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“New” New Zealanders, or Harbingers of a New Transnationalism?

1.5 Generation Asian Migrant Adolescents in New Zealand

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at Massey University, Albany
New Zealand

Allen Bartley
2003
This thesis is concerned with the experiences of acculturation, settlement and ethnic identity formation of a sample of 1.5 generation adolescent migrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, who migrated to New Zealand as children, and who participated in the research as fifteen-to-nineteen year-olds. Advocating a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods as a particularly effective way of ‘doing sociology’, the thesis addresses the experiences of these migrants by exploring their perceptions and assignments of meaning with regard to their own ethnic identity, their sense of belonging and the social distance between themselves and others in New Zealand society; their acculturation experiences and strategies; their relationships with their parents and other family members; and their engagement with the wider community, through participation in clubs and other extra-curricular activities. The thesis posits that the experiences of migrant adolescents have been under-theorised, despite their particular sociological appeal, as they are located at the convergence of a number of different social pressures: between childhood and adulthood; often between their parents and the local community; between origin and host societies; and between competing demands on loyalty and attachment. These particular migrant adolescents are also sociologically interesting as children of highly-skilled, well-educated parents, who possess not only significant economic capital, but also high levels of social capital, and who have employed strategies of transnationalism in order to preserve and enhance these forms of capital. They have maintained their businesses and relationship networks – and sometimes their family homes – in their origin societies, in addition to pursuing forms of settlement and acculturation in New Zealand. With reference to survey and interview data, and drawing on the relevant literature, the thesis explores the meanings, motives and aspirations of migrant adolescents, and problematises conventional explanations of migrant adjustment and settlement. It posits that many 1.5 generation migrant Asian adolescents develop transnational identities through strategies of selective acculturation and aspirations of pursuing educational and occupational opportunities in other overseas destinations. Analysis of the data suggests that these particular migrants possess the cultural, social and economic resources to reproduce their parents’ transnational identities, rather than the conventional and normative model of migrant settlement.
Acknowledgements

In the very early days of my PhD studies, a friend overheard her sons talking with my daughter, just five at the time, about what their respective parents did. The boys talked in some detail about their father, who owns and manages a small furniture manufacturing business. Having been to his workshop many times, they were able to offer a detailed picture of large machines, timber, sawdust, and finished products of tables, chairs, cabinets, hutches, and so forth. When they came to ask my daughter what I did, she said, without ceremony, “Oh, he sits down.” They pressed for details: what did I do while I was sitting down? Did I draw, did I make things, did I talk to people? What did I actually do? Lauren coolly replied, “Nothing. He just sits down.”

During my many hours of sitting down, my wife, Naomi Bartley, has managed our household, provided order, structure and continuity for our children, as well as patient attention well beyond the normal bounds of physical and mental endurance. She has tolerated my preoccupied absentmindedness and the precarious nature of a student’s income for considerably longer than anyone anticipated when we both embarked on full-time study in 1994. Mere ‘acknowledgement’ would be meagre return indeed for expending so much of herself to make up for my ‘sitting down’. She has my deepest gratitude for encouraging (and occasionally urging) me to pursue this goal, for being able to close the office door and leave me to it when she would have preferred to share a cuppa, and for knowing when to draw me out of myself and back into the home and family I love so dearly.

Grateful thanks are also extended to Paul Spoonley and Ann Dupuis for their attentive supervision, despite extremely demanding workloads. I have relished the intellectual engagement into which they have been prepared to enter so willingly, often at considerable inconvenience. From people for whom time is such a valuable commodity, such investment and encouragement – not to mention interest and opportunities for professional development – are an invaluable expression of confidence. I am also grateful for Ann’s insistence that doctoral study is an important
vehicle for addressing questions of how we ‘do’ sociology. The influence of her argument is manifest in this thesis.

I am also indebted to Carl Davidson, a teacher, colleague and friend, for the many weekly coffee dates, during which I was able at times to develop thoughts and test-run ideas, but more often to allow myself to be led across huge expanses of intellectual terrain by one whose free-ranging appetite for knowledge is both astonishing and humbling. I owe him great thanks for expanding the bounds of my thought, and for inspiring me to think of social research as a genuinely fascinating pursuit. I also owe him a great many double-shot latte bowls, and muffins containing anything but blueberries.

Finally, I must gratefully acknowledge the students who took part in the research, as well as the principals, teachers and counsellors at the eight schools in and around Auckland who facilitated my access to the research participants. Without the willing co-operation, good faith, interest and accommodation of individuals such as they, social research of this kind would not be possible. I offer special thanks to Ian Frayling for his generosity in sharing his professional expertise and personal insights into the experiences of Asian migrant adolescents to New Zealand. I am deeply mindful of the commitment, energy and time invested by these and others in the preparation of this thesis.
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7.7 Respondents’ Perceptions of What Was Lost in Moving to New Zealand
I am an American migrant to New Zealand, and am married to a New Zealand Pakeha. We had met and married overseas and, having decided to settle in New Zealand, arrived on Labour Day, 1992. My wife is herself a migrant, and is a child of migrants. Her parents were British colonials in Kenya, and their move to New Zealand, when my wife was still a toddler, brought to three the number of countries, and distinct regions of the world, which they called ‘home’.

As migrants, my wife’s family neatly fit into New Zealand’s historic immigration regime. In 1968, the year they migrated to New Zealand, 16,077 people holding British passports arrived in this country as migrants. For over a hundred years, New Zealand maintained a ‘country of origin’ preference: as a result, immigrants to New Zealand have been overwhelmingly of British and Irish origin. Migrants from the United States, while relatively few (only 762 in 1968), have nonetheless been consistent arrivals to New Zealand since the days before 1840 when whaling ships and seal-hunting expeditions frequented New Zealand waters.

However, due to changes in immigration policy, the cohort of all migrants to New Zealand in 1992, when I first migrated, was dramatically different from those who arrived in 1968 with my wife and her family. Since 1987, many more people from non-European backgrounds have arrived in New Zealand than had ever settled here before.

My arrival in New Zealand as a new permanent resident occurred less than a year before former National Party member and sacked Minister of Maori Affairs Winston Peters launched his new opposition party, New Zealand First. The New Zealand First campaign strategy for the 1993 general election, repeated in 1996 and 2002, was oriented around opposition to immigration and foreign investment. ‘They’ threatened ‘our’ culture, ‘our’ way of life, ‘our’ economic sovereignty.1 On a subjective level, while I was an immigrant, a new resident, and a property owner, I knew on an intuitive

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1 Winston Peters' anti-immigration discourse will be analysed theoretically in Chapter Two.
level that Winston Peters was not talking about me when he referred to foreigners inflating house prices and driving up the interest rates. When Peters – and others – talked about the flood of immigrants, and demanded that something be done about it, I did not feel threatened. When he linked these social problems with the issue of ‘astronaut parents’ or ‘parachute families’, I knew that it was not me he was using to gain political traction. The undercurrents of unease, suspicion or outright hostility to ‘foreigners’ which were moving through New Zealand, and which Mr Peters sought to ride to power, did not threaten me, *because I knew that I was not among the foreigners targeted in his campaign*. He – and others – were talking about Asians; the ‘new’ migrants to New Zealand who had begun arriving since 1987, who were so different from the typical migrants this country had welcomed and assimilated into New Zealand society. How did I, and presumably the thousands of other American, English, Irish, Australian, South African and Dutch migrants living here, know that we were not the subjects of the discussions of the ‘immigrant problem’?

One answer to that question lay in the history of migration already mentioned, and the resulting fact that ‘white’ migrants had been perceived in mostly positive terms throughout the country’s history. There have been exceptions, of course: Dalmatian migrant workers in the nineteenth century were not readily accepted, and were relegated to mostly rural occupations of gum digging and stock herding (Brooking & Rabel 1995:28-9). However, as a ‘white’ migrant in New Zealand, *I blend in* – that is, at least until I speak, and my accent betrays my origins.

The fact that I have been untouched by the racialised anti-‘immigrant’ discourse in the society to which I have migrated has made me both sympathetic and sensitive to non-European and non-Polynesian migrants in New Zealand. Since living here, I have wondered about how their reception by the host society – so different from my own – has affected their experiences of adjustment and settlement in their new country.

This thesis represents the first opportunity for me to explore those questions seriously and methodically.
Introduction

During the last twenty years or more, the extent of global migration has been unprecedented. Castles and Miller (1998:5) put the number of ‘recent’ international migrants at 120 million. While the movements of voluntary and involuntary migrants, as well as refugees, leave almost no country unaffected, those understood to be traditional immigration countries of the New World – such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – as well as the liberal democracies in Europe, have experienced dramatic changes in both the numbers and origins of those knocking on their doors (Bauböck 1996). Since the mid-1980s, the majority of migrants to New Zealand have been from countries in Asia, making them significantly different from those who had traditionally been assumed to be the ‘preferred’ sort of immigrant: white, preferably Western European, most preferably British (Ongley & Pearson 1995).

In New Zealand, the fourth Labour government abandoned the explicit preference for ‘migrants from traditional origins’ – meaning British – only in 1987. In 1991 a ‘points’ system was added, which severed the direct link between immigration and the labour market, and instead gave preference to applicants on the basis of age, qualifications, occupation, business skills, and available investment capital (Ip 1996:126). In liberalising immigration policies in this way, New Zealand was following the pattern set by Canada and Australia. The primary rationale for the shift towards a more open policy in each of these countries was to attract trading relationships and investment capital from Asia as a way of stimulating sluggish economies (ibid. 786-7; Wong 1995: 470; Ho, Bedford & Goodwin 1997: 42).
As a result of the changes in immigration policy in the last two decades, New Zealand has experienced a dramatic influx of highly skilled, professional and/or wealthy migrants from countries across Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, China and India. The number of New Zealand residency approvals granted to people from only three of these countries (Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) over the 15-year period preceding the beginning of my research illustrates the result of these policy changes (Table 1.1). While the figures given refer to approvals for residence rather than actual arrivals, the steady increase in the number of residency approvals from these three countries alone – and particularly the figures post-1991, after the points system had been introduced – indicates both the effectiveness of the prior discriminatory policy and the expression of interest in a more open policy by professional and/or wealthy prospective migrants in Asia. The drop between 1995 and 1997 is also noteworthy, corresponding both to the Asian economic downturn and Asian concerns about the ascension to the Government benches of Winston Peters, whose influence in the immigration debate will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 1.1
Number of People Approved for Residence in New Zealand by Nationality, 1983-97

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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6706</td>
<td>2926</td>
<td>3023</td>
<td>763</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>2682</td>
<td>3394</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>2505</td>
<td>12,253</td>
<td>493</td>
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Source: New Zealand Department of Labour

The phenomenon of international migration – as well as the consequent issues related to the incorporation of migrants into a given society, and the ‘problem’ of managing cultural diversity – have always been of great sociological interest. The sociology of immigration has been an important specialty within the discipline since the days of Robert Park and the Chicago School after the first World War, and Park’s views on assimilation continue to wield considerable influence. As both a sociologist and a migrant with New Zealand-born children, there is a certain understandable affinity to my interest in immigration as an engaging field of sociological enquiry.
This thesis focuses on two areas of interest within the sociology of immigration that have recently attracted the attention of theorists and researchers. The first is the sociological significance of the children of migrants, and especially of those who migrated as school-aged children, known as the 1.5 generation. The emerging interest in this special class of migrants is demonstrated by the large proportion of the references cited in this thesis which were published only after my research had begun in 1999. My initial aim in undertaking this thesis was to explore the experiences of 1.5 generation Asian adolescents because they are sociologically interesting – they are part of the phenomenon of ‘new’ migrants who have arrived in New Zealand post-1987, which makes them culturally different from the vast majority of historical migrants. The 1.5 generation are particularly interesting because their position within their families and within society places them at the convergence of a number of social forces. This convergence is characterised in the thesis as ‘in-betweenness’. They are situated between their countries of origin and residence; they are between childhood and adulthood, they are often between their parents and the host society, and in New Zealand they are between the Pākehā majority and Māori, the indigenous, dominant ethnic minority.

The research that forms the basis of this exploration into the experiences and perceptions of 1.5 generation Asian adolescents was conducted towards the end of 1999. Detailed in Chapter Three, the process of gathering the data comprised three stages, using three different techniques. First was a survey of 121 students in eight secondary schools around Auckland. These quantitative data were augmented by two follow-up semi-structured group interviews, which were themselves followed by further one-on-one interviews with selected individuals.

The second major interest addressed by the thesis began to emerge during the research process. Conventional explanations and policies which presumed permanent settlement and assimilationist pressures became problematised as I engaged both with the experiences of the 1.5 generation migrants who took part in the research, and with the literature. This emergent theme concerns the explanatory and theoretical possibilities presented by the concept of transnational migration as an intergenerational migration and acculturation strategy.
Since the early 1990s, a growing number of theorists have begun to question the applicability of assimilation theories to the experiences of migrants who maintain “simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society” (Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:48). According to these theorists, cross-border lifestyles characterised by “the high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis” (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999:219) are better conceptualised as transnational migration, or transmigration. Although readily picked up and extended by others since Glick Schiller, Portes and their respective associates began promoting the concept, it has not been universally embraced as a legitimate theoretical construct. One of the lingering questions about transnational migration as a concept to explain a migration strategy is whether such a strategy is able to be sustained and reproduced generationally. This thesis is well-placed to contribute to that discussion in the context of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in New Zealand.

**The Role of New Zealand**

The fact that this thesis is sited in New Zealand is purely incidental: New Zealand is where I live and study. On the other hand, a more ideal setting for such a study would be difficult to find. As introduced briefly above, and presented in detail in the next chapter, the 1987 changes to New Zealand’s immigration policies, and the resulting shift in the demographic profile of new migrants to New Zealand, is sociologically significant for several reasons. The new policy reversed over a hundred years of immigration policies based on an explicit country-of-origin preference for migrants from Britain, and has reflected more recent governments’ efforts to realign New Zealand’s cultural and economic focus away from Europe and towards Asia and the Pacific. The changes have challenged the New Zealand state to address the difficult task of managing greater cultural diversity than previously known in this country, and to do so within a social policy framework explicitly oriented not to multiculturalism, but rather to biculturalism, in light of the Crown’s on-going bicultural partnership with Māori via the Treaty of Waitangi.
**Doing Sociology**

The process of doctoral study presents an important opportunity to reflect on the practice of sociological enquiry and theorising. Conscious of the need to justify one’s choices and decisions at every step in the process, the doctoral candidate is likely to consider especially critically all options and perspectives before committing a number of years – and possibly one’s future trajectories – to the pursuit of a particular form of knowledge. However, far from making a virtue out of necessity, the reflection on ‘doing’ sociology is a significant component of this thesis. I have relied on Alford’s (1998) conceptualisation of dialectical analysis as a way of formally structuring what might otherwise be an intuitive and purely pragmatic preference for a mixed-methods approach to social research. An approach to research that utilises both quantitative and qualitative methods is increasingly understood to be not merely a valid, but a preferred strategy for linking the macro – the sweep of history and the structures and institutions operating within and across societies – with the meanings, contexts and textures as played out in individuals, families and communities. This would seem to embody Mills’ conceptualisation of the sociological imagination as grasping the intersection of history and biography (Mills 1959:5-8).

**Thesis Structure**

The thesis is organised as follows. Chapters Two and Three provide the historical and theoretical groundwork for the thesis. In Chapter Two the focus is on the history of New Zealand immigration policies and their impact on both historical and contemporary society in New Zealand. This material is presented with comparative reference to Australia and Canada. Those two Commonwealth countries are often grouped with the United States as classical, English-speaking, New World countries of immigration (Castles & Miller 1993:5, 99). With a current population of fewer than four million, New Zealand often does not gain consideration with larger states when the global movement of peoples is concerned. However, since the 1840s, nation-building in New Zealand has relied heavily on immigration, and continues to do so today. The material presented in Chapter Two compares, with reference to the literature, the policy history of New Zealand with those of Australia and Canada, and addresses briefly the measures taken by the latter two states in managing the incorporation of new migrants in
multicultural societies. Australia and Canada, as Commonwealth countries that have similar histories of nation-building through immigration (Ongley & Pearson 1995), share with New Zealand both the historic practice of restricting Asian immigration, and the subsequent dismantling of race-based immigration policies in favour of multicultural, human-capital immigration. Canada and Australia both have pursued policy frameworks based on the principle of multiculturalism, which will be analysed briefly. As alluded to above, I argue that New Zealand faces unique challenges with respect to multiculturalism, and must rely on the development of unique solutions to the 'problem' of social cohesion in a culturally diverse society.

Chapter Three extends the discussion of the incorporation of migrants, to address the theoretical approaches used by social theorists to explain migrant incorporation in receiving societies. Two major themes are raised in this chapter. The first is that the concept of transnational migration is an increasingly important theoretical approach to describe and explain the experiences of a growing number of contemporary migrants. This is primarily because the concept takes into account the problematic assumption of permanent or long-term settlement inherent in conventional explanations under the rubric of assimilation. The chapter's second theme is the need for theorists and researchers to incorporate an interpretive approach when theorising transnational migration. This becomes especially important when exploring the transnational possibilities embodied in the children of migrants. On the basis of their decisions to settle, return, on-migrate, or carry on some continuing form of transmigration, members of the 1.5 generation are the migrants who will determine the viability in New Zealand of explanations based on transnationalism.

Chapter Four is a statement on 'doing' sociology, and presents a reflexive account of my emerging philosophy as a social researcher. This includes the commitment to an approach based on the integrated use of multiple research methods, described by Alford (1998) as 'dialectical analysis'. It also entails an ethical position with regard to research participants, presented in that chapter as expert correspondents in their habitats of meaning. Hannerz's (1996) intellectual construct of the habitat of meaning is developed as a means of conceptualising the subjective field in which the meanings assigned to social actors' lived experiences are worked out. From the starting-point of 'doing' sociology in general terms, the chapter ends with the presentation of how I 'did'
sociology in this instance, with a reflexive discussion of the development of the methods used to undertake the research that underpins this thesis.

The following four chapters are each organised around one or more of the major indicators that drove the quantitative research design. Given the interplay of considerations and themes across the data, the application of any organising framework is bound to impose a structure of divisions and classifications that appear artificial or forced. I have minimised that tension by following the logic of discovery. That is, I have used as the organising framework for presenting the data analysis the five major indicators that were developed for operationalising the initial phase of data collection, the survey. While there is still a great degree of interplay amongst the quantitative and qualitative data that extends across the four chapters, which I signal throughout the discussion, each chapter both addresses the data produced by the particular indicators, and also adds to the cumulative picture. Chapter Five presents the dialectical analysis of two related indicators: Ethnic Identity, and Ethnic Dissociation. These data are foundational to the thesis, as they establish several critical themes, incorporated into each of the remaining data analysis chapters, that suggest the significance of theoretical approaches that privilege migrants’ habitats of meaning. The themes that emerged are that the formation of migrant identities are influenced by the meaning given to legal and administrative considerations, such as citizenship, and by essentialist notions of identity, such as ‘Asianness’; that cultural adjustment and acquisition are idiosyncratic processes, at times conscious and deliberate, and at other times less so; and that acculturation is a relational process, in which outcomes are strongly influenced by both relational dynamics, such as belonging, and by migrants’ own motives and aspirations, which develop in relation to others.

In Chapter Six the Acculturation Indicator data, and the interview data they inspired, are addressed. The analysis of the quantitative data regarding cultural adjustment, such as language acquisition, is integrated with the emphasis on the meanings assigned to those adjustments provided by the qualitative data. Taken together, the data suggest that while all participants undertook adjustments, and most had determined that migration to New Zealand was a good idea, their sense of belonging in New Zealand – and of New Zealand as ‘home’ – was characterised by ambivalence and contingency. That is, many felt ‘neither here nor there’, and although most felt that New Zealand was home 'for
now’, they intended to leave New Zealand to pursue educational and career opportunities in other destinations.

Chapter Seven focuses on the family relationships of the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents. The discussion centres around the opportunities for significant intergenerational tensions to emerge when established roles and normal patterns of family interaction are disrupted by international migration. The data highlight that participants’ family relationships were generally characterised by generational consonance rather than dissonance, despite the fact that many participants considered that their parents suffered substantial losses in migrating to New Zealand. These losses are conceptualised as resulting from an unfavourable ‘exchange rate’ for the various forms of non-economic capital – human, social and cultural – that has limited the value, in New Zealand, of their parents’ skills, educational qualifications, social status and fluency in their origin language. Ironically, such a serious loss for their parents was interpreted by several participants as a gain for themselves: performing as cultural brokers for their parents – effectively mediating between their parents and the wider community – helped them to develop maturity, confidence and skills, as well as a privileged insight into their parents’ lives. The chapter contributes to the discussion of the ambivalence and contingence of participants’ outlook by suggesting that uncertainty regarding their parents’ long-term aspirations problematises for these migrant adolescents any sense of where their ‘family home’ may be located in the future.

The final data analysis chapter, Chapter Eight, presents the analysis of the data relating to participants’ social integration, via their involvement in clubs and other extra-curricular activities in the community. The major theme of the chapter is the apparent contradiction in these data, that extensive social integration did not correlate with participants’ sense of identity or belonging. This is the point at which the other elements of the data analysis chapters are brought to their culmination, as I argue that the apparently incongruous data may be explained most effectively if they are interpreted as representing a strategy of transnational migration. The contradictions are able to be resolved within such a perspective, as transnational participants’ reluctance to embrace a New Zealand-oriented identity, and their intentions to leave New Zealand in the future, would not prevent them from actively seeking to engage with the host society, to make friends, to adjust to the culture, and to excel at school. On the
contrary, those activities would enlarge their cultural repertoires, and contribute positively to a strategy of transmigration.
Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to set out the historic context in which contemporary issues of immigration to New Zealand – particularly of the ‘new’ Asian immigration – are established. It is largely descriptive, with a focus on the policy environment, in terms of the changes to New Zealand immigration policies, and of questions regarding the state’s management of the incorporation of new migrants. These questions are addressed with comparison to Australia and Canada. Given their histories as settler societies and former British colonies, the three ‘white dominions’ share comparable immigration histories. While each has specific features that makes it different from the other two, New Zealand is unique in the relative homogeneity of its historic immigration stream. The policies and practices in New Zealand of both preference (for some) and exclusion (of others) have been so consistent and uniformly embedded as to form a structure of immigration. This structure was fully formalised by 1920, with the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act, and only completely dismantled in the 1987 Immigration Act. The dismantling was decisive: during 1986 and 1987 the changes to New Zealand’s immigration policies overturned more than a hundred years of discriminatory immigration policies based on limiting the numbers of non-British and non-Irish migrants, and almost completely excluding Asians. These changes were so substantive as to not only dismantle the historic structure of immigration, but also to transform to New Zealand’s immigration stream, and to alter significantly the ethnic distribution of New Zealand’s resident population. To illustrate the scope of the changes, the number
of New Zealand residents categorised as ‘Asian’ in the 1986 Census\(^2\) was just under 48,000 (just 1.5 percent of the population); this number grew nearly four hundred percent, to over 237,000 (more than 6 percent of the population), by 2001. With this growth, the pan-ethnic grouping of Asians replaced the similarly pan-ethnic grouping of Pacific peoples, as New Zealand’s third-largest ‘ethnic’ category (Table 2.1).

### Table 2.1

**Major Ethnic Groups in New Zealand, 1986 and 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2,650,845</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>404,775</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Peoples</td>
<td>119,370</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>47,979</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>40,314</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Statistics New Zealand

- Includes all of the people who stated each ethnic group, whether as their only ethnic group or as one of several ethnic groups. Where a person reported more than one ethnic group, they have been counted in each applicable group. As a result, the sum of the proportions exceeds 100%.

- All categories that produced fewer than 1,000 responses were re-grouped as ‘Other’.

After describing both the historic structure of New Zealand immigration, and the policy shift that dislodged it, this chapter will address the significant challenge to social cohesion introduced by greater ethnic diversity, which must be managed by the state. The discussion brings two related components of social cohesion into focus: the reactions by the host society to the presence of new and ethnically dissimilar migrants, and the incorporation of those migrants into the society. The sudden growth in the numbers of new migrants from Asia after 1987 has often been portrayed in popular discourse as a threat to New Zealand’s economic and cultural sovereignty, and to New Zealanders’ safety and security. This sense of threat found its most prominent articulation in Winston Peters, a number of whose speeches are analysed briefly in light

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\(^2\) Those placed in Statistic New Zealand’s category ‘Asian’ included: Asian (not further defined), Bangladeshi, Chinese (not further defined), Fijian Indian/Indo-Fijian, Filipino, Indian (not further defined), Indonesian (including Javanese/Sundanese/Sumatran), Japanese, Khmer/Kampuchean/Cambodian, Korean, Lao/Laoisian, Malay/Malayan, Other Asian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan (not further defined), Taiwanese Chinese, Thai/Tai/Siamese, Vietnamese.
of the ‘new’ racism (Barker 1981). The last part of the chapter deals with states’ efforts to manage cultural diversity. Again, comparisons with Canada and Australia are useful, given both the similar histories of immigration policies and the strong assimilationist discourses that dominated in all three countries until well after the second World War. Since the 1960s, both Canada and Australia have adopted multiculturalism as official government policy, and the discussion briefly traces the development of the various forms of multiculturalism, and multicultural citizenship, as they have emerged in the policies of those two countries. In this respect also, New Zealand is unique, as the New Zealand state’s bicultural relationship with Māori, formalised in the Treaty of Waitangi, has resulted in a policy framework informed by notions of biculturalism. An increasingly multicultural population problematises this bicultural framework. However, given both the hegemonic power of the assimilationist discourse in New Zealand with regard to historic immigration policies, and the Treaty relationship with New Zealand’s indigenous population, policy approaches to manage greater cultural diversity in New Zealand must rely on unique solutions, or novel adaptations to solutions implemented elsewhere.

This chapter and the next form two parts of a whole. By introducing the history of immigration policy and practice in New Zealand, as well as describing the social policy challenges which confront the state’s management of ethnic diversity, this chapter sets the groundwork for the following chapter. While the focus of this chapter is on the policy environment, the discussion in the next chapter addresses how sociologists theorise contemporary migration experiences. Of particular importance, given the subject of this thesis, is the debate over how to best theorise the experiences of the children of adult migrants, described as the second generation and – when those children participated in the migration as well, rather than being born in the destination country – the 1.5 generation. The end of that chapter completes the circle, as it were, by focusing all the aspects of the discussion to that point – the policies, issues and theories – on the experiences of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in New Zealand.

**New Zealand Immigration Policies – A Brief History**

To gain some sense of the magnitude of the changes introduced in New Zealand by the 1986 Ministerial Review of immigration policy and the 1987 Immigration Act, one
must have an understanding of what had existed previously. In 1840, when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed by Governor William Hobson, representing Queen Victoria, and 500 Maori representatives of iwi (tribes), there were only about 2,000 British subjects in New Zealand. They were whalers, traders, escaped convicts from Australia and missionaries, as well as some settlers (Burns 1989:78). Colonial settlement, which had already begun, was formally brought under the governance of the British Crown, which used its formal sovereignty to buy huge tracts of land, which was then sold to settlers and entrepreneurs (Walker 1990:105-6). These settlers came almost exclusively from Australia, Britain and Ireland, and by 1860 (Pool 1991:61) their population equalled that of the tangata whenua (“people of the land”, the people of a given place).

"Whiter than White" Immigration Policy

The first organised group of Chinese migrants arrived in New Zealand from Australia in 1866, invited by the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce to work as miners in the Otago goldfields (Ip 1990:13). By 1871 public criticism of the presence of Chinese migrants was sufficient to prompt a Parliamentary Select Committee on Chinese Immigration (ibid.:14; O’Connor 1968:42). Though that committee determined there was no need for action to be taken to restrict Chinese immigration to New Zealand, within ten years the government had passed the Anti-Chinese Act, which imposed a £10 poll tax on each Chinese immigrant (roughly equivalent to a waterside worker’s monthly income), and restricted their arrival numbers by specifying that no more than one Chinese would be accepted for every ten tons of weight on all arriving vessels. The New Zealand census conducted during the same year showed that the Chinese comprised a mere 1.02 percent of the total population (ibid.).

Those restrictions were maintained for the next forty years. At various times they were made even more onerous, with the intention of prohibiting, rather than merely restricting, the migration of the Chinese to New Zealand. Of course the Chinese were not the only targets of discriminatory rhetoric and policy. In fact, the net was thrown even wider than the “Asiatics”, which included all Asians, including Indians – variously referred to as “Assyrians” and “Hindus” – who migrated from Fiji after completing
contracts as indentured labourers (O’Connor 1968:47). Southern Europeans, from Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece, were also targeted. The 1889 Kauri Gum Industry Act was specifically enacted to discourage “Dalmatian” immigration, by reserving the gum fields “for the exclusive use of naturalised British subjects” (Brooking & Rabel 1995:28). Then in 1920, the Dominion government devised “a splendid essay at legislation – achieving all the powers for the maintenance of a white New Zealand, without any ugly stigma of ‘racialism’ being attached to it” (Brawley 1995:63). The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1920 stated that those people who were not of British or Irish parentage and birth could migrate only if they submitted a postal application to do so. Approval of such applications was at the sole discretion of the Minister of Customs, who was not required to offer an explanation for any rejected applications. The appearance of magnanimousness was supported by the repeal of both the ‘Natal test’ and the objectionable practise of thumb-printing only Chinese migrants, though the poll tax and shipping restrictions remained in force until 1934 (Ip 1990:177).

The discriminatory approach taken by New Zealand was far more subtle than those adopted by other dominions such as Australia, Canada and South Africa. All these continued to employ the ‘Natal test’, which required prospective migrants to demonstrate aptitude in any European language (Brawley 1995:49). To ensure the effectiveness of the policy, the New Zealand government had earlier been advised by the Colonial Secretary “that the best results from a language test [as applied in Australia] could be obtained if Customs officers were empowered to demand a knowledge of any European language they chose, or all of them if necessary” (O’Connor 1968:50). The subtlety was required both to make the immigration restrictions acceptable to the Imperial government, which faced complaints from India and elsewhere across the Empire, and to deflect direct criticism from the increasingly indignant governments of China and Japan. Ironically, such criticism was attracted by Australia for its ‘White Australia’ policy, which in its acceptance of Southern and

3 These restrictions were particularly galling for the Indians who were, after all, British subjects. O’Connor notes the resentment of the Indian government – particularly on behalf of the Indian elite, “that, while they can move freely in the best society of any European capital, they could not set foot in some of the dominions without undergoing vexatious catechisms from petty officials” (O’Connor 1968:47). The Imperial government pressured New Zealand politicians continuously during this period to avoid legislation that specifically targeted “Hindoos” (ibid.:48). The Imperial government’s threat – and occasionally the act – of withholding the royal assent prevented the passage of exclusionary legislation that London found particularly offensive (O’Connor 1968:43).
Eastern Europeans was actually more liberal than New Zealand’s ‘British only’ preference. New Zealand was content to exploit the illusory difference between its immigration policies and those of its ‘benighted’ neighbour (O’Connor 1968:65) well into the 1960s, however: politicians and public officials would flatly deny that New Zealand’s policy was discriminatory (Brawley 1995:270), or go so far as to proclaim, as Prime Minister Fraser did in Ceylon in 1948, that there was no discrimination against Indians in New Zealand “because no white policy on Australian lines operated there” (quoted in Brawley 1995:264). Rather than the ‘white’ policy overtly expressed by Australia, New Zealand can be said to have had a shrewder, ‘whiter than white’ policy (Brooking & RabeI 1995:39).

The structure of New Zealand immigration remained stable well into the 1960s, based on the near-exclusive preference for Britons and Australians, with an occasional influx from other ‘white’ migrants from the Commonwealth, Northern Europe and North America. However, there was some periodic softening of attitudes towards Asians. For example, Chinese migrants were given a somewhat more favourable acceptance after World War II, given the collaboration of China in the war against Japan, and again after the communist takeover of China, when it was recognised that many Chinese might prefer to remain in New Zealand, or be unable to return to China. This caused the New Zealand government in 1952 to restore to Chinese the right to seek naturalisation in New Zealand, which had been denied to them 44 years earlier (Ip 1990:178; McKinnon 1996:40-41). However, even into the 1970s, the entry of ‘race-aliens’ (that is, anyone not of European stock) into New Zealand essentially was limited to those who already had family ties here (McKinnon 1996:42-43). The 1976 New Zealand Census indicated that the Chinese population comprised 1,653 – just 0.053% of the total population of over three million (New Zealand Official Yearbook [NZOYB] 1977:82).

Exceptional during this period was the labour migration from the Pacific Islands, predominantly from the New Zealand ‘territories’ and ‘former territories’ of Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands (Macpherson 1996:124-5). These migrants, along with the urban migration of Mão (Davis 1984:146), supplied much of the semi-skilled and unskilled labour for New Zealand’s burgeoning post-war industries. Between active recruitment of labour migrants, particularly for work in the manufacturing sector, and the process of chain migration (Appleyard & Stahl 1995:16-
18; Macpherson 1996:125), the population of Pacific peoples in New Zealand by 1976 was 65,694 – two percent of the total New Zealand population, and forty times greater than the Chinese population. However, during the severe economic downturn in the 1970s, caused by the dual blows of oil crises and the loss of protected export markets when Britain joined the EEC, Pacific peoples were thrust into unemployment and racialised as a ‘problem’ – as gang members, ‘overstayers’ (i.e., migrants who illegally overstay their residency permits) and “violent people who broke the law and who took jobs away from ‘New Zealanders’” (Appleyard & Stahl 1996:18; Spoonley 1996:64).

Radical Policy Shift and Demographic Implications

In fact, Britain’s severing of the traditional ties of economic patronage in 1973 was one of the major factors that caused New Zealand to redirect its orientation away from the United Kingdom and Europe, and towards Asia and the Pacific. Brawley (1995) argues that, as the restriction and exclusion of Asian migrants were such important policies in Australia, Canada and the United States, as well as in New Zealand, such imperatives shaped the foreign relations policies of these countries. In New Zealand in the 1970s, however, the need to improve relations with the promising emergent markets in Asia provided the impetus to restructure immigration policy. Those who advocated looking to Asia to bolster the economic prosperity of New Zealanders made the link to immigration explicit. Insisted Norman Kirk, Prime Minister from 1972 to 1974, “New Zealand’s future lay with Asia and the Pacific. It is vitally necessary to establish sincerity in the eyes of Asians. A fair and just immigration policy would be a way of showing good faith” (quoted in Brawley 1995:321). Another pragmatic commentator noted, “if New Zealand wishes to expand her markets in South East Asia, it may be advisable to allow a good number of people from that region to come to New Zealand so that contacts with these countries can be safely built on knowledge and close relations’ (ibid.).

The traditional country-of-origin preference and Ministerial discretion remained intact until 1987. However, a shift was signalled the year before, with the release of a White Paper from the then-Minister of Immigration, Kerry Burke. The White Paper, a Ministerial Review of immigration policy, distanced the government from the long-
practised country-of-origin preference (Burke 1996:15), and instead presented as an objective:

> to enrich the multicultural social fabric of New Zealand society through the selection of new settlers principally on the strength of their personal contribution to the future well-being of New Zealand (Burke 1996:10).

Gone was the assumption that migrants from Britain were inherently more desirable than others. Also missing from the new policy was the explicit and over-riding concern for migrants’ ability to assimilate into the dominant culture – one reason for earlier preference for the Dutch and Scandinavians as “second-tier” European migrants. Instead, economic capital and human capital – in the form of educational qualifications and professional experience – were desirable traits. For the first time in New Zealand, multiculturalism became a normative feature of the social landscape.

Under the Act, the Occupational Priority List (OPL) continued to be the mechanism for approval for most migrants, but the opportunities presented by the list could now be filled by anyone with the skills to do so (NZOYB 1988-89:202-203). The OPL was updated at six-monthly intervals according to information supplied to the Department of Labour by manufacturers, employers and unions. Prospective migrants needed to show evidence of a job offer by a New Zealand employer, and skills which were in demand in New Zealand, as indicated by the OPL (Hurrelle 1988:539). While the country of origin was no longer a limiting factor for these migrants, the Review introduced two other hurdles, which were criticised at the time as “modified source country preferences” (Bedford, Farmer & Trlin 1987:53). These were a requirement for all applicants and their families to be subject to a personal interview, to assess various criteria, including skills, work history, language ability, and so forth. The second criterion was that English language capacity for all applicants, their spouses and children over twelve years old would be considered a “significant element” in their capacity to settle well in New Zealand. According to the Review, “to understand those rules and to make their place in their new homeland, it is important that they should have adequate English language skills and then be able to communicate with the wider New Zealand community” (ibid.). The point of contention was not whether such language skills were valuable or important, but whether they should be so important as
to be a prerequisite for arrival, rather than a goal for migrants to achieve after their arrival.

The other significant shift signalled in the Review was the introduction of the Business Immigration Policy. Applicants under this scheme, who demonstrated "proven ability" as business or self-employed people, could obtain permanent residence on the strength of an intended business proposal and at least $150,000 capital "to meet initial personal establishment costs" (Hurrelle 1988:542; NZOYB 1988-89:206; Trlin & Kang 1992).

The significance of the 1986 Review and the 1987 Act is difficult to overstate. It were as though the desire, some fifteen years prior, of the late Norman Kirk – Prime Minister of the third Labour government – for an economic alignment with Asia and a "fair and just immigration policy", had finally prevailed. With this single piece of legislation the fifth Labour government confirmed New Zealand's economic realignment away from Britain and towards the economies of east Asia and the Pacific. The Act also overturned 106 years of discriminatory immigration policies, and began to alter radically the structure of New Zealand immigration. Its effect on the ethnic composition of the New Zealand population was almost immediate: in 1991, just five years after the radical policy shift, the population of Chinese in New Zealand reached 44,793 (Statistics New Zealand 2001). Though just 1.3 percent of the total population, the growth in the fifteen years since 1975 (from 1,653 – a more than 2600 percent increase) was phenomenal.

The changes in the structure of New Zealand immigration follows similar, though not so dramatic, policy changes in Australia and Canada (Atchison 1988). Ongley and Pearson (1995) argue that the three countries share comparable aspects of nation-building and immigration policy histories. Of course, these are notwithstanding the very significant differences in the extent to which the three states have engaged the indigenous populations and other minority populations within their borders, and the methods they have used in so doing. Ongley and Pearson point to the fact that the three were largely British settler societies which required large-scale immigration to meet economic demands, particularly after World War II, when growth in the British economy led to a shortage of British migrants, so heavily relied upon by all three. Canada, like Australia and New Zealand, had a "whites only" policy, enshrined in
legislation since 1910 (Ongley & Pearson 1995:770). Ongley and Pearson, and others, make the point that for all three states, the dismantling of such discriminatory measures was driven primarily by the need for migrants to fill critical labour shortages and, more recently, to fuel domestic consumption and economic investment (ibid.:787; Castles 1992b:551; Fleras & Elliot 1999:263). This argument is supported by Birrell, who points out that when the post-war nation-building and population-building programme undertaken by the Australian state was extended to unskilled and low-skilled workers from Eastern and Southern Europe, it risked threatening the historic accommodation between workers and capital that had protected Australian workers for thirty years (Birrell 1994:108-9). Passaris suggests that the cultural and ‘racial’ diversity of Canada’s post-war immigration “heralded the triumph of economics over discrimination” (Passaris 1984:90-91).

Some time after dropping the overtly discriminatory selection criteria, all three countries also introduced ‘points’ systems as a way to formally assess the mix of skills, qualifications, experience, capital and other qualities presented by prospective migrants. Table 2.2 illustrates the timeframe in which each change was introduced. In the case of New Zealand, the ‘points’ system replaced the OPL, which was directly linked by the Department of Labour to specific skills shortages in the New Zealand labour market. The ‘points’ system removed this link, opting instead for a more generalised requirement for migrants to possess a mix of economic and human capital. Ongley and Pearson suggest that each of the three states altered their policies only when recourse to traditional immigrant sources could not meet their labour market demands: the relative recency New Zealand’s transition to a non-discriminatory immigration regime reflects both the country’s smaller population and modest demands for migrants – relative to the two larger countries compared – and New Zealand’s relationship with the island nations in the South Pacific (Ongley & Pearson 1995:773). The similarities between the three countries – climate notwithstanding – and their immigration criteria mean that they now compete in the global market for the same highly educated, skilled professionals, entrepreneurs and investors (Rogers 1998:210).

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4 In New Zealand, the link between labour market demand and immigration is manifest by the fact that the New Zealand Immigration Service is an agency nested within the New Zealand Department of Labour.
Table 2.2
Removal of ‘Country-of-Origin’ and Racial Restrictions on Immigration: Canada, Australia and New Zealand Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Discriminatory Categories Removed</th>
<th>‘Points’ System Introduced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, New Zealand’s history of immigration policies that discriminated against, and effectively excluded, Asians was similar to those enforced in Australia and Canada. However, the structure of New Zealand immigration prior to 1986 was notably more narrow and homogeneous than either of the other two countries. Historically, New Zealand, like Australia and Canada, ‘managed’ the incorporation of migrants through assimilationist policies. Until after World War II, the main strategy employed by all three states to accomplish assimilation was a series of immigration restrictions. In Australia and Canada, the restrictions took the form of a ‘whites only’ policy. In New Zealand, however, until the 1960s the restriction of immigrants was much more tightly focused, in order to more exactly match the settler population. Here, the goal was not merely ‘whites only’, but rather, ‘British only’, with a concession being made to include the Irish. The exception to the homogeneity of New Zealand’s immigrant population was the labour migration from the Pacific Islands. However, amidst the economic downturn experienced by New Zealand in the 1970s, these migrants became racialised in ways reminiscent of the anti-Asian discourses during the previous century. The radical shift in New Zealand immigration policies since 1987, to attract investment capital and highly skilled migrants from across Asia has, in a very short period of time, had a dramatic impact on the ethnic composition of the New Zealand population.

Challenges of Social Cohesion

This second major section of the chapter examines two related issues that arise from the greatly increased ethnic diversity, and which pose challenges to a popular sense of
social cohesion. These include the reactions from the host society to greater ethnic
diversity, manifested by the greater number of migrants who are culturally and – of no
small significance – phenotypically different from both the dominant culture and
significant minority groups. Vertovec describes the notion of social cohesion as implying “the presence of basic patterns of cooperative social interaction and core sets
of collective values” (Vertovec 1999:xii). Vertovec also suggests that, powerful though
the ideal of social cohesion may be, it tends to be invoked only in its absence, and for
many evokes a nostalgic, Gemeinschaft-like ideal of simple homogeneity (ibid.). On
the other hand, as McAndrew and Weinfeld point out, the insertion into a society of
groups that are significantly culturally different may challenge “the more general
notion, which societies have, of the ties that must bind its members” (McAndrew &
Weinfeld 1997:3). The mere suggestion that these ties should be presented for scrutiny,
much less be put up for grabs, may be sufficient to create a negative reaction amongst
conservative elements within the dominant ethnic groups in the host society. The
discussion first addresses such negative host society reactions as being, in themselves, a
threat to social cohesion. Concerns in New Zealand about the scale of immigration, and
the impact that new migrants have on regional infrastructure when migrant populations
are concentrated in a region such as Auckland, have been exploited by alarmist
headlines and opportunist politicians to create the impression that migrants pose a
threat to New Zealand society. After briefly analysing the threat discourse, I discuss the
challenge, confronting the state, of incorporating migrants into the receiving society.
Australian and Canadian forms of multiculturalism are contrasted with New Zealand’s
bicultural policy framework and, with reference to Soysal’s ‘regimes of incorporation’,
I suggest limitations, as well as considerable strengths, in New Zealand’s approach to
the incorporation of the ‘new’(post-1987), culturally-diverse migrants.

Host Society Reactions to Increased Ethnic Diversity

Given the conspicuous shift in the ethnic profile of immigrants after 1987, it is not
surprising that the policy changes were greeted with concern and resistance by various
individuals and groups within the host society. Most of the effects of east Asian
immigration were seen in Auckland, where most of these ‘new’ migrants chose to settle.
This was readily apparent in the real estate boom, particularly in Auckland’s eastern
suburbs, where very large and expensive homes were built in developments catering to
tastes and styles tested through market research in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and influenced by *feng shui* consultants (Gordon and Reynolds 1998). Suburbs such as Howick, one preferred destination of Asian migrants, were derisively referred to with Asian-sounding names like “Chowick”, and “The Far Eastern Suburbs” (McLauchlan 1991).

Given that the changes to immigration policy were just one element in the then-Labour government’s strategy to deregulate and internationalise the economy, it should be noted that, during the same period, the rules governing foreign investment were also liberalised. Commentators within the business and financial sectors were generally in favour of increased foreign investment, and did not seem troubled about where it would come from (Irving 1989:14-21). However, investment and immigration were often conflated in public debate, and the tenor of the resistance to the new Asian immigration (quickly dubbed “The Asian Invasion”) most frequently was alarmist. Asian immigration was represented as a threat, and stories in the print media emphasised this threat with sensationalist headlines that played on racialised types and heightened tensions. The Asian threat was represented on several fronts. Asians were characterised as a threat to New Zealand’s sovereignty, New Zealand ‘culture’, public safety and order. First, the threat was to New Zealand’s sovereignty, both economic (through greater foreign ownership of assets and shares in the New Zealand stock market) and cultural (as a result of greater numbers of residents whose language was not English, evidenced by the proliferation of foreign-language shop-front signs).

Headlines sensationalised the threat of crime, particularly playing on the fear that triad gangs could possibly be operating in New Zealand, evading the country’s security and police forces. One news story, which appeared in Wellington’s daily paper, *The Dominion*, reported the conviction of three men on charges of importing two kilograms of heroin. One of the three was reported to have ties with an organised crime syndicate in Thailand, from where the heroin was sourced. The headline perfectly illustrates the alarmist tone and the ‘threat’ discourse: “Triads Planned to Swamp New Zealand with

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5 While my focus is specifically on the New Zealand response to the new Asian migration, this should not be read to suggest the New Zealand experience is unique in this regard. Wong briefly describes a similar, contemporary set of images attached to Chinese capitalist migrants in Canadian urban centres (Wong 1995:487), as does Castles in the Australian context (Castles 1992a:68-70).
Heroin" (Gadd 1990:9). Youth gangs with cell phones and "weapons resembling the hardware in a Bruce Lee movie" were presented as a growing threat to public safety, and immigration was explicitly identified as the cause: "[t]he gangs are Asian, and Auckland’s newest crime phenomenon is a product of wealthy Asian immigration to New Zealand" (Matthews 1996:26). Another threat to public safety came not so much from criminal activity, but from the reputed poor driving habits of Asian migrants. An article addressing this ‘threat’ in New Zealand’s largest daily newspaper, the *New Zealand Herald*, juxtaposed anecdotes of shockingly poor driving with carefully understated comments by officials that there was no evidence to suggest that Asian drivers are worse than other drivers (Wong 1992:B3). Accompanying the article was a cartoon showing four cars – each with an Asian at the wheel – racing, unheeding, from all directions, into an intersection. Each driver is reading the road code rather than watching the road. In fact, the only ones actually aware of the imminent collision are a European New Zealander standing on one corner, and a dog on another. In an even more outrageous example of racialisation, a passenger in one of the cars is shown gesturing hungrily at the dog.6

The final threat suggested by media representations of Asian migrants capitalised on the phenomena of ‘astronaut’ parents and ‘parachute’ children – that is:

wealthy Asian migrants who buy in the city’s best suburbs, book their children into good New Zealand schools and universities, but then return home to keep their businesses going (Matthews 1996:26).

The ‘parachute kids’ phenomenon has relied almost exclusively on anecdote, as no authoritative study has been done to demonstrate how rare or common the practice is in New Zealand (Ho, Bedford & Goodwin 1997). However, such “offloaded children” (Evans 1989:3) have been represented as unaccountable to any adult authority and often out of control, thereby posing a threat to the authority structures of schools, to other school students, and to general order. Again, the triads make an appearance, as fears are

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6 Wilson & Horton, Limited, the publisher of the *New Zealand Herald*, withheld permission to reproduce the illustration in this thesis. The determination to not allow the cartoon to be used again, for any purpose, was motivated by the fact that it “caused problems when it was previously published" (email communication, 17 December 2002).
raised that such youths are also targeted for recruitment by the mysterious Asian organised crime syndicates that apparently have infiltrated New Zealand society ("Triads Prey on Dumped Kids" 1997:2).

Winston Peters and the ‘New Racism’
These different representations of Asians as posing a threat to New Zealand society, and to a supposedly homogenous way of life that defines the nation, aligned precisely with what has been referred to as the ‘new racism’ (Barker 1981). In New Zealand, the ‘new racism’ received its most powerful articulation in the speeches of politician Winston Peters. Peters, who had been an MP for the National Party since 1978, left the party a year after being dismissed from his Cabinet post in 1991, which he had held for less than a year. He established the New Zealand First Party in July, 1993, in time for the elections held later in that year. Staking out a particular populist niche, Peters articulated the concerns of the disaffected, and identified himself with them.

You who have been constantly abused these last nine years, relegated, denigrated and forgotten, you have got power if you but use it. You who are superannuitants. You’ve got real power. You who are students. You’ve got power. You who are out of work. You’ve got power. Struggling middle and small business men and women, you’ve got power. The homemaker, you’ve got power. You country folk anxious about falling commodity prices and the future of your communities, you’ve got power....

In closing, on so many issues we have requested and our requests have been spurned. We have pleaded and our pleas have been ignored. We have humbled ourselves to ask for relief and they have laughed when no relief came. Well, we request no more. Plead no more. And we humble ourselves no longer. We defy their abuse of power (Peters 1993:12,14).

In addition, Winston Peters laid out a position with regard to immigration and foreign ownership of New Zealand assets, which effectively blurred the two issues. By appealing to a supposedly homogeneous set of shared New Zealand values, Peters both introduced the theme of the racialised ‘Other’ and identified those Others as an economic and cultural threat.
Even many of those who are getting by are wondering about their New Zealand and whether they are still New Zealanders. Their major assets have been stripped. For the most part sold well below value to people who in many cases *neither speak our language or share our values*. The internationalisation of New Zealand and the arbitrary, authoritarian and often totally incompetent manner in which it has been accomplished is for most of us humiliating, frustrating and destabilising (Peters 1993: 3 – *emphasis added*).

