Local elites, co-opted by the state in development programming, causing further reductions in distribution and reinforced exploitation and domination. (Brohman 1996, 220-222).

The success of early alternative development models was further eroded with the global debt crisis of the 1980s, which enhanced the rise of neo-liberalism. A sense of global insecurity increased, in the 1980s, characterised by environmental collapse, expansion of poverty and increasing communal violence. However, the 1980s also saw a renewed call to address development methods. Growth, valued on consumption and material productivity, was again seen as being negative in many circumstances. (Korten 1990, 10).

Friedmann (1992) describes ‘alternative development’ as ‘people centred’ development and frames this development on the household, classifying households as functional collective economies making joint decisions for the benefits of their own lives and livelihoods. Which classifies them as productive and proactive units. This is in contrast to neo-classical economic theory, which places production in industry and agriculture outside the household. With neo-classical economics, the household is placed as a centre of consumption at the end of the line and is of little interest in the function and value of growth (Friedmann 1992, 32). However, alternative development (viewing the household as productive, political and social base unit), requires participation (individual and community) as an integral part of any development process.
2.5 Participation

The global organisation of capitalism, with its emphasis on modernisation and neoliberalism, has resulted in large numbers of people being marginalised and left out of meaningful participation in social, political and economic systems. As Friedmann (1992) points out, the message and the action communicated to the low socio-economic populations is that, for all practical purposes, they are nearly redundant for the growth in capital accumulation. For example, modern capitalism has no need for 'land-less rural workers' as multinational corporations are in need of the land for large scale harvesting.

Figure 2.2: The Transformation of Peasantry in capital social formations (Friedmann 1992, 16).

---

**Figure 2.1** The transformation of the peasantry in capital social formations (Friedmann 1932, 16)
of industrial and exportable primary products, the production of which has been revolutionised by technological innovations to limit and minimise labour requirements, maximise production and eliminate labour complexities. This is represented in the model (figure 2.2). The process of the capitalism working as a mainstream economy outlining the reduction in participation of the general public and the increased control of the production and consumption patterns, power and domination by the elite.

2.6 The history of participation in development

The post-war development in the 1950s and 1960s tends to create a utopian global image of Western civilisation providing, full employment, universal health for all, good education, the provision of livelihoods and adequate consumption was the subject of major debate in the 1970s. A review of development performances, based on Keynesian theory of economic growth, was shown as a dismal failure with the result that large populations’ living standards showed no improvement; in many cases, people were worse off (Chambers 1997, 1). The rapid commercialisation of agriculture, capital investment in industrialisation, transfer of traditional values and the generation of national infrastructures was (and is) the means for creating economic growth, the benefits from which (viewed by Adam Smith) would ‘trickle-down’. This has not happened; the result is an increase in the inequities of the class and racial structures and no significant change to the alleviation of poverty (Hall & Midgley 1988, 91).

McNamara president of the World Bank, (1973), was acknowledged as saying that growth was causing a ‘greater mal-distribution of income in many developing countries’ and increasing the nature of inequality for the poor (Rahnema 1992, cited Sachs, 117). The 1970s saw the development debate gradually moving toward the concepts of ‘participation’ and ‘basic needs’. The elite (Western developers, academics, bureaucrats, NGO’s and the like), discussed, supported and wrote about the need for ‘participation’ in development. Participation, as a humanistic development approach, was visualised and it incorporated the necessity of providing for the ‘basic needs’ of the poor (the world’s majority) combined with the notions of people’s need for expression, creativity, tradition and ability to determine their destiny and self reliance as individuals (Brohman 1996, 207). One of the early leaders in the move to participation in development was the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), a
Swiss based NGO, established mid 1970s. Their development concept was set on a bottom-up approach; raising people’s consciousness to development and trying to initiate participation of grassroots organisations in decision-making processes.

The concept and theory of participation was sound. However, the early development programmes, based on this alternative, were criticised on a number of points;

- Mainstream development tradition remained influential;
- Top-down conceptualisation and planning gave little meaning to participation by local organisations until the implementation of projects;
- The gap between theory and practice was never bridged, thus giving rise to the comment that the ideology of local participation was ‘lip service’ only;
- The top-down approach maintained the control of development within state and local elite’s capacities.

This led to the understanding by many critics that the bottom-up, local participatory approach was like swimming upstream against mainstream economics and the power base. The new ideologies formed through the debates of the 1970s regressed further with the impact and influence of the ‘debt crisis’ of the 1980s.

The decade of the 1980s, termed ‘the lost decade for development’, saw an economic adjustment process dismantle and abandon any previous achievements from such development (Esteva 1992, Cited in Sachs (ed), 16). Keynes’ and Rostow’s philosophies of state led growth (on shaky ground during the 1970s) was completely bulldozed way in the 1980s with the emergence of neo-classical economics engendered by a wave of neo-liberalism. Free market philosophy with radical decentralisation of the state was the influencing factor on development. The economic climate changed radically, with the introduction of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which were driven by the World Bank, as a measure to address the rising debt crisis. The result of SAP was the privatisation of state assets, the withdrawal of state services and influence and the introduction of export-driven agriculture and industrialisation, especially for Third World economies suffering debt repayment crises having to align with the SAPs process in order to survive, whereas for New Zealand’s situation it was a totally voluntary move.
More recently, and with the inefficiency of the mainstream development frameworks over the last three decades, attention was focused on re-formatting the need for alternative strategies and participation in development. Revisiting the initial concepts, introduced in literature of the 1970s and with the hindsight and analysis of the key elements, new insights into the theory and practice of development are being created (Brohman 1996, 201). According to Sachs (1992) and Chambers (1997) the ideology of development is in ruins in the intellectual landscape. However, they goes on to say that much can be grown from, and out of, ruin. Participatory theory and practice is prominent, lucid and practical in the arena of development today.

2.7 Theoretical Process for ‘Participation’

It is important to analyse the interpretation of ‘participation’ in order to gain working definitions for productive, beneficial and authentic participation. Participation includes the stakeholders; their visions, interpretations, knowledge, commitments and ownership of, and for, development, thereby making development a process for beneficial growth in people’s well-being and also the well-being of related generations.

Participation is well documented in format and structure but the interpretation and practice has been seen to produce some alarming and oppressive results. Arnstein (1969) illustrates that ‘citizen’s participation’ indicates the theoretical spectrum from oppressive to authentic participation (figure 2.3). Broken down into eight rungs of a ladder, moving from non-participation to full citizen’s participation.
To understand how participation has been used, over the previous two decades, I feel it is not so important to break it into such intricate determinants, but rather, as Ghia (1989) considers, the formulation of the structure of participation can be represented into three areas:

- Participation as manipulative (oppressive);
- As consultative/informative;
- As a process citizen’s control (people-centred participation).

Participation, described as manipulative by Rahman (1995), looks at top-down, centrally-planned development which is reluctant to transfer the resources and power away from dominant political and social structures to the poor and underprivileged, who are non-participatory. Mainstream development, on its deathbed in the 1970s, needed the term ‘participation’ as the social ingredient to give the development discourse a new lease of life. The poor and impoverished, mobilised under the concept of participation were used as a resource to maintain the process of wealth and power within the state,
organisations and the elite. Developers, with relish, adopted the new concept of participation as an initiative and an asset to stabilise their own future development through manipulation (Rahnema 1992, 120).

This can be seen with the situation experienced in Indonesia where top-down, centralised planning and control eroded and isolated localised traditional bodies which historically supported and promoted rural development (Hall 1988, 97). In Ethiopia, revolutionary discourse cited peasant participation as a fundamental part of the transformation process for increased growth and productivity. However, urban-based government agents, allowing minimal participation to occur, controlled actions of more than 28,000 peasants’ associations (Hall 1988, 99).

Consultative and informative participation (termed ‘planner-centred’ as opposed to ‘people-centred’ by Michener (1998)) focuses on domination and financial efficiency of outside professionals and expertise. They are motivated by active participation and see the use of stakeholders’ participation as a way to successfully reach their programme objectives. Through participation, planners and developers can facilitate local people’s acceptance of new ideas and technology. During the process, local knowledge, in-kind and labour contributions, can be acquired by lowering implementation costs. The process provides growth for the participants, however, only in terms dictated by the state and its national development policy. The process may provide the benefit of increased services at minimised costs to the central authority but still in question are the actual wants and needs of the local inhabitants.

Rahman (1995) outlines participatory development on this basis as ‘tokenism’. Citing the promotion of participation in Third World areas, such as Bangladesh, seems very random with NGO’s selective and sparse introduction of participatory programmes. Rahman (1995) questions development programming in this way as a way not disrupt the ‘status quo’ of mainstream development. The result of this has seen no appreciable decline in poverty for many of these developing areas (Rahman 1995, 28).

These approaches are all determined from top-down policy directives. The written policies may outline the ingredient for ‘popular participation’, securing beneficiary commitment, local control of resources, responsibility of stakeholders, beneficiary’s understanding, developing self-reliance and empowerment. However, no mention is
made about the mechanics or a means of determining and achieving people-centred participation. The mainstream development use of participants is thought of as a resource, necessary in making development projects function with the minimal amount of problems. The involvement of people was considered as essential to project management under the control of state officials but was confined to the implementation and evaluation stages rather than the conceptual, planning and design stages of development projects (Michener 1998).

No project, unless acknowledging people's participation, will find funding. 'Participation' has become a focal point in development jargon (White, et al 1994, 16). The actual practice of participation, by some organisations once funding has been obtained, is only a secondary concern.

So, how is the participation, involved in developmental programmes, seen as effective, equitable and functional? Termed 'people's participation' (Connell 1997), 'people-centred' (Korten 1996), 'authentic participation' (Anderson 1998), 'genuine participation' (Michener 1998) and/or 'popular participation', are seen, in positive connotations, as being an open and embracing exercise. People-centred participation, in the developmental sense of the word, is about the sharing of knowledge and the process of learning in the formation of people's self-determination and development. The effectiveness of this process hinges on the transfer of local knowledge to the outsiders and then transposed, with the outside knowledge of developers being absorbed into local communities (Connell 1997, 250).

Development agents need the involvement of the whole community and it's local knowledge in order to play a more effective role. The rural community needs access to the outside tools and information for developing a more informed and wider contextual view of how and where they live, so enabling them to make appropriate and informed decisions about their self-development. This is the essence of productive, positive and functional participatory development.

Hence, the perspective in participatory literature, of which mountains are being produced, conveys an image of participation which shows it as a multi-faceted and, at times, a highly nebulous concept which has been misapplied to describe a range of development initiatives (Hall 1988, 106). Real participatory development, or as Korten
(1996) acknowledges it 'people-centred', is not a quick fix-process, but more of a concept that takes time, resources, imagination and commitment for successful outcomes to be achieved. This people-centred approach reveals a conflict of interests and distinctly questions 'old habits' and requires degrees of behavioural change to enhance the need for sharing power and empowerment. The people-centred process, in its meaningful form, replaces 'top-down' planning of development and is based on joint learning and negotiation.

2.8 Participation the Tool

People-centred participation as a development tool is dynamic and, used effectively and efficiently, has many benefits. However, due to the nature and diversity of the subject, there are also multitudes of risks that can be, and are, associated. Because participation involves a large degree of people-interaction, there will always be, like people, uniqueness to every programme. People's variation and uniqueness being acknowledged in programmes are fundamental and must be included. Dugdale and West (1991) maintain that following fundamental principles and introducing people-centred participation carefully, has the ability to significantly improve the likelihood of successful results. Determining and putting into practice a good process of partnership with the community will allow open and transparent progress, so that, whatever process is initiated, evaluation is critical throughout in order to address changes and/or improvements from people's views to reflect community needs (Dugdale & West 1991).

The basic principles, reviewed by academics and professionals of development, to ensure achieving the objectives of programmes involving people-centred participation are:

- Participation should be initiated at the earliest possible opportunity;
- Network the community to identify key issues, through the involvement of key people;
- Achieve broad representation of those who will be affected;
• Designing the participation process is critical to the involvement of the community;

• Make all relevant information available and accessible;

• Develop in the structure interactive participatory techniques;

• Conflict resolution and understanding and consensus decision-making needs to be addressed;

• Use staff who have good professional and interpersonal communication skills;

• Provide community participants with the tools and skills of participation;

• Develop feedback systems that address issues and outcomes;

• Establish community evaluation and monitoring systems of the complete process. (Dugdale and West 1991).

As with all people-orientated processes there are risks and barriers that have the potential to disrupt and infect the development programme. When dealing with any process involving change, (especially involving socio-economic change), problems will always appear which influence outcomes. Such problems are:

• Inappropriate planning and implementation which can lead to disappointment and backlash;

• Participants with strong vested interests and weak community interests can create dissatisfaction, sabotage and create the collapse of community interests;

• Community leaders elected to represent people may not feel the need to be accountable to the community;

• Outside-resource providers may see people-centred programmes as a means to subscribe to the interests of sponsoring organisations (the smoke screen effect);

• The ability for organisations and associations, either outside or inside the community, to manipulate individuals or groups;
Reluctance to participate due to lack of knowledge and fear of inferiority;

The possibility of developing conflict between individuals or groups already established in the community (Dugdale and West 1991).

Working with people in communities as an outsider is a very sensitive and not-so-simple process. There are many factors that unbalance the natural equilibrium of social interactions. The awareness of the unique resources and constraints imposed within a community is critical in developing people-centred programming. The more preparation and understanding distributed at the conceptual stages of development objectives and strategies, the more successful and constructive are the results (Howard & Baker 1984).

An overview of the potential of participatory process shows that the attributes and involvement of more socialisation between people creates the platform for positive development to be experienced in and by communities. However, it is clear to see the intricate nature of ‘participation’ and its ability to be beneficial or manipulative.

2.9 Poverty and Dependency

The concept of poverty is difficult to define. In its simplest form, poverty may be looked at as the lack of the basic needs of people, in their normal circumstances. They are unable to feed, clothe and provide shelter for themselves. The consequence of this may even be death. Subjectively, our Western image of ‘the poor’ and poverty, is seen in the situations of famine or the landless and deprived peoples (as a result of disaster or conflict) in the Third World. When categorising poverty, this could be regarded as ‘subsistence poverty’, which is different in concept from ‘basic needs poverty’ and/or ‘relative poverty’.

“Subsistence poverty’ is viewed as meeting the needs to survive and to evade death. Such individuals are placed in the situation of absolute deprivation by being deprived of human basic needs, (food, clothing and shelter). This is our First World/Western view of poverty. The introduction of the philosophy of ‘basic needs poverty’ involves not only the physical properties of survival, but also introduces community-based needs and expectations. Community needs may be viewed as ‘essential services’, such as sanitation, drinking water, health, education and transport. Other requirements are of a qualitative nature, such as
a satisfying environment, the ability as an individual to participate and the opportunity to make decision’s for oneself. This conceptual view of poverty moves along the spectrum towards the meaning of ‘relative poverty’ (ILO 1976, 7).

As Dixon and Macarov (1998) state the case for defining poverty;

“It is clear that the attempt to construct an absolute and presumably universal definition of poverty is fundamentally flawed, both in theory and practice. Poverty analysts are driven remorselessly to accept that poverty has to be understood as a socially constructed concept with powerful qualitative and normative components. As such it is inherently a relative concept". (Dixon & Macarov 1998, 7).

Relative poverty then, by definition, incorporates a measurement of comparison. That measurement is the comparison of prevailing economic and social patterns within a community, region, state or globally, hence a social system or structure. The factors that may be observed to estimate the degree of deprivation and exclusion, as a result of poverty, within a system are; income, health, education, location, gender, culture, race, access to goods and services, etc. Townsend (1979) adds another very important aspect to the equation, that of 'social participation'. The parameters that enable individuals to participate actively and positively within a community are of great importance when addressing degrees of poverty. For example, in terms of New Zealand, such parameters are the ability to experience the atmosphere of watching a live international rugby match or being able to decide to celebrate an important family occasion by dining out or experiencing a commercial adventure recreation activity. (Dixon & Macarov 1998, 7)

The abstract ‘poverty’ will always be of a debatable nature. Disagreement will be voiced on the nature of comparisons as well as the reliability of the factual data, such as income and consumption patterns. Overall, however, adopting relative poverty gives a much more realistic picture of individuals and communities within a defined system. It provides the potential to evaluate development and progress. Poverty is a complex phenomenon, one that breeds exclusion and abuse, and is prevalent globally. All is relative to the situation analysed. As summarised by Dixon and Macarov (1998);

*Our concept of poverty determines our definition, and our definition determines our measures. What we choose to measure, and how, gives us the problem we
choose to confront, and thus shapes our policy. We have seen that the seemingly academic questions of poverty – definition and measurement – have profound consequences for policy and practice, and thus for those now condemned to poverty and its consequences. Unless and until the poverty problem is adequately conceptualised, defined and measured, countless millions will continue to suffer”. (Dixon & Macarov 1998, 17).

The link between poverty, social exclusion and the Third and Western Worlds have been matters for discussion over recent years. De Hann (1975) outlines the overlap when reviewing Third World poverty and it's focus on 'multi-faceted nature of deprivation' which includes ill-being, vulnerability and capability. These same parameters are experienced in social exclusion. Maxwell (1997), in reviewing the connections, convergence and comparisons of poverty between the Third and Western Worlds, focused on the similarities of poverty and relating factors globally. He concluded that the more recent modernisation theories of globalisation in the world economy provides a structure for the creation of poverty in both. Whereas, with the 'old-style' modernisation theories, the appearance of poverty and social exclusion were fogged, for example by the 'trickle down' concept. Poverty, deprivation and exclusion are global phenomena that are apparent in the majority of societies today. (O'Brien, Wilkes, de Hann, Maxwell, 1997, 4-5) However, we also need to be aware of the concept of relativity in comparing social groups and their situations.

### 2.10 Dependency

Poverty is caused by a lack of resources, and this prevents participation. The irony, with Third World poverty, (which may be seen predominantly as 'subsistence poverty'), is that it is a 'decision based' poverty, in that there is very little, if any, welfare infrastructure that will provide assistance to the underprivileged and excluded. They are left to make their own decisions on 'how' to meet their basic needs. Contrasted with the Western poverty, which often supplies a welfare structure, many of the decisions that are fundamental for survival in the Third World have been reduced or eliminated. The decisions to meet individual's basic needs have been taken away and are determined, in many cases in the Western structure, by the elite. Producing a hierarchical structure which, in the West, is termed 'democratic and free'. Herein lies the birth of Western dependency, via state institutionalism, where the privileged decide when, where and how and who gain
and by how much. This, in turn, reduces the options and choices for the not so privileged.

Dependency, being a complex set of relationships, is manifested in many forms. Some may be genetically based while others are determined through particular social interactions. The span of relationships can be between individuals, families and groups, or households and the State and these are intermingled with conflicts of power, security, fulfilment and satisfaction. In today's Western society, where time, money and the enterprise culture has precedence, financial dependency is more prominent and receives much more of our attention than other forms of dependency. (Day 1992, 6).

This reliance on fiscal dependency has influenced the development of the welfare state dependency, which is a programme based on humanitarian concepts. However, over time, this has led to a judgement that state dependency implies social inferiority, associated with individual and community behavioural changes. The welfare state ideology, (a post World War II doctrine), was based on wealth redistribution and equality. In more recent years this has been challenged by the enterprise society that holds that individual effort and personal responsibility, working within market forces, are paramount.

This poses the problems linked with the welfare state today. Households dependent on the welfare state are unable to supply a positive change to their income. Unlike an employee who is gaining capital through an employer and who has a choice to change employers, or to acquire more skills, or provide more time or to collectively withdraw labour, a claimant on the welfare state has a limited ability, if any, to alter their circumstances. Finally, the individual or household clamped with the handicap that enforces welfare dependency, is likely to have increased anxiety and insecurity. Evidence shows that state policies place overbearing constraints on welfare claimants; for example, in supplementing a welfare income with part time employment. The restriction to be innovative and productive provides little opportunity for growth. If restrictions are breached, then, first, the welfare income is cut and secondly, an individual is liable to prosecution, which may result in being labelled 'criminal'. (Day 1992, 68). Latham (1999) comments on the interaction of welfare dependency and the resulting social problems:
"All evidence shows close relationship between welfare dependency and social problems. Life on the dole is anything but quiet. It is associated with a host of anxieties and stress, ranging from family problems, drugs and crime to a lack of education and hope in life". (Latham 1999, cited in Sullivan 2000,10).

Our situation in terms of 'Western' social structure has degrees of 'relative' poverty, bordering on 'subsistence' poverty, and is further complicated with the issues created from dependency.

2.11 Summary:

Economics has been the dominating factor in the majority of development practice. During the mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century global development policies were influenced by Keynesian economic philosophy. The appearance of Neo-liberalism, ignited through the impact of fuel and debt crises experienced through the 1970s, which set trends of global recession. Both systems working from Modernisation theories based on producing capital through growth, while pertaining to alleviate poverty, have not done so.

While development alternatives have been initiated, looking at 'peoples participation' and considering development from a holistic concept incorporating social, cultural, environmental and economic dynamics, their use is in question. Present circumstances, shown by the World-systems Theory, indicate that fiscal economics still dominates in development today.

Understanding the fundamentals of relevant theories gives a background for reviewing New Zealand's economic and development situation in the following chapter.
3 The New Zealand System

3.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the results of the New Zealand economic system under the influence of the neo-liberal political structure. Commentary, by professionals and critics, on New Zealand's economic structure and situation today offers contradictory views of the benefits that have been achieved. This chapter also looks at the Government's current development policy and its relationship with the economic structure. Positive figures of growth (an increase in the percentage of GDP growth, low unemployment figures) for the country are put in perspective by looking at a case study on rural Maori women as a marginalised group, a group that is predominantly represented in the lower income sector of the population.

3.2 New Zealand Economic Structure

New Zealand has experienced nearly 20 years of economic reform under neo-liberalism; what Jane Kelsey (1995) terms 'the New Zealand experiment'. Through this period, the primary influence has been 'neo-liberal' economic theory, ideas of a 'global village' and a free market approach to economic growth, development, community and individual's well being. This has sparked debate on what some classify as positive and good for the country, and others regard as destructive and bad for the public's well-being.

An overview of structural adjustment is important to understand the current economic climate that functions in New Zealand today. The proposed benefits as propounded by some (e.g. the Business Round Table), project a picture of affluence and stable, sustainable economic growth. Whereas the negative outcome experienced and recorded to date, by exponents such as Kelsey (1995, 1997, 1999, 2002) Philpott (1985, 1997, 2000) and Rankin (1995) paint a quite different picture of the current position. From this picture, development, both economic and social can be better framed and reviewed to address potential and underdevelopment.
With the arrival of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984, came the transformation of New Zealand's economy by a process of structural adjustment. This was the advancement of neo-liberalism, generated from a very 'right of centre' policy and politics, in order to establish a strong national economic climate. The new economic regime was carried forward with National's governance through the 1990s. The fundamentals of it remain under another Labour government, which came to power in 1999.

Structural adjustment, based on a neo-liberalism policy agenda, relies on the invisible hand of the free market combined with the deregulation of labour and the withdrawal of state services and influences (Rankin 1995). The dominance of market control supposedly creates export-led production and the opportunity for global capital to be invested internally. Deregulation provides the opportunities for labour and capital to move freely. Downsizing of the government through reduction in state services, health, education and social services and the selling of public assets are seen both as a process of cutting state expenditure, and expanding areas where market forces operate. In simplistic terms, economic growth is supposedly provided.

The Economist, 19 October 1996, summed up the radical reforms, under both Labour and National parties, which helped to turn New Zealand from one of the world's most supposedly 'hide-bound' economies in the early 1980's to one of it's most liberal a decade later. In particular, the country now has one of the least distorting tax systems and the most deregulated labour markets of any OECD economy.

Commentators on New Zealand's economic reforms provide two very different appraisals of the outcomes. The positive commentary for the free market philosophy appears to come from those people who believe that the reforms have created opportunity and provide benefits for all. Whereas, the opposition comes from those who feel that the neo-liberal structure has moved us away from growth. The latter hold the view that growth reflects a community moving towards a just, sustainable and prosperous society. A more 'human economic' structure that provides wealth in social development as well as economic.

To give some examples of these divergent views, reviewing the outcomes of 11 years of reform, 1984 to 1995, Michael Barnett's (Chief Executive, Auckland Chamber of Commerce) has commented:
“There is a general feeling that this is the best environment businesses have operated in for the last 40 years. Anything more would be a topping-off”. (Rankin, 1995, 1).

Similarly, Doug Meyers (Chair Person, Lion Nathan Ltd.) provides a positive view of the reforms:

“It concerns the ongoing quest for higher living standards. Improvement depends on adaptability, on the kind of economic environment favourable to innovation and change that has been the source of Asian dynamism and progress. New Zealand resisted change for many years, ...We embraced it for a time with the economic reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, but then decided continuing adaptation was too hard and opted for another of our perennial teabreaks”. (Meyers 1998, 18, cited in Callander 1998)

Roger Kerr (Executive Director, NZ Business Roundtable) outlines the positive attributes of the reforms over and above other alternatives:

“The issue I have argued, is not whether there are alternatives: clearly there are, and alternatives have been vigorously promoted by all protagonists in the debates. Rather, the issue is which alternatives have merit. In economics, as in most sciences, alternative remedies are always on offer. New Zealand experimented with quack prescriptions for many years; only in the 1980s did we start adopting some conventional cures. The evidence is continuing to accumulate that the countries that are faring best in the modern world are those that are continuing to work towards greater economic freedom and small government”. (Kerr 1998, 26, cited in Callander 1998).

Such statements arguably reflect the mindset that prevails for many of New Zealand’s elite.

Today, the New Zealand economy is the classic contemporary example of the new wave, global, neo-liberal free market economy. The basic outcome is the withdrawal of government influence in the market place. This has led, over a short time, to the removal of government subsidies, import tariffs and the liberalisation of trading policies. Combined with this was a climate of major public sector reformation, such as the State-owned Enterprise Act 1986, which set up corporatised government entities (e.g. Forest Corp, NZ Post Ltd, Telecom).
The outcome, which has been flagged globally as positive for economic growth by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was the massive fragmentation of the country’s labour force. The corporatisation of government entities into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) created the shedding of what was called ‘surplus labour’, creating widespread redundancies. The private manufacturing sector also shrank dramatically, resulting in a large number of job losses. By the late 1980s the unemployment rate reached record highs, peaking at over 10% of the labour force (St John & Stewart 1997, 392-395).

Wolfgang Rosenberg (1993) has reviewed the neo-liberal polices of Roger Douglas, Caygill and Richardson (New Zealand’s financial managers from the mid 1980s to early 1990s). He has voiced major scepticism. Rosenberg argues that ‘export-led development’ is a process that works on market competition to produce and manufacture at the lowest cost, which implies that the labour force is a cost item that needs to be reduced, resulting in the increase of profit margins which overtly prompts foreign investment. In simple terms, the process leads to the rich getting richer and the poor not doing so well. Rosenberg (1993) also explains how the policies of structural adjustment which were imposed (that of deregulation within the state along with no import restriction), created a scene for de-industrialisation, stagnation and unemployment, such as the effect that was seen with the privatisation of the State Forest Service, or the pressure put on to the clothing and textiles industry. With the social and economic changes experienced from the mid 1980s, shown in Table 3.1, gives an indication of the poor performance that the liberalisation policies initiated. Unemployment rocketed. External debt, both public and private, soared, and the rise in crime figures suggested that the health of the social climate within the communities was declining.

Table 3.1: Key Domestic & External Developments between 1974 & 1992.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>995 (av)</td>
<td>62,000 (Sept)</td>
<td>148,000 (July)</td>
<td>235,000 (Dec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (NZ$m) Official</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>12,474 (Mar)</td>
<td>20,087 (Dec)</td>
<td>27,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (NZ$m) Private</td>
<td>535 (est)</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>31,980</td>
<td>34,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Debt</td>
<td>1000 (est)</td>
<td>16359</td>
<td>52,067</td>
<td>62,479 (Jun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td>216,416</td>
<td>454,931</td>
<td>537,300 (91/92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cited Rosenberg 1993, 14)
Even today, the figures of unemployment, people relying on beneficiary payments and declining living standards and welfare can be said to have resulted from the dismal performance of the economy since 1984. From Table 3.2, Rosenberg (1993) illustrates the lack of productivity created from the neo-liberal reforms measured by the growth or decline of Gross Domestic Production (GDP).