This strategy of selectively conflating immigration and foreign investment was used carefully by Winston Peters, allowing him at times to rail against foreigners, and then to back away from charges of racism by claiming that the listener had misunderstood – or, more often, by accusing the listener of deliberately misrepresenting his position. For example, the following exchange between Peters and the then Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, occurred during question time in Parliament, in June 1995 (*New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* [NZPD] 1995, Vol. 547:7113-4)

Hon WINSTON PETERS (Tauranga) to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his statement of 5 October 1988 that “I do not intend to allow the Government, in its reckless pursuit of dollars, to sell my turangawaewae to whomever should come along with 30 pieces of silver”; if so, what has he done to prevent his Government from doing this?

... (supplementary)

Hon. Winston Peters: ... Is it not the case that when he made those statements about not selling his turangawaewae, the then flood was shortly to turn, under him, into a torrent, which is running now at $8 billion of asset transfers per annum, and are those commitments not worth the air they passed on?

Rt Hon. J B BOLGER: I am not sure what the member is on about, except that he has an absolute fixation. ... His populist nonsense, to try to raise racist anger against those who want to invest in New Zealand, is a disgrace to him and his people.

Hon. Winston Peters: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. The Prime Minister referred to the issue of racism. He should be required either to justify that
statement or to apologise. In none of the speeches that I have made have I used the words they allege——namely, “Asian investors”. He should simply be required either to apologise or, for the first time, to substantiate something he says.

Of course, Winston Peters most often referred in oblique terms to “those who neither speak our language or share our values”, but he did occasionally specify Asians as being the foreign owners who most threatened New Zealand’s economic sovereignty, as he did in this speech in Parliament in July 1995, just a few weeks after claiming that he never referred to “Asian investors.”

Hon. WINSTON PETERS: Well, foreign shareholdernesship in New Zealand in 1989 was 19 percent. Today it is 55 percent and rising. . . . National believes that selling our assets is the way to prosperity. . . . National talks about selling it off in the hope that the Asians will give it back to us. That is what those members believe (NZPD 1995, Vol. 549:8158-9)

Winston Peters often took care to codify his arguments so as to defend himself against charges of racism. He did this by, on the one hand, linking “foreigners” to the threat posed by immigration, while selectively identifying Asians with foreign investment, and at other times conflating immigration and foreign investment as a single problem, without specifically mentioning Asians. With the repetition of these themes, Peters was able to assume a link between “foreigners” – whether investors or immigrants – and Asians. However, in August 1995 the association of all three elements in the discourse (foreign investment, immigration and Asians) was finally made explicit by Winston Peters, in a speech in Parliament.

New Zealand First believes that New Zealand is truly ours, and that that is the way it should be for our children, and for future generations. . . . I can show [the Minister of Immigration] family after family in Auckland where the husband is back in Asia, or in other parts of the world, giving of all his entrepreneurial skills whilst his spouse and children are in New Zealand. Those children will not earn one cent for us until they are 20 years of age. That is the reality. I will show the Minister Howick. I will show him the old Sommerville farm. It is chock-a-block with such families today, so do not tell me that it is
The articulation – even the prompting – of concerns about the threats posed by foreigners is consistent with the ideology of the ‘new racism’ theorised by Barker (1981) in relation to Thatcher’s Conservative governments and the rise of the Far Right in Britain. According to Barker, whether one personally believes that such fears are justified is beside the point. If, as Margaret Thatcher suggested in the late 1970s, that “people are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture”, and that “if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in”, then responsible politicians must surely act to alleviate these fears (quoted in Barker 1981:15). This is done by restricting immigration.

Barker argues that the ‘conceptual slide’, from acknowledging the genuine fears of ordinary folk, to arguing against immigration, is made complete by the link between genuine fears and the notion of a homogeneous way of life. In this discourse, the nation’s “essential unity” – shared customs, language, beliefs, etc. – constitute “our way of life”, and therefore represent the security of the nation (ibid.:17). What is more, Barker argues, the reality of the threat is justified by nothing more than people’s fear of the threat. Whether or not the country actually is being “swamped” by foreigners hostile to “our” way of life is not important: the fact that ordinary people are afraid of such a prospect is sufficient evidence that the threat is real, and that real action must be taken to stem the threat.

It is this element of the new racism that Winston Peters deftly exploited, and articulated more completely, and more effectively, than any other public figure in contemporary New Zealand. In February, 1996, Peters delivered a speech in Howick – a centre of the new Asian immigration – in which all of the elements discussed above came together. According to one commentator, the speech
repeated all the clichés. The opening paragraphs told the story of former Vietnamese refugees who had recently been caught running a gold-thieving ring (they’re all criminals); and continued with familiar complaints that the schools are becoming overcrowded (they’re a danger to our children); that we’re attracting immigrants with the same skills as us (they’re taking our jobs); that they live in ostentatious housing (they may come from poor countries but they’re richer than us); and that once grown up, the children will return overseas (they’re screwing us) (Heeringa 1996).

Peters’ profile and outspokenness on the issues of Asian immigration and foreign investment helped the New Zealand First party to win just over thirteen percent of the vote in the 1996 general election, New Zealand’s first under the MMP system. In doing so, the party gained seventeen seats in the 120-member Parliament, held the balance of power, and formed a coalition government with Peters’ former colleagues in the National Party.

The Incorporation of Migrants

The discussion of the history and outcomes of New Zealand immigration policy and practices suggests that New Zealand is an increasingly multicultural society. On a number of levels, this is certainly true, although there is a need to clarify exactly what is meant by the term ‘multiculturalism’. As Heisler warns, “one must distinguish between multiculturalism as an ideology, a social policy and as a feature of the structure of society” (Heisler 1992:633). In fact, the term is used to embody such a variety of circumstances and goals that, without clarification, it cannot be used with any precision.

As such ubiquitous usage has emerged, ‘multiculturalism’ has been evoked in widely divergent discourses by persons and groups located all along the political spectrum. At present multiculturalism may refer to: a basic demographic description of a society (the sheer presence of x number of immigrants from countries 1, 2, and 3 offered as evidence of cultural diversity); exotic otherness displayed in the observance of lively festivals, spirited dances, spicy cuisines, and colourful costumes; a vague vision of how society, with its minorities, should function (with keywords ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’); public policy aimed
at minorities, including the promotion of equal opportunity; or distinctive institutional arrangements designed to benefit, or called for by, specific minority groups including special advisory offices, consultation boards, representatives and funding. . . . But given such a wide range of actors and arenas, it is apparent that multiculturalism currently means no single thing, that is, it represents no single view of, or strategy for, contemporary complex societies (Vertovec 1996:223-4 – emphasis added).

Multiculturalism – either in practice or as a policy ideal – must describe the structure of inter-group relations, rather than inter-personal ones. Clearly, very few individuals, especially in a society such as New Zealand, are personally multicultural. Many more are intercultural, however, in terms of their exposure to, or engagement with, persons, ideas and expressions of many other cultures. The question of import is, does the presence of individuals from many cultural groups, and the accumulation of so many personal intercultural experiences, make a society multicultural? Is the basic demographic composition of a society, or a community, or an institution, as Vertovec alludes to above, which includes members different cultural or ethnic identities, sufficient to justify claims made by such societies or institutions that they are ‘multicultural’?

On one level, the presence of at least several significant and distinctive cultural groups is enough to make a society, community or institution multicultural. However, such a characterisation does little to describe the structure of inter-group relations, the politics of decision-making, the distribution of power or the incorporation of migrants and other ethnic minorities. Those dynamics require a more critical and normative conceptualisation of the term. The indistinct nature of the concept is further complicated by the fact that multiculturalism, as a social policy or as a set of policy initiatives, comes to mean different things in different national contexts and at different times. Heller points out, for instance, that multiculturalism takes particular forms in the New Worlds (the Americas, Australia and New Zealand) than it does in the Old Worlds (in Europe and in Asia) (Heller 1996:26). In both Australia and Canada, where multiculturalism is explicit government policy, the policy framework has undergone a variety of incarnations over time based, according to Castles (1992b:559) “on shifting and sometimes incoherent notions of culture and identity.”
The purpose of this latter half of the chapter is to compare the approaches adopted by Australia, Canada and New Zealand to manage the incorporation of multicultural migrant populations. Both Australia and Canada have structured ‘regimes of incorporation’ around a policy framework of multiculturalism, and multicultural citizenship. After introducing Soysal’s ‘regimes of incorporation’ concept, the discussion briefly addresses the ways in which the Australian and Canadian regimes of incorporation have changed since the 1970s, and how the notion of multiculturalism has been shaped by those changes. The focus on Canada and Australia is to provide a context in which New Zealand’s changing incorporation regime may be compared. Significant differences persist, primarily to do with the pre-eminence in New Zealand of biculturalism rather than multiculturalism, and with the lesser emphasis on citizenship as a mechanism for incorporating migrants.

Regimes of Incorporation
Soysal (1994) developed the concept of ‘regimes of incorporation’ to explain the incorporation of guestworkers in Europe. The concept describes “patterns of policy discourse and organisation around which a system of incorporation is constructed” (Soysal 1994:32). ‘Systems of incorporation’ refers to the sets of rights, privileges and duties – traditionally the purview of citizens – which are increasingly extended to non-citizen residents. Soysal constructed a typology delineating two dimensions that determine nature of individuals’ membership in the polity: the locus of action and authority, oriented either towards the state or civil society; and the ‘organisational configuration’, which describes the extent to which society is organised around collectivism or voluntarism. Thus her typology maps out four archetypes: corporatist and liberal, the two archetypes in which civil society is the source of action and authority, but which differ in the extent to which such action is collectively organised; and statist and fragmental, the two archetypes which are oriented towards the state, but differ in the extent to which action is centralised (ibid.: 36-41).

Soysal’s typology is helpful in tracking and conceptualising the development of Australian and Canadian policy frameworks with regard to migrant incorporation, as well as in specifying the areas in which New Zealand is unique. However, Soysal’s thesis downplays the role of citizenship in the incorporation of migrants. Soysal makes
much of the fact that, even in the ‘guestworker’ countries in Europe that attempt to deny
the fact of immigration in their own societies, the emphasis on universal human rights,
and on shared participation and responsibilities, have replaced citizenship as the
predominant basis upon which individuals are incorporated into the society (ibid.:163-6).
While these developments have undoubtedly blurred the distinctions between
citizens and non-citizens, they do not eliminate two significant impediments to the
incorporation of migrants into the host society. The first of these is political rights. In
most countries the citizen/non-citizen distinction is brought into sharp relief over the
question of voting rights, and the ability to participate in other political processes and
organisations. The other barrier of non-citizens is more discursive: it is about national
identity and belonging. There is significant symbolic power – at least on the level of
discourse – in becoming a naturalised citizen, as it undercuts nativist arguments, based
on suspicions of disloyalty, of the Other. To use Winston Peters’ argument again,
accusations against “those who neither speak our language or share our values” lose
their legitimacy when levelled against those who can demonstrate that they are, in fact,
New Zealanders. In the comparative discussion that comprises the latter half of this
chapter, the role played by citizenship will be considered in the incorporation regimes of
Australia and Canada, as well as New Zealand.

Australian and Canadian Multiculturalisms
According to Castles, multiculturalism, as a purposeful alternative to the perceived
failure of Australian assimilationist policies, was borne out of the Australian Labour
Party’s successful attempts to politicise working-class Greek and Italian migrants in the
early 1970s. At that point,

the emphasis in ALP policies was not on cultural pluralism but on improving
welfare and education systems. . . [such as] the right to invalid and widow
pensions, migrant housing and low-interest loans, family health insurance, and
work-based childcare programmes employing workers of appropriate ethnic
backgrounds (Castles 1992b:555).

After the Labour Party victory in 1972, the other major Australian political parties also
embraced multiculturalism, and extended it to promote cultural pluralism (Atchison
1988:17-19). Successive governments created a bureaucratic infrastructure to monitor,
support, research and promote multiculturalism and “multicultural attitudes” (Castles 1992b:555). They also supported the promotion of ethnic organisations to play a mediating role between ‘ethnic communities’ and the government, both for consultation and for the provision of culturally relevant welfare services (ibid.:554-5). Canada’s multicultural policy framework was proceeding along the same lines during this time. These manifestations of multiculturalism embody what Soysal defines as the corporatist model of membership, in which the state’s engagement with members is primarily mediated by collectivities.

Both Australian and Canadian multicultural policies shifted again in the 1980s and 1990s, from this corporatist model, or managed multiculturalism (Rogers 1998:209), towards what, in Soysal’s typology, is referred to as the liberal model of membership. Castles identifies it as ‘inclusionary’ multiculturalism (Castles 1992b:559), while Fleras and Elliott call it ‘civic’ multiculturalism (Fleras & Elliott 1999:304). These later incarnations of multiculturalism conceive culture, not as a feature of class or community, but as a private right (Pearson 1990:231-4). This led the federal governments of both countries to move away from the business of protecting and promoting distinct migrant ethnic identities, and of funding ethnocultural organisations, to strategies of managing ethnic diversity within the framework of citizenship and a strong commitment to the nation. This form of civic multiculturalism is considered inclusionary because it is directed at all members of society: “[m]ulticulturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of the cultural, social and economic rights of all citizens in a democratic state” (Castles 1992b:557). The emphasis in this form of multiculturalism is on society building, based around the concept of a shared citizenship. In Canada, this manifests as a desire of the state to promote consensus around the notion of an inclusive Canadianness, in which ethnicity plays a purely symbolic role. The privatisation of ethnicity allows governments to support the rights of all citizens, “within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage” (ibid.:556). Fleras and Elliott defend the relegation of ethnicity to the private sphere as an essential component of preserving and building the nation amidst increasing diversity.

Under official multiculturalism, all Canadians are encouraged to identify and participate as individuals in the cultural heritage of their choice.
Multiculturalism in Canada is not concerned with the enhancement of ethnic communities, let alone the preservation of ethnic nationalities. . . . Ethnicity within the framework of society building can only exist when stripped of its potency to divide or incite, then folded into the prevailing social and cultural system of society.

Herein lies the appeal of situated and symbolic identities within a multicultural society. Promotion of ethnic identity at situational or symbolic levels comes across as relatively harmless, since the political and economic status quo is left intact. In that sense, multiculturalism does not exist to promote ethnicity. Multiculturalism is a tactical strategy for creating a society in which ethnicity is accommodated as integral and legitimate but without undermining the interconnectedness of the core. . . . This “consensus-based” multiculturalism represents Canada’s response to the conundrum of making society safe for ethnicity as well as safe from ethnicity (Fleras & Elliott 1999:130-1).

The various changes in the way multiculturalism has been conceived and managed by Australia and Canada have reflected other interests of the state, and each has been susceptible to criticism. For example, critics contend that corporatist, or managed, multiculturalism, of the sort epitomised in Australia in the 1970s, conceives group “cultural” identities as being fixed, bounded and unalterable (Vertovec 1996:51). In addition, these bounded identities are reified in law, planning and government policies which may actually maintain ethnic divisions, rather than manage them (Rogers 1998:209-210). In this model, policies are directed at the minority groups. Moreover, the leaders of ethnic communities, identified as such by the state and therefore subject to the pressures of patronage, have an interest in maintaining conservative, bounded notions of culture, while also being co-opted by the political centre into co-responsibility for administering state policies (Vertovec 1996:60).

On the other hand, the liberal, or civic, multiculturalism model amounts to mainstreaming. While relegating ‘culture’ to the private sphere does allow individuals the freedom to pursue ethnic identities in relation to other co-ethnics and the majority culture, as well as still other ethnic minorities, mainstreaming the delivery of social services can also mean “neglecting special needs and perpetuating structural discrimination” (Castles 1992b:560). Civic multicultural policies, expressing the social,
cultural and economic rights of all citizens (ibid.:557) are directed at the whole of society, rather than at discrete migrant groups. However, such an arrangement masks the structural dominance of the majority group (or groups) which, in the guise of the state, continues to play the role of a supposedly neutral power-broker amongst the various cultural minorities. Thus, Fleras and Elliott’s notion of “making society safe for ethnicity as well as safe from ethnicity” (1999:130) may be read as a strategy for maintaining the status quo in the distribution of power, with real political power – such as that to define the prevailing culture of most public institutions – continuing to reside with the majority culture. The relegation of ethnicity to the ‘private’ sphere reinforces a kind of assumed consensus over the status quo (Pearson 1990:233-4), making it more difficult for ethnic minorities to advocate for greater visibility in the ‘public’ sphere, without being accused of demanding ‘special’ treatment. Parekh argues that such a form of liberal multiculturalism amounts to little more than assimilation.

It confines minority cultures to the private realm and hands over the public realm of common culture to the majority. The minorities are free to cherish their differences, but as far as the shared public realm is concerned they are required to accept it as it is. The liberal response thus does little more than carve out a precarious area of diversity on the margins of a predominantly assimilationist structure (quoted in Vertovec 1999:xxxii – emphasis added).

In addition, the shift from one form of multiculturalism to the next has created contradictions which have yet to be resolved. As Castles points out, Australian ethnic organisations have a history of official legitimacy and partnership with the state. This history has produced a degree of political clout, and an expectation of continued consultation – as well as patronage – despite the government backing away from such linkages, favouring instead the rhetoric of the equal rights of all citizens (ibid.:560).7

It may be, however, that the infrastructure of such ethnic communities may provide an advantage in the current model of civic multiculturalism. When cultural populations are able to form a variety of civic organisations, they create opportunities for “multiple

7 Another significant problem with the Australian manifestation of multiculturalism policy, according to Harvey, is the continued exclusion from the model of Aboriginal people – “the most oppressed, marginalised and powerless minorities” (Harvey 1993:210).
modes of minority representation” in the political realm (Vertovec 1996:66). They are freed to operate outside the prescribed roles dictated to “cultural communities” by the state. However, the potential may be realised only when ethnic groups possess, or have access to, the social, political and economic capital such engagement requires. In most cases, this presupposes a historically stable ethnic community.

Despite the similar immigration histories of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the differences are sufficient to warrant to this point the exclusion of New Zealand from the discussion of multiculturalism policy. This is to do with the role of the indigenous peoples, and the influence they have managed to wield over the direction of such policies. While Canadian Aboriginals remain sceptical of multiculturalism, they have not been able to define the terms of the debate in the way that the Māori have in New Zealand. As such, since the 1970s New Zealand social policy has been greatly influenced by the notion of biculturalism.

New Zealand and Biculturalism

Though the term ‘multiculturalism’ has been increasingly invoked to describe New Zealand society since the mid-1980s, New Zealand does not hold to normative multiculturalism as a social policy principle. New Zealand’s cultural – or intercultural – policy environment has quite a different history from Australia, for instance, including different discourses and distinctive sets of imperatives and actors. Cultural policy in New Zealand has as its major referent the Treaty of Waitangi, which established a constitutional relationship between iwi and the Crown.8 Though there have been, and continue to be, differing interpretations of exactly what sort of relationship the Treaty intended (Orange 1987:1-5; Durie 1998:3-4), it is generally accepted that the Treaty forms the constitutional basis for a relationship between the Crown and New Zealand’s indigenous population, the tangata whenua (“people of the land”).

Despite their constitutional standing as a partner to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori were grossly under-represented in the institutions of state well into the 1980s. Beginning in the late 1960s there had been an increase in Māori radical activism, led by young, urban,

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8 A translation into English of the Māori version of the Treaty (most signatories signed the Māori version) is reproduced in Appendix A.
articulate, university-educated Māori people. They infused a confrontational boldness into Māori aspirations, demanding greater recognition in government policy of the Treaty and their status as tangata whenua. Their use of protest tactics, and their practice of challenging the legitimacy of the Crown on the grounds of the Crown’s historic failure to honour the Treaty, shattered many New Zealanders’ smug and complacent assumption that New Zealand enjoyed harmonious race relations (Mulgan 1989:1; Walker 1990:225). Protest activities centred on three areas of grievance: land alienation, and control of Māori-owned land; the loss of the Māori language, and the continued low status of te reo Māori; and the monoculturalism of New Zealand institutions and the denigration of Māori cultural aspirations. Their catch-cry was for Māori Sovereignty – Tino Rangatiratanga – as guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi.9

In the 1970s, liberal Pākehā began joining with Māori in attacking the monoculturalism and institutional racism of New Zealand state agencies, including the justice system, health and social welfare agencies, and educational institutions (Walker 1990:277-281). One such group, the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD), highlighted and criticised institutional racism practised by diverse groups such as the police, hospitals, the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), mental health institutions, education, the judiciary and the tourism industry (ibid.). ACORD was followed by the Women Against Racism Action Group (WARAG), who criticised the institutional racism of the Department of Social Welfare; their observations had added authority because some members of WARAG were employees in the Department they criticised. Their report found that the institutional framework of the Department of Social Welfare “reflects a relentlessly Pakeha view of society, which oppressively and systematically discriminates against the interests of consumers and staff who are Māori and Pacific people” (DSW 1986:Section1.2).

The Government’s response to WARAG’s activism was to convene a Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare. The

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9 Tino rangatiratanga has its own history in political discourse. Traditionally translated to mean “absolute chieftainship” (Orange 1987:41), the term has been re-defined by successive governments to mean “self-management” (New Zealand Department of Justice 1989:10-11). Mason Durie (1998:Chapter 8) elaborates on the relative merits of tino rangatiratanga and another concept adopted by Māori to describe the aspiration for Māori control over Māori affairs, mana motuhake, as well as the New Zealand state’s unease with these discourses, preferring ‘self-management’ over ‘self-determination’ (ibid.:220).
report of the Committee, entitled Puao-Te-Ata-Tu ("Daybreak"), was a watershed, in
that while its specific focus was the Department of Social Welfare, it was recognised as
addressing the monocultural nature of the entire State sector (Walker 1990:280-1). The
Committee stated that, while mindful of the terms of reference guiding them, "we
nevertheless believe that more of the difficulties Maori clients have with the Department
are reflections of the socio-economic status of Maori in the community. In proposing a
Maori perspective for the Department, we cannot ignore the lack of a Maori perspective
in the community at large" (Puao-Te-Ata-Tu 1986:17).

Puao-Te-Ata-Tu signalled a major shift in Government’s approach to the state’s
relationship with Māori. After nearly twenty years of confrontational activism and
protest, biculturalism became official government policy in 1988. At that time, the
State Sector Act required chief executives of state agencies to acknowledge the
aspirations of Māori, and to act upon the need for greater Māori involvement in the
public service (Kelsey 1996:185). Biculturalism very quickly became enshrined in
government policy, particularly in relation to education, social welfare and health. For
example, the “Tomorrow’s Schools” policy required all schools to draft a charter, in
which they would pledge, amongst other things, to uphold the principles of the Treaty
of Waitangi; the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 legislated nearly
all of the relevant recommendations presented to the Department of Social Welfare in
Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, particularly those relating to the involvement of iwi, hapu and
whānau10 in decisions regarding the care and placement of Maori children.

The most common expression of the State’s commitment to biculturalism is summarised
in the discourse of “Partnership”. As the two parties to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori
and the Crown (manifested practically in New Zealand as the government, though
Māori have traditionally personalised the relationship as being with the Sovereign – see
Durie 1998:233-4) are obligated, in the words of the Court of Appeal, “to act towards
each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith” (quoted in New Zealand
Department of Justice 1989:14). The Crown’s commitment to act in good faith towards
its Treaty partner was formalised in its 1989 Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty
of Waitangi, which stated that:

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10 Or, “tribe, sub-tribe and extended family”; in Māori society these are kin-based political as well as
social structures.
The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. . . Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there is consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership (ibid. – emphasis added).

Ironically, not long after the bicultural partnership with Māori had begun to be formalised and institutionalised as the foundation for social policy in New Zealand, the government instituted the 1987 changes to immigration policy which were to radically transform the structure of New Zealand immigration. These changes were to produce in the New Zealand population, in dramatic fashion, a more multicultural composition than had been known previously. Such a transformation challenges the notion of biculturalism, the result being that Māori must defend the bicultural partnership against threat not only from conservative Pākehā, but from immigrant minorities as well.

Walker (1995:284-5) has argued that the Treaty of Waitangi explicitly addresses the issue of immigration as one reason forcing the necessity of a treaty with Māori in the first place, a view supported by Durie (1998:176). Walker points out that the Treaty’s preamble states that:

“Her Majesty Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom . . . has deemed it necessary, in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty’s subjects who have already settled in New Zealand, and the rapid extension of Emigration from both Europe and Australia which is still in progress, to constituted and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of her Majesty’s sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands (quoted in Walker 1995:284).

As a result, Walker posits, Māori have the right to be involved, as Treaty partners, in the decisions relating to immigration – especially relating to immigration from sources other than those mentioned in the Treaty: the United Kingdom, Europe and Australia (ibid.). This position is, of course, at odds with that taken by the government, which insists that such determinations are the sole prerogative of the Executive (Burke 1986:10-11; Bedford, Ho & Lidgard 2000:12). Since the late 1980s, successive New
Zealand governments have found themselves in the invidious position of pursuing, on the one hand, normative biculturalism (as a guiding social policy principal), and multiculturalism (via immigration) on the other, without effectively reconciling the two.

There is general recognition of a tension between biculturalism and multiculturalism, which has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. At least part of the problem stems from the tendency to view them as mutually exclusive imperatives, resulting in the dilemma of having to choose either one or the other. Many commentators share the cynical view adopted by Māori of some New Zealanders' latter-day rush to embrace multiculturalism. In this light, multiculturalism is seen as a “dishonest” and “reactionary” position that serves to deny Māori status as a Treaty partner and solidify Pākehā power (Vasil 2000:35). Māori become just one more ethnic minority, whose interests must be balanced by the (Pākehā) state against the interests of all other ethnic minorities. It “can also be used as a weapon to subvert the additional rights of indigenes who do not wish to be viewed in the same way as immigrant communities” (Pearson 1990:234). This form of multiculturalism I call ‘facile multiculturalism’, as its proponents appear unwilling or unable to address the complex historical, cultural and constitutional challenges posed by Māori indigeneity.

We are very fond of the term ‘multi-culturalism’ which sounds very good but is really a smokescreen under which the battleships of the Pakeha world maintain their hold on power and wealth. For the ordinary citizen the concept is ready made for diversionary questions such as: What about the Greeks? And how about the Vietnamese and Samoans? How about their languages? Most of these strategies of avoidance are aimed at creating distance between us and the issues of Māori-Pākehā relationships (H.M. Mead, quoted in Mulgan 1989:8).

However, as unsatisfactory as facile multiculturalism is, commentators such as Pearson (1990) also view biculturalism as problematic. Pearson argues that while the flaw of facile multiculturalism in New Zealand is its inability to cater for Māori, the flaw of biculturalism is that it completely ignores all who are neither Māori nor Pākehā – all others are swept into “a nonsensical residual category” (Pearson 1990:239). Such a position denies status not only to Pacific peoples, who have their own historic relationships with the New Zealand state, and claims to special status as a result, but
also to the many non-European and non-Polynesian migrants to New Zealand. This has implications for the incorporation of such migrants, who tend to believe that the Treaty relationship, and biculturalism in general, excludes them. Concerns over such a perceived exclusive biculturalism were given voice at a 1998 conference of the Association for the Study of Chinese and their Descendants in Australasia and the Pacific Islands (ASCADAPI):

The Chinese population in New Zealand... seek to build a "multicultural" society in order to be able to assert their cultural identity to an extent consistent with their numbers, resources, energy, etc. Within a democratic society they expect equality before the law and at least decreasing racial discrimination.

Lacking a proper understanding of "bicultural" principles, they observe with interest the apparently endless Treaty claims for vast tracts of "government" lands, rivers and fisheries... They are also uneasy when they see national resources being allocated to Maori language maintenance, Maori radio and television and Maori educational support.

They are positively alarmed when the Minister of Justice (naïvely) explains that there is one law for everyone, but the Maoris [sic] have additional rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (Young 1998:19).

This view reflects a particular tension inherent in New Zealand’s regime of incorporation. Recalling Soysal’s typology, New Zealand can be said to operate two different models of minority membership. The Crown’s partnership with Māori reflects the corporatist model of membership, with the state actively engaging with Māori through a variety of collective agencies, most notably iwi. With regard to migrant ethnic minorities, however, the state adopts a liberal approach, in which there are no “state-sponsored formal structures through which new populations and their interests can be incorporated” (Soysal 1994:38). For adult migrants to New Zealand, the labour market is a major instrument of incorporation, while for adolescents it is school. It is not surprising that migrants, who for assistance and engagement must rely on private and voluntary associations in the absence of state-sponsored collective entities, may look at the state’s engagement with Māori with some bemusement.
Attempts have been made to reconcile such simplistic and stark conceptualisations of biculturalism and multiculturalism, however. These tend to rely on two foundational principles: the first is a focus on the Treaty of Waitangi as New Zealand’s founding constitutional document, and an insistence that the Treaty was not between Māori and Pākehā – the error that Pearson, and others, appear to fall into (see Thakur 1995) – but rather between Māori and the Crown (Kawharu 1989:xiii). The second principle is the recognition of Māori as tangata whenua, the indigenous people of New Zealand. Recognition of the tangata whenua status of Māori leads to an acceptance of Māori – including Māori culture and custom – as a constitutional entity, even prior to parliamentary recognition (Durie 1995:34). As Durie insists, Māori custom “is part of the law of the land because it always has been. It grew from out of this earth” (ibid.).

These two principles are not without difficulties, however, which must be addressed before they can be mobilised effectively to resolve the biculturalism/multiculturalism tension. To begin, the notion that Māori can be both a Treaty partner with the Crown and simultaneously subject to the Crown presents a considerable constitutional difficulty (Mulgan 1989:108-112; Turner 1995:80). This tension has not been resolved, though the Crown has, from time to time, specified formal limits to its sovereignty over Māori, in line with the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles. One example is the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, charged with hearing Māori grievances and claims against the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi (Walker 1990:212). The Tribunal has recommendatory powers only, however, and the Crown reserves the prerogative to act upon or ignore, or modify, the Tribunal’s recommendations. The only circumstances in which the Tribunal’s recommendations are binding concern the return to Māori of certain lands owned by the Crown: these are either Crown forests or lands owned, or formerly owned, by the Crown over which a covenant has been placed advising of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over that land. No binding recommendation by the Waitangi Tribunal has never been enforced (Waitangi Tribunal - FAQ). Further, the Crown reserves to itself the right to determine and identify who are ‘legitimate’ parties to represent the Treaty partners, an arrangement which frequently results in “ad hoc small groupings of senior government ministers and officials meeting with ad hoc small groupings of senior Maori leaders and advisors” (Turner 1995:86-87).
Another, related, difficulty posed by the notion of 'Treaty Partners', and indeed the principle of Māori as tangata whenua, is that these positions serve to reify cultural identities as enduring essentialisms. In a society with significant rates of endogamy between Māori and non-Māori, it is not merely mischievous to ask, “Who is a Māori?” The Crown’s response has been to recognise foremost those bodies which represent iwi, and which have formal structures in place (such as Trust Boards) that ensure some degree of accountability to those the groups claim to represent. A result of this careful stance is that those Māori who are designated to act as representatives of the Treaty partner usually represent conservative, iwi-based Māori, and do not necessarily account for the views of the vast majority of Māori, who live in urban settings and whose links with the traditional tribes are frequently tenuous or non-existent.

However, while acknowledging the problems with the concepts, the tensions between biculturalism and multiculturalism are best resolved when the two are not taken to be binary opposites (Thakur 1995:271), but rather when biculturalism is conceived as the framework within which multiculturalism may be realised. This was the position adopted by the New Zealand Conference of Churches in 1990 in a Statement on the sesquicentennial anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. Arguing that, under a bicultural model, each cultural group in New Zealand should negotiate a primary relationship with Māori as tangata whenua, the Conference of Churches posits that:

Multiculturalism is the network of completed bicultural negotiations  
(Conference of Churches 1990:11).

The model offered by the Conference of Churches is under-theorised, and simplistic (reproduced as Appendix B). For instance, it suggests that “each group needs to recognise and negotiate its relationship with the Maori – the people who are the land” (Conference of Churches 1990:11). However, it does not suggest how this is to be done, or the social or constitutional framework within which such negotiations might occur. However, it points towards a type of critical multiculturalism which fulfils the dual imperatives of honouring the bicultural relationships established in the Treaty of Waitangi, and acknowledging the status of Māori as tangata whenua, while also catering pragmatically for the coexistence of other minority cultures. The model is simply signalled in this thesis: the work of theorising and formalising such a model is outside
the current scope. It is in this context, however, that the notion of a facile multiculturalism must be abandoned, and a critical, biculturally-just multiculturalism developed for Aotearoa New Zealand. This would allow for the full incorporation of other cultural minorities: firstly, by clarifying their relationship with Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi; and then, by fashioning a social policy framework which adequately addresses both bicultural and multicultural aspirations and realities.

Citizenship

In most countries of immigration, the conferral of citizenship upon migrants is seen to be a means of facilitating their integration into the society (Rogers 1986:41). In countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States, the granting of political rights which come from citizenship – the status which allows migrants to vote in federal elections, and to hold elected office – is one of the primary factors motivating migrants to those countries to seek naturalisation (Yang 1994a:452). These are vitally important considerations when examining regimes of incorporation, but which Soysal downplays unjustifiably. Her argument – that states are increasingly extending membership rights (i.e., social and civil rights) to non-citizens on the basis of the recognition of human rights, and that the notion of nationally-bounded citizenship is weakened as a result – is limited by that minimalisation. While a certain number of rights, protections and provisions are extended to migrants on the basis of human rights, their ultimate incorporation into the polity in most countries does not occur until they are naturalised. In multicultural Australia and Canada, for instance, migrants are fully incorporated on the basis of their rights as Australians or Canadians.

New Zealand is exceptional in this regard, a fact which even Soysal fleetingly acknowledges (Soysal 1994:127). As a result of the largely homogeneous immigration stream into New Zealand, particularly prior to the labour migration from the Pacific Islands, the threshold for political or civic participation in New Zealand society is very low. Prior to the Citizenship Act 1977, Commonwealth citizens had full civil and political rights. Since 1977, residents share virtually all the same rights as citizens, with only two major exceptions: only citizens can stand for Parliamentary office or travel on a New Zealand passport. Some provisions of the welfare state are available only after residency criteria are met (normally two years). Otherwise, non-citizen residents
have all the social, political and civil rights of citizens (McKinnon 1996:42-45; Spoonley 2001:163).

Citizenship has not traditionally been a pivotal element of New Zealand identity. “Becoming a New Zealander”, in terms of citizenship, has not had the same weight in nationalist discourse as has “becoming an American”, for instance. There are a number of reasons for this. Primarily, New Zealanders were British subjects, without a separate citizenship regimen, until 1948. Given its history (described above), the emphasis of nationalist discourse in New Zealand has traditionally centred not around citizenship, but around ‘race’. Also, the similarity between the rights of citizens and residents in New Zealand has made it easy for non-citizens (historically almost indistinguishable, culturally and ‘racially’ from citizens) to participate in all aspects of social and civic life. In one sense, this ease of participation has made naturalisation unnecessary for most non-citizen residents.

Nor are the criteria for naturalisation onerous. New Zealand tolerates dual or multiple citizenship, so one is not required by the New Zealand government to relinquish prior citizenships. The only other criteria for naturalisation, according to the 1977 Citizenship Act, are: three years’ normal residence in New Zealand; applicants must be “of good character”; they must have “sufficient” knowledge of English, as well as knowledge of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship; and they must state their intention to maintain residence in New Zealand.

Given the near-equivalence of the rights of citizens and non-citizen residents, it is unsurprising that British, Irish and Australian citizens typically have not taken up New Zealand citizenship in large numbers, despite their preponderance in the New Zealand population. Asian migrants, on the other hand, have proved more ready to acquire New Zealand citizenship. As Table 2.3 illustrates, in 1996 alone, ten percent of New Zealand residents born in Taiwan were granted citizenship. A similar proportion of New Zealand residents born in Hong Kong were also granted citizenship.

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11 McKinnon notes an exception to this, in the period immediately following the introduction of the 1977 Citizenship Act. British and Irish residents, facing the prospect of tighter immigration restrictions (in effect, being placed on a par with other immigrants), applied for citizenship in large numbers. However, McKinnon points out that when it became apparent that non-citizen residents could obtain multiple-re-entry visas, citizenship applications again fell to their previous levels (McKinnon 1996:44-5).
during that year. Nearly six percent of New Zealand residents who were born in Korea also gained citizenship – a particularly notable figure, given that Korea does not allow its citizens to hold dual citizenship. Koreans therefore incur a far greater cost than others in becoming New Zealand citizens (Lidgard et al. 1998:36-7). During the same year, less than two percent of the more than 180,000 British citizens resident in New Zealand were granted citizenship, as were less than half of one percent of Irish citizens. While many of those citizens from Britain and Ireland may have lived for longer periods in New Zealand, and may have previously taken up New Zealand citizenship, these are not static populations. In the five years leading up to 1996, 13,436 Britons and 416 Irish were approved for residence in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand). This suggests that many more British and Irish citizens would need to become naturalised New Zealanders if they were to match the proportion of Asians doing so.

Table 2.3
Citizenships Granted in 1996: Country of Birth, as a Proportion of the Normally Resident Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Grants in 1996*</th>
<th>Total Resident Population**</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>11,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>12,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>10,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>211,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18,579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs
** Source: 1996 Census, Statistics New Zealand

There are several factors that may explain the greater readiness of Asian migrants to take up New Zealand citizenship. One is in response to the racialisation and suspicion with which they have been confronted, demonstrated by Winston Peters’ suggestion that the presence of migrants who “neither speak our language nor share our values” was contrary to the national interest. Becoming new New Zealanders is one way to demonstrate a commitment to New Zealand and to undermine, to some degree, the nativist, “New Zealand for New Zealanders” ideology. Much of Ip’s work (1990; 1996;
2000), emphasising the historic presence of a Chinese community in New Zealand, also serves to disrupt this racialising discourse. Yang refers to this sort of explanation as the *forced self-protection hypothesis*, which posits that members of minority groups that have historically suffered discrimination are more likely to become naturalised citizens than others (Yang 1994b:595-6). Yang’s research of U.S. census data lends support to this hypothesis (ibid.:614).

Another factor motivating many Asian migrants to take up New Zealand citizenship is more instrumental: New Zealand citizenship opens doors for Asian migrants which would otherwise be closed to them, particularly the opportunity to on-migrate to Australia (Lidgard, et al. 1998:37). This practice has invited criticism from both nativist New Zealanders and Australians alike: the New Zealanders accuse such migrant citizens of “disloyalty”, of manipulating the system; while Australian critics blame lax immigration policies in New Zealand for creating a “back door” for migrants who would not otherwise qualify for entry into Australia (Ip 2000:11). This is a point to which I will return in the next chapter.

However, New Zealanders are not unfamiliar with such an instrumental approach to citizenship. Many New Zealanders who are eligible, on the basis of genealogy, take up British citizenship as a means to access educational, career and travel opportunities both in Britain and across the European Union. As Spoonley notes:

> Dual nationality is a relatively normal and standard option for New Zealanders, as long as they fulfil the conditions required to be a citizen of the other country and if they see any advantage. It has been possible to gain British or Irish nationality, notably a passport, and to claim other nationalities at the same time as a New Zealand passport or nationality. Given the significant proportion of the New Zealand population that fulfil the conditions of Irish or British nationality, *this has been seen as an option with certain advantages, especially given the possibility of access to the European Community offered by a British or Irish passport* (Spoonley 2001:164 – emphasis added).

Given their long-standing instrumental approach to citizenship, and the transnational opportunities offered by the gaining of a strategically significant passport, New
Zealanders should not find it surprising that others may calculate an instrumental advantage in gaining the administrative status offered to them by New Zealand citizenship.

While acknowledging the problematic nature of the concept of ‘social cohesion’, this section has highlighted two challenges to social cohesion – that is, to basic patterns of social cooperation and a generally accepted core set of values – which confront states coming to grips with the increased cultural diversity inherent in contemporary migration. Host society resistance to ethnic diversity, particularly as prodded by proponents of the ‘new racism’ (no doubt by old-fashioned racists as well), is a significant challenge to such cohesion, as well as to attempts to establish patterns of inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue over core values. Related to the first challenge, and complicated by it, is the task of incorporating new migrants. New Zealand’s regime of incorporation is made problematic by the Crown’s Treaty-based constitutional relationship with the tangata whenua, and the bicultural policy framework that has developed from it. The liberal mode of membership available to migrants, and the very low threshold for formal civic, political and social incorporation in New Zealand (based on residency rather than citizenship), presents resident migrant groups with the unique opportunity to participate fully in the political process without necessarily having to become naturalised citizens. However, the relationships between migrants and the Treaty of Waitangi, and therefore between migrants and Māori, have not been sufficiently formalised or articulated in policy, a fact which causes persistent tension between biculturalism and multiculturalism.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the historic and social context of New Zealand’s immigration policies and practices, and compared them to those of Australia and Canada. Despite the historic and cultural affinities amongst the three countries, two major factors require the question of migrant incorporation in New Zealand to be addressed in ways that are fundamentally different from the other two. The first is New Zealand’s ‘whiter than white’ immigration policy, which developed from the late nineteenth century, and was maintained – at least with regard to Asians – for over one hundred years. This institutional structure of mostly homogeneous immigration was
dismantled suddenly, and with dramatic results, as the presence of a new, large multicultural minority population attests. This has produced a challenge to social cohesion, in the form of host society resistance to ethnic diversity, and to cultural Others, who are racialised as a threat, not merely to cohesion, but to New Zealand’s very sovereignty and security.

The second factor regarding migrant incorporation unique to New Zealand, which also presents a distinct challenge to social cohesion, is the state’s bicultural social policy framework, based on the Treaty partnership between Māori and the Crown. Tension is produced by the fact that New Zealand’s population is increasingly multicultural. Because biculturalism and multiculturalism are generally—and erroneously—conceived as binary opposites, a policy framework has yet to be developed that embraces multiculturalism from within a bicultural standpoint. Such a regime of incorporation would provide the context in which migrants from other than the ‘traditional source countries’ could be incorporated fully in New Zealand society, while continuing to do justice to New Zealand’s founding constitutional arrangement, formalised in the Treaty of Waitangi.
Introduction

The discussion of the previous chapter dealt with the historic and current immigration policy framework in New Zealand, including the measures that states such as New Zealand employ to manage social cohesion. Against that backdrop, this chapter addresses the question of how social theorists grapple with explaining the incorporation of migrants. Any study of migrants' incorporation must come to grips with the terminology used to describe the associated processes. This challenge is compounded by the fact that a variety of terms are often used uncritically to refer to similar processes. As McAndrew and Weinfeld describe, the choice of one term over another is not always rigorously made.

Studies on immigration and ethnic relations use a wide variety of terms to describe the contact between an immigrant group and its host society. These include adaptation, adjustment, absorption, incorporation, assimilation, acculturation, and, of course, integration. . . . [T]here are many and even contradictory definitions for each . . . and their use by academics and decision-makers, at times, is based more on the intellectual styles of the day or on national variations than on true conceptual differences (McAndrew & Weinfeld 1997:3 – emphasis original).

McAndrew and Weinfeld's observation notwithstanding, these various terms are not all equivalent, particularly with respect to their histories and the weight of political discourse. Assimilation is one which must be specially addressed, because although the
term may have some current utility, its history as a normative discourse and policy goal infuses it with particular, and problematic, meanings.

After discussing the theoretical approaches based on assimilation, I introduce the concept of transnationalism as an advance in immigration theory. Transnationalism has been developed as a means to explain a particular form of migration that challenges conventional explanations premised on the assumptions of permanent settlement and the absorption of migrants into the host society. The discussion to that point, comprising the first half of the chapter, focuses on macro level explanations. The second half of the chapter shifts to address micro, or interpretive, approaches to the incorporation of migrants. I argue that it is through these interpretive explanations that the possibilities for the concept of transnationalism will be realised, because the factors that determine whether migrants employ strategies of transnationalism, or maintain them across generations, are processed subjectively in migrants’ lives. These factors have to do with migrants’ sense of their own identity, as well as their motivations and aspirations. Questions about the durability of transnationalism as a migration strategy reside with the children of migrants. The discussion of 1.5 generation and second generation migrants culminates in an examination of the current research into Asian migrant adolescents in New Zealand. This forms the basis of the justification for this thesis, as the subjective insights and experiences of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents hold answers for the future of transnational migration as it is practised in New Zealand.

Assimilation

Historically, the New World countries of immigration – the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – all premised their immigration policies on some notion of assimilation. In the US, assimilation took the form of Americanisation, a discourse that was particularly powerful in the early part of the twentieth century. According to Glazer (1993) the ideology (if not always the reality) of an American identity was built, not on an exclusive ethnicity, as was the case in the nation-states of Europe, but rather upon political and social ideals. Quoting Philip Gleason, Glazer notes:

The ideological quality of American national identity was of decisive importance, vis-à-vis the question of immigration and ethnicity. To become an
American a person did not have to be of any particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background. All he [sic] had to do was to commit himself [sic] to the political ideology centred on the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism. Thus the universalist ideological character of American nationality meant that it was open to anyone who willed to become an American (Gleason 1980 – quoted in Glazer 1993:125).

Glazer’s argument is that articulations of the assimilation discourse such as these overlooked, or perhaps assumed, the obvious exclusion of African Americans.

The normative tenor of the Americanisation discourse was so pervasive during that period, and clearly aimed exclusively at European migrants, that even those Glazer refers to as “progressive social workers” promoted the cause. In the quote below, highlighting the Eurocentric element of American immigration at the time, the different ethnic groups are referred to as “races”. Again, Glazer notes that in the discourse concerning the acceptance of other “races”, African Americans are excluded – as are, it would appear, native Americans, Asians and Latinos.

Americanisation is the science of racial relations in America, dealing with the assimilation and amalgamation of diverse races in equity into an integral part of the national life. By “assimilation” is meant the indistinguishable incorporation of the races into the substance of American life. By “amalgamation” is meant so perfect a blend that the absence or imperfection of any of the vital racial elements available, will impair the compound. By “an integral part” is meant that, once fused, separation of units is thereafter impossible. By “inequity” is meant impartiality among the races accepted into the blend with no imputations of inferiority and no bestowed favours (Kellor 1919 – quoted in Glazer 1993:127).

Assimilation was central to the policies of the other immigration countries as well. Morrissey, Mitchell and Rutherford suggest that the normative goals of post-immigration settlement in Australia were invisibility and self-sufficiency:

Essentially, successful settlement was the achievement of invisibility by the immigrant. Not only was it required that immigrants assimilate totally at
linguistic and other cultural levels but it also required that neither immigrants as a whole, nor individual 'national groups', should remain visible in the sense of having special needs beyond the initial period of arrival (Morrissey et al. 1991:25).

New Zealand had the same normative assimilation discourse, as demonstrated by the history of immigration policy addressed in the previous chapter. The New Zealand state attempted to ensure assimilation by limiting the countries considered to be acceptable sources of immigrants to those whose citizens were assumed to be easily assimilable into New Zealand society. Even as late as the 1950s, New Zealand immigration, settlement and naturalisation policies were premised on normative assimilation. In 1953 the Naturalisation Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs acknowledged:

That a satisfactory measure of social assimilation is essential before the grant of citizenship is undeniable, and most of the conditions for naturalisation ... are assimilatory in conception. The minimum five years' residence is set to allow the alien immigrant to find his [sic] way in the new society, and it is interesting to note that few if any countries have a shorter period, though several have longer. The minimum of one year's notice of intention to apply is a machinery measure enabling observation of progress towards assimilation, and remedial advice and action where necessary (Department of Internal Affairs 1953:20).

By that time, assimilation was the norm not only in policy and public discourse, but also in social theory. According to Kim and Hurh, the conventional assimilation theory developed during this time assumes the homogeneity of a single dominant social group, and posits that "over time, all groups will conform to the mores, lifestyle and values of the dominant group" (Kim & Hurh 1993:697). The major components of assimilation theory are that it is a unidirectional, progressive and a zero-sum process. That is, assimilation has been assumed to be a process affecting primarily the minority groups as they accommodated the majority group. The process has also been assumed to lead progressively to a given end-point, so that descendents of migrants will practise the ethnicity of the majority, with perhaps some expressions of symbolic ethnicity tacked on. As a zero-sum equation, expressions of the new ethnic attachments (e.g. 'becoming an American') have been assumed to dislodge the old; as one gains the new culture, the old is dropped, like so much excess baggage.
Assimilation theory has been an extremely influential explanation for the settlement behaviour of immigrants and their descendents. Robert Park’s views of assimilation as the inevitable and desirable end-point of the process of intergroup contact influenced generations of American sociologists. Even amongst “the best-informed, most liberal, and most sympathetic analysts of the ethnic and racial scene”, according to Glazer, “assimilation was a desirable consequence of the reduction of prejudice and discrimination, while acculturation, that is, becoming more like the majority, would contribute to the reduction of discrimination and prejudice” (Glazer 1993:133).

As assimilationism has been displaced in the realm of social policy by cultural pluralism and by multiculturalism, the normative value invested in the term has limited its utility for analysing contemporary immigrant settlement processes (Portes & Zhou 1994). Of course, analysts argue that assimilation still does occur to a great extent (Portes and Rumbaut 1990:Chapter 6; Glazer 1993:134-5; Portes & Zhou 1994: 20-21). However, the analytical challenge since Glazer and Moynihan (1970) first structured a formal critique of assimilation, both as policy and as a normative concept, has been to describe under what conditions, and to what extent, and with what exceptions, contemporary migrants actually do assimilate into the host societies in which they settle.

Some, however, remain wedded to the use of the term as a rubric into which all other features of migrant insertion and incorporation can be theoretically arranged. It is on this basis that Yinger somewhat optimistically attempts to rehabilitate the concept of assimilation – that is, to decouple it from its normative proscriptions – by redefining it as a “process of boundary reduction that can occur when members of two or more societies, ethnic groups or smaller social agents meet” (Yinger 1994:39). Using assimilation as an overarching concept, Yinger posits a framework for analysing four dimensions of such boundary reductions: acculturation (cultural assimilation), integration (structural assimilation), identification (psychological assimilation) and amalgamation (biological assimilation). Similarly, Kivisto insists that the “overarching theoretical umbrella” of assimilation is sufficient to cover all eventual settlement outcomes – including transnationalism, addressed below – with one qualification. The assumption of an inevitable end-point unnecessarily limits the theory. However, Kivisto is convinced that this is not an inherent problem.
When freed from an invariant teleology, assimilation theory has the potential for making sense not only of acculturation and incorporation, but also resistance, group survival, discrimination, ethnic conflict, and variation in outcomes (Kivisto 2001:556).

As noted in the previous chapter, with reference to Canada and Australia, the assimilation perspective may also explain the outcomes of the various forms of institutionalised cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. However, my argument with Kivisto’s claim is that assimilation cannot be freed from the assumption of a progressive endpoint, and – contrary to Kivisto’s insistence otherwise – recent usage by other immigration theorists supports my point. While freeing it from its normative edge (so that one presumably may be an assimilation theorist without being an assimilationist), theorists use the term to denote, as Bauböck states, “the gradual abolition of difference” between groups (Bauböck 1996:114). The teleology is implicit: there is an endpoint in assimilation, where migrants may be “completely assimilated”, as is claimed of previous generations of Protestant ‘white’ migrants in the United States (Ben-Rafael 1996:140). Even Alba and Nee, authors Kivisto cites in defence of assimilation theory, conclude that “assimilation can be defined as the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it” (Alba & Nee 1997:856). While in defence of a refined and reconceptualised assimilation theory, Alba and Nee appear to be in no doubt that assimilation, as a concept and a process, is inherently teleological.

As a result, the term must be more critically engaged. It cannot be used to refer to both the overarching conceptual framework encompassing the whole of the migration experience, as Yinger and Kivisto argue, and the endpoint of a particular process (e.g. ‘complete assimilation’). This could only be the case if the two were synonymous – that is, if that end-point were the only possible outcome of the process. Instead, it should be reserved for use in referring only those aspects of migrant incorporation which imply progress towards the abolition of difference between groups. A more neutral umbrella term – Bauböck at times utilises “insertion” (Bauböck 1996:113-4) – at least opens the possibility that the process of migration can produce a number of trajectories, each with different outcomes, of which assimilation is only one, and not
necessarily inevitable. It is on that basis that the terms are generally adopted in this thesis: acculturation is taken to refer to the process of migrants' cultural adjustment to the host society; integration – when qualified – is used to refer to migrants' participation in specific spheres of social life in the receiving society (i.e., social integration, economic integration, etc.); assimilation is critically adopted only to refer, as Bauböck, and Alba and Nee, suggest, to the gradual elimination of cultural difference.

In sum, while the normative implications of the concept of assimilation have mostly been withdrawn from migration theorising, the concept remains both popular and useful. As many experts point out, assimilation continues to be useful to describe the long-term experiences of many migrants in receiving societies. Increasingly, however, the conventional explanations of migrant settlement and adjustment are being challenged on a new front. Because they are premised on the assumption of permanent settlement, theories of migrant adjustment, incorporation and assimilation are an increasingly inadequate explanation of many contemporary migrants' lived experiences, which may involve continuing, deeply-rooted connections with networks and communities at 'home', frequent travel between sending and receiving countries, and multi-local residence. The concept of transnationalism is promoted by a number of theorists as an alternative description to take account of such alternative migration patterns. These theorists, led by Glick Schiller and others, present transnationalism as a new dynamic, a strategy employed by a growing number of migrants to maintain networks of relations – familial, cultural, economic, political and religious – over multiple sites and across national borders.

Transnational Migration / Transmigration

In the early 1990s, cultural anthropologists Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton initiated the development of transnationalism as a concept in a series of publications. They proposed conceptualising as transnationalism the emerging phenomenon of migration, in which “migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992a:ix). Their work and theory focused primarily on the movement of people from the less developed countries to “centres of capital” (ibid.:x). The resulting examples of transmigrants produced by Glick Schiller and her collaborators, and followed by Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999), who use a
similar model, tend to describe workers from Caribbean, Central or South American countries, and the Philippines, who migrate to the United States. Once there, those migrants send back remittances, goods and other forms of support in order to retain and enhance their status and influence in their origin societies. Many intend to retire in their places of origin (Robinson 1984:235-6; Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:50-58), though in the meantime use the increasingly global economic system to simultaneously pursue family businesses or employment opportunities in multiple sites (ibid:54). In fact, Glick Schiller and her associates argue that while the increased proliferation and speed of transport and communications have facilitated the process of transmigration, it is the global restructuring of capital, and the drawing of most of the world into a single capitalist system, that has had the greatest impact on restructuring the nature of contemporary migration (Glick Schiller 1992b:8-9).

Portes and his associates (1999) take up the theme of transnational migration, and present the framework for a necessary argument as to why ‘transnationalism from below’\(^\text{12}\) can be conceptualised as an original phenomenon. While not specifically investing their analysis with the commitment to world systems theory evident in Glick Schiller’s approach, Portes et al. posit four reasons for the significance of transnational migration as a subject of inquiry: “the high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis” (ibid:219). Also, as a result of these – and other – factors, transnationalism has produced “a distinct form of immigrant adaptation to those described in the past literature” (ibid:227). The argument put forward by these writers is that, as transmigrants engage in such patterns of intense contact and exchange between both sending and receiving societies (and perhaps others as well), the two social fields actually merge, and create opportunities to pursue alternatives to the conventional path of settlement and “gradual but inevitable assimilation” (ibid.:228).

Whereas, previously, economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks

\(^{12}\) The term is used by Portes and others (Portes 1997a; Portes et al. 1999:221) to distinguish the activities of individual migrants, their families and social networks in both sending and receiving countries, from those of institutional actors such as transnational corporations, states and social movements, which may be characterised as 'transnationalism [or globalisation] from above'.
across national borders. For immigrants involved in transnational activities and their home country counterparts, success does not so much depend on abandoning their culture and language to embrace those of another society as on preserving their original cultural endowment, while adapting instrumentally to a second (Portes et al. 1999:229).

However, the phenomenon of transmigration is not merely a reconfiguration of the concept of the sojourn. Transmigrants are not sojourners, according to Glick Schiller and Basch, because they pursue integration into the receiving society.

However, at the very same time, they are engaged elsewhere in the sense that they maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they have emigrated (Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:48).

It is this ‘simultaneous embeddedness’ (ibid.) which characterises transmigrants, and marks their experience as part of an original social phenomenon. The imagery both Portes and Glick Schiller use to conceptualise this simultaneity is that of bringing the societies in which transnationals are engaged into a single social field. This is an attempt to disentangle social science from theories that posit societies as “discrete and bounded” entities (Glick Schiller et al. 1992b:6). Faist (1999) employs the concept of transnationalism to describe the same processes, although he reconfigures ‘social fields’ into ‘social space’, in which transnational migration is a “boundary-breaking process in which two (usually) or more nation-states are penetrated by and become part of a singular new social space” (Kivisto 2001:565). Minor differences in terminology aside, Faist’s conceptualisation of transnational migration aligns with those already described, in that the central feature is the persistence of sustained, high-density, cross-border ties of persons, networks and organisations (Faist 1999:2).

As these theorists describe them, transnational migrants – or transmigrants, in Glick Schiller’s terminology – represent a departure from the conventional process of migration. This is primarily because they have not uprooted themselves from their origin societies, but instead maintain property and business interests, as well as relationships there, and may actively participate in the politics of those societies as well
These are the “high-density” ties described by Faist as a defining characteristic of transmigration. Glick Schiller and her collaborators (1992b), as well as Portes (1997a) and his collaborators (1999) describe not only the ways in which transnational migrants mobilise to influence the local and national politics of their homelands, but also the ways in which homeland domestic politics — and politicians — follow the transmigrants to their new destinations. This is a significant shift from the suspicion and abandonment with which sending states have traditionally viewed their expatriate populations, as states recognise the influence transnationals may have in both societies (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:3-4; Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:57; Portes 1999:466-8).

In the same way that transmigrants experience leaving their homelands without being uprooted, so also do they pursue incorporation into host societies without necessarily intending for themselves or their families to settle permanently there. Transnational migrants may live in the receiving country but send their children back to be educated in their origin societies (Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:49). Others invest savings earned in the receiving country in real estate or in business ventures run by adult children, siblings or other extended family in the origin countries (ibid.:54). Some migrants — either on their own or as members of a transmigrant community — send remittances and contribute to special projects ‘back home’ as a status-building strategy, so that when they return for visits or in their retirement it is to a grateful and respectful community (Portes 1997:12). On the other hand, transmigrants may not have such an either/or orientation, choosing to forego an assumed primacy of loyalty and attachment to one place or the other, and rather may simply be living simultaneously in both locations, neither absolutely here or there, now or in the future (Glick Schiller & Basch 1995:56).

It is precisely this ambivalence which challenges the conventional assumptions about migrant settlement and assimilation, and their converse, the migrants’ return.

However, the use of the concept of transnationalism to describe a new or distinct phenomenon is not without controversy. Kivisto questions whether transnational migration — or transmigration — is actually either new or distinct. His argument against the concept as developed by the group of theorists identified above — Glick Schiller et al., Portes et al. and Faist — addresses three major issues. According to Kivisto, transnationalism is not a new occurrence; it is not a widespread phenomenon; and as a
concept it is an inadequate and unnecessary alternative to assimilation. These concerns must be addressed before any extension of the concept by others may be considered.

Arguments Against Transnationalism
Kivisto bases his argument that transnationalism, as described by the pro-transnationalism theorists, is not a new or distinct phenomenon on the fact that previous (pre-1960s) waves of migrants were not as completely uprooted as those theorists suggest, but instead maintained “interest and involvement” in their homelands. Further, he argues, most migrants seek to maintain at least some aspects of their origin culture, and preserve a “nostalgic symbolic ethnicity” (Kivisto 2001:562). However, these are not precisely the claims that the proponents of transnationalism make. Rather, the focus is not on ‘interest and involvement’ in homelands, but on a continued presence, and on sustained, high-density ties, as conceptualised in the notion that both origin and destinations are brought into a single social field (or social space, as Faist calls it). These ties are not merely symbolic and nostalgic, and the culture being practised and maintained by transnationals is not the reified and nostalgic culture often practised by the uprooted: rather, the cultural events and goods that Portes describes being traded by transnational entrepreneurs are both current and dialectical. The latest pop music and videos, this week’s newspapers and magazines, are now easily available – either in their traditional formats or on-line – to migrants intent on maintaining active ties. Portes et al. note that cultural and ethnic enterprises in the homeland may supply goods (such as hard-to-find food items) to compatriots in other countries in response to specific demand, while return migrants may establish small businesses supplying goods back to the homeland from the far-off lands from which they have returned (Portes et al. 2001:9).

In addition, Glick Schiller and her associates agree that transnational practices are not new, but that traditionally hegemonic discourses about migrant settlement – assimilation, in other words – actually shaped the ways in which those practices were previously noted and interpreted (Glick Schiller et al. 1995:51). On that basis, Kivisto is quite right to question how the experiences of past migrants might be reinterpreted to account for transnationalism as its proponents describe it. However, given the ways in which new technologies (making travel and communication more accessible) and the higher levels of various forms of capital available to many new migrants make
transnational strategies possible, it is unlikely that many in past waves of migration would have been able to pursue transnationalism to the extent more common today (Portes et al 1999:223-27).

Kivisto’s second argument is that transnationalism, as described by its proponents, is a phenomenon practised by relatively few contemporary migrants. Kivisto rightly points out that not all migrants are transmigrants. While the new technologies and social, human and economic capital that facilitate transnationalism may be more common, they are not universally available to all migrants. “Given these stipulations, it would appear that those that can actually be defined as transnational immigrants might in fact constitute a minority of today’s total immigrant population (Kivisto 2001:562). This point seems self-evident, and should hardly be considered an objection. The fact that migration and transmigration are not synonymous strengthens the case for a distinct concept to describe the experiences of the latter – albeit smaller – group.

Kivisto’s major complaint with those who would employ transnationalism as a new concept to describe the strategies and processes involved in contemporary migration is their attempt to present it as an alternative to the concept of assimilation. In addition to his general commitment to assimilation as an overarching concept, described earlier, Kivisto capitalises on the point made by Portes and his colleagues that the outcome for transnational migrants and their descendents may lead to assimilation (Portes et al 1999:228-29). According to Kivisto, if even its proponents believe it may lead to assimilation, then transnational migration need not be considered as a distinct concept (Kivisto 2001:563-64). As I argued earlier, however, the problem with assimilation as a concept is that it has only one ultimate outcome. As Portes and his colleagues point out, transnationalism posits several outcomes, of which assimilation is certainly one. However, other outcomes are also possible: return migration; intergenerational transnationalism; or extended transnationalism and the expansion of the social field via on-migration. Kivisto fails to grasp that, at its centre, transnationalism problematises the notion of settlement. As he argues,

... place counts. Even in transnational social spaces, place continues to count. Contrary to the image of transnational immigrants living simultaneously in two worlds, in fact the vast majority is at any moment located primarily in one
place. If the location where they spend most of their day-to-day lives is the receiving country, then over time the issues and concerns of that place will tend to take precedence over the more removed issues and concerns of the homeland (Kivisto 2001:571).

Settlement – permanent, or at least long-term – is assumed in received theories of migrant insertion and adaptation. This may explain why Kivisto is able to conflate the process of migrant insertion with the assumed endpoint, and refer to both as assimilation: his explanation of why most transnational migrants will ultimately assimilate is based on the assumption that they have actually settled, and that their location is stable. This is the assumption in the assimilation rubric, and indeed in most immigration theories, that transnationalism primarily challenges, as other trajectories are plausible and within reach.

For the reasons described, I find Kivisto’s arguments against the concept of transnationalism uncompelling. The practices described by proponents of theories of transnational migration are widespread and varied. They have implications for how we explain and conceptualise the insertion of migrants into recipient societies, particularly with regard to their settlement outcomes. A growing number of theorists and commentators have adopted the concept since Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton first advocated it, and have begun to explore transnational migration and its impact across an increasing variety of settings and actors.

Transnationalism Extended
As the concept of transnationalism has become more widely accepted by those who recognise its possibilities, it has also been applied more broadly than the specific phenomena studied by Glick Schiller, Portes and their respective collaborators. These theorists themselves acknowledge that under the rubric of ‘transnationalism’ there is room for any number of different strategies, experiences and outcomes (Portes et al. 1999:221). For example, as agents of those corporations and institutions pursuing transnationalism ‘from above’, Portes et al. (1999:221) describe diplomats and expatriate employees of multinational corporations as transnationals – elsewhere referred to as ‘professional transients’ and ‘capital-assisted’ migrants (Castles & Miller 1993:161). I would add to that list missionaries. As different as these groups are from
each other, they represent a significantly different manifestation of transnationalism from that engaged in by migrants who participate in hometown associations that are a source of remittances, as well as more ambitious community development projects in their countries of origin (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:2-4). Different also are the transnational entrepreneurs who Portes cites in several articles (1997b; 1999). Portes notes that such transnational networks and practices have been identified by other researchers of other migrant communities (Portes et al. 2001:9-12), which suggests that these transnational communities – and the entrepreneurs who cater to them – have begun to structure the increasingly-trafficked transnational social fields.

One extension of the concept of transnational migrants, significantly different from those previously mentioned, is embodied in the Chinese transnational capitalists described by Ong and Nonini (1997). The primary distinction between this group of transnational migrants and others lay in the direction of the flow of capital. Portes and his colleagues, and Glick Schiller and hers, mention these transnational capitalists in passing, but their focus remains firmly fixed on those migrants from countries “on the periphery of the developed world” (Portes et al. 2001:7) who are “forced to migrate to the countries of capital...” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:x). Modern Chinese transnational capitalists, on the other hand, draw on capital previously based in financial centres such as Hong Kong, and invest in long-range opportunities for capital accumulation in other parts of the world (Ong 1992)13. Ong specifically describes Chinese capitalists in the San Francisco Bay area, but could also refer to the activities of such capitalists in many other parts of Asia and the Pacific (Ong and Nonini 1997).

Kong (1999) also focuses on Chinese transnationalism in her study of the relatively small group of Singaporean transmigrants in Beijing, including both residents and those regularly commuting between the two locales (Kong 1999:572). Those in Kong’s study were not transnational capitalists, however, but were instead owners of local small businesses, or were those on corporate ‘tours of duty’. Like Ong and Nonini, Kong

13 Elsewhere, Ong and Nonini challenge as naïve such assertions as Glick Schiller’s that transmigrants by definition resist and transcend the ‘hegemonic constructions’ of states and global capitalist systems that ‘surround and dictate the terms of their existence’ (Glick Schiller, et al. 1992:13:11-12). Ong and Nonini argue instead that transnational Chinese capitalists, in pursuit of their own interests of capital accumulation, have by turns both subverted and supported existing repressive regimes (Ong and Nonini 1997:324-5).
extends Glick Schiller’s and Portes’ formulations of transmigration by applying the concept to migrants in quite a different context, who inhabit very different sets of political, historical and socio-cultural dynamics. In doing so, she further decouples the transmigrant experience from the periphery-to-core movement described above, and also from a context in which there is a well-established co-ethnic (or co-national) settler community. Kong also endorses Glick Schiller’s contention that transmigration must be viewed as being structured by global capitalism, when she quotes Findlay:

> the fact “that most states welcome skilled transients in an era when other forms of migration engender such hostility . . . attests to the economic benefits if not economic necessity perceived to be attached to this form of highly skilled migration” (Findlay 1995:521 – quoted in Kong 1999:573).

Kong’s study illuminates the ways in which a state can pursue a policy promoting the transnationalism of its citizens for the purposes of “enhancing their competitiveness and expanding Singapore’s economic space beyond its limited geographical boundaries” (ibid.). Singapore’s support of the transnational practices of its citizens that she describes is an extension of the tacit acceptance of transmigration by the sending states examined by Glick Schiller and Portes. At the same time, the Singaporean state has sought to reinforce a sense of national identity and nationalist commitment amongst those it has encouraged to pursue opportunities abroad. Kong identifies three aspects of the Singaporean state’s strategy, which include the promotion of a nationalist hegemonic discourse, developing supporting organisations to “help Singaporeans who study, work and reside abroad to maintain links with Singapore” and barring adult Singaporeans from holding dual citizenship (ibid.:573-576).

A key point that arises from Kong’s work, indeed from all the work on transnational migration, mentioned above, is that the phenomenon of transmigration challenges conventional discourses in both sending and receiving countries about the nature of migrant settlement and adaptation, and about the relationships between migrants and the societies amongst which they move. The contention made by Kong (1999:582) – that cultural identity is not a zero-sum equation, but rather that migrants’ cultural repertoire may expand to accommodate new circumstances and experiences – is not new (see, for instance, Yinger 1994). What is new, and what is motivating such a flurry of theorising
and research interest in the phenomenon of transnational migration, of ‘globalisation from below’, is the multiplicity of ways in which migrants actually are expanding their cultural repertoires rather than submitting to the assumptions (or demands) of receiving states that identity and national loyalty are a zero-sum equation. Also new are the extraordinary diversity of both the ends to which, and the means by which, migrants are exploiting the transnational social spaces in which they live. These factors may go quite a long way towards helping to develop the concept of transnationalism, and to theorise the possible future trajectories of today’s transmigrants. These are issues to be discussed with reference to the contribution of microsociological theorising, in the next section.

Shifting the focus finally to New Zealand, in the last several years a number of writers have identified different groups of Asian migrants as transnational migrants (Ho et al. 1996; Beal and Sos 1999; Ip 2000; Ho 2002), and begun to pursue explanations that challenge conventional approaches to migration and settlement. Ip, as one such writer, argues that Chinese transnationalism in the New Zealand context is a characteristic of class rather than culture. She points out that many other migrants to New Zealand — including Britons and South Africans — engage in the frequent short-term departures, as well as long-term returns to their countries of origin, which typically are identified as activities unique to Asian transnationals.

Ip’s argument is that such mobility is becoming more common amongst middle class professionals, regardless of ethnicity or residence status in New Zealand. In explaining the transnational phenomenon amongst ethnic Chinese migrants in New Zealand, Ip cites as problematic both the conventional notions of permanent settlement and the over-simplified and reactionary characterisation of such transmigrants as ‘disloyal’ or as cynical manipulators of bureaucratic systems, who employ their ‘astronaut’ strategy in order to exploit New Zealand’s social and environmental resources for their own gain (Ip 2000:3-4, 14-15). Ip seeks to deflect such criticism from Chinese immigrants to

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14 Ip highlights the fact that Britain has been the leading source of migrants to New Zealand (in terms of residency approvals) for all but two years in the 1990s, when the numbers of migrants from Britain were eclipsed from Hong Kong in 1991 and Taiwan in 1995 (Ip 2000:6). Britons also top the list for long-term departures. According to Ip, between 1990 and 2000, “half of the British migrants . . . eventually went home (58,739 Britons arrived and 29,920 departed from New Zealand long term in the last decade, far out-numbering any group from Asia)” (ibid.:7).
New Zealand. She points out, for example, that the very qualities which make them desirable migrants to New Zealand, “young, highly-educated, highly trained professionals, technocrats and business entrepreneurs” (ibid.:8), also make them desirable to other countries of immigration, as well as to the countries from which they have emigrated. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that such individuals are able to pursue opportunities across a variety of potential destinations.

Ho (2002) also addresses the phenomenon of transnational migrants in New Zealand and, although Ho’s studies have focused particularly on migrants from Hong Kong, she highlights work by others to stress that Asians present but one manifestation of transnationalism in the New Zealand context. Ho cites two other examples, which have tended to be overshadowed by the relatively recent and, in New Zealand terms, novel phenomenon of Asian transmigration. The first example of other transnationalism in the New Zealand settling referred to by Ho concerns the Pacific peoples, who have, “for many years, used a collective strategy of building multi-local, multi-national communities of kin to maximise opportunities for education and employment for their own generations as well as for future generations” (Ho 2002:148). Spoonley and others describe the institutional nature of what they call ‘an emergent Pacific diaspora’ (Spoonley, Bedford & Macpherson 2003:27), encompassing the island nations of Samoa, Tonga Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau, whose citizens have become increasingly transnational since the end of the second World War. Discussing the density of traffic in the circulation of people, capital, goods and ideas across Oceania and the Pacific basin, these writers stress the significance of the New Zealand-born populations of Pacific peoples, and the demographic shift relative to those in the ‘homelands’ (ibid.:34-35), as well as the economic benefit to those homeland village communities and kin networks, by way of remittances. They estimate, for example, that in 1989, remittances comprised nearly half of Tonga’s GDP (ibid.:37). In such instances, transmigration becomes an economic strategy adopted, not so much by states, but by villages and family groups.

These diasporic peoples also create demand for exported goods from the homelands, which in turn give rise to such economic and social phenomena as the Otara market in South Auckland, New Zealand’s largest open-air market, where goods and foodstuffs from across the Pacific may be purchased from stalls run by Pacific transnational
entrepreneurs (de Bruin and Dupuis 1999). Like Portes’ and Glick Schiller’s descriptions of the economic activities of transnational communities and cultural enterprises to which they give rise, Spoonley and his collaborators contend that “[i]t is now routine for containers to circulate between Auckland and Apia, Sydney and Nukualofa, bringing Island-produced goods or foods, to be replaced by second-hand clothing, household appliances or tinned food. . . [which] represents an important point of connection and a set of reciprocal obligations that sustain transnationalism” (Spoonley et al 2003:37).

The second example of common-but-overlooked New Zealand transnationalism, in the form of multi-local families highlighted by Ho, is the steady movement of New Zealanders overseas, particularly to Australia, but also to the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Ho 2002:148). New Zealanders have always ventured off-shore. The OE – that is, the ‘overseas experience’ taken by many young New Zealanders in search of work and cultural experiences in settings such as Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and so forth – has been a particular rite of passage that generations of New Zealanders have experienced when they have completed their formal education. Indeed, many who leave New Zealand stay away for considerable periods: there are an estimated 500,000 New Zealanders living overseas, and a further estimated 300,000 children born elsewhere with at least one New Zealand-born parent (Collins 2001:A5). According to Bushnell and Choy (2001) the number of the New Zealand-born living overseas is equal to fifteen percent of New Zealand’s resident population. Two-thirds of overseas New Zealanders reside in Australia (Bushnell and Choy 2001:7). Australia’s dominance in the transnational experience of many New Zealanders is further emphasised in the fact that half of all people leaving New Zealand since the early 1980s have gone to Australia; a further fifth went to the United Kingdom (ibid.). There is a particular irony that disquiet over the recent influx of Asian transmigrants has been one of the factors which motivated a spate of public hand-wringing over New Zealand’s so-called ‘brain drain’ (Bushnell and Choy 2001). This, in turn, directed the attention of politicians and business leaders in New Zealand towards the potential for replicating amongst New Zealanders living overseas the same sorts of transnational networks in which Asians living in New Zealand engage. However, for their transnational activities, the Asians have been attacked by others in New Zealand as ‘disloyal’ (Ip 2000:3-4).
I have argued in this section that conventional sociological theories of migrant incorporation, based on the concept of assimilation, have historically adopted the same normative stance that was prominent in public policy and discourse. In more recent times, assimilation theories have become more critically applied, although the concept remains teleological, despite Kivisto's insistence to the contrary. That is, implicit in the notion of assimilation is the presumed endpoint, which is the gradual elimination of difference between groups. Contemporary theorists grappling with the need to explain other forms of migrant adaptation, which are premised neither on assimilation nor necessarily even on stable settlement, have posited the concept of transnationalism as an alternative. The individuals and communities theorised in the literature as ‘transnational’ commonly embody increasingly expanding transnational social fields created by sustained, high-density ties between origins and destinations. The extensive variation in the experiences so described supports Portes' contention that the concept of transnational migration – or transmigration – may be fruitfully exploited in order to explore the characteristics and experiences these groups have in common.

However, such a diversity of forms, experiences, conditions and outcomes also challenges the coherence of the concept, and can lead to circumstances in which the experiences of quite different groups of migrants are conflated and analysed as though they were synonymous. Kong’s research is an example of this uncritical application of the concept. In researching the experiences of Singaporean migrants in Beijing, Kong’s participants were both resident business owners and those on corporate assignments; yet in her analysis of the interview data she does not appear to have controlled for the very significant differences between those who would migrate and settle in order to establish local businesses, and others on what are usually fixed-term overseas assignments as representatives of multinational corporations. The differences between these two groups is so great that in many jurisdictions they fall under completely different classifications: in New Zealand, for instance, those on corporate assignments are granted work permits rather than residence visas, and are not considered immigrants at all. Transnationals they may be, as are the diplomats and missionaries mentioned earlier. However, one must proceed from the starting-point that the processes surrounding their settlement (or ‘tour of duty’, as may be more appropriate), adaptation and identity are almost certainly different from those who migrate with the intention of
long-term or permanent settlement. Portes' point — that, in order to legitimately be considered a 'concept', the rubric of transnationalism must be general enough to account for different manifestations and experiences of cross-border or multi-local activities — is a valid one. However, it must be emphasised that these various forms of migrant behaviour challenge conventional notions of adjustment and settlement, identity and loyalties. They must, therefore, be able distinctly to be identified in order to allow us to examine those experiences and their distinct implications. The diplomat and missionary may both be transnational, but their experiences, aspirations and expectations of settlement and adjustment necessarily will be different. They will be different again from the Pacific peoples in New Zealand, as well as from the newer Asian transnationals. The circumstances of migration, including the motives and aspirations tied up in the decisions to migrate, will influence the experiences and perceptions of the migrants, and must be able to be identified and differentiated when examining the patterns of adjustment, settlement (or circulation) and identity. These issues — embedded as they are in assignments of meaning — are explored most effectively by interpretive approaches, as discussed in the following section.

Interpretive Views: Theorising Individual Incorporation

A number of the critical questions posed by the phenomenon of transnational migration, and efforts to explain it, are difficult to address because their answers reside in the individuals who engage in practices identified as transnational. Kivisto highlights this fact when he questions whether the children of those currently engaged in transnational migration will replicate the transnational strategies in the next generation. Of course, this question is not presently answerable. The factors that contribute to decisions to maintain transnational social fields are embedded in the meanings, motives and aspirations of transnational migrants and their families. Given that transnational migrants have the resources which allow them to maintain deep ties across national boundaries, the question of whether they will eventually assimilate, posed by Kivisto earlier, must surely be answered, at least in part, by addressing whether they wish to do so. That is, the question is related to their motivation to develop and maintain a transnational, rather than conventional, migrant identity, and their aspiration to settle, return, or continue to engage in some form of transnationalism. These are interpretive questions, best addressed by researchers operating in the mezzo and micro realms of
social research. These researchers must appeal to notions of identity, motives and aspirations, which are worked out in what Rumbaut calls “the crucible within” – the individually-negotiated phenomenal field in which subjective experiences are processed (Rumbaut 1994:752). Briefly noted here, this concept is developed further in Chapter Four as the “habitat of meaning”, a concept suggested by Bauman and begun to be developed by Hannerz (1996).

In this latter half of the chapter, I will address the issues of the identities, motivations and aspirations of migrants, and why they are crucial to determining the current and future manifestations of transnational migration. These questions must be worked out, not only in the lives of the current generation of transmigrants, but – more importantly, if Kivisto’s question about the future of transnationalism is to be answered – in the lives of their children.

**Migrant Identities, Motives and Aspirations**

Several of the studies already mentioned in this chapter take into account the importance of considering the subjective elements of migrants’ experiences in theorising settlement outcomes. Of particular relevance is the manner in which migrants negotiate their identities in receiving societies. These studies look past the structural and statistical factors that often comprise migration research – such as demographic profiles, employment and naturalisation figures and surveys into language and cultural acquisition – to grapple interpretively with the meanings that migrants themselves ascribe to those experiences. By way of illustration, I will briefly revisit several researchers cited in the earlier discussion of transnationalism, and show how attention paid to migrants’ own processes of negotiating their identities forms an important – even determining – feature of theorising transnational migration. The examples to be addressed are: Kong, and her study of Singaporean transnationals in Beijing; Ip, with her explanations for the development of transnational strategies amongst Chinese in New Zealand; the work of Ho and others in studying the aspirations of migrant adolescents in New Zealand; and Zhou’s exploration of ‘parachute’ children in California.
Singaporean Transnationals in Beijing

Kong’s study explored the effects of transmigration on migrants’ own perceptions of identity, within the context of a form of transnationalism promoted by a sending state, which also takes steps to reinforce a sense of national identity and commitment over its expatriate citizens. While the Singaporean state attempts to draw a boundary around its citizens abroad, how do those citizens themselves identify and negotiate the boundaries between themselves and the host society? To address this question, Kong conducted a series of interviews around themes which included ‘migration motivations, adaptation processes, national identity and ethnic identity’ (Kong 1999:572). Kong’s research participants indicated that notions of identity did become problematised, that conventional notions of a stable, grounded national identity sat uncomfortably alongside emerging globalised identities as a result of their transnational experiences. Participants’ sense of their Singaporeanness was challenged by a growing sense of hybridity, of in-betweenness, of contingency. Notions of ‘home’ became problematic, as some participants acknowledged that the sense of historical attachment they felt for Singapore as their place of origin did not preclude the transfer of primary identification to their new setting, Beijing (Kong 1999:582-4).

Another factor that shaped the identity of many transnational migrants in Kong’s study was the response they perceived from the host society in Beijing. Despite their assumptions (albeit qualified) of a shared ethnicity and the anticipated appeal to a common Chineseness, many in Kong’s sample did not feel that they were accepted by the host society, perceiving instead as though they had been treated as foreigners by the Beijing Chinese. Such resistance, which I will revisit in Chapter 4 amongst 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in New Zealand, constitutes a type of boundary construction, and reinforces Wallman’s (1979) thesis that the boundaries around communities, whether ethnic or – as in this case – transnational, are constructed both from the inside and from the outside.

Chinese Transnationals in New Zealand

In attempting to deflect what she views as unwarranted criticism of Chinese transnational migrants in New Zealand, Ip’s argument relies on an appeal to meanings and motives that lay behind the numbers of those Chinese New Zealand residents or citizens who engage in transnational activities. An important point made by Ip
addresses the long-standing New Zealand tradition of the OE, introduced earlier. Ip suggests that it is reasonable that the aspiration for the OE would be shared by many migrants as well. Given the unsatisfactory employment or investment outcomes for so many Asian migrants in New Zealand, some are prepared either to return, on-migrate, or adopt the ‘astronaut’ lifestyle as a survival strategy (Ip 2000:9). In this last sense, according to Ip, the transnational characteristics and behaviour of many ethnic Chinese – and perhaps other – migrants in New Zealand may be not so much by design and intent as it may be motivated by sheer necessity. Drawing on Skeldon’s (1992) characterisation of emigrants from Hong Kong in the lead-up to that territory’s return to China in 1997 as “Reluctant Exiles”, perhaps these individuals may be referred to as “Reluctant Transmigrants”.

Ho also reinforces Ip’s contention that the ‘astronaut’ phenomenon has been motivated largely by difficulties faced by migrants in establishing business ventures or gaining suitable employment in New Zealand. This argument is made even more forcefully by Beal and Sos (1999:9-10), whose study into Taiwanese transmigrants in New Zealand and Australia found that ‘astronauts’ felt a great sense of failure at not having achieved their business or employment aspirations in their destination countries. However, according to Beal and Sos (1999:57-8), given that these migrants were motivated by lifestyle aspirations as much as by economic factors, it was seen to be preferable to adopt the ‘astronaut’ strategy so that the rest of the family could benefit from the social, environmental and educational opportunities in New Zealand, while the breadwinner returned to Taiwan to continue earning the family income. The position held by both Ho, and Beal and Sos, is that these intentional migrants have indeed become reluctant transnationals.

The interplay of these interpretive factors, and their impact on New Zealand migrant adolescents’ educational and occupational aspirations, was the subject of a 1995 survey of 500 immigrant students from Asia, described by Ho, Chen, Kim and Young (1996). Most of the participants in their study found New Zealand secondary schooling was less

15 Ho shares Ip’s position that the concept of ‘astronaut’ is dated, and most appropriately describes a phenomenon that was more wide-spread in the 1990s than now. The patterns of transnationalism have since expanded and become more structured, evolving into what Ho refers to as “the transnational family phenomenon – families that are now based in two or more countries and retain close links with their homelands” (Ho 2002:145-6).
competitive and stressful than in their countries of origin, despite experiences of racism, and the pressures associated with adjustment and acculturation (Ho et al 1996:15-18). These students had high educational aspirations – most intended to pursue university degrees, with a significant minority (up to a third) intending to pursue doctoral studies (ibid.:18-21). Such aspirations reflect their families’ cultural emphasis on education, as well as their motives for migrating to New Zealand in the first place (ibid.:24). Their intention to earn desired placements in competitive university programmes motivated participants to choose school subjects in which they could compete on a more equal footing with their New Zealand-born peers, such as maths and sciences, while instrumentally avoiding English (ibid: 4-5,9).

Most of the migrant adolescents in the 1995 survey aspired to professional and managerial occupations, or self employment and, despite expressing satisfaction with life in New Zealand, only a small proportion indicated a desire to pursue careers in New Zealand (Ho et al 1996:46-49). One reason for this apparent contradiction was the widespread perception among the participants – perhaps reinforced by the difficulties in gaining suitable employment faced by their parents and other middle-class professionals from Asian migrant communities – that in New Zealand the opportunities to work in the professions to which they aspired, or at the levels they intended, were more limited than they were in their countries of origin, or elsewhere, such as the United States and Australia (ibid.:46). Ironically, the aspirations to work overseas, held by so many of the migrant adolescents in the sample, contradicted the desire of most of the migrant parents surveyed by Ho and her colleagues, who expressed the desire for their children to pursue careers in New Zealand (ibid.:46-48).

While their work addressed the lacuna of empirical studies regarding Asian adolescent migrants in New Zealand, the report by Ho and her colleagues did not address “the process and meanings of . . . identity construction” (Park 1999:141) experienced by these migrants. However, the research pointed to the problematic notions of settlement, belonging and ‘home’ confronting both new migrants to New Zealand, and the society that hosts them.
In her exploration of the phenomenon of Chinese ‘parachute children’ in southern California, Zhou (1998) suggests that educational and political considerations motivate these migration decisions. Zhou argues firstly that the education systems in the source countries of such migrants to that area of the United States – Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and Singapore – are extremely competitive, with large populations of students vying for relatively few places in universities (ibid.:4). Young people who aspire to a university education must endure the stress of both working consistently and very hard over the course of years, and having to excel ‘on the day’ in annual entrance exams (ibid.:12). Parents with sufficient means, who believe that their children may not be able to compete on such terms, or who desire a less stressful existence for them, may choose to opt out of those systems, and ‘purchase’ education for their children overseas (ibid.:4). New Zealand has realised amongst such families a growth market for ‘export education’. According to the New Zealand Ministry of Education, the number of Foreign Fee Paying (FFP) students has been rising steadily throughout the 1990s. In 2001, more than 90% of primary and secondary school FFP students were citizens of countries in Asia (Ministry of Education 2002:3). The growth trend from 1996 is illustrated in the following table, reproduced from the Ministry’s report on FFP students to 2001 (ibid.:40).

**Figure 3.1**

Foreign Fee-paying Students in New Zealand Primary and Secondary Schools, 1996 - 2001
Another dynamic affecting migrants’ motivations, highlighted by Zhou, is the consideration of political factors. Prior to the 1997 return of Hong Kong to Chinese administration, a great many people in Hong Kong applied for residence abroad, and many entered into arrangements so that their children could ‘parachute’ (Zhou 1998:4). Uncertain relations with China also motivated families in Taiwan to pursue contingencies through migration (ibid.). Taiwan’s policy of national service for all males over 18 causes many Taiwanese families to consider migration, for their sons if not the entire family. It is this reason, Zhou argues, that “explains why Taiwanese dominate the parachuting phenomenon”, as “boys over 15 years of age are forbidden to leave [Taiwan] for any extended period of time to prevent fraud” (ibid.:5). Parents wishing for their sons to avoid national service must therefore make arrangements for them to be out of Taiwan before they turn 15. The combined educational and political factors make a strong argument for why many families in such circumstances take the decision to disrupt the routine flow of their lives and migrate across national borders.

Explanations such as Zhou’s provide a far more nuanced and sophisticated approach to the important question of the motives and aspirations of migrants than that offered by Portes and Rumbaut (1990) in their discussion of the migration of professionals and managers to the United States. Despite noting that in 1987 the top five source countries for such migrants (Philippines, India, Great Britain, China and Taiwan) span a vast range of cultural, societal, economic and structural differences, as well as differing historical and economic relations with the U.S., Portes and Rumbaut ascribe a single motive for all: “the gap between available salaries and work conditions in their own countries and those regarded there as acceptable for people with their education” (Portes & Rumbaut 1990:18). Their purely materialist argument, that “[p]rofessionals who earn enough at home to sustain a middle-class standard of living and who are reasonably satisfied about their chances for advancement seldom migrate” (ibid.:19), entirely ignores the motives of ontological security for those in countries caught in uneasy relations with powerful neighbours. It ignores also parents’ aspirations for their children, which may encompass educational, environmental and security factors as well as instrumental or economic ones, in addition to a more general preparation and positioning of their children to participate in a global milieu. Portes and Rumbaut surprisingly overlook the international market for highly-skilled professionals, or the concept of circulation as a long-term strategy (both economic and cultural), or the risks
East Asian middle-class parents take when they exit rigid and highly competitive educational and occupational structures in their countries of origin, knowing that doing so makes it very difficult to return (Orellana et al. 2001:576). In fact, Orellana and her colleagues, to whom I shall return later, offer a sharp rebuke to explanations as narrowly focused as that presented by Portes and Rumbaut, for overlooking the great importance of children in families’ considerations of migration.

Scholars who ignore children’s presence and participation in processes of migration, framing them as baggage that weighs down adult migrants, neglect a central axis of family migration, and an important reason why families move across national borders and sustain transnational ties. Adult-centred studies of migration also obscure ways in which children actively shape the nature of their families’ journeys, the spaces they move in, and their experiences within those social fields. And in shaping those journeys, the children of immigrants shape their own trajectories as well (Orellana et al. 2001:588 – emphasis original).

Orellana and her collaborators suggest that by ignoring these dynamics in the ascription of motives for migration, analysts are bound to misinterpret the adaptation strategies and aspirations of migrants as well. Efforts to explain migrants’ trajectories are necessarily limited, without first accounting for their journeys, including the extent to which the presence of children in the equation affects how the decisions about whether to migrate or stay, settle or return are made (ibid.:578).

Migrant Generations

While in recent years there has been an increased focus on the children of adult migrants – most often on second-generation children – much of the literature produced has been demographic, medical or psychological in nature. As a result, we are able to learn more about migrant children’s oral hygiene and dental health (Aurelius & Lindstrom 1980; Cipes & Castaldi 1980; Woolfolk et al. 1984), or about their psychiatric disorders (Munroeblum et al 1989; Ratzoni 1991; Louden 1995), or behavioural problems (Sowa et al 2000; Furnham & Adam-Saib 2001), than we are to find scholarly accounts of the strategies immigrant youth employ to make sense of, and adjust to, their new circumstances, or the degree to which they are actually engaged with the host society of their country of immigration. On this basis Kyeyoung Park...
could justifiably claim in 1999 that “no one has done research on the process and meanings of 1.5 generation Asian Americans’ identity construction” (Park 1999:141).

Though increasingly acknowledged to be a special class of migrants, the concept of the 1.5 generation has yet to develop generally agreed-upon parameters. Rumbaut, an early theorist of the “one-and-a-half generation”, stipulates that they will have migrated before the age of twelve (Rumbaut 1994:759). On the other hand, Park’s conceptualisation of the term stems from the discourses within migrant communities in the United States. Park notes that, since the 1970s, Korean Americans have used particular terminology to refer to child migrants, as situated between the first and second generations (Park 1999:140). Park traces the development of the term to the Japanese community in Hawaii, who refer to this category of migrants as the “knee-high” generation (ibid.). According to Park, early formulations of the concept of the 1.5 generation differed across Korean migrant communities in different parts of the United States. Some applied the concept to those who migrated in middle to late adolescence, while others included younger children, or young adults, as well (ibid.:140-42). The general agreement amongst these views, however, is that those who migrated as very young children – before school age – usually have been considered to be second generation (ibid.: 141).

Zhou has also noted the inconsistent application of the concept of the 1.5 generation, and suggests that the determination is often made on the basis of presumed stages of socialisation. Thus, “children between 6 and 13 years of age [are conceived of] as 1.5-generation children and those arriving as adolescents (aged 13 to 17) . . . are similar to first-generation children” (Zhou 1997a:64). While there undoubtedly are significant differences in the socialisation experiences between those who migrate before and after reaching adolescence, I contend that other factors make even the older group different enough from their parents to be conceptualised differently. Of the two most prominent differences between migrant adolescents and their parents, one refers to processes that occur prior to migration, the other to those occurring after they arrive. The latter relates to their continuing socialisation in the receiving society: migrant adolescents attend school, and are thus immersed in the culture of the host society in ways their parents rarely can be. The former process differentiating migrant adolescents from their parents has to do with the decision to migrate, and the relative degree of autonomy and
authority parents and children exercise in making the decision to migrate. Children may
be consulted in the matter, but rarely are they in a position to decide for themselves to
migrate, nor are they necessarily able to process the long-term implications that such a
decision is likely to have on their lives. For these reasons, I suggest that the term 1.5
generation should refer to children, aged between six and eighteen years, who migrate
as part of a family unit, but who have experienced at least some of their formative
socialisation in the country of origin.

As already alluded to, some scholars (Park among them) recently have begun placing
the sociological concerns of migrant children – both 1.5 and second generation – at the
centre of empirical work, and have begun to explore both the adaptation strategies of
these groups, and the meanings with which their experiences are invested. Some, such
as Orellana and her collaborators, focus specifically on the dynamics of the family unit,
and on the children’s experiences as members of migrant families. For others, such as
Park (1999) and Zhou (1997a), migrant children’s family relationships comprise just
one element – significant as it is – in the whole-of-life experiences of migration and
adjustment for 1.5 and second-generation migrants. Both perspectives reinforce the fact
that migrant children are a special category of migrants, with their own sets of issues
and experiences of adjustment which are markedly different from those of migrant
adults. They experience unique challenges, in addition to the pressures of displacement,
adjustment and alienation which confront nearly all migrants, of whatever age. In the
process, the intergenerational relationships – what Orellana et al. (2001:578) refer to as
the “moving dialectic of child and adult agency”, between ‘growing up’ (from the
child’s perspective) and ‘bringing up’ (from the parents’) – are re-shaped and re-
positioned, though not necessarily re-negotiated, by the experience of migration.

Such disjunctures in the normal parent-child relationships in migrant families produce
what Zhou, citing Portes and Rumbaut, refers to as ‘generational dissonance’ (Zhou
1997a:81) when immigrant parents’ position of authority is threatened by their
children’s (usually faster) acculturation. Zhou, framing generational conflict with
specific reference to ‘growing up American’, notes that the different generations tend to
configure the challenges of migration from different perspectives. Immigrant children,
on the one hand, struggle with fitting into their new environment immediately, “based
on a frame of reference that they have acquired from their American peers and from
television and other forms of mass media” (ibid.). Their parents, on the other hand, struggle to maintain family values and stability in the midst of change, which tends to lead them “to focus on the future and to emphasise discipline and scholastic achievement” (ibid.). The vignette played out between these two positions illustrates the ways in which the ‘moving dialectic’ between children and their parents is made even more complex as a result of migration.

How do I fit into American culture and my own ethnic culture at the same time? Which side should I stay loyal to, American or my own ethnic culture? Can I ever become American without leaving home? . . .

Why are my children so disrespectful? How can I make my children understand that everything I am doing is for their own good? Can’t they understand that I wouldn’t have chosen a life here if it hadn’t been for them? What should I do to keep my children from losing their cultural roots and from assimilating too much? (Zhou 1997a:81).

On the other hand, Zhou and Bankston (1994) present an example of generational consonance – that is, the dynamic in which both migrant generations acculturate at similar rates, or at least agree on selective acculturation (Zhou 1997a:81) – in their study of a Vietnamese migrant community in urban New Orleans. In this case, an ethnic community which began with refugees in the mid 1970s, and which has since been augmented via chain migration, resides in an economically depressed area peopled almost entirely by ‘racial’ minorities. These Vietnamese families and their African-American neighbours, according to Zhou and Bankston, “are clustered in the poorest part of a poor area in a poor city in a poor State” (Zhou & Bankston, III 1994:828). Their socioeconomic and geographic locations make the younger generations in this community vulnerable to what the authors refer to as the “disruptive social factors typical of urban ghettos” (ibid.:838): gang involvement, substance abuse, school dropout rates and continuing cycles of poverty and marginalisation.

Parents in this community are aware of the possibility that their children risk following the trend described by Portes and Zhou as segmented assimilation (1993). This is a settlement trajectory in which racialised immigrant minorities find themselves unable to
advance beyond the menial jobs undertaken by their parents as previous (white) immigrant generations had done, and instead remain confined amongst the permanently subordinated and disadvantaged (Portes & Zhou 1993:489). To combat that possible negative outcome, the Vietnamese community in New Orleans has adopted a strategy of ‘strong normative integration’, placing a high value on education and occupational attainment of the younger generations (Zhou & Bankston, III 1994:830-1). Through mobilising social and cultural capital, via strong family and community relations, members of the ethnic community are able to encourage an ethic amongst younger members which serves to build human and economic capital as well. Zhou and Bankston argue that such a strategy is founded not simply on the cultural orientations of the Vietnamese community, but actually arises from a self-conscious response to the social environment in which they are embedded:

In disadvantaged neighbourhoods where difficult conditions and disruptive elements are often found, immigrant families may have to consciously preserve traditional values by means of ethnic solidarity to prevent the next generation from assimilating into the underprivileged segments of American society in which their community is located (ibid:841-2).

Ironically – because educational success is generally accepted to be a marker of successful migrant acculturation (see Leung 2001:8) – what emerges as a cultural orientation towards family life, educational success and occupational aspiration, is actually perceived by this particular ethnic community as running counter to the prevailing norms of the (localised) host society, and to what leading members of the ethnic community perceive to be negative aspects of American culture. Aided by dense community networks in which children are monitored closely and constantly, and which normatively reinforce parental authority,

... families emphasised obedience, industriousness, and helping others but discouraged egoistic values of independent thinking and popularity, which are most commonly associated with contemporary American society. ... Moreover, [children] are pressured to avoid hanging out too much with non-Vietnamese children in the neighbourhood, dating non-Vietnamese, and becoming “too American.” These Vietnamese family values constitute a source
What Zhou and Bankston describe is a process of selective adaptation, referred to as ‘adhesive adaptation’ by Hurh and Kim (1984). The terms are used to refer to the process whereby “certain aspects of the new culture and social relations with members of the host society are added on to the immigrants’ traditional culture and social networks, without replacing or modifying any significant parts of the old” (Hurh & Kim 1984:188). This model of selective, adhesive or additive acculturation (Portes and Rumbaut 1990:214) further problematises conventional notions of zero-sum assimilation by suggesting that migrants can – for different reasons, under differing conditions and with varying degrees of success – critically add components of the host culture (such as language, education, etc.), while also taking steps to preserve important elements of their origin cultures (also including language, as well as ideologies and structures of family, work ethic, etc.). Portes and Rumbaut suggest that additive acculturation has not been the norm amongst migrants to the US – given that most migrant groups have typically become English monolinguals by the third generation (ibid.:183). However, they do acknowledge that, in a comprehensive study of secondary school students in the San Diego School District carried out in the mid-1980s, students whose migrant parents (from a variety of source countries, including those in East Asia, South Asia and Europe) were highly educated professionals on high incomes, and who maintained relationships within ethnic networks, were more likely than other migrants to have successfully employed an additive strategy and become fluent bilinguals. Moreover, the combined effect of all these factors – social class, intact family unit and active involvement with an ethnic community – contributed to make those fluent bilingual students amongst the highest achieving participants in the population of nearly 40,000 students in the study (Portes and Rumbaut 1990: Chapter 6).