**Table 3.2: New Zealand GDP Growth Rates in four Periods (% Growth – Real GDP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Protected Econ (Holyoake/Marshall) (av)</th>
<th>Protected Econ (Kirk/Rowling)</th>
<th>Inconsistent Liberalisation (Muldoon) (av)</th>
<th>Full Liberalisation (Douglas/Richardson)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960/63 - 4.1</td>
<td>1973 - 4.4</td>
<td>1976/79 – 0.7</td>
<td>1985/88 – 2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/71 – 2.5</td>
<td>1975 – 4.0</td>
<td>1984 – 2.9</td>
<td>1990 – 1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 – 2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991 – 0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992 – 1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(cited: Rosenberg 2001, 16)

Kelsey (1995, 1997, 1999 & 2002) reiterates the same arguments, that it is no coincidence that the biggest increase in income inequalities have occurred in economies such as those of America, Britain and New Zealand, where free-market economic policies have been pursued most zealously. The chief statistician for Statistics New Zealand termed the national income trends between 1982 and 1996 as ‘striking’ and ‘unequivocal’: ‘income inequality has increased substantially’. Statistics show that the average adult Maori income in 1982 was $16,800, fell to $11,900 in 1991 and had only grown marginally to $14,400 by 1996. Comparatively, the Pakeha figures indicate the widening of the ‘gap’, with 1982 recording $20,700, 1991 $19,500, and $21,000 by 1996 (Kelsey 1999, 368-370). These are some of the outcomes of the neo-liberal wave, which, Kelsey (1999) and others consider as being of benefit to a few and causing the marginalisation of many as well as the social upheaval and costs:

"The social costs have also become unsustainable. Over a decade and a half, many urban and rural communities have been shattered by government policies imposed with little or no warning, and with callous disregard for their effects on
people’s lives. In single-industry towns, the closure of the major employer—
a timber mill, car assembly plant, freezing works or clothing factory—was
devastating. As jobs went, shops and banks closed. Schools and emergency
services that no longer had a critical mass were shut down. Some former
employees became self-employed contractors, carrying all risk for often small
and uncertain income. Many young people left town, or opted for gangs, drugs,
or suicide. Small businesses that serviced the local community maintained a
marginal existence or went” (Kelsey 1999, 367-368).

Maori have been hit hard as, being a major part of the labour force, the large-scale
redundancy schemes in the public sector and industry, of the late 1980s, affected them
seriously. Unemployment in the Bay of Plenty was approximately twice that of the
national average. Statistics reveal that long-term unemployment in the Maori labour
force, in 1986, was 1% but, by 1992, it had risen to 15% (Kelsey 1999, 370).

The evidence thus clearly shows that the neo-liberal free market philosophy, combined
with globalisation and the reduction of trade tariffs, has created unemployment and
large-scale inequality in New Zealand. In the real economy, it does not add to the
development of growth and prosperity as a nation, but more to sections of. A concern of
Rankin (1997) was that the ‘meaningful socio-economic indicators’ show that the gap
between New Zealand and other Western economies has widened. Rosenberg (1993)
shows how New Zealand prospered with no unemployment from 1939 to 1975 and
raises the question of whether mass unemployment is necessary. Kelsey (2002) cites
others, such as Chatterjee, Philpott, and Conway for their concerns and bewilderment
about the ‘hands off’ neo-liberal pursuits. As Helen Clark remarked to a Labour Party
rally in 1999:

“The heavy handed government of the Muldoon era drove New Zealand to the
wall. But the no-handed government hasn’t delivered the goods either. And
that’s why like our friends in Western Europe and North America, we have come
to talk of a third way:

• Of smart, active intelligent government;
• Of government of vision and purpose;
• Of government committed to leadership, to partnership, to facilitation and to funding where the market fails and where investment in people is so critical". (Clark 1999, cited Kelsey 2002, 67)

As mentioned, this has had an enormous effect on the rural communities, especially single-industry communities such as Minginui. What are the results of these effects on the development of such communities? This we will visit in Chapter 6.

### 3.3 Government Policy Today

New Zealand's recent parliamentary history has undergone various changes over the past 15 or so years. As mentioned, 1984 saw the election of a labour government, which led the country into a radical programme of economic deregulation and the floating of the New Zealand dollar. Income taxes were cut, import protection was lifted, farming subsidies were removed and a consumption tax (GST) was introduced, all this left the populace in confusion. This was surpassed, in 1990, by the election of a right wing National Government which also set about radical changes in social policy. Welfare provision was slashed, public housing drastically cut back and the labour laws were revamped. The Employment Contracts Act (1991) deregulated the labour market further and set about distorting the ability for collective bargaining. Unemployment rose sharply, public health was sent toward commercialisation and poverty was on the increase for the first time since the Depression.

By 1999, New Zealanders were arguably bewildered and, finding the radical changes a burden and of no benefit to social prosperity and finding the economic reform a failure, they elected a new Labour Government. This Government is still in power. The challenges facing the new Government were outlined by the Prime Minister:

"So the challenges faced by our new government were not only to build a stronger economy and deliver more social justice, but also to keep our word to the electorate and make a minority coalition government elected under MMP rules work. Fainter hearts may well have walked away from the task!" (Rt. Hon Helen Clark, 21-2-02, 3).

Taking the 'task' in hand, the Government, after consultation, has recently released new strategies for developing and lifting the country's economic performance. In February
2000, the Government launched a programme of 'Growing an Innovated New Zealand'. The programme had been determined through consultation with Government agents and the private sector. For example, the 'Knowledge Wave Conference' (sponsored by Government and Auckland University) brought together many of the private sector. The Aim was to improve New Zealand's economic performance and to lift the quality of life for all. The framework that was established, through wide consultation for 'Growing an Innovative New Zealand', set its objective as 'returning New Zealand's per capita income to the top half of the OECD ranking by 2011.

In the statement to Parliament on 12 February 2002 by the Prime Minister, the Government's development outlook was reviewed. New Zealand's economy, although sound with a moderate positive growth rate, will need an accelerated growth rate to achieve this. The framework sets out the new initiatives in four key areas to speed up growth. Firstly, to enhance the innovation system involves incorporating increased research and development spending, developing new centres of research excellence and establishing a 'Venture Investment Fund' for the support and development of innovative business. Also, developing strategies and support opportunities for the entrepreneurial environment through mentoring programmes, incubators and cluster development. Secondly, the developing of skills and talent, which requires investment in education and industry training, adaptation of immigration policies to target specialist talents and to enlist the skills and expertise of New Zealanders living overseas. Thirdly, increasing New Zealand's global connectedness, (which involves the up-marketing of the national branding of New Zealand to advance aggressive exporting) and the attraction of quality foreign investment. Fourthly, to focus the Government's resources to speed up growth and innovation in three main areas, namely information and communications technology, creative industries and biotechnology. These areas are believed to have considerable growth potential and high spill-over effects for other sectors (PM's Statement to Parliament 2002, 1-6).

The Labour/Alliance Government and private sector shared this vision. In a speech by the Hon. Steve Maharey, opening the Social Science Research Centre, at Canterbury University, said:

"Let me remind you of the shared vision that has come through the Growth and Innovation Framework released by the Prime Minister on February 12. In the framework, the vision for our country is:
• A land where diversity will be valued and reflected in our national identity;
• A great place to live, learn, work and do business;
• A birthplace of world changing people and ideas;
• A place where people invest in the future.

That vision sees New Zealanders as:
• Optimistic and confident about our country’s future;
• Celebrating our successes in all walks of life;
• Creating globally competitive companies;
• Committed to sustainable development;
• Gaining strength from the Treaty of Waitangi as our nation’s founding document”.

(Hon Steve Maharey 2002, 5).

The Ministry of Social services thus gives the impression that it is very aware of the inequalities that are present in our social structure. The Minister outlines current problems, income inequalities, poverty and social exclusion. The outcome has supposedly been to build a ‘spring board of opportunity’ for people in the most need.

The strategy to achieve the outcomes mentioned are those based on economic development. The drive toward this is dominated by the Ministry of Economic Development, whose Minister, the Hon Jim Anderton, is characterised by his old style left wing politics. Is this not the opposite to the neo-liberal philosophies of the 1980s and 1990s? But social development and people’s well being are still regarded as a spin off from economic development.¹

Indeed, a heavy emphasis continues to be placed on strategies for economic growth. Little mention is made of social development and well-being itself; rather they are regarded as a simple by-product of productive economics. Other questions arise: what does it mean to be committed to sustainable development? Do we have an understanding or accurate definition for this? And how do the Government agencies go about delivering these concepts?

Currently, senior members of the Government frequently outline, in public addresses, how well New Zealand is functioning in the current global climate. Economic growth to years end, June 2001, was 3.5 per cent, with unemployment reaching a 13 year low at 5.2 per cent. The current account deficit recorded an 8 year low at 4 per cent of GDP

¹ An overview of policy dynamics for Government Ministries that impact on the community of Minginui can be reviewed in appendix A.
and the trade balance has produced positive figures for the first time in 6 years (Rt. Hon Helen Clark, 21-2-02, 4).

However, there seems to be an ever-increasing gap when figures are gathered on the other end of the spectrum. Reviewing the most disadvantaged sector of our country, the outcome does not paint the same pro-active, positive scenario as that portrayed by growth in purely economic terms. Globally, for instance, women, (and predominantly indigenous women) of rural communities are one of the victims and most marginalised sector of a community structure. New Zealand is no exception, where rural Maori women don’t fare well, and are represented at the lower end of the economic and social spectrum. A focus on the rural Maori women in New Zealand (and reviewing the statistical data available) provides a picture that indicates that the New Zealand economic climate, as projected by Government figures, is definitely less rosy and glossy than what we are led to believe. This study acts as a prelude to the more detailed examination of the community of Minginui, as set out in chapters four to seven.

3.4 Rural Maori Women

Statistical information on rural women per se does not give a good indication of the predicaments of rural, low income, women. The category, ‘rural women’, includes women with higher educational qualifications and the abilities to access business opportunities, as well as the women contained in a poverty trap. This discrepancy is noted in the report by Davis et al 1997, *The New Zealand Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status*. Statistically, the Maori population has a high percentage of people of lower socio-economic status but represents a high proportion of the population in New Zealand’s rural environment. Thus what is set out here only reviews the status of rural Maori women.

The impacts of structural adjustment have been noted by the findings of reports commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture. They typically comment that rural communities have gone through, and are currently experiencing, social and economic changes in one or more of the following areas:

- Increased unemployment, particularly amongst the low- or un-skilled;
• The movement of rural people to urban areas and of urban people to rural;

• Changes in the way many services are accessed as a result of the rationalisation of these services (i.e. banking facilities being replaced by electronic connection and transaction);

• Greater requirements on the voluntary sector (i.e. the professionalisation of the volunteer structure);

• Greater devolution of responsibility for the delivery of services at the community level;

• The social impacts of changes in land use and tenure (forestry plantation with absentee landlords).

(CEDAW Report 1998, 66-67)

These changes have a greater impact and influence on the lower socio-economic members of the rural communities.

The New Zealand Employment Service (1996) states that 69% of Maori are seeking long term employment. It found that a lack of skills, experience and qualifications all acted as handicaps to this group. Approximately 70% of the women surveyed held this view (Pouwhare 1999, 9). However, it is important to remember that this is only one factor in the equation for the women in low socio-economic environments. For example, costs of education and access to appropriate and affordable childcare also impinge heavily on their access to education.

Research shows secondary school-aged Maori girls, although obtaining higher grades than their male counterparts, are enrolled in subjects that have a limiting effect on their later employment opportunities (e.g. typing and domestic sciences). The statistics on Maori school leavers in 1996 show that 39% leave without qualifications, as opposed to 15% non-Maori. At bursary level, 4% of Maori gained a credit as opposed to 24% of Non-Maori (CEDAW Report 1998, 33).

A recent report produced by the Ministry of Women's Affairs (2001) indicates that very little change has occurred over the last decade in the problems and outcomes experienced by Maori girls and women. It gives the example of early childhood
education (the inclusion of which sets the foundations for participation and achievement in education and society in general), showing again a significant disparity between Maori and non-Maori. The key barriers, being similar if not the same over the previous decade, are identified as the cost of and access to services, especially for the rural group (Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2001, 2-3).

Prior to the Second World War, 75% of Maori lived in a rural environment. Women in the labour force (necessitated by the lack of male labour due to the war effort of the 1940s) were required to work in non-traditional areas of consumer goods production. Like many developing countries, patriarchal social power and demands have influenced the position of women and their inclusion in the labour force. Post-war employment saw the development of work opportunities for women, although they were typically sex-segregated and sex-stratified. Maori women, unlike Pakeha women, have been steered toward factory and low-income employment, the areas of work which give little personal development and economic stability:

"Both Maori and Pacific Islander women were incorporated in a narrow range of manufacturing positions that were characterised by lower wages, poorer conditions, less security and fewer opportunities for advancement than those occupied by many Pakeha women". (Laner 1993, 90).

Arguably, this illustrates the trends for women in development all over the world. The same situation exists in our very own environment (Western) as exists in women's involvement and associated problems in Third World development.

The debt crisis of the 1980s and the introduction of economic reform in the guise of 'structural adjustment' (adopted with passion by the New Zealand government of the time) mirrors the inequalities and marginalisation of women in the Third World. Maori women's employment, which was based predominantly in the lower socio-economic realm, decreased by 10% between 1986 and 1991. Non-Maori woman's employment decreased by 1.7% over the same time period (Pouwhare 1999, 5).

With the 'structural adjustment' policy there was also a sharp decline in rural employment opportunities. Firstly, it saw the closure of small companies, such as the shoe manufacturing operation in Opotiki. More recently, there has been the closure of large operations that had survived, but which eventually had to succumb to the open
market process, moving off shore to gain cheaper women's labour. Key examples are the closure of Bendon and Toyota, both large employers of rural Maori women.

Figures produced by Davies and Jackson (1993) on the employment of Maori women between 1976 and 1986 show the negative results that have taken place. In 1976, 75% of Maori women were in full-time employment and 20% working part-time. By 1986, the number of Maori women in the labour force, full-time, had dropped to 47%. And the 1996 figure for unemployed Maori women was 28% of the total number of unemployed women (Te Puni Kokiri 1999, 16). The annual average income of Maori women, in full-time employment, in 1994, was $15,000. This can be compared to the national average of $28,500 (Statistics New Zealand 1994). These figures clearly indicate a large disparity between the position of Maori women and what is the average in New Zealand.

Current figures also reveal that levels of Maori health are considerably lower than that of non-Maori. Research, both in New Zealand and internationally, suggests that people's health status is strongly influenced by their social, physical, cultural and economic factors. That is, it is evident that individual and community health is closely linked to the socio-economic environment in which people find themselves. The Deprivation Index (NZDep96 Index of Deprivation), a commonly used measure of health status and life expectancy, gives a clear indication of the socio-economic situation which the Maori population experiences. Figure 3.1 shows that 56% of Maori live in areas with a deprivation index greater than eight (Te Puni Kokiri 2000, 2).
Figure 3.1:

The results of research on low-income women show the following problems with the household's healthcare:

- Insufficient money is available for healthcare;
- The needs of children come before the women, hence women obtain healthcare as a last resort and not until the late stages of illness;
- Payments for prescription charges are hard to meet;
- Poor health is caused by an inadequate supply of nutrients in the household diet. For example, lack of food and ability to only afford cheap basics, such as bread and potatoes (which are high in starch low in protein) create an unbalanced diet;
- High levels of emotional and psychological stress, due to the inability to cover living costs, cause health problems;
- Lack of transportation (especially for rural women) to health facilities;
- Poor quality of housing (i.e. dampness, lack of maintenance).

(Duncan et al 1996, 10-11)
Issues that are of most concern result from smoking, alcohol and family violence, combined with medical conditions that are prominent in Maori (asthma, diabetes, high blood pressure, iron deficiency and obesity) (Te Puni Kokiri 2000, 4-8). In addition, the public health commission’s report (1994) states that these are factors which are likely to lead to chronic ill health. Duncan et al (1996) and Te Puni Kokiri (2000) recognise the following as new health risk factors:

- Reduced family support;
- Alcohol;
- Misuse of drugs;
- Smoking;
- Poor diets;
- High-risk leisure pursuits;
- Inadequate preparation for parenthood;
- Persistent unemployment;
- Substandard housing.

Attention to two factors is important. Firstly, Maori health status is also influenced by physical, mental and spiritual factors and is, therefore, closely associated with Maori social, economic and political standing. The historical example of alienation of land, which contributed to depopulation in rural areas, is similar to the present, cultural, economic and political alienation, which are thought to have a significance in poor health. Secondly, the institutional division of responsibility for health, employment, welfare, housing and income, is not necessarily a practical format: in reality, each area influences one or more of the others. Health, therefore, cannot be separated from other social and economic considerations, which is seen as very significant for Maori development (Public Health Commission 1994, 59).

Finally, Maori women are constantly over-represented in unemployment and family violence statistics. Employment and education policies have increasingly marginalised
Maori women, which is exacerbating family violence. The annual estimated cost in New Zealand, caused by family violence, is around 1.2 billion per year (Pouwhare, 1999, vii). The definition of family violence, given by Pouwhare (1999), relates to the desires of an individual to exercise power and control over others in the family. This is overwhelmingly male orientated and is imposed on women and children as victims:

"When power over [another] is being exercised there exists a wide gap between the interests of the powerful and powerless. The former uses power to bring about specific goals while the latter may be subject to restrictions and deprivation". (Thorpe & Swift 1996 cited in Pouwhare 1999, 8).

"Recent research here in Aotearoa New Zealand suggests that family violence is widespread in communities." (Pouwhare, 1999, 8).

Table 3.3 Survey - Abuse and Violence on Maori Women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence experienced:</th>
<th>Percentage of Maori women with current partners:</th>
<th>Percentage of Maori women with recent partners (i.e. separated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least one act of psychological abuse</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one act of physical abuse</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten or more acts of violence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feared they may be killed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Morris 1997 in Pouwhare, 1999, 9)

Forms of violent abuse, within the family, are psychological, physical, sexual and economic. Physical abuse, being readily seen, has significance in the social arena. However, it is important to understand the harmful and long term effects that psychological, financial and sexual abuse have on women’s lives (Pouwhare 1999, 9). It is important for this to be addressed for positive development to occur.

**Summary:**

Reviewing New Zealand’s current economic situation, the Government and the business sector are generally positive about the performance. However, when reviewing a
recognised low socio-economic group, rural Maori women, the outcomes are not so positive. In fact, statistics give an indication that there is an increasing gap between those that 'have' and those that 'have not'.

From the commentary above, it would appear that a small portion of New Zealanders can claim benefit from neo-liberal economic reform, as implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. Some commentators state that the business climate is the best in the past 40 years, and living standards are on the increase. Others critics, such as Kelsey, present a different appraisal of the situation. Going on official GDP figures, which measuring the rate of growth, it can be seen that economic performance was generally much higher in the state regulated economy, and that since the late 1980s the results have been dismal.

The Government's current policy to create 'benefit for all' is dominated by the development of economic growth, stimulated through innovative systems, retraining and aggressive exporting into the world market. To achieve this, rhetoric focuses on the 'growth of the nation' through partnership, participation and collaboration. Policy aims to rise New Zealand's standing in the OECD to the top ten by 2011. The policy of the present Government appears locked into the global vision of free trade and economic growth.

The current Prime Minister, explaining that the recent GDP showed a growth of 3.5% and that unemployment has reached a 13-year low, has argued that nationally, New Zealand is doing well. This can be contrasted, however, with the situation experienced by rural Maori women. Evidence given above indicates that besides having achieved growth in our economy, we have paid a price: the deprivation and marginalisation in the case of Maori women. This further highlights inequalities in the rural sector, especially social ones, which have increased since the late 1980s. Further examples of rural poverty and inequality can be seen in communities such as Minginui. The next chapter looks at the historical background and early development of Minginui.
4 Minginui Background

4.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the planning and growth of Minginui Village through to the start of its underdevelopment. The chapter briefly reviews the Maori history of the area, the development of the forestry industry and other social processes. The forestry industry from the early 1900s was predominantly free market orientated, with some limited regulation by the state. By the mid 1900s, at the peak of Keynesian state-regulated economics, the New Zealand Forest Service founded Minginui as a 'model village', one that would also have a model workforce. The valley prospered for the next thirty years, albeit under a highly structured and 'top-down' management system. The promise of prosperity, good work, and accommodation encouraged the immigration of people from other regions to Minginui, increasing the population in the valley significantly. Today, local residents have vivid memories of a hard-working, but vibrant lifestyle in the village between 1949 and 1985.

However, the economy of the valley was based mainly on the extraction of native podocarp timber, a resource that was ultimately limited. In addition, through the 1970s, growing environmental concerns sparked a review of native logging practices. Minginui and the Whirinaki forest were placed under the national spotlight, becoming a place where environmental policy was seriously debated. By 1978, the logging of native timber was drastically reduced.

The economic turmoil of the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a 'snap election'. The Muldoon-led National Government (1975-1984) was replaced by the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1989), heralding the introduction of Neo-liberal economic reform. The impact of this heavily influenced state-run industry and rural single-industry towns, such as Minginui. In addition, the Fourth Labour Government ordered the full cessation of indigenous logging on Crown land.
4.2 Geographical location

Minginui Forest Village (Minginui, or the village) is situated at the southern end of the Whirinaki Valley (the valley), in the central Bay of Plenty at the western edge of Te Urewera Ranges. On first impression, it is a majestic wilderness comprising pastoral river flats bordering the Whirinaki River which runs along the valley's floor, and surrounding rugged hills covered in forests. The eastern and southern extremes of the valley are predominantly indigenous timber, while the majority of the western side is now planted in exotics and managed as production forests. Access to the valley is via the recently sealed State Highway 38, which links Rotorua and Murupara with Lake Waikaremoana and the East Coast. State Highway 38 was intended to be sealed to the East Coast, but was recently rezoned and will remain metalled into the foreseeable future.

The road sealing ends with the a sign indicating 'State Highway 38 Ends' and gives the navigator the opportunity to turn right and travel for another 9 kilometres to the entrance of the Minginui Forest Village (Minginui). The land surrounding Minginui is dedicated to a variety of land uses: farming, commercial forestry, and outdoor recreational pursuit opportunities within the native forest park. The valley provides very good example of a rural North Island community in New Zealand which is geographically isolated. In 1996 it comprised a population of 282 (Statistics NZ, 1996). Results from a recent local survey (2002) put the resident population of Minginui at approximately 200\(^2\).

The isolation is heightened by the realisation that the nearest services are some 30 kilometres away at Murupara, which only provides the very basics, such as postal services, two small grocery shops, police and a doctor. Post deliveries to Minginui are twice a week (Mondays and Wednesday) and telephone communication is limited and erratic. The Internet connection climaxes at the rapid speed of 7200kbs/sec, if and when line connection is available. The nearest substantial service centres are Rotorua, 100 kilometres to the north, Taupo 87 kilometres south west by road, and the coastal domain of Whakatane, 100 kilometres to the northeast.

\(^2\) Appendix C: Minginui Questionnaire results, Whanau Support, October 2002. The cost involved for gaining the latest census results was too prohibitive for this research.
4.3 A Historical Perspective of ‘The Valley’

Taylor (1988) refers to the Maori history of the Whirinaki and Te Whaiti areas as being rich and strong, explaining how the whakapapa of the residents of Te Whaiti Nui a Toi (The Valley of Toi) stretches over more than 30 generations. These are, respectively, 18 generations from the original migration into the area, and an additional 12 from Wharepakau (a chief who originally came from the Kawhia district, and who led a conquest of the original occupants, later marrying into them) (Taylor, 1988, 5). The iwi Ngati Whare are now the tangata whenua of the valley. Boast (1999) outlines how ‘strongly conscious’ Ngati Whare are of their heritage and their connection to their famous ancestor Wharepakau. Ngati Whare are also closely connected to Ngati Manawa and Tuhoe through marriage. Many localities and place names in the valley are directly associated with the achievements and life history of Ngati Whare ancestors (Boast 1999, 24).

A recent report, ‘Ngati Whare and the Crown, 1880 – 1999’, by John Hutton and Klaus Neumann (2001), paints a grim picture of the Government’s initial exploitation of the local Maori community in the earlier years of the twentieth century. Through an illegal and aggressive programme of land purchasing (1915-1920) the Government acquired most of the good land in the valley. The development of the forestry industry commenced with the erection of the first mill in the valley in 1928 at Te Whaiti. This mill was built in partnership with local Maori land owners. Soon other mills started up. Within a period of just over 10 years most of the easily accessible timber on the little remaining Maori land had been cut out (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 307-324).

Today, aside from Minginui, other residents of the valley include a few whanau at Te Whaiti and a small number of freehold landowners farming throughout. But the valley had supported a prosperous and industrious community in the middle of the twentieth century. Te Whaiti was actually a larger settlement than Minginui in its prime. Through the 1930s and 1940s, Te Whaiti supported a township with three grocery stores, a post office, a butcher’s shop, a church, police station, picture theatre and a billiard saloon. All serviced the timber milling and agriculture industries located nearby (Goldsmith, 1988, 22).
From the late 1930s the State Forest Service increased its presence in the valley. While Ngati Whare had been left with little land on which to develop economically, the Crown owned the vast majority of the valuable timber in the area. New mills were built, this time up in the southern end of the valley around an area called Minginui. At times local residents had little opportunity to determine their future. Prior to the State Forest Service’s development of the ‘model village’, Minginui, in 1947, private sector industry dominated the functions and lifestyles of people in the valley.

Like many frontier communities, life in the valley in the 1920s and 1940s was not easy. Judge Harvey of the Waiairiki District Native Land Court commented (in a 1944 report on Te Whaiti and the local industry):

“The present site of the Wilson Timber Company’s Mill is a most unsuitable one and that the accommodation supplied by the company to its employees is of a very low standard. … the Wilson Timber Company will not spend sixpence more than it is compelled to in catering for the accommodation of its employees, and it does not put a high value upon the available Maori labour” (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 485).

This is one view of ‘free market’ forces experienced in the early to mid years of the last century! The interaction and influence of private industry on the population more than fifty years ago seems to be occurring once more in the present economic climate, i.e., labour is an unimportant and dispensable item.

4.4 The Origins of Minginui Forest Village

In the mid 1940s the Forest Service developed the concept of a ‘model village’. The Forest Service was concerned to create economic stability in the Whirinaki area, to provide an organisational infrastructure for the future exploitation of timber there, and to improve the housing and social facilities for the industry’s work force. The end of the Second World War and the influx of returned servicemen had created a demand for housing. This, combined with a labour shortage in the forestry industry, led to the implementation of a much larger ‘model village’ than originally envisaged (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 487-493).
In 1947 development of the 'village' commenced with the construction of 22 houses, as had been planned in 1944. This was later revised and upgraded to 100 houses. By the mid 1950s, nearly 70 houses had been completed to accommodate both the workers for the independent sawmills and Forest Service personnel:

"In collaboration with the Housing Division, the planning of a model forest village was begun in May 1945. This village, officially named 'Minginui Forest Village', is designed to accommodate all sawmill workers and Forest Service personnel employed in the integrated forest management, logging and sawmill activities in the Working Cycle. ... [W]hen completely established [it] will comprise 100 houses for married personnel, accommodation for 50 single men, social and communal facilities comprising a recreation Hall, shopping, medical; and Plunkett facilities, and an industrial area". (NZ. Forest Service 1951, 19., cited Hutton & Neumann 2001, 496).

It is interesting to note that, over this period, 1944 to 1950, considerable discussion and debate took place within the Forest Service on the possible separation of Maori and Pakeha populations. Indeed, the segregation of Maori and Pakeha was a prime factor in the early stages of the planning processes. However, running against this was the need to protect the job opportunity for local valley and the Urewera residents. One of the initial arguments for the small number of housing units was to provide a deterrent to migrant labour in need of housing being drawn into the valley.

It is important to acknowledge the foresight of the Forest Service management, as set out in the 'Working Plan' for the Whirinaki Valley (1951). The Minginui Forest Village was planned as a permanent settlement. This determination was set on the future appraisal for the forest industry. The Assistant Director of Forestry, Mr. N. J. Dolamore, in 1949 at a hui on the Waikotikoti Marae, Te Whaiti, assured locals that there was work in the valley for the next 40 years. Subsequently, the plan held that the permanence of the Minginui Forest Village would depend on the change of the Whirinaki Forest to exotic management (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 505).

Hutton and Neumann (2001) argue that the Forest Service had determined that they would be the developers and managers of the 'model village' and community. They suggest that Minginui, was a kind of laboratory for 'social engineering'. It was intended to provide a settlement model for a society that had become sceptical about the Forest Service ethic of 'pick a forest and clean it out', rather than to foster the development of a
productive unit that exploited but also conserved (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 498-500). However, total control by the Forest Service was hampered through the lack of funds to realise the plans for Minginui, and the fact that the community came to be not solely made up of Forest Service employees. The residents of the village also included the managers and employees of the sawmills who would at times challenge the Forest Service authority over the village (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 513).

The development of the Minginui Forest Village and the three private sawmills, in conjunction with the Forest Service, created a vibrant and stable industry in the valley from 1950 through to the late 1970s. School attendance rose and community services, such as health, transport and communication, were efficient and available. Unemployment was not an issue and the community social interaction and entertainment was energetic and alive. As one commentator noted in 1950:

"To the chance visitor of today the "model Village" (or Minginui Forest Village to give it its official name), provides a startling surprise, with its trim houses, large gardens and modern appearance in the midst of a wilderness of scrub, fern and bush". (Liddell, 1950, 23).

Comments from residents today who were young parents or children during the time of the development and building of the Minginui Village, show fond and very favourable memories. With a sparkle in their eyes, speaking vibrantly, they displayed a pleasure in telling of their earlier years in the valley:

"As a young married wife and mother, I found life here very, very exciting and interesting. ... Got work with my Aunt, Aunty Rae, at the post office ... in Te Whaiti. Then I got involved with the Maori Women's Welfare League. It had a very big following in the valley. They did a lot of mahi in the valley, those women". (MFV-008 Resident's Interview, 11-09-2002).