Other research, such as that undertaken by Hurh and Kim (1984), suggests that adhesive acculturation, as an ‘alternative strategy’ – in their case, for Koreans in southern California – is the result of a similar combination of factors as those described by Portes and Rumbaut. However, in addition to families’ socioeconomic background and location within ethnic communities, which in Hurh and Kim’s research were designated
as structural and situational variables, the authors added what they refer to as psychological factors – that is, immigrants’ subjective perceptions of their situation. Additionally, Hurh and Kim explicitly introduced the same set of variables present within the host society as an additional layer to the equation determining migrant acculturation strategies. They argue that the socioeconomic structures in the host society that define the conditions into which migrants locate, as well as the ‘psychological’ factor of the dominant group’s perceptions of migrants, are equally important in defining the circumstances under which migrants may choose an adhesive acculturation strategy. Though Hurh and Kim rather clumsily ascribe the concentration of ethnic groups in enclaves such as Koreatown in Los Angeles to the “imposed ethnic segregation . . . of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States” (Hurh & Kim 1984:209),¹⁶ their focus on the prevailing socioeconomic climate and the circumstances determining migrant groups’ engagement with the host society highlights important factors of migrants’ experiences that the analysis by Portes and Rumbaut downplays. Given the significant shift in source countries amongst migrants in the United States from Europe towards Asia, a trend mirrored in New Zealand, researchers must remain sensitive to commensurate shifts in the host society’s reactions to migration and to migrant groups, as an important feature of migrants’ settlement and adjustment experiences.

The notions that the reception given by the host society shapes the settlement experiences of migrants, and that migrants’ acculturation need not be accompanied by a commensurate sense of belonging, are not new developments (see Gordon 1964: Chapter 3). However, there is a continuing challenge to reconcile these interpretive, ‘mezzo’ and microsociological elements with the macro level factors (such as migrants’ socioeconomic and geographic distribution, rates of endogamy, language acquisition, academic and occupational success, etc.) to create a more integrated and comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework for studying migrant assimilation. Alba and Nee (1997) cite elements of Shibutani and Kwan’s 1965 work on ethnic stratification in the United States as offering a mechanism that links micro and macro levels of analysis. According to Alba and Nee, the earlier authors’ concept of social distance – “the subjective state of nearness felt to certain individuals” (ibid.:835) – provides a way to

¹⁶ Contrast, for instance, the discussion by Alba and Nee (1997:854-856) concerning the residential assimilation of non-white migrants into suburban neighbourhoods in the US.
explain systems of ethnic stratification which may persist, particularly for non-whites, despite movement towards assimilation on other levels.

When social distance is low, there is a feeling of common identity, closeness, and shared experiences. But when social distance is high, people perceive and treat the other as belonging to a different category; and even after long acquaintance, there are still feelings of apprehension and reserve (ibid: 836).

This is the point that Espiritu (1994) makes when she questions whether the children of middle-class migrants of colour, having achieved structural integration in the United States, will further emulate earlier European migrants and assimilate as well, limiting their engagement with the origin cultures to what Gans (1979) called “symbolic ethnicity”. Arguing that the racialisation of people of colour is the prerogative of the powerful, and that non-whites are incapable of becoming “the invisible against which others’ visibility is measured” (Espiritu 1994:251), Espiritu posits that the children of such migrants are forced “to confront simultaneously the political pressure for assimilation and the racism that signals to them that they will never be accepted” (ibid.:253 – emphasis original). In her study of second-generation Filipinos in the US, Espiritu describes the social distance between Asian and “white” Americans – those unhyphenated Americans possessing the power to “fix the co-ordinates of self-other identity formation” (ibid.:251) – as being maintained by both institutional practices and personal prejudice, a different manifestation of the “feelings of apprehension and reserve” described by Alba and Nee.

The ‘In-betweenness’ of the 1.5 and 2nd Generations

For many 1.5 and second generation Asian migrants, the realisation that their non-white status produces social distance between themselves and the majority population is one of a number of factors which results in a sense of ‘in-betweenness’ that operates and manifests on a number of levels (Min & Kim 1999:219; Park 1999:145). In addition to being caught between the pressure to assimilate and racist barriers hindering – if not preventing – assimilation, described by Espiritu, there are at least three other ‘in-betweens’ which impact on the identity of these migrants, creating multiple and hyphenated identities, and multiple notions of ‘home’ (Wolf 1997:473). They are: in-
between origin and destination societies; in-between childhood and adulthood; and in-between the majority and other minority or indigenous cultures in the host society. These special features of the 1.5 generation experience must be empirically explored if theorists are to draw conclusions about the future of transnational migration as an enduring feature of the social landscape. This is especially true for cases such as New Zealand where, because their children’s educational opportunities is such an important motivation, many of the ‘new’ migrants from east Asia to come to New Zealand with school-aged children.

In-between Sending and Receiving Countries

One factor that dominates the lives of 1.5 and second generation migrants is the simultaneous affective ‘pull’ of the country of their (or their parents’) origin, and that of their residence. The complex and sometimes troubling ways the two are jostled in considerations of ‘home’, belonging, identity and fealty overshadow other settlement factors. The transcultural dynamic, which may elude life-long attempts at resolution, is summarised by an informant quoted by Park (1999:149) as requiring these migrants actively to think about their identity:

I have gone through several identity crises. I haven’t necessarily come up with a conclusion, and it’s definitely a struggle to juggle two cultures. You have to think about what makes your identity. Is it your appearance, where you grew up...? If it’s where I grew up, then I’m American. If it’s where my parents came from, then I’m Korean. If it’s my values, then I’m American. I juggle all these things in my mind.

The 1.5 generation Korean Americans Park studied identified that at times they felt neither Korean, nor American, nor Korean-American, while simultaneously operating in all three identities. Some felt uncomfortable with both Koreans and ‘white’ Americans, feeling unconfident in their ability to speak either English or Korean (ibid.:151).

The ambivalence between origin and destination is reflected in the dual pressure to assimilate and preserve their origin culture (Zhou & Bankston 1994:822; Brubaker 2001:540-542.). Sometimes these pressures are exerted from different directions (i.e., host and migrant communities, school and home): at other times, however, the pressure
to both assimilate and preserve origin culture originate from the same source, their own families. Migrant parents, whose identity as migrants is usually relatively stable, who for the sake of their children’s future success urge them to excel at school and develop a strong command of the new language, and who also struggle to reproduce and reinforce valued aspects of their own culture within the family, contribute to the ambivalent space – the neither here nor there – which their children inhabit. Suárez-Orozco (2002:14) identifies this as a tension between instrumental culture and expressive culture, suggesting that, on one level, assimilation is valued and promoted by parents and immigrant communities; while at the same time, assimilation – when considering the realm of values, worldview, relationship patterns and identity – is often resisted as not only unwanted and unnecessary, but also dangerous (ibid: 20-21).

In-between Childhood and Adulthood
Children of migrants must contend with the significant – and sometimes traumatic – upheaval that comes with crossing national and cultural borders. However, they also confront all the normally-expected tensions that adolescents face, in terms of beginning the transition to young adulthood and renegotiating boundaries in relation to their parents, their communities, their sexuality, other adults and authority figures such as teachers, and so forth. Orellana and her colleagues (2001), specialists in the anthropology of childhood, present the process of “growing up” as

a guided but open-ended and highly contingent process, involving conflicts of will and struggles over autonomy and control. . . . [in which adolescents] manoeuvre in an in-between zone, still dependent and in need of adult protection and active care (although to varying and contested degrees), but also increasingly capable of independent action (Orellana et al 2001:578).

These writers point out that the complex dynamics between parents and growing-up children overlap family migration, and are made all the more challenging by it (ibid.).

One of the elements of family relations which may be seriously disrupted has to do with autonomy. In fact, the exercise of autonomy involved in deciding to migrate is one of the key factors which makes migrant parents quantitatively different from their migrant
children. Though few would debate the claim made by Orellana and her colleagues that children’s “perceived needs, interests and desires” enter into parents’ considerations about whether, and when, and where, to migrate (ibid.:587), this is not the equivalent of children (the soon-to-be 1.5 generation) autonomously making the decision for themselves to engage in the difficult and disruptive process of cross-cultural resettlement. The power differential vis-a-vis migration may be heightened when adolescent children who are difficult or disobedient – or who show signs of becoming so (Orellana et al 2001:583) – are threatened with being ‘sent back’ to origin countries (Wolf 1997:471).

The dynamics of power and autonomy within migrant families are further complicated when children are relied upon to be culture and language brokers – that is, to mediate between their parents and the host society, often in the role of interpreter or translator (Zhou 1997a:80). The role reversal, with parents suddenly dependent on adolescent (or pre-adolescent) children, can create significant upheaval, particularly in families previously organised along strict hierarchical lines. However, while children may gain a certain amount of power in their role of translating important documents for their parents, or mediating between their parents and school officials, real estate agents, banking and insurance officers (albeit the power in this role may be rigidly circumscribed), the children are also learning valuable life-skills that many of their peers may not possess or require until later in life. Indeed, the experience may give many migrant adolescents a maturity and an insight into their parents’ lives that their non-migrant peers may never gain. In a report on immigrant youth in Canada, Kurtz and Hanvey detail how research participants commonly reported that, as difficult as migration and acculturation may have been for them, it was more difficult still for their

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17 One particularly disturbing situation disclosed to me by a school counsellor who became a key gatekeeper in my research was of an Asian migrant adolescent referred to him by school administrators because he had an ‘anger problem’. After a number of sessions with this troubled boy it emerged that he had come to New Zealand with his parents on holiday for the summer, which they had thoroughly enjoyed. However, as he prepared to return home, his parents informed him that in fact they had migrated, and New Zealand was to be their home now. It was explained to him that he had not been told because his parents did not want anyone to know of their aspirations until after they had conducted a ‘scouting-out’ visit to New Zealand and made a final decision. Had others known of their plans, they feared that if during their visit they had decided not to remain in New Zealand, their return home would be read as a failure. By informing their son beforehand, they risked more widespread knowledge of their plans. A few days after receiving this bombshell, he was enrolled and attending school in Auckland, without having adjusted yet to the fact that he was not returning to his home, or having been able to say good-bye to anyone he had left behind. As a result, he was a new Asian migrant in New Zealand, with an anger problem.
parents. Three particular areas in which these migrant adolescents noted their parents’ struggles were in language acquisition, gaining proper accreditation or recognition of overseas qualifications and experience, and difficulty in finding employment, or the loss of status involved in underemployment:

- “In Algeria, my father owned businesses. Here, he is unemployed.”
- “At home my father was an engineer. Here all he can get are odd jobs.”
- “My father was very depressed for a long time. He still can’t find a job, but he knows that my mother and I are safe and that seems to be enough for him.” (Kuntz & Hanvey 2000).

In-between Dominant and Other Minority Cultures

Mention has been made earlier in this chapter about attempts by migrants in the United States to increase the social distance between themselves and African-Americans as an explicit strategy to integrate into ‘white’ American society (Alba & Nee 1997:842). In fact, this is a well-established strategy. Perlmann and Waldinger (1997: 901-903) describe it as a historical aspiration for European migrants to America in the early twentieth century, as a way to ameliorate the prejudice directed towards them. Their eagerness to emphasise the boundary between themselves and African-Americans led to the emergence of hyphenated identities, according to the authors, as well as to migrants’ complicity in “strategies of social closure that maintained black exclusion and ensured more stable employment and better wages for others of their own kind” (ibid.:901). Perlmann and Waldinger highlight the perennial tensions that exist between middlemen minorities and other minority groups (Perlmann & Waldinger 1997:83), which were demonstrated dramatically in the clashes between African-Americans and Korean shop-owners during the Los Angeles riots in 1992. However, the authors also suggest that the identity of the “new”, contemporary, migrants as people of colour will be more enduring than for their European predecessors – particularly for those caught in the lower segment of the hourglass economy (ibid.:89-90).

While some perceive ‘colour’ as creating a potential barrier to upward mobility (Zhou 1997b:985-6), others see the boundary between migrants and African-Americans as less definite and more contingent. Experiences of racism and discrimination lead some 1.5- and second-generation migrants to identify themselves as people of colour, and to
identify politically with other racialised minorities, including American blacks and Latinos (Mediratta 1999; Min & Kim 1999:220-221). Some of the 1.5 generation migrants in Park’s research, inner-city Korean-Americans, were strongly influenced by other racial minorities, using hip-hop slang, and fashioning their expression of masculinity and physical presentation (dress, hairstyle, even their manner of walking) after African-American and Latino influences (Park 1999:147; 157). Their experiences as racial(ised) minorities had given them a political affinity with other minorities, even as their families’ incomes, educational and occupational performance and aspirations were more closely aligned to the ‘white’ middle class (ibid.).

As discussed in the last chapter, migrants in New Zealand have found themselves, since the 1970s, between Pākehā and Māori. The presence of culturally diverse migrants has been the complicating factor in the competition between the discourses of biculturalism and multiculturalism. While in the 1950s and 60s, there may have been a degree of Māori unease when labour migrants were being recruited from the Pacific Islands, the Māori collective political voice was not then as powerful – either in party-political, academic or community-body levels – as it is today. However, there is some consonance between Māori and Pacific peoples, tangata whenua and tagata Pasifika, in that they share Polynesian identities, and the Pacific peoples’ experiences of the New Zealand state’s imperial aspirations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have led them to align themselves with Māori along a number of political issues, not least of which is that of the Māori quest for tino rangatiratanga – Māori sovereignty (a concept often diluted by the state, and re-interpreted as Māori self-determination).

However, no such coalescence exists between Māori and the new (post-1987) migrants, most of whom are from Asia, though the objections of many Māori remain the same as in earlier waves of migration. These are that, as a partner with the Crown to the Treaty of Waitangi, the aspirations of Māori for a greater political voice, and for meaningful participation in establishing a framework for a bicultural society in which their position remains secure, is weakened by the growing presence of other ethnic minorities. One result may be seen in recent Māori opposition to immigration, which centres around fears that competition for low-skilled employment, as well as migrant demands on increasingly insufficient welfare provisions, such as state housing, public hospital
treatment and special education services, threaten the already parlous position of many Maori people (Dekker 2002:B7).

Taken together, the various elements of the discussion in this section point to the need to incorporate interpretive analysis into theoretical explanations of the experiences of migrants. It is in the motives and aspirations of migrants, and the meanings they ascribe to their incorporation experiences, that determine how they configure their identity as migrants. This is particularly crucial in studies of the 1.5 generation, if theorists are to make a case for the continuing relevance of the concept of transnational migration.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented a justification for considering the legitimacy of transnationalism as a concept denoting a (mostly) contemporary migrant practice of simultaneously engaging sustained, deep ties across two or more countries, in ways that bring those destinations together into a single social field, or space. The concept of transnationalism challenges conventional assimilation theories, in terms of the latter’s assumptions both of an inevitable end-point, and of long-term or permanent settlement. While assimilation is still a possible outcome for many – or even most – migrants, I have argued that sociological theories must account for alternative possibilities, of which transnationalism is one. Studies of transnational migration – also referred to as transmigration – rely on, and contribute to, both macro-level and micro-level theories of migrant incorporation. That is, large models and structures, and international comparisons of populations are essential to determine the existence and extent of transnational movements. However, explanations of transmigrant experiences, their differential incorporation into host societies, and the qualitative features that distinguish them from conventional migrants, also rely on an interpretive exploration into their changing sense of identity, their motivations and intentions for the future. These factors will be all-important as theorists anticipate and analyse the generational impacts of transnational migration.

The previous chapter began by stating that these two chapters together form a whole. Chapter Two provided the historical background and comparative context in which to consider the theoretical approaches presented in the current discussion. The issues
addressed in these two chapters, which stem from a review of the more recent literature, and which have shaped this thesis — either by informing the data collection or my efforts to interpret the data — may be grouped around five inter-related themes. The first is that the structure of New Zealand immigration has changed dramatically since 1987. Prior to that time, the New Zealand state enforced a regimen that specified a country-of-origin preference for prospective migrants, which effectively limited the number of migrants who were not British or Irish. With the exception of the few thousand Chinese labour migrants involved in gold mining and infrastructure building in the 1860s, and the continuous migration of Pacific peoples since the 1960s, New Zealand had maintained, until the mid-1980s, a ‘white-than-white’ immigration policy. The changes from 1987 must be viewed in this context as part of a re-orientation of the country away from Britain and towards Asia. The ambivalent response by many Pakeha and Maori New Zealanders, and the profoundly negative response by others, to the sudden and intensive arrival of migrants — particularly from East and South Asia — must also been seen in this historic context. This dramatic realignment of New Zealand immigration policy has produced many new New Zealanders who do not fit the bimodal European/Polynesian norm.

Secondly, this new wave of migration to New Zealand occurs at a time when the nature and structure of global migration is changing. As the global economy has become an increasingly unified capitalist system, highly-skilled, highly-qualified migrants find themselves in demand in all quadrants. The ease with which global capital can be routed through myriad nodes in the system is now mirrored by similar movements of people, greatly expanding transnational networks. The process of globalisation, initially motivated ‘from above’ — that is, by multinational corporations and organisations — is now being pursued ‘from below’.

A third theme is that migrants relocate into societies which are not otherwise static and stable, but rather which are subject to internal disruptions, and are intersected by a number of fault lines — such ethnicity, gender, class, as well as regional or parochial divisions. The insertion of migrants into such societies further complicates such divisions, as illustrated in New Zealand by the debates about which model of ethnic pluralism — biculturalism or some form of multiculturalism — is both just and feasible, sustainable or desirable. Also, the reception given to migrants by the host society
(however migrants themselves interpret it) impacts on the processes and outcomes of migrant settlement and adjustment. Those who encounter inflexible and enduring boundaries are more likely to develop a reactive ethnicity, and to rely on ethnic networks and communities for support and a sense of belonging.

Fourthly, given both the increasing ease with which people may move through ‘transnational social spaces’, and the heightened emphasis on ethnic pluralism in many countries of immigration, contemporary migrants no longer need to submit to normative regimes of assimilation. Cultural hegemonies are able to be contested, ethnic identities are more fluid, and notions of belonging, settlement and ‘home’ are made more contingent. They are further complicated by the diversity of options available to middle-class, professional transnationals, as well as to their children. Facilitating these, for example, are the prospect of dual or multiple citizenships, and – in New Zealand – very few restrictions governing migrants’ civic, economic and political integration. As a result, the meanings, motives and aspirations which migrants ascribe to their experiences have become critically important factors that affect the outcome of the process as much as do policies of the state. These produce questions such as why they migrate, under what conditions they settle, and why – and to where – they leave a country to which they had previously migrated.

Finally, as the previous point suggests, the children of recent migrants – the 1.5 generation – are perfectly positioned, at the convergence of all the factors described above, to test the veracity of the claims about the new conditions of transnational migration. In New Zealand, the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents – financially well-resourced, motivated to pursue educational qualifications and high-skilled occupations, bilingual (at least), and with a degree of cultural flexibility and transnational experience – are not fated to settle in New Zealand, if to do so requires significant costs, whether economic, cultural, occupational or aspirational. They have options, and can set into play any number of trajectories. In this regard, they may the harbingers of a new transnationalism. Whether they reproduce their parents’ transnational patterns and strategies, or stay and become the new New Zealanders – or both – remains to be seen.
The least suspected fact of the intellectual life . . . is that thinking is a haphazard, fitful, incoherent activity. If you peer in and see thinking going on, it would not look like that trimmed and barbered result, *A THOUGHT*. Thinking is messy, repetitious, silly, obtuse, subject to explosions that shatter the crucible and leave darkness behind. Then comes another flash, a new path is seen, trod, lost, broken off, and blazed anew. It leaves the thinker dizzy as well as doubtful; he [sic] does not know what he thinks until he has thought it, or better, until he has written and riddled it with a persistence akin to obsession.

- Jacques Barzun (1955) *Teacher in America*

[Quoted in Alford (1998:dedication)]

**Introduction**

The methodology chapter is traditionally where thesis writers engage in the ritual of tracing the philosophical and epistemological roots of a particular ‘paradigm of inquiry’, to use Alford’s (1998) phrase, in order to justify their choices concerning the methods used to conduct their research. While not seeking to somehow detach various approaches from their epistemological foundations and the philosophical standpoints which inform them, nor to naïvely create a mélange of methods disguised as methodology, I intend to pass up the opportunity to participate in this ritual. Questions of philosophy and epistemology will be addressed in a later section of this chapter; they will not, however, assume the central roles so often reserved for them. One of the reasons for this choice is pragmatic: as described below, I have employed a combination of data-gathering methods, an increasingly common research strategy
which precludes an exclusive commitment to any single ‘school’. Another reason is that the ritual philosophical statement has been supplanted in the current discussion by a more reflexive presentation of my standpoint as a sociologist. This includes philosophical, epistemological, ethical and pragmatic elements, but extends beyond these to present a more honest account of the choices I made in engaging with the existing body of knowledge and conducting the research than a restating of traditional arguments would do. Instead, the chapter is an account of how I ‘do’ sociology, and a justification for why this strategy is a – not The – satisfactory approach to ‘doing sociology’.

As an alternative, in the first half of the chapter I set out a discussion of ‘first principles’ which form the basis of my research practice. These principles are:

- a commitment to research participants as expert correspondents of their habitats of meaning;
- a reflexive critique of the role of the researcher; and
- a pragmatic and philosophical commitment to combined research methods.

The setting out of methodological ‘first principles’ may be read as a statement of how I propose to ‘do’ sociology; in the second half of the chapter I describe the application of those principles – how, in this instance, I ‘did’ sociology. That is, I present the development of the research process, from the theoretical concepts which emerged from my exploration of the literature to the production of the research tools and strategies, and the techniques employed to interpret the data. The analysis of the research findings is then presented in the four chapters which follow.

**Doing Sociology**

_Respondents as Expert Correspondents of their Habitats of Meaning_

The notion of viewing research participants as expert correspondents is as much an ethical position as an epistemological one, as it embodies the desirable shift away from the view of participants as ‘research subjects’ (Aldridge & Levine 2001:26). That unfortunate assignation is a remnant from positivist attempts to equate the social
sciences with the 'hard' sciences, in which the expert scientist actively manipulates, and extracts data from, the subject of observation or experimentation. Social actors are far more than mere data sources or receptacles of information from whom data must be extracted by experts. Instead, a view of participants as experts of their own experiences presumes that participants' attitudes, behaviours, opinions and perceptions, as well as the meanings they attribute to them, are the result of their lives, their interactions and relationships, their motivations, struggles, hopes, feelings and thoughts. As such, they are real and valuable in themselves, and not given meaning and value only after having been manipulated and postulated by experts. This standpoint is easily overlooked in many texts on research methods and codes of ethics, where emphasis tends to fall on the pragmatic steps of informed consent, confidentiality, doing no harm, avoidance of 'unnecessary deception' (Massey University), and honesty in reporting results. Less common is the view that "humans must never be treated as means to someone's ends for they must be seen as 'ends in themselves'" (Snook 1999:72). Of course, their experiences are subjected to interpretation, analysis and theorising, processes which largely are outside of participants' control. This is a point to which I will return in a moment.

The choice of the term 'correspondent' is deliberate, as it connotes specialist knowledge. Like journalists sent by news agencies into foreign territories, correspondents have a specialist knowledge of their subject, an authority based on the fact that they are there, and we are not. They can smell the smells, can become immersed in the whole-of-life experiences of a place that images - reproduced in print, or broadcast on radio and television, or up-loaded onto websites - merely hint at. This is not to claim some monopoly on Truth: other correspondents assigned the same tours of duty may have other experiences and other views. The validity claims attached to their views remains the same, however: they are there.

Given the argument developed in Chapter Three, that critical elements of the experience of transnational migration must be analysed interpretively, the locus for much of my

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18 As an epistemological point, de Vaus (1995:15) advises survey researchers to ask participants 'why' questions to ascertain motivations and meanings - though, he adds, '[t]his is not to say that we accept the stated reasons uncritically, but it can help provide insight into the meaning of behaviour'. The clear presumption is that it is the researcher, rather than the participant, who establishes meaning.
research is on the phenomenal field of the individuals concerned – what Rumbaut refers to as “the crucible within” (Rumbaut 1994). Conceptualising respondents as being located in given habitats is an expression of the commitment to the privileged position of the research participant, both ethically and epistemologically. The notion of ‘habitat’ I draw on was introduced by Bauman (1992:190-193) to provide an alternative to conceptualisations of the fields in which social agents operate which are inherently structural: these include society, community and class – to which I would also add Bourdieu’s ‘fields’.19 As defined by Bauman, the habitat is

the territory inside which both freedom and dependency of the agency are constituted (and, indeed, perceived as such). Unlike the system-like totalities of modern social theory, habitat neither determines the conduct of the agents nor defines its meaning; it is no more (but no less either) than the setting in which both action and meaning-assignment are possible. Its own identity is as under-determined and motile, as emergent and transitory, as those of the actions and their meanings that form it (ibid.:191).

Ulf Hannerz (1996) adapts and extends Bauman’s concept in response to similar criticisms of the concept of culture as employed by anthropologists, as overly bounded, defined and structured by place and collective identity. Hannerz promotes a concept of ‘habitats of meaning’ in order to shift the focus in cultural studies towards agency and away from a “sociocentric, collectivist understanding of culture” (ibid.:22). Positing that a habitat of meaning is identified primarily with individuals, and repeating Bauman’s characterisation of the habitat as “emergent and transitory” (ibid.:48), Hannerz develops the concept of a habitat of meaning by highlighting its idiosyncratic nature as defined by individual agents, noting that “places we have been to and the people we have met in them, the books and newspapers we read, the television channels

19 The field, as a concept that delimits “a socially structured space in which actors struggle, depending on the position they occupy in that space, to change or preserve its boundaries and form” (Wacquant 1992:17), is used by Bourdieu to describe “systems of objective relations which are the product of the institution of the social in things or in mechanisms that have the quasi reality of physical objects” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:127). Fields are both the product of social structure, and they in turn structure the relations of agents within them.

Nor does the habitat of meaning equate to Bourdieu’s habitus – the internalised ‘rules’ of the “spheres of play” that are fields – particularly given the mutual dependence of the two concepts (Wacquant 1992:19).

As described above, the habitat of meaning takes as its reference point the individual actor: it is the sphere in which individuals negotiate their systems of meanings.
we can zap to, all these make a difference" (ibid.:23). Habitats of meaning are not comprised merely of those external processes and stimuli to which agents are exposed, but also of the meanings and interpretations, available from agents' own resources, which shape their responses to those things they encounter. Neither are habitats of meaning solely the arbitrary objects of agents' own production, as Hannerz points out that "major parts of our habitats of meaning are now deliberately shaped by institutional and corporate actors" (ibid.:24) – such as states, which select, preserve and promote aspects of culture to maintain and reinforce collectivity, and corporate players in global markets, which produce signs and meanings, and fix them onto commodities.20

While Hannerz further defines a habitat of meaning as consisting "of a network of direct and indirect relationships, stretching out wherever they may within and across national boundaries” (ibid:48), another part of his discussion of the relationship between culture and territory concerns the significance of the local. It is in the local that face-to-face and everyday experiences are immediate, multi-sensory, emotionally absorbing and therefore often more 'real' (ibid:27). The local has, therefore, a significant impact on an individual agent’s habitat of meaning, for while permeated by outside influences, it is in the local that experiences and relationships are characterised by immersion, embeddedness and contextualisation. “The everyday and face-to-face may be small-scale; in the aggregate, it is massive” (ibid:28). The dynamic interplay of external and internal processes is of central importance to the concept. The habitat is not shaped entirely by external forces, however; otherwise as a concept it would merely rearticulate a bounded, structured form.

Yet our habitats of meaning will of course depend not only on what in some physical sense we are exposed to, but also on the capabilities we have built up

20 A local example of the interplay of culture, signs, meanings and their commodification is New Zealand's national rugby team, the All Blacks, arguably New Zealand's most significant global 'brand'. The major sponsor of the All Blacks is adidas, the global sportswear corporation. The team also has sponsorship arrangements with Coca-Cola and with a local popular breakfast cereal manufacturer, which features team members on the cereal boxes and in advertisements. Other advertisements for the same cereal feature the jingle “Kiwi kids are Weet-Bix kids.” The manufacturer, Sanitarium, is also incorporated in Australia, where similar ads play a similar but locally-appropriate jingle: “Aussie kids are Weet-Bix kids.” The New Zealand state has a major interest in the All Blacks as well, of course, due to the team's status as a cultural icon, as was apparent in the government’s response to the New Zealand Rugby Union’s failure to secure a co-hosting agreement for the 2003 Rugby World Cup.
for coping with it knowledgably: the languages we understand, write or speak, our levels of literacy with respect to other symbolic forms, and so on (ibid:23).

The conceptual usefulness of the habitat of meaning lay in the interplay between structure and agency, objective and subjective, macro and micro. As conceptualised by Hannerz, the habitat is the perfectly-positioned level of analysis for the qualitative researcher. The concept of the habitat of meaning is particularly apropos to this thesis, given that the focus of the research described in this thesis is on the experiences and perceptions of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents. It is also particularly helpful due to the extended and diffused points of reference upon which these particular agents can draw, in order to interpret and adapt to their experiences in their new environments. The pivotal position of 1.5 generation adolescent migrants, in relation to a variety of divergent cultural agents, institutions and pressures – local, global and transnational, familial and alien – marks them as privileged commentators of their habitats. Their perceptions of what they commonly identify as ‘Kiwi Society’ are based primarily upon everyday, face-to-face encounters – their own experiences of friendship, or of being the recipients of offensive gestures and epithets hurled from passing cars, for instance – and are supported or qualified by the experiences of trusted others, and by institutions like school and the media. As Bach notes with regard to the Changing Relations Project, the very large ethnographic study of U.S. immigrants and the communities in which they lived, “[i]mmigrants’ adjustments to U.S. life are adaptations to the dominant subcultural patterns in local schools and neighbourhoods and to the perception of the place of minorities in U.S. society as a whole” (Bach 1993:158). This is the interplay of external forces and local processes, and the meanings actors fix to them, that Hannerz’s concept captures. Accepting research participants as expert correspondents of their habitats of meaning means recognising the diverse resources of experiences, relationships, meanings and interpretations, most having their genesis in far-off contexts, but which now jostle with those of local origin, which participants bring to bear in order to cope with and make sense of their lives – as young people, as migrants, as children of migrants, as new New Zealanders, exiles, consumers, friends, insiders, outsiders, Asians, and so on.

This methodological/epistemological/ethical standpoint is not the naïve or ill-applied approach criticised by Portes (1997b) as being damaging to the efforts of the
development of new theories of immigration. Portes describes as a 'common pitfall' the application of individuals' self-reported perceptions and experiences in the testing or attempted falsification of generalised and abstracted theoretical positions. His argument is developed along three lines: firstly, that theories cover broad trends and are built upon generalised issues, and therefore analyse aggregates of experiences and studies. The resulting theoretical explanations not only may be unrecognised by individual participants in particular studies, but also possibly may be rejected by them. Portes' point is that macro and micro approaches of theory and application are not necessarily immediately commensurate or mutually affirming. His second, related, criticism is of the practice of testing or falsifying theories on the basis of individual, small-scale studies. “A case study of a small group of immigrants cannot, for example, invalidate a general theory supported by large-scale trends” (ibid:32). Portes' third criticism is the converse of the second, as he decries the misapplication of research data to inappropriately support a given theoretical explanation. One suspects that Portes fears his own theoretical insights may be damned by such faint praise as offered by small, qualitative studies.

However, Portes' complaints appear to me to be more about the application - or, rather misapplication - of empirical data analysis, than in any inherent conflict between theory and evidence. By its nature theory must be abstracted. It must deal with generalised trends rather than individual cases. Relying on aggregates and generalised propositions as they do, theories will almost always fall down when worked backwards, or downwards, to the individual or case level. Stated another way, individuals rarely are able to identify themselves as the precise embodiment of an ideal type presented in a given theory. To attempt to falsify theories on this basis - or against the findings of a single small-scale and localised study - is simply inappropriate. To this extent, Portes' criticism is justified. Theories are neither built nor dismantled on the basis of one study. On the other hand, Portes surely cannot be arguing against the process of theory testing. Theories become problematic when they are accompanied by a great many caveats and qualifications in order to account for particular settings and circumstances where they cannot be applied. In dialectic fashion, too many empirical exceptions to a given rule may create the need for new rules. Social theories must by subjected to empirical testing. As a result, it is perfectly justifiable to measure the results of particular studies against the prevailing theories - not to overturn the theories if found to be inadequate in
the particulars, but to suggest instances or settings in which they may need to be revisited.

Portes’ concerns regarding the discontinuity between the perceptions of individual agents and their location or participation in larger social processes is one which must be addressed in the research under consideration. Given my commitment to the standpoint of respondents as expert correspondents of their habitats of meaning, Portes’ argument does pose methodological and epistemological challenges. As Portes points out:

Acts involved in a given process may not be aware of the broader issues at play or may have a different opinion of them. The various stages of the process of acculturation and dissimilation ... may be at variance with how immigrants themselves view their situations. Thus, a group can be in rapid process of assimilation according to some external standard, while their members may still consider themselves quite foreign to the receiving society (Portes 1997b: 802).

Here Portes identifies two related but different processes – objective and subjective states of assimilation – as though one were ‘real’, and the other the product of false consciousness, or denial. Given the processes involved in boundary construction, those actors (whether immigrants themselves or members of succeeding generations) who perceive themselves to be alien to a receiving society despite objective indicators of assimilation may yet offer valuable insights towards a more refined and nuanced understanding of the processes of migrant adaptation and cross-boundary belonging. My response to Portes is that for a situation to exist as he has described suggests the need for a refinement of the concept of assimilation that takes account of subjective, affective elements of respondents’ experiences. How can individuals or groups be said to have ‘assimilated’ into a society in which they perceive themselves to be ‘foreigners’? I am not attempting to deny the importance of analysis and interpretation. As Espiritu contends, migrants may reveal the ‘truths’ of their cognitive experiences, while remaining unaware of other ‘truths’ (Espiritu 1994:253-4). Rather than posing a threat to effective theorising, an insistence on the ‘higher authority’ (Portes 1997:802) of respondents as expert correspondents of their habitats of meaning

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21 As it happens, this question will be re-addressed in subsequent chapters, as this is a scenario presented by my research data.
serves to highlight additional considerations that demonstrate the real-life complexity of social processes that otherwise appear overly simplistic. Such a standpoint may be used to lessen the gap between subjective experiences and perceptions on the one hand, and empirical observations and explanations on the other.

Perhaps the analogy of the foreign correspondent may again prove useful: the correspondent may be allotted time within a given news broadcast to report on a story. However, that story is often framed by editorial content and decisions that are out of the correspondent’s hands. She may be interviewed by the news anchor in order to offer views on particular elements of the story. The audience does not learn all about the correspondent’s daily life, but rather only those elements which are of significance to the story, as determined by others. The correspondent does not determine the context of the story, nor is she able necessarily to frame the issues involved independent of other editorial processes, despite her position as the expert on the ground. Her ‘story’ may be placed in a broader context, or subject to analysis by other experts – perhaps those with knowledge of historical or political processes not immediately available to the correspondent on the ground. This is analogous to the relationship between the research participant as expert correspondent of their habitat, and the researcher, whose expertise lay outside it.

**The Role of the Reflexive Researcher**

From this standpoint, I identify myself as an external analyst of the social processes which are the subject of this thesis. I am not an entirely objective or detached observer, though – if indeed such a position could be humanly possible or desirable, given one’s embeddedness and engagement in the realm in which these processes take place. Sociological researchers very rarely begin a piece of research having no ideas about what they are likely to encounter. Rather, sociologists tend to be part of the society about which we theorise. What is more, we may be deeply embedded in the very social processes, relations and transactions which become the objects of our research. As a result, it is impossible to suppose that sociological researchers are able to approach research questions without some well-formed ideas about what we are likely to encounter, whether that encounter be in the library or in the field. This is not so say that there is little to discover in sociological inquiry: it would hardly be useful to anyone if
sociologists merely set about to prove what they – and presumably everyone else – already knew. One of the aspects of sociological research which makes it both infinitely interesting, and maddeningly frustrating, is the constant sense of discovery and surprise associated with investigating even those aspects of social life which we think we know best.

Nor does my role as a social researcher contradict the position of respondents as expert correspondents of their habitats. Rather, having made myself well-versed in available explanations of the processes involved in the social adjustment experienced by 1.5 generation migrant adolescents, I prepared to learn from expert correspondents about their experiences, perceptions and reflections, and to interpret these in light of others’ explanations of similar social phenomena. The questions and issues of greatest interest to me had been formulated in a context of engagement with the literature on transnationalism and migrant settlement and adaptation. The research participants, on the other hand, have lived the processes: to make sense of them, they have drawn upon resources – and encountered limitations – within their ever-expanding habitats. The empirical data in this thesis are not the collective stories of these expert correspondents. Rather, it is my analysis of the information – sifted, coded, manipulated, struggled over – which they offered in response to my questions and observations. The meanings and motivations each participant attributed to their experiences are their own. I propose to offer explanations about the patterns and contexts of the meanings, experiences, motivations and aspirations that were shared with me.

Multiple Research Methods

My use of multiple research methods is based upon both practical and epistemological considerations. Speaking practically, the decision to employ several research methods merely reflects the fact that this is how much social research is actually done, as increasingly researchers reject the barrier between quantitative and qualitative camps as being unnecessary and counter-productive (Bell and Newby 1977:10; McNeill 1990:13-14; Alford 1998:132; Aldridge and Levine 2001:14-15). The methods employed by the two schools address themselves to different questions, and therefore produce different kinds of data, which can be complementary (Strauss 1987:277). Bryman (1988:127-
suggests four relevant explanations for employing the strategy of mixed methods. Utilising a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods is useful because:

- the differing data may provide mutual corroboration;
- the two approaches taken together may produce a more expressive picture of the group or phenomena being studied;
- while surveys may reveal patterns in attitudes, backgrounds and profiles, qualitative methods highlight the processes in which the structures are played out; and
- often the explanations and connections which are sought are not readily apparent in quantitative research, because the independent factors (‘causal’ or ‘intervening’ variables, in the language of quantitative research) may not be easily amenable to quantification.

This last point is particularly applicable in research for which questions about identity and belonging are central. Causes, meanings and motivations are thoroughly intertwined and not readily addressed by survey methods precisely because they resist measurement.

Such considerations raise the epistemological questions – the ‘how can we know?’ questions – confronting the research with which this thesis is concerned. The different methods traditionally associated with the competing epistemological schools within the social sciences are best suited to answer different types of questions. Employing mixed methods provides an interesting challenge to a researcher’s flexibility, however, as the different methods require different styles of thinking (Strauss 1987:277-8). One must move from the ‘how much / how many’ approach inherent in quantitative methods to asking questions such as ‘what are the different actions taken?’ ‘why do different actors employ different strategies?’ or ‘what are the conditions under which different actions are taken?’ The struggle to move between the different modes of analysis, while simultaneously remaining open to any flash of insight coming from either, is summarised and formalised in Alford’s (1998) characterisation of ‘dialectical analysis’. Dialectical analysis refers to Alford’s strategy of integrating the three ‘paradigms of inquiry’ – quantitative, qualitative and historical methodologies – in order to
answer particular research questions and also [to recognise] their partial and incomplete characters. A dialectical approach recognises the tensions or contradictions between macro and micro analyses, between case studies and comparative studies, between an emphasis on culture and one on structure. It tries to understand the ways in which historical change transforms the conditions of intellectual work and constrains the very possibility of formulating certain kinds of research questions. It refuses to accept as hard and fast the classic oppositions between understanding and explanation, between history and science, between objective and subjective (Alford 1998: 123).

Using studies which form part of the canon for the discipline of sociology, Alford further argues that such a dialectical approach marks every 'good' piece of research, in which one or another paradigm of inquiry is presented in the foreground, but is built upon background assumptions based in the other paradigms (ibid.: 2). In doing so he promotes the case that, far from being a recent and uncritical research strategy, the integrated use of multiple methods has always been employed by social scientists, and should be the preferred strategy for finding out about the social world.

**The Process of Finding Out**

The critical first step in any piece of social research must be to answer the question “What do I want to find out?” This seemingly banal statement is deceptively complex, since enveloped in it is the entire process of moving one’s thinking from the very general and abstract levels of concepts towards determining the concrete, specific and precise details of every facet of the who, what, where, when, how and why of the research. “What do I want to find out?” becomes a question asked at every phase of research design and implementation, the touchstone applied before every decision is made. Of course the answers to that critical question undergo continuous refining – if not outright rejection and replacement – throughout the process. Research is ideally a reflexive process, in which the process itself helps to shape the questions which initiated the process in the first place.

The second half of this chapter addresses the who, what, where, when, how and why of this research into the settlement/adjustment experiences of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents, and what those experiences suggest about the nature of migrant settlement
and ‘belonging’ in contemporary New Zealand society. Here I address other ‘truths’ – those relating to the assumptions, decisions and compromises I made in preparing to “get in” and “get along”, to use Lofland and Lofland’s terms for gaining access to participants and building productive relationships with them (Lofland & Lofland 1995:37-41). First I lay out the foundational assumptions, drawn from the literature, which shaped the research design and participant selection criteria. These assumptions were challenged immediately when I began the process of selecting and gaining access to the participants, as discussed in the following section. I then address the ethical considerations impacting upon both the design and the implementation of the research. Issues relating to the imbalance of power in the relationship between the researcher and research participants are significant ethical considerations in nearly all research. However, in cross-cultural and cross-generational research, these issues appear more striking. Finally, the chapter culminates with an illustrated discussion of the result of the various ethical and pragmatic considerations that produced the specific methods I used to gather and analyse the data.

Starting Points: Applying the Literature

Based on themes which emerged in my examination of the literature, introduced and discussed in Chapter Two, I approached the question of the adjustment experiences of 1.5 generation migrants with a number of assumptions that shaped the foundations of the research. These assumptions included:

- Migrants whose families came to New Zealand under the General and Business Investment categories were likely to differ markedly, with regard to education, socio-economic status and life experiences in their countries of origin, and in terms of their expectations of life in New Zealand, from those who qualified under the Humanitarian categories – i.e., family reunification or as refugees;

- Migrants from non-English-speaking countries would have different settlement/adjustment experiences from those from English-speaking backgrounds;

- Migrants from countries with a significant history of migration to New Zealand may be able to link into pre-existing networks and communities in the host society,
easing considerably the difficulties associated with trans-national migration and adaptation; and

- All other factors being equal, those migrants whose ‘racial’ appearance differs greatly from the majority in the host society are likely to have different settlement experiences from other migrants who – despite also being from a non-English-speaking background (NESB) – may be able to ‘blend in’, visually, at least. That is, migrants from Japan are going to have different experiences of settling into New Zealand than, say, migrants from Russia with similar qualifications, skills, personalities, expectations and resources.

Given these assumptions, my plan was to study two groups of adolescents whose families had recently migrated to New Zealand as General or Business Investment migrants: those from three selected Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong), and others from Germany. There were a number of reasons, most related to the above assumptions, that these source countries were selected. Prior to the changes in immigration policy in 1987, there was little New Zealand immigration from the three Asian countries selected, compared with other Asian countries, such as China, from which the numbers of professional or business migrants has increased since 1987; however, as highlighted in the previous discussion of Manying Ip’s work, the history of Chinese migration to New Zealand had its origins in the gold rushes of the 1860s and continued – despite rigid and racist policy restrictions – through New Zealand’s nation-building phase until the First World War. As a result there is a significant, albeit relatively small, New Zealand Chinese community, members of whom maintain relationship networks in China (Ip 1996). This historic community potentially gives new migrants from China – particularly those from the same provinces to which the New Zealand Chinese community still has ties – a type of opportunity for relationship, belonging and expectation not readily available to those from source countries without such a history.

The dynamic created by historic labour migration to New Zealand of those from other possible target countries in Asia, South Asia and Europe, was one of several key elements in decisions to eliminate a number of countries from consideration. Other factors which stemmed from the foundational assumptions were the limiting of the
population of interest to migrants whose families qualified as Business, Business Investor or General migrants, rather than as refugees or family unification or humanitarian migrants, as well as the need to have a sufficient number of migrants since 1987 (but not too many from before that time) to make finding and surveying sufficient numbers of 1.5 generation adolescents an attainable goal (Table 4.1). An additional consideration was that New Zealand secondary schools have a large and growing number of fee-paying students, primarily from east Asian nations, who come to New Zealand on student visas, briefly described in Chapter Three. However, these students were rejected from the target population because they did not fit the criteria of Business or General category migrants (strictly speaking, they are not actually migrants at all), and because they do not come with their families.

### Table 4.1

| Long-term and Permanent Arrivals from Target Source Countries, 1981 - 2001 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                            | Germany | Hong Kong | Korea | Taiwan | Total Arrivals from All Countries |
| 1981-1987                  | 1,946   | 893       | 694   | 68     | 132,504                     |
| 1988-1994                  | 2,690   | 13,137    | 8,569 | 10,922 | 167,908                     |
| 1995-2001                  | 3,823   | 9,632     | 14,430| 13,573 | 288,381                     |

Source: Statistics New Zealand

### Survey Participants

I felt that schools were likely to be the best avenue by which to access research participants, and I set about identifying the Auckland suburbs in which significant numbers of households were identified in the 1996 Census as being from any of the four target countries (Table 4.2). 22 Almost immediately I encountered a complication: while there were substantial cohorts of households from South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong in a number of suburbs, Germans do not appear to have grouped together in any numerically significant way at all. This was confirmed by the secondary schools in each of the communities that had been shown in the Census data to have promising

22 A map of the Auckland region, with these suburbs identified, is presented in Appendix C.
numbers of Germans in them: no school had more than a few students who were German migrants – too few to justify inclusion in the research. Due to the methodological constraints, discussed earlier, which eliminated other European countries from consideration (either historic immigration, or else insufficient total numbers since 1987), as well as pressing time constraints, I dropped the idea of a European comparative group. As a result, only the Asian students were left in the survey. However, the exploration of how the migration and settlement experiences of new groups of NESB European migrants differ from those of Asians remains an important though uncultivated field. Later in the process, an interview participant stated to me that she had observed European migrants being more easily received than Asians by her Pakeha peers, although given my decision to change the focus of the research, I had not asked the participants to compare their experiences with other migrants of European descent. The fact that one student independently had noted such a dynamic reinforces my belief that this question needs to be explored further.

I originally sought permission from twenty-three secondary schools to recruit students in the target populations for participation in the survey, and received permission from eight. Those eight schools were located in central Auckland, the eastern suburbs, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb (Number of Residents from Origin Country)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maungamaungaroa (1656)</td>
<td>Meadowbank South (516)</td>
<td>Forrest Hill (636)</td>
<td>Waiheke Island (42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascades (1212)</td>
<td>Maungamaungaroa (483)</td>
<td>Target Road (393)</td>
<td>Stanmore Bay (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meadowbank South (669)</td>
<td>Cascades (459)</td>
<td>Lucken Point (360)</td>
<td>Auckland Central (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea (570)</td>
<td>Chelsea (411)</td>
<td>Sunnynook (345)</td>
<td>Meadowbank South (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberfeldy (534)</td>
<td>Aberfeldy (393)</td>
<td>Monarch Park (342)</td>
<td>Red Beach (27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1996 Census: Statistics New Zealand
on the North Shore: three were public co-ed schools; two were public single-sex schools (one boys', one girls'); two were private single-sex schools (again, one boys', one girls'); and the eighth was a private co-ed school.

The decision to access research participants via the schools was not without complications. I was reliant upon school administrators – principals, deputy principals, guidance counsellors, deans or ESOL teachers – as gate-keepers, and at some of the schools these gate-keepers simply did not allow access. At one school, a guidance counsellor told me that the large Asian student population had been researched continuously over the previous several years and, despite repeated promises by many researchers that the participants and the school would be kept informed of the results of each piece of research, they had never heard from any researcher once the required data had been collected. As a result, the principal, having determined that no benefit was delivered to the school or the community from previous researchers, had served notice that no further research would be allowed involving migrant adolescents at that school. Despite my approach to well-placed insiders, being armed with a well-prepared spiel and a presentation of myself as knowledgeable and courteous – in short, having followed the textbook advice (Lofland and Lofland 1995) – ‘getting in’ to most of the schools I approached was simply not going to happen. On the one hand, all of the school counsellors I contacted were very supportive of the research proposal, and were quick to offer anecdotes confirming the need both for further research into the experiences of migrant adolescents and for additional support structures for these migrants and their families. Other school officials, on the other hand, were not always so enthusiastic: some insisted that the proposal came at a bad time in the school year (the third term), and the fact that all potential participants would be busy preparing for end-of-year exams; others simply remained unavailable for appointments and unresponsive to written requests, effectively embodying the gate-keeping role in silence.

The attitudes of the gate-keepers towards the research, and their consequent decisions about whether or how the research would proceed in their schools, had a very substantial impact on how the survey was conducted. Of the eight schools whose students took part in the survey, guidance counsellors facilitated my approach in five; two others were ESOL teachers, and in one school a deputy principal who was undertaking post-graduate research ensured access and promoted the survey among staff...
and students. Without question, the school counsellors were the most actively supportive of all the gate-keepers, not only in advocating for me with decision-makers at their schools, but also offering me valuable advice (discussed more fully in the section on ethical considerations), and even personally approaching students to publicise the survey.

**Interview Participants**

The recruiting of interview participants involved yet another layer of availability sampling. Survey participants were asked, as a final question, whether they would be willing to take part in a group discussion of the issues raised, and if so, they were asked to give their names and their Form class so that they could be contacted. After the survey had been administered in all the participating schools, group interviews could be arranged with only eight respondents from two of the schools.²³

The strategy of choosing a very small subset of interview participants from amongst a larger sample is bound to raise questions around notions of representativeness in the mind of a researcher trained primarily in quantitative methods: how can I be sure that what these few tell me is somehow representative of what the many *might have* told me (Bryman 1988:88)? Given that so much qualitative research is based on the availability and willingness of participants, the issue of the validity of the data gathered is a common one (Silverman 1993:160). I eventually²⁴ resolved the disquiet I held regarding interview participants’ representativeness via several means. Firstly, I compared their survey responses (dealing with their characteristics – age, length of New Zealand residence, etc. – as well as their other responses) to those of the sample as a whole, to determine that they were not obviously exceptional in those terms. Secondly, when I identified for the gate-keepers at both schools (both guidance counsellors) the students who needed to be contacted to arrange the group interviews, I remained sensitive to their reactions. I was determined to stay attentive to any kind of hesitation.

²³ While a single respondent indicated a willingness to take part in group interviews in each of four other schools, respondents in only the two schools could form a group. As explained in the final section of this chapter, one-on-one interviews had not been considered at this point in the process, so those interested individuals in the other schools were thanked for their willingness and were declined.

²⁴ Again, the final section in this chapter – in which I discuss in greater depth the interview stages of the research – details the way in which I only gradually became aware of the practical need to approach the qualitative data on a fundamentally different basis from that on which the survey data were analysed.
or caution on their part regarding those students. In both cases, the guidance counsellors were familiar with the students, and were happy for them to contribute to the study. Finally, during the group discussions I frequently checked back with the group for validation of particularly strong claims made by any individual. As an example, when one student claimed that classmates had asked him if he ate exotic animals (monkeys, snakes, dogs and so forth), I quickly checked back with the rest of the group, asking, “So have you ever had a classmate that you got along with ask you seriously, ‘So, do you eat strange animals?’” In this way I was able to test the validity and, to a lesser degree, the representativeness of what interviewees told me with the most appropriate means available.

**Ethical Considerations**

Sensitivity to potential ethical difficulties infused every stage of the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the research. This was the result both of a natural anxiety at undertaking the research in the first place, as well as a desire to ward off any possible difficulties before they actually arose. Of course Massey University has a code of ethics to which all research carried out under its auspices, including doctoral research, must adhere. Foundationally, however, the question to which I regularly returned was, “What potential difficulties arise by me conducting this particular piece of research amongst this particular group of individuals using these specific methods?” On reflection, this was a most useful stance to maintain. One reason that researchers sometimes find themselves in ethical dilemmas arises when considerations of the impact of their research activities are not given until the implementation or reporting stages of the research process. Writers of research methods texts mirror this error – and perhaps reinforce it – when they place their ethics chapter near the end of their books, after the detailed discussion of various techniques and concepts, as well as implementation strategies, have already been covered. A reflexive dialogue with the principles of ethical engagement which begins at the earliest points of the process allows researchers greater opportunities to address concerns before they become dilemmas.

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25 For example, in de Vaus’s (1995) otherwise excellent twenty-chapter text, ‘Ethics in Social Research’ is chapter nineteen. Babbie (1992) also presents the chapter on ethics as the penultimate in his book on social research.
The first issue raised by the foundational ethical question needed to be addressed, even if not fully resolved at once, before any other work began: was it appropriate that I should be the one to carry out the research at all? After all, I am not an NESB migrant, and am not well-versed in the subtle meanings and protocols of the cultures that are of interest to this study, nor of the languages spoken; nor am I, as a relatively recent migrant, fully at home in the New Zealand cultures, as I have alluded to in the Foreword. However, I determined that while the issue of the differing ethnic identities of both the researcher and the participants presented particular challenges which would require external advice and a measure of sensitivity, this dynamic in itself would not preclude me from successfully carrying out the research. I relied heavily on advice from across a wide network, on the sociological training I had received, and on my own judgement and sensitivity. I did take extensive advice very early on in the process, from ESOL instructors, both within the university and the participating schools, as well as from various cultural brokers, such as the Korean Advisor for the Auckland region of the Ministry of Education, and international postgraduate students. I remained sensitive to others’ views and reactions, and I applied reflexive analytical skills to monitor my interactions with others in the process.

Because those in the population of interest were young people by definition, special care was required in addressing potential ethical challenges posed by their age, in addition to the cultural differences. My initial response was to develop a very clear and detailed information sheet and parental consent form, which was then translated into the Chinese and Korean languages, so that each form contained the information in both English and one of the origin languages of those who might take part in the study. To ensure the clarity of information regarding the survey and my request for participants, as well as a promising response rate, the first school I dealt with had agreed to call an assembly of all interested Asian migrant students during a free period. During this assembly I was able to introduce myself and my research, and ask the students to consider participating. I presented the information/consent forms, and asked all who were interested to take a form home, get a parent to sign it, and return it to my contact over the following couple of days. I had gone to the school optimistically armed with 150 forms, and was delighted when at the assembly’s conclusion they were all taken, with other students asking if I could send additional copies to be collected from the school office.
From that very promising start I visited a guidance counsellor at the second school to arrange a similar meeting with migrant students. This individual, an experienced school counsellor with whom I had already had several meetings, took one look at my consent form, and told me, "If you insist that students must have a parent’s signature in order to participate, you’ll have almost no responses." I was stunned, and eagerly assured him that at another school that very day, literally hundreds of students raced for the forms. He smiled sagely and predicted that few would be returned. His reasoning was simple: many students would simply forget, and the form would lie neglected in a school bag for days before being thrown away; others would be interested in the idea of taking part, but would be unwilling to ask their parents’ consent and invite parental scrutiny over their responses to such a survey. His confidence in these assertions worried me, and I asked his advice. "Drop the need for parental consent," was his response. My ethical indignation was immediately aroused, but he assuaged me with wise advice borne of experience: children aged fifteen years or older do not require parental permission to take part in most activities, he pointed out, and therefore if I restricted myself to the older cadre of students (which in fact meant dropping only fourteen-year-old students from the sample), then my only concern need be to obtain informed consent from the participants themselves. This informant’s wisdom was to be proven in practice, as of the nearly two hundred consent forms distributed at the first school, only twelve were returned – despite the fact that that was the only school at which I was given the opportunity to make a public and personal appeal for participants.

At all but one of the other schools that agreed to take part, I was able to be present when participants actually completed the survey, invariably taking place at lunch time. I felt this was an important measure to ensure informed consent, as I was able to personally hand a questionnaire to participants, explain the procedure, and ensure that they knew they were free to answer only as many or as few questions as they chose. I was also available to clarify any questions they had, though I was careful not to hover closely as they completed the questionnaire. At the only school which was the exception to this rule, my contact was the ESOL teacher, who insisted that the school’s schedule was too inflexible to cope with such a disruption. Instead, he offered to distribute the questionnaires to whichever of his students were interested in taking part, which they could do during a succession of free periods over several days. His flexible approach, though leaving me with no direct control over the process, and no contact with the
students themselves, resulted in the highest number of responses of any of the participating schools.

The only other significant ethical consideration presented by the survey was the need to ensure confidentiality. This was not at all difficult, as participants were not asked to identify themselves in any way, unless they were interested in taking part in follow-up interviews. As a result, the vast majority of participants remained anonymous. The very small proportion of students who agreed to be interviewed were asked only for their names and class details, which were then passed on to the gate-keepers to arrange a suitable time for the interviews (Figure 4.1).

The dynamics of my relationships with the participants was to change drastically in the interview phases of the research following the survey. As a result, additional ethical considerations became manifest. The first concerned the dynamics of a group interview. In such a setting, it is not only the researcher who must give an undertaking to protect participants’ confidentiality, but also the other participants. I was careful to lay out the ground rules concerning the confidentiality and safety of all the participants, and gain specific assent to those conditions before beginning the interviews. I also stressed that participants in the group interviews were free to end their participation at any time, and at several points in the interviews, when there was a lull I repeated that point (see Appendix D for the interview schedule). I had prepared for the possibility of disagreements and tensions between interview participants, and strategised how I might mediate in such an event, but it never eventuated. The eight students who took part in the two group interviews were familiar with one another, were very willing to talk, and seemed quite at ease. They all agreed to my videotaping the group interviews, particularly when I assured them that it was merely for the purpose of helping me to transcribe their comments and that the tapes would not be available to others, thus ensuring my commitment to their confidentiality. Although I had no guarantee that the group participants would adhere to their commitments to respect the confidentiality of the other interviewees, the positive responses I later received during the third phase of the data collection, from the solo interviewees, suggested that none of those participants had experienced any negative reactions as a result of their earlier participation.
In remaining sensitive to my foundational ethical question ("What potential difficulties arise by me conducting this particular piece of research amongst this particular group of individuals using these specific methods?") from the initial stages of the research process, I was able to anticipate ethical considerations and address them before they became ethical 'problems'. Issues which arose that I did not anticipate were able to be resolved by reflecting on that question. In doing so, the Massey University Code of Ethical Conduct for Teaching and Research Involving Human Subjects was upheld with ease. In fact, I did have one grave concern following the first of the two group interviews. I had brought for the participants several bowls full of nibbles to be consumed during the interview. At several points during that initial interview I became conscious that none of the young people were touching the food, despite my encouraging them to help themselves. Finally, near the end of the interview, I jokingly asked them if they were just being polite, or if they were all allergic to nuts or chocolate. Eventually, several of the participants ate a small amount. After the interview I was struck with the thought that I may perhaps have committed a cultural error of which I was ignorant, and of which they were too uncomfortable to inform me. So it was with some apprehension that I presented a similar party mix to the second group at a different school. I need not have worried however: as soon as they saw food, they freely and abundantly helped themselves, much to my great relief and satisfaction. On that basis, I attributed the reticence of the earlier group, in terms of their snacking, to group dynamics, rather than essential cultural differences.

**Figure 4.1**

Survey Question Regarding Consent for Follow-up Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you be willing to take part in a group discussion or interview about the issues raised in this survey?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="no.png" alt="No" /> <img src="yes.png" alt="Yes" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form Class:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Form Teacher:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Methods 1: The Survey

As described above, the data collection comprised three stages. Stage one was a self-administered questionnaire; this was followed by a semi-structured group interview of groups of students who indicated in the questionnaire their willingness to be involved further; the final stage was an in-depth, one-on-one, semi-structured interview. I decided on a three-tiered process to allow me to gather quantitative data from students across the Auckland region, while also gaining access to a smaller number of students who could articulate for me, in qualitative terms, meanings and explanations of the responses generated by the questionnaire. Details of the development of the interview process will be covered in the next section. An important point about the survey, however, is that it was not designed to be a large-scale, representative survey which could be generalised over an entire population. Rather, as a first foray into the topic, it could more appropriately be considered an exploratory survey. As a result, I did not attempt a random sample of all 1.5 generation adolescent migrants in New Zealand, or in Auckland for that matter. Sampling for the questionnaire could be called multi-stage availability sampling: given that the participants were recruited from a group of schools amenable to the research, the question of whether members of the target population were able to be asked to participate, let alone offer their consent, depended in the first instance on each school’s decision to grant the opportunity for access.

The survey’s intent was to study the settlement and adjustment experiences of 1.5 generation adolescent migrants in Auckland, with a primary focus on their perceptions of adjustment and belonging. The questionnaire addressed these concepts of belonging by focusing on a set of five key indicators gleaned from the literature: ethnic identity; ethnic dissociation; acculturation; intergenerational dynamics; and community engagement. I developed variables to measure these indicators, using both open and closed questions, with some questions containing a combination of open and closed responses. Further descriptions of the indicators and variables are offered in the discussion below.

The development of the questionnaire required a considerable amount of consultation with others, including ESOL specialists and migrants from the same countries as the
survey’s target population. These came from the English-language programme at Massey University’s Albany campus. Two ESOL instructors agreed to review the survey instrument, and to request assistance from international students utilising their service. Their advice throughout the numerous drafts of the questionnaire remained consistent: to avoid misunderstandings with respondents whose English may be limited, the language had to be kept simple; questions needed to be phrased positively wherever possible; and special care was needed to ensure that instructions were easy to understand. The fact that such advice is applicable to every self-administered questionnaire, regardless of the intended audience, is not in dispute. However, in this case, as it was possible that English could be new to many of the survey participants, the questionnaire needed to be revised continuously over many weeks before it was ready to be used – and even at that point some of my advisors had minor concerns about particular words or phrases.

The questionnaire, of which there were versions tailored to address participants from each of the targeted source countries, comprised four major sections: Ethnic Identity; Language; Family and Community; and Life in New Zealand. The layout of the sections and formatting of the questions were designed to be easy to read and follow, as well as visually and conceptually interesting. To those ends, each section contained clear labels and instructions (Figure 4.2), questions requiring a variety of different response types (including tick-boxes, graphic continuum responses and open-ended options) and lively graphics (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.2
Example of Section Label and Explanation

Language

These questions ask about the languages you use.
The graphic continuum response, mentioned above, is a modified form of the ordinal scale response (Figure 4.4). The modification, which produced very positive reactions during the survey pre-tests, allows the respondents to place themselves at any point along a response continuum with identified extremes (i.e., Agree/Disagree, Always/Never, Very Easy/Very Difficult). This response method serves two important purposes: first, it is different from, and more interesting than, the more common ordinal scale responses with which most people are familiar, which offer a pre-set number (usually five) of clearly-delineated options; the graphic continuum also offers respondents the sense that they are unconstrained by pre-set categories. For example, the conventional presentation of the classic Agree/Disagree continuum is as a set of discrete categories, i.e.,
Many survey participants feel constrained when presented with such a response option, evidenced by the number of respondents in nearly every survey who either circle two adjoining numbers, or tick on the line between them. Of course this presents the researcher with a coding dilemma that usually results in the response being rejected altogether. The researcher committed to an ordinal response set has only one option: increase the number of response options available to the respondent. Unfortunately, even if this did prevent respondents from choosing a non-existent middle option (it does not), it creates a cluttered and unnecessarily complicated look. It also invites awkward questions that hint at the ludicrous proposition of precisely quantifying the unquantifiable, such as “What degree of difference is there between ‘Mostly Agree’ and ‘Agree Somewhat’?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Mostly Agree</th>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree Somewhat</th>
<th>Mostly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The graphic continuum response removes the dilemma, giving the respondents the satisfaction of being able to more accurately express their position, and allowing the researcher to impose onto the responses the scale of whatever level of complexity is deemed most appropriate. This may be achieved simply by reproducing the graphic continuum — with the coding scale — onto an overhead transparency slide, and physically imposing it over the participants' responses.

Figure 4.4
Example of Graphic Continuum Response Question

[Diagram showing a continuum with points marked for 'Always', 'About half of the time', and 'Never'.]

Ethnic Identity

Questions around identity comprise an essential but insufficient indicator of belonging. In the question of migrant settlement and adjustment, a strong origin ethnic identity neither precludes nor necessarily facilitates adjustment to the new destination. Indeed, a strong sense of self, of one's own ethnic identity, when supported by a measure of flexibility — in the learning of the language, familiarisation of dominant customs and so forth — may be an adolescent migrant's strongest asset. On the other hand, a strong, or even strident, origin ethnic identity may be reactionary; a young person, frustrated by difficulties in learning English, who has received unwelcome or racist attention, or who feels exposed or out of place as part of an ethnic minority in a culturally mixed environment, might prefer to associate completely with co-ethnic students, and choose to maintain an uncompromising origin ethnic identity. This is a reactive ethnicity. However, a young migrant who steadily advances along a process of acculturation may eventually adopt a hybridised identity, choosing to identify as a hyphenated New Zealander, for instance, or an 'Asian Kiwi'. Such a change in one's ethnic identity
would then signify one’s sense of – or at least desire for – belonging in the destination society. So, while notions of identity cannot, of themselves, indicate belongingness, one’s perception of one’s place in society is both reflected in, and shaped by, one’s ethnic affiliation.

Four variables were used in the questionnaire to measure ethnic identity: the first, after briefly suggesting several means by which people conceptualise cultural or ethnic identity (e.g., citizenship, cultural heritage, generalised categories such as Asian or European, or some combination), simply asked respondents how they preferred to describe themselves. Other variables were: where respondents thought of as ‘home’ (open question), how they described their friends’ ethnicity (Figure 4.5), and their reactions to a list of possible other descriptions which might be applied to them (Figure 4.6).

The interaction of these four variables can be illustrated by two ideal types. At one extreme, respondents whose own self-descriptions of their ethnic identity are origin-focused, who identify their origin country (or city) as ‘home’, whose friends are mostly the same ethnicity as themselves, and who accept descriptions which define them as a cultural ‘Other’, could be said to indicate a strong origin ethnic identity. At the other end of the continuum, respondents who are flexible in their self-identification, who identify New Zealand (or Auckland) as ‘home’, whose circle of friends is ethnically diverse, and who object to descriptions which label them as ‘Other’ might be said to indicate an emerging migrant ethnic identity.
Figure 4.6
Ethnic Description Question (from Survey of Korean Students)

Here is a list of descriptions. Would you feel okay about being described as these? Place a ✓ in either of the boxes for each description.

If you don't know, leave the line blank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel okay about this description</th>
<th>Object to this description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean New Zealander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuhirior Tauriwi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Student</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Immigrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ethnic Dissociation**

An indicator that was developed to help further describe respondents’ ethnic identity was ethnic dissociation – that is, the degree to which respondents differentiate themselves from ‘New Zealanders’, as they perceive them to be. This indicator was also used to begin to suggest the boundaries confronting respondents, the limits to their belongingness. Included in this indicator were questions about language use and acquisition, where respondents would most like to be living in five years’ time, whether they had felt misunderstood since living in New Zealand, their perceptions of New Zealanders’ openness to others, and of New Zealand as a destination for migrants. Several of the Ethnic Identity variables were referred to as well, as these could also suggest a sense of ‘Other-ness’.

The Ethnic Dissociation indicator helps to elaborate the Identity indicator in this way: two respondents hypothetically could answer the Identity questions in the same way, both indicating a strong origin ethnic identity, and yet have vastly different perceptions of the boundaries dissociating them from the host society. For example, Respondent A may dissociate greatly, by indicating that he never speaks English when he has the opportunity to use his origin language, in that he considers his language acquisition to be poor, intends to have returned ‘home’ in five years’ time, and offers consistently negative responses to the variables regarding being misunderstood, being judged by New Zealanders because of his culture and on the desirability of New Zealand, Auckland and his neighbourhood as destinations for migrants.

A hypothetical Respondent B, who also indicates a strong origin ethnic identity, may have completely opposing responses for the Dissociation variables, suggesting that her neighbourhood, or Auckland, or New Zealand, is a good place for migrants to live, insisting that New Zealanders have not judged her because of her culture. She may have not experienced any significant instances in which she felt misunderstood because of her culture, though she continues to prefer her origin language and intends to return ‘home’. Clearly these two respondents would perceive the social distance between themselves and New Zealanders (given that they do not consider themselves to be New Zealanders) will be discussed in the next chapter. My use of the terms are intended to reflect participants’ usage and intention.
Zealanders) to be greatly different in nature, and such perceptions can have had differing effects on their sense of ethnic identity. Respondent A, having an uneasy settlement experience, may perceive himself to be defiantly maintaining his identity in the face of antagonism, or possibly rejection, by the host society. Respondent B, on the other hand, may simply have decided that although she has had a relatively unproblematic settlement experience, she is simply not a New Zealander and does not intend to become one. Indeed, her experience in New Zealand may be entirely positive: however, in her perspective she is who she is, and in time she will return to the country from which she has come.

**Acculturation**

The questionnaire included questions designed to indicate the degree to which respondents managed the major tensions involved in adjusting to a new society. These include the identity and language issues already discussed, as well as other socialisation factors such as respondents' thoughts on the necessary adjustments of eating different food, making new friends, attending a new school and maintaining relationships in the country of origin and elsewhere.

A number of the variables indicating acculturation were designed to encourage the respondents to reflect upon their migration experience either in very specific ways (such as the adjustment questions, Figure 4.7), or in rather more comprehensive terms. These included several statements about those who might have helped their adjustment, to which respondents indicated the extent of their agreement or disagreement (Figure 4.8).
### Figure 4.7
Adjustment Questions (from Survey of Hong Kong Students)

Many people find it difficult to adjust to things when they move to a new country. How easy or hard has it been for you to adjust to the things listed below?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eating different food</td>
<td>Very Easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using a new language</td>
<td>Very Easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making new friends</td>
<td>Very Easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to a new school</td>
<td>Very Easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining close relationships with people in Hong Kong</td>
<td>Very Easy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A critical element in respondents’ evaluation of their migration and adjustment is the question of cost (Figure 4.9). Clearly migrants will be more positive about their experience if they believe they have gained more than they lost in the move. Conversely, if 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents believe that moving to New Zealand has involved significant costs to them (not only – or even necessarily – economically, but also to their educational or career opportunities, to their social development or status, or their important relationships), their adjustment will be more problematic. This variable may also be a result, rather than a cause. Respondents whose experiences in New Zealand have been generally positive would be more likely to acknowledge gains than losses, and vice versa.
Intergenerational Family Dynamics

The fifteen variables in the Intergenerational Dynamics group indicate the extent to which respondents are aware of their parents’ (or parent’s) own adjustment experiences as being different from their own. Several of the questions asked respondents to compare with their perceptions of their parents’ experiences the ease or difficulty they have had in adjusting to life in New Zealand. They were also asked whether each parent enjoys living in New Zealand more than they do themselves, and whether each parent would like to return to their country of origin. Further, in addition to the ‘Cost to Respondent’ question already described, the young people involved in the survey were asked to reflect on whether they recognised a difference between their evaluation of the cost to themselves personally of moving to New Zealand, and that of the cost to their families (Figure 4.10).
The rationale behind this line of questioning is that migration and settlement are often experienced not simply by individuals, but by individuals as members of larger social units, usually families (Orellana et al. 2001). The survey questions are intended to suggest the extent that these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents perceive or acknowledge the family support, cohesion and conflict they experience during a time of significant family upheaval.

**Community Engagement**

There is a sizeable body of literature on the locally-based networks of relationships that are established and maintained by adult migrants for the benefit of themselves and their families. There is also a growing literature on the lives of second generation migrants. However, as already discussed, far less is known about the strategies employed by 1.5 generation migrant youths to develop and maintain relationships extending beyond their families, and the contribution made by those contacts to assist in the adjustment/settlement processes. When Zhou and Bankston (1994) studied second generation Vietnamese youth in New Orleans, and the role of social capital – developed through a strong ethnic community – in their adaptation to American society, they constructed an indicator for ethnic community involvement. The questions they asked, as indicators of ethnic involvement, centred on: languages spoken at home, Vietnamese literacy, self-identification (in this case, “Vietnamese”, “Vietnamese-American” and “Other”, including “Asian American”), ethnicity of close friends, and participants’ commitment to endogamy (Zhou & Bankston 1994:834).

The Community Engagement indicator for the survey I developed was designed to test general levels of participation in organised activities in the community. The question of the strategies 1.5 generation adolescent migrants use to pursue meaningful relationships in the wider community – both with co-ethnics and with the host society – in itself would form the basis of important and fruitful study. For the survey, the participants were asked about their involvement in clubs or out-of school activities (Figure 4.11), as well as more reflexive questions about the ease or difficulty they found in making new

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27 See, for instance, Jean Martin’s (1972) seminal work, *Community and Identity: Refugee Groups in Adelaide.*
friends and the extent to which their friends helped them adjust to life in New Zealand. There is a profusion of activities, clubs, lessons, teams and activist organisations available for young people in New Zealand, and particularly in Auckland, quite apart from the ad-hoc recreational pursuits and hobbies they may pursue outside of more organised activities. The survey question was designed around a mixed open/closed response set, and intended to glean from participants the nature of any clubs or extra-curricular activities in which they took part, and the predominant language used in each.

Figure 4.11
Respondent’s Club Involvement Question (from Survey of Korean Students)
Methods 2: Interviews

My original intention in the research design was to conduct a single group interview at each of the participating schools, and then compare the interview data across the schools. The utility of that data, as a follow-up from the surveys, was to clarify and extend the information collected in the earlier phase, to provide corroboration and, where possible, explanations for the survey results (Bryman 1988:Chapter 6). However, when a group of students from only two schools agreed to take part in that phase of the research, I became concerned that the value of the qualitative data might be compromised. It was not that the data gathered would in itself be invalid, but rather that a greater range or depth of views would be needed if the qualitative data were to be used to add clarity and texture to the survey data. It was determined that the two group interviews should proceed, and the next step decided upon once I had gained an impression from the initial analysis of the transcripts.

At that point in the process I had been inclined to treat the interviews as an extension of the quantitative data, not fully appreciating Strauss' (1987:277-8) admonition that the two approaches to data collection actually require different styles of thinking. While I had followed the mechanics of interpretive data analysis (Tesch 1990:113-134), carefully recording themes in the transcripts, de-contextualising and re-contextualising, and finding connections and continuities, I was doing so almost exclusively for the purpose of clarifying specific aspects of the survey data. It was not until I had sat with the transcripts from the group interviews for several weeks that new themes began to emerge which motivated me to ask new questions of the qualitative data, independent of the survey results. As in the Barzun quotation which opens this chapter, a new path was suddenly visible, and I found myself asking further questions which could not be answered by the data I had collected, and which were quite outside the scope of the original survey. I had stumbled into the arena in which the two different styles of questions, and what I eventually recognised as the two different sets of data that they had produced, had created a dialogue. The result of this dialectic interchange was the recognition of a substantial gap in the centre of these data; a lacuna of meanings and motivations to which all the data seemed to point.
It was at this stage that my supervisors recommended an additional layer of interviews to explore these questions of meaning, reflection and motivation. I agreed, and was able to arrange in-depth, solo interviews with four of the participants who had previously been involved in one of the group interviews. These four, all from the same school, were chosen because they were by far the most articulate participants, and had demonstrated clearly in the group interviews that they had reflected on their experiences of migration to a considerable degree, and had not been surprised or caught off-guard by any of the lines of questioning during the group interview. In addition, they each had demonstrated different processes, perspectives and commitments, so that I was confident that their solo interviews would produce a fascinatingly complex range of information. On reflection, it was only in preparing for these later interviews that I began to approach the qualitative process as being different fundamentally from the survey. In these interviews I focused on their reflections upon the contexts in which participants’ habitats of meaning are shaped, expanded and constrained, the meanings that they ascribed to their perceptions of identity and belonging, and the motivations which they could identify as bearing upon their responses.

The reflexive nature of the research process is reinforced by the way in which the information collected from the four one-on-one interviews required me to re-visit both the group interviews and the survey data. This was not only in order to examine the original data through the lens of newer insights provided by the newer data, but also to test the validity of these new insights by corroboration (Silverman 1993:156-9). However, because the data collected at each stage were so different, what I looked for was not correspondence but rather resonance across the data. Readers should get a sense of the dialectical relationships of the different types of data and modes of analysis in the discussion of the research findings which follow.

**Reporting the Findings**

Univariate tables describing the responses to the major survey variables are presented in Appendix E. However, the following four chapters detail the research findings, which are grouped around the major indicators discussed above: Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Dissociation, Acculturation, Intergenerational Dynamics and Community Engagement. In those discussions, little notice is given to the fact that the quantitative data were
collected first. Instead, the analysis embodies Alford’s dialectical approach. In fact, the qualitative data are given priority in much of the analysis, with the survey results supporting or problematising the foregrounded discussion. This strategy is in keeping with the commitment to respondents as expert correspondents of their habitats of meaning: those indicators which are based in the detailed, personally-held meanings, interpretations and motivations of participants, such as those dealing with identity and adjustment, lend themselves to the greater qualitative focus. The analysis of participants’ interactions and engagement with the wider community, on the other hand, is most effectively accomplished with primary reference to the survey data. In that chapter, the qualitative data move ‘upstage’ to make way for a substantial examination of the quantitative material. As will be further examined in each chapter, the decision about which ‘paradigm of inquiry’ should be foregrounded is based both on epistemological grounds of which type of data best answers which questions, and on practical considerations such as the quality and clarity of the data produced. Not surprisingly, the two dynamics are closely related.
Introduction

The Ethnic Identity Indicator was a central feature of this study’s quantitative component. Questions of identity – and especially of ethnic identity – form a perfect subject for sociological enquiry. An individual’s sense of cultural identity is personally held, perhaps intensely so, yet it is negotiated in relation to a wider community or communities. On the one hand, ethnicity is often presented in commonsense terms as being enduring and static, of embodying a stable set of characteristics (“I can’t help it, I’m Italian.”), yet migrants’ ethnic identity is subject to shifts and fluctuations. Nor are such shifts necessarily linear, unidirectional or permanent (Yinger 1994:40-41). Ethnic identities are social identities, formed, maintained and mobilised in social relations. As such, the question of how migrant adolescents configure their identity may be understood as the outcome of their negotiating and managing the competing demands from a number of different social entities, and the reconciling of such demands with their own meanings, motivations and aspirations.

Ethnic dissociation, describing the ways in which members of one group differentiate themselves from others, is a feature of ethnic identity. The Ethnic Dissociation Indicator is presented in this chapter as a subset of the Identity Indicator, as the quantitative Dissociation data specify instances and patterns of the social distance between participants and the host society, which influence the formation and maintenance of ethnic identity.
The data examined in this chapter illustrate that the participants as a group did not demonstrate a unitary approach in formulating their identity as migrants. Interview and survey participants chose to configure their ethnic identities in a variety of ways, treading any number of paths to reach a given identifier. Some respondents focused on citizenship or nationality, while others further identified their legal-administrative place in New Zealand by referring to New Zealand residency. Still other participants acknowledged that the migration experience had had some degree of impact upon their ethnic or cultural identity by blending national and/or cultural identifiers from their places of origin with elements of New Zealand. For some, notions of ethnicity, culture, nationality and citizenship were interchangeable – indeed, for some societies whose populations appear to be more homogeneous, they may be. However, other 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescent participants demonstrated an awareness of cultural identity beyond the bounds of nationality or citizenship. These young people embodied culture as a dynamic (rather than fixed) identity, and grappled with how their experiences of migration had altered their habitats of meaning.

The data from the primary ethnic identity variable illustrate the complexity involved. Participants offered sixteen different types of responses to the survey question asking them to describe their own cultural or ethnic identity. They including responses based on citizenship, mixed citizenship/ethnicity combinations, hyphenated identities (e.g. “Korean-New Zealander”), dual identities (e.g. “Chinese and New Zealander” or “Dual Citizenship”), and a generalised, pan-ethnic identity (Asian). One innovative participant even devised her own hybrid identity (“Korean + Kiwi = Kowi”). Such a diversity of approaches towards one’s identity suggests considerable fluidity, not only in how migrants perceive themselves in relation to the host society, but also in how they begin to make sense for themselves (and for others) of the challenging adjustments they have been required to undertake. An important feature of the variety and fluidity inherent in such varying responses is that the same individual may employ any number of these different identities in different circumstances and various contexts. For instance there is considerable legal/administrative significance in obtaining New

Judith Okely (1979) describes the instrumental application of this flexible use of multiple configurations of identity by Gypsies in Britain. Although inspired by Okely to explore the idea that one may selectively engage a repertoire of cultural identities, I am not suggesting that the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in this study employed similarly instrumental strategies as those described in Okely’s study.
Zealand citizenship, as a milestone of migration and also as a necessary credential for those considering pursuing studies or careers in destinations such as Australia. However, participants’ identity as New Zealand citizens appeared to be less significant when they talked about their engagement with members of the host society. At those points their conversations were punctuated with descriptors such as ‘Kiwis’ and ‘Asians’, rather than ‘New Zealanders’, while at other times they referred to themselves in more cultural terms, as being Chinese or Korean – or occasionally, as not very Chinese, or not Korean enough.

In response to both survey and interview questions concerning notions of identity, participants offered answers which, when analysed, identified a variety of different factors that came into play to affect their identity as 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents, which will be detailed in this chapter. These are not discrete categories, but rather processes, motivations and reactions whose interplay is exceptionally complex, often muddled and sometimes unrecognised by the actors themselves. Migrants’ legal status as New Zealand residents or citizens was amongst these factors. For some interviewees, citizenship was a mere administrative formality which did not affect their identity at all, while for others it was a significant milestone of their journey as migrants. Another factor was their sense of essential traits, the possession or lacking of which defined some participants. The most prominent example of an essential trait is ‘Asian’ as a racial identity, which featured in all the interviews.

Cultural acquisition is a third factor which emerged as a key to some participants’ identity. This was the sense that some had of ‘becoming’ New Zealanders – not in the legal sense of citizenship, but rather in adding to their cultural repertoire the language, attitudes, behaviours and other cultural elements that they identified as belonging typically to ‘Kiwis’. Related to cultural acquisition, and held in tension with that process, was the relational factor of belonging. In other words, the degree of participants’ sense of belongingness, or Other-ness, of being accepted by other New Zealanders as belonging, had a significant impact on their identity. Finally, closely related to these last two are the motivations and aspirations of migrants. At least one participant thought of himself as a virtual exile from the home where he truly belonged.

29 The question of participants’ future aspirations is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.
While that perception may have developed in part as a reaction to other factors mentioned above, it also had a great deal to do with his sense of what he sacrificed – or, more accurately, what his parents' decision, taken on his behalf, required him to sacrifice – in leaving the life he had at home. The factor of aspiring to return eventually to his country of origin and begin to reclaim what he had lost makes this participant, his experiences of migration and his sense of identity integrally unlike other participants who aspired to belong in their new 'home'. Faist characterises particular types of migrants with an over-riding intention to return home – usually labour migrants – as exiles, and though he acknowledges that their intentions may change, an exile standpoint precludes the formation of substantial ties to the destination society (Faist 1999:11).

The discussion in this chapter raises as many question as it sets out to answer. Importantly, the chapter signals the major issues to be addressed in subsequent chapters, as identity is a critical element in migrant acculturation and in their engagement with the wider community, and is frequently a source of intergenerational tensions within migrant families. The present discussion reports the survey results from the data produced from these two indicators. It also addresses the themes that emerged in the interviews, introduced above. Specific conclusions are few, however: instead, the themes introduced in this chapter are subsequently brought to bear on the issues of participants' acculturation (Chapter Six), their relationships with their parents (Chapter Seven) and their involvement in extra-curricular activities (Chapter Eight).

The manner in which participants configured their identity as 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents was framed by several considerations, which are the themes, mentioned above, that are to be the organising concepts for this chapter. They are: the symbolic significance of legal/administrative considerations; the influence of essentialist notions of identity; the idiosyncratic nature of cultural adjustment; the importance of relational dynamics and affinities; and the role played by participants' motives and aspirations. The complexity of migrants' perceptions and meanings provides the basis for these themes. As such, the qualitative data is presented in the foreground in this chapter, while the survey data are mostly used to establish the framework in which these issues are developed.
The Question of Identity

In order to compare meaningfully the responses to the survey question about their ethnic or cultural identity, the sixteen response types generated by the survey respondents, mentioned earlier, were standardised into six major ordinal response categories – that is, categories which could be arranged along a relational continuum, with origin-based identity responses and New Zealand-based identity responses at opposite points (Figure 5.1). Two different categories share the central area of the continuum, as both are conceptually equally distant from either pole. These two categories, the dual/blended identity (illustrated by responses such as “Both Taiwanese and New Zealander”, and the novel “Kowi”) and the pan-ethnic identity (Asian) represent different manifestations of attempts to engage with the host society.

![Figure 5.1 Major “Ethnic Identity” Response Categories]

In this format quite different identity configurations could be compared in terms of their relativity to both origin and host societies. Ten survey participants failed to answer the ethnic identity question. Of those who did respond, 60% indicated a dominant Origin identity. The next largest group of respondents indicated a qualified New Zealand identity (23%), while only two respondents indicated a dominant New Zealand identity (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2
Respondent Ethnic Self-description - Major Categories (N = 111)

Legal and Administrative Considerations

Nearly one-third of survey respondents answered the cultural/ethnic identity question by specifically referring to the holding of citizenship, either of their origin country or of New Zealand – or both, as several highlighted their dual citizenship status. Most of these respondents cited origin citizenship only, while most of the remaining participants expanded their sense of identity with other factors (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1
Respondents Citing ‘Citizenship’ as Element of Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural / Ethnic Identifiers</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Sub-set (N=39)</th>
<th>% of Sample (N=121)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin Citizenship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Citizenship + “Asian”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Citizenship + New Zealand Residency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Citizenship</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Citizenship + Origin Ethnicity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There were an additional twenty-four respondents who identified themselves as hyphenated New Zealanders (e.g. ‘Korean-New Zealander’). Because they did not specifically highlight citizenship as the means by which they lay claim to the identity ‘New Zealander’, they have not been included in the above list. However, it would be reasonable to assume that most hyphenated New Zealanders would adopt that identity on the basis of having gained New Zealand citizenship.

Interviewees did not emphasise citizenship as a critical factor in their identity as migrants, however. Kyle\textsuperscript{30} dismissed the gaining of New Zealand citizenship as a mere formality that did not affect his cultural identity, commenting: “Okay, New Zealander, you get New Zealand citizenship, that’s a New Zealander.” Joanne, a Korean migrant, was equally dismissive about the prospect of losing her Korean citizenship, since Korean citizens are not allowed to hold two passports, and a New Zealand passport was considered by her and her family to be more useful in the long term. Besides, Joanne said, she was not interested in living in Korea.

Joanne: I wouldn’t want to go back to Korea. I don’t really know the language any more. And there’s something about I can’t have two citizenships. I have to give up one citizenship.

\textit{AB:} \hspace{1em} \textit{How do you feel about that?}

Joanne: Don’t care.

\textit{AB:} \hspace{1em} \textit{So you’d consider giving up Korean citizenship?}

Joanne: Well, if I have to, yeah. I mean, just having a piece of paper saying that I’m a citizen, it doesn’t really bother me.

\textit{AB:} \hspace{1em} \textit{But it would mean that if you were to go back, you’d have to go as a visitor. You’d have to apply to go home!}

\textsuperscript{30} The names of all the participants have been changed.
Joanne: It's really just a piece of paper. If anyone asks you where you're from, I'll still say Korea. . . . But when I go back — I went back to Korea for a visit a couple years ago, I didn't belong there.

However, for at least one interviewee, the granting of a New Zealand passport, and the prospect of travelling overseas as a New Zealander, raised questions that she had not previously considered. Early in her solo interview, Shona had reiterated for me that, despite having lived in New Zealand for the majority of her life, and acknowledging that she had undergone a great many changes to her cultural make-up (discussed in greater depth later), she considered herself a Taiwanese. It was in this context that she reflected on gaining her New Zealand passport. She had originally taken up citizenship, like Joanne, as an administrative requirement for studying in Australia. However, the process introduced unexpected questions for Shona, not just about who she was, but also about where she was from.

I just got my New Zealand passport yesterday, because I might go to Australia for university. I haven't had a New Zealand passport, and so I applied for it, and on the passport it says, "Nationality: New Zealand". And I looked at it, and I thought, "Wow, now my nationality is New Zealand." Plus already if you go to other countries and they ask where you come from, what are you going to say to them? I mean, if you say New Zealand, then people look at you and say, "Oh, you don't look like a New Zealander, you look like something else." (Shona)

The orientation of most of the participants towards an origin ethnic identity is supported by their responses to the survey question that asked participants to identify the proportion of their friends who were the same ethnicity as themselves. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents indicated that a majority of their friends were of the same ethnicity as themselves, and about fifteen percent indicated that the majority of their friends were of a different ethnicity, while only two respondents had no friends of the same ethnicity (Figure 5.3). These results will be discussed again in the next chapter with regard to issues around adjustment and acculturation, but as a marker of identity, the fact that nearly half the sample indicated that all, or nearly all, of their friends were the same ethnicity as themselves suggests a significant ethnic group attachment.
Statistical analysis of the ethnic identity variables revealed a weak association between respondents' ethnic identity and their friends' ethnicity (Kendall's \( \tau_u = .14 \)), suggesting that participants' subjective sense of their own ethnic identity did not significantly influence their range of friends. Moreover, as Table 5.2 below illustrates, no variables were strongly associated with either participants' ethnic orientation or their friends' ethnicity. In fact, the only variable even moderately associated with participants' ethnic identity was whether they felt okay about being described as a foreigner, a result from which one might draw the uninspiring conclusion that those participants who maintained a dominant origin ethnicity were somewhat more likely to feel okay about being called a foreigner than those whose identity was more fluid. These results suggest that the determining processes by which the migrant adolescents in this survey develop and negotiate their ethnic identity are not so much the quantitative factors which describe certain aspects of their life in New Zealand, such as how they adjust to a new language, or the friends they make, or how long they have lived here – or indeed the impact of their gender, place of origin or the school they attend. Instead, it is the qualitative factors, the realm of meanings, through which they interpret this variety of experiences.
The fact that most respondents’ identity was oriented towards the place from which they migrated rather than their destination does not suggest that this group of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents have not adjusted to life in New Zealand. On the contrary, many had made significant adjustments and felt themselves to have acculturated well in their new society. This was reflected in a range of survey and interview data relating to participants’ experiences of adjusting to a new language, a new school and a new set of friends, which are analysed in detail in the next chapter. However, their orientation towards an origin identity did indicate the social distance perceived by many of these young people between themselves and other New Zealanders, which they attributed to the fact of their being Asian.

**Essentialist Notions - Being Asian**

Phenotypical differences are the most apparent essentialist traits that set groups apart (Castles & Miller 1998:232), and these differences constituted the most significant factor impacting on the identity of those in the study. Specifically, their experience of being racialised as Asian in New Zealand defined, to a greater or lesser extent, the identity of every participant, including those who felt as though they really belonged here. It was the most significant form in which they were cast as the ‘Other’ in New Zealand society, and was the term all participants used when they contrasted themselves and their experiences with other New Zealanders.
Well, in myself I really feel that it's not 100 percent possible [to belong in New Zealand]. Like, it could be 90 percent or 80 percent [for migrants who] assimilate with looks, but not when the first impression when people look at you is that you're Asian. (Louise)

While ‘Asian’ as a referent might on the one hand be read merely as a pan-ethnic term of people coming from a given geographic region – much as ‘European’ might be – others argue that it is not a politically neutral term, but rather serves to homogenise an array of distinct people groups and cultures into a single racialised Other (Espiritu 1992:251). Writing about Filipino migrants in the United States, Espiritu points out that

The very term “Asian American” arose out of the racist discourse that constructs Asians as a homogeneous group. Seen by the dominant culture as “non-white” but not black, Asian Americans simultaneously are celebrated as America’s “model minority” and condemned as the unwanted “Yellow Hordes” (ibid.:251-2).

Of course, social distance is not merely the product of racial differences. Any number of perceived differences may result in a particular group being cast in the role of the Other. Kong (1999:576-7) describes the process by which Singaporeans living in Beijing developed a heightened consciousness of their national identity through encountering unanticipated boundaries between themselves and the Beijing Chinese. Many of Kong’s interviewees had felt themselves to be Chinese before migrating to China; however, after being treated by the Beijing Chinese, not like Chinese, but rather like “foreigners”, they (re)discovered and (re)asserted their identity as Singaporeans. The development of a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived structured social distance between migrants and the host society further problematises migrants’ transnational identity.

Group interview participants were all well-versed in the forms of racist discourse rehearsed in the media concerning Asians in New Zealand and discussed in Chapter Two, and the label ‘Asian’ was not universally acceptable to the research participants. Survey participants were presented with a series of identifier labels or descriptions, and asked to indicate whether they objected to, or felt okay about, being described as each
of the labels presented. More than a quarter of respondents (28%) objected to the term 'Asian' (Figure 5.4). A third of participants objected to the term 'Asian Immigrant', while three-quarters of the sample indicated that they felt okay being described as an [Origin] New Zealander – that is, Taiwanese New Zealander, Korean New Zealander, and so forth. Surprising to me, the second-most accepted label was [Origin] Student – Chinese Student, Korean Student, etc. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the participants felt okay being described thus, despite the significant differences between themselves, as migrants, and the non-migrant, fee-paying students from the same countries, who either home-stay with New Zealand host families or 'parachute'. My expectation was that 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents would wish to distance themselves from the sometimes unfavourable image of ‘Asian students’ as described in Chapter Two.

People tend to think that Asians are Chinese, because there are so many Chinese people. So, yeah, whenever they see an Asian person they think they’re Chinese. (Lara)

I think Asians is just a bigger category, and that Asians can be Chinese, Japanese Korean, Taiwanese, and people tend to mix them up. There’s a guy who asked me, “What’s the difference between the Chinese and Taiwanese?” I said, “Chinese come from China, Taiwanese come from Taiwan.” He said, “Oh, right.” I know I’m Asian, but I don’t like other people just calling me Asian. It’s like calling a New Zealander a European. (Jason)
Several interviewees offered insights into why some might have objected to the label ‘Asian’, which suggests that while the term carries an essentialist cast, in that it is used to describe a ‘racial’ category, it is also a social construction resisted by those who are not prepared to accept a pan-ethnic label. Jason, who confessed to disliking the label, compared being called an Asian to calling other New Zealanders ‘Europeans’. Louise was also one who rejected such a label on her arrival in New Zealand, because she felt that other New Zealanders were not prepared to acknowledge the cultural differences amongst the various ethnic groups subsumed by the label. However, Louise found that she was more prepared to accept the term over time. Its more inclusive boundaries allowed for a greater ‘Us’.

Louise: I remember when I first came here, I would definitely have labelled them as Hong Kong, Korean, and like that. I don’t really like the term they use ‘Asian’ because – like because Kiwi people think, “Oh, they are all Asians, they must all be the same.” They didn’t understand that we are all from different parts of Asia. And I didn’t really like the idea because I think that “Oh, we are just given a general title.” But once I’d been here for like three years, I started to look at things in
more general terms. Yes, what’s the problem with using the term ‘Asian’? Yes, we come from Asia, and our ideas and our habits and stuff are not too much different from other people around Asia, so I now will accept the term Asian.

*AB:* So there is a bit of a process there.

Louise: Yes.

*AB:* So how do you relate to other people from Taiwan when they first come over, because they’ll have all those same attitudes, won’t they?

Louise: Yeah, they do (laughs)! And like, I’ll tell them, “Oh, I felt exactly the same when I first came here, but I mean, as time goes by you will know that it will just go away."

Ironically, that same student later observed that other migrants – even other migrants from non English-speaking backgrounds – who were ‘white’ seemed to be accepted by the Pakeha students more readily than were the Asians. Vasil and Yoon have noted this differential acceptance as well, stating that Pākehā recognise European migrants “as being equally civilised, as persons of equal worth”, while the religions, languages, cultures and habits of Asians tend to be viewed with suspicion and disdain (Vasil & Yoon 1996:45).

I find it quite an interesting trend that, like, more of the Europeans come here, they look like the Kiwis do, so every time when we are all together, like lunch or assembly, all those people sit together. I mean, regardless but I mean, even three of them are all from different countries, they will sit together. So you get all the Asians sitting together one side, and the other students down the other side. (Louise)

The acceptance of essential characteristics as a central consideration in determining one’s identity, reasonably widely acknowledged with an referent such as ‘Asian’, also appeared in discussions about an identifier unique to New Zealand, that of ‘Kiwi’.
Who is a Kiwi?

There was a consensus amongst the interview participants that New Zealand society equated to New Zealand Pākehā society. This conflation of national and ethnic identity was uniform in both the group and individual interviews, to the point that the term ‘New Zealanders’ was taken to be synonymous with ‘Pākehā, ‘Europeans’ and – most significantly – ‘Kiwis’. I tested this notion at several points in the group interviews, asking whether Māori were included under the rubric ‘Kiwi’, but it was a point of significant agreement that Māori comprised a unique ethnic grouping outside the bounds of what constituted ‘Kiwis’. Because ‘Kiwi’ was the term all the interviewees used most readily when referring to Pakeha New Zealanders (or New Zealand Europeans), as well as to New Zealand society more generally, it is the term used most often in this chapter to refer to New Zealand’s dominant ethnic group, as well as New Zealand society as it entered participants’ habitats of meaning.

Interview participants did not consider themselves Kiwi. Even those who felt that they were well-adjusted into New Zealand society and culture deferred on the term because, they said, it signified New Zealand Europeans almost exclusively. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the survey question concerning participants’ reactions to particular identifiers presented in Figure 5.1, above, as that question had asked whether they would accept being referred to as the label, rather than whether they chose actively to apply it to themselves. When questioned about their use of the term Kiwi, participants suggested that because a kiwi is a native bird, one would have to be native to apply the term to oneself; others had the sense that as a cultural referent, one would need to ‘give up’ defining aspects of one’s ‘own’ culture in order to take up the Kiwi label. One interview participant succinctly encapsulated the two major aspects of the term, culture and phenotype, that most participants associated with the term, by saying, “I think the word Kiwi gives connotations of white people. To me, I think of Weet-Bix, not in terms of Maori people... I really don’t like that ad.”

While some insisted that the meaning of the term was fixed and referred always and exclusively to Pākehā, there were some who felt that Asians, and indeed other non-Pakeha New Zealanders, might become Kiwis; that Kiwi was indeed a cultural identity, although one which was a marker of a more general New Zealand-ness rather than being fixed in ethnicity. However, even those few acknowledged that even if an Asian person
‘felt Kiwi’, it would be unlikely that others would identify them as such. The most ardent advocate that certain Asians should be free to identify themselves as Kiwis found herself setting the standard for such individuals very high: Asians did not become Kiwis, they had to be born so, as the following interchange illustrates.

Louise: I think sometimes I feel quite unfair for the third or fourth generation of Asian immigrants, for they have nothing to do with their previous culture, they accept all of New Zealand way of life and stuff, they call themselves Kiwis, but other Kiwi people don’t think they are because, just because of what Joanne said, “Oh, when we talk about Kiwi, we think about white people.”

AB: So can those people be Kiwis?

Louise: I think they could call themselves Kiwi.

Joanne: Obviously the first perception [by others] of that ‘Kiwi’ would be that they’re Asians, but once you get to know them and stuff, you’d find out they weren’t the stereotypical Asian.