Indeed, present day views of adults who grew up in the valley as children in the 1950s and 1960s were overwhelmingly positive. The majority of people saw these years as stimulating and enjoyable. Negative comments about this time period are minimal.

"It was good. ... Looked forward to the weekends, look forward to the school holidays. ... There was lots to do. Like going camping; we were going camping at the age of 8 and 9. That was up the Whirinaki River ... Ride our pedal bikes up the fam, cross the river at night. This was a place called Daniel's, we used to
go there in the weekends, on Friday night and come home Sunday lunch time....
That was just mates. It was half a dozen of us, packed our food in a bag and just
went. We weren't bored. ... There was always something to do". (MFV-021
Resident's Interview, 04-09-02).

While reviewing the image of the valley during their youth that people hold, it is also
important to have an understanding of the role that the schools have played in the
community's network. The schools of the valley are seen as being very significant in the
processes of developing and influencing the community's energy and resilience. Their
historical record also has relevance as a social indicator. The cycle of activity in the
valley, be it development or underdevelopment, seems to have a direct influence on the
nature and culture of the community schools.

The first school in the valley at Poukura (the present site of the Te Whaiti School) was
established in the early 1896. At this time, the teacher, Mr. Whyke, found the people of
the valley so keen to learn that evening classes where held. The evening classes were
for the benefit of the adults to acquire the skills of reading and writing (H.B.H 1950, 40-
41). The Education Native Schools Department erected a school building in 1896. By
1928, the school roll was 25 pupils. Because of the development of the timber industry,
by 1931, the roll had increased to 90 pupils. By 1945, Te Whaiti School's roll had
increased to 145 and reached its peak in 1949 with 162 students.

By the early 1950s, a school was established near the Minginui Forest Village, the
Minginui Maori School. This lowered the roll at Te Whaiti. The later years saw both
schools prosper (Williams 1988, 9-10). In the 1950s night classes were introduced with
the development of cultural programmes for both young and old. The interest was high
in the valley and the people were positive and active:

"The School Committee has worked hard to provide as many facilities as
possible for the school, to promote a healthy spirit of co-operation between
parents and scholars, in the hope that the children of this community will develop
a sturdy, self-reliant and wholesome character, worthy of the highest traditions of
4.5 Migration

The valley's population (the majority of which lived at Minginui) peaked in 1956 with some 800 people. The availability of good housing with work opportunities was a powerful factor. During the 1950s, New Zealand's population experienced major shortages in housing. The knowledge that work was available, with on-site family accommodation at nominal rents by the Forest Service, created a big draw of labour. As mentioned, the original concept of the development of the Forest Service's 'Model Village' (1946) was that of a very small complex of housing which catered for forestry management. Labour for the industry would be also gained from the local resident Maori living at Te Whaiti. Documentation indicates that the Forest Service policy at the time was to keep the cultures separated, but also keeping in mind that the labour work force should be obtained from local valley residents, not from outside the area. This idea did not last particularly long, although the population at Te Whaiti tended to move out of the valley, to Murupara or Rotorua, rather than shift up to Minginui (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 539-541).

Data shows that the work generated by the forestry industry created a population consisting of slightly more than half being of Pakeha descent and the rest Maori. Of the Maori sector, oral information recounts that, prior to the development of Minginui, the majority were of Ngati Whare. In 1949 figures at the Te Whaiti Forest Service camp showed 55% Pakeha and 45% Maori. The figures remained relatively consistent until the latter part of the 1950s. Census figures give an idea of the population trends over the time period 1945 to 1981 (Statistics NZ, cited Hutton & Neumann 2001). The first appearance of the decline in the population was with the migration of Pakeha out of the valley, as the opportunity of adequate family housing became much easier to acquire in other areas and closer to more central community living areas, like Rotorua (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 540-541).
Table 4.1: Census figures for Minginui, Te Whaiti and Ngaputahi 1945 – 1981 (number of Maori in brackets)\(^3\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minginui</th>
<th>Te Whaiti (vic)</th>
<th>Te Whaiti (Town)</th>
<th>Ngaputahi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>15 (3)</td>
<td>457 (306)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>444 (176)</td>
<td>310 (214)</td>
<td>13 (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>400 (162)</td>
<td>343 (283)</td>
<td>22 (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>448 (233)</td>
<td>257 (217)</td>
<td>22 (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>393 (271)</td>
<td>177 (143)</td>
<td>18 (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>374 (268)</td>
<td>91 (65)</td>
<td>25 (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Statistics NZ, cited in Hutton & Neumann 2001, 540)

Through the mid twentieth century trends in New Zealand's internal migration started to change. The movement of individuals or families between regions grew with the increasing development of the country's infrastructure. For Maori, inter-regional migration increased, and by the 1950s widescale movement from the rural to the urban sectors accelerated. Inter-regional migration is an important factor for Minginui, which we will visit later in this thesis. It raises other issues: that of tangata whenua and tangata whenua-through-kinship, which became apparent while spending three months living amongst and observing the people of Minginui.

The above table shows the decline in the Te Whaiti population from 1945, the primary cause being the exhaustion of the timber supply at the north end of the valley and the relocation of the centre of the forestry industry in the valley to Minginui. As alluded to above, the population dynamics wasn't simply the local residents shifting 9 kilometres up the valley to the Forest Service 'model village', but a more complex interaction. A large proportion of the Ngati Whare living in Te Whaiti moved away from the valley, to Murupara, Rotorua, the wider Bay of Plenty or elsewhere. In part the forestry industry of the valley couldn't support the full population (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 541). Instead,

---

emigration from the valley took place as industry, infrastructure development and opportunity outside the valley became more attractive.

The long term productivity of the valley's timber industry was unsustainable. The community of Minginui prospered while the forestry industry was heavily oriented toward indigenous logging. The Government's reshaping of the New Zealand's economy after 1984 was certainly the final nail in the coffin for growth and development of an economy based purely on forestry. However, this event was preceded by the general public's support, in the mid-seventies, of the termination of the indigenous commercial timber logging and milling.

4.6 Native Logging

The 1970s was an era of environmental awareness, a better understanding of the relationship between people and their environment. It was a period where a 'wake up call' was made questioning the continued abuse and over-exploitation of natural resources. The rise of 'conservationists' promoted environmental care and the sustainable management of the environment. With regard to the actions of the conservation movement, the climax of events was highlighted with the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984, and the fulfilment of their election promise which was to discontinue native forest timber milling in the North Island (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 631). This sequence of events, combined with the devolution of the Forest Service in 1987 led to the break down of the economic structure of the community at Minginui and, as will be discussed later, caused a major alteration to the well-being of the people there.

The late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s saw a rise of 'environmental awareness'. Reacting to growing public concerns about the management and preservation of New Zealand's natural history resources, an advisory group, the Forest Development Council (FDC), was set up in 1971. By the mid 1970s, new policies for the management of logging of indigenous forests were derived from a series of Forest Development Conferences (1974/5) conducted by the FDC. These conferences brought together dominant interest groups, such as Forest and Bird, the Forest Service, and other 'warring factions' (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 635).
The revised indigenous forest policy was actioned by the then Director-General of Forestry, Mr. Malcom Conway. Meeting with central North Island Forest Service District Rangers, Conway explained the need for action by the forestry industry and appreciated the need for immediate implementation of a reduction in native milling. The Government’s acknowledgement of the revised Indigenous Forest Policy, by the then Minister of Forests Mr. Venn Young, was not actioned until 1977. Meanwhile, Bob Collins, the Forest Service’s Ranger in charge of the management of the Whirinaki Forest, had established a policy of selective logging. Both Young and Collins, at differing times, made clear reference in their reports to the fact that the changes and the reduction of indigenous logging would have major and damning effects on the people and communities engaged in the forestry industry. Indeed, Conway had brought attention to this earlier in the 1970s (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 635-640).

Growing public concern for the conservation of New Zealand’s natural history impacted on Minginui, particularly through the Native Forest Action Committee (NFAC) in the latter part of the 1970s. The NFAC, a coalition of related conservationist movements, did not agree with the representation of their ideas by the seemingly venerable and politically conservative Forest and Bird Protection Society. Rather, the NFAC took a much more active and direct approach to the termination of indigenous logging. It became active in the Whirinaki Valley from 1976, making several organised visits to the Whirinaki Forest with members from Whakatane, Rotorua, and Auckland branches. Initially, their actions saw little contact with the local people, but rather sparked a correspondence war, which outlined the NFAC’s complaints to Ministers and forestry officials (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 644-647).

However, the climate changed drastically with the actions of the NFAC in its attempts to stop logging in the Pureora Forest:

“In January 1978, NFAC activists carried their protest into the forest and climbed Totara earmarked for felling. Conservationist determined to force an end to the logging, and local forestry workers who feared for their jobs, clashed. After a couple of days of confrontations, the Forest Service gave in and agreed to a moratorium. The NFAC campaign was eventually successful; logging at Pureora ceased, and a sanctuary was set up” (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 646).
Leaders in the Minginui community had been aware of the NFAC’s activities and their aims for the closure of native logging prior to Pureora. The closure meant a major change to indigenous logging across the country. The residents of Minginui, all reliant on the forestry industry for their livelihoods, became aware of their situation and potential doom via the media. Residents became worried about a dramatic change to their lifestyles which would occur when ‘doomsday’ arrived. Matters were complicated further by the Whakatane and Rotorua branches of the NFAC intention to lobby the Urewera National Parks Board to amalgamate the Whirinaki Forest with the National Park, and to impose regulations to curtail the hunting, the use of horses and the collecting of forest resources for food and traditional uses. Similar restrictions had been experienced with the neighbouring Urewera National Park. All this had little appeal to the local residents. (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 649).

The residents of the valley were therefore aware of their situation, and became angry at the imposition of outside influences and power having control of their lifestyles. A scene was set for confrontation. Local leaders, Bob Collins (District Ranger), John Ingoe (shop owner, Minginui) and George MacMillan (previous village shop owner, Minginui), set out, with the support of the Minginui residents, to counter this ‘infiltration’ into their lives and well-being. The leaders in the community saw a ‘united community’ as their weapon to try and control impending change from outside pressure groups:

“Macmillan, Ingoe and Collins agreed that the people of Minginui ‘would not be demonstrators but rather a united community up against interfering [sic] minority groups. We were ordinary people defending our right to live without outside pressure, defending departmental and Government policy on Whirinaki forest management and administration” (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 450).

An organised trip by the NFAC to the Whirinaki Forest was met by a blockade of Minginui residents, many riding horses, and Minginui children bearing a sign reading ‘National Front Against Conservationists’. This confrontation was well documented through the media; both sides seemingly trying to overplay the opposition’s affront.

“In his account of the blockade, Bob Collins suggested that the incident on 3 June represented a major defeat for the conservationists, and left them fuming and crying for vengeance. But most of the discussions that took place between Minginui villagers and the ECO [Environment & Conservation Organisation] delegates on that day were amicable. ‘Despite strong feeling on both sides, the
incident went off without any violence or even harsh words’, the New Zealand Herald reported. According to a newsletter published by NFAC’s Rotorua branch, the conservationists were not nearly as furious as Collins suggested: ‘Although foiled at the road block set up by the residents, most agreed it was interesting to hear the locals’ side of the story in the ensuing good natured verbal exchange which followed’, the newsletter stated” (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 655).

A stand off at best, with no real winners or losers and the important realisation that there are two sides to a story. This gave a chance for the people of Minginui to be heard. Comments made by individuals, after the confrontation, are interesting. It is documented that Richard Prebble, in Parliament, accused a government servant in the Forest Service (Bob Collins) of lying ‘to the workers at Minginui, and told them that, unless the government’s policy to mill native trees was continued, they would lose their jobs.’ He went further to say that his party and he himself gave ‘an unqualified assurance’ that they would not let the forestry workers be dumped ‘on to the scrap heap’. This was confirmed by comments made by the then Minister of Forests, Venn Young:

“Both the Minister of Forests- ‘No Government policy would destroy this village’ – and Richard Prebble assured the villagers that they would not lose their livelihood as a result of the implementation of either National Party or Labour Party policies” (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 657).

However, the phasing out of indigenous logging was well under way. In 1979 Cabinet approved a management plan for a rapid decrease in indigenous logging, to a low of 5000 cubic metres in 1985. It was resolved that Minginui Sawmills should convert to mostly exotic production sooner than planned (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 687). Under this scheme, therefore, the working population of Minginui would be secure in their employment. The conservation threat, while decisive in ending native logging, did not necessarily mean the end of Minginui.

However, the words of politicians (like those of Prebble) were words with little meaning. Collins’ summing up was reported in the media, ‘that the Whirinaki issue had become a political football game with the poor Minginui community as the ball’ (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 658). This was, arguably, the initial stage of the economic decline and subsequent alienation of Minginui Village and its community from mainstream New Zealand. Jobs and the forestry industry were not secure and people’s apprehension,
distrust and fear were growing. The next sequence of events to continue the destruction of rural communities comes with the election of the Labour Government in the 1984.

4.7 New Zealand and ‘Structural Adjustment’.

The election of the Labour Government in 1984 saw the end of indigenous logging in the North Island. This was one of Labour’s election promises. However, accompanying this two years later was the introduction of a radical neo-liberal economic policy, a huge structural adjustment led by the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. The outcome of this policy has been discussed previously. Arguably, the results had dramatic consequences for New Zealand’s development (illustrated in Chapter 3 with comments from Rosenberg, Kelsey, and Philpott). Minginui’s circumstances and today’s environment have been heavily influenced by this period.

The Minginui community could claim a victory over the ‘Greenies’ for the time, with the blockade providing job security, but continual pressure was applied from the outside for the closure of native logging over the proceeding years. Ian Shearer, Minister for the Environment for the National Government in 1981, took a hard line in his opposition to native logging in the Whirinaki, causing continual waves for the publics conservationist views within government and cabinet. In 1983 the East Coast National Parks and Reserves Board (ECNPRB) developed a proposal for the enlargement of the Te Urewera National Park, with the inclusion of the Whirinaki Forest. This would immediately collapse the native logging industry in the region.

Their argument for such a move was based on the nurturing of Maori conservation ethics, tradition and culture with the development of an indigenous people’s educational facilities within the Minginui community. But the community, seemingly under attack once more, countered with the argument that their traditional and cultural lifestyles had already been greatly threatened with the gazetteing of the Te Urewera National Park. Many of their traditional resources for hunting, food, medicines and materials had been lost. The people of the valley thought it highly unjust to be subjected once more, by powers above that would determine and demean their livelihoods and well-being further (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 691-695).
With the Labour Party's environmental election policy to call a halt to timber extraction from all virgin indigenous State forests in the North Island (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 695), and with the increasing public feeling for the protection of native forests, the Forest Service had reduced its native logging in the Whirinaki to the recovery of windblown natives by 1982. Initially, labour demands actually increased — the replanting scheme requiring more work than clear-felling.

However, this soon became the first blow for the Minginui village. The opening of the Whirinaki Forest Park in 1984 and the demise and eventual closure of the logging industry saw the village's population start to decline. The Forest service employees numbered 135 in 1984 but had dropped to 90 midway through 1986, despite the promises of politicians that 'no jobs will be lost'. The decay was only just beginning.

The second policy shift evolved from the 'Roger Douglas camp' of the newly elected Labour Party. This was the start of a radical reduction in state governance and the rise of 'free market' policies. The main goals were the deregulation of the market place and withdrawal of State services, and the reduction of regulation in the labour market. As part of the wider policy platform, the Forest Service underwent structural reform.

To a single industry town such as Minginui, this had drastic effects. Yet the Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, in a press statement (24 February 1987) referred to the benefits of the restructuring, saying that 'putting more money in the family purse is the long term aim of the corporatisation of the State's trading activities':

"For many years, the New Zealand economy performed badly in relation to other economies. Policy was characterised by numerous controls, regulations and interventions by the Government, together with erratic monetary and fiscal policies. While some policies purported to insulate New Zealand from the rest of the world, others were introduced to encourage investment into particular sectors of the economy. What has now become clear is that although the total level of past investment was on a par with that of other OECD countries, much of it was directed into areas that were not profitable from a national perspective. Public sector investment was misdirected on a massive scale ['think big']. While in the private sector, investment was distorted by the controls, regulations, and subsidies which gave businesses confused and changing signals. As a consequence, the economy performed relatively badly compared with OECD countries. Employment and living standards suffered as a result". (The
Chairman, Ministerial Co-ordination Committee on State Owned Enterprises 1986, 1).

Palmer, as chairperson of the Ministerial Co-ordination Committee on State Owned Enterprises, went on to state that 'the process of change is a precursor to the attainment of more jobs and higher living standards' (The Chairman, Ministerial Co-ordination Committee on State Owned Enterprises 1986, 7). But this in fact signalled the rapid decay of rural communities such as Minginui.

The State Forest Service was disbanded on 1 April 1987, and income-generating assets were transferred to the new Forestry Corporation and remaining assets dispersed. The Government, being aware of the social upheaval of the restructuring, was proactive in developing governmental working groups to research, monitor and advise. As one memorandum stated:

"Current Government moves to corporatise various Departments will have a pronounced effect upon residents in small single employer towns, forcing them to undergo social changes of unprecedented proportions". (Govt. document 1987, Ref No: NZ8726-4).

Government consciousness on the situation, as limited as it may have been, saw Cabinet, on 16 June, 1986, request a further analysis of the possible social impacts of their State Owned Enterprise (SOE) policy. This, in turn, saw the establishment of an interdepartmental advisory group, the Social Impact Unit, which linked departments such as Maori Affairs, Social Welfare, Labour, Trade and Industry, Housing Corporation and Internal Affairs. The advisory group was chaired by the State Services Commission. At ground level, a Social Impact Unit was commissioned to operate regionally in affected areas (Wilson 1987, 1).

The work generated by the Social Impact Unit was in some ways thorough. The Unit made a number of recommendations on the effects that corporatisation was imposing on the rural single industry communities. For instance:

"It is clear that with the dramatic increase in unemployment in the area, caused not only by the Corporatisation of the Forest Service but also increased redundancies in the private sector forestry [a direct spin off of restructuring], there will be an accompanying increase in associated social problems, crime, domestic violence, financial problems, health and so on. Even before
corporatisation, crime and associated problems were increasing dramatically (a 96% increase in crime in 1986, over 1985). (Workman 1987, 1).

A review by Social Impact Unit staff in respect to the Bay of Plenty (BoP) region, although accurate, was rather grim. The Unit's insight into the major problems facing the rural communities documented the following:

"Apart from the loss of jobs, the loss of family home was considered to be the most serious problem facing the workers. The meeting reported great concern, not only on the likely effects of corporatisation but the complete lack of consultation with the entire community regarding their whole future". (Sims 1986, 1)

However, the result of the Forestry Corporatisation at Minginui was not growth in employment and improvements in people's living standards. The predictions of Members of Parliament were in fact wrong. The rationalising of Forest Corporation to a 'lean and mean' profit-making machine also contributed to the closure of the private sawmills at Minginui. The combined effect of the policy created a rate of unemployment of 95%. It is fair to say that factions of the State Services, as well as individuals in the public service, worked hard and diligently during the reforms to solve the problems incurred through restructuring (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 714-733).

It should also be acknowledged that the people in the affected communities, scared, stressed and very unsure of their futures, were also active in trying to manage this whirlwind of change. A 1987 report from the Murupara Forestry Housing Committee to Timberlands, in proposing a housing package, clearly outlines the rural populace's view, concerns and their overall understanding of the meaning and implications involved in the government's restructuring policies. The document describes the Government's objectives for the corporatisation as:

- Streamlining operations;
- Developing open market competitiveness;
- Prompting self-sufficiency and self determination;
- Less dependency on Government fiscal funding;
• Producing a profit making organisation.

The Murupara Forestry Housing Committee's concerns were:

• The speed at which the Government pursued the objectives;
• That much of the population regarded themselves as tangata whenua;
• That employment opportunities were slim;
• Relocation, especially to urban city environments, was traumatic and very foreign to families;
• The stress and uncertainty of the future;
• That their skills applied to the forestry industry and had limited transferability to other areas;
• That relocating from an already economically depressed area drastically limited opportunities, as local residents couldn't meet the costs;
• That the people's choice for the determination of their futures has not been an option;
• Most of all, the need for security in providing housing for families.

(Murupara Forestry Housing Committee 1987, 1-5)

The Committee also stated:

"Finally, it is our view that the Government has seriously misunderstood the impact the restructuring has had on people and would urge strongly that the Government, through its agency the Housing Corporation, ... settle for a negotiated package as outlined. It is our opinion that were this to happen, the people involved would see justice having been done to them, rather than feeling, as they presently do, that they are being unfairly handled by a crushing, uncaring bureaucratic landlord". (Murupara Forestry Housing Committee 1987, 5).
These views were common in the communities of Kaingaroa, Minginui, Murupara and other forestry communities in the Bay of Plenty, if not over all New Zealand. These people were worried, confused and bewildered that Parliament was in the process of destroying their lifestyles and general well-being.

The path of Minginui's demise and underdevelopment shows the reluctance of the Government to take and to be accountable for actions and outcomes resulting from the economic changes of restructuring. Sims (1987) lends weight to this argument in correspondence as Regional Transitional Manager, Maori Affairs, working in the Social Impact Unit trying to research, design and generate answers to the many social dynamics that were occurring. On completion of the Social Impact Report for Minginui and Kaingaroa, Sims was fighting for funding:

"Obviously I could not allow a hold-up of this report while departments in Wellington decided whose responsibility it was to "foot the bill". You will appreciate the strain and uncertainty still being felt by the villagers, most of whom are unemployed.

The funding for the study will be met by the Department of Conservation and Mana Enterprises, $10,000 each, with the balance from my regional allocation.

I trust this will relieve some of the anxiety being displayed by the Contingency Fund Committee." (Sims 1987, Government correspondence)

As individuals, many of the government agents working at regional levels could clearly see the impact of the economic reforms. However, within their organisations their opinions, ideas and commentary seemed to lose impact the further up the 'chain of command' it travelled. There was little that they, or indeed the local residents, could feasibly do in the face of 'Rogernomics' and rapid, radical new right economic reform.

**Summary:**

Minginui, from the Second World War, saw considerable social and economic development. But by the late 1970s this was to be transformed into a period of underdevelopment. This started with the decline and closure of the native logging industry in the valley. With the public's discovery of conservation ethics, successive governments reduced the amount of timber that was milled from the Whirinaki State
Forest. The residents of Minginui were well aware of the predicament they were in, and lobbied successfully for a time to preserve their lifestyle. However, forest management from the late 1970s saw a substantial reduction in native timber milling, and a change in the work conducted in Minginui to exotic forest management and logging.

The 'snap election' of 1984, however, was to sentence Minginui to a different fate. First, rather than a phased reduction in native milling, all milling was stopped. Second, and most critically, the State Owned Enterprise policy saw the corporatisation of the New Zealand Forest Service, and the radical reduction of labour across the entire forestry sector. Almost overnight, soon after 1 April 1987 (the date of the creation of the Forestry Corporation), half the working population of Minginui was rendered unemployed. The Carter Holt Mill outside Minginui closed in August 1988, increasing unemployment to around 95%.

While the Government sought to monitor the social effects of its State Owned Enterprise policies, all advice it received from bodies such as the Social Impact Unit of the State Services Commission, was ignored. Arguably, the policy change to a full free market, new right platform, had little room for the consideration of the social dynamics of a community like Minginui. The Government's habit of side-stepping accountability and responsibilities, along with unclear communications within the Government ranks, seems to become stronger as time and events progressed. Problems with the effect of the structural adjustment policy became harder to solve. The Government's disposal of its ownership of the Minginui Village in 1988, as discussed in the next chapter, was to add to the community's woes.
5.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the Government's decision in 1988 to transfer of Minginui Village to the local iwi, Ngati Whare. It argues that a period of poor leadership at all levels, reinforced by high levels of unemployment, resulted in the village and village residents sliding into a state of underdevelopment. The newly elected Fourth Labour Government's economic reform policies are seen as having significantly negative impact on the community. Moreover, in the case of the ongoing management and expense of running Minginui, the Government wished to release itself from its responsibilities in the most cost-effective way possible. This had serious implications for the resources made available to Minginui and to Ngati Whare for them to run the village into the future. In addition, what training and development schemes that were instigated by the Government in the late 1980s and early 1990s (to assist the now unemployed community of Minginui) were of little use. They fostered no long term social or economic development and were, at best, stop gap measures.

5.2 The return of Minginui

The gifting in 1988 of Minginui Forest Village from the Crown to Ngati Whare was originally seen as a positive act in line with the principles of the Treaty. But, in reality the gift was to become another thorn in the side for people of the valley. As has been discussed above, in 1988 most village residents, because of the Government's restructuring of the Forest Service, had been made redundant. They had no prospect of work, they were insecure in their future and were powerless and wary of outside influence. This environment generated further distrust, anger and disillusionment in the community. It was a difficult time. Hutton and Neumann give a well-documented analysis of the event, creating a script for what they have termed the 'politics of poverty' (2001, Chapter 9).

With the restructuring of the Forest service and the establishment of the Forest Corporation in 1987, the social welfare of the work force became of secondary
importance to the new regime. Providing housing for employees was no longer the responsibility of the forest industry. Rather the new Forest Corporation was to operate along ‘New-right’ ideals, to produce profit. While Minginui had been established at a time of labour shortages – the housing was in effect a bribe to attract workers into timber milling – the establishment of the Forest Corporation saw a radical reduction in labour. Minginui’s original purpose no longer fitted. Therefore Minginui had to go.

The question was, where, or how? Options considered included the destruction of the village and the relocation of the residents, the administration of the village being passed to the Whakatane District Council (Minginui is situated in its south eastern rim), or the return of the village to the local iwi and the village residents. Relocation, while discussed at various government levels, was not thought of as a realistic option. The country’s circumstances, undergoing economic structural adjustment, left little opportunity for the availability of work for Minginui’s ‘blue collar’ labour force. This was further complicated as the majority of the redundant work force in Minginui was only skilled in the forestry industry.

Other influencing factors were that a significant body of the residents were of Ngati Whare descent, and were therefore tangata whenua. Many had serious reservations, both cultural and practical, about the idea of moving from the valley. Interviews with residents, about that time, revealed that culturally the valley is turangawaewae (home, or home ground). Nor could the majority of the villagers, being unemployed, see any benefit in their relocation. There was no work available in the wider region.

On the Government’s side, relocation would have meant the dismemberment of a Maori community from their turangawaewae. Given Minginui’s prominence in the media in the late 1970s, and the occupation of Bastion Point in 1981, the Government was unlikely to have gained good press by such a move. In addition, regionally there was a housing shortage, so the cost of relocation of such a large number of families was prohibitive. Overall Government policy was to incur the least cost possible, and to divert expenses to other (private sector) parties. Added to this, in August 1988 the Carter Holt Mill ceased operation at Minginui. This put the remainder of the village out of work. The houses occupied by the mill workers were passed to them as part of their redundancy package. The Government then carried an extra financial burden: if the village population was to be relocated, the Government would have to purchase the ex-mill houses from their...
occupants, as well as finding them housing elsewhere (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 722-735).

Whichever way the Government viewed the destruction or transfer of Minginui, problems and complications developed. The zoning of Minginui as Rural ‘B’ designated it as ‘State Forest’ which has given the Forest Service the ability to develop the township of Minginui as an ‘ancillary function’ of their forestry operations. This gave the old Forest Service the freedom within planning consents, to develop to their will. This became a major hurdle when the transfer of the village to the Whakatane District Council (WDC) was considered. The WDC viewed their administration of Minginui, if transferred, as a drain and liability for the majority of WDC ratepayers. The rates collectable from residents of Minginui would not cover the community running expenses. The conditions of transfer that the WDC put forward were for the Government to meet all costs for the maintenance and upgrading (if required) and for it to comply with the WDC Code of Practice for Subdivisions in the district.

A report presented by the Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) ‘Minginui Village: Issues Involved in a Change of Administration’, of August 1987, gave a detailed outline of the necessary maintenance schedule and costs required to meet the WDC Code of Practice. Unless government met these costs, from the WDC’s perspective the transfer of control and administration of Minginui was not considered an attractive proposition (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 749-750).

Arguably, the MWD report also served as an example of the Government’s mismanagement of the transfer of Minginui. It gives the impression that Government was more concerned with costs than with the welfare of the residents of Minginui. Hutton and Neumann (2001) summarise the structure and maintenance issues plaguing Minginui in 1987, and the estimated costs involved in bringing the village up to local by-law sub-division standards as required to meet Whakatane District Council building codes and infrastructure standards:

‘Engineering services in the town were described thus: ‘old and in some cases maintenance is long overdue’. … The services, particularly engineering ones that were identified as requiring an upgrade included the following:

- Revised ‘built plans’ were needed, showing where services such as sewage in fact existed;
• Technically the roads were too narrow (7.3 metres as opposed to 8.5 metres), grass was growing between the kerb edge and the seal, chip loss was evident, and access to pumping stations had to be sealed;

• The stormwater system did not comply with council standards – pipe size, cesspit and manhole spacing did not comply, maintenance had lapsed for some time and some of the cesspits were blocked, and inlet and outlet structures had become overgrown;

• Footpaths needed widening;

• Pram crossings did not exist, and if at some date these became a council requirement they would need to be installed;

• The water supply was adequate, except for one bore which was potentially contaminated by seepage from septic tank effluent;

• The reservoirs required some minor repairs;

• The pipes supplying water to the village were ‘old and regularly in need of maintenance and repair’. The 3 inch main was nearing the end of its serviceable life and fire hydrants needed replacing;

• Street lighting needed upgrading;

• Perhaps the most derelict part of the village’s infrastructure was the sewage system.”