Kunz and Hanvey (2000) found that migrant adolescents in Canada had raised the same kinds of questions about ‘being Canadian’. A number of participants in their Immigrant Youth in Canada research had determined that the term ‘Canadian’ applied to white Canadian-born people of Anglo-Saxon descent, and while most of their research participants – who were migrants from all over the world, and not exclusively Asian – felt comfortable in Canada, and adapting to Canadian life, they neither felt Canadian nor expected ever to do so. According to Kunz and Hanvey,

“[m]any believed that one’s country of birth determined your identity for life. According to this view, only people who were born in Canada were truly Canadian. Others saw the issue more in terms of their ability to integrate. ‘As long as I have an accent, I don’t think I can feel really Canadian’ (Kunz and Hanvey 2000).
Identity and Gender

As a frequently-cited essentialist identity element, some mention must be made of gender. Unlike other research suggesting that transnationalism, migration and assimilation are gendered processes which produce gendered outcomes (Wolf 1997), gender did not appear to be a significant factor in either the quantitative or qualitative data in the present study. Gender had no impact on variables such as ethnic identity, friends’ ethnicity, language use or other dissociation variables, nor did it impact on the educational and occupational aspirations of the interview participants. Several of the female interviewees mentioned gender differences, but these were framed in terms of differences between Asian girls and Kiwi girls, rather than between Asian girls and boys. Their observations were that Asian girls had somewhat stricter controls applied to their social lives than Kiwi girls seemed to have. Aside from the issue of having more or less freedom to attend parties or stay overnight at friends’ homes – neither of which were presented as significant problems with interviewees – there were no gender-specific differences cited. In fact, one interview participant, after suggesting that Kiwi girls generally thought of Asian girls as being “geeky” and of having very strict parents,31 also noted that she is often invited to parties by her Kiwi friends, which she always accepts. Finally, in comparing Kiwi girls and Asian girls, this participant rejected the idea of gendered cultural outcomes.

I think it would still be coming down to family background, because you can still find total different personalities. Like I have friends who are really quiet personalities, you know like, she’s even more self-conscious than Asian girls. I mean some Asian girls get even wilder than those Kiwi girls. Some Kiwi girls are just totally like boys: they get along with boys, and yeah, I mean, I think it’s the same as what Asian girls are, I mean, you can still find wild and quiet ones. (Joanne)

In summary, most of these migrant adolescents identified themselves primarily in relation to their origin ethnicity or nationality. However, for many this identity is complicated by three factors related above: the significance invested in changes to their citizenship; the assumption, sometimes problematic, of ‘Asian’ as a pan-ethnic identity, and their identification with other ‘Asians’; and interaction with New Zealand’s

31 The theme of parents’ strictness will be taken up in Chapter Seven.
dominant ethnic group, whom they identified as ‘Kiwis’. Although every adolescent Asian migrant would be confronted with these same considerations, their relative significance within each habitat of meaning varies greatly, as demonstrated in the wide range of self identifications the survey participants produced.

**Ethnic Dissociation: How Different are ‘They’ from ‘Us’?**

While analysis of participants’ notions of identity was informed in part by the survey and interview data derived from the Ethnic Identity indicator variables, other data that had a bearing on these considerations emerged from the Ethnic Dissociation indicator – that is, the extent to which participants differentiated themselves from ‘Kiwis’. The Ethnic Dissociation indicator data help to refine notions of ethnic identity in that they indicate the distance that members of the target population perceived between themselves and the host society’s dominant ethnic group, and suggest the size and permeability of the perceived boundaries confronting 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents to New Zealand. In the interviews, ethnic dissociation took the form of participants describing what Kiwis were like, how they thought Kiwis were different from themselves, and suggesting what they believed Kiwis thought about Asians.

Generally, interviewees agreed that Kiwi students were more enthusiastic, assertive and demonstrative than themselves, while also being less focused on school work. In the individual interviews, participants talked about the differences between activities they do with their Kiwi friends, and those they do with their Asian friends. Their responses were consistent with the impression of Kiwis being more involved in sporting activities, or in discussing sports, than their Asian friends, and less inclined than their Asian friends to seriously pursue school work in their out-of-school hours. One interviewee mentioned that she did sometimes talk about school work with her Kiwi friends – when she was helping them with their homework. But, she said, “it’s never like, ‘Let’s go to the library and study.’”

Like, my Kiwi friends, they are more active, and they are always energetic, like, going around their house is like doing sports stuff. My Asian friends are quieter, and they always talk about different things, like school life, like how
they get on with their homework, and what they usually do in the weekend, and sometimes we talk about boy/girl business, just gossip.

Kiwi friends, they’re always on about sports, they really talk about sports. I think they try to avoid talking about homework, school, and school work. Because in their free time they just want to enjoy themselves without any homework, without any school work. Like this weekend I went out with this friend, and I realised that whatever they talk about, they’re like, more positive. (Louise)

Louise went on to describe that, when she goes out with her Kiwi friends, they often do quite active things, such as ten-pin bowling, or swimming – what she called “energetic stuff.” She contrasted these activities with typical get-togethers with her Asian friends, described as “sitting down, and listening to music – not that violent type of activity!”

Lunch-times at school provided participants with observations about the differences between Kiwis and Asians – particularly Kiwi boys, whose activities seemed to occupy more of the shared space at school.

I think they're more active than Taiwanese boys. For example, in the interval or at lunchtime I think Kiwi boys play hackey, or handball, passing the rugby balls around. And Asian boys, they just stand around in a circle, chatting, and at lunchtime they're all in the library. And Kiwi guys are still standing there doing active stuff, joking around, shoving around and all that. Some of them are in rugby teams and stuff. I’m not suggesting that Asian guys don’t do sport, they do: they play sports, but not in interval or lunchtime. (Shona)

Most interviewees noted the differences in the sports each group plays most, as well. The sports identified as “Kiwi” were more expansive.

Yeah, there’s a really clear distinction between Asian sports and Kiwi sports – Kiwi is like rugby, cricket, hockey, and like Asian sports are like table tennis, badminton, like that. But I mean, when you look at the boys here playing sport, and boys in Taiwan, they don’t have that kind of enthusiasm in them. (Monica)
In fact, some participants observed that the enthusiasm with which Kiwi students approached sports – whether playing them or talking about them – was symptomatic of a generally positive disposition. Louise, in particular, detailed what she saw as major differences between Kiwis and the more reserved Asians.

I should say in general our Taiwanese are not as enthusiastic as Kiwi, when they look at things, when they do whatever things. Because, like, when you ask for people to come and talk – I mean, it’s very clear in our student rep meetings: all the Asian student reps, we all sit there and we listen to all the others’ ideas and just go, “Oh yeah, it’s just so good. Oh yeah, this one’s good, and that one’s good.” But the Kiwis stand up for their own ideas, they go, “Oh well, I think your one is quite good, but how about mine?” I think that they dare to stand up for their own beliefs, whereas we accept them all, “Oh, yeah, everything is all right, we will just go with everything!” (laughs) And they go, “You can’t accept everything, we have to come up with one solution!” (Louise)

When I asked Louise to suggest why it was that she thought the Asian students would not defend their own views or opinions as strongly as Kiwi students, she pointed to two factors. One was language skills, of which she said that Asian people were likely to be critical of their own English-speaking ability, particularly when in an ethnically-mixed group, and they would allow that self-consciousness and fear of embarrassment to hold them back. Her other observation was that Kiwi students tended to be more optimistic than Asian students, who were more likely to be pragmatic.

Even if you can speak really good English, I think because we are brought up, still – I mean, compared to Kiwi standards. . . . Like, they look at things at that distance and think, “Oh well, if you try it you might get there,” whereas we try to be more realistic, really, saying, “Well, there’s no point in trying this, it’s just ridiculous,” But I mean that if you do try it, you might get that far, you never know, but we hold ourselves back and say, “Oh, we’re not going to try it, there’s no point.” (Louise)

Louise’s discussion of language fluency raises another of the milestones used by migration theorists to chart and compare migrants’ adaptation to their new environments. Interview participants repeatedly talked about the ways in which their
self-consciousness and unease with English had held them back from interaction with other New Zealanders. This was a factor which affected most interviewees in the early part of their residence in New Zealand, and which shaped their friendships, their participation in class and the activities they took part in. This is supported by research conducted by Ho and her colleagues, in which many of the Asian migrant adolescents who took part disclosed that it had even influenced their decisions regarding which courses they chose to take – or not take – at secondary school (Ho et al. 1996:4-7). A fuller discussion of language issues is canvassed in Chapter Six, in the context of cultural adjustment: however, the topic is introduced here as it has such a bearing on other factors which influence – and are themselves influenced by – migrant adolescents’ sense of their own cultural identity.

Participants’ understandings of cultural or ethnic identity combined both fixed, monolithic characteristic, or set of characteristics, and degrees of flexibility, interpretation and hybridity. These two modes of conceptualising identity were often held in tension. On the one hand, most had drawn clear and essentialised distinctions between Kiwis and Asians. When asked, “What are Kiwi teenagers like?”, all of the participants had ready observations; none suggested “they’re just like me”. However, they also acknowledged shifts in their own identity, as they alternately accommodated or embraced various aspects of their new milieu. Details emerged in the interviews which suggested that participants were engaging in a more subtle and complex process of identity (re)formation that undercut stable and fixed notions of cultural identity. Shona was one interviewee who, on the one hand, stated unhesitatingly that she would describe herself still as a Taiwanese, though later in the interview questioned “Do I belong to Taiwan or to New Zealand?” and described her position as ‘stuck in the middle’ between the two.

In a way, I do sort of fit in, but I would never call myself as a Kiwi, even though I’ve been here for many years. I mean, even if I had been living in New Zealand for ten years, or a hundred years, I would never call myself as a Kiwi, or Pakeha, because I think people specifically hold the word Kiwi or Pakeha as European, or white. But in a way I do, I do feel I belong here, because I have been here for quite a few years, and I have sort of integrated really well. . . .

(Shona)
It is clear that Shona had begun to realise a more fluid, perhaps hybrid identity; she was becoming, though she struggled for the words to express the goal, the becoming whom? Some, like Shona, came to an awareness of the extent to which their identities had changed after a visit back to their country of origin. Shona described her first visit back to Taiwan as being initially quite unsettling, being confronted by the realisation that she had, in fact, adjusted to life in New Zealand. Reproduced below is an interchange from Shona's interview transcript which illustrates how the complexities of a concept like 'belonging' are played out in the habitats of some 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents, and how these dynamics challenge notions of their own identity. After five years in New Zealand, Shona discovered during her visit to Taiwan that her assumption that she still belonged there was mistaken. While the changes she had embodied challenge her sense of belonging in Taiwan, prior to her visit she clearly had not considered actually belonging in New Zealand. Since then, she seems to have resolved that New Zealand is where she 'sort of' fits in, but that this belonging remains limited and contingent. At least part of the explanation for such contingency is revealed in the extract below, when I asked her about whether she would consider herself a Taiwanese New Zealander. At that point, she immediately replied that, despite her own considerations, others would not see her that way.

Shona: I do feel that I am still Taiwanese, but last year I went back to Taiwan for a holiday, and I hadn't been back for about five years, so that's the first time I went back. And it was totally different from what I expected. I found myself really hard to adjust to the Taiwanese-style culture, and in a way it's kind of disappointing. I feel like I'm sort of, like, excluded from Taiwanese circle. So I was pretty disappointed, in a way. I feel like people just think I'm different, like I exclude myself. At that time I started to feel like, "do I belong in New Zealand, or do I belong in Taiwan?" I sort of felt like I'm stuck in the middle.

AB: Do you still feel that way?

Shona: Not really now. I like New Zealand, and I sort of fit in pretty well here.
AB: You said that you wouldn't call yourself a Kiwi. So what do you call yourself?

Shona: Still a Taiwanese.

AB: Would you hyphenate that? Would you say Taiwanese-New Zealander?

Shona: People wouldn't know that you were a Taiwanese New Zealander when they look at you, they would just think you were Asian. But, yeah, I could call myself a Taiwanese New Zealander.

That notion of being 'stuck in the middle', which others refer to as being 'neither here nor there' (Kong 1999:583-4), points to the emergence of a hybrid or cosmopolitan identity, the surprising discomfort and instability that may accompany the expansion of one's cultural repertoire, and a jostling for primacy amongst various identities and places in the lives of migrants – what Kong refers to as 'the unresolved tensions between the competing demands on allegiance and attachment' (ibid:585). Louise, quoted earlier describing her initial resistance to the homogenising nature of the term 'Asian', also related in her solo interview that after she had resigned herself to accepting Asianness as a fixed identity which marked her as an Other who belonged elsewhere, she was startled to discover that she was perceived differently by visitors from Europe.

In the beginning, I thought, “Oh well, I’m always Asian, I can’t change. So maybe New Zealand is just the place where I will stay for awhile, do my education, and then I will just go back to where I belong after I finish my studies.” But then, as time goes by, I start to feel that I’m part of New Zealand now. Several weeks ago a group of Finnish people came to our school for the education tournament, and I was one of the student reps, so I took them around the school, and I’m introducing things to them. They looked at me as a New Zealander too – saying things like “Oh yeah, you in New Zealand, blah, blah,” and I was like, “Oh yeah, this is my country.” (Louise)
However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the passage of time and the expansion of one’s cultural repertoire naturally or necessarily eliminates bounded or essentialist notions of identity in favour of hybrid or cosmopolitan alternatives. Another participant, who was the same age as the previous speaker, and who arrived in New Zealand in the same year, was equally certain of his origin ethnic identity:

No. I wasn’t born here, and I wasn’t brought up as a New Zealander, and those two are quite new to me, and I have to adapt to the lifestyle here. I am more used to the Taiwan set-up, more used to the food, the lifestyle, the whole culture which is different. Yeah, I belong to Taiwan. (Kyle)

The juxtaposition of these two participants, Kyle and Louise, is significant, because they represent antipodal points on a continuum of identity, between which all other participants are located. Significant also are the factors which delineate their contrasting positions, because they are not to be found in the quantitative data except in glimpses. The primary difference lay in Kyle’s assessment of what he had been forced to give up upon leaving Taiwan, and his determination ultimately to return there and reclaim his life; as a result, his view was that although he would need to make the most of his time in New Zealand, and adapt to new friends, new school, new language and food – which he had done – he simply did not belong here.32

Conclusion

The survey of Asian migrant adolescents was designed with the intention of examining their experiences of belonging, becoming and boundaries. However, little in the quantitative data indicated factors that influenced ethnic identity. Patterns simply did not emerge between ethnic attachment and the range of variables the literature suggests should demonstrate an association. My engagement with the interview participants and the qualitative data they offered led me to identify a range of factors that impact on their identity and give shape – while in term being shaped by – their habitats of meaning in ways not accounted for by purely quantitative studies of migrant acculturation.

32 Kyle’s explanation, and its impact on my approach to the data, is given prominence in Chapter Seven.
Analysed dialectically, the survey and interview data derived from the Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Dissociation indicators suggest that for these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents, ethnic identity and ethnic attachment are multi-dimensional, flexible and dynamic. As migrants to New Zealand, their ethnic identity is defined significantly, but not solely, by Asianness. It is around this feature that these migrant adolescents pivot. For some, it is a factor that complicates their identity as New Zealanders but does not negate it, as they are able to draw upon other factors, such as Kiwi friendships and citizenship, to bolster a sense of themselves as New Zealanders. For others, being Asian means confronting a boundary that has been created and maintained by other New Zealanders, which limits their identity as New Zealanders, and through which they will never completely be allowed to pass. However, not all Asian migrant adolescents wish to 'become' New Zealanders, demonstrating an attachment to their origins which persists independently of other acculturation factors, such as learning English, making new friends, and even gaining citizenship. Notions of identity, attachment and belonging are interwoven and unstable. They are influenced by migrants' engagement with the host society, by their sense of acculturation and 'becoming', and by their aspirations to belong, to return, or to extend their transnational experience to other destinations. The factors, infused with meaning by the participants, which are woven through their conversations and their survey responses were introduced as: the symbolic significance of legal/administrative considerations; the influence of essentialist notions of identity; the idiosyncratic nature of cultural adjustment; the importance of relational dynamics and affinities; and the role played by participants' motives and aspirations.

Having introduced these factors in this chapter, and foreshadowed their influence in subsequent chapters, the following summary serves as a link between them.

- **Legal / Administrative Considerations**

For those relatively few participants who configured their cultural identity specifically around citizenship, consideration of their legal status was highly significant. The retention of origin citizenship, the gaining of a new citizenship or, as described above, a new passport, can have symbolic resonance for these migrants, as milestones signifying an important element of who they are, or where they belong. Some, like Shona, are
surprised by the way in which what they had assumed to be a merely administrative procedure takes on a significance which challenges their previously-held notions of identity. The decision to pursue New Zealand citizenship – taken for instrumental or affective purposes – may be an especially significant one for those from nation states (such as South Korea) which seek to enforce national loyalty by disallowing its citizens to hold dual citizenship: for these, it is a zero-sum equation, as the acquisition of a new citizenship requires renouncing this symbolic tie to the land of their heritage.

On the other hand, some migrants may take a more instrumental approach to citizenship and reject its symbolic significance, such as Joanne, who insisted that relinquishing Korean citizenship did not affect who she is; neither did gaining New Zealand citizenship. Rather, these are steps one must take in order to pursue one’s objectives. Joanne’s embodiment of transnationalism produced in her a sense of identity completely detached from issues of citizenship. For others, transnational identities may be maintained or enhanced by the gaining of dual citizenship (Orellana et al. 2001:577), since ease of movement – not only back and forth between one’s origin and ‘new’ countries, but also onward to other destinations – is strategically enhanced due to political agreements between states, such as that between New Zealand and Australia.

These ideas are not foreign to Pakeha New Zealanders. Many descendents of British migrants instrumentally pursue British citizenship, in order to gain a coveted British passport, which will allow them to live and work in the United Kingdom, as well as gain easy access to Europe (Spoonley 2001:164). In a similar fashion, the instrumental value of a New Zealand passport, particularly as a means to pursue educational or employment opportunities in Australia, did not, for most of my research participants, translate into symbolic value in ways that affected their identity.

- Essentialist Notions of Identity

Boundary-building is part of how we make sense of the complexity of our social world. As Alba and Nee point out, humans necessarily “place people into categories, each associated with expected behaviour and treatment, in order to deal in a routine and predictable manner with strangers and acquaintances outside of their primary groups” (Alba & Nee 1997:836). For the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents who
participated in this study, it was ‘race’, not gender, that defined an essential element of their identity. Data collected from all of the interviewees confirmed the dual utility of the identity ‘Asian’. On the one hand as a pan-ethnic identity it is useful for describing themselves, their peers and others from countries across Asia, whose difference from the majority of other New Zealanders, and from most other migrants to New Zealand, is most readily apparent. On the other hand, as a racialised identity, Asianness is an identity constructed by others’ perceptions of them (Min & Kim 1999:28). Others’ assumptions, misunderstandings and expectations of participants, based upon their identity as Asians, resulted in patterns of social distance. These form a boundary that interview participants found constructed around them by non-Asians. At the same time as confronting this external boundary, and to some extent as a response to it, interviewees identified an essential identity for white New Zealanders: eschewing what still is perceived largely as a Māori term for New Zealand Europeans that has been adopted by liberal academics and others – Pākehā – interview participants’ reading of the host society led them all to refer to New Zealand’s dominant ethnic group as Kiwis. Even those few who felt that Asians should be able to adopt the identity as well – given the right set of conditions – acknowledged that the boundaries were fixed quite rigidly, and that as an identifier Kiwi effectively was the common equivalent of Pākehā. As such a prominent element in their identity, Asianness features in the discussions of all the data analysis chapters that follow.

- The Idiosyncratic Nature of Acculturation

Despite often describing cultural identity in fixed, bounded and essentialist terms, many of the participants had experienced aspects of acculturation that complicated their sense of their own identity. Changes were sometimes the result of conscious decisions, such as making Kiwi friends, or choosing to pursue extra-curricular activities. At other times the realisation that they had changed took participants by surprise, as Shona’s return visit to Taiwan demonstrated. Individuals may attempt to take corrective action to reverse previous decisions. These are all processes that take place within migrants’ habitats of meaning, and occur in relation to those around them. Having introduced the link between cultural adjustment and migrants’ identity in this chapter, the motives, processes, and meanings attached to participants’ acculturation will be taken up in following chapter.
• Relational Dynamics and Affinities

As emerged in the interviews, the relational elements of their identity as migrants were more significant for the participants than was the consideration of citizenship. The importance of these relational processes reflects the adjustment processes perceived by migrants, of encountering boundaries between themselves and the host society, and discovering how firm or porous, how solid or gappy those boundaries are. These are the questions about belongingness or otherness that confront migrants, questions of identity which are linked inexorably to the perceptions of their relationships with those from the host society.

The notion of 'belonging' was a critical factor in some participants' consideration of their identity. Questions about where they belong, about whether they can ever truly belong in New Zealand, or ever again really belong in their origin countries, are complex and fraught with emotional and symbolic significance. The issue of belonging – elements of which stem from normative ideologies in both sending and receiving societies of loyalty and attachment to place, culture and nation – connects many of the questions and answers in the study, and are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.

An additional relational factor influencing the identity of 1.5 generation migrants concerns their family relations. The extent of generational consonance and dissonance at play within migrant families, the transnational strategies deployed by families to maintain relations with others in their origin countries, or indeed their livelihoods, or the family home, all combine to influence the development of young migrants’ identity. The survey and interview data concerning these dynamics are analysed in Chapter Seven.

• Motives and Aspirations

As I argued in Chapter Three, one cannot overlook differences in the motives that compel different categories of transnationals to cross borders of nations and cultures. One must also take account of the ways in which those differences will affect their
transnational identities. Take the middle-class professionals with highly specialised skills, who decide to leave Taiwan for the sake of their children’s education and to prevent their sons’ call-up to national service, and who discover upon their arrival in New Zealand that they are unable to use their sought-after skills because they are ‘Asian’. That is, their qualifications and experience are not recognised by professional bodies, or their English is deemed to be insufficient – or, they may suspect, they are discriminated against (Lidgard 1996:31). Given the competitive nature of the Taiwanese education system they have left, and the fact that their children’s education is the overwhelming reason for migrating in the first place, return of the entire family is an unacceptable option. They are therefore faced with the choice either to bring further disruption to their families by employing the ‘astronaut’ strategy, to seek employment in fields in which their skills will be either under-utilised or entirely irrelevant, or to retire. Given such a scenario – variations of which were rehearsed for me by all but one interviewee – how are we to conceptualise the settlement and adjustment experiences of these migrants, or of their children? Are we to assume that they will settle in the same way that other migrants have settled, or that they aspire to belong in the receiving society in the same ways as other migrants? Do we assume that the ‘myth of return’ is to remain a myth for these transnationals, and that when the primary purpose for their migration has been fulfilled, and their children graduate from university, they will have put down roots, begun thinking of themselves New Zealanders, and calling New Zealand ‘home’?

Most of the those in the survey identified primarily with a dominant origin ethnicity, and identified significant and enduring aspects of the social distance between themselves and “Kiwis”, which limits their sense of belonging, and therefore impacts on their identity. Given these elements, and the transnational resources at their disposal, a question that arises from the data, to be addressed in the proceeding chapters, is this: how many of these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents wish to become new New Zealanders?


Introduction

The discussion in this chapter addresses the survey data derived from the Acculturation Indicator variables, and the related interview data. Acculturation is the process by which migrants adjust to the dominant culture(s) of the host society. Of course, migrants usually have to make significant and continuous adjustments to life in the new society, even if they settle into an established ethnic community. The primary adjustment for most migrants is to using a new language. Other significant adjustments confronting 1.5 generation migrants centre on school and peer relationships, and the need to manage the competing demands of loyalty and attachment to their origin culture (often represented in their parents and families) and the dominant culture in the wider community (reinforced primarily at school and amongst peers).

The conventional explanations of migrant settlement tend to describe acculturation as a function of time and of relations with members of the host society, as well as attachment to one’s origin culture (Kim & Hurh 1993:697; Alba & Nee 1997:828-9). The process may be self-reinforcing: as migrants adjust to life in the new society, and the host society adjusts to their presence, the social distance between migrants and host decreases. As that happens, the migrants are able to develop stronger relationships with members of the host society, and the social distance diminishes further. Migrants may feel themselves to be more ‘at home’, as they perceive the boundaries between themselves and their new society to be lowered over time. As such, conventional hypotheses might posit that, in time, migrants who demonstrate a weak attachment to their origin culture, and who are able to establish friendships with members of the
dominant culture, are likely to adjust more completely than new migrants, or those with stronger attachments to their origin cultures and a smaller range of friendships.

Building on the research and explanations established in the literature, I developed an 'Acculturation Indicator', with survey variables that addressed areas of adjustment such as participants' language acquisition, as well as other socialisation factors such as respondents' relationships with members of the host society. Additional questions asked about the necessary adjustments of eating different food, making new friends, attending a new school and maintaining relationships in the country of origin and elsewhere. Also under the heading of 'Acculturation' were more reflective questions, asking participants about their attachment to place ('home') and their future aspirations, as well as soliciting general positive or negative assessments of their migration experience.

As with much of the other data collected in this research, the quantitative 'Acculturation' data is best conceptualised as providing a platform and a context for the qualitative data. On its own, the quantitative data do not clearly indicate any of the trends or associations suggested in the literature. That is, participants' performance on one set of variables is not useful for predicting responses to others. However, the reiterative process of conducting initial analysis of the quantitative data, and then returning to it after having qualitatively explored the insights, meanings and motivations of the interviewees, illuminates the data, and makes it perceptible in ways which would otherwise not be possible. This is a form of dialectical analysis in action (Alford 1998:123). In this instance, the quantitative data indicated a range of results, but could not explain them. These results informed the qualitative data-collection process, from which the meanings and motivations permeating migrants' acculturation help to explain why the conventional expectations for cultural adjustment do not adequately account for the experiences of these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents.

The chapter addresses the Acculturation Indicator data in five sections. The first section picks up the discussion of boundaries that began in Chapter Four, and extends it by demonstrating how this group of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents responded to the structured patterns of social distance they encountered. The boundaries are durable. As patterns of social distance, these boundaries are reinforced by notions of 'race', as
mentioned in Chapter Four, and by inter-cultural misunderstandings. Migrant adolescents’ status as outsiders is accentuated when they need to explain themselves in many social situations, to give account for an attitude or behaviour or reference not generally recognised by other New Zealanders. The second section explores specific adjustment experiences, such as participants’ observations about language acquisition, the process of ‘becoming New Zealanders’, and the internal tensions created by acculturation. The data indicate that, despite the persistence of social distance between migrants and ‘Kiwis’, acculturation did, indeed, occur. This section ends with an examination of whether these migrants felt that all the changes they have undertaken have been worthwhile, by addressing participants’ assessment of whether, by moving to New Zealand, they lost more than they gained.

Following these two sections are two others that each focus the discussion on a specific qualitative aspect of migrant adolescents’ experiences which add a complex and problematic layer to the question of cultural adjustment. These build on the ethnic identity material introduced in the previous chapter. The first is belongingness: migrants may acculturate without gaining a sense of belonging in the society to which they are adjusting. The qualitative data suggest that at least some 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents have developed a flexible and contingent sense of belonging – of belonging for now. This development is elaborated in the fourth section, detailing participants’ future aspirations – which, if fulfilled, would take most of these migrants away from New Zealand. In this context, the enlargement of migrants’ cultural repertoire becomes a transnational resource, a form of cultural capital that will help them to fulfil their aspirations. Such aspirations, to pursue educational and occupational opportunities in their origin countries or in other parts of the world, may be both a causal factor and a result of the limited sense of belonging in the society to which they have migrated, and may help to explain their complicated sense of ethnic identity. Finally, the issues raised in the preceding four sections are brought together in a discussion of participants’ attachment to place. Migrants are confronted with competing demands on their allegiance, and must constantly weigh up all they have gained in their destination against all they have lost from their place of origin. A sense of being ‘at home’ carries with it a degree of ontological security: one has a place. The Maori concept ‘turangawaewae’ – a place to stand, where one may plant one’s feet – evokes the sense of belonging and security invested in one’s attachment to place.
Where migrant adolescents think of as ‘home’ is bound up in the extent to which they belong ‘here or there’, as well considerations about where they may live in the future. Additionally, their adjustments take place in the context of family adjustments: those migrant adolescents who do not know the ultimate location of their ‘family home’ (i.e., their parents’ home or homes) may find it impossible to determine or predict the location of their own ‘home’.

The analysis in this chapter begins to address the themes introduced in Chapter Four, a process that is carried through the next two chapters as well. Building on the questions that emerged in the data about participants’ identity — specifically, what factors contribute to most participants’ ethnic dissociation, and their commitment to an origin ethnic identity? — the acculturation data suggest that 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents do adjust to life in New Zealand, but do so selectively. For these migrants, acculturation is not synonymous with assimilation. Rather, they adjust while continuing to feel ambivalent about belonging here. Many acknowledge the benefits they have gained from their migration experience, but aspire to pursue careers elsewhere. Drawn from the Acculturation Indicator variables and from the interview data, these findings add considerable texture to the Identity and Dissociation data introduced in the previous chapter.

**Boundaries**

In the previous chapter, in the discussion of the ethnic identity and ethnic dissociation data, I began to describe as ‘boundaries’ the patterns and structures of the social distance that research participants perceived between themselves and “Kiwis”. When participants reflected on their experiences of adjustment to life in New Zealand, those boundaries began to delineate the patterns of social distance more clearly. Earlier, with the question of identity, it was enough to identify that boundaries existed, in terms of participants recognising themselves as ‘Others’. However, with regard to their adjustment experiences, the data offer details as to the shape and circumstances of the boundaries perceived by 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents as being constructed and maintained by them and around them. All participants recognised the existence of boundaries between themselves and members of the host society. However, differences were manifest in both the perceptions of the flexibility, permeability and permanence of
such boundaries, as well as in participants’ responses to those boundaries, and their experiences of negotiating across and around them.

There was one boundary which was recognised by all the interview participants, and acknowledged by them as the most problematic consideration regarding their identity as 1.5 generation migrants to New Zealand. This was the fact of their Asianness which, for most of the interview participants, acted as a dampener to their feelings of belonging in New Zealand.

Yes, yes, I think other people’s reactions are quite important, because even if you feel like you really, really belong here, like some Asians were born in New Zealand, I’m guessing that they might not feel like they really belong here, because other people’s reactions to them would think ‘You’re still an Asian’ and sometimes they do things like being told to go home, when it is their home, they were born here. Yeah, so that’s very important. . . To feel like you really belonged, I think the society, other people have to accept you, to make you feel like you really belonged (Shona).

Clearly, interviewees whose perceptions were similar to Shona’s would subscribe to Wallman’s (1977) idea of the boundaries between groups being constructed and maintained on both the inside and the outside, that one is simultaneously both an ‘us’ (to some) and a ‘them’ (to others). Significantly, interviewees had all had experiences which reinforced their position as outsiders, as those who did not belong. These messages – such as anonymous others yelling obscenities or proffering rude gestures from passing cars, a common experience for the interviewees – often came from strangers. However, this fact did little to lessen the negative impact such experiences had upon their sense of belonging.

In the last chapter I also described how one interview participant, Louise, had insisted that third or fourth generation Asian New Zealanders should be able to identify themselves as Kiwis. At another point in the group interview, she also disclosed that she has relatives who have been in New Zealand for several generations, and that an aunt in her forties has told her that Pakeha New Zealanders seem unable to accept Asians as ‘real’ New Zealanders, regardless of their New Zealand-born lineage.
My auntie’s totally a Kiwi. And when she was running a business, when she was talking on the phone with other Kiwis, they get along quite easily, but then when they arrange a meeting, the first impression of the customers: “Oh, are you Asian?!?” And she’d go, “Oh, yes,” and the customer goes, “Well how do you speak English so well?” And that pissed her off quite easily, because it’s happened so often, and she told me that “I didn’t see any problem with an Asian who can speak English well, but they’ve got a very limited image of, like, ‘Asians: Can’t Speak English’.” Like that. They classify you as you’re not particularly belonging. And she was 40, and she spoke exactly the same way as all the people, all the Kiwis, but she can’t still reach her goal of being a New Zealander! She’s definitely a traditional New Zealander, but people still can’t see her as one. (Louise)

Louise made it quite clear that, though she feels comfortable with her own adjustment to life in New Zealand, and has made very many Kiwi friends, she has resigned herself to her aunt’s view that she is unlikely to be readily accepted by other New Zealanders as belonging unreservedly. However, a strong theme evident in a number of the interviews was, though they may never completely feel as though they belong here, and though there would likely always be some forms of resistance to them by other New Zealanders, they still were able to adjust to life in New Zealand to a great extent, and to feel comfortable – as Louise did – with those adjustments. In both the group and individual interviews, the notions of adjustment and belonging represented overlapping but different considerations. Most of the interviewees talked about their acculturation processes as though they had become reasonably accustomed to the language and to the many adjustments they had had to make in order to succeed at school, and to join clubs and make friends, and so forth. Some acknowledged that the process of adjustment had affected their sense of themselves, as highlighted in many of the quoted excerpts from interview transcripts presented in this and the previous chapter. The question of belonging in New Zealand was a further step, however; a relational process, which involved not just their own adjustments, but was dependent upon members of the host society as well. Their perception, though, was that the host society recognises them first – and in some cases, exclusively – as Asians.
When reflecting on their interaction with, and juxtaposition to, "Kiwis", all of the interview participants, regardless of the ways in which they characterised their own ethnic identity in other circumstances, were comfortable characterising themselves as Asians, placing themselves in a group whose boundaries were wider than their own ethnic group. This was not the case merely when reflecting on the question of what "Kiwis" thought of "Asians" – though certainly it did occur then – but for most of the participants it revealed a flexible sense of identity, and one through which they engaged with New Zealand society. Indeed, as suggested, the interview participants did reflect on what Kiwis thought of Asians. They related to me a variety of experiences and impressions that tended to reinforce the boundary between themselves and their Kiwi counterparts. The following interchange, from a group interview, underscored the frustration many of the participants felt at being confronted with Pakeha classmates' view of them as stereotypes.

Lara: They've got their ideas that are too generalised. So like if they see a real rich person from Asia, they'll think all Asians are rich, and they'll come up to you and say, "Oh, you're rich... ."

Jason: They think we eat strange animals, like monkey –

Vivienne: Turtles!

Jason: – snake, mouse, cats and dogs.

Vivienne: It's all stereotyping.

Jason: Yeah, "does monkey taste nice?"

AB: Now, are these people that just walk up to you at school that you don't really know, or are they classmates, friends...?

Lara: They're usually people who have something against Asians.

Jason: Once my friend asked me, "Do you like monkey?" So I said, "Yeah, sure, I like monkey." He was like, "Wow, how do you cook it?" I
said, “I don’t like monkey, I don’t eat monkey.” He couldn’t tell that I was joking!

The conversation continued, and the participants disclosed that they regularly encountered a racist taunt, a variation of which, according to Manying Ip and unknown to the interviewees, has been hurled at Chinese migrants to New Zealand since the nineteenth century. (Ip 1990: 20,99,110,129).33

Vivienne: Some kids taunt you. They’ll say, like, “Oh, Chinese ching-chong.”

James: Yes, and I want to know, what is “ching-chong”, I never know what is ching-chong.

Vivienne: I know, they’re just mimicking how we talk, but I just usually just ignore it.

Monica: You want to forget it, but you can’t.

Vivienne: You can’t.

James: I makes you depressed.

Participants recognised how racist views of Asians influenced others’ attitudes and actions towards them. Many felt as though they constantly measured their behaviour against the racist stereotypes. For example, interviewees talked about the differences between the racist image of Asian drivers in New Zealand, and the reality of what they encountered on Auckland roads.

They’re always complaining about Asian drivers. Some people won’t let you onto the highways, and if you’re not driving too fast, they drive by and do the fingers and shouting stuff at you. (Vivienne)

Ip, as well as several of the subjects in her tenderly-written volume, recall the taunt as “Ching-chong Chinaman”. Ironically, the up-dated epithet has become gender-inclusive.
Another group interview participant, reacting to Vivienne’s comment above, told the group that whenever his family drove together, his father would constantly defend himself from the generalised criticisms about Asian drivers (“They say we drive too fast”) by pointing out Pakeha drivers around them who exceeded the posted speed limits. Another interviewee astutely observed that people focus on instances and encounters that support their prejudices, while choosing to remain blind to exceptions to their rules.

They don’t react the same. Say if there’s a car full of Asians and a car full of Europeans. And if they’re both over the limit but they’ll only judge the Asians, not the Europeans. It’s always “that Asian.” (Lara)

The social distance structured by ‘race’ was also reinforced by the many misunderstandings participants had experienced because they were Asian. The general sense from the interview participants was that their racial identity caused other New Zealanders to view them, not as individuals, but as a set of (alien) characteristics, with the accompanying assumptions and expectations that others had of what Asians should do, or how Asians should perform. These became particularly apparent when participants breached the norms, refusing to conform to – or in some cases being ignorant of – the stereotyped image of Asian adolescents held by some of their Pakeha counterparts. When I asked Joanne to explain what sorts of misunderstandings she regularly encountered, she unhesitatingly replied,

Well, the first thing that comes to my mind is language, because teachers will look at me and then start speaking really, really slowly. And same with classmates. Like, when I first came here, the first day of school, I walk into class and I said something in English, and one of the girls went, “Oh my god, she can speak English.” Just the way they stereotype that Asians can’t speak English. (Joanne)

Other participants also expressed disappointment that they had been misunderstood by Pākehā, including teachers, as well as frustration that teachers expected them to work hard and be able to excel simply because they were Asians. One student, on the other
hand, thought that she was disadvantaged by another misunderstanding which she attributed to teachers:

I think that most teachers think that Asian people are cheaters, that’s how they do so well at school. That’s not true. (Monica)

The sense that 1.5 generation Asian migrants had been misunderstood by many in the host society is underscored by the responses to the questionnaire, in which two-thirds of the participants indicated that they had been misunderstood because of their culture. However, when in the follow-up question they were given the opportunity to detail by whom they had been misunderstood, some of the participants gave answers that suggested that ‘misunderstood’ was perhaps the wrong choice of words to communicate the dynamic I was looking for. I had hoped they would reflect on their experiences of cultural misunderstandings, or incidents where they perceived a negative reaction because of their cultural identity, as detailed in the interview data above. However, the fact that some indicated that they had been misunderstood by friends, or by the bus driver, suggests that at least some of the respondents interpreted the question to be asking about their use of English. Some students undoubtedly interpreted the question as I had intended, though, with two citing misrepresentations in the media as examples of feeling misunderstood because of their culture. Figure 6.1 details the presentation of the survey question, and the proportion of students who responded to each of the ‘misunderstood’ questions.
Figure 6.1
Ever Felt Misunderstood? (N = 121)

Since living in New Zealand, have you ever felt misunderstood because of your culture?

63% Yes
33%* No

By whom? Place a ✓ in as many of the boxes as apply.

Teachers 37%
Other people who work at the school 12%
Strangers 29%
Neighbours 16%
Friends 24%
Classmates 25%
Shop keepers 21%
Other (please list)

Misrepresentations in the media 2%
Bus driver 1%
Younger Students 1%

* 96% of the sample responded either Yes or No. Of the remaining five participants, two chose not to respond, and three indicated that they did not understand the question.

The social distance between these migrant adolescents and “Kiwi” society was delineated primarily by ‘race’, though other factors also contributed to participants’ sense of being outsiders. These boundaries were reiterated in many forms, from the blatant experiences of racism, described above, to more subtle – and for many, more demanding – factors such as the feeling of never being able to bridge the social distance,
and feeling as though they had to constantly explain themselves to those in the host society whose cultures, experiences and perceptions are so different from their own.

I feel more comfortable talking to people that look the same as me. Because when I talk to people who have a different race I feel like they’re judging me differently. I’m more relaxed at home. It’s like I’m not made to feel that people are judging me. So I’m more relaxed, so I can express myself more easily. (Monica)

Well, with some people you can get past that, because I do have some Kiwi friends. It’s like there are cultural differences, and you might be talking about something that they can’t relate to the same thing. So you’re always explaining things. Unless you grew up here, there’s always those differences. (Vivienne)

The acknowledgement of boundaries between themselves and the host, or “Kiwi”, society does not mean that participants had rejected comprehensively any goal of meaningful participation and engagement with other New Zealanders. Many had “Kiwi” friends. However, as highlighted in the previous chapter, they clearly delineated between these and their Asian friends, in terms of the types of activities in which they engage, and the subjects around which their conversations gravitate. There seemed to be an irony in some of their discussion, as their descriptions of interactions with Pakeha friends had at times a sense of freedom in them, of fun, activity and enjoyment. At the same time, the recognition of the social distance between them was never far off. In fact, one interview participant, who had a large number of Kiwi friends, seemed to surprise herself when, in response to a question about whether her friends ever met at her house, she realised that they never did: she, and her other Asian friends, always met at their Kiwi friends’ houses. I asked her why she thought that was:

I don’t know, but strangely enough they never use the Asians’ place as the place where they meet, where they can party. For me because I think that in Kiwis’ ideas they think that all Asian parents are quite strict and they wouldn’t stand for that kind of loud – – because like, every time we are over there, they turn on the stereo so loud that all the neighbours can hear clearly, and they might think, “Oh, Asian parents wouldn’t allow that, and wouldn’t allow us to be crazy, to chill ourselves out. It’s not popular to be at their house.” (Joanne)
That some Asian migrant adolescents shared different – and perhaps more active, enthusiastic or fun – experiences with Pakeha friends does not necessarily lead them to make a great number of Pakeha friends. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the survey respondents indicated that a majority of their friends were of the same ethnicity as themselves (Figure 6.2). Of the remaining 44 respondents, most replied that half their friends shared their ethnicity, while only 17 respondents (15% of the total) indicated that a majority of their friends were of a different ethnicity, and two respondents claimed no friends from their own ethnic group.

![Figure 6.2](chart.png)

The challenge and fascination in quantitative data analysis lay in the process of finding in the data some patterns or relationships amongst the participants’ responses that may explain particular results. In this instance, I looked to the data to explain why some survey participants had friends of diverse ethnicities, while others gravitated mostly towards friends of their own ethnicity. I thought it reasonable, based on the literature, to expect that their age, or how long they had been in New Zealand, would contribute towards the extent to which their friends were of a different ethnicity from themselves. In fact, the list of variables which might be associated with the ethnicity of respondents’ friends was extensive:

- current age;
- confidence in English language ability;
- age at migration;
- length of residence in New Zealand;
- gender;
- school attended;
- ethnic self-description;
- country of origin;
- where Respondent would most like to be living in five years' time;
- the extent to which Respondent agreed or disagreed that moving to New Zealand was a good idea.

However, as Table 6.1 illustrates, there was no strong association to be found between respondents' friends' ethnicity and any of these other variables. Amongst the variables compared with the "Friends' Ethnicity" variable, the strongest coefficient calculated was with the variable addressing where respondents most wished to be living in 2005 (five years from the time they took part in the survey): this comparison showed a correlation (Cramer's $V$) of .28, suggesting a weak association. The correlations with respondents' ages or length of residence in New Zealand showed virtually no association.

### Table 6.1

**Correlation Coefficients of Variables Compared to "Friends' Ethnicity"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent would most like to be living in 2005?</td>
<td>Cramer's $V$</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic self-description</td>
<td>Cramer's $V$</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School attended</td>
<td>Cramer's $V$</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's place of birth</td>
<td>Cramer's $V$</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's English language self-assessment</td>
<td>Kendall's $\tau_b$</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's gender</td>
<td>Cramer's $V$</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to New Zealand was a good idea</td>
<td>Kendall's $\tau_b$</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence in New Zealand</td>
<td>Kendall's $\tau_b$</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's current age</td>
<td>Kendall's $\tau_b$</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's age at migration</td>
<td>Kendall's $\tau_b$</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An interviewee offered an important insight about the social distance between Asian migrants and ‘Kiwi’ society, which will form the final word about boundaries. At the end of Shona’s interview, she described for me a survey she had conducted for her sixth form (year 12) Sociology course, in which she surveyed Asian students about “how they coped with the change in lifestyle”. She described some of her results, including the high proportion of respondents who had experienced instances of racism at the school—including verbal abuse, name-calling, being told to go home, and so forth. I suggested that, as Pakeha New Zealanders—particularly those in the suburb in which she lived, which historically had been largely monocultural—became more accustomed to interacting with people different from themselves, perhaps the situation of racism would change. This student’s response to my suggestion showed a keenly developed insight into cultural politics in New Zealand. Her response also revealed her underlying pessimism about the prospects for acceptance of Asians by Pakeha society.

I think the word ‘accustomed’ and ‘change’ are quite different. They may understand other people, but they may not change. It’s like Maori and Pakeha—I mean Pakeha hasn’t really changed, Maori have changed. I think it has to do with which group is more dominant, so like Pakeha hasn’t really changed to Maori kind of stuff. I’m not sure what will make them change. (Shona)

In sum, this discussion about the perceived social distance between the participants and “Kiwi” society suggests that, to a very great extent, this social distance is structured by essentialist notions of identity, specifically by ‘race’. The fact of their Asianness marks them as different, and that difference is reinforced, both blatantly and subtly, in daily interactions with “Kiwi” society, even amongst their “Kiwi” friends. This perception of the social distance related to their identity as “Asians” was so persistent, and so patterned, that it can be said to be structured. The concept of the boundary delineates the structure of the social distance between these Asian migrant adolescents and the host society.

Adjustment

Despite encountering boundaries that reinforced their position as outsiders, these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents did experience acculturation. In certain aspects of
their lives, such as the languages they speak, and attending a new school, they adjusted because they simply had to. Other adjustments were made by choice, however, and reflected a sense of selective acculturation (Kim & Hurh 1993). This section focuses not only on the types of adjustments these migrants made, but also on the different ways in which they adapted to the myriad changes which confront them, and on their reflections upon the processes involved. The discussion begins with particular aspects of life in New Zealand to which participants either had to adjust, or chose to adjust. It then addresses the effects of those changes in the participants’ lives, in terms of their becoming, and their assessments of what they gained and lost in the process.

Survey participants were asked a set of questions about the aspects of life in New Zealand to which they may have had difficulty adjusting. With a graphic continuum response set that ranged from ‘Very Easy’ to ‘Very Difficult’, participants were asked to assess the difficulty they had in adjusting to these common factors: eating different food; using a new language; making new friends; going to a new school; and maintaining close relationships with people in their country of origin.

Of these, respondents found using a new language and attending a new school the most difficult, while eating new food was the least difficult (Figure 6.3). This may be because, as previous research suggests and interview participants disclosed, meals which they ate at home with their families remained largely unaffected by migration.34 Additionally, the lack of vibrant city life was highlighted by nearly a third of participants who responded to the open question about other aspects of life in New Zealand to which adjustment was difficult. Others mentioned a variety of factors, including the lack of public transport, adjusting to New Zealand driving patterns and having to maintain gardens as aspects of life in New Zealand which they found difficult to adjust to (Table 6.2). Interestingly, only one participant noted dealing with multiculturalism and interaction with Māori as a difficult aspect of New Zealand life to which to adjust.

34 In research amongst more than 600 Korean migrants in the Chicago area, Kim and Hurh found that, while most ate what they called “American” breakfast and lunch on weekdays, nearly all the respondents ate Korean food for dinner, and at weekends, regardless of the length of time they had lived in the destination country (Kim and Hurh 1993:708-9). Participants in my interviews confirmed this practice.
Figure 6.3
Compared Responses to Adjustment Questions: How Easy or Hard is it to Adjust to...

... Using a New Language? (N = 120)

... Going to a New School? (N = 121)

... Making New Friends? (N = 121)

... Maintaining Close Relationships in [origin country]? (N = 121)

... Eating New Food? (N = 120)
I began the group interviews with the question that I, as a migrant, have been asked most often: “what do you miss most about the country you left?” The resulting discussions offered telling insights into participants’ acculturation experiences, as they described aspects of life which they had enjoyed previously (before migration), which now were missing. Most participants talked of missing the hustle and bustle of urban life as can be found in major centres like Hong Kong or Taipei, which simply cannot be replicated in Auckland, even though it is New Zealand’s largest, and only international, city. They described Auckland, and the suburbs in which they lived, with adjectives such as quiet, small, boring and empty. One interviewee described his situation as “living in the country” (he lived with his family in a medium-density Auckland suburb), and noted the irony that while such a lifestyle may be “seen to be nice and quiet, like a better lifestyle” to many New Zealanders, it was a shocking encounter for adolescents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Aspects of Life in New Zealand Difficult to Adjust to (N = 58)</th>
<th>% of Respondents (N=58)</th>
<th>% of Sample (N=121)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language issues</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of entertainment/too quiet/boring</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural habits</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding jobs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No public transport</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving habits / road rules</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything is more expensive in New Zealand</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many people not as work-oriented</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outdoors / Having to maintain gardens</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less convenience (e.g. shopping)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having to maintain gardens</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics / Government policies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural issues: interaction with Māori</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward change in social status</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different family dynamics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
who were familiar with the activity, spectacle and seemingly limitless opportunities for entertainment and consumption available in Taipei. “But,” he said,

it’s not so easy when you live in the city for years. Here, it’s like, life is quite boring. It’s extremely quiet. Like, back in Taiwan the shops are open 24 hours a day, and the restaurants – you can go, like, midnight, and there are still places open. I really miss that. I like the life in Taiwan, busy and noisy. City life. (Kyle)

I miss all the activity there, because there are lots of shops and stuff in Taiwan, and there was always lots of people around, like mall traffic and stuff. And it’s really quiet here, and the shopping centres close at around 9. When my grandfather came out, he asked, “Where do all the people go?” because there was just no-one around. (Vivienne)

I think it was a mixture of excitement and fear before I came here, and once I arrived here, I found the nature around is quite beautiful, I enjoy it. But I find that it’s too quiet in some ways. The first night my sister complained that she wants to go back because it seems like we moved from the city to a little town, that nobody was around and it was too boring. (Louise)

They tend to be stuff that you don’t like about New Zealand that you want, like decent public transport. So I think of things that, like, “Oh, I wish it had these sorts of things that I had before.” (Joanne)

I miss decent TV. In Taiwan we had cable TV, so we had something like over a hundred channels to choose from, it’s like, every day non-stop. And I miss the food; I’m not used to eating Western food. Yeah, I miss food. (Kyle)

I think music. I miss the most popular songs, but since we have the internet now it doesn’t quite make a difference, but it’s still quite hard to get access to the real market in my old country, that I can’t get access to what I like real easily. Firstly the language is different. And here people like more pop music than the type of music that I like. The style’s different. Basically the whole trend of a culture’s music is different. (Louise)
The participants readily talked about having to adjust to a somewhat quieter and slower pace, and to different forms of entertainment, and much more limited choices. However, other aspects of life participants had previously known and now missed were more ephemeral. Several talked about the adjustment to the loss of social status that accompanied their migration as being particularly difficult, and another aspect of life in New Zealand which constantly reinforced their position as outsiders.  