It should be noted at this point the degree to which the lack of infrastructure maintenance was already causing problems in the village, the sewage system being the critical example. It is in a worse state today than 15 years ago, due mainly to financial constraints of the Minginui administration. This will be discussed further below. From the MWD Report:

“The sewage system within Minginui is septic tanks. It would appear from discussions with the local people and the Health Department that these tanks are old and have problems with soakage. About 40 houses (at least half) are affected by poor septic tank effluent drainage due to a low permeability clay layer near the ground surface. The drainage from the tanks has given the ex NZ Forest Service some concern as there appears to be some seepage into the
gully behind the houses. One section of this gully has been piped and on inspecting the water system a definite sewage smell is evident. The Forest Service recognised this problem and have designed a sewage system. The installation of this system did not eventuate as subsidy money could not be obtained". (Askey, Gibbs & Crawford 1987, cited Hutton & Neumann 2001, 747-745)

The MWD Report outlined the estimated costs involved for the upgrading of the infrastructure services at Minginui. It provided a minimum and maximum cost, as well as estimating the general maintenance costs to be expected on a yearly base. The figures in Table 5.1 are significant. They provide a good example, as the story unravels, of differing agendas within government systems and in respect of the transfer of Minginui back to Ngati Whare and the village residents.

Table 5.1: MWD Report; Summary of Engineering Services Costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Minimal Option</th>
<th>Total Upgrade</th>
<th>Annual Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As built plans</td>
<td>$16,000</td>
<td>$16,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roading</td>
<td>$112,000</td>
<td>$270,000</td>
<td>($6,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reseal in ten years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storm Water</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$104,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Sewer</td>
<td>$323,000</td>
<td>$323,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footpaths</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$80,000</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pram crossing</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>$139,000</td>
<td>$144,600</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical supply</td>
<td>$30,200</td>
<td>$30,200</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounds &amp; sites</td>
<td>$53,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubbish collection</td>
<td>$4,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$639,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>$971,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>$91,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Askey, Gibbs & Crawford 1987, 38)

These figures are exclusive of GST, therefore in real terms the figures for a minimum upgrade would be $700,000 plus and a full major upgrade well over a million dollars.

The Report also categorises the abodes in the village into three types:

- A 'State Type', of which there were 9, built out of native timber in the 1940s;
- A 'Modern Type' of which there were 35, Lockwood and Keith Hay homes construction. Most of these would be relocatable;
• A 'Substandard Type', of which 50 were built. None were relocatable as they do not meet local by-law standards due to low studs and substandard framing. (Askey, Gibbs & Crawford 1987, cited Hutton & Neumann 2001, 748)

The situation becomes more complicated when reviewing Minginui as a Government 'asset'. In 1987 the Government appears to have seen Minginui as a liability. The Forest Corporation was not obliged to meet the responsibility of running the village; the Government wanted to release itself from any ongoing costs. As discussed above, relocation of the community was plagued with political issues, high costs and the fact that ownership of some houses (not land) had been transferred to mill workers in their redundancy packages. The transfer to the WDC was hampered by the major reluctance of the council to accept it and incur the high costs needed for infrastructure maintenance. These issues gave the proposal for the return of the village to the local iwi (Ngati Whare) much merit, in that it enabled the Government to release its responsibility for Minginui easily.

It should be recognised, though, that the government employees involved in the original formatting of ideas to give the village back to Ngati Whare did so in good faith. The regional employees, Workman of the Department of Maori Affairs and Sims of the Social Impact Unit, worked hard for the benefit of the local people. They acted as facilitators, and at times lobbyists to agencies in Wellington. However, the financial policy decisions were made by the State Services Commission (SSC) and Treasury, with ultimate approval being given by Cabinet. For these bodies, cost remained of particular concern.

The SSC supported the proposal to return Minginui to Ngati Whare, as represented by the Te Whaiti Nui-a-Toi Trust. Indicating that Government retention was no option and that the transfer to the WDC was not viable in recognising the costs involved, the MWD Report stated that:

"The [Works] report ... estimated that the costs associated with the transfer of Minginui to the Whakatane District Council would cost between $787,085 and $1,187,343, involving major structural and up grading of village facilities. The Council would not expect to meet any of the upgrading costs. Further such administrative change would take two years."
Total administration of Minginui village by Whakatane District Council is therefore considered inappropriate as costs to the Crown and to residents would be excessive". (Roger, cited Hutton & Neumann 2001, 762)

This memorandum provides clear evidence that officials and decision-makers within Government were aware of the circumstances, costs and the situation Minginui found itself in, and that they saw Minginui as a liability. Hutton and Neumann (2001) also cite a Treasury report on the future of Minginui. This report became the basis for Cabinet's decision to return the village to Ngati Whare. It clearly indicates that government preferred to opt out at the lowest cost possible. Considering the SSC's report, that of the Government's responsibilities as the ex-employer, and the fact that the relocation of the community may be seen as socially adverse, the Treasury report stated:

"It should be made clear to the residents, that after the initial period of support, no further Government assistance will be provided for the village, and the administrative body will take full responsibility for the future viability of the village". (James 1988, cited Hutton & Neumann 2001, 768)

The Government's responsibility for the upgrading of the infrastructure before any form of transfer was undertaken was also considered. As pointed out earlier, costs ranged between approximately $700,000 and over $1,000,000. But this figure had been reduced to approximately $200,000 in the SSC's recommendations. The village residents had disagreed with the findings set out in the Works Report. They felt the costs there were too high for the government to consider returning the village. Fearing relocation and thus the destruction of the Minginui community, they agreed that much of the upgrades were unnecessary. This helped lower the cost to Government. Treasury took the following stand on the matter of assistance:

"We consider there is some case for meeting some of the costs of upgrading the village as local authorities currently receive approximately a third of their funding from Government to meet the costs of roading, water and sewage rates. It is a matter of judgement what the level contribution should be from the Crown. We have no information as to the level of wealth held by the residents. A 50/50 sharing agreement between the Crown and the local residents could be appropriate". (cited in Hutton & Neumann 2001, 767).

These suggested guidelines became the Government's position. After its return, Minginui, would have to fend for itself. On 4 October 1988, Cabinet agreed to return
Minginui to Ngati Whare with an upgrade package of no more than $100,000. The cost of $787,085 necessary for the community infrastructure to be brought up to a standard that local by-laws consider reasonable was to be carried by the village itself.

On 29 March 1989, the Maori Land Court facilitated the return of the land that Minginui was situated on to Ngati Whare. The Court drew up an Order under section 436, vesting the land in Wharepakau, the eponymous ancestor of Ngati Whare. A trust, the Ngati Whare Trust, was created to hold and maintain the land. The village assets were also passed to the Trust, including thirty-six ex-New Zealand Forest Service houses (the balance of the Government owned houses were being used by DoC; these were later transferred to the Trust when DoC ceased to use them). The sale of these houses to the residents would supposedly create a fund for the future running of the village. This matter, and the ongoing management problems of the village, are discussed in the next chapter as a case study.

This was effectively the end of the era of the forestry industry within the valley. A summary of the process is given by Hutton and Neumann (2001):

“What can be said with certainty is that change was both rapid and dramatic. In social terms the people on the ground were often left in the dark, placed in an insecure position while being required to make difficult decisions with little or no information. What can also be said is that the re-structuring of the Forest Service dramatically affected Maori and Maori communities such as Minginui, Murupara and Kaingaroa. When talking to members of Ngati Whare who continue to reside in the Bay of Plenty region, the ‘devolution’ of the Forest Service remains a highly significant point in their lives. Their view is one of economic upheaval, of entire communities being rendered unemployed and of the economic effects flowing on to their present state of poverty. In many ways these communities have not recovered from restructuring and downsizing”. (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 713-714).

It is important to add that the promises by politicians in 1984, such as that by Geoffrey Palmer as Deputy Prime Minister, that economic restructuring would benefit all New Zealanders by providing greater employment, better standards of living and well-being, did not and has not eventuated for the people of Minginui. In fact there has been significant regression. With Minginui, the plight of long term unemployment following corporatisation was made worse by the situation of the management and maintenance
of the infrastructure of the village; something they had little knowledge of, no experience of, and very little resource for. Added with this was the Government's view that, on transfer, there would be no further support given to the community. As one resident so aptly described:

“I think the biggest disappointment was when they handed us back the village with no real structures in place, to actually run the place. In saying that, prior to the village getting handed back everything was handled by the Forestry Department. Like the rates and all that. At the time we were young and we didn’t understand. You can guarantee there are a lot of people wouldn’t leave the place [Minginui], unless you got a job. It’s not worth leaving unless you got a job. You might as well stay. But everything is still in the same situation and they [the village people] haven’t gone anywhere. The only thing I got is more kids since then”. (MFV-026 Resident's Interview, 2002).

5.4 The Underdevelopment of Minginui

The transfer of ownership and management caused many problems within the village. Critically, however, this was compounded by the fact that Government social services were inadequate and employment options through the 1980s and early to mid 1990s were minimal. All in all, the community was driven into a survival mode. Combined with a declining population, the social impact of redundancy saw widespread social depression. Recently, though, in the latter part of the 1990s and the beginning of this century, attitudes and aspirations of community members appear to have changed. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Reviewing population figures from the decade 1986 to 1996, it is clear that there was a substantial change in the number of residents in Minginui (Statistics NZ, cited in Morant 1999). An immediate reduction in the population of the community was close to 20%, at the time of the Forest Corporation restructuring. Put simply, those who could find work in other regions, and who were not tied to the valley for cultural or family reasons, packed up and left. The majority of long term resident Pakeha left. This period also saw a reduction in the number of pupils attending Te Whaiti Primary School at the other end of the valley; in 1989 there were 11 pupils, down from approximately 52 in 1965. The present principal, a former pupil of Te Whaiti and high school teacher from Ngaputahi, feared that the closure of the school was imminent. Realising the need and importance
of the educational facility for the community, took the vacant position of head teacher and principal. The School once again has prominence in the community’s structure and well-being today. The development of the school will be addressed in the next chapter as a case study.

The valley was therefore in crisis, with high unemployment and a rapidly declining population. This in turn impacted on the availability and maintenance of adequate public services. With a growing ‘user pays’ philosophy infecting all levels of Government, the smaller number of people in the community meant that cost of supply outweighed that of demand.

**Table 5.2: Population figures Minginui 86-93.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minginui</th>
<th>Te Whaiti &amp; Ngaputahi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>369 (264)</td>
<td>84 (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>306 (252)</td>
<td>57 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>282 (249)</td>
<td>69 (45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Morant 1999)

Table 5.2 above shows a dramatic drop in population over the period 1986 to 1991, coinciding with the impact of forestry corporatisation. This saw, initially, the migration of skilled labour which found opportunities of employment, in forestry and other industries, in other locations. Others left, drawn to larger centres in hope of work and easier access to goods and services that were no longer available in the valley. However, this was further complicated by the ongoing effects around the country of the economic structural change; unemployment was rampant for much of the 1990s.

The newly-elected National Government of 1990 continued Labour’s structural adjustment policies. It also devised a strategy that arguably hampered people’s well-being and placed many people in an abject position ever since. The deregulation of the labour market, with the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, coupled with the simultaneous reduction in the social welfare benefits, was meant to increase the international competitiveness of New Zealand industry (Rankin 1995, 18). Lowering labour costs was seen as the initiative for the establishment of new enterprises that could compete in the global market place. But this was undermined by the
Government's removal of tariffs on imported goods. The manufacturing industry found it hard to remain competitive, especially against manufacturing from the cheap labour markets of the Third World. With the removal of further tariffs, clothing and shoe manufacturing industries experienced major layoffs and closures. Kelsey and O'Brien (1995) summarise the effect that the 'miracle economy' was having on rural communities such as Minginui:

"The structural adjustment programme not only failed to remedy many of the ills which plagued New Zealand economy in 1984 – for most of the decade it made them worse. By the end of 1994, New Zealand's 'economic miracle' had only recovered about half the estimated 100,000 jobs lost in the last decade. Many other economic indicators were only just returning to their pre-1984 levels. When measured in terms of social indicators – poverty, unemployment, crime, suicide, alienation, disempowerment, loss of control – the country was a great deal worse off". (Kelsey & O'Brien 1995, 29).

After the establishment of the Forestry Corporation, people in Minginui on various occasions took the initiative both independently and via Government assistance to try to re-establish income generation within the valley. Through the Maori Access schemes, training modules for outdoor pursuits, carpentry, catering, carving, Maoritanga, to name but a few, were established and run.

It is revealing to look at the results of these programmes from the perspective of the people from Minginui who took part in them. When asked what support was provided, one resident recalled:

"Little bits and pieces over time from 1988 to 1990! We had PEP schemes [ACCESS] and those kind of things, to start getting us on our feet. But they were like a lot of other Government things at the time. It was just short period, short term thing and no real substance at the end of it. Nothing at the end of it. ... Didn't really effect us in the long term! ... It was more just a stop gap measure for that period of time. It didn't help us in the long term for employment". (MFV-026 Resident's Interview, 2002)

Another resident stated:

"It didn't provide employment. ... No moneys, eh! That's what it was". (MFV-025 Resident's Interview, 2002)
And yet another view:

“They always tried something fast in here [Minginui] . . . Come in fast and went out fast. I reckon it’s bloody rat-shit, it should have been still here. All those schemes, we would have some qualified people by now”. (MFV-027 Resident’s Interview, 2002)

Other local initiatives, such as the Whaka Araara Trust Programme that was developed soon after 1987, indicate that individuals within the community wished to deal with their predicament. But funding from ACCESS and other initiatives soon ran out. With the retrenchment of welfare payments in 1991, sources of assistance soon disappeared. (MFV-006 Resident’s Interview, 2002)

The formation of the Whaka Araara Trust was an important initiative at the time. It was formed by a group of local people to establish a venture in tourism which would use the natural resources around the valley. Nationally, tourism was developing as a vibrant industry. Through ‘korero’ (discussion) with local kaumatua, the focus of the Trust was broadened to build employment throughout the valley. The original scheme was for the setting up of a traditional Pa and Marae sight adjacent to Minginui as a tourism venture. Members of the village, liaising with the NZ Army, were involved with its initial development. The Trust then broadened its scope to re-establish the village shop that had been recently abandoned by its owner due to rising costs and loss of income from mass unemployment. When establishing the shop, the Trust also negotiated, with an outside party, the establishment of a sewing factory to supply work for the women in the village (MFV-006 Resident’s Interview, 2002).

However, the Whaka Araara Trust struggled from a lack of money in the immediate area. The isolation of the community, low incomes there, and the heavy burden that the country was experiencing from the ‘structural adjustment’ programme reduced potential income. The shop struggled for approximately 6 years until the mid 1990s, when the diminishing population and continued unemployment meant that people could not afford more than just basic necessities. (MFV-006 Resident’s Interview, 2002)

The sewing factory was also short-lived due to the pressure on the national clothing industry from the competition of cheap imported goods from Asia and the Pacific. The sewing contracting partner left the valley, owing money to people of the village. The
tourism venture, because of local residents lack of industry knowledge and the valley's isolated situation, never got off the ground (MFV-006 Resident's Interview, 2002).

Through this period the predominant feelings of residents were those of despair, anger and alienation. Words from a resident who lived both prior to and after the restructuring gives an indication of social attitudes in the village:

"I worked in the mill. All my mates worked in the forestry so I got a job in the forestry. To me it was neat. You were in wide-open spaces, you were doing different things at different times. It wasn't to me a boring job. ... My bosses were good, and the big bosses were good, not that I had a lot to do with them. ... It has gone to the pack. I've seen photos on TV of Otara. Well, you could think this place was a suburb of Otara, but it is not. You are in the country. ... I have to shake my head. ... This place is getting worse and worse to my eyes. Well, a home is what you make it. ... People living in those houses, why they let them go back so far, cos it is going to cost them and arm and a leg to bring them forward again. My mates sitting here now, run the system down, run the pakeha system down cos they got broken windows, their houses aren't painted. It's got nothing to do with it, it is your pride, it's your pride you should do it. ... When the Pakeha left here we were lost, we went to the pack. They won't admit it 'cos it is all anti Pakeha talk" (MFV-021 Resident's Interview, 2002).

Arguably, the individual and wider community's state of mind is a crucial element in the acceptance, or not, of change and the generation of new initiatives. Development is about social and economic change. But the radical and drastic shift Minginui experienced from an economically robust community based on the forestry industry, to a situation of almost full unemployment in little over two years, lent little to the acceptance of the change being experienced. Indeed, this change was not development in a positive sense – it was underdevelopment. As one resident stated:

"The village was thriving because of the work here. But like every good thing it comes to an end. ... The village has gone down to ground zero. ... It went to nothing. ... It went as far, it couldn't go any farther, or get any worse". (MFV-026 Resident's Interview, 2002).

It is important to state that the people of the Minginui were, and are, well aware of their plight. They had a good understanding of the circumstances involved with the situation: simply put, 'no moneys'. But they also had a problem with the intent and approach of
Government agents at the time. Government policy sought to address the problem of unemployment, but it lacked the ability to address the economic fundamentals of the community. Rather, 'quick fix' solutions or short term training was instigated, as discussed above. Among village residents, there was a lack of communication and understanding on the outcomes of programmes. The planning process was also dominated by a top-down approach, lacking an appreciation of the people's actual position. The residents of Minginui remained aware of this tendency and, although not often speaking out about their frustration, have built resentment on it.

In the early 1990s, therefore, Minginui was a rural community alienated from wider social and economic structures by the withdrawal of industry. The residents were left to manage for themselves, with a village infrastructure that was gradually decaying, substandard housing, and limited access to the benefits of the mainstream welfare systems. This arguably led to further withdrawal from mainstream systems. Other social signs of a struggling community (abuse, theft, alcohol abuse and lethargy) came to the fore. Many projects initiated by both local individuals and Government were tried, but to little effect. While it is important to acknowledge that many individuals in the community are intellectually able, and have many abilities coming from their forced 'survival' through this period, over time an awareness of resources that were available to the community decreased.

5.6 Summary:

Following the corporatisation of the Forest Service in 1987, Minginui became 'surplus to requirements'. The easiest and cheapest way for the Government to rid itself of Minginui was to pass it as a 'gift' to the local iwi, Ngati Whare. This option was supported by Ngati Whare, who were pleased to see land coming back to the iwi, and by the village residents, who had been afraid that they would lose their houses.

But the gift caused many problems within the village. Combined with a declining population, due to people leaving in search of work, the social impact of widescale redundancies saw Minginui fall further into economic depression. The fact that Government failed to provide viable alternative economic development forced the majority of the community into dependency. In addition, insufficient resources were available for the village to run itself, a situation made worse by protracted rent boycotts.
The history of the twentieth century for the Whirinaki Valley has been one of externally driven, ‘top-down’ governance. Initiatives of job creation involving the community of Minginui since the Forestry corporatisation universally ended with negative results. This has influenced views of people residing in the valley. People’s trust, pride and self-esteem were slowly eaten away. None of the promises from the ‘outside’ (such as Geoffrey Palmer’s promises of continuous employment and better living standards) eventuated. The next chapter looks at the present day community of Minginui from the observations and interviews managed by the researcher. It documents some arguably more positive and internally driven initiatives, as well as recent government-assisted initiatives to create work in the village.
6 Minginui Village Today – An Overview

6.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the situation in Minginui Village today. After a brief discussion of the current demographic status, it presents some general observations about the residents' attitudes and situation gained during fieldwork. As stated at the outset of this thesis, the period of fieldwork ran from late July to the end of October 2002. The researcher lived in the village of Minginui, observing and participating in the day to day life of the community. After a one month period of 'breaking the ice', the subsequent two months were spent gathering data, through informal discussions, documentary material, and conducting formal interviews.

During fieldwork it became evident that a positive change in the attitudes of village residents had taken place. At a general level the nature of this change is discussed below. It would appear that the environment of long term unemployment and underdevelopment of the 1990s is being gradually replaced by what is termed here as 'internal development'. While unemployment remains high, and resources are still desperately low, the capacity of the community to develop has radically improved. The next chapter sets out a series of case studies that explore the precise nature of this 'internal development'.

However, there remains one significant hindrance to such positive 'internal change', the administration of the village itself. As has been argued in the previous chapter, the village management, and its structure and performance was largely a legacy of the devolution of Minginui from the New Zealand Forest Service to Ngati Whare. Many Minginui residents are still not clear about the transfer process that took place in 1988. A review of the village management is set out below. It shows the hindrance and effect that this has had on the social and economic development of the community. It is argued that issues of village management must be addressed to ensure the long term development prospects of the village, and to capitalise on the success of other more recent, internally driven initiatives.
6.4 Demographics

Minginui is now a predominantly Maori community. Only a few residents have full time employment. Many are beneficiaries, both young and old. The population, as mentioned earlier, is approximately 200, although there is a relatively high level of population mobility as people move to and from the village.

A household survey undertaken by Whanau Support recently recorded 193 people, a decline from the 285 recorded by Statistics NZ in the 1996 census (Morant 1999). With Maori representing over 90% of the village, the remainder consisted mainly of Pakeha, with a small proportion of Pacific Islanders (Household survey 2002). Out of the 67 responding households 38 had affiliation with the local iwi (Ngati Whare), 23 affiliated with other iwi around the country, one response was not known and the remainder were pakeha households (Household Survey 2002).

Sixty percent of households were reliant on government beneficiary payments; 33% responded as wage/salary or self-employed, and the remainder were voluntary work or part time/beneficiary. Determining actual household income was beyond the scope of the survey.

6.2 General Observations

Driving into Minginui on a frosty July morning for the first time in recent years, the picture appeared unchanged from 10 years earlier. Horses roamed, dogs barked heralding the arrival of a foreigner, and signs of people were scarce, apart from the chimney smoke from houses. But first impressions are often mistaken.

I had first visited the valley in the early 1980s for recreation. A few years later, as the managing director of an outdoor educational company, I worked with some Minginui residents, setting up outdoor educational programmes. At that time two sawmill sites still existed, although only one was operational. In the early 1990s, these sites were cleared and only barren land was visible. Today, in 2002, trees are planted over one site and the other, on the upstream side of the road, is scrub and grazing land. The only remains of the mill is a large pile of sawdust, apparently leaching toxic waste in close proximity to the Whirinaki River. The village itself appeared relatively unchanged, except for the
limited services that were available; for example, the small shop and fuel pumps are no longer operational.

Like many rural communities, the people of Minginui will only talk to an outsider if directly asked a question. But to be accepted by the community and gain its trust is a totally different thing. People of Minginui were slow in accepting my presence, both in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and more recently with my living in the village over three and a half months (from July to mid October 2002). However, my visits in the late 1980s had brought me into contact with the local Mongrel Mob Chapter. With the Mob I facilitated access to resources and involved them in the development of training programmes for outdoor education. At the time I sought to approach people openly and honestly. Within a short period, I was socialising at the Mob's Pad and at the local sports club the social centre points in Minginui at the time.

In the late 1980s people were obviously bitter about how the village had been treated. I could see that the consumption of alcohol was high. They were equally bitter about the loss of jobs through the corporatisation of the New Zealand Forest Service and the closure of the Carter Holt Mill. There was little trust for 'outsiders', as well as much distrust, bickering and aggressiveness between people in the village. People I later interviewed in 2002 who had come to the village from elsewhere during this time made similar comments. One said:

"[The] Village seemed rather run down. ... The meeting with locals, couple of kids, then two adults that didn't want to communicate. ... [I learnt that people were] very afraid to leave their house. This was something that there was a real fear, nothing could be left, everything needed to be locked up. Everybody stole from everybody else, and this was very very prevalent. And I mean this was really there, don't show anybody you have got anything. Don't do this, don't do that; family against family and everybody against everybody else. Distrust, total distrust, you couldn't leave your firewood out or somebody would go and steal it. The people where pretty rough. ... The vehicles weren't great. The houses weren't that great. ... I started to meet more people and see in effect what they were doing. I found that, although shy initially, that once you got to talk to the people [you] found them to be bright. Once I had been here a couple of times they always say hello. ... I was never snubbed. And I gradually got to know the people in the village. ... I couldn't believe that people were so resourceful as
they were with what they had. They didn’t have a lot and they were doing their best with what they had” (MFV-016 Resident’s Interview, 25-09-02,1-2).

On returning to Minginui in 2002, direct physical change was not apparent. From a distance it was the same group of houses that I had driven past many times in the earlier visits. If anything, they had weathered further over the intervening years. But driving through, people (mainly children) were out and about playing. The odd mother was pushing a pram or involved with a group of kids. Initially, the number of people out of their houses struck me as being unusual. It was mid winter, helpfully the sky was blue, yet the Whirinaki Valley is no tropical paradise during the winter months. After only a few days of trying to make myself known around the village my diary observation was: ‘Things are different, there seems to be more freshness in people’s attitudes – change is happening’. (Research Diary entry, 02-07-02).

What has happened? First and foremost, the community of Minginui appears much more united than a decade ago. It seemed to have adapted to an environment of high unemployment, if it is ever possible to truly adapt to such conditions. And after spending time in the community, I learnt that the community had initiated and developed what may be termed positive growth. This positive growth had been established predominantly from within, by using the limited resources and personnel available.

For example, one organisation, the Whanau Support Trust, was established in 1996 by community members with the aim to set up a community centre, to create opportunity, and to assistance residents. The initiative was generated from the residents’ need for some basic social services (such as telephone and fax facilities). It has become a catalyst for the community to work collectively. As discussed in the next chapter, Whanau Support operates on minimal resources, a situation that makes its continued existence at times precarious.

The development of the schools in the valley is another indication of the community’s incentive, from within, to build and develop. The schools have moved from facing closure, to being regarded as examples of excellence in their particular fields of education. The Primary School’s development has been through the leadership of the principal, who had the leadership skills required to generate the enthusiasm in the community to take ownership of their schools. Parents take great pride in the achievements of their children.
Te Runanga o Ngati Whare iwi Trust is a new administration body. Established in 1999, the Runanga was founded to carry the mandate of the Ngati Whare iwi, to represent Ngati Whare and to administer and make management decisions in respect to the iwi's assets, limited as they maybe. The Runanga is also recognised by Government agencies as the link between the iwi and the people of the iwi, many of whom live in Minginui. As well as managing the iwi's Waitangi Tribunal claim, the Runanga has broadened the scope of its responsibility to include providing assistance to the Minginui community as a whole, where it could.

While all initiatives have been fraught with problems, the overall effect on the village has been positive. As has been discussed above, comments by various residents suggested that socio-economic decay in the village reached its lowest point during 1996. At this time residents' interaction with one another was limited, delinquent behaviour was common and people's attitudes showed bitterness and discontent. This was arguably a pattern for communities that have experienced social exclusion and marginalisation. Today, though, people talk of their desire for improvement to increase the chances and opportunities for their tamariki:

"It is a lot better now than 6 years ago. I compare it with that a lot of us had nothing to do. There was a party happening just about every second day. Today it is very hard to find anybody doing nothing. Everybody is doing something, whereas, before you had people just sitting out on the front door just doing nothing. Today there are a lot more people doing something". (MFV-001 Resident's Interview, 24-08-02, 30.

A person who moved to the village gave this description of the social functions within the village when asked whether they had experienced change since their arrival:

"A significant one, ... you noticed small changes, when you look at the problems that these people have had. Looking back ... the kids were getting into trouble. It was falling over, the village was falling over. People hated each other. This was wrong, that was wrong, and taking it and turning it over from everything wrong to finding some small spark to make it right. Some of the drinking and boozing backed away. Yes, they still drink, but not to the extent that they did. ... People started to look for work. The schools started to help the kids: the kids were getting something out of the school. The school turned itself around. They initially wanted to deal with the parents and realised that they couldn't. So they
A similar observation was made by a young mother who has been in the village for approximately 8 years. She and her husband came to Minginui because her husband is tangata whenua:

"It's developed more now, over the 8 years that we have been involved. More knowledge that has come in, like there were a few ideas ... bought back in and implemented into the Kohanga. More parents started to get involved and started to make decisions. I thought that they [parents] started to find that it was an enjoyable place to be. ... People felt more welcome into the environment. Whanau started to get involved, parents got involved, it is really going strong now". (MFV-023 Interview, 26-09-02).

Through a series of case studies, the next chapter explores in greater depth these changes. We will now turn to the long-running problem of village administration.

### 6.5 Village Management

Ever since the government returned Minginui to Ngati Whare, on 29 March 1989 (outlined in Chapter 5) there has been confusion, misunderstanding, a lack of communication, and at times total distrust between the parties involved with the control and management of the village. This has to be the longest running problem in the village. It has a marked influence in the unsettled atmosphere in the village. It also impinges on the social dynamics and interaction between residents, Ngati Whare and the trustees of the Ngati Whare Trust. The more recent problems encountered with the administration of the village, being passed to an 'outside' body – a court appointed Trustee, resident in Rotorua – has heightened residents unease with external institutions.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ngati Whare Trust was set up to administer the land asset (Minginui) that had been returned to iwi ownership by the Crown. In conjunction, a limited corporate structure was established to manage and administer the day to day welfare and maintenance of the village infrastructure. This was known as the
Minginui Village Council Ltd. The Ngati Whare Trust leases the village assets to the council, which has the responsibility of rate payments and running the village.

The process of returning Minginui to Ngati Whare and the village residents was established through the interaction of government, government agents, and Ngati Whare. The Crown's internal deliberations set a formula for the generation of capital for the village, and for the future sustainable management and maintenance of Minginui. In brief, the idea was for the Forest Service houses and a few other community assets to be gifted to Ngati Whare, who would then sell houses to the residents. These sales were to be used to establish the capital asset base for the Ngati Whare Trust to operate from. The Crown’s estimation was that the 54 crown-owned houses, valued by Treasury at $9,260 per house, would supply a $500,000 capital asset. That would become the Trust's funds for the maintenance of the village's infrastructure (Hutton and Neumann 2001, 763). 'Land rent', a form of rates, was also to be applied as an income for the running costs of the village.

Two factors become questionable immediately. First, how did Treasury arrive at a valuation of $9,260 per house? As Hutton and Neumann (2001) point out, what was the value of a house, in 1987, in a rural location that offered no employment and was experiencing regression and underdevelopment, and in a village that was threatened by destruction? Secondly, the houses were located on land transferred to the Ngati Whare Trust, and therefore 'free hold' status, if purchasing a house, was not an option. This was further complicated by a covenant that the houses could not be relocated. Whatever the case, only a few of the 54 houses would be able to be relocated without undergoing major reconstruction to meet District Council bylaws and building codes (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 770).

On paper, the proposal was well received by Ngati Whare. The idea of being offered some of their original land back was viewed as a small miracle. Ngati Whare, whose treatment by the Crown over the last century was far from just, were overjoyed by the prospect of the gain. The very fact that land was coming back, a matter of great cultural importance to Maori generally, perhaps blinkered them from the reality of the so-called 'generous' offer by the Crown. Ngati Whare leaders saw little of the problems that they were moving towards. Indeed the transfer of ownership and responsibility for Minginui
went from a large organisation (the Forest Service) with major resources, to a very small
group of people with very limited resources.

Adding to the problem was a total lack of experience by members of the local iwi in the
budgeting, maintenance and management of a small town and its infrastructure. Nor
were resources provided by the Crown to the iwi, such as professional assistance and
knowledge on how to establish and run amenities i.e. water, sanitation, roading, etc.
This led to further disruption and discontent in an already depressed community. The
lack of understanding of the situation, particularly the conditions of payment of land rent
or rates was, and still is, a contentious issue.

Two factors emerged. First, the village houses had either belonged to the Forest
Service (which had to be purchased by their occupants from Ngati Whare Trust), or the
Carter Holt Mill (which had been returned to the occupants as part of their redundancy
packages). There was considerable delay between the point of return of the Forest
Service houses, and the setting up of loans through the Housing Corporation for the
residents to purchase them from the Ngati Whare Trust. Secondly, there was a delay
between the point at which the village was returned to the establishment of the Minginui
Village Council, which had the task of running the village and collecting land rent, or
rates. There were other delays in the issuing of ‘occupation licences’ to the home
owners, and thus the collection of rates.

Evidence suggests that delays were later made worse by problems of communication
between the Ngati Whare Trust, most members of which resided at Murupara or
Rotorua, and the Minginui Village Council, who all resided locally. Many household
owners were unclear about the purpose of the land rent. Some owners came to the
conclusion that since the land had been returned to Ngati Whare, and since they were of
Ngati Whare descent, they did not need to pay rent. All in all, confusion grew among the
home owners. As one resident recalled:

“They sent two people up here. ... What they did was get all the ones that were
thinking of buying the forestry homes, got us to have a meeting, and asked us
how we felt about it. We were done one at a time, individual questioning and
answering on papers and all this sort of thing. And we all said then that we
wanted to pay rent not to buy the homes. But all those papers never even
surfaced at any iwi meeting hui, not one of them. They had a hui here, they
brought up all the lawyers in and they were talking about the Occupational License, and people asked at that hui 'could you clarify every sentence to us?' And in the end, and with all the papers that they brought in, the lawyer couldn't answer, no they couldn't. And all those people [lawyers] walked out and left Minginui as it is. They didn't answer any questions. ... And then you have the forestry lot, they're kicking up the stink because they don't understand a lot. And you have the mill ones, already explained and they are settled, and you have them saying 'pay your rates, pay your rates'. But these ones over here don't want to pay your rates, because they can't see what they are getting for their money. So we are arguing with those people over there, plus the ones that have the mill homes." (MFV-032 Resident's Interview, 28/08/2002).

Possibly, calling the rates 'rent' was a mistake. But the problem got worse as the Village Council, through a general lack of funds, was unable to improve on basic services. Those who defaulted on their rates would ask, 'what are we paying rates for anyway?' With a significant number of defaulters, the resources of the Village Council further decreased.

The problem assumed a circular character: the less money that was available to run the village through rates, and thus the less that could be done. In addition, there was no clear mechanism to force people to pay rates. The village council and the Ngati Whare Trust were extremely reluctant to bring civil procedures against the homeowners. They were also reluctant to evict people from their homes, although this was threatened a number of times. In fact, the Ngati Whare Trust could not bring themselves to evict the people: the owners were inevitably connected to them through kinship, and, where would they go? As time passed the arrears for some became substantial, in the thousands of dollars. For families unemployed and on benefit support schemes, payment of arrears became impractical and impossible for them to pay.

The Works Report of 1987 established that an amount of $91,800 per annum was needed to provide upkeep for the village and to maintain the infrastructure. With a yearly rate of $600 from each household (an average rate charged in Whakatane District) for approximately seventy-five households, this would create a yearly income of $45,000. That is a yearly shortfall of approximately $47,000. Thus with all home owners paying their rates, there was little chance that the village could be properly run.
The Maori Land Court held a hearing at the Murumurunga Marae on February 1995 to try to address the problem. Minutes of the hearing point to the lack of understanding, which was voiced by some. The result of the hearing was that all the trustees of the Ngati Whare Trust except two resigned. The remaining two endeavoured to meet with residents to effect a solution to the problems. It needs to be acknowledged that these gentlemen, given time by the Court to fix the problem of rent arrears, were dealing with far greater problems than just the council debt.

The situation again came to a head in April 1995, with an application to the Maori Land Court, heard by Judge Hingston, calling for the resignation of the remaining two trustees of the Ngati Whare Trust, and for them to be replaced by Court appointed trustees. A review under section 351/93 was called, on the basis that the trustees were 'not acting in best interests of the beneficiaries of the Ngati Whare trust' (Maori Land Court 1995, s351& 240/93). On hearing the account of Watene Horsfall (a Court appointed Trust secretary), the Court decided to replace the Ngati Whare Trustees with both Horsfall and a Mr. Gray as trustees. The judgement seemed to be based solely on the testimony of Horsfall who, when asked by the Court if the existing trustees' actions were detrimental to the Ngati Whare Trust, said:

"Well in my professional opinion totally detrimental, decisions were made which I felt was not in the interest of, not only the village but of the 'Ngati Whare iwi'. ... People that I recommended that they evict they wouldn't evict, not only wouldn't they pay for the house but they won't even pay their land rates some of them to the council itself. So as a result of the action and non-action of the trustees in my professional opinion it's been absolutely detrimental to not only the village but to the iwi of Ngati Whare". (Maori Land Court 1995, -s 351& 240/93)

Admittedly, the problems of rates arrears had not been solved by the remaining two Ngati Whare Trustees. But, as discussed above, it was hardly an easy task for a trustee of Maori descent to evict a member of his or her own whanau or hapu (Minute Book: 240 Rotorua, 134-136). This was particularly so when most of the individuals concerned had been unemployed for six to seven years, and given the economic situation of the time, were likely to remain unemployed.
The Court then appointed Horsfall and Gray with directions to them to put the situation in Minginui in order within a 2-year period. After this, they were to return the administration back to the iwi.

This directive has had detrimental and lasting effects on the village. First, the Court’s appointment of non-community and non Ngati Whare members to manage and direct the management of the village arguably disempowered the residents, causing further resentment in the community. Horsfall and Gray were both experienced administrators, but problems of communication between them and the community appear to have limited their ability to act. Secondly, the majority of residents bonded together, and grew adamantly against the trustees. As one resident stated:

"I mean, ok, the guy himself is living in Rotorua so how does he know that the work up here is being done? How does he know that the villagers are doing all right? He doesn’t know a thing. He is never here, so I can’t see how that structure is in place. To me, if you are going to put up a structure it should be overseen all the time and it is not". (MFV-008 Interview, 11-09-02).

However, over time little appeared to change. After six years, Gray resigned. The 'catch twenty two' situation was ongoing. Rates were not paid, eviction was threatened, no evictions took place, and limited (if any) communication was maintained. The situation was made worse by the long-term stagnation of the village administration and a lack of services being provided. The job set by the Court, which was to stabilise the village council operation and management of the village and finalise the sale of houses to residents, is documented in Gray’s application to resign as trustee:

"Court: Well the first application is for directions I think. That was filed in February of this year, (Yes), and it reads; “I am one of the two Responsible Trustees to the Ngati Whare Trust. Court record’s show the reason for my appointment but it was to resolve problems within the trust and stabilise the whole operation, which included selling the houses. This appointment took place some four years ago and it is my belief we have had more than adequate time to bring matters up to scratch and hand the trust back to the Ngati Whare beneficial owners. There is no doubt that any outstanding matters could have been well resolved within the previous time period. Consequently I am concerned in that matters have been drawn out for this length of time. In discussion with the beneficial owners they now see the original brief has turned into a bread and butter project whereby the trustees continue to draw fees and expenses from the
trust without due and just cause supported by the Court. As I have a degree of
sympathy with this proposition I now seek direction from the Court and would
submit my resignation". (Minute Book: 256 ROT 112).

As discussed previously, the problem that faced the original trustees was one of
ignorance in matters of running and administering public services, complicated further by
a lack of information. Guidance and training by Government in managing the
infrastructure of the village should have been part of the Forest Service's responsibility in
the 'handing over' of Minginui to Ngati Whare. The long term benefits for Minginui may
have been very different if the residents had properly understood the situation.

The period of Gray and Horsfall's work has led to further defaulting of Land Rent
payments. For some, this is because the residents' questions are never properly
answered. The biggest question is 'what are we getting for our payment?' The fact that
the residents have not seen any improvement in the conditions of the village for nearly
20 years reinforces the distrust that started at the time of corporatisation.

To many individuals residing in Minginui, Horsfall's management of the village has been
less than adequate. As an example, one resident received notice from Horsfall that, if
the amount of Land Rent, $276.00, was not paid, eviction would follow. Yet from the
resident's records, and from a subsequent application to the Maori Land Court for
settlement of the dispute, they were found to be in credit for their Land Rent to the
Minginui Village Council Ltd. Another village resident comments on the dealings with
Horsfall:

"Meanwhile we've received threat letters of eviction and stuff like that. That's not
right. I mean we're dealing with the problem, we're paying the rates back.
Communication between him and the villages was pretty slack as far as I'm
concerned, him not doing his job properly. We believed ... that the rates where
in the payments, the repayments for our house. But in all those years we never
received a rates bill saying that we owed the rates. So finally after all these
years, 3 years later we receive a big bill and it is like oh! Oh!! There was no
follow up to say you owe, now you owe, now you owe. So it was a freak out.
There was a handful of us that never received our rates account. Apparently
everyone receives six monthly, but we weren't in that category, it was 3 years
down the track and it hit us in the face" (MFV-023 Interview, 26-09-02).
With the establishment of the Ngati Whare Runanga in 1999, elected members of The Runanga began to involve themselves in the village. The Court’s hearing, in December 2000, of Gray’s application to resign and attempt to hand the Trust back to the beneficial owners. The Court transcript gives some indication of the difficulties of the situation. The Runanga was keen to see a transfer of the Trust back to Ngati Whare based administration, although it voiced concern that none of the problems had been sorted out:

“Since we’ve formed the Runanga, we’ve been trying to make contact with these two persons, it was only Mr. Horsfall that we could make any contact with, he actually sat with us in a meeting in Murupara on Sunday 14th May to try and sort this Village out. The Runanga then was ready to take over the Village but not in the state that it was in. I made one contact with Mr. Gray, he refused to speak to me. I told him that the Runanga was in place, we were ready to take the Village over and he virtually told me to go away because he was appointed by the Courts and he would not leave that position until the village matters were settled. ... In our feelings, the Runanga, he’s trying to jump a sinking ship. Now I think I can speak on behalf of our seven Runanga members that these two people should stay in the Village until such times as their problems are sorted out, the rent is up to date, before the Ngati Whare people take over the control of the Village”. (Minute Book: 256 ROT 117)

The present situation is that, in over two years since this last Court appearance, the Runanga and village residents are still trying to gain back of the control of their Village. The continual saga of unpaid rates worsens. The accumulated non-payment of the rate fee of $600 per year is now impossible for some whanau to pay. The most critical point being that the village council is still without resources to address the public works that have needed attention since the transfer of ownership to Ngati Whare.

However, reviewing the history of Minginui’s administration from 1988, it is important to consider the role of external forces. From the evidence, the Maori Land Court could review its responsibilities in the matter. The appointment of Gray and Horsfall as Trustees by the Court was meant to last two years. Instead, a period of approximately eight years has passed. Taking a broader, historical approach, the Government could also re-evaluate the original gifting of Minginui to Ngati Whare and the village residents. It would appear that, with the management of the village’s infrastructure and financial independence on the transfer, very little was given in resources and knowledge to foster
the skills needed for administration. The community remains very disgruntled with the 'power over' attitude that 'outside' organisations have had, and still have, with the management and administration of their village.

It may be hoped, however, that more recent internal development has created sufficient capacity within the community to once more administer their affairs. Whether this can be done in the absence of any external support, particularly in regard to the skills and material resources needed to run what is in effect a small local body authority, is questionable.

6.6 Summary:

Minginui poses various contradictions. On the one hand, from a period of fieldwork and study, it would appear that the village has experienced a certain level of internal development. Unlike the early to mid 1990s, where the shock of almost total and sudden unemployment saw division in the community, new community based institutions have evolved and old institutions such as the schools are being run with much success.

However, the legacy of the problems that developed with the return of the village in 1988 have continued to plague Minginui. In particular, a paralysis or stand-off in the matter of management and the payment of rates arrears has continued. It seems essential that the matter of village administration be resolved to the satisfaction of all, so as not to endanger positive development. This is only likely to happen through a concerted effort from within the village and by the Ngati Whare Runanga, and by the deployment of resources from external agencies. Minginui remains a poor and under-resourced community. It appears to be a case for considered and well delivered government assistance.
7 Case Studies

7.1 Introduction:

Minginui is experiencing, after many years of recession, a time of change, much of which is coming from within the community. Continuing from the previous chapter, this chapter goes into greater detail, reviewing specific situations of positive change. However, there are certain difficulties or challenges faced by the organisations or initiatives described here. Simply put, Minginui remains resource-poor, dependent on an array of predominantly external sources of funds and resources. Combined with the mistrust that has arisen in the community from its experience of underdevelopment since 1988, Minginui’s development has been restricted.

The following organisations will be discussed. Whanau Support is a community initiative founded by the community to supply services to itself, but it is restricted in its access to funding. Te Runanga o Ngati Whare Iwi Trust is the iwi’s administrative body. The Runanga works as a linking agent with outside authorities, and while currently limited in resources, it has a demanding and intricate role in development. The valley’s two schools, fortunately having to deal with only one funding authority, the Department of Education, have at times struggled for their survival. The attempt of Government departments to provide work for residents of Minginui is reviewed in one case, the planning and setting up of a pest eradication programme. It should be noted at this stage that the upgrading of Highway 38 between Murupara and Te Whaiti, a government funded programme, appears to have had both positive and negative effects on the community.

7.2 Whanau Support:

Whanau Support Services Trust (Whanau Support) is a non-profit organisation set up by residents of Minginui in 1996. Its mission statement is ‘to advance the community by acting in unity and always in the best interests of our community and our descendants’. Whanau Support was originally established to access government funding for

---

4 Appendix B: An outline of the maintenance and management of the Highway 38 is reviewed.
programmes which were established for the retraining and development of residents within Minginui and the surrounding valley area, Te Whaiti and Ngaputahi. The present status of Whanau Support is as a registered non-profit trust from 2001.

From its inception, programmes were initiated that benefited people in the community, such as cooking and budgeting classes and inviting the residents to look at their family’s food intake, costs involved and offer alternatives for benefits in health and cost savings. For example, the development of lower fat diets and the establishment of alternative cooking styles and recipes for vegetables with the introduction of stir-fry vegetables, chow miens or noodle dishes. The woman who initiated Whanau Support, when she left the village, was quoted as telling Jim Hudson (of the Child, Youth and Family Association), ‘that there was no-one qualified enough to run these programmes, let alone have the skills in office procedures’ (MFV-001, in discussion). This comment, viewed through ‘mainstream filters’, (people’s thinking influenced by mainstream ideals) as having justification, lacked a real understanding of Minginui and it’s residents and their recent history.

Today, Whanau Support is run by a trustee committee which is made up of village kaumatua, kuia, and members of the Minginui community who are motivated to produce a healthy village environment. It has become a central focus for the village residents and local area, which comprises approximately 300 people, and it supplied assistance and help for over 1500 clients from June 2001 to June 2002. The services provided are:

- Advice and information;
- Education and prevention;
- Family well-being;
- Senior citizens services;
- Health and housing.

The Whanau Support office has become the community centre for the village. It’s small space is often crowed with people asking for advice or visiting the centre to use the
utilities, fax, phone, internet or photocopier. Many of the residents do not have access to communication facilities in their homes and rely on Whanau Support to make contact with the ‘outside world’. This has helped many in the community, especially when dealing with government departments such as WINZ, and employment agencies, family benefit or health and medical organisations.

Currently, Whanau Support is actively involved with the village youth, organising holiday programmes with the objectives to provide education and encouragement for the youth to seek employment opportunities, career options and further education. For the younger children, programmes provide collective stimulation working together and building appreciation of and for one another. This is providing positive building blocks for individual’s attitudes and an atmosphere to encourage young people to turn their minds away from petty crime, a situation that had developed after 1987.

For family well-being, Whanau Support focuses on low-income whanau in the community developing programmes. With the help of outside government agents they have provided training in basic word processing and letter writing skills. They provide workshops for developing household budgeting skills, attaining a driver’s licence (many people having driven for most of their lives without a licence) along with other programmes. Whanau Support thus functions as a link between government agencies and the community, providing necessary services at the base level. This can include advice for completing benefit forms for WINZ or Family Support Services.

Services for the senior citizens, although very limited due to the lack of available funds, have been steered toward health programmes, general maintenance of their homes and social venues and travel assistance outside of the community. Working with the Ministry of Health, Whanau Support developed a much needed flu vaccination programme. The wet climate and dampness in the houses (due to their substandard nature has meant) that these simple advantages have had good effects on both the health and mind set of the senior citizens. Many people in Minginui have no easy access to vehicles or are not able to drive, meaning that previously they had limited access to these benefits. Travel assistance is critical for everybody, not only for the senior citizens, especially for getting basic provisions for the household. The nearest supermarkets are just over 100 kilometres away, in either Rotorua, Whakatane or Taupo.
Being conscious of the problems associated with rural health and housing, Whanau Support has initiated links with outside organisations such as Korowai Aroha, Rural Educational Activities Programme (REAP) and Housing New Zealand (HNZ). The Trust’s aim is to better the living conditions in the community. Along with the flu shots for the elderly, they have helped set up screening programmes for cancer, diabetes and hepatitis. Realising Minginui’s deprived housing maintenance regime, they have made links with HNZ and Te Puni Kokiri to review and develop an upgrading of the substandard housing in the village and local area. HNZ has administered a programme of providing housing insulation for the people that applied. An appraisal team from HNZ assessed people’s homes that had applied for HNZ funding in respect of substandard housing. A major time lapse has occurred and nothing to date has happened.

The comment made by the original administrator, that the local community lacked the ability to run Whanau Support, may have had credence earlier. But, over time and with positive determination by members of the community and people, the organisation has survived. Working in line with their mission statement they have built their limited resources and are looking at expanding their provision of programmes for the betterment and development of Minginui.

Two local residents who had volunteered to work for Whanau Support from its inauguration in 1996 (and who still administer the trust and run many of the programmes under the same title, ‘voluntary’) were left to fend for themselves in 1998:

"Once [the first Whanau Support administrator] moved into Rotorua there was only two people to run the [Whanau Support]... [They] had no clue about paper work let alone using a typewriter. So, because of government departments you have to supply this, to write reports ...[they] knew nothing about all that. [They] would have lost it because of the Government issue, wanting reports on everything you do. A lot of documents that government write up are all written up for people that are university level and either you have a lawyers degree or something...[Many of the residents] didn’t understand what ...was written, [they] could never interpret it. [Whanau Support] would have lost it if it hadn’t been for Jim Hudson (CYFS). He used to be our field worker. He actually asked for a meeting with the community and trustees, and said look whatever you do keep doing what you are doing and I will help you as best as I can". (MFV-001, 24-08-02, 3).
This shows the importance of key external relationships and the value of advice and assistance from government staff. It also illustrates the strength of individuals both from outside and from within the community who have helped establish Whanau Support as a base for the community's social services. As another resident describes:

"Whanau Support had been started, ... [Volunteers] helping out with it and the lady that was involved with it took off to Rotorua, and her parting comments were; 'oh there's nobody here good enough to do anything', I told [the Volunteers] to give it a go. Not without glitches along the way, because there were times [experience was lacking and the] ... difficulty for them to take [on board the] views of outsiders and trust them totally. Because that trust wasn't there. [Whanau Support] started to work between families, take the barriers away, and there were a lot of problems addressed, ... finally in the open, came to a conclusion. ... People during that time had progressed from being totally distrust worthy and totally antagonistic to more of a spirit of co-operation". (MFV-016, 25-09-02, 3).

Over the numerous interviews carried out while living at Minginui gaining the residents ideas and opinions on various subjects, the comments were very positive toward Whanau Support and what it has offered to the community. A major credit which Whanau Support's presents is that, after 6 years, it is still operating unlike many of the initiatives over the past 15 years, which have come and gone. For instance:

"I think Whanau Support is awesome, it is were you can go and feel welcome and they do lots of things. What I really like about Whanau Support is that they get up and get things moving, especially for our children around here. Example, like the holiday programmes. They may not be much to lots of people out there in the big wide world, but in our opinion ... they are awesome". (MFV-023 Interview, 26-09-02, 1).

"Nowadays all you got is Whanau Support trying to keep everybody together, taking a big load. [Whanau Support] is awesome, na! they are awesome. The people in there are awesome. Really, I thought when they first started it was more or less to do with the kids. There was funding out there for the kids for running holiday programmes. Now they are going to get bigger and bigger with social services and all that. ... Really they are going to have loads on their shoulders. They realise now that they are really the centre of the place, oh [well] I do. They can take on heaps". (MFV-025 Interview, 24-08-02, 1).
Many people talk of Whanau Support as the village community centre. Much like the school and Kohanga Reo, Whanau Support is the place where people meet, discuss and find out information. The added benefit is that, unlike the educational facilities, ideas and problems, both personal and about the community are discussed and debated here.

There remains an issue of Whanau Support’s position in relation to the Rununga. The perceived line of distinction is that the Runanga holds a mandate to represent the iwi at an iwi level; while Whanau Support has responsibility for more local, non-iwi initiatives. Yet comments made by some indicate that there is a perceived tension between the two. As one person stated:

"Provided they keep in their own jurisdiction, their own street ... They do tend to step out of line. The boundaries are there, but they haven't been listening. ... Told them once, ... attended meetings, say[ing] to them, quite strongly, these are the areas that ... you shouldn’t be in. That this is not your portfolio, and whether they have understood that I don’t know. I am still quite prepared to go up there and help them. I keep an eye on them from time to time". (MFV-008 Interview, 11-09-02, 2).

Or alternatively:

"The Rununga is the umbrella trust. They are the mandated body. They got that from the eight hapu of Ngati Whare, they are the mandated body. Like the likes of Whanau Support, they haven't the mandate. So, we know where the mandate is coming from. It is coming from the people and was given to Ngati Whare. I think some bit of a misunderstanding there, somewhere we have a bit of a clash in things that was working through Whanau Support". (MFV-006 Interview, 07-09-02, 3).

These comments aside, Whanau Support and the Runanga are both relatively young and developing in a very new and unstructured environment since the dramatic changes enforced on the region after 1987 and the Forest Service restructuring. Whanau Support has thus gained an appreciation, value and trust from residents of Minginui. This is an important concept that has been seriously lacking over the past decade. They have also achieved a status of common ground in the community, which has been an unvoiced ‘want’ in the community for years. In philosophical terms, Whanau Support works for the people, by the people and with the people. Arguably, this
is an example of a successful development exercise, initiated and developed from energy and resources within the village, providing benefits for the community through the participation of residents.

After having established themselves with very limited resources, Whanau Support remains in a precarious 'hand to mouth' situation. Government bodies such as Child Youth and Family Services (CYFS) or Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ) which are able to fund them are restricted in the amounts they are able to provide. The availability of that funding also depends on a range of criteria, some of which change as Government policy changes. Further, funding can be earmarked for specific tasks, rather than all the matters Whanau Support wish to address.

For instance, the funding for the youth holiday programme provided by WINZ is only available for youth aged between 15 to 18. The Youth worker in Minginui explained, though, that the largest group of youth in Minginui ranged from 10 to 15. Funding was not available for this group. To involve all the youth of the village Whanau Support would have had to spread the funding received for the older youth over 3 times as many people. The youth worker also pointed out that the 10 – 15 age group, if not actively engaged in holiday programmes, caused disruption and petty crime in the village.

Funds received by Whanau Support cover their office expenses and programme delivery. It is only through careful budget management and voluntary staffing that Whanau Support has been able to survive. With no asset base or available cash reserves, Whanau Support's opportunity to develop further for the benefit to the community is very limited. A future shift in social services delivering policy, or a reduction in funding to key government departments could potentially scuttle Whanau Support.

Perhaps most importantly the voluntary staff of Whanau Support have taught themselves to understand and learn the needs and wants of government agencies in order to maintain their existence. There is an element of skill in this. They have acquired skills in basic business management, enabling them, for example, to properly maintain obligations to the Inland Revenue Department. Again, such achievements have been developed internally.
7.3 The Ngati Whare Runanga

Te Runanga o Ngati Whare Iwi Trust (often called the Ngati Whare Runanga, or simply the Runanga) was officially established on 14 February 1999. It operates under the law as a common law trust. The Runanga was established because of the iwi’s need to have an administrative body. Ngati Whare had lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal in 1987. In order to prepare the work required for a Tribunal claim, and to maintain an ongoing relationship with Ngati Whare’s Treaty Partner, the Crown, the iwi required a group of dedicated decision-makers. An official iwi body is also necessary in today’s environment as the representative body for all people affiliated to Ngati Whare, whether in relation to the Crown or with other iwi. Realising the need for the iwi to take charge of its future, the Runanga has broadened the scope of its portfolios to develop opportunities for iwi members and residents of Minginui.

The Runanga is composed of seven members elected by the iwi at regular hui-a-iwi. These members work principally on a voluntary basis. Due to historical events which have minimised the opportunities of the iwi to develop (such as the illegal acquisition of much of their land by the Crown between 1915 and 1923), the Runanga has proceeded with diligence to prepare their case for the Waitangi Tribunal. Compared to many other claimants in the wider region, this claim is poised ready for presentation.

It is worth noting that the Runanga has evolved from earlier Ngati Whare structures. Prior to the Runanga’s formation, the iwi was administered by Te Whaiti Nui a Toi Trust and, for a brief time in the 1990s, by the Ngati Whare Iwi Claims Committee. However, Te Whaiti Nui a Toi Trust is responsible for the administration of a block of land that is leased to the Crown for an exotic pine plantation. The block is owned by a group of approximately 1500 shareholders (Hutton & Neumann 2001, 623). While for some years the Trust functioned as a representative body for Ngati Whare concerns, it can only properly represent the shareholders. The Ngati Whare Iwi Claims Committee was established solely to administer the iwi’s Waitangi Tribunal claim, receiving funding from the Crown Forest Rental Trust between 1996 and 1998.

In contrast, the Runanga is able to properly represent all Ngati Whare iwi members and their interests, those who reside outside the valley as well as those who reside in Minginui and Te Whaiti. While the Te Whaiti Nui a Toi Trust represents approximately
1500 people, many Ngati Whare alive today have not yet succeeded to shareholdings in this Trust. Often a parent or grandparent owns the shares, with an additional ten to thirty, or more, beneficiaries yet to be registered. On a whakapapa basis, it is possible that Ngati Whare could contain 10,000 members. Many such members would, of course, be able to connect to other iwi. But this is the case for all iwi today.

Therefore, through culture and tradition the Runanga’s representative obligations are necessarily broad. The Runanga represents a large group of people, over and above those in the Whirinaki Valley. But Minginui and Te Whaiti are vital and are seen by the Runanga as the heartland of the iwi.