I really want to go back. . . . For a lot of reasons, I think. Well, firstly I might have higher social status in Taiwan, and I wouldn’t be perceived as different. And for a lot of other reasons which I can’t think of right now. (Kyle)

The ways in which various interview participants recognised and ‘owned’ the changes in themselves suggests a degree of self-conscious and critical reflection about their experience of migration, and its impact on their lives. Their consideration indicated that their other observations on New Zealand society, and on their prospects for the future, were neither glib nor ill-conceived. Rather, they were the result of needing to grapple seriously with questions of their identity and their place in their communities, and in the world, in ways that many Pakeha New Zealanders may take for granted. This seriousness tended to be reflected in the survey data where, in the question asking respondents to consider whether moving to New Zealand was a good idea, the responses were generally positive, but not overwhelmingly so (Figure 6.4).

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35 This theme is addressed again in the chapter dealing with intergenerational dynamics because, while only a few participants noted their own loss of status in migrating to New Zealand, most perceived intensely the loss of status suffered by their parents.
Figure 6.4
Survey Responses: “Moving to New Zealand was a good idea” (N = 120)

Cultural Acquisition

The process of talking about their adjustment experiences also gave the participants opportunities to reflect upon the extent to which they actually had adjusted, had changed – or not – as a result of their experiences of migration and settlement. Those participants who noted changes in themselves were also more inclined to suggest that the boundaries between themselves and the host society were not as great as they had been upon their arrival in New Zealand. They mentioned factors such as that others had noticed changes in their behaviour and attitudes; or that intra-Asian differences were less significant now than when they had first arrived, and the pan-ethnic label “Asian” was now less offensive; or that they were less inclined to try to be inconspicuous, and more willing to be visible, to make themselves heard; or they were more understanding of their Kiwi peers. Some of the adjustments were described as conscious decisions, suggesting a selective or additive acculturation strategy. Other adjustments were made unconsciously, and noticed only in retrospect, such as the loss of fluency in their origin language. Additive and substitutive acculturation were simultaneous components of the single process of adjustment. For those who aspired to belong as New Zealanders, whose sense of themselves as Asians did not negate the prospect of belonging as an attainable goal, the process of adjustment is part of becoming. On the other hand, the 1.5 generation migrants who did not aspire to settle or belong in New Zealand – either because they always intended to return ‘home’, or because they perceive the barriers to
belonging to be insurmountable, or some combination of the two – the process of acculturation necessarily is selective; they need to adjust to their new environment, but do so with an eye on the social distance between themselves and others.

Kyle, more than any other interviewee, typified the transmigrant who is intent on returning, and his attitude towards identity ("I belong to Taiwan") was mirrored in his approach to the necessary adjustment to life in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{36} Recognising the need to do well in school, and being a sociable person accustomed to having many friends, Kyle "managed" his acculturation.

> I think you try to incorporate both. You take both groups and try to incorporate them. I try to live in some ways Kiwi style, but I also couldn’t give up my Asian things, so I try to live like a Kiwi and an Asian as well. Both. (Kyle)

Even the two different strategies of additive and subtractive acculturation, which may be assumed to be employed differently by transmigrants than by traditional migrants, suggest a fictitious simplicity, for they are not discrete processes. Acculturation is a haphazard, even serendipitous, process, in which there are not always stable reference points from which to gauge one’s own position or movement. For instance, as described in the previous chapter, Louise was caught by surprise when school visitors from overseas related to her, not as a Taiwanese, or as an Asian, but as a New Zealander who was representing both her school and New Zealand to outsiders. The experience caused Louise to re-evaluate the social distance she had perceived between herself and Kiwi society. As a result, she came to recognise unexpectedly that her cultural repertoire had changed, and that the modifications were not merely at the performative level – language and behaviours – but she also was adopting what she saw to be Kiwi values. These related particularly to the style of pedagogy and learning: Louise found that she enjoyed the freedom afforded by the critical approach to knowledge employed in the New Zealand education system, to which education in her origin country seemed stifling by comparison.

\textsuperscript{36} Kyle’s interview produced insights that altered fundamentally the way I interpreted the research data. His unexpected comments are presented in detail in Chapter Six.
I’ve only been here just for nearly 3 years now, and many of my ways and many ideas are still deeply rooted in my old self, but I think I’ve started to change, just like started to accept more Kiwi ideas in how I think.

Back to my own culture, it’s too many restrictions. Like, let’s say for education for example, when a teacher taught you something, you just had to memorise it. You could never ask questions. You can’t just go, “Oh, why is that?” They’d just go, “Memorise it, and do it for the test.” You study for the sake of it. But then, once I came here, everything’s different, everything’s new, and the teachers are very happy to help you and to answer all the questions that you have – even if they can’t do it, they would go to their colleagues and ask them how to do it, and sort it out for you. In that kind of way there are more freedoms, and there is more space for you to wander around and see much more stuff than what you can originally have in my own culture. It’s a freedom where you can really enjoy yourself.

I’m more open in the way that Kiwi people respect each other, and really feel that maybe this is the way that we should speak to each other. (Louise)

While Louise adjusted easily to a perceived sense of intellectual freedom, other participants noted a relational freedom, mentioning that they felt their way of relating to others had changed, that while still respectful, they were more informal – “much more lively”, as one interviewee put it. This occasionally caused some friction with parents, some of whom clearly preferred more culturally traditional modes of intergenerational communication. Shona, whom I described in the previous chapter as having realised that a shift had occurred in her identity after a visit to Taiwan, also reflected on how adjusting to life in New Zealand had affected her values. Living in New Zealand, where the welfare safety net ameliorates extreme poverty, left her unprepared for the types of poverty she saw in Taiwan: her shock at seeing beggars in the street, and at witnessing the apparent nonchalance of those around her, was another sign of this shift. It was a sign recognised not only by Shona herself, but by other Taiwanese – including strangers, who would stop her in the street and ask if she were from elsewhere.

37 The effects of acculturation on these family relationships are canvassed in the next chapter.
Like, well I went to this flea market in Taiwan, and there’s lots of beggars in the street, and you wouldn’t normally see – well, you’d never see that kind of stuff in New Zealand, never. There’s these poor beggars, some of them are disabled, and they’re just crawling on the street begging for money, and they just looked really – they’re begging and they’re poor, and I was just shocked. And normal Taiwanese people, they just walk past, they wouldn’t notice they were there. If a Kiwi or European was in that situation, they would be “Ah!”, shocked. So, in a way, probably my reactions to things told other Taiwanese that I came from somewhere else. (Shona)

An important point to be made about acculturation is that it is not permanent or irreversible (Yinger 1994:40-41). Shona described to me how, shortly after her arrival in New Zealand, she had a desire – borne of a great sense of alienation, of being neither here nor there – to reject her own cultural identity in the quest to become a “true New Zealander”. For more than two years she avoided speaking Mandarin as much as possible, withdrew from Taiwanese friends and made every effort to fit in with a circle of Pakeha friends from school.

I can still remember when I first came here, I just totally wanted to lose my own culture, and I just – because I was very frustrated and upset about, that I cannot speak or understand the language well, and that, feeling where am I? So I was really desperate to become a true New Zealander and speak the language. So I kind of like, forgot about my other culture. And after a couple of years I started to think that my culture is really important too, so I want to have my culture here. (Shona)

However, as a result of that period, Shona discovered that she had lost a degree of fluency in Mandarin. While this is something her parents had noticed and commented on, the extent of her language loss was confirmed when she was asked by a school official to translate for a parents’ night function.

She was talking about careers, and jobs, and she talked for a long time, she spoke for an hour, and I had to stand at her side and translate. And I just found that extremely difficult, I had to go very slowly, and think a lot. It was very stressing. (Shona)
Shona’s experience highlights the complexity of the motives and considerations which come into play, sometimes at cross-purposes, in the process of migrant acculturation. On the one hand, she has substantially adapted to life in New Zealand, and feels a sense of accomplishment at having done so, although she recognises that she went through a period of intense alienation with her culture of origin en route to that goal. Having begun to move towards some kind of equilibrium, she remains ambivalent about the cultural gains and losses.

When I’m with my Taiwanese friends, who have not been here for as long, so of course their Mandarin is much better, I feel bad, because they can speak really well, and write well. But I speak English better than them, so it sort of balances out. But in a way I feel uncomfortable – not uncomfortable, but uneasy. I feel like I’m losing culture. But I feel like it is a good idea to preserve that culture. (Shona)

Language
The focus on language acquisition is, of course, a central element in migrant acculturation. It was also a prominent component of the survey. The questions concerning language that I asked survey participants included two which asked them to reflect on their acquisition of English: first, they were asked to evaluate how well they spoke English when they first arrived in New Zealand; then to identify how well they spoke it at the time of the study. While more than three-quarters of the respondents indicated on the graphic continuum that they spoke English worse than ‘Okay’ when they arrived, more than half evaluated their English language skills as better than ‘Okay’ at the time of the survey (Figure 6.5). Interestingly, four students evaluated their present English skills as worse than at the time they arrived in New Zealand: of those four, one had been in the country less than a year, and the other three had each been in New Zealand for three years. It is unlikely, however, that their language skills objectively had deteriorated during the time that they had been in New Zealand, attending school and being exposed to English – and native speakers – on a daily basis. Rather, as an interviewee suggested to me, with regard to their own language skills, the level of self-consciousness these young people experienced is likely to have increased precisely because they were surrounded by fluent speakers. Most of the interviewees
reiterated this self-consciousness in recalling when they had first arrived in New Zealand as well: they were reluctant to participate in class, fearful of making a language mistake and embarrassing themselves, careful not to attract attention.

I can still remember in the first year I got here, I felt like I don’t want people to pay any attention to me, like I just want to stay invisible, like for example, in a class situation, I wouldn’t be so happy if the teacher asked me a question, like to share it, or anything else. I think I would not raise my hand, because if you raised your hand or speak in class you will miscommunicate in a strange way.

(Shona)

Figure 6.5
How Well Participants’ Spoke English at Migration, and at Time of Survey (N=121)

More than a third of the respondents indicated that they never spoke English at home with their families, and a total of three-quarters of the sample indicated that English was spoken less than half the time at home. Interviewees further elaborated on this question, by detailing that they often spoke their origin language at home with their parents, but conversed with their siblings in English. With their limited use of English at home, combined with the reluctance of many participants to risk embarrassment at school over their English language ability, it is unsurprising that eight out of ten survey participants indicated that there were times they preferred using their origin language. In response
to the survey question asking them to describe the circumstances in which they preferred to use their origin language (Table 6.3), forty-one respondents offered a range of situations, from simply expressing themselves more clearly and easily, to preventing others from overhearing conversations. Five students indicated that they always preferred using what they referred to as their ‘own’ language, communicating clearly that while they used English, it was not ‘their’ language.

Table 6.3
Circumstances in which Respondents Preferred Using Origin Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Respondents (N=41)</th>
<th>% of Sample (N=121)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To express something more easily / readily</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When talking to friends</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When talking to family members</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When talking to people who don’t understand English</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When describing own feelings, or when angry</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing schoolwork, answering questions in class</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always prefer ‘own’ language</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prevent NZers from listening to conversation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When asking a friend for clarification</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When doing business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When phoning people in Taiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gain / Loss

There were two rather more reflective questions in the survey which were designed to indicate aspects of participants’ acculturation by asking them to evaluate their overall experience of migration. Did they ultimately approve of their parents’ decision to remove them from their origin country, and from all they had previously known, to relocate them in “quiet” Auckland? In effect, they were asked to weigh up the benefits and costs of migration in these two questions. Both questions were presented as statements: the first was, “I think that moving to New Zealand was a good idea”; the second question appeared a page later, “By moving to New Zealand I have lost more
than I have gained."  

These both were placed towards the end of the questionnaire, after participants had addressed questions about ethnic identity, friends, use of English, and a series of questions about their adjustment experiences. The two questions used the same format, with response options presented as a graphic continuum, the opposing ends labelled “Agree” and “Don’t Agree”; they also served as a test of internal reliability, as a negative response on the first question would be expected to produce a positive response on the second. The placement of these questions, which asked them to reflect on the whole of their experience, was deliberate, as before reaching them, participants would have answered other questions that had prompted them to think about a range of their migration and adjustment experiences.

These two questions were designed to suggest meanings and motives in ways that none of the other survey questions did, because their responses on other variables could be tested against their answers to these ‘big picture’ questions. As Figure 6.6 illustrates, the shape of the responses to the two questions was very similar. For comparison’s sake in the analysis phase, the Agree/Disagree labels were re-configured as representing a positive or negative assessment of participants’ adjustment experience. Generally, respondents tended to offer positive responses to both questions, though the number of “Not Sure” responses indicate that the experience has not been unequivocally positive for a significant minority. Nearly a third of respondents admitted ambivalence on the question of whether their move to New Zealand represented a loss or a gain, while nearly a quarter of respondents indicated that they were not sure whether moving to New Zealand was a good idea. The difference in the cumulative negative responses to the two questions is less than two percentage points. Participants generated slightly more positive responses for the ‘good idea’ question than for the ‘loss’ question, with the difference being taken from the middle (‘Not Sure’) category. Crosstabulations with other adjustment and identity variables revealed no significant patterns in the data.

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38 An additional question, asking respondents whether their families had lost more than gained by moving to New Zealand, produced quite a different set of responses, which will be compared in Chapter 6.
To close this part of the discussion, everyone in the research sample acknowledged some degree of acculturation. Of the myriad of adjustments they were required to undergo, using a new language was principal among them though, given their reasonably positive evaluations of their current English ability, it may represent one of their foremost gains as well. The social distance they perceived between themselves and the host society allowed many of the participants to adopt a self-consciously critical approach to the adjustment process. This critical stance suggests that most of these migrant adolescents have adopted a generally selective strategy of acculturation. However, for some, cultural shifts were imperceptible at the time, and became apparent only in retrospect. Equally, the distance from their origin country allowed some to reflect more critically on their origin culture as well. Despite lingering doubts and concerns expressed by some participants, the general sense was that the decision taken by their parents to migrate was a positive one; and though many remained aware of what the experience had cost them, a small majority agreed that the gains they had made in adjusting to life in New Zealand outweighed their losses.
Belonging

Belongingness, for some of these migrants, may be a goal to be attained at some point in the future. Until that point is reached, however, belonging is elusive: the rising and ebbing of a sense of their belonging in New Zealand may be the result of struggles to adjust, to increase one’s language proficiency, to make new friends or to deal with negative experiences and encounters. Changes in migrant adolescents’ sense of belonging may also motivate changes in other areas, such as a desire to increase one’s language proficiency and make new friends. Belongingness may be both the product of particular aspirations, and the gateway to new possibilities. As described in this section, migrants’ perceived belongingness is a dialectic synthesis of subjective, objective and relational factors. Participants generally responded to the dynamic and elusive nature of belongingness by adopting a stance characterised by ambivalence and contingence.

I was able to explore with several of the solo interview participants the notion that belonging could be conceptualised as a goal towards which one may progress. This was in order to more finely assess the solidity of the perceived boundaries between themselves and the host society. From that premise, I was able to ask these participants – who had identified ‘belonging’ as a goal to which they aspired, to a greater or lesser extent – about their sense of progress towards that goal. I then asked them to imagine what would be different if they actually did feel completely as though they belonged. While not all the interview participants were able to identify specific, tangible examples of what would be different for them if they felt completely as though they belonged in New Zealand, there was a very strong sense that things would be different from their current experience.

I think with school subjects, I would still be doing exactly the same school subjects in that situation, and in terms of grades. I think if I really, really belonged, like born here, I think I would have lots more Kiwi friends than I do now. My friends would come from wider.... So I suppose, yeah, my school life would be much more aggressive and bigger. (Lara)

Even Louise, the participant who indicated the strongest intention to remain in New Zealand, whose acculturation process had motivated her to reflect critically on many
aspects of her origin culture, acknowledged that she was unlikely ever to feel as though she fully belonged in New Zealand.

Well, in myself I really feel that it's not 100 percent possible [to belong in New Zealand]. Like, it could be 90 percent or 80 percent [for migrants who] assimilate with looks, but not when the first impression when people look at you is that you're Asian. So to look at me as definitely Kiwi, I think . . . no.

I really feel that wherever I live, that's where I belong. It's not that I'm Taiwanese so I definitely belong to Taiwan and no matter where I go, I'm definitely Taiwanese. I mean like, yes, I'm Taiwanese, and this is a thing that I can't change – my national origin, I can't change. But I don't really have a limited sense of belonging in that way. (Louise)

As with their identity, discussed in the previous chapter, consideration of relational factors was a significant element in the minds of these 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents as they determined whether, or to what extent, they belonged in New Zealand. This dialectic between the relational elements and internal, affective factors was expressed by nearly all the interview participants, and most clearly by Shona:

I think other people's reactions are quite important, because even if you feel like you really, really belong here, like some Asians were born in New Zealand, I'm guessing that they might not feel like they really belong here, because other people's reactions to them would think, "You're still an Asian," and sometimes they do things like otherwise, like being told to go home, when it is their home, they were born here. So, yeah, that's very important.

To feel like you really belonged, I think the society, other people, have to accept you, to make you feel like you really belonged. (Shona)

At one point in the group interview, and then again in her solo interview, this participant had mentioned that she ‘sort of’ felt as though she belonged in New Zealand. When I probed this sentiment, it became clear that she perceived that a barrier persisted which limited her sense of belonging. However, she then expressed something that was subsequently voiced by other interviewees as well, and which clarified a lingering
question I had had about the quantitative data. This was the contingency, the “and besides” that entered into the question of belonging, and that altered the equation completely.

It’s not necessarily important for me, because I already feel like I sort of belong. And besides, someday I may leave for work, or job, or travel around the world, so it doesn’t necessarily mean that I have to belong here, because someday I might go to Australia or America or somewhere else. But I think it is a good idea to feel like you belong somewhere. (Shona)

As a result of such ambivalence amongst many of the participants, of feeling as though they belonged – or of wanting to feel as though they belonged – and yet also perceiving boundaries that may impede or prevent them from being accepted by the host society as belonging, that feeling or goal of belonging was recognised as only one option among a range of possibilities. Belonging became contingent and temporal: I belong for now; I want to belong for now; I’d like to belong, but I may not remain long in New Zealand, so it is not imperative to belong. The contingent nature of their sense of belonging, which emerged in the interviews, helped to clarify the survey sample’s responses regarding their future in New Zealand, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their hopes and ambitions for the future with their current sense of ‘home’.

Aspirations

The sense of contingency that emerged in participants’ discussions of their sense of belonging comprised a significant factor in their hopes and ambitions for the future. Once again, insights gleaned from the qualitative data were used to clarify and explain the survey results. The question of likely future destinations, and where participants intended to settle and embark on careers, was an important indicator for participants’ sense of belonging in New Zealand. Whether migrants actually intend to settle in the receiving country surely is an important factor in shaping migrants’ acculturation strategies, and is one that, surprisingly, is addressed hardly at all in the literature. Rather, it is assumed that permanent – or at least long-term – settlement is what migrants do, and what they desire to do. Both the quantitative and qualitative data suggest that these Asian migrant adolescents depart from conventional migration
patterns in this regard, as relatively few participants indicated that New Zealand was their preferred long-term destination.

The survey questions regarding future aspirations required participants to think five years ahead, asking in which country they thought they were likely to be living in five years’ time, as well as in which country, if they had the choice, they would prefer to be living in that time. Upon reflection, I realised that these questions, as they were asked in the survey, could only give information about where participants expected to attend university, as most of the participants would have expected to be undertaking undergraduate – or possibly post-graduate – studies five years beyond the date at which they took part in the survey. Given that educational accomplishment was a motivating factor for migration in most – if not all – cases, it is reasonable to expect that New Zealand would be the most likely short- to medium-term destination. In addition, those who might consider attending university in other countries would likely still plan to apply to New Zealand universities as well, in case their first options failed to materialise. Such considerations distort the intent of the questions, and render the results suspect, as I had intended to draw conclusions about where they aspired to locate themselves after they had completed their studies. A more considered wording of the questions would have been something like, “When you have completed your studies and are ready to start a career, where do you think you will be living?”, and “... where would you most like to be living?” Given these qualifications, I expect that the data overstate the proportion of respondents who would prefer to live in New Zealand long-term, as even those embarking on tertiary studies in New Zealand might still intend to pursue careers elsewhere after they graduated.

In response to the question about where they were likely to be living in 2005 (five years in the future), four in ten respondents indicated that they would most likely be living in New Zealand – some specified Auckland – while a further quarter of respondents indicated that they would most likely have returned to their country of origin. These figures were effectively reversed for the question of where they would prefer to be living in 2005: 41% indicated their country of origin, while 26% indicated New Zealand (Figure 6.7). This figure is surprisingly low, especially given the complicating factors just mentioned. For both questions, about a third of respondents indicated other destinations, such as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, or simply stated
that they did not know where they were likely to be, or indeed where they preferred to be, in five years’ time.

![Figure 6.7](image)

**Figure 6.7**
Survey Responses Compared - Most Likely and Most Preferred Destinations

To clarify the analysis of these results, the “Don’t Know” responses were removed, and the smaller categories combined. The consolidated data indicate that respondents were nearly as inclined to cite other English-speaking countries as a desirable destination (23%) as they were to indicate a desire to remain in New Zealand (28%) (Figure 6.8). These data, like virtually all the quantitative data, reveal no strong, or even moderate, associations with other variables that might be expected to show a relationship, such as how respondents described their ethnic identity, their length of residence in New Zealand, their English-language self-assessment, or their opinion of New Zealand and Auckland as good places for migrants to live. In other words, participants’ patterns of responses on these other variables could not be used to predict, with any meaningful statistical probability, how they would respond to the question of preferred future destination.
Given the presumed difficulty in concluding from the survey data the question of participants' long-term future aspirations, the interview data became immensely important in filling in the gaps, because I was able to ask not only about their educational options, but also their career aspirations. In fact, in discussing their hopes and intentions for the future, none of the interview participants insisted that New Zealand was their permanent home. However, these were not migrants holding to the 'myth of return'. Rather, they expressed a considerable degree of flexibility about their future prospects. Even those participants who stated that they would like to remain in New Zealand after completing their university studies were keeping themselves open to alternative possibilities. Some talked of going back to their countries of origin: getting a job would be easier there, they would enjoy a higher social status, they expected to be able to fit in, and of course there was the attraction of returning to life in a major urban centre. Others, however, did mention a desire to remain in New Zealand, citing facts such as that their mastery of their origin language had suffered to the point that they did not feel that they could return, that they had got used to life here, and the prospect of moving on to a further destination, such as Australia, would entail a new adjustment process. However, even those who mentioned such grounds for staying qualified them with other, contradictory, considerations, such as career opportunities and marriage
prospects. Still others – and indeed also some of those who said they would like to remain in New Zealand, given the right conditions – mentioned the very real possibilities of on-migration, of travelling to Australia for further education or employment, of going to the United States or other parts of Asia beyond their country of origin.

I think getting a job [in Taiwan] is easier, that’s why. It’s hard to get a job here as well, personally I’m going to back, after I go to university. (Vivienne)

I’d rather go to America. Better jobs, better universities, better equipment, compared to here. It’s more competitive. (James)

Most interviewees cited a perceived lack of job opportunities in New Zealand as a motivation for aspiring to move elsewhere after university. This view was informed at least in part by the fact that the parents of all but one of the interviewees were either underemployed or unemployed in New Zealand, or else working as ‘astronauts’ in their origin countries. However, those who considered staying in New Zealand did so also on the basis that they would have good job opportunities here. In fact, all three of the interview participants who said that they would consider remaining in New Zealand were planning to study medicine. An interviewee explained to me that, given this country’s need for medical professionals, her career prospects in New Zealand were positive. On the other hand, her brother and sister, who both planned to do business degrees, were talking about returning to Taiwan. A permanent return to Taiwan was not in the cards for her because, she explained, an English-language qualification – much valued in high-tech, business and commerce, for instance – would not be of great worth for doctors in Taiwan, because most of the patients would speak Mandarin. Of course, she was also considering Australia as a possible future destination, because she imagined opportunities to be better there, claiming that New Zealand “can’t take all the high-skilled people and offer them the good jobs they can get in Australia, or in America, or somewhere else.” Confronted with a hypothetical scenario in which her

39 The question of what Louise’s parents would do, with children in at least two different countries, is part of the discussion of the next section.
career prospects in New Zealand, Australia and the United States were about equal, this interviewee responded,

If they were all about the same, I would take New Zealand, because this is what I am used to. I mean, if you change it to Australia, you have to get into everything again, and you don’t really know people, and you've got no relations whatsoever. I mean in New Zealand you’ve got your friends, you've got familiar with the environment, and I think I really like it, so I would stay here. (Louise)

Another aspiring medical professional, the interviewee who earlier had reiterated that she ‘sort of’ fitted in to New Zealand, and liked living here, revealed that she had applied to medical school in New Zealand, but that her first two choices were universities in Australia. After qualifying as a doctor, however, this interviewee hoped to apply those medical skills in Third World settings for a time.

I think after I graduate from six years in medical school, I’m thinking of doing one year or two years in hospital, to get some experience, and then I will probably go on further to specialising in a specific area. And that will probably take a year or so. And after that I am really keen to travel around the world, especially in the African countries, and practice in aid clinics for a time, because I think that rich countries like America, New Zealand, if you get sick you can get to a doctor very easily, whereas if in those countries they get sick, they can’t find doctors. And I’d also like to do some research. (Shona)

Asked if she would ever plan to return to New Zealand, she offered a reply that I was to hear more than a few times: “when I retire.”

I think it depends, if I am retired, if we were old, I would want to go to a place like New Zealand, or some other peaceful countries. But if you want to work, if you really care about work, then you might choose some other place. (Shona)

This comment is another manifestation of the image that many of the adolescent migrants had of New Zealand as a quiet, peaceful, environmentally beautiful location, but not a destination for the ambitious. Instead, the many adjustments undertaken by
these migrant adolescents, particularly in terms of language acquisition, increased their cultural capital, which could be put to use in destinations such as Australia, the US or the UK, which they viewed as offering greater opportunities.

Another interviewee mentioned that she had become a naturalised New Zealander, relinquishing her Korean citizenship in the process, specifically to pursue educational opportunities in Australia. After medical school, she said, the possibilities she considered were to practice in Australia, or New Zealand, “or somewhere else. Maybe the States.” She added that her consideration of other destinations was tempered by several factors, not least of which was the fact that she felt uncomfortable with the thought that she had “taken advantage of” New Zealand’s education system.

I’d like to stay here, because it’s where my family is, and friends. Plus, it sort of feels a bit ironic, coming here to get an education and then going somewhere else to work. But I’ll just take it as it comes. (Joanne)

The following interchange, from one of the two group interviews, suggests that career opportunities are not the only factors which 1.5 generation Asian migrants might consider when planning their future destinations. I began this phase of the interview by reporting to them that four in ten survey participants expressed a desire to return to their country of origin, and the group were quite prepared to explain some reasons why that might have been the case.

AB: Does it surprise you that so many people said they’d go back?

All: No.

James: I think New Zealand’s getting boring as you get older.

AB: So what do you think it is that causes people to want to leave New Zealand?

Vivienne: Jobs.
Lara: Marriage. To find a partner and have kids there, so they can adapt to their own culture and stuff.

*AB:* *Korean people will go back to Korea to marry other Koreans?*

Lara: Or marry Koreans living here. There's more choice over there, or America.

Vivienne: I don’t think my parents or grandparents would be really happy if I married a European.

*AB:* *No?*

James: No way. (general assent)

*AB:* *So there's an expectation to go back to Korea or Taiwan to find someone to marry, and then raise your kids over there? But what if you go off to University here, and all that changes?*

James: What do you mean, ‘all that changes’?

*AB:* *What if you fall in love at university?*

Monica: With a European?

*AB:* *Yes. Do you think your parents would say, “No way.”?*

James: My parents wouldn’t say “No way,” but . . .

Vivienne: But they wouldn’t be happy about it!

I asked this last question again at the second group interview, whether the prospect of falling in love with a Pakeha New Zealander at university would affect their plans, and Kyle utterly rejected the idea, saying, “My friends and I don’t even think about Kiwi girls. They wouldn’t look at an Asian guy, so why bother?”
The discussion of these migrant adolescents’ future aspirations underscores the validity and the importance of identifying both the meanings and the motives behind their adjustment experiences. Generally, research participants’ aspirations were influenced by the desire to recover a sense of belonging in a society that reflects their own cultural identity, or to position themselves in terms of educational or career goals. The data suggest that all of these considerations mitigate against most participants aspiring to remain in New Zealand over the long term.

*Home*

All of the data analysed and discussed to this point contribute to the consideration of how 1.5 generation migrants configure and reconcile for themselves notions regarding ‘home’. Home encapsulates their sense of identity, belonging and aspiration. As such, the location of home in the minds of migrant adolescents is as contingent and subject to change as their sense of themselves and their belongingness. Indeed, it would be fallacious to presume that all migrants’ notions of home are invested in a single location at any given time: some migrants may reconcile the competing demands on their allegiance by thinking always in terms of multiple locations, ‘homes’. In the same way that their identity as migrants is complex, layered and situational – balancing considerations of nationality, culture, ‘race’, relations and aspirations – so also their attachments to place are bound up in complex, overlapping and competing considerations.

The contradiction, ambivalence and contingence amongst this sample of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents regarding the notion of ‘home’ is apparent when the data on ‘home’ are analysed as an indicator of participants’ identity and sense of belonging. The survey question asking participants to identify where they thought of as ‘home’ was an open-ended question, which elicited five types of responses. Six out of ten respondents identified New Zealand – or even Auckland, more specifically – as ‘home’ (Table 6.4). The two most common responses (Auckland/New Zealand and Origin City/Country) each identified a single location as ‘home’. Other respondents offered more complex answers, such as half-here/half-there, or mostly-here/partly-there. Seven respondents reflected an even more contingent approach to the issue of ‘home’, replying that ‘home’ was wherever they happened to be living. However, the data did not
demonstrate a strong or significant link between participants’ sense of ‘home’ and their length of residence in New Zealand (Table 6.5), nor of their sense of ethnic identity. In fact, the two participants in the sample with the longest residence, who each had lived in New Zealand for eleven years, chose to identify exclusively their places of origin as ‘home’. The correlation co-efficient, Kendall’s $\tau_c$, shows a weak negative association of $-0.18$, much weaker (and in the opposite direction) than one would expect given the range of years in the ‘length of residence’ variable. A similarly weak association is demonstrated in the crosstabulation of participants’ sense of ‘home’ and their age at migration (Table 6.6), for which $\tau_c = 0.14$.

### Table 6.4
Where Respondent Thinks of as ‘Home’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where Respondent Thinks of as ‘Home’</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Sample (N=121)</th>
<th>% of Respondents (N=109)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly NZ, but partly Origin Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wherever I am living”</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.5
Crosstabulation: Where Respondent Thinks of as ‘Home’ by Aggregated Length of Residence in NZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where Respondent Thinks of as ‘Home’</th>
<th>Aggregated Length of Residence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-2 Years</td>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin City/Country</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly NZ, but partly Origin Country</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wherever living”</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Column %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two major themes regarding participants' sense of 'home' which emerged from the interview data were contingency and ambivalence. As described earlier with regard to belonging, and again with aspirations, participants expressed the sense that New Zealand is home for now. However, given that all the interviewees had mentioned pursuing educational and occupational opportunities elsewhere, New Zealand may not remain 'home' in the future. Their notions of 'home' were contingent in that regard. In response to this finding, some may argue that aspirations or intentions to pursue study or employment opportunities in overseas locations such as Australia or the United States do not necessarily indicate that New Zealand ceases to be considered 'home'. I would agree with this argument, to a point. In Chapter Two I highlighted Ip's suggestion that migrant adolescents' aspirations for the "OE", or Overseas Experience, may simply reflect a prominent institutional discourse amongst young, well-educated and professional New Zealanders, and therefore may be another indication of their acculturation to the dominant middle-class Pākehā culture in which they are immersed.

However, the “OE” argument does not account for the ambivalence that was expressed by interviewees such as Shona, who had come to the realisation that although she did not look upon Taiwan as 'home' at this point in time, she was not convinced that New Zealand was 'home' either. Nor does it address the limited sense of belonging that so many of the participants expressed. They 'sort of' belonged; they felt they had adjusted, but they would never fully belong; they did not feel allowed to belong. Finally, their ambivalence about New Zealand as 'home' is influenced by an additional consideration which further problematises the “OE” argument: many of these 1.5 generation Asian migrants do not know where their parents will choose to live after they themselves complete their studies. Given that so many made the decision to migrate for their children’s education in the first place, and considering the difficulty that many of these highly-skilled and highly-qualified adults have had in gaining adequate employment in New Zealand, the young people I interviewed could not say with certainty whether New Zealand was 'home' to their parents. Many of the interviewees had 'astronaut' fathers who maintained their careers, and the family home, in their origin countries. As a result, the family had not actually uprooted in the first place. When one of the primary motives for migrating – children’s education – has been successfully fulfilled, where will the ‘family home’ be located?
One participant who embodied this question is Vivienne, whose father is a school teacher who was unable to find employment in New Zealand. As a result, he has returned to Taiwan as an ‘astronaut’. He visits on the school holidays – a pattern, according to Vivienne, which confuses the picture for her of where her parents might settle when she and her siblings are grown. Her father, living in Taiwan, wishes to retire in New Zealand, while her mother, left balancing domestic and employment responsibilities in New Zealand, misses family and friends – and her husband – in Taiwan.

Well, my dad likes it here, because he’s a teacher, he comes during school holidays, so it’s like when he can relax himself. He likes to go to the beach and stuff. My mom, I don’t think she likes it here as much because she’s working and there’s a bit more pressure. So it’s like, my dad comes here to get away from the pressure in Taiwan, and my mom wants to go back to Taiwan to get away from the pressure here, because she works at the bank. Yeah, I think they plan to move back. Though I’m not sure: my dad wants to stay here when he retires, but my mom wants to go back. But I think we’ll end up going back anyway. (Vivienne)

Louise’s father, also an ‘astronaut’, has allowed his New Zealand residency permit to lapse. While Louise is uncertain about where she will pursue a career, her younger siblings intend to leave New Zealand. She and her mother have discussed the possibility that their family could be stretched across numerous countries and continents. According to Louise, while her mother seems to enjoy her life in New Zealand, she also has considered filling her retirement years with international travel.

My mother seems to quite like the environment here, and she likes the way of life, in that it’s not stressful. Every day she will, like, cook stuff and she will go to the garden and do something there. Yeah, the way of life is really quiet for her. I mean, it really depends on my father, because now I think he has already given up his right to live here, his residence, so if he would want to come here, we have to go through another process of like, he is our relative, and so he could come that way. But I don’t know if they will want to do that.
I think that my mom said that if all of them go back to Taiwan and wherever, and only I stayed here, she will spend half the year here with me, and half the year stay in Taiwan with them all. She might travel around the world, and like at the end of the trip come to New Zealand and stay for a while with me. (Louise)

Shona’s parents were also unable to find suitable employment in New Zealand, but chose to leave the labour market rather than ‘astronaut’ or seek out underemployment. According to Shona, their future plans are uncertain, because they enjoy the lifestyle in New Zealand. They have friends, and enjoy outdoor activities in the clean environment, which they would lose if they returned to Taiwan. However, a return would allow them to regain a measure of freedom and social capital that cross-cultural migration has cost them.

Well, I think there is actually a conflict in choice whether they want to stay here or not. Because they like New Zealand’s environmentally clean image, so my dad is all right, because he is really addicted to fishing and doing gardening, and my mom has actually made a lot of Kiwi friends. So I don’t know if maybe they want to back to Taiwan. But in a way they don’t think their English is good enough, so I think in their daily lives they think it’s not very interesting for them. Because first of all they’re retired, so they have no work. And then sometimes when they get frustrated with learning English, and sometimes they cannot communicate or express fully what they want to say to Kiwi shopkeepers and such, and sometimes they do talk about oh, we still have a house there, and we can go back. But in a way I don’t think they will, because Taiwan’s environment is appalling. Yeah, so I think there is actually conflict in choice between staying and going. (Shona)

At this point in time, Shona, like other 1.5 generation Asian migrants, does not know where her parents will be located ten or so years into the future, because they have not yet reconciled for themselves where they wish to be. If she fulfils her aspirations to study and practise medicine in Australia and in medical clinics in Africa, and if her siblings also pursue overseas careers, she has no way of knowing where the ‘family home’ – that is, her parents’ home – will be located. This is an aspect of transnationalism that has not been fully explored. Kong (1999:582-3) suggests that
attachment to place and the identification of one particular location as 'home' are not mutually exclusive. The attachment to a given place would not necessarily be diminished for some transnational migrants if other family members moved elsewhere, but a place may be more readily identified as 'home' if family members were there. If this were a general feature of 'home', then for most 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents, 'home' necessarily remains, for the near future at least, a nameless place.

**Conclusion**

A dialectical approach to data collection and analysis suggests that the migrant adolescents in the sample did acculturate, despite difficulties and the persistence of boundaries which maintained social distance between them and "Kiwi" society. However, these data also confirm that acculturation and assimilation are not synonymous processes (Alba & Nee 1997:829). Their adjustment to life in New Zealand was not accompanied by a strong sense of belonging; indeed, belonging and attachment to place were notions largely met with ambivalence and contingency. "Sort of" and "for now" seemed to characterise the considerations of New Zealand as 'home' and as a place to belong for this group of migrants. Such considerations, like those involving identity in Chapter Five, are influenced by motivations and aspirations, as well as by circumstance. Most of the research participants did not intend to remain in New Zealand past the medium term, and even some of those who felt likely to stay would have preferred to be elsewhere in the pursuit of educational and career opportunities.

The contingency with which participants addressed their current attachments and future prospects in New Zealand may, for many, rest partly on the uncertainty of their parents' future residential plans. If 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents leave New Zealand to pursue opportunities overseas, as many other skilled and ambitious New Zealanders do, there is no indication that their sense of New Zealand as 'home' will be strong enough to draw them to return here, especially if their parents have also left the country, either to return to their country origin, or – with New Zealand passports in hand – to engage in the process of step migration to further destinations.
However, some caution must be applied to these conclusions. Simply because these migrant adolescents have declared intentions and have made plans does not mean that their future actions are determined inevitably. Their plans for the future have been made with the confidence and arrogance of youth. These 1.5 generation migrants may follow trajectories of integration and settlement like so many migrants before them, regardless of ‘racial’ differences, and despite their stated ambitions. They may decide to make New Zealand ‘home’, and fulfil their aspirations here. They may have internalised the generations-old New Zealand practice of the “OE”, as Ip suggests, and satisfy their wanderlust with a few years’ study and employment in larger overseas markets. They may also, like many other New Zealanders, decide to return ‘home’ to New Zealand when they long for a peaceful, secure, and unspoiled environment, or when they feel that it is time to raise families and ‘settle down’. On the other hand, they may return to their origin countries, to the great urban centres in Asia, only to discover that the pollution and traffic and population density, as well as cultural practices and values, no longer hold appeal for them. They may discover on such a ‘homecoming’ the alienation from one’s origins that often comes from broadening one’s experiences and expanding one’s cultural repertoire. Perhaps in such circumstances they will discover that they had become New Zealanders after all.

On the other hand, they may also leave New Zealand, applying their increased cultural capital to expand their habitats of meaning across additional destinations and cultures, and never return. They may employ all these options, and others besides. The point is, it is too early to know what the 1.5 generation migrants from Asia will do. The factors which shape their current and future experiences and identities are all subject to change. We can only speculate, based on the information we currently have: of their sense of identity, boundaries and belonging; of their cultural, social and economic capital; and of their hopes, ambitions and intentions. On the basis of these combined factors, 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents are a category of migrants New Zealand has never before hosted. We cannot assume that their experiences are commensurate with those of past migrants to New Zealand, or of current migrants from elsewhere across the Pacific or around the world, or indeed of other Asians who have migrated to other centres. They may be new New Zealanders, part of the new, permanent New Zealand Asian population which will continue to alter radically New Zealand’s demographic, cultural and economic landscape. They may, on the other hand, upset all previously-
held theories and models about migration, adjustment and settlement, by practicing a form of transnationalism in which New Zealand is but one node in a global social field, one locale amongst several – or many – across which they operate. Their stories will continue to captivate for some years to come.
Table 6.6
Crosstabulation: Where Respondent Thinks of as ‘Home’ by Age of Respondent at Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where Respondent Thinks of as 'Home'</th>
<th>Age of Respondent at Migration</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly NZ, but partly Origin Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Wherever living&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My solo interview with Kyle was the last interview I was to conduct in the data collection phase of my research. We talked after school one day, for nearly two hours; the interview ranged over so many topics and was so interesting that I did not realise how much time had passed until I ran out of tape. Kyle’s responses were so different from all the other interviews. He was resolute in his determination to return to Taiwan, and yet his determination to not settle in New Zealand, or to undertake adjustments that would hinder his re-settlement in Taiwan, did not result in his being shut off. On the contrary, he was a most engaging young man – intelligent, humorous, perceptive. When we had finished, I packed up my recorder and tape, and asked him if he needed a ride home. He replied that his father would be waiting for him in the car-park, so we chatted as we walked out of the building together. He asked about my progress in the research, and I told him how I had found the interviews, noting that his responses differed markedly from the others’. It was then that I mentioned to him that one of the others, with whom he had taken part in the group interviews, had singled him out as the only Asian migrant they knew who wanted to return to their origin country. He replied, thoughtfully at first, then more passionately, “I think maybe I am the only one I know who wants to go back as well.

“But my situation is different from most of the other Asians. Most of them came here for education, because maybe they were not doing so well back in Taiwan. But that’s not how it was for me. I had a life in Taiwan. I was respected. I was the son of a doctor, and I was great at school, I was popular, and I had a future. I lost everything to come here. . . .
“So we moved here, and I know that my parents have also sacrificed to move to New Zealand. So there’s no way I can tell them that I wish we never left Taiwan. That would be so ungrateful after everything they gave up to bring me here.”

With that, he pointed across the car-park and said, “There’s my father.” We wished each other well and said good-bye. His father pulled away as soon as Kyle was in the car, leaving me wondering how this last revelation might transform my understanding of the data I had collected, and excoriating myself for not interviewing Kyle first.

The preceding vignette presents two major themes that feature in this chapter dealing with the dynamics of the relationships between migrant adolescents and their parents. These are threads that have also appeared in the previous two chapters, discussed in the context of identity or cultural adjustment, or else suggested in glimpses, foreshadowing their detailed examination below. The first theme relates to the fact that the processes of migration, adjustment and acculturation are played out in families. The family provides the reference-point against which changes are measured, though family relationships may be reconfigured in the process of migration (Orellana et al. 2001:587). The first step in the process is the decision to migrate at all. An important feature of the experiences of 1.5 generation migrants is that – unlike most other migrants – they tend not to actually be involved in the deliberation and decision-making processes. Rather, migration is something that is done to them, and for them. Understanding the adjustment experiences of 1.5 generation migrants requires taking account of their limited ‘ownership’ of the migration decision. The data also demonstrate how post-migration adjustments manifest differently across generations, and how families develop strategies which take account of those differences. The role of children as cultural and language brokers for their parents is one example of such a strategy. The fact that family strategies may be gendered is also addressed. In addition, the data highlight the generational differences in the discussion of how the migrant adolescents in the sample thought about their parents’ experiences of migration and
settlement in New Zealand. Participants discussed the changes in their attitudes and behaviours which produced tensions in their family relationships. They also pointed to changes they perceived in their parents that helped minimise these tensions.

The second theme extends the discussion of the gain/loss equation, begun in the previous chapter, in addressing migrant adolescents' critical awareness of the costs of migration borne by their parents. As presented in Chapter Six, participants were asked to assess their gains and losses in migrating to New Zealand. As a separate consideration, they were asked to evaluate whether their families had lost more than they had gained in migrating. The survey sample and the interview participants together confirmed that these migrant youths recognised that their parents had endured considerable sacrifices in migrating to New Zealand.

These themes are analysed in the light of two theoretical dynamics regarding generational relations: the first is the dual concept of generational consonance and dissonance introduced in Chapter Three; the second is the question of agency. The concept of generational consonance and dissonance has been a constant feature of migration studies, usually in the context of the shift in values and behaviours of the second generation, as assimilation creates social distance between migrants and their native-born children. In this regard, it should be unsurprising that these dynamics are also to be explored in the relationship between 1.5 generation migrants and their parents.

The question of agency, on the other hand, introduces a more unusual dynamic, but one which plays a central role in the lives and adjustment experiences of many 1.5 generation adolescents. It is actually a particular manifestation of generational dissonance, but one which warrants its own examination. Agency is the dynamic that makes these particular migrants conceptually different from other migrants. Parents may decide to migrate, at least in part, because they believe such a move will be of ultimate benefit to their children. However, the decision to migrate is not one that children make for themselves. Some, probably many – or even most – may eventually determine that their parents made the right decision, that migrating was a good idea. The importance of agency as a dynamic is that it is dynamic – that is, 1.5 generation adolescents grapple with their parents' decision to uplift them from their home and
place them in a new setting, a new culture, in which many of the things that had previously defined their lives are either missing, or else subject to an almost unbearably intense scrutiny by the host society. The decision which is likely to re-define their entire lives was made on their behalf by others.

**Generational Strategies**

As discussed in Chapter Three, the act of migration introduces factors that necessarily upset the normal flow of family relations. The levels of consonance or dissonance between parents and children are determined by the strategies adopted by migrant families, both as individuals and as a unit, to respond to the challenges, disruptions and adjustments involved. This section introduces three specific areas of family migration experiences that were touched on in the surveys, and discussed in depth in both the group and solo interviews. The section opens with interviewees’ discussions of their families’ decisions to migrate, and their involvement in the process. Both of the dynamics introduced above come into play in their discussions, as the sense that some participants had of being forcibly uprooted, and thrust into an alien environment, was a source of dissonance between them and their parents. Next is an analysis of how participants reflected on their parents’ adjustments to life in New Zealand. These questions, from both the survey and the interviews, demonstrated that most of the participants acknowledged that the experience of migrating to New Zealand was more difficult for their parents than for themselves. This situation, according to the criteria set out by Zhou (1997:80-86), creates the potential for significant generational dissonance, but may also be used to create strong family bonds if members are enabled to contribute to strategies for family adjustment, rather than merely individual acculturation. The third issue addressed in this section is one example of such a strategy, as interviewees reflected on their roles as cultural and language brokers for their parents. This situation, when children are called upon to interpret for their parents – either literally, in the light of English-language differentials, or culturally, when children are required to explain cultural behaviours or values and their meanings – presents opportunities for significant generational dissonance, as the normal distribution of power within the family is disrupted. On the other hand, families may also be strengthened in the process. The response of the interview participants offered some surprising insights in this regard.
The Migration Decision

One universal response from interviewees is that the adolescents themselves did not make the decision to migrate. In a number of instances, they did not know that they were going to migrate until the decision had already been made. Some of the young people – many being very young children at the time – may have been aware that there were plans to move, and may even have been consulted, but did not know what to expect, or even how to process the reality and enormity of international migration and its implications for their lives. These factors indicate what might be accepted as a commonsense observation: as children and young people, 1.5 generation migrants exercise at best very limited agency in terms of migration.

Of course, all parents make decisions on behalf of their children, and necessarily so. Parents may agonise over any number of decisions regarding their children – how family life and the household routine is to be structured, whether to accept a new position in another town or city, district or region, which schools their children will attend – and the possible future impact of those decisions. However, deciding to migrate internationally, and cross-culturally, bears even greater implications than these other significant life-decisions which parents make on behalf of their children – sometimes in consultation with them, and sometimes not.

Participants demonstrated varying degrees of advanced knowledge about their families’ decisions to migrate. Two interviewees said that their parents specifically asked them their opinion – not about whether to migrate, but about which of the choices of destination countries they preferred. Part of the reason for their lack of involvement in the decision may have been their age, as many of the participants were still young children when the decision was made. On the other hand, half the survey respondents were young teenagers when they arrived in New Zealand (Table 7.1). Several of the interviewees knew they were moving, but had no awareness of the enormous implications of such a decision.

I can’t remember [if I knew in advance], but I didn’t actually understand what immigration was, I was just like, “Oh, wow.” After I actually moved here, I
realised that I’m going to be apart from family and stuff. But I didn’t actually take it really seriously before I moved, and it was actually at the airport that I realised what I was doing – and I was crying my head off. I was seven.