The kaupapa of the Runanga is to act as facilitators, managing external relations and accessing opportunities from outside authorities and organisations for the iwi. It has been explained to me that they are not in the business of administering the day to day business of Minginui, or telling people what should or should not be done. On talking with members of the Runanga, their role is to develop the structures in which the iwi can work with the ‘mainstream’, and manage positive change. Overall, the Treaty claims, Industry New Zealand and other Government initiatives, and the political and economic situation in terms of the Crown and Maori are, at present, moving through a very dynamic and changing environment. Whether or not the situation of Ngati Whare is representative of other iwi (a matter not in the scope of this research), the Runanga has realised the need to take ownership of their destiny. The Runanga has visualised itself as a ‘linking agent’, that functions to establish positive development for the iwi.

One of the Runanga’s responsibilities is working with various Crown bodies in advancing iwi business (Ngati Whare Deed of Trust 1999). Building relationships with government departments and local body organisations is important, such as with Environment Bay of Plenty, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry of Health, or TPK. An example of this is the Runanga’s commitment to the ‘Partnership Programme’, a Ministry of Economic Development’s initiative for regional development.

Learning from the experience of other Maori organisations, they wish to establish their organisational structure before any financial gains arrive out claim settlements or other economic ventures. They hope that if they can establish a positive environment of trust and confidence with the people of Ngati Whare and the Minginui community, their future
function and mandate for the iwi's economic and social development will be stable. Indeed, some members of the Runanga, reviewing the performance of other iwi organisations elsewhere, sense that money has led some to mismanagement. Their objective is to minimise this possibility. Whether conscious or subconsciously, the Runanga's philosophy appears to be in line with the principles of Maori development as proposed by Durie (2000):

"The 'value added' principle recognises that an ultimate aim of Maori development should be to add value to Maori lives, Maori knowledge, and Maori society. This is not the same as eliminating disparities. There is little disagreement with the fact that disparities between Maori and non-Maori are completely unacceptable, or that efforts to overcome them should be given high priority, but it is equally unreasonable to expect that Maori development should come to a halt until the gaps have been eliminated". (Durie 2000, 14).

To date, while busy with Tribunal claims, the Runanga has also been very active in both the process and development of employment and training opportunities for people of the valley. While broadening the Runanga's portfolios, they have initiated training programmes. Linking with government departments and outside training providers, programmes such as a pest eradication programme (called the 'possum programme') and chemical programme have materialised. The result is the up-skilling of individuals, some of which have been employed. Furthermore, working with Fletcher Challenge Forest, the Runanga has helped facilitate the establishment of a full time men's forestry pruning gang. More recently, the Runanga was contacted by Fletcher Challenge to establish a pilot programme to develop a women's pruning team. The women in the village are very excited about this new opportunity. As one woman explained:

"I'm on the forestry job. I am looking forward to that. ... Something to do during the day, instead of staying home. ... [We got] told that we'll be getting $105.00 per day. That will be the starting rate: that is cool. I get that a week on the benefit. That is excellent". (MFV-029 Residence's Interview, 9-09-02).

Other Runanga ventures, such as the establishment of a Hau Ora (Health Clinic), are now underway. The New Zealand Housing Corporation has been approached and initial steps are being taken to investigate the upgrading of residents' homes.
These processes are not easily attained as, with the Hau Ora, the funding to renovate an unoccupied dwelling at Minginui was only granted after a long period of lobbying. Having applied to the Ministry of Health, applications for funding were denied. The Ministry of Health replied that while they wished to help with the project, their policies directed that the community had to have an established facility. Approaching Te Puni Kokiri (TPK) through a local office, their proposal was turned down. As a last resort, the Runanga wrote to the head of TPK, and their proposal was reassessed. Funds have subsequently been allocated. In this instance, the bureaucratic wheels, slow and complicated to move through, needed to be tackled directly.

To an outside observer, the Ngati Whare Runanga appears to have developed, for themselves, considerable skill over its four years of operation. This includes dealing with Government agents and organisations in preparing proposals, researching opportunities and accessing funding for projects. One of the objectives in introducing the Hau Ora in Minginui is to help build a positive relationship with the community. This is an important concept for the future positive development in the area.

As a relatively new operation, though, the Runanga has its share of problems. First is their resource base. The Runanga members, most of whom work on a voluntary basis, face a consistent struggle to finance the entity. At present they are entirely dependent on external funding. Second, the Runanga has to constantly prove its ability and gain the confidence of the people in the valley. Due to the historical disempowerment of the iwi and the drastic reduction of the iwi's land base, and the dispersal of the iwi's population through much of the North Island and indeed overseas, this is no easy task.

Fortunately, through their link with the funding agency the Crown Forestry Rental Trust and its subsidiary the Volcanic Interior Plateau (VIP) project, two members of Runanga have been able to immerse themselves full time with the administration and development possibilities for the Runanga. From my observations during fieldwork, this added resource has allowed them to operate in many new and positive ways. However, the Runanga remains under-resourced, and unable to freely compete in the development market.

Through the persistence of individual members, the Runanga manages to maintain a large array of external relationships. But they lack resources in all areas, including
personnel, infrastructure, financial and knowledge of the intricate processes of the mainstream system. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of the Minginui community from the late 1980s has not helped the Runanga’s acceptance in the village. For some Minginui residents, the Runanga is seen as an ‘outside’ organisation and are regarded with suspicion, just as any other ‘outside’ organisation is regarded. Others have little idea about the Runanga. For yet others, particularly those who have dealt with the Runanga, comments are positive. Thus unsurprisingly, when asked about their opinion of the Runanga, there was a varied response from the residents. First, two statements from people who had but a vague knowledge of the Runanga’s business:

“Haven’t had a lot to do with them. I know that they run this place here. I don’t really understand where they are coming from”. (MFV-033 Resident’s Interview, 30-08-02).

“My knowledge of the Runanga is very little. I don’t really know what they are doing for the iwi, so I couldn’t really comment on it.... Once again, I don’t know what they do in the village. Mind you, I don’t know what their responsibilities are anyway”. (MFV-023 Resident’s Interview, 26-09-02).

As a second example, the following statements are generally negative:

“I don’t know nothing about them [Runanga]. Are they looking after the assets of the Ngati Whare people or that and us. ... It looks like there are two groups, they are looking after the shareholders that have the land around this place, but not worrying about the people that are living on their land. That’s my view. I don’t know whether they are there for the good of the people [residents] or the good of the shareholders. There’s two [factions]; there’s us and the shareholders that own the land around here”. (MFV-021 Resident’s Interview, 04-09-02).

“In my view they are outside of the loop. .... They have a presence in Murupara. They don’t have a presence in Minginui, they aren’t putting money where their mouth is. There are a few people with agendas that remain hidden that serve on the Runanga. ... They should be having their meetings in the hall with the whole community there, as observers, because they are dealing with this area. ... Once a year you stand up and tell the world how good you are. ... Why don’t you tell the world what you are doing? What we need to know is what are you guys going to do? What is best for the community? Get the “what” sorted out, then we’ll worry about the “how to”. Yes, they are on the band wagon with the Volcanic Interior Plateau. Yes, they’re pushing for settlement, but one gets the
feeling that the settlement is for a very few and not even for the Ngati Whare that live here". (MFV-016 Resident’s Interview, 25-09-02).

It would appear that having been excluded over the years, some individuals necessarily isolate themselves. That is, while having survived long term unemployment, people tend to shut off reviewing outside influences. Others, however, are aware of the Runanga and have an appreciation of what it is trying to achieve with the limited resources that are available. For instance:

“Well I just try and back them up to do a good job. That is all I have got to say on that. ... We know them through just talking to them, through the meetings. ... I know where they are coming from and all that. It is just a slow process because of the claims. ... That is what is slowing everything up for the progress of the village, because of the claims”. (MFV-025 Resident’s Interview, 24-08-02).

“Well the Runanga should be the head of these places, to lead the hapu. They have a major role of leading the hapu or iwi. That is why they were put in those areas for consultation between them and agencies or Government agencies. They are the ones that should make things happen; that is how I see it. The Runanga, to be able to do [things], they should have the authority and power to get things for their people or iwi. If you needed help, people in the village needed help, as a corporate entity, you should be able to go to the Runanga and say ‘look could you do this’? And they should have enough clout as they are recognised by Government and that”. (MFV-024 Residents Interview, 20-09-02).

As a general observation, it seemed that the more prominent members of the Minginui community understood the role of the Ngati Whare Runanga. They understand its circumstances, and respected its efforts and achievements. There was also a group within the community that do not have an understanding of the Runanga’s position. It can be argued, though, that the Runanga is an example of ‘internal development’ in respect to the iwi and the Minginui community.

7.4 Valley Schools – Minginui and Te Whaiti

Schools have been an intricate part of the Whirinaki Valley for well over the past 100 years. Both schools are mainstream schools. The school at Te Whaiti is a total emersion school, until year 6. Minginui School is bilingual. The schools have recently
moved from the threat of being closed down by the Ministry of Education, to being regarded as very organised, forward thinking, successful educational units devoted to, and providing a high level of learning to the young people of the valley.

The most critical time for Te Whaiti School was after an Education Review Office (ERO) report in 1995. ERO is an arm of the Ministry of Education that is responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the standards of education delivered nationally as prescribed by the Ministry's policies. The ERO report stated that Te Whaiti School was on the brink of closure. It cited gross misunderstandings between the education Ministry, bad principalship and the school board's lack of knowledge. Prior to this, following the corporatisation of the Forest the school experienced an infrastructure and social downturn parallel to that of the wider valley services. The principal describes what was experienced on arrival at the school:

“Well I felt that, when I first came into the school, a lot of the behaviour of the children were what I considered atrocious. With the small number of students that were here, you had big ones who were bullying the little kids. The language was bad. From the way they did things it appeared as though they were accustomed to doing a lot of things that I would have considered unsuitable. Like for example, prior to my taking over, one of the kids had gone around and got hold of a hammer and nails and nailed all the desks shut. And when I asked about it I discovered that was fairly typical of some of the behaviours that were being shown by the children.” (MFV-036 Interview, 10-12-02, 3).

Under new principalship in 1989, the school was saved from being closed (because of a falling roll), by developing it from a roll of 11 students to 24 by year-end. The infrastructure of the school improved by setting standards based on the basic principles; having regard for health, personal grooming, standards of behaviour and concentrating on reading, writing and arithmetic. By the end of 1989, sport had been introduced and the drive toward full immersion in Te Reo was developing well.

The principal sought to understand the views of the community. Community meetings were held to establish the want and needs of the community in regard to their children's education. The Government's restructuring policy of 'Tomorrow's Schools' had recently been established. The policy envisaged greater engagement and involvement by parents and the wider community. However, as the principal explained, the transfer into 'Tomorrow's Schools' took a long time. In part, this was because the initial board of
trustees, like the new principal, had absolutely no idea what they were supposed to be doing in relation to the new Government policy (MFV-036 Interview, 10-12-02, 4).

In spite of minimal assistance from the Ministry of Education, the new principal took on the responsibility of the new policy. But the policy framework was only recently established. Initially, the Ministry's response when contacted for assistance and help was not terribly encouraging. As the new principal recounts:

"Under the system, you have different subject advisors and then you have a rural advisor whose job it is to basically tell you what happens in rural schools. However, the rural advisor wasn't able to come out to visit me at that time because he said he was already booked out, and that he would send me some material to read. So I figured "oh well, just get on with it". I spent a lot of time doing a lot of reading at night and on weekends, getting a feel for what happened at primary schools." (MFV-036 Resident's Interview, 10-12-02, 4).

The principal's role as facilitator, stimulated the community to take ownership of the schools development. In many ways, it appears to be a textbook example of the success of 'Tomorrow Schools'. A restructuring of the children's programmes took place, as did the setting of routines and established standards based on academic fundamentals, behaviour and attitude. Critically, the school opted for bilingual approaches, although this too was fraught.

Local residents initiated the process toward bilingualism in the school. Concerned about the performance and bleak outlook of the school's future, residents asked the principal about the possibility of introducing a bilingual curriculum. The principal facilitated his and generally organised the gathering of information required in the move toward a bilingual school.

Essential to the process was the establishment of an agreed consensus from the community for the development of a bilingual study programme. The majority of the community were favourable to the concept. Many parents had reserved feelings about how, in their own experiences, they had felt a loss of identity in not speaking Maori. They wanted an opportunity for their tamariki to regain what they had lost. A majority in the community were of the opinion that there was a need to revitalise the native language.
There was a small group of conservative people that felt the change would not be productive and not beneficial to the children. However, through the facilitation of teachers and elders in the community a consensus was reached to introduce a bilingual curriculum.

This created the need for the principal to move away, in 1992, to up skill in the methods and theory involved with Te Reo based teaching. In the principal’s absences two relieving teachers were contracted, and moved into Te Whaiti, to maintain the programmes and functions of the school.

The influence of the relieving teachers, in their short term at the school, caused, once more, a state of confusion within the community in respect to Te Reo. The relieving teachers felt that bilingual studies would not satisfy the needs of children who would come to work and live in a predominantly Western or Pakeha system. In a relatively short time they influenced the thinking of some parents in the community. In many ways their view was understandable and well intended. If it had been the norm in education circles for many years, and indeed most parents in the valley would have grown up with an English-only education. People’s opinions fragmented and by the time the principal returned the initial resolve of the community had been undermined. A shift to bi-culturalism had to be re-argued. The Education Report Office (ERO) had also been involved. ERO was un-happy with the proposed outcomes and the management plan. The re-building of bilingual policy thus also included the development of the school’s operational and management plans.

With significantly renewed support from the residents and school board, the principal facilitated the development of the bilingual programme. As a group they pushed the programmes development into high gear.

“All of the knowledge that I acquired at that time, was knowledge that I had actively gone out to look for myself. That’s about the size of it. However, we had built a team of people who were gaining in skills and gaining in confidence. And who found that ‘yes’ they [staff and board] could actually do stuff. One of the things that I did learn for myself was not to say ‘you weren’t doing your job’, but to say there was a lot of work that needed to be done.

[The ERO had] said next time they come back they wanted to see some improvements, so we did a big drive, to get things put into place. So every
person had to have their portfolios and stuff like that. And, success had arisen and I felt that people were working brilliantly. I felt that I could move on”. (MFV-036 Interview, 10-12-02, 12).

At the end of 1994, with the bilingual policy in place and functioning well, the principal accepted a position in Ruatoki. Unfortunately, with the principal absent fostering the development of another rural school, Te Whaiti went through a further period of confusion. In one year the pupils, staff and board had to try and adapt to three different principals. The reasons for the turnover of school principals is not clear. This disruption coincided with a visit by the ERO, who returned damning report on the school. A major lack of communication between the ERO and the School Board and staff resulted in what may be described as a hatchet job being applied to the board. Facing further threats of closure from the Ministry of Education, the principal returned from Ruatoki and restarted the building process. The conclusion in the ERO Audit Report outlines the dissatisfaction:

"There are barriers to student achievement at Te Whaiti School because of low quality curriculum delivery and an absence of systems to monitor and record student progress. Students are at risk because of serious health and safety matters, which require addressing". (ERO Audit Report 1995)

The school now credits its success to working with the full involvement of staff, board members and residents. They met to discuss ways to turn the 1995 ERO report into positive outcomes. A large hui was held, the outcome being a determination that the school was there for the benefit of their children. A positive learning environment was considered to be the most important factor. All other matters were to be of a secondary nature. Hence, the language that the community used to articulate this may not have fitted the mainstream audience, but the philosophy was the same. With community backing the principal rekindled the infrastructure that had been developed prior to what may be termed unfortunate absences. Te Reo was introduced and targets set to evaluate the outcome of the system that the community had built for itself. The target, set by staff and the school board, was that in three years time all senior students (Form 2) would sit and pass their School Certificate Maori Examination.

In 1994, three senior students sat the School Certificate Examination, the results of which are scaled from 1 to 7, one being excellent. The school recorded a 100% pass
rate with the three students all gaining a 1 or 2 for their grade. The school’s 2001 results recorded 100% pass rate with eight students all gaining a grade 1 or 2. The student’s exam marks since 1994 onwards are always in the top 10% of the national results. A recent press release from the University of New South Whales gives the schools most recent achievement:

“The Primary Schools Mathematics Competition is an initiative of the Educational Testing Centre (ETC) ant the University of New South Whales. The examination provides an independent assessment of students’ mathematical ability. It is an important asset in planning future teaching programmes and schools and students receive detailed feedback of their collective and individual abilities. The best performance, out of the 309,000 students from Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific came from six students from Te Whaiti School, receiving ‘High Distinction Awards’. Out of the 17 students from the school sitting the exam the other 11 all received Distinction Awards”. (University of New South Wales 2002, Media release).

To an outside observer, the result of this success on the school and community has been electrifying. A realisation has been born that both as individuals and as a community, all have had input into the success of the students and the school. The school roll is growing. It is presently at fifty-six students with work for three full time teachers. The ERO reports now acknowledge the school as a leader in its sphere. It is recognised as a model of innovative organisational management. As the remarks in the school’s most recent ERO report shows:

“Students at Te Whaiti School receive sound and varied learning opportunities through a balanced curriculum. High quality curriculum management and implementation supports learning and is meeting the needs of students. The board’s commitment and dedication is complemented by its knowledge and understanding of what is required as school governors. Sound systems guide and monitor that the board’s obligations are being fulfilled”. (ERO Report 1999).

The scope of the schools success was recognised by business management consultants. As seen in an article written in the New Zealand Herald:

“The natural tendency is not to call on collective wisdom, but to throw up project heroes – individuals that now have sufficient know-how and personal clout to get and keep the wheels of the enterprise turning.
Lack of leadership depth is also an issue. If the hero goes AWOL for whatever reason, the enterprise risks losing traction or even complete derailment.

Which is why managers should be interested in the story of how a small, central North Island school transformed itself from an educational disaster zone into a learning environment that consistently nurtures student success.

Instead of turning to management texts, they drew inspiration from their ancestors, called on their own collective wisdom and pursued a pattern for growth that followed natural cycles. What they achieved was a level of organisational maturity that most enterprises struggle to reach.

Running the school has become a project in which leadership can be shared because all are clear about the goal.” (New Zealand Herald January 16, 2002).

It is also acknowledged, on paper, by the Auckland University of Technology (AUT) as the ‘Tipu Ake Lifecycle’.

“Tipu Ake means Growing (from within) Upwards (toward wellness). It is a new business/ project model from people at Te Whaiti Nui-a-Toi. It captures some of the innovative processes they used to transform their school from failure and the brink of closure to become probably the top performing rural school of its type in NZ. ... They have tendered for and been awarded Ministry of Education contracts for curriculum development and teacher in-service training in language and technology areas. Their students (form 1 and 2) are provided laptops. All sit and pass School [Certificate] Maori with top marks before they leave” (Invitation, 2001).

Like the Te Whaiti School, Minginui Forest Primary School has undergone change. With a new principal (from the beginning of 1999) the school has moved from a mainstream establishment to an educational unit working in Te Reo and Te Kunga. An interview with the acting principle outlines the school’s awakening:

“I had never been to the village before my arrival in 1998. That was my first time. My first thoughts of it were ‘who would come here?’ Having looked at the place that was my first thought. When I saw the place, how run down it was and that it needed a bit of a clean up, the homes and stuff on the outside. Once I began to live amongst the people, well, my thoughts changed and that. My views changed and I thought that what could I do to help these people, knowing that they are a
part of me as hapu and iwi. I will come [here] as principal [that] is my part. When offered the job, they wanted Te Reo Maori and Te Kunga back into school. The school had been mainstream for 49 years. Their desire was to bring Te Reo back into the school and teach Te Kunga. I thought, I can do that, I certainly can help you in that way. And straight away, in 1999, we began to change the school, the whole atmosphere, the whole environment of the school into a Maori focus. That certainly happened. It took me almost 2 years to change the whole focus...from a mainstream environment to what is now a Maori focus and for the children to have a good grasp of their Te Reo and Te Kunga. I've had good support from the community in that respect. In all areas, actually, they have been very supportive in what has been happening culturally, sporting wise".

(MFV-024 Interview, 20-09-02, 1)

Minginui and Te Whaiti Kura are at present working toward total amalgamation. After many years of indifference and segregation, they are working closely to develop the youth of the valley. However, the schools are fighting hard as their proposed amalgamation does not fit neatly into the Ministry of Education's 'box'. For example, the Ministry's current determinant with any amalgamation is for only one structural educational unit to remain operating. The experience within the valley is that they can operate the two schools closely. Their proposal is to dedicate the Minginui site to developing junior school, and the Te Whaiti site to administer and run the senior school. The junior school would be a total immersion in the Maori language. The senior school would be bilingual. This proposed separation is based on the understanding that young children function best in a single language environment. Older children function better bilingually. Yet having a supplied good argument for the use of the two sites under the one umbrella, people from the Ministry still had a problem with the concept. To bring the situation around, one of the School Board members (thinking outside the box) suggested that the school's driveway was six kilometres long (the distance between Minginui and Te Whaiti). At first the Education Ministry people could not rationalise this concept.

This is only one of the many problems that the School Board and staff have had to compete with in order to realise their vision of developing and strengthening the educational base in the local area. After many months of negotiations and trips to Wellington, only recently, they have been provisionally granted permission to run the amalgamation of the type of schools their wants and needs dictate.
This review provides a good study on the initiative of the Minginui / Te Whaiti community and their desire to improve their situation. It shows that a good sense of leadership is required along with a combination of knowledge and resources, both internal and external, to facilitate a framework of positive development through participation. The principal’s leadership and understanding of the mainstream system and skills needed to research the material needed to structure the programmes and system to meet the demands of the Ministry of Education were imperative. Combined with the understanding and ownership of the project by the staff, School Board and parents has been the major components of the Schools recent achievements. However, the narrow-mindedness and total lack of understanding and background research of the Government agents, such as the ERO, came very close to destroying opportunity and the confidence of a community that has had a history of negative impacts from external sources. This is a recurring trend throughout this research project.

7.5 Possum programme

In 2001 a pest eradication programme, termed ‘the Possum programme’, was run in Minginui. A joint venture between different government organisations, with support from Ngati Whare Runanga was developed to meet a variety of objectives: the development of work opportunities for the region’s rural people; the opportunity for unemployed people to upskill and develop an income for themselves; and a process to provide trained people in the region for pest eradication and control. The intentions of the programme were good. But there is a wide range of differing opinions about the benefits gained.

Discussion of the subject of possums and possum control is topical, but debate remains on methods of control and eradication. A report from the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment summarises the situation with regard to possum controls:

“Despite programmes such as Project Crimson and ongoing publicity from the Animal Health Board and Department of Conservation about the threat possums pose, this study revealed limited understanding of the necessity, magnitude, costs and complexities of controlling possums. Unless there is ongoing recognition of, and consensus on, New Zealand’s possum risks there will not,
and cannot, be an informed debate about future control options” (Boland 2000, 90).

This review looked at the hunting option for eradication (and its significance as viable training and employment), particularly as an economic stimulus for a rural community. The report argued that hunting was a positive initiative. Yet compared to 1080 poison drops, it does not produce immediate gains. Instead, a system of hunting is only likely to produce results in the long term. It should be noted here that there is a distinction between bounty hunting—the receipt of payment for every possum killed—and hunting over a block to achieve a certain level of eradication. The latter is currently DoC policy.

In regard to Minginui, a joint venture was established between the Department of Conservation, Te Puni Kokiri and the Ngati Whare Runanga. To the newly established Runanga, the programme promised to provide an opportunity for residents of Minginui to upskill and, hopefully, gain long term employment. The training programme was subsidised by the Department of Conservation and Te Puni Kokiri. The Runanga’s perspective, as conveyed to me through discussions with a current member of the Runanga, was to provide positive development opportunities for the residents of the valley. The Runanga’s philosophy is to invite and establish as many training programmes as outside organisations are prepared to offer, their idea being that residents who involve themselves in training will not all gain and appreciate the skills which training provided. Some will take up the challenge and progress into work; others will decide that it is not for them as a means of employment.

Thus, if ten unemployed people take up a training programme and only two out of the ten become employed long term out of it, there are at least two people in full time employment. The two now employed are likely to mean that complete families would have their incomes raised. Then if another training programme eventuates, eight people are enrolled, from which another two find the programme to be ‘their thing’, thus creating a gain in employment for over a third of the original group. Over time the Runanga’s objective is to help create employment for the majority of the residents in the valley (MFV-004 in discussion, 10-07-02).

The problem with this approach is that it depends on the availability and willingness of external agencies to provide for training. The Runanga itself has no financial resources to contribute.
The policy of TPK is to endeavour to enhance the capacity of Maori and Maori communities, both rural and urban. The provision of skills and thus employment falls within this policy. The Department of Conservation as caretakers, has a responsibility to administer the welfare and management of native New Zealand flora and fauna. The possum is one of the department’s major risks in their management programme. It was therefore apparent that all stakeholders, TPK, DoC, and the Runanga saw the development of training programmes as a positive, proactive strategy, one that met their individual needs.

The possum programme entailed the training of individuals over sixteen weeks in the management and control of possums on blocks of land under the control of the DoC. The programme enrolled 8 students, predominantly male, from the residents of Minginui and the local area. The programme developed the skills involved in providing performance-based contracts with DoC and the effort and skills required to do this. Bush-orientated practical skills were delivered and administered by the Tairawhiti Polytechnic, Gisborne.

At the end of the programme all students achieved the relevant qualifications needed to gain contracts for possum control on Department of Conservation land blocks. Five students then obtained work, of which two are still employed. One student now works as a travelling tutor for Tairawhiti Polytechnic, delivering training programmes throughout the North Island.

Reviewing the resident’s opinions of the possum industry, it seems that there is a split in their view of the opportunity the work provides. Some individuals comment on the positive, while others are not too enthralled with the prospects of the work. Those that have obtained contract blocks from DoC have spoken of how physically hard the work is, and on how the terrain within the block contributes substantially to the effort needed to meet DoC’s evaluation targets. However, the money, while ‘not being fantastic, is OK’. The vital and added bonus to possum eradication is the market potential for the fur. The price of fur has improved over recent years with the development of clothing fabrics with a wool/fur blend. Hand plucked fur from the back of the possum carcass is sold for approximately $50 to $55 per kilo, requiring around twelve possum bodies per kilo. I was told that this equated to approximately $600 for a rubbish bag full of fur.
Some residents saw problems with the Department of Conservation's evaluation process, claiming that if they failed to reach the block target, then they were left penniless. Due to their personal circumstances, no fiscal buffer was available for any down time that may be experienced, be it by accident or by not reaching their targets. This makes the contracting option unfavourable for some. Others commented on how they made good money at the start of a possum control programme, but later when the numbers of possum had reduced to DoC's contract target, the amount of fur harvested did not make a worthwhile added bonus. Hence, for the amount of labour that they had to supply, they felt it was not worth their while. Their argument was that to be on the benefit schemes was much less demanding and gave them far more free time to organise their needs. As one resident of Minginui stated:

"I think they have a really hard job the possumers, I mean they walk in it [the possum block]. If they don't get a possum they don't get paid. Once they go there [possum trapping] they lose their benefit straight away. I think they give them a couple of payments, it is self-employment after that. They help you out for a couple of months, then after that you are on your own. In that couple of months you might get some good sales and think, yeah! After that, you don't fill your quota and your starting to think, 'I didn't pick the right job'. Maybe one day I don't want to go to work, you know, things like that. I know it sounds, it sounds funny, but if your not willing to do it you won't get paid. I wouldn't want it. I wouldn't want to be walking over those [possum blocks] and then you go back and sell your possums, and then you have to go out and do it to get another wage." (MFV-031 Resident's Interview, 08-09-02, 5).

The acquisition of a steady income was complicated further by DoC's management perspective. Generally speaking, possum control programmes lack funding, meaning that there is not enough work available to maintain a constant annual workload for local residents. There is certainly insufficient funding at present for any more than a few village residents to be permanently employed on possum eradication contracts in the Urewera. In order for a possum contractor to gain an adequate annual income from the industry, they are often required to move from region to region. This makes it difficult for individuals with family responsibilities, particularly with young children. For example, an individual person spend three months trapping in the Urewera National Park, then move to Taranaki for three months. If, during DoC's contractor tendering process, the contractor misses out, due to outside competition, then they are forced once more on to
a benefit. Therefore, possum hunting is not a viable, long term economic solution to Minginui's problems under the present regime.

However, from discussion with some DoC officers who are working in the local area, it is evident they are very conscious and concerned with trying to provide as much work opportunity as possible to local residents when planning their work programmes. An ex-employee of DoC, who was head of Animal Control and was responsible for the regional possum programme, Rangitaiki Area, gave his views of the situation. In developing the Possum Training Programme, he gave the prime objective of the programme as:

"To provide training to local residents in performance based contracting in animal control". (MFV-017 Phone Interview 15-01-03).

Those who were in charge of the Animal Control Unit, knowing that in the following year there was to be a concentration of possum control in the Rangataiki area, and knowing that the skills needed for the contracts weren't available locally, pushed for the training programme so as to upskill local residents, rather than having to bring in outside contractors:

"Bringing in outside contractors just means that the money is taken out of the area. It was important to try and retain the money and make it available locally" (MFV-017, Phone Interview 15-01-03).

Such motivations are restricted by budgets, though. It is often difficult for DoC to engage with the local community as they did in the past. One officer commented that, prior to the reforms of the 1980s, there was little unemployment in the Urewera Ranges. In fact the Forest Service struggled to find labour for their track maintenance and management programmes. Furthermore, interaction between Government agents was far more flexible:

"From the DoC point of view, I've run several Task Force Green kind of projects over the years. We had guys employed on the tracks and a lot of our track work wouldn't of got done without having that pool of labour. You know for six months. But now we kind of like being automated with the digger. ... [This has] taken a lot of the back work [labour] out of it, and you don't need so many guys.

So we had Task Force Green with guys painting huts and things. They were good for a while. When [government programmes] last, people are busy and
doing things, and a portion of those guys that are on it, ... it rekindles their work ethic and they kind'a go on and get a job somewhere else.

The last one we had, the possum scheme, that was quite a good initiative. Dave Payne from DoC pulled together on that. Eight guys started out on that and there’s two of them still going in the possum industry in one shape or form. One of the other guys, although he’s not doing possums anymore, he hasn’t stopped working since the possum scheme, and he is now working on one of the forestry crews that work out of here. ... So it does get people going. ... [If] one person gets through it is a plus” (MFV-022 Resident’s Interview, 28-08-02).

A major problem outlined was that funding for DoC was at times erratic. An example is the rare species programme at Minginui, where Kiwi, Kaka and Kereru programmes have been active in the area over the last 3 years. Suddenly, for no apparent reason, the officer in charge of the operation was denied a budget. The programme had seen employment for Minginui residents, and skills training in rare species management. Residents who had been working were no longer required. The Kiwi programme is now at a stage of building the local population of free ranging birds.

A positive spin off from the possum programme was the increased awareness by residents of nature, wealth and special care that their environment required, to keep it in a pristine state. These were benefits over and above the skills training that the possum-training programme delivered. It gave the local population a far better understanding of the reasons and needs for the use of 1080 (1080 being a major point of conflict for many years):

“[The programmes are] good for making and creating the linkages between government departments like DOC (which has a lot of involvement in this area) and the locals. They get to see what you are doing from the inside. ... If they are getting critical on the likes of 1080, give them jobs possuming, and they learn the need from seeing that it all can’t be done through the trapping programme” (MFV-022 Interview, 28-08-02).

From fieldwork, it became obvious that people working at the ‘coal face’ for DoC and other organisations have a good understanding of the situations and state of the environment in which they are active, socially, economically and environmentally. But they seem to be hampered by their institutions, particularly budgeting constraints and
bureaucratic management. Such was the view of a retiring DoC officer, not holding back with his parting words, as described by a person in the audience:

“A guy, [at his] farewell do … basically summed it up pretty well. He said, “there is a whole lot of people down at the bottom level, into their conservation going out and doing things and … getting in there and doing it, and you have the Hugh Logans and Sandra Lees at the top, into their conservation making the right noises. In between, you have this lump of management who’s just interested in bureaucratic processes and covering their arses and the systems thing, and rather than what is good for conservation at the bottom”. It is more like protecting your comfortable life style kind of thing” (MFV-022 Interview, 28-08-02).

Other factors that become apparent, such as lack of understanding as to whether communication on a subject is properly understood. An example of this is the differing opinions within the village as to the way the possum industry works and the benefits that can be gained.

To summarise, it can be said that all those involved with the possum eradication training programme started with good intentions, and a wider perspective than just benefits for themselves or their organisation. The programme itself delivered good results, providing skill based training in animal eradication, a skill that was lacking in the region. The spin off for local residents was employment, and a broader appreciation of DoC’s pest eradication programme. These included the need for the differing methods, such as 1080 poison, trapping and bait lines. However, there are a number of problems that have become apparent from moving through the process. These are, work reliability, the contention of remuneration being adequate to move people from a dependency regime to self-employment, and the lack of funding for the job to be done well and consistently. Possum hunting, while good employment for some, does not offer a long term economic solution for Minginui.

7.6 Summary:

From 1987 the community of Minginui seems to have adapted to an environment of long term unemployment and economic marginalisation. But adaptation is perhaps better termed survival. The community is now looking for answers, knowledge, and ideas to move it forward. Recent social development appears to have revolved, to a large extent,
around the highly motivated and active Primary Schools, a community service group 'Whanau Support' (supplying social support), and various avenues that connect and communicate to government social service agencies. Slowly, employment, both part- and full-time, is increasing, much of it through the brokerage of the Ngati Whare Runanga Iwi Trust. This development has been initiated and resourced locally, what I have termed 'internal development'.

Such 'internal development' has shown degrees of people-centred, participatory development practice. Whether conscious or unconscious of this endeavour the community due to the historical nature of development and underdevelopment in the region, has sought to make opportunities work for them. Government attempts at people-centred development, while talked about, have not eventuated in any substantial manner.

The Possum Programme, while developed from positive intent, provides limited benefits. Quite simply, there is insufficient funding available to provide permanent, long term work. But the programme had a second effect; giving stimulus to residents to change from a survival and benefit dependency mode, to one of opportunity and seeking.

Problems created through the Government's policy of change in the mid 1980s still remain today. The most straightforward is a lack of resources, financial, infrastructural, administrative and knowledge. The community, though, is more aware (having to survive for themselves for nearly two decades) that future development is their responsibility. Experience shows that they can little depend on comprehensive and targeted funding, particularly on a long term basis. But they acknowledge that they require support and resources from outside. Such support is best delivered on their terms, and not terms designed and dispersed solely from 'outside' organisations. The following chapter links the concepts of development, as discussed, with the results of this background research and field study.
8 Concluding Discussion and Recommendations

At the beginning of this thesis, various theories of development were reviewed. The proposition was put that the key to successful development, particularly as set out in alternative development theory, was to foster peoples’ participation. This concluding chapter reviews the development issues of Minginui today. Of particular concern is what this study has termed ‘internal development’ and the potential Minginui now has to work constructively with an external, well resourced body. Key contradictions or problems are set out, and some modest recommendations are made. It is not intended here to repeat or summarise the body of material set out in the thesis.

Minginui was established in the late 1940s by the New Zealand Forest Service to house forest workers and their families. For a period of over thirty years, the village prospered. It was a time of full employment and social cohesion. The management of the village was, however, highly paternalistic, with the Forest Service taking care of almost all matters, from the maintenance of public utilities, to the repair of houses. In fact, the local mills and the Forest Service owned all houses in Minginui – the workers and their families simply resided as tenants.

It is with this background that events which followed the corporatisation of the Forest Service in 1987 appear stark. Policies of structural adjustment meant the introduction of a free market and a radical reduction in state-supported industry and services, particularly the large state run Forest Service. Almost overnight, the community of Minginui shifted from one of full employment to almost full unemployment. Village leadership that had been maintained by the Forest Service and certain key Pakeha, such as the local store owner, departed. From 1987, the community of Minginui has suffered an extended period of poverty and underdevelopment. In many ways their experience could be described as ‘Third World’.

To date, Minginui has continued to experience poor housing, long term unemployment, poor health (with limited care available), deteriorating public utilities, and an inadequate infrastructure (at one point the village fire truck had to be pushed to a fire due to the high cost of its maintenance – fortunately Minginui is flat).
In 1988, responsibility for Minginui was passed to a local iwi body, the Ngati Whare Trust, and to the village residents who formed the Minginui Village Council Ltd. As has been shown, by doing so, the Government divested itself of a liability. Costs that would have been required for the village to meet a standard of public utility acceptable under local bylaws were estimated to be between $700,000 and $1,000,000. However, the Government made $100,000 available for the future running of the village, the idea being that the iwi and village management could raise the balance of the money through the sale of the houses to the now unemployed residents. Considerable delay and confusion took place at this time, particularly over the need of the residents to purchase their houses and to pay land rent.

It should be noted, however, that neither the local iwi nor the village residents had sufficient experience and resource to properly administer the village at this time. Most residents who could find work elsewhere (in what was a highly depressed labour market) were the highly skilled labour, and they departed the village soon after corporatisation. The village was left with a serious leadership and resource gap, a gap that the new National Government of 1990 made no effort to address.

The net effect of rapid and massive unemployment, and a subsequent lack of opportunity and employment was socially catastrophic. Stories told by village residents of this time were almost universally ones of social depression, detriment, alcohol abuse, and community dysfunction. Many residents frankly admit that the community was at rock bottom, individuals simply surviving day to day.

But more recently, people in Minginui have initiated positive and beneficial development programmes within education and community structures. These programmes have been discussed in the body of the thesis, and include the establishment of Whanau Support and the Ngati Whare Runanga, and the revitalisation of the schools.

What, though, sparked this process? In my mind there appears to be three elements: first, the schools formed a kind of catalyst. Through the ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ programme, which gave parents ownership of their children’s education by their management of school boards, the high achievement of the children reflected positively on the work of the parents. Individual leadership began to develop. Secondly, the establishment of Whanau Support as a community service agent gave a number
individuals a vital opportunity to learn how to access and manage relationships with various Government agencies. These skills had otherwise been absent. The third element was the development of the Ngati Whare Runanga. This body has been able to facilitate education programmes for village residents, find funding for the construction of a health clinic, and it has, through private sector relationships, created various opportunities for local employment.

These processes and institutions have been termed 'internal development' in this thesis. The point must be made that their establishment and growth have come largely from within the community, and from a very limited resource base. But all organisations remain dependent to a great extent on external sources of funding. Their future success will be limited without further external support. Moreover, Minginui still has very high levels of welfare dependency, low levels of employment, poor individual health, and a rapidly decaying village infrastructure. These vital matters are not likely to be addressed by internal development alone; they too require sustained and well directed assistance from Government.

Calling on the language of 1950s development theory, Minginui is ready for 'takeoff'. Essentially, the internal development of Minginui needs to be capitalised upon by external, well managed and directed assistance. It remains to be seen, though, whether Government agencies are able to capitalise on the potential that has evolved in Minginui. The significant problem which Government faces (and thus also the Minginui community) is the fragmented nature of government agencies, and the at times inflexible nature of departmental policy. Added to this is the problematic assumption underlying much Government policy today that development can take place through the picking of entrepreneurial 'winners'. The 'free-market' approach has singularly failed Minginui for the last fifteen years.

Minginui’s underdevelopment thus needs to be addressed at many levels: health, education, training, improvement to public utilities, housing, and the development of sustainable industry in the area. It appears that an ‘all government’ approach is necessary, one that sees co-ordinated efforts from different government agencies through a single, easily identifiable group or department.
What is also required, in my mind, is the establishment of a sufficiently resourced 'linking agent', that is, a body or organisation that can mediate the relationship between community needs and initiatives, and government services and assistance. The linking agent should be able to engage with all parties, both locally, at an iwi level, and with Government agencies, creating full participation of all. The linking agent should also be locally based – there is no point developing capacity in solely external agencies or areas, when that capacity can grow within the community. One potential linking agent would be a newly established village council working in partnership with the Ngati Whare Runanga.

With a linking agent securely in place, with clear lines of communication to an 'all government' body, and with a sufficient financial resource made available, the following initiatives may be considered:

- The development of educational and recreational tourism (capitalising on the natural and cultural resources of the valley and the Whirinaki State Forest Park);
- The development through training and assistance of a pool of skilled labour which can find employment in the region's forest and other primary production industries;
- The establishment of specialised agriculture and horticulture on common village lands;
- The re-establishment of Minginui's internal governance and administration, and the proper resourcing of repairs and upgrading of Minginui's public and private utilities to a standard that would meet local bylaws. This would include initial assistance for the repair and upgrading of homes so that they might comply with local bylaws;
- Assistance in the establishment of local service industries, such as a shop and tourist accommodation;
- The development of a culturally based craft industry (carving, weaving, and other arts).
The key to such a programme of development is that the initiatives listed above are not treated as once-only solutions to Minginui's plight. A development strategy must be created that is multi-levelled, linking various areas of opportunity and potential. The great weakness of Minginui's economy in the period 1950 to 1986 was its dependency on a single industry, forestry.

Development, therefore, needs to foster a diversified range of economic opportunities. Furthermore, any engagement by the Government needs to be of a sustained nature. The underdevelopment of Minginui created after the corporatisation of the Forest Service in 1987 can not be repaired all at once. A ten year strategic plan is required, the establishment of which needs to involve a designated government agency, the linking agent, and the community.
References:


ERO Audit Report, 1995

ERO Audit Report, 1999

Esteva, G., 1992

Friedmann, J., 1992

Ghia, D., 1989

Goldsbury, P., 2001

Goldsmith, O., 1988

Government Doc 1, 2002
Prime Minister's Office - Growing an innovative New Zealand - The Office of the Prime Minister (not dated). Wellington: Parliament Buildings.

Government Doc, 1986
Proposal for Housing and Employment to Ex. N.Z. Forest Service Workers at Minginui, Kaingaroa and Murupara. Wellington; Cabinet Committee on Social Equity. (WP72S Disk 20S Draft 1 S1/2/21). New Zealand; Government Archives.

Government Doc, 1987

Government Doc 4, 2002

H.B.H., 1950
A Brief History of Te Whaiti Maori School; in Te Whaiti 1950: A Story of a Community. Adult Education Group, Maori School Te Whaiti.

Hall, A. & Midgely, J., (ed) 1988
Development Policies Sociological Perspectives. USA, Manchester; Manchester University Press.

Hall, A., 1988
Community Participation and Development Policy: A Sociological Perspective, in Hall, A & Midgely, J (ed)
Haque, M.S., 1999  

Hettne, B., 1990  

Himona, R., 1987  

Howard, T. & Baker, H.R., 1984  
Constructive Public Involvement, in Blackburn, D.J. (ed.) Extension Handbook. Canada; University of Guelph.

Hutton, J. & Neumann, K., 2001  

International Labour Organisation, (ILO) 1976  
Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies of Eradication Mass Poverty and Unemployment. Geneva; ILO.


Kabier, Naila, 1999  

Kellsey, J., 1997  

Kellsey, J., 1999  

Kellsey, J., 2002  
At the Crossroads: Three Essays. New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Ltd.

Kellsey, J. & O'Brien, M., 1995  

Korten, D., 1996  
When Corporations Rule the World. USA; Kumarian Press.

Korten, D., 1990  
Getting to the 21st Century. USA; Kumarian Press.

Laine, M., de, 2000  
Fieldwork, Participation and Practice: Ethics & Dilemmas in Qualitative Research. London; Sage.

Laner, W., 1993  
Changing Contents: Globalisation, Migration and Feminism in New Zealand, in Sneja Gunew and Anna
Yeatman (eds) Feminism and the Politics of Difference. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books Ltd.


Ngati Whare Deed of Trust 1999 Deed of Trust, relating to Te Runanga O Ngati Whare Iwi Trust, 14 February, 1999. Murupara; Trust Offices.
New Zealand Herald, 2002  
Back-to-nature way to herd cats. Business Herald: D1
Wednesday, January 16, 2002.

Nga Tuara, 1992  
Nga Toka Tu Moana: Maori Leadership and decision
Making. Wellington; Te Puni Kokiri.

NZ Forest Service, 1951  
Working Plan for Whirinaki Production Working Cycle;
Rotorua Conservancy, in Hutton, J. & Neuman, K. 2001
Commissioned by the Crown Forest Rental Trust.
Wellington: Crown Forest Rental Trust.

O'brien, D., Wilkes, J., de Hann, A., & Maxwell, S., 1997 Working Paper 55; Poverty and Social
Exclusion in North and South. UK; University of Sussex,
Institute of Development Studies.

Plange, N., 1996  
The ‘Science’ of Society. Fiji; Quality Print Ltd.

Pouwhare, T., 1999  
Maori Women and Work. Wellington:The National
Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges Inc.

Public Health Commission, 1994  
Our Health – Our Future: The Statement of Public Health

Rahman, M.A., 1995  
Participatory Development: Toward Liberation or Co-
option? In Craig, G & Mayo, M. Community
Empowerment: A Reader in Participation and

Rahnema, M., 1992  
Participation. In Sachs, W. (ed.) The Development
Dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power. London;
Zed Books Ltd.

Rankin, K., 1995  
New Zealand 1995: A Miracle Economy. The University
of Auckland: Department of Economics.

Research Diary, 2002  
K. Price Research Notes Dairy No.1. Massey University;
School of People, Environment & Planning.

Rist, G., 1997  
The History of Development: From Western Origins to
Global Faith. New Jersey: Atlantic Highlands, Zed
Books.

Robbins, R.H., 1999  
Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism. USA:
Boston, Allyn & Bacon.

Robinson, J., 1994  
Rebuilding New Zealand: Towards a Sustainable
Society. NZ: Martinborough, Technology Monitoring
Associates.

Rosenburg, W., 1993  
New Zealand Can Be Different and Better. Christchurch:
NZ Monthly Review Society Inc.

Rostow, W. W., 1956  
The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth, in Economic
Rt Hon Helen Clark, 2002
PM's Statement to Parliament, 12-02-2002.
http://www.primeminister.govt.nz/, Speeches and
Releases pg. 10

Rt Hon Helen Clark, 2002
Prime Minister's Address to the London School of
Economics. Govt. Archives Web; Govt papers/speech-2
Helen Clark.cfm

Sachs, W., (ed.) 1992
The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as

Scheyvens, R., 1998
Sewing Versus Self-esteem: Strategies for the
Development of Women in the Solomon Islands pp.252-
55 in P Forer and P Perry (ed.) Proceedings of the
Eighteenth Conference of the New Zealand
Geographical Society 27-30 August 1995, Canterbury
University, Ch-Ch.

Sims, M., 1986
Report - Notes of Meeting, Regional Co-ordinating
Meeting – Corporatisation of NZSS: Government
Document: Regional Liaison Officer 10 November 1986.
ABJZ 869 W4644 Box 123 36/27.

Sims, M., 1987
Report – Minginui Village: Issues Involved In a Change
of Village Administration. Government correspondence,
Wellington: Government Document, Social Impact Unit,

Sims, M., 1987
Regional Transition Manager, 26 August 1987. Rotorua:
State Services Commission.


St John, S. & Stewart, J., 1997
Economic Concepts and Applications: The
Contemporary New Zealand Environment. Auckland;
Addison Wesley Longman NZ Ltd.

Labour Market.
nsf/html/docs/Employment+and+Unemployment+(Labour+
Market)

Statistics New Zealand, 2001
2001 Census Snapshot 4 (Maori) – Media Release.
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.n
sf/web/Media+Release+2001+Census+Snapshot+4+Ma
ori?open

Statistics New Zealand, 1994
New Zealand Now: Maori. Wellington: Statistics New
Zealand + Te Tari Tatau.

Sullivan, L., 2000
Behavioural Poverty: Essay one of Caught in the Net:
Six Essays on Welfare Systems and Family


Wallerstein, I. 1999 The End of the World As We Know It: social science for the twenty-first century. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota.


Wilson, S. (ed) 1987 Social Impact of Forestry Corporatisation (Draft). Planning Services Division, New Zealand Forest Service. (Ref.: ABJZ 869 W4644 36/2/7 Part 1.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Reference List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MFV-001, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 24-08-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-004, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal Discussion, 10-07-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-006, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 07-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-006, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 07-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-008, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 11-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-017, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Phone Interview, retired Animal Control officer, 15-01-03.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-021, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 04-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-021, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 04-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-022, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 07-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-023, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 26-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-024, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 20-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-025, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 24-08-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-026, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 10-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-027, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 10-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-031, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 08-09-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-032, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 28-08-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-035, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Te Puni Kokiri Regional Employee 20-12-02, TPK; Whakatane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-036, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's Taped Interview, 10-12-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFV-037, 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whakatane District Council Employee 10-12-02.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

Appendix A  Overview of Government Ministries.
Appendix B  Highway 38 review.
Appendix C  Whanau Support - Community Survey.
Appendix A

Introduction:
The following overview of Government Ministries provides a brief appraisal of government departments that have an influence on development in rural communities. Three Ministries were reviewed: The Ministry of Social Services; Ministry of Economic Development; and Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Development). The review mainly entailed a literature review in determine Ministry’s policies. Combined with this a small number of formal interviews with Government employees, at the regional level, was undertaken. The interviews provided an understanding of the relationship between the organisation’s policy and how it is determined and presented to the regions.

Ministry of Social Services.

In recognising the problems facing individuals today, especially those in the lower economic sector, the Ministry of Social Services (MSS) is endeavouring to provide a ‘springboard of opportunity’ and security for people, when they need it most.

Acknowledging problems, MSS appreciates that society is far more diverse today, with communities being made up of families of differing cultures and traditions. Work, volunteerism and recreation have changed, more women are in the work force and many people are employed on a part-time or casual basis. Because of these changes, MSS openly admit the present structure is old and in need of an overhaul. Pointing out that the present system isn’t providing for people’s wants and needs. They acknowledge that the complex nature and inefficiency of its delivery bewilder many people in that finding a job, people, find themselves no better off than they were. The prospect of achieving independence is limiting (MSS Publication 2001, 3). An example given by the MSS in published material, tilted ‘Working More for Less’ shows this need for a rethinking.

"Here’s an example of how the current benefit and tax systems provide no financial incentive for beneficiaries to join the paid workforce. Julie, a sole parent with one school age child, is working 25 hours a week at the minimum wage, which brings her $161.03 net (after tax) a week. When her family tax credit, family support and child tax credit, and accommodation supplement are added to this, her net weekly income is $439.50. When Julie is offered a full-time job at
the minimum wage paying $250.90 net a week, she is going to be $1 worse off, despite the fact that she is going to be working considerably longer hours. This is because the family tax credit ‘top-up’ reduces by $1 for every net extra dollar earned, and the accommodation supplement reduces by $1 because of the increased wages. The result is that her total income will be $438.50. Working full-time also means Julie needs someone to look after her child after school. If Julie uses an approved OSCAR programme, she will be eligible for a subsidy. But there will still be costs, making full-time work an even less attractive proposition.” (MSS Publication 2001, 15).

The MSS further indicates the problems that are facing New Zealand society today when they break down the statistical records show that New Zealand’s per capita market income has increased since 1988. Pointing out that over the decade, 1988 to 1998, income inequality has increased. The incomes of the middle and low end of the distribution spectrum had remained constant or decreased in real terms, whereas, the position of the top income sector has improved. The most affected in the low-income sector being sole-parent families, people reliant on benefits, Maori and Pacific Islanders and people in rented accommodation (The Social Report 2001, 73).

Combining poverty and social exclusion together, MSS realise the fact that hardship and lack of means alienates groups and individuals from participating fully and belonging to society. This has initiated the decision, by Government, to invest in social development, which refers to providing security, opportunity for people to realise their potential and a bridge for the transition from benefit to work. The Government envisages a social security system that is simple, fair, constructive and supplies the needs of the general public. The MSS’s philosophy was summed by an address by the Hon. Steve Maharay at the opening a Social Science Research Centre, University of Canterbury;

“To achieve our key social outcomes, we require effective social development policies. ‘Effective’ means ensuring that there is widespread participation and equality of opportunity. It means that children have the opportunity to achieve their potential. It means security for older people and for those who become unemployed or sick. It means people having real choices. Social development is not only important for its own sake. Social development is also vital for economic growth. Previous governments have argued that economic growth was the paramount concern, and that other aspects of social development (such as the elimination of poverty and exclusion) would either take care of themselves – the
famous trickle down theory – or were a luxury that we could only afford once the
economy had grown sufficiently. The evidence today does not support this. Our
relative ranking has been consistently falling in the OECD league table of
economic growth. The overall effect of this decline has been a reduction in the
well-being of New Zealanders relative to that of others in the OECD. At the same
time we have witnessed widening inequality between major sub groups in the
population.” (Hon Steve Maharay 21-02-02, 2).

There is an enormous amount of recorded rhetoric outlining the social concerns like the
comment above. However, the structure of development and growth seems to still be
dictated by the strategy of economic growth providing for all.

**Ministry of Economic Development**

The election of the Labour/Alliance coalition, in early 2000, saw the development of new
portfolios, created by the Hon. Jim Anderton. The Economic Development portfolio, in
conjunction with the new Ministry of Economic Development, having a holistic role, was
to work towards an economically sustainable strategy and policy for development. The
Industry and Regional Development portfolio was instituted to use policy advice to
generate and implement new programmes as any changes in policy emerged.

Government’s link between the Ministry of Economic Development and the ‘coal face’ is
through Industry New Zealand (INZ), a Crown entity that was established mid 2000. It
was established to link the Government, the private sector and the non-profit-making
organisations (“None Government Organisations” or NGO’s) to build industry and
regional growth. It’s mission statement states:-

“MISSION: Creating wealth for all New Zealanders by acting as a bridge
between the private sector and government” (INZ Annual Report 2000-2001, 1).

Its goals closely parallel the Government’s vision of ‘Creating an Innovative New
Zealand’. These goals are to build strong businesses, sectors and regions through
robust governance, providing encouragement and support to realise individual’s and
groups’ full economic potential and to facilitate access to capital. From this, to build a
positive attitude to entrepreneurship, business growth and business success (INZ
Annual Report 2000-2001, 1). The aspirations and generating potential behind INZ
was, and is, the Minister for Economic Development (MED), the Hon. Jim Anderton, who has frequently visited many rural areas over the last term in government, to act as a driving force for economic development for the benefit of 'all New Zealanders'.

Industry New Zealand's strategic direction, at first glance, gives the impression of a hard, dynamic and functional organisation that is looking at economic growth for the nation on a fiscal economic strategy, concentrating priorities on initiatives that display 'high growth potential' which will provide a positive economic impact.

"Industry will concentrate its efforts where it can make the most positive impact. Our efforts will be directed at priority sectors of the economy that can compete on the world stage, and at stimulating regional growth based on enhanced business capability and capacity." (INZ Annual Report 2000–2001, 1).

But, as a governance organisation connected with national economics, their focus is on high-performance areas. These are envisaged as knowledge-rich businesses that will grow and develop quality jobs (for the knowledge-rich young New Zealand individual), and will grow exports in value and volume, thus creating greater national prosperity. This view is characteristic of the many comments made by the Minister for Economic Development, Hon Jim Anderton. The common thread of the Minister's speeches is that New Zealand, in order to reach goals related to 'growth in an innovative economy', needs to develop 'partnerships'. To achieve this, the Government sees the need for the above development to enhance employment opportunities, in order to secure a strong and sustainable future. The key factors for this are through participation and collaboration.

"Our challenge is to harness our innovative talent and our natural advantages in order to create an even stronger economy. ... Underlying the success of any of these initiatives is the concept and reality of partnership. This is very different from the Asian command economy management and also a long way from the hands-off approach of past New Zealand Governments. This Labour alliance Coalition Government has restored balance to our economic management. We know that we need to work at creating a sustainable environment, which supports business while protecting the land and our people. ... I would like to see innovative individuals encouraged through business incubators, mentoring programmes and strong advisory assistance similar to that beginning to be provided by Industry New Zealand." (Anderton, 4/7/2001).
By July 2000, the Ministry of Economic Development, via INZ, launched three programmes marking the new wave of the Government working with business, local government and communities. These were:

- Industry New Zealand Enterprise Awards Scheme;
- Industry New Zealand Investment Ready Scheme;
- Industry New Zealand Regional Partnerships Programme.

The first two programmes seriously focused on elite small businesses and entrepreneurs to assist financially for development, either by grants from the awards scheme or by initiating overseas and private investment. All the programmes relied on the evaluation, by the Ministry, of dynamic businesses and innovative proposals. Is this a common thread in our general population, that of being in the league of entrepreneurs and innovators?

The Regional Partnership Programme, also proposal driven, is intended more for long term regional development. The Government is interested in proposals that involve a cross section of organisations (local government, communities, iwi and business) from a region, that have designed their own development strategy. The idea is a bottom-up approach, with the Government working with local communities, using their unique strengths, to enhance the regions through collaboration between organisations at all levels, from local to national (MED, Partnership for Growth 2000, 3). As explained by an established Maori business consultant working closely with MEO in the eastern Bay of Plenty:

"I've been involved in a whole range of government initiatives. Most recent, the economic development strategy, through the MED and Industry NZ. ...The strategy that we prepared was, as much as we could make it, 'community driven'. So, rather than sitting round the table and saying lets think of strategies for the Eastern Bay and go out and get this community to sign them off. We said 'well let's go out and say 'look what is it that you want'. ... There are lots and lots of different strand and issues around the programme. One of them is getting the three councils and iwi to work together. [The] three different councils who have, in history, worked in isolation, so you've got [separate] community driven initiatives ... and ... trying to get people who will work together, the local politics
to work together. ... I think central government was a little naive about how smooth that would go. They thought 'OK, well you guys come back and say that you’re a region and then you guys can get on with it. Which isn’t what actually happened in practice. To the point where central government had to come in and say, 'hey, you will work together, otherwise you will lose the opportunity’”. (MFV-038 Maori Business Consultant, 17-12-02, 4).

Central government is trying to enrich a philosophy of autonomy through its policy. However, it also has to show leadership through autocratic means, to point out that ‘you need to work together or lose the opportunity’. The first hurdle has been overcome, with the individual units now recognising the benefits of working as an united front, 'Eastern BoP' (Eastern Bay of Plenty). The present issue is the economic wealth differentiation between the contributing councils. Whakatane Council, supplied by a larger population base, is able to contribute more to a regional development agency but feels that this is unfair to their community (MFV-038 Maori Business Consultant, 17-12-02). This raises the issues of equity, resources and accountability. These issues always seem to appear, whether it is at the top of the pyramid, at the bottom or somewhere in between.

When reviewing the Regional Partnership Programme, (an initiative from Industry NZ), in relation to the Eastern BoP, the positions of Opotiki, Kawerau and Whakatane are very diverse. Looking at the ‘index of deprivation’ Opotiki registers as the most deprived area in the country, Kawerau is number two and Whakatane is number six, which indicates the extremes in one region. For example, when establishing the proposed ‘regional development agency and the funding required:

“Whakatane puts up $276,000.00 worth of ratepayers money...if you work it out on a population basis, Kawerau and Opotiki would put in an equivalent amount of money. It equates, and this is the only fair way to do it, ...a $75,000.00 contribution from Opotiki and a $58,000.00 from Kawerau. [This is] when the mayors and Chief Executives get to the crunch point, which we’ve reached. It’s “well where do they get the money from?” (MFV-037 Whakatane Council employee 10-12-02, 6).

A comment made by the Maori business consultant (17-12-02) was that those who have limited knowledge of the ‘real picture’ generally made central government policy: ‘like trying to put a square block in a round hole, they just don’t fit’. Many of the situations created by government agents seem to miss their targets. An example of this is the BIZ
Programme (business management training programme) run by Industry NZ. Initially, it was run directly between provider, such as Whakatane District Council and Industry NZ, each provider having autonomy in the delivery of the programme. On the second round of the programme, major changes were adopted due to the inconsistency of results. The programme was contracted to 'lead providers', under a 'one size fits all' concept, who were responsible to subcontract the programme to local providers. The BoP region was administered by ECN (Enterprise Central Network), thus creating another tier of management:

“So we [did] the same areas that we did in our original contract but there is heaps more reporting processes. We did end up with one size fits all, which was OK for Whakatane. One of the things with the new contract was that, to run a training programme, you had to [have] a minimum of 10 participants or the funding would be cut. If you lost 1 person you lost 10%, if you lost 2 people you lost 20%. The thing is, they had a minimum of 10 people and maximum of 15". (MFV-037 Whakatane Council employee 10-12-02, 2).

It was all right for Whakatane, which had a population base that could cope with the programme criteria, but the peripheral areas suffered. Trying to get a guaranteed number of people, especially 10, in places like Minginui or Ruatahuna was not practical. One reason was that there weren't ten people wanting to do the programme. Secondly, if one tried to set up a programme in the outer areas, by combining the numbers from different communities, out of a possible 15 people, only 4 would turn up. This raises the issue of accountability and trust.

Government sponsored programmes are, and have been, many and varied over the last decade. The MSS and MED (prior to MED, Ministry of Internal Affairs) have generated and administered programme after programme, of which the Minginui residents are now quite sceptical. Such as 'work for the dole', of the mid 1990's, where the people of Minginui, to retain their benefits, were working up to 20 to 30 hours a week for an extra 20 dollars. Programmes to up-skill and gain qualifications to ready themselves for the workplace, when there were no jobs available nearby, has led to the rural people's distrust of the system and the labelling, by others, of many members of rural communities as lacking self-responsibility and not being accountable.

"Like I said, the need has really got to be demonstrated by the community. You know there are heaps of programmes. I don't want to go in there and say "No,
well I think you guys need this". Because their history has seemed that they have had all these suggested ideas and just been let down time and time again. You know I can go and do a two day intensive [programme] and make everybody feel wonderful about and recognise their strengths and opportunities. But, where to from there?" (MFV-038 Maori Business Consultant, 17-12-02, 10).

The situation seems to be caught in an ever-increasing spiral. As was summarised by the Whakatane Council Employee, when discussing the establishment of the Regional Development Agency:

“So we are working through this process, but it’s very fraught and I must say, I can see where they [Mayors & Chief Executives] are coming from. So we are going around in circles. They want to be part of it. They can see the opportunity. But when it comes to putting money into it, it’s too hard”. (MFV-037 Whakatane Council employee 10-12-02, 7).

Being caught in a cycle is evident, at many levels, as the product of development. Between the Ministry and the programme providers, between providers and local government or providers and individuals or community groups, there seems to be a mismatch. The provision of government programmes, although meaningful, battle with issues of funding, length, trust, communication and leadership.

In a recent journey, the Hon. Jim Anderton visited the isolated community of Ruatahuna, to meet and listen to local worries and complaints. The intentions are honourable but the outcomes and influence, unless handled very carefully, can be very disruptive.

This is a short example of the New Zealand government’s response to concerns on current problems voiced by a rural community and their need for resources to address them. After repeated attempts by the Ruatahuna community (in the central Urewera Ranges) to get action from government agents, correspondence from Aubrie Te Mara was sent to the Minister of Economic Development, Mr. Jim Anderton, who, in response, (and only giving the community of Ruatahuna, 2 days notice), sent a reply that said he would visit the community in person on the afternoon of Wednesday, 6 June, 2002, for a two hour time period, when he would listen to people’s arguments and reply to them. The sequence of events is described from my assessment as a neutral observer at the hui and listening to the korero.
From research notes:

"Ruatahuna Community meeting, with Hon. Jim Anderton June 6, 2002.

Location: Ivan White's Marae, Ruatahuna.

Mr. Anderton was scheduled to arrive at 2.40 p.m., but he didn't arrive until 3-10 p.m. I arrived at Ivan White's marae one hour before and introduced myself and asked Mr. White if there were any problems with my observing and taking notes of the korero between the community and Mr. Anderton. Consent was given with pleasure and my introductions were made and the coming arrival of Mr. Anderton was discussed over tea and sandwiches in the kitchen of the Whare Kāi (where much of the discussions on community issues take place for Maori) and arrangements were finalised.

Aware of time constraints, the community, had organised a short powhiri (welcome ceremony) to be followed by the discussions, which were to be combined with refreshments in the Whare Kāi (the food house on the Marae). Mr. Anderton and his party were escorted to the head table where they promptly placed their note pads and pens at the ready, a sign of tight and efficient readiness!! Hosting the meeting, Mr. Richard Tumarae, made everybody aware of the little time available for the organised speakers. The community had arranged 6 speakers, giving them no more than four minutes each to state their arguments.

The speakers, 2 women and 4 gentlemen, were well rehearsed organised in their briefs, and spoke eloquently on their topics. Kaumātuas (well-respected elders) Whare Biddle and Ivan White addressed the meeting in Maori. The following issues were addressed:

The lack of modern communication, as a rural community, to access Internet Technology to enable them to gain the benefit for their children at school and business opportunity in the area.

The increase in visitor population to the area, due to the increasing marketing of New Zealand’s National Parks, is causing carrying capacity problems due to lack of facilities and resources, i.e. pollution.

Health issues, especially women’s health and the recent history of 10 years ago when the valley had more than 10 services running in the community. Today there are none.
The publication "Puao Te Ata Tu" (Day Break) was written by a Ministry advisory group on Maori perspectives in 1988 but embargoed until 1997. The issues described in the publication are still not being addressed.

It was stated that it was hard to access Government information on the issue of rural housing. The response time from government sources is erratic and unreliable and the government seems very reluctant to address community needs.

Whare Biddle & Ivan White's issues were voiced in Maori, and I could not translate.

The pens of Mr. Anderton's entourage were flashing fast and furiously, giving a sense of efficiency. Halfway through the speaker's address, the government officials interrupted the speakers, and informed the meeting that, due to outside commitments, Mr. Anderton's departure was to be brought forward by 20 minutes. Hence the rush for 'information exchange' was speeded up.

The final speaker was a Pakeha, Mr. Tony Goodman from Auckland, an interesting addition to the majority of Maori at the meeting. Mr. Goodman revealed that he had established plans for a "new innovative housing scheme" and tourism development in the area. He complained that contacts with government were slow and the government agents, such as Housing Corporation and TPK, lacked the ability to communicate about the development of 'his' programmes, thus causing considerable problems. An interesting 'outsider' to be present at such a hui. His attitude portrayed a 'power over' mentality. Enquiring about the gentleman's position from residents of the valley, I was informed that he was an outsider with limited respect due, mainly, to the arrogance he projected.

Interestingly, I noticed Mr. Anderton gave what appeared to be a pre-prepared reply to the hui. He started with talk of the need for a strong nation, and that small rural communities and their growth were an important concern. He said that Government policy, for a long time, 'did not care about regional and rural development, full stop', but a strong and effective Maori economic development was of extreme importance. "Equality across the board" was mentioned but nothing about the government's economic structural adjustment programme since 1984, and many of the problems addressed by the earlier speakers were ignored.
To Mr. Anderton's credit, he gave some good examples of rural communities that had, due to government assistance, re-emerged from poverty, recession and social collapse, such as Moerewa, in Northland. However, it appears that all the examples that received government assistance only occurred after extreme pressure was placed on government agents to embarrass them. Mr. Anderton finished his summary address by indicating that he and his officials had listened to the concerns and problems that had been voiced, had made comprehensive notes and gave his word that the community would see action to address the issues.

This situation provides a good real life overview of the interaction between the top level, and grass roots of Government. The people of Ruatahuna had put a lot of energy into the time that was being given to voice their concerns. As an observer, the respect shown to the local people by the Government agents was not fitting. With the limited time available limited, to be shortened further due to outside circumstances that weren't explained, could be viewed as an insult to the community and hence time wasted by all concerned”.

The Hon. Jim Anderton in his speeches, whilst travelling the region has, on more than one occasion, used similar words:

“I've been out in the regions virtually every week this year”. (Anderton, 4-7-2000)

Indicating that:

“I can tell you we have made comprehensive notes and have listened to what you have said.” (Anderton, 28-11-2000).

These were the words that I heard at a hui nearly two years later. Only four weeks later, the Hon. Jim Sutton, Minister of Rural Affairs, expressed, the Government's views on the continuing work to strengthen rural communities and to build opportunities for development and innovation. He maintained that the Labour Government, 'for rural communities', had established the Heartland Service Centres. These were to restore the face to face contact with Government services and for voluntary groups to again access resources, and to increase police presence in rural areas and they had started a 32 million dollars premium to attract medical practitioners (Sutton 09-07-2002, 1).

“Mr. Sutton said that Labour would continue to strengthen the partnership between central government and rural communities to ensure that people living in rural communities had the same opportunities as their urban counterparts.
Key areas in this would be the provision of telecommunications services, health, education and law and order.” (Sutton 09-07-2002).

How has this rhetoric impacted on the community of Minginui? In essence the bureaucratic wheel turns slowly, however, there needs to be the understanding of the historical past, experienced by many rural communities, the effect that this has had, before mutual trust can be regained.

**Te Puni Kokiri - The Ministry of Maori Development**

With the increasing awareness of the rights of minority groups world-wide, over the last decades of the 20th century, the New Zealand Government’s policies reflect the benefits that can be achieved through a diverse, multicultural society. Te Puni Kokiri, established as the working arm of the Ministry of Maori Development, in 1991, has a role to assist and give guidance, to the Government, on policy in administering the partnership between Maori and the Crown. The organisation has the responsibility of managing a very complex and dynamic situation involving this partnership. Broadly speaking, this involves development, both social and economic, for Maori under the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Te Puni Kokiri set out to address the inequalities that have been promulgated throughout the history of the colonisation of New Zealand and to support and increase opportunities in, and, for Maori development.

“To influence, develop, implement and evaluate policies and strategies that accelerate Maori social, economic and cultural development”. (Te Puni Kokiri 2001).

Since 1999, the Labour/Alliance Coalition Government has set the scene for Te Puni Kokiri to adopt a leadership role, with the state sector and other agencies, in monitoring and auditing services and programmes to improve the outcomes for Maori. Taking stock of this role, Te Puni Kokiri sets it’s strategic path, in light of the Treaty of Waitangi (The Treaty), in economic, social and political areas.

In reference to The Treaty, acting as facilitator, Te Puni Kokiri is obliged to provide an understanding of our present day environment. This means that they have to deal with a
number of complex issues, such as the settlement of historical grievances, allocation of fisheries assets, airway licences and the conservation estate's ownership and control. Te Puni Kokiri, aware of the issues, also voices the lack of understanding, in the whole community, of the influence The Treaty has on the future and growth of New Zealand as a nation, claiming that the 'lack of understanding impedes' progress and resolution (Te Puni Kokiri 2001).

Nowadays, the economic climate for many Maori-owned establishments, working in the primary industry, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, has improved over recent years due to the strong performance of the primary export industry because of the low exchange rates and reduced inflation. Even though there have been additional gains for Maori in certain sectors, economically, their position has deteriorated over the last decade (Te Puni Kokiri 1998). In a more recent report, the figures indicate that the 'gap' between Maori and non-Maori has, socially and economically, not yet closed to any great degree (Te Puni Kokiri 2000). As stated earlier, (in the review of statistics for Maori women), the 'gap' is very evident in education, health, housing and employment.

The problems they envisage for economic expansion for the Maori in the future, are related to; lack of skilled people; a reliable capital base; and issues surrounding multiple ownership of land and its development. A lack of expertise in the information technology and knowledge-based industries, over-indulgence of generating commodities from primary production, and the general low capital base of many Maori are prime areas needing attention (Te Puni Kokiri 2001).

As mentioned, the increasing diversity of the New Zealand society with the growing awareness of the ethnic and economic differentiation manifests itself in problems in social development. The Labour/Alliance Government has recently moved toward policy of support for 'by Maori for Maori' solutions. Te Puni Kokiri is placed as the Government's agent in the community to assist whanau, hapu and iwi to acquire resources for their development and growth. The regional offices of Te Puni Kokiri are mandated with the task of administering and providing programmes for local and rural groups to achieve this. The key areas in the strategic plan are to:

- Work with Maori to build their capacity to enable them to achieve their aspirations;
- Provide active state sector leadership and brokerage services that accelerate Maori development and achieve improved outcomes for Maori;
- Pro-actively identify and advocate the development of best practice and gain Government support for local solutions to Maori needs;
- Provide support for Maori groups that are pursuing development initiatives;
- Review current programmes and services, to ensure their reliability and appropriateness as uses for Maori development;
- Be aware that programmes identify and are responsive to individual and community needs. (Te Puni Kokiri 2002).

This is a large responsibility for Te Puni Kokiri regional offices but, aware of the associated diversity and dynamics required, the Ministry has adopted flexibility, allowing, through a bottom up framework, the instigation of regional development profiles to meet the needs and aspirations of local Maori (Te Puni Kokiri 2002).

Talking to a regional employee of Te Puni Kokiri it was apparent that there is agreement about its goals and objectives within the organisation:

"The role of Te Puni Kokiri, us, as staff in this office, our roles are quite varied and there is quite a large role. But, basically, it's to broker, facilitate and coordinate projects for the communities, to enable them to develop. At the moment, us, as a Ministry is going through a capacity building phase, where we are looking at building the capacity of our communities so they're able to use that capacity to develop themselves within the future. So, it's really to have a sustainable sort of model where we try and help them help themselves". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02).

The outcome of the discussion clearly showed the drive for a bottom-up approach to their programme's formatting. On most occasions, they try, as facilitators, to adapt whanau, hapu, iwi or community ideas and concepts into functional proposals, initiated and owned by the these groups. Leadership, flexibility and communication are seen as high priorities for achieving. But this also creates, in the present climate, numerous problems.
The leadership role was seen as critical in the TPK Regional Office;

"For us as an office to act as leaders and provide leadership, for our people within the groups, as required. And, I know that a couple of the projects that I worked on, one in particular, 'Regional Development [Programme]', require[d] us, as an office, to co-ordinate, facilitate and lead a Mataatua Iwi Forum. ... That's a collection of all the iwi authorities, within our region, so basically it encapsulates all the Mataatua iwi. And, that's been one huge positive project that we've been working on". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02, 4).

The need for flexibility was seen as a major component in working productively within the regions, especially with the blinkered view that Maori comes under the umbrella as a holistic and united group which are traditionally and culturally monolithic.

"Terms of flexibility, with our regional office within TPK, have been given the ability to work with the Maori groups within their communities. So, what we say in the Whakatane Office, [is that] how we roll out capacity building may be different from how Auckland rolls out capacity building. Because, the Maori in that area [Auckland] have different needs to the Maori in this area. And I think that's an excellent or a positive aspect for us as a Ministry, that we be given that bit of flexibility to be able to work with the Maori groups that way. Rather than, sometimes, ... it is a bit of a problem with some of the policies that come through. We are out there and obviously we have to promote ... if it's a policy with us. ... It's quite often difficult to get iwi all in the same boat". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02, 4).

An example, given to emphasise the complexity of interactions, was in relation to the Regional Partnership Programme. TPK, in support of the Ministry of Economic Development through Industry NZ, was expected to make sure iwi and Maori were participating, not realising the variance that exists within the subject of 'Maori'. The other Ministries lag somewhat in not seeing the real picture; that iwis are very individual identities.

"I think, generally, there is still that perspective within other agencies about fitting 'Maori'. ... They are warming to the idea and getting a sort of gradual understanding, that may be just individuals, and people within [the Ministries]". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02, 5).
The problems that are apparent, through the discussions, are related to lack of knowledge, lack of communication and lack of understanding of any communication, with isolation and the mistrust of government orientated programmes. The TPK regional office was very aware of these factors:

"Information, informing and the distribution of knowledge, [growing] people’s awareness, is probably one of the areas that are quite important for us as our role. Because, what we’ve found is that, we may have all these programmes and services to offer the communities, but if the people don’t know about it, then what use are the programmes. ... Because they are not there [isolated] and the information is not readily accessible for them (and I do have some concerns about the capacities of some rural communities, because they don’t know those things [programmes] are there). They don’t know how to access them. We call it the 'most needy areas' within our region. The rural communities, because they are not getting the information and don’t know about the services and everything that is being offered by the Government, ... they are the ones that are missing out. ... Development may not be as ideal as it [could be] at the moment". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02, 7).

An information week, Te Hau Parongo, was set up, each region determining what they viewed as the most efficient way to disperse information on TPK’s programmes and services. The result was a real ‘eye opener’ for the TPK Whakatane regional office due to the response they received. Having adopted a method of information distribution, they thought would be appropriate, the poor turnout was a shock. Quickly they had to review the process, personally delivering information, although time consuming, was most appropriate.

"About the first week of July [2002] we had what we called an information week, Te Hau Parongo ... our CEO was really supportive [to the idea]. [It was about] us, as an office, promoting our services and what we can offer to our region. ... [Having] ... strategically located presentations, within our region. ... It may have been the timing, a number of things, [but] the turn out wasn’t great. Which meant that we ... had to actually then take all that information ... and actually hand it to the people. Especially the ones in those rural communities". (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 20-12-02, 8).

There wasn’t one set means of information distribution. Each region took it on themselves to plan the method to be used for Te Hau Parongo. Some regions used
formal presentations to iwi authorities at Maraes, others used a ‘come and meet us’ format. Proposals were reviewed by TPK head office, but the overall structure was flexible enough to allow each region to determine the methods of presentation that could be most effective to their circumstances.

The TPK Whakatane office was cautious of the degree of mistrust that was apparent through the rural communities that they deal with and the need to inject positive results before people will ‘buy into what TPK wants to achieve’;

“Getting a project that they can see is coming into fruition, or something that they can see is being developed and getting them to bind to that and say “oh well, maybe [these people] can do something for us”. (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 2012-029, 9).

There was a positive and innovative atmosphere within the Whakatane office of TPK. Whether it is from good leadership from the central hub of the organisation or the individuals working in Whakatane, it appears that the TPK mission is alive and understood and the job is being done. When asked if they felt that they worked under heavy financial constraints the response was positive:

“I wouldn’t say we’ve got enough money. We’ve never got enough money. But, I think that, with the funding that we have, there is the ability for Minginui to be able to benefit from that. Just to inform you, we as an office have ... identified what was actually part of what we call a Kai Tataki a Rohi service. ... That’s a programme that looks at providing communities with a, ... it’s like a community project co-ordinator. Part of this process, we had to identify as an office, ... was which communities would be most needy in terms of one of these positions. At the moment we are looking at Minginui and Kaingaroa as the two communities to work with first. What that involves is ... potentially be a project co-ordinator that could work on projects for those communities. They’re like a kaiwhakarite [mobile relationship manager], but they are local”. (MFV-035 TPK Employee, 2012-029, 10).

The point being stressed was that the kaiwhakarite was a resident member of the community. Lived, worked and acted within the community but also having the means and resources to use the mainstream system to provide opportunity and direction for local ideas and projects.
References – Appendix A

Anderton, J. 4-7-2000

Anderton, J. 28-11-2000

Hon Jim Sutton 09-07-2002
Labour publishes its Rural Affairs Policy. Press Release from Hon Jim Sutton.

Hon Steve Maharey 21-02-2002
The Social Development Agenda and the Importance of Social Research.

Industry New Zealand 2001

Ministry of Social Services 2001

Ministry of Social Services 2001

MFV-035, 2002
Te Puni Kokiri Regional Employee 20-12-02, TPK; Whakatane.

MFV-037, 2002
Whakatane District Council Employee 10-12-02, Whakatane.

MFV-038, 2002

Te Puni Kokiri 2001
Appendix B

State Highway 38

State Highway 38 (SH 38) links the Taupo and Rotorua regions with the East Coast, between Napier and Gisborne, passing through small and scattered settlements through the Urewera Ranges. From Murupara, SH 38 presently runs to the Minginui turnoff at Te Whaiti and here it officially ends, as does the sealed surface. From this point, at Te Whaiti (Minginui turnoff), the road changes status to a Special Purpose Road (SPR) until it reaches the Huiarau Summit. Then, although the road remains a SPR, it comes under the jurisdiction of a separate local authority (Wairoa District Council) until it reaches Waikarimoana. From this point on, it becomes SH 38 again and runs to the coast. The national roading concept and management is a very intricate structure involving, since Government's structural adjustment, many local and government bodies. For the determining of road status and maintenance for SH 38, you have local authorities of Rotorua, Whakatane and Wairoa all involved as well as Transit NZ and Transfund. Public submissions have an impact but really only on a five year review process. In recent years, since 2000, the section of SH 38 from entering the Urewera Ranges, 3 kilometres east of Murupara, to Te Whaita has been reconstructed and sealed. The sealing of the road has had a positive impact on the residents in The Valley.

Discussion with a district roading-engineering consultant enabled me to get a general picture into the complexities of the national roading network. This was followed by a discussion with a Transit New Zealand (TNZ) policy analyst to confirm the process and gain the perspective of the road access to Minginui. The national roading network is split between TNZ, which administers and maintains the State Highway system and local bodies administering SPR's and local roads. The majority of this is funded through Transfund, the Crown's organisation that which is responsible for determining standards of maintenance and construction and undertakes the audit and reviewing of road controlling authorities.

The objective of TNZ is to operate a safe and efficient state highway system, and, since its establishment in mid-1996, it is responsible for the national highway system. TNZ
conforms to its own internal safety and maintenance code and is subsidised by Transfund at 100%. The construction and maintenance of SPR’s within a region is the responsibility of the local body and is subsidised by Transfund, 100% for construction and 75% for maintenance. The standard to be maintained is usually ‘best practice’, which is determined as whatever the local body has adopted for its safety management practice. There are many standards available. For example, TNZ or Australian-based documentation may be used. Transfund has a voice in what safety management scheme is used but this will almost always be lower than State Highway standards due to the lower volume of traffic on these roads. SPR’s is the title given to roads that, due to location and use, have the need of additional funding over and above the other roads managed by local authorities. For instance, the road from Te Whaiti/Mingenui to Ruatahuna, which runs through a National Park, has low traffic use and services a small scattered community, but can attract up to 75% funding. However, transfund subsidises local roading authorities up to 50% of the maintenance costs to an agreed standard, and usually depends on volume use – low volumes mean low maintenance to balance funding needs because local bodies have pressure on them for other community services, such as library service, waste management and water.

With regard to SH 38, recent history has seen its designated status down-graded during the last decade. In 1994, the road from Ruatahuna to Huiarau summit, (the saddle between Ruatahuna and Waikaremoana), had its status revoked and was declared an SPR. Again, in 1997, SH 38 was shortened and the segment from Te Whaiti to Ruatahuna was declared an SPD. Currently, in the latest review, (not yet published), SH 38 is to be down-graded and the section between Murupara and Te Whaiti will be determined as an SPR. This continual withdrawal of SH 38 gives the appearance of yet another form of cost cutting by central Government.

One of the many problems facing the community was the isolation. The upside of TNZ’s development and maintenance work on SH 38 over the last 3 years has seen the sealing of the road completed between Murupara and Te Whaiti. The local community has been overwhelmed with this development and the impact has made major significant changes within the Minginui community. Sealing the road has meant that time to the nearest service centre, Murupara, has been halved. The major deterioration of people’s vehicles by the constant battering travelling on the unsealed, severely rutted, gravel road raised the problem of whether to put money (of which they have little) into a vehicle that would
deteriorate rapidly because of the road conditions, or make do with illegal wrecks that they themselves can keep mobile. It is not hard to pick the option most frequently used. With the road-sealing, this problem has now been solved.

With the sealing of the road, the upgrading of vehicles has become obvious as well as the change in people's attitude. For example, the sealing of the road has made the opportunity of obtaining work outside the village more appealing. One, people have a legal and reliable vehicle, and two, the travel time and reliability of transport has improved so that the people can make themselves more available for work.

Discussion with residents on their view of the roading improvements was made obvious;

"Awesome, personally I think it is awesome because my tyres and car last longer. Like the car wear and tear, the stones used to knock our cars about". (MFV-023 Residents interview, 26-09-02.)

For one resident it is appreciated, but long overdue:

"Good, very good, it is a benefit for these people. Buying new cars, you know, that will help them at least to have more money because ... when they go on a bumpy road the car falls to pieces, they got to go get stuff for it, or take it to the garage. The road they have been waiting [for the sealing] for 20 years". (MFV-021 Resident's Interview 04-09-02).

A few residents mentioned how the sealing of the road had affected them positively, with the improvement in people's attitudes being due, partly, to the increased mobility that is being experienced. However, there was also criticism on the negative side of the improved access. The village people indicated that the speed 'on their road' had increased, causing some distress to locals that are not used to fast traffic. Residents also noticed the increase in the amount of traffic that has started moving through the valley. They make mention of the increased quality of the road and also the rise in independent travelling tourists that are frequenting the area. Concerns are voiced, but overall the benefits are seen as positive.

"Our people have to learn to let people come in ... " (MFV-032 Residents Interview, 28-08-02).

This overview is to show the complex nature and intricacies involved in the roading structure. However, from the local viewpoint access and mobility has provided greater
choice for the residents. The people of the valley have seen this as positive. It is one of
the first contributions from the outside to have a positive impact and development for the
community, since the restructuring of the forest service and Governments reforms.
However, reviewing the maintenance history, of the highway, indicates further
retrenchment by Government from its responsibilities in providing resources for the
country to function in a positive and equitable environment.
## Appendix C

**Whanau Support – Community Survey.**

Whanau Support Results Sheet
Household Questionnaire: Minginui Village September 2002

1. Do you mind answering some questions on the household at this address?
   - Yes - 3
   - No - 67
   - n/a - 5
   - Total - 75

2. How long have you been resident in Minginui?
   - 0-5
   - 6-10
   - 11-15
   - 16-20
   - 20+
   - n/a
   - Total - 75

3. If you have returned or moved to the village, where did you move from?
   - BoP
   - North
   - South
   - Overseas
   - n/a
   - (area in respect to Minginui)
   - Total - 75

4. What was your reason for moving to Minginui?
   - Work
   - Family
   - Housing
   - From City
   - n/a
   - Total - 42

5. Do you own your own house?
   - Yes
   - No
   - Rent
   - Whanau
   - n/a
   - Total - 1

6. Are you paying off a mortgage?
   - Yes
   - No
   - n/a
   - Total - 4

7. How many people are living in your house?
   - Adults
   - Young People
   - Total - 193

8. Are the residents of;
   - Maori
   - Pakeha
   - Pacific Is.
   - Total - 111

9. If Maori decent, what iwi affiliation do people hold (Multiple affiliation, eg. N.Whare & Tuhoe)?
   - N. Whare
   - Tuhoe
   - N.Manaw Te Arawa
   - Tainui
   - N. Tuwhar
   - N.Kahanunu
   - Awa
   - Awa
   - Total - 98

10. Do you have land interests in this valley or wider region (Minginui, Ruatahuna, etc.)?
    - Yes
    - No
    - n/a
    - Total - 8
11. Are those land rights with/through;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whare</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuhoe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manaw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainui</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. The adult/s in this house, are they;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-emp</th>
<th>wage/sal</th>
<th>Volunteer</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. How long have they been in present employment?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How long have they been on a benefit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. What skill based training courses have residents attended?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Non-training</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. If an employment opportunity were to be made available, what would you consider a fair and worthwhile income for a 40-hour/week job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$300-399</th>
<th>$400-499</th>
<th>$500-599</th>
<th>$600-699</th>
<th>$700+</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Have you ever been offered opportunity of work while being in the village?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Have you considered moving away from Minginui?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. For what reasons would you leave Minginui?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Tamariki</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. What reasons do you stay in Minginui?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Iwi Affiliation</th>
<th>Life Style</th>
<th>no Alter</th>
<th>Fin on</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Do you feel that you have any voice in the management of the village?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Do you have an understanding on the running & management of the village?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>