(Vivienne)

I think I was quite young when my parents made the decision. They may not have involved me but I guess I was quite naïve and I just thought, “Oh, we’re going to a new place, exciting”. They talked about moving, but when we came here I didn’t know what it was going to be like. (Shona)

My parents had been talking about it for like two years [amongst themselves, not with me]. So they were just talking and talking, and then suddenly they told me, “Next month we’re going to move, so pack up your stuff.” (James)

Well, when I was back in Korea my auntie was here as an overseas student, and she told us it was real nice, so, my dad came here for a year by himself, and stayed, and came back and told us that it was really nice so he wanted us to move, so he decided that we would move and came here. (Lara)

Basically my parents made all the decisions, and we weren’t told until half a year before moving. I was still quite young and I knew they were thinking about moving, but I didn’t think they were taking it seriously. So they didn’t ask me anything about this decision. (Kyle)

### Table 7.1
**Participants’ Ages at Migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like so many other significant life decisions, the decision to migrate with one’s family is often motivated by a combination of factors and forces. In fact, for many 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents to New Zealand, their parents’ decisions about their education is linked to their experience of migration, as education was a major motive, if not the primary motive, for migrating at all. Education was a recurring theme in the interviews, and was supported by anecdotal information from many of the gatekeepers in the participating schools. No interviewee suggested that education was not a factor, though several had suggested that there were additional motives for migrating: for these individuals it was education and. Some of those other considerations were predictable – leaving a polluted environment for a reputed pristine setting, rejecting the highly demanding and stressful competition in origin societies, the considerations of the political uncertainty in pre-1997 Hong Kong or the avoidance of national service in Taiwan. On the other hand, other motives were more difficult to anticipate. In addition to his parents’ security concerns in light of Taiwan’s tense relations with People’s Republic of China and his pending period of compulsory national service, one young man from Taiwan, whose father is a doctor, told of more immediate security concerns, as the result of the kidnapping for ransom of children of several of his father’s medical colleagues. So yes, he said, education was a factor, but more important were the security concerns confronting his younger brother and him. Another student spoke of being the child of an international executive and of spending most of her primary school career in international schools in several different countries. As a result, this student’s competency in English far surpassed her ability to use her origin language, so her parents decided to migrate to an English-speaking country for the sake of her secondary school and university education.

40 Without exception, all of the school counsellors I spoke to in the process of negotiating my way into schools seemed determined to dispel what they saw as the ‘myth of the successful Asian student’. Very many of their students from Asia were successful, they would say, but it is because of extremely hard work and long hours, and not necessarily because they were ‘the best and brightest’, as one counsellor put it to me. Those students, the ‘best and brightest’, were the most likely to gain the scarce and valued university places in their home countries, and so were less likely to migrate. According to these counsellors, parents from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and other countries in East Asia, would begin looking for overseas educational opportunities for their children when it became apparent that they were not going to be as successful as they needed in order to guarantee university placements. On this basis, education became the prime mover in their migration decisions. While this position is not empirically verifiable in the context of the present study, it was the firm view of the counsellors at more than a dozen Auckland area schools.
The result of these discussions indicated that most participants were reasonably accepting of their parents’ decisions to migrate, and the rationale that supported them. They all knew why they had moved. There was one interview participant, however, who in a very few words described a scenario which was as troubling and poignant as it was unusual:

Umm, the reason I came here is kind of confusing. It’s because my parents got divorced, so I came out here with my dad. . . . My friends didn’t know that I was moving. Yeah, because I had to lie to them, because my dad doesn’t want my mom to find out. So it was hard. (Monica)

The under-stated manner in which this young person told of both the disintegration of her family and the enforced cessation of all her friendships stung me. Later in the group interview, this student disclosed that her father, unable to gain employment in his profession in New Zealand, had returned to their origin country, leaving her to live with an aunt. Having first lost her mother to divorce, she had now lost her father to return migration. Such dislocation cannot be accounted for in the bounds of ‘generational dissonance’. When the discussion had turned to factors which would have made their migration experiences more positive, this student said simply, “I would just want my whole family to be together. . . .”

Such limitations to one’s agency and autonomy, especially with regard to the decision to migrate, is rarely associated with migrants, and more typical of the experience of refugees, and other ‘involuntary migrants’. Clearly, the respondent just described, and others related anecdotally to me by informants, might be better conceptualised as such, given the traumatic circumstances of their migration. Of course, not all the participants were so heavily burdened. One student’s response to a question about whether she felt pressured to succeed, given that her family had moved to New Zealand for her education, was nonchalant: No, she replied, because she never asked them to move – it was their decision, and not her responsibility. This was a discussion she had had several times with her parents as well, and as far as she was concerned, the issue was settled.
Parents’ Adjustment

When the interview participants reflected upon their parents’ attitudes about living in New Zealand, they tended to focus on the momentous lifestyle changes they had endured, having to do with unemployment or underemployment, difficulties with the language, and the impact of these two factors on all other aspects of their lives. Though one interviewee insisted that employment was not a problem in her family, all the others talked in some detail about their parents’ under-employment, or their adjustment to lifestyles rather likened to enforced retirement. Their fathers had learned to enjoy gardening, love the golf and fishing, and explained this time in New Zealand as a period of rest. Their mothers, while also adjusting to the quieter lifestyle and leisure activities, missed family and friends back in the origin country. Another variation of this scenario was that, after a period of unemployment (during which time they may have gained New Zealand citizenship), their fathers had ‘astronauted’ – returned to the origin country to continue his career – while their mothers remained here with them. Some mothers had gained part-time employment. The addition of the transnational dynamic introduces its own challenges to family life, as illustrated by Vivienne’s case, quoted in Chapter Six, where her father returns to New Zealand from Taiwan to enjoy the school holidays at the beach, while her mother longs to return to family and friends in Taiwan.

Well, my dad likes it here, because he’s a teacher, he comes during school holidays, so it’s like when he can relax himself. He likes to go to the beach and stuff. My mom, I don’t think she likes it here as much because she’s working and there’s a bit more pressure. So it’s like, my dad comes here to get away from the pressure in Taiwan, and my mom wants to go back to Taiwan to get away from the pressure here, because she works at the bank. (Vivienne)

Difficulties with employment was a major theme which, for many interviewees, defined their parents’ experience in New Zealand. Many of the young people who took part in the interviews had fathers who were doctors, none of whom were actually practising medicine in New Zealand. Some of these fathers had simply accepted their retired status and had begun developing leisure interests, while others had employed the ‘astronaut’ strategy, returning to the origin country to continue practising, while the rest
of the family remained in New Zealand. Their explanations of the difficulty their parents have had in gaining equivalent employment, and the disruption and stress caused by the need to ‘astronaut’, adds qualitative meaning and texture to the debates which have raged in the New Zealand media about the phenomenon. Far from being a cynical manipulation of New Zealand’s immigration rules, as frequently suggested by critics of Asian immigration, the qualitative data support the contention that the ‘astronaut’ strategy is a survival strategy, one borne by those forced to implement it as a failure, rather than a sneaking success (Beal & Sos 1999:9-10; Ip 2000:9). The interviewees were well-rehearsed in recalling their parents’ failure to find employment that matched their skills and qualifications.

James: My father was a doctor in Taiwan, but when he came here he can’t be a doctor, he would need to go to school –

Lara: Get a new qualification.

James: - go to school for two years and have to work in the countryside before working in the city. And he hasn’t got another job.

AB: So what does he do?

James: Golf. He just enjoys life, he decided to back to Taiwan in about two years.

AB: Is that common? (to other group participants) Do your parents have that experience?

Monica: Yeah, because my dad’s a doctor too. And instead he played golf as well. Once we got our passports, he’s gone back to work. Now he works in Taiwan.

AB: How do you feel about that?

41 The two-parent scenario presented as the norm is not the product of uncritical assumption. Of the eight interview participants, only Monica’s parents were divorced.
Monica: I don’t want him to leave, but he has to.

Interestingly, the interview participants seemed to be better informed about their parents’ employment prospects and future considerations of their employment than they had been about the decision to migrate in the first place. In addition to James, Kyle also knew of his father’s future intentions to ‘astronaut’.

Kyle: My father’s not working as a doctor. He’d have to get a new qualification, which means he would have to go through years of studying again, and go through that test again, and my dad says he’s too old for that. Like, those English terms and all the jargon, he can’t do that. So he just does sort of gardening and things like that. Trying to... I don’t know, just... reading.

AB: So how does he adjust to that?

Kyle: Well, I think he’s getting used to that pretty well. He doesn’t complain about that, the boredom and that. He’s getting used to that quiet lifestyle.

AB: But he’s lost his career.

Kyle: Yeah I know, but he says needs the rest or something. And he won’t be here for a long time, he’s going back to Taiwan soon. So he thinks of this time as a rest.

Utilising the ‘astronaut’ strategy was not the only option for parents unable to gain equivalent employment. Other alternatives were under-employment, or – for those with sufficient economic means – retirement.

My parents both were engineers, both working in Taiwan. And now they do leisure activities like gardening, walking. (Shona)

My parents are both working full-time... completely out of their fields. My dad works, oh it’s just a packaging company, and he’s just a worker there. And my mom works at a pharmacy. She had a lot of trouble with language, because
she can speak English, but it's quite broken, and lot of customers kind of look
down on her. Well, my dad loves it here. Oh, he was very stressed in
Singapore, in this huge architect firm. Besides, here he has a lot more to do to
with the family, and around the house. I don’t know about my mom, don’t
know how she likes it. (Joanne)

The other major difficulty of their parents’ experience, as suggested by the previous
quote, and noted by nearly all the interviewees, centred around language. They felt that
their parents faced significant barriers as a result of their limited ability to communicate
in English – or rather, for some, the lack of self-confidence in their ability to
communicate in English. Conventional explanation for adults’ limited acculturation is
that their cultural identity is well-established (Portes & Rumbaut 1990: 183). However,
another difference between adult and child migrants was highlighted in the group
interview: adults are not required to attend school, one of the most important
institutions for cultural transmission. The result, from their children’s observations, was
that they were not involved in the local community, and that as a consequence, their
adjustment to life in New Zealand necessarily suffered. According to Zhou, this
example of differential acculturation is a primary source of generational dissonance,
creating a disruption in the dynamics of power and authority in the family, as parents
attempt to compensate for their loss of social capital by insisting on strict cultural codes
within the household (Zhou 1997: 80-82). However, interview participants betrayed
little of such tensions, instead empathising with their parents’ struggles.

My parents are finding it really hard to fit into life, because they can’t
communicate. And they get real annoyed, and they get shy about it. And they
back away and don’t talk to people, so they don’t know what’s going on.
(Lara)

I think it would be harder for the adults because they’ve actually gotten used to
life in the country they’re from, like all their friends and jobs and stuff. It’s
like, my mom is always complaining about it’s harder to learn English because
she’s older, and kids just adapt to things easier, so it’s harder for the adults, I
think. (Vivienne)
I think it’s harder for adults, because children: we’re forced to go to school and we’re forced to learn the language, but they have to make their own opportunity, so they have to go out meet people. . . . Because they can make a choice, they don’t go, they’d have to force themselves, where children are forced. (James) 

And then sometimes when they get frustrated with learning English, and sometimes they cannot communicate or express fully what they want to say to Kiwi shopkeepers and such, and sometimes they do talk about oh, we still have a house there, and we can go back. (Shona)

Despite the fact that several interviewees knew of their parents’ future plans to engage in the ‘astronaut’ strategy, most participants in the research did not appear to know how their parents actually felt about their migration experience, or about the sacrifices they had chosen to make. For instance, a third of survey respondents were unable to say whether either of their parents enjoyed living in New Zealand more than they themselves did, choosing instead the ‘Not Sure’ option (Figure 7.1). The same was true for the questions about whether their parents wanted to return to their origin country (Figure 7.2). In fact, when the graphic-scale responses, originally coded as seven-point scales, were consolidated into positive, negative and ‘not sure’ orientations, the responses to these four questions were rather evenly divided between the positive, negative and ‘Not Sure’. The notable exception to this observation is that nearly half the respondents (44%) indicated that their father enjoys living in New Zealand more than they do. The data do not indicate what proportion of those fathers may be ‘astronauts’ on holiday.
Despite several interviewees knowing of their fathers' future intentions to return to their origin countries to resume employment, interview participants tended to be limited to drawing conclusions about their parents' behaviour and experiences based on their own observations, rather than from open discussions with them. I discovered this when I
asked about the ambivalent survey responses regarding parents’ attitudes and intentions. Several interviewees suggested that limited intergenerational communication – especially about the processing of emotions – was a cultural feature.

I don’t think that Asian kids have the close relationship as other European kids. I don’t know why, but from my point of view, when they’re little, in primary school, kids come along and tell parents everything, but in Asia they’re like too stressed and too pressured with studying that they don’t have time to talk to their parents. That’s what I think. (Lara)

I didn’t realise it, but I think it’s quite common. One of my friends back in Taiwan, he went away to camp, when he came back, everything’s packed, ready to go. He said, “Oh, are we going?” “Yes.” He said, “Oh, where are we going?” “Hamilton, New Zealand.” And he went to say good-bye to his friends, and the next day they just went. (James)

It’s like a lot of my friends, they don’t really talk to their parents, they live separate lives. They only eat dinner together, and don’t even talk. So the whole family just eats, with no conversation. (Monica)

These explanations would tend to suggest generational dissonance, and a setting for tension, misunderstanding and conflict. Other participants, on the other hand, had more sophisticated explanations for why migrant parents may not communicate their adjustment struggles openly with their children. One suggestion was that the parents themselves may not know quite how they feel about New Zealand society because of their limited engagement with Pakeha New Zealanders. However, another explanation was more a product of generational consonance than conflict: Kyle suggested that parents, mindful that migration was their decision and was imposed on their children, would shield their children from their own struggles in an effort to support them through the difficult transition and adjustment period.

I think we don’t quite understand what the parents, they themselves feel, because parents are not easily getting involved in the community, basically because they can’t speak good English. Mostly they only get on with the people from their own country. So we don’t understand how parents feel about
the society in New Zealand, because they haven’t hooked up with the society at all. (Louise)

I don’t think that children would actually think about what their parents feel. A year ago, or two years ago, my parents didn’t talk to me about how they feel about New Zealand, because they think I’m under enough pressure. They don’t want to give me their pressure as well, so they try to show me they expect that you may miss things but that you get used to it, and things like that. But since we’ve been here for a period of time they start showing some things that they don’t quite like about New Zealand. But before, they don’t want to put any pressure on us. They think life is hard enough for us and they’re just trying to help you feel better, handle the pressure. It’s their decision, they can’t do anything about it, but to tell the kids, it would be like “You brought me here and now you tell me you don’t like it?” It would be like, “What?!” (Kyle)

Kyle’s explanation met with some agreement in the group interview. Shona added that parents would of course accept as a priority the need to help their children “cope with life and school”. After that had been accomplished, she said, perhaps then they would turn the attention to their own adjustment. At that point, Kyle quickly replied, “I don’t think my parents have adjusted to anything.”

Survey participants were also given the opportunity to reflect on the level of generational consonance or dissonance in their own families. The survey used several pairs of questions, all utilising graphic continuum response sets, to ask participants whether their parents had helped them to adjust to life in New Zealand, whether it was easier for children or adults to adjust to life in New Zealand. As an additional indicator of generational dissonance, participants were asked whether they felt that their parents understood what the experience of migration and adjustment was like for them.

Nearly six in ten respondents answered on the positive side of the continuum that their parents had helped them adjust to life in New Zealand, with most of those giving the strongest positive answer possible. Fewer than two in ten answered negatively (Figure 7.3). The paired question appeared later in the survey, which asked participants whether they agreed that they had helped their parents adjust to life in New Zealand more than vice versa. Participants tended towards the ‘Not Sure’ option on this question, as they
did for a number of questions in which a stronger answer might indicate generational dissonance. Thirty percent of respondents indicated that they had helped their parents adjust more than their parents had helped them, but nearly half the respondents said they were not sure (Figure 7.4).

The survey sample was far less equivocal about the question of which generation had an easier time adjusting to their new setting. Nearly six in ten respondents agreed, in the strongest possible way, that it was easier for younger people to adjust to life in New Zealand than older people (Figure 7.5). Despite the fact that they did not make the
autonomous decision to migrate – anthropologists of the family such as Orellana and her associates (2001) might argue that their autonomy had been abused – these 1.5 generation migrants were in little doubt that their parents had a greater struggle to adjust to life in New Zealand than they had. This may be due to their awareness of their parents’ struggles with language and employment. They were also sensitive to the flow-on effects of these two difficulties, such as their parents’ limited meaningful engagement with the host society and the sudden drop in the value of their social and cultural capital (which a number of participants identified as a loss of social status). Those difficulties are in considerable contrast to the ambitious educational and career goals of the participants, as detailed in Chapter Six.

![Figure 7.5](image)

"It is easier for younger people to adjust to life in New Zealand than older people" (N=120)

Cultural Brokers
Interviewees identified language acquisition as the primary factor in their parents’ adjustment difficulties. It was that factor which caused their parents to rely on them as cultural brokers. Many of these young people had been called upon to serve their families as interpreters: if phone calls needed to be made to the bank, or insurance brokers, or real estate agents, they did the talking. They also did much of the shopping, or at least were required to accompany their parents, in the event that they might be needed to interact with English-speakers. Again, such a disruption in the normal roles,
routines and structures of power within families could be the source of significant generational conflict. How did these young people cope with the responsibility of mediating between their parents and the local community, and how did their parents adjust to the alteration of family roles? Kyle described the change in his parents, from being confident, self-reliant and respected professionals in Taiwan, to being ‘kind of scared’ in New Zealand, too tentative even to go grocery shopping by themselves.

They have lost freedoms. Because of language. Like they can’t read to go shopping and things. I think if you go on the street and you see people speaking funny and things like that, I think you get scared. And then you just, it’s totally different. You know, my parents are kind of scared. Like if they walk into a Kiwi place they’re scared they won’t be able to speak to them, so they rarely go out. Sometimes we’ll walk into a shop or something, and at the checkout to put the stuff through, they can’t do it. So whenever they go shopping they have to grab me or my brother to go with them, and let us do all the talking. (Kyle)

Kyle contributed this observation during the group interview, so I checked it with the group, asking if it was common for participants to be called upon in similar circumstances. All the participants had had similar experiences, summed up by another participant, who said, “My parents sometimes get us to phone, and sometimes they say Kiwis won’t be able to talk to them, so they need me to ring the insurance company, the bank, and things like that.”

The role-reversal involved in parents relying on their children as cultural or language brokers has potential for explosive generational dissonance. Parents cede a degree of power to their children in these circumstances, far beyond the simple acknowledgement that their children’s acculturation is further advanced than theirs (Zhou 1997). The potential for conflict lay in the extent to which parents and children are able to agree on the limits of the children’s new power, on the specific circumstances in which the roles are indeed reversed, and the ability of the parents to maintain a degree of authority while also relying on their children to fulfil the important mediation function. Parents’ roles in providing guidance and age-appropriate boundaries for their children may be compromised when they are also reliant upon their children for interpreting cultural
norms and values of the host society. A classic example of this would be the more casual nature of many Pakeha New Zealanders’ conversations. Migrant parents may interpret casualness for disrespect when their children begin to adopt that manner with their parents.

In fact, interviewees in this study determined that their parents’ reliance upon them as cultural brokers contributed to greater family consonance. Their new roles challenged the young people to learn more about household management, and to take on extra responsibilities. In the process they gained maturity and their parents’ respect.

It’s possible our relationship is more positive. And in a sense I also know quite a lot, which I would not have known in Taiwan. (Shona)

Yeah, it’s changed our relationship. Because I just realised that they actually respect me in some ways. In Taiwan we have to just listen to what they tell you to do. But whereas here they have to depend on me, and they actually do, and so you feel they respect me, and I respect them as well. And I think they feel quite happy, because they see me getting more, compared to what I used to be in Taiwan, you know, I couldn’t do these things in Taiwan. So they’re happy for that, so I don’t think they really care about that giving up those things. It’s just that sense of security they miss. (Kyle)

The fact that children are called upon to act as cultural brokers in particular circumstances does not necessarily alter other aspects of the parent/child relationship. Participants indicated that they continued to rely on their parents for encouragement, advice and stability, and that in providing these, their parents had helped them to adjust to life in New Zealand. The boost in confidence and self-esteem these young people gained by fulfilling such a crucial role in the family, and by their parents’ added confidence in them, and respect for them, may alleviate the loss they experience in the value of the social and cultural capital upon migrating. Interviewees seemed able to identify which of their parents’ concerns were minor and the result of acculturation differences, and which were more serious concerns. More importantly, they took comfort that their parents would identify the difference as well, and hoped that their parents would initiate discussions with them if they felt it were warranted.
I think actually if they think did think that we were like, weird, they're just going to talk to me about it. Because they don't know, “is this good or not?” They don’t know New Zealand enough to be able to tell, so they would just, like, talk to me about it. (Kyle)

**Generational Tensions**

The possibility that relationships between 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents and their parents may develop such positive and novel dynamics does not in itself eliminate other aspects of the power relationships between parents and their teenaged children. Several themes emerged from the interviews in this regard, which suggest the possibility for significant generational dissonance. One such tension extends the discussion, above, of children as cultural brokers, and addresses how the young people manage competing sets of values, attitudes and definitions of what is appropriate behaviour. Given that the parents of many 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents have not meaningfully engaged with the local host society, the acculturation differential between the generations inevitably produces friction, as children critically adjust to various aspects of ‘Kiwi’ culture which appear to depart from the parents’ own cultural values and expectations.

Another of the tensions centred on the young people's academic performance, and the pressure most participants felt in knowing that accomplishment at school was a major reason their families migrated to New Zealand at all. However, participants sometimes had difficulty reading their parents’ expectations: were they to maintain similar regimens of study that they had in their origin countries, or were they to adopt a more relaxed, ‘Kiwi’ approach to education, which balances academic and social/community development ideals?

That these tensions did not seem to have produced generational dissonance amongst the interviewees and their parents may be a reflection of their own personal qualities and commitments. After all, survey participants were self-selecting, and the interviewees doubly so, given that they were the survey participants who had agreed to take part in group and solo interviews. It is reasonable to assume that migrant adolescents with troubled family relationships or profoundly negative migration experiences were less
likely to agree to take part. Further research is needed, drawing upon a much larger sample, before claims of representativeness could be established.

**Maintenance of Language and Culturally-appropriate Behaviours and Values**

An overwhelming majority (96%) of the survey participants indicated that their origin language was the one they spoke most often at home, and most indicated that they never, or almost never, spoke English at home (Figure 7.6). The impression given by the interview participants was that they felt that their parents either did not speak English well, or at least lacked sufficient confidence about their English skills to allow them to communicate freely in the wider community. I asked the interview participants how they managed the changes between school and home, between languages, and between the different cultures and different types of rules and expectations. None of the interviewees indicated any kind of tension over the use of language in the home, though they did all – bar one 42 – continue to communicate with their parents in their origin language. Most, but not all, tended to utilise English when conversing with people other than their parents. One participant was discouraged from practising English at home, not by his parents, but by his younger brother, whose attempts to shame him were apparently successful.

In my primary school, I would just speak English at school, and speak Mandarin at home. But in this school, I speak Mandarin at school as well, so there’s not much change. I don’t really speak English at home, because my brother says “Oh, you’re trying to be a show-off.” He’s very sensitive about that – don’t try to act Kiwi, you’re not good enough. (James)

Well, I’m pretty much the same at home as I am at school, because I speak English to my sister, so it’s not that much of a change to me. I talk to all my Chinese friends in English as well. I mean my mom understands English as well, but if she talks to me in Chinese I will answer in Chinese. (Vivienne)

42 This was Joanne, who had attended English-speaking international schools her entire student career, and who had lived most of her life, with her parents, in Singapore. English was her family’s medium of communication there, as well.
I'm the same as Vanessa, I speak English at school and though I do speak some Chinese at home with my auntie, most of the time I speak in English. (Monica)

Figure 7.6
“How Often Do You Speak English at Home with Your Family?” (N=118)

Their parents’ dissociation from the local community within the host society had implications beyond the use of language, as the young people found themselves attempting to mediate between their parents’ culture and ‘Kiwi’ culture as well. It was generally agreed, as a result, that there was a gap developing between themselves and their parents.

Well, as we gradually adjust to the New Zealand culture, and our parents cannot, there becomes quite a big gap between parents and children, mostly to do with values. (Shona)

My parents think these Kiwi people are a really bad influence. (Joanne)

Values, definitely. Because it’s like, we’re brought up in a different culture, a different society. In my impression I believe that in the eastern world they’re more conservative about things. So when they are talking about the teenager issues it will shock my parents quite a lot from the point-of-view of what New Zealanders believe. And I have changed, gradually. I now accept what New
Zealand is doing so it might contradict from my own life. It’s a culture conflict. So it will bring a culture shock for my parents, like, “Oh, how can you accept this?” And then, I go, “Well, everybody does.” So then they say, “Well, don’t you think that you are an Asian? People will see you as an Asian, they will still classify you as an Asian, so you must have the Asian side of you, like you should do things in a more conservative way than the others.” (Louise)

Well, I don’t think about it with my friends, except my parents do think that I’m a bit disrespectful towards them, but just towards them. To other Korean adults I don’t say a word, because my Korean isn’t up to standards. In school I just avoid older Koreans, because they think younger students should respect them more. But that age thing doesn’t matter to anyone except my parents. But they let me get away with it as well, because they don’t expect me to do everything. .. (Joanne)

Joanne’s last statement is a particularly important one, because it suggests that migrant parents are not culturally static, which is often assumed to be the case. The extent or speed of their adjustments to life in a new society and culture may not be as dramatic as their children’s, but this should not be taken to indicate that a degree of selective acculturation does not occur. Indeed, this is another explanation for the surprising degree of generational consonance which the interviewees indicated: their parents were adjusting to life in New Zealand – even if only to the extent that they tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, their adolescent children to acculturate. Other indications of this process, suggested by the interview participants and further highlighted below, were that their parents encouraged them to become more involved with activities such as sport or music, and occasionally persuaded them – as mentioned earlier – to not worry so much about school work. That their parents would adopt these positions took participants by surprise.

On the other hand, interview participants also suggested that parents tried to maintain stricter and more protective standards of behaviour than they recognised amongst their Kiwi peers, particularly the girls. The gendered nature of acculturation is another adjustment which 1.5 generation females need to negotiate, or accommodate. Wolf (1997) argues that there is a great gender difference in the adjustment experiences of the
children of Filipino migrants in the United States, based around their parents’ differential treatment.

In particular, Filipinas seem to be under greater parental controls over their movements, bodies, and sexualities than their brothers and more of them are exhibiting signs of distress (Wolf 1997:459).

The young women I interviewed acknowledged that they were subject to stricter controls than their brothers, or other boys their age. One participant claimed that Asian parents would “almost never” let their daughters spend the night at a friend’s house, for instance. However, participants did not demonstrate any of the levels of anguish and despair so apparent in Wolf's research. There was evidence that at least several had internalised their parents’ rationale for the gendered restrictions, identifying, for example, “Kiwi” parents as being “not very strict”, rather than necessarily identifying their own parents as “very strict”. There was general consensus that Asian parents tend to hold to more conservative social mores than ‘Kiwi’ society; interviewees suggested that this conservatism is manifested by placing firmer controls – “protections” – on their daughters.

I think there is a major difference [between Kiwi families and Asian families]. I think that Kiwis’ parents are not that strict. Parents have very much more strict control over girls in Asian families. For example Kiwi parents will let their children go out to parties a lot more often, or stay overnight at other friends’ houses. I do think that’s why sometimes family conflict occurs, because parents and children think differently on different matters. Like if you want to stay out with friends late at night they won’t let you, they don’t want you to go out late at night. Or they don’t like the way you dress. (Shona)

Yeah, they don’t like how I dress. My mother has a problem with bra straps that show, and singlet tops that come down to here [midriff] – she says they’re too showy. But the whole dress issue is quite tough. My parents are, like, different, because they don’t like the way Koreans dress, either. You see in Korea teenagers walking around the streets with big, baggy pants, and they can’t stand that. And my mother can’t stand the singlet tops. I think that one big thing between New Zealand parents and Asian parents is like, the thing
about girls and boys. Because for Asians, girls are over here and boys are over there (gesturing in opposite directions). Well, that's how my parents perceive it, separate. And the issue of, like, sex is taboo in Asian countries. My parents find it quite hard to adjust to teenage couples just walking around, holding hands and stuff. They just think that's... not done. Well, not to them. (Joanne)

At least one participant – a female, and also one who had talked about being relied on as a cultural broker for her mother (her father is working in Taiwan) – indicated in her solo interview that she was quite prepared to accommodate her mother in a variety of ways. She had internalised the rationale behind her parents’ strictness in terms of dating, to an extent that would bring comfort to the parents of most teenaged daughters. She explained that, as a teen, one is still figuring out who one is, and what one’s future might be; when one reaches university one has a better idea of these things, and as a result a clearer view of the compatibility of prospective partners. In these and other matters, she did not merely accommodate her mother, however. She actively considered her mother’s self-consciousness, in terms of her use of English, and took account of those considerations when deciding whether or not to invite Kiwi friends home. At one point in our interview she had mentioned that she always went to the homes of her Kiwi friends, either to “hang out” there, or as a staging-post from which they went out. I asked her what her friends would do if she suggested using her home as the base from which they launched their evenings out.

Louise: (laughs) Oh, I never tried that, but it’s worth trying!

AB: What has stopped you from trying it?

Louise: That’s a hard one! Ummmm.... I think basically because I think my Mom, because she’s like a very quiet person, and by the way her English is not well, so I mean like, if I invite Kiwi friends to my house, she can’t speak that well, and she would just hide herself in her room or whatever, and they might think that was really weird, that she would hide herself. But I’ve got one friend – that girl was born here, her family is from Taiwan – and she said that whenever she would invite her Kiwi friends to her house, they always complained about her
mother’s English, “How come your Mom’s English --- she’s been here for so long, and she can’t speak English?” That girl felt quite hurt, because she thought “Oh, you’re my friends, so you are supposed to accept what I have, and that my Mom cannot speak English is not her fault.” So after she realised that this kind of thing was getting worse and worse — after she realised that then she will only go to their house. But I mean that’s just one person, you can’t just say everyone is like that. But for my mother, yeah, I wouldn’t want her to feel awkward.

While their greater exposure to, and engagement with, ‘Kiwi’ culture led these migrant adolescents to have different cultural experiences from their parents, this differential did not necessarily produce generational conflict within their families. Instead, some suggested that differences with their parents were not necessarily culturally bound, but were perhaps as much a universal tension resulting from adolescents pursuing greater independence. Disputes over curfews, for instance, or dress standards, are not limited to Asian migrant families. As one of the young people commented, in response to a question about the extent to which they talked with their parents about their difficulties at school, “You don’t want to involve your parents in something at school.” This sentiment was confirmed by another participant:

I think we all do that, balance different rules between family and friends. We all adapt to where we are. It’s the same as running around with your friends and then talking to you parents. It’s similar for all teenagers. (Joanne)

School Performance

Given that, for so many Asian adolescent migrants, education features so prominently as a reason for migration, parents’ attitudes towards their educational performance and study habits is a focal point of intergenerational dynamics. Interviewees were expected to perform well at school. One student recalled that his parents reminded him regularly for the first year after migrating that education was the reason they came to New Zealand, but that he hadn’t been reminded in the couple years since. However, he said, as a result of all the things his parents gave up, he still felt pressure to excel, to “pay them back.” When asked what he thought would adequately pay them back, he replied, “Just get good marks, and be happy.” Only one participant rebuffed the notion that she
should be pressured to succeed because her parents had migrated for the sake of her education. In an ironic development of the discussion on their lack of agency in the decision to migrate, this participant insisted, “No, because I never asked them if we could move here – they made the decision.”

Most interviewees, on the other hand, appeared to have been surprised that their parents did not make more of their expectations of educational success, instead reminding the young people that they had migrated to New Zealand to escape the immense pressure that students faced in their origin countries. Several of these students expressed both relief and exasperation at not being able to predict their parents’ attitudes towards their education: they would be encouraged to work hard and do well at school, but would also be encouraged at times not to work so hard, or to pursue hobbies. These were sentiments these young people were certain they would not have heard had they not migrated to New Zealand. This is not to suggest that parents did not communicate high aspirations for their children. The interviewees all communicated the recognition that they were expected to do well at school, and to go on to university and professional careers, expectations that participants also had of themselves. The difference was that academic success and university entrance in New Zealand did not require the single-minded focus and pressure that peers in their countries of origin experience.

Sometimes they go, “If you don’t obey me I’ll take you back to Korea so you can study hard.” But sometimes when I study really hard they say, “Oh, don’t stress about it, that’s why we came here, so you’re not under that pressure.” (Lara)

Like you get about 88 percent in something and it’s like, “Oh, that’s not so good.” It’s like, my parents expect me to do a lot better, and then if I think, “Oh, I could have done better,” they’ll be like, “Hello, you passed.” (Joanne)

And because in Taiwan all the kids – oh, it’s because of the pressure in Taiwan. Like half of the standard six kids would be wearing glasses because they’d been studying so hard. My mom tried to stop me from getting glasses and not having to go through all that pressure. It’s like we’re just exam machines, you know, we get all the information in, and then write it down in the exam. But I still got glasses anyway. (Vivienne)
I wouldn’t be as involved in Taiwan as I am now. Parents might not let you, because those things are just not as important as school work there. But here everyone is getting involved – here, not getting involved is bad. (Kyle)

In my old school, they had a lot of things you could be involved in, but nobody cares because they just don’t have any time. And my parents encouraged me not to take part in those things in Taiwan, but I try to do some of those things here. (Louise)

The participants generally acknowledged that, while their parents may not have made great strides in their acculturation to New Zealand society, they had adjusted many of their expectations of their children. These migrant adolescents viewed their parents still as being more conservative than “Kiwi” parents, and more restrictive, especially of daughters. However, they recognised that their parents’ demands on them, in terms of school performance, behaviours and relationships, were more relaxed than they would have been, had they not migrated. These considerations all contribute to greater generational consonance in migrant families.

**Gain/Loss**

In the previous chapter I introduced the survey data regarding participants’ considerations of whether they had lost more than gained in migrating to New Zealand. Participants were also asked to consider whether by moving to New Zealand their families had lost more than they had gained. The survey data illustrate the extent to which participants perceived that their parents had indeed made significant sacrifices for their benefit. Nearly a third of respondents appeared undecided on both questions, placing themselves in the middle of the continuum between ‘Agree’ and ‘Don’t Agree’. However, there the similarities between the two sets of responses end. While just under twenty percent of the respondents agreed, to a greater or lesser extent, that they had lost more than gained in migrating, more than twice that proportion acknowledged that their families had lost more than they had gained. In fact, the response sets nearly mirror each other, in that almost the same proportion of respondents agreed that they had gained as agreed that their families had lost (Figure 7.7). Interviewees not only supported those sentiments, but made the link between the two. They were keenly
aware that their parents had endured considerable sacrifices for the sake of their future success and well-being: their parents’ loss was their own gain.

The perception of the participants was that the combined forces of their parents’ loss of employment and their limited ability or readiness to engage with the wider host society resulted in a fundamental loss in social status for their parents. From being well-educated, highly skilled and successfully employed professionals with a respectable place in society, their parents had endured, in many cases, enforced retirement or extended ‘rest time’, a withdrawal from social interaction, and even an increased dependence upon their children to mediate between themselves and Kiwi society. In other words, the social and cultural capital which they had been able to mobilise in their origin countries suffered by way of an ‘exchange rate’ upon migrating to New Zealand. Their qualifications suddenly were not acceptable, in many instances their professional credentials were rejected. Whatever confidence, eloquence or fluency they posses in their origin countries – in fact, all the non-economic capital which had served them at ‘home’ – was not able to be converted easily into equivalent forms of capital in New Zealand. Those with economic resources have been able to opt out of employment altogether, while the others have had to develop other strategies for managing the abrupt loss in the value of their social and cultural capital.

The following exchange, from one of the group interviews, illustrates how the young people perceive their parents’ loss of social stature.

Kyle: Social standards. Like, people in Taiwan are all – when there are no racial differences, everyone is the same, so people will respect you and you will respect them. But when we actually moved here, we were Asian, so Asian people are treated like lower status. Well, I think that a lot of Asians don’t get as much respect as Kiwi people here. And, like if my parents were in Taiwan, someone wouldn’t, like, point fingers to them for no reason, which they do here. I think loss of status is hard for them, for most Asian families.

AB: The rest of you seem to be agreeing with that, are you?
Shona: Yeah, I think that a lot of parents in Taiwan had high social status but when they came here they lost their job, that’s quite a big issue. So all parents who used to have high social status in Taiwan and now suddenly become jobless and besides everyone’s the same now, not even a doctor or whatever in Taiwan, an accountant, so the loss of social status is very big.

Ironically, of all the interviewees, only Kyle mentioned his own loss of social status in similar terms that all the participants had used to describe their parents’ loss. Most of the others, reflecting the quantitative data, described their parents’ sacrifices as being quite different from their own. This is because they were able to recognise that, in addition to whatever losses they had suffered – discussed in the previous chapter – they had also gained significantly from the experience of migration. None of the interview participants were prepared to claim that their parents had experienced such gains.
**Figure 7.7**

Respondents' Perceptions of What Was Lost in Moving to NZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Don't Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Lost more than Gained by Moving to New Zealand (N=119)</td>
<td><img src="chart1.png" alt="Bar Chart" /></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's Family Lost more than Gained by Moving to New Zealand (N=115)</td>
<td><img src="chart2.png" alt="Bar Chart" /></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

There is a certain methodological danger in theorising parents' experiences based on the observations of their adolescent children. This is not what I have done in this chapter, however, nor what I propose to do at this point. Rather, the emphasis is on the adolescents' habitats of meaning. 1.5 generation migrant adolescents' relationships with their parents provides a context, and at times a counter-point, for their experiences of adjustment, struggle, acculturation and development as young adults in New Zealand. The high degree of generational consonance demonstrated by participants, and the
correspondingly low levels of dissonance, demonstrates a remarkable outcome, given the degree of struggle they and their families have endured.

Orellana and her colleagues state that “[c]hildren’s negotiation of autonomy may take particular twists when adult/child relations are situated within transnational social fields” (Orellana et al 2001:578). A key development in my analysis of the data stemmed from the realisation, courtesy of Kyle, that 1.5 generation migrants do not exercise agency in the decision to migrate. As such, the conceptualisation of these young people as ‘migrants’, in the conventional sense, is problematic. Some of the participants did not know they were about to experience such a momentous change until the decision had already been made. Others were too young to appreciate the significance of their migration until they arrived in “quiet, boring” Auckland, or started school. Their parents’ decisions to migrate, taken on their behalf, and even with their ultimate best interests in mind, profoundly disrupted and re-defined their lives, their identities and their trajectories.

Participants acknowledged that their parents’ decisions to migrate to New Zealand was based – at least in part – on long-term strategies to give their children opportunities which they may not have had in their origin countries. However, those strategies often have been altered by “forced choices based on limited options” (Orellana et al 2001:587) presented to them. These families found their options unexpectedly limited by a type of cross-cultural exchange rate that rendered their normally-impressive social and cultural capital of limited immediate worth. The exception to this was the value placed on education: participants were well aware of parents’ expectations that they should do well in school, and go on to gain a professional qualification at university. However, parents’ own employment opportunities, their ability to communicate in English, and their resulting lack of engagement with the host society, have caused these adult migrants to experience an abrupt loss of social status. This was manifested dramatically for participants who were called upon to act as cultural brokers for their parents, interpreting for them and mediating between them and New Zealand society in everyday situations. The experience of becoming cultural brokers was not interpreted as an entirely negative one by the participants, however. They gained life-skills and responsibilities that their non-migrant peers may not have had the need – thus the
opportunity – to develop, and they felt that they had also gained their parents’ greater respect as a result.

Generational differences in acculturation rates did create some tensions over values and behaviours between participants and their parents. However, interviewees demonstrated that their parents had experienced some shifts in their expectations on their children. Some were more relaxed about – or perhaps more resigned to – their children’s more casual manner of dressing and of behaving towards them. While maintaining the expectation of educational success, they surprised their children by encouraging them to pursue extra-curricular activities, and to broaden their educational focus beyond the strict definitions of school achievement prevalent in their home countries. The recognition that their parents had accommodated change, accompanied by the increased respect they felt their parents had for them, produced significant generational consonance, and a platform of understanding and empathy for their parents’ difficulties.

Having opened with Kyle’s contribution, the chapter will also close with one. Kyle was as aware of his parents’ loss of status as he was of his own. He knew that, as a doctor, his father had enjoyed considerable social status in Taiwan – so much so, in fact, that they feared that Kyle and his brother would become targets for kidnappers. Once in New Zealand, however, his parents had become timid, unsure of themselves, unconfident of their ability to engage with New Zealand society. Several times he referred to his parents as being frightened to leave the house without one of their children, in case someone spoke to them in English. He knew that family separation was imminent, as his father prepared to return to Taiwan, to resume his medical practice as an ‘astronaut’. Despite these tremendously negative repercussions of their migration, and his own insistence that he did not belong in New Zealand, and would follow his father’s example by returning to Taiwan to practise medicine, Kyle suggested that his parents’ experience had actually produced one positive effect. He thought that the way they had been forced to adopt a less active mode of life would result in changes to the way they conducted their lives back in Taiwan. They would pursue a greater degree of community involvement, he thought. For one so sensitive to the negative impact of his family’s decision to migrate, this was an remarkable insight.
Well, my parents, back in Taiwan, they weren't doing any clubs or activities at all. But whereas they came here and they've changed, they've relaxed. And if they were now back in Taiwan they would join a lot of activities, because they have actually changed. But because moving here, they don't have the language and stuff, they don't do anything about it [clubs] even if they wanted to. But I think that in Taiwan they would get involved a lot more. (Kyle)
Introduction

This chapter, the last of the data analysis chapters, addresses the 'Community Engagement' Indicator data from the survey, and the material from the group and solo interviews which they inspired. The issue of migrants' interactions with the host community is an important aspect of migration studies, although the effects of such interactions are usually assumed to be played out only upon the migrants. For example, the Changing Relations Project was a major ethnographic study carried out from 1988 to 1991 in six large cities of immigration across the United States. Commissioned in response to media reports of inter-ethnic struggles — typically amongst immigrants and other resident minority groups, its intent was to determine, amongst other things, the nature of the relations between immigrant and host communities at the local level. In justifying the need for such research, Bach (1993) has argued that little systematic research has been conducted to explore the effect on established communities of significant levels of immigration. Despite the fact that so much of immigrants' adjustment experiences are located in the context of interactions within local communities,

[l]ittle attention is given to the everyday activities, organised and unorganised, that bring people together and form the foundations for community stability and change. When the popular media turned to ask why communities were in conflict, few studies could offer evidence of common interests and shared activities amid the social and cultural diversity within urban areas.
Unchallenged, the media report pervasive images of intergroup conflict (Bach 1993:158).

The accumulation of everyday encounters provides a structure of relations, for both newcomers and established residents, of reception, response and adaptation. These structures also interact with other structures that impact on local communities, such as general economic conditions, and infrastructural issues within communities, such as the state of housing, schools and recreational facilities (ibid.:157). While the research that forms the basis of this thesis does not focus on such ambitious objectives as addressed in the Changing Relations Project, it is informed by the assertion that patterns of interaction within the local community play a very significant role in the adaptation of migrants and their reception by the host community. These dual, overlapping processes of mutual engagement are conceptualised as social integration.

Integration, as a concept linked to the incorporation of migrants into a host society, is defined by Yinger as occurring on both individual and group levels. The integration of migrant groups is defined by their enjoyment of equal rights as members of the host society, and by their equal participation in societal institutions (Yinger 1994:83). This is structural integration. On an individual level, social integration occurs when individual migrants belong to the same groups as members of the host society, and interact with those other members on the basis of equality (ibid.:82-3).

The social integration of migrants is a complex weave of interactions, motives and discourses. Integration is not a unilinear process: to be integrated the newcomers must be received. Yinger argues that social integration is both reliant upon the openness of the host community to newcomers, and contingent on the willingness, anxieties, values and capabilities of the individual migrants (Yinger 1994:116-8). In this way it is different from the process of adjustment or acculturation, though acculturation may be a step towards social integration. Equally, integration may impact on cultural adjustment; however, the two terms represent different processes. This difference between acculturation and integration is the foundation for the argument that Zhou and Bankston present in their discussion of the role of strong ethnic communities in building social capital amongst second generation migrants in the United States (Zhou & Bankston 1994). In their argument, immersion in a strong ethnic community gives migrants a
context in which to adapt selectively to life in the new society, and a platform from which to pursue greater future integration, as well-educated, professional, hyphenated Americans.

Indicators of the social integration of migrant adults tend to centre on such activities as employment, friendships and involvement or membership in voluntary associations, such as unions, sports teams, churches and social clubs (Schmitter 1980; Min 1992; Owusu 2000). Opportunities for engagement with the community are no less important for migrant youths (Rumbaut 1994:754), though somewhat different reference points are required. The quantitative indicator that I developed to measure the engagement with the local community of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents concentrated on their involvement in clubs and other extra-curricular activities. Of course, school was the context for much of their contact with the wider community, but given the location of the participating schools in Auckland city and nearby suburbs, opportunities for extra-curricular involvement in local communities (whether host or ethnic) are abundant and diverse. The question of community involvement is particularly important for 1.5 generation migrant adolescents, given their unique position at the convergence of so many different social groupings: as cultural brokers, they are frequently positioned between their families and the host society; as secondary school students they both represent their ethnocultural groups in a ‘multicultural’ setting and fulfil their families’ aspirations for educational achievement and enhanced social and cultural capital; in co-ethnic associations these young people represent a new generation of Asian (or Chinese, or Korean) New Zealanders, who may be stirred to extend their groups’ histories as settlers in New Zealand.

Consideration of the social integration of the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in the current study occurs in the context of issues raised in the previous chapters. Analysis of the quantitative data has, up to this point, suggested that many of the migrant adolescents display contradictory sets of characteristics relating to their identity, acculturation, attachment and belonging which substantially defy conventional assumptions of migrant settlement. These migrant youths do undertake significant adjustments, including to the languages they speak, to their school life, their friends and behaviours. Some acknowledge deeper adjustments to their attitudes and values. At the
same time, most maintain a dominant origin ethnic identity. They identify New Zealand as ‘home’, but aspire to pursue their life goals elsewhere.

Analysis of the study’s qualitative data has attempted to clarify these issues by pointing towards transnationalism as a concept that helps to explain and resolve these contradictions. The origin ethnic identity held by some of the interviewees was held in tension by an ambiguous and contingent sense of belonging in New Zealand — as described in earlier chapters, some felt that they belonged for now. Several continued to call themselves Taiwanese, for example, because they believed they would not be accepted readily by other New Zealanders as New Zealanders in their own right. In a similar way, most of the interviewees identified New Zealand as home, for now. This determination was influenced by a number of factors, including their intention to pursue educational and career goals overseas, as well as the persistent uncertainty as to where their parents considered ‘home’ to be.

The quantitative Community Engagement data, consistent with the other indicators analysed the preceding three chapters, defies explanations based upon the conventional assimilation approaches. Gordon’s seminal theory posits that the integration of migrant groups into the core society — ‘structural assimilation’ — is the necessary precursor to all other types of assimilation (Gordon 1964:80-81). In the conventional paradigm, one might anticipate finding patterns in the data to indicate that those who had lived in New Zealand for longer periods would be more involved in the local community, and that such involvement would have an effect on migrant adolescents’ sense of belonging. One might expect that those involved in clubs or other extra-curricular activities would have been presented with greater opportunities to establish a wider and more diverse network of friends. All these factors, according to the assimilation thesis, would lead to a greater degree of social integration, towards assimilation in New Zealand society. These effects should manifest in participants’ greater identification with New Zealand as ‘home’, and in their long-term intention to remain in New Zealand, to ‘settle’.

All these expectations are utterly confounded by the data, however. The survey instrument was designed to explore three questions: who got involved in clubs and other activities; in what sorts of activities were they involved; and what effects did such engagement have on participants’ sense of identity and belonging, and on their
aspirations? Quantitative analysis produced none of the strong relationships that might be expected between participants’ involvement in the community and their adjustment to life in New Zealand, or their aspirations to settle here. The qualitative data, on the other hand, answered why some of these 1.5 generation migrant adolescents got involved: they had encouragement from their parents and the opportunities to do so; in order to meet “Kiwis”; and to maintain relationships with co-ethnics in their local communities. More elusive were plausible explanations for why their participation in extra-curricular activities did not necessarily boost their belongingness, or meaningfully affect their sense of identity.

The discussion in this chapter is organised in response to the major questions set out above. The style frequently adopts a narrative of discovery, at times giving equal attention to what the data do not indicate as well as to the answers they suggest. This narrative strategy not only follows closely (albeit in a highly abridged fashion) the data analysis process as it was actually carried out, but it progressively reveals the seeming contradictions in the data, which conventional explanations, premised on settlement and assimilation, could not resolve. The consideration of transnationalism, as an explanatory concept, emerged when other efforts to explain the data failed to do so. Following the logic of discovery, the case is made for explaining the data based on transnationalism, when it is apparent that this is the only viable explanation which remains.

**Who Engaged?**

Just over half (55%) of the survey respondents indicated an involvement in clubs or out-of-school activities (Table 8.1). Participants’ responses on no other variables could be used to predict whether they were involved in the community, nor vice versa. For example, thirteen key variables were of particular interest to me, as these were the variables expected to be associated most strongly with participants’ involvement in activities in the community. Of these thirteen, four are unequivocally independent variables, while the other nine have a more dialectic relationship with the ‘engagement’ variable. That is, respondents’ performance in these variables may both influence and be influenced by their engagement with the local host community. The thirteen variables are presented in Table 8.2: the independent variables are gender, country of
origin, school attended and length of residence in New Zealand. The strongest correlation coefficients ($r$) were demonstrated by the school that respondents attended and the extent to which they agreed that moving to New Zealand was a good idea (Table 8.2). One might reasonably expect that those migrant adolescents who involved themselves in extra-curricular activities would be more likely to agree with the decision to migrate to New Zealand. Conversely, those who have not engaged with the local community would be less likely to have experienced levels of social integration that would lead them to a more positive view of their experience. Or, given the dialectic relationship between the two variables, those who feel themselves to be exiles, and who have determined to return to their country of origin, may be less inclined to take up opportunities for greater community engagement. However, the correlations of these two variables with the “Involvement” variable are not strong enough to justify such conclusions for this sample. As Table 8.2 illustrates, the correlation coefficient suggests weak associations for all the variables. The conclusion from these data must be that, for this sample of migrant adolescents, involvement in extra-curricular activities is not strongly influenced by participants’ gender, length of New Zealand residence or school attended, nor does it indicate acculturation to New Zealand or participants’ attachment to place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1
Respondents Involved in Clubs or Out-of-School Activities (N=118)
Table 8.2
Variable Correlations with Participation in Clubs or Out-of-School Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dialectic Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>$r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Attended</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of New Zealand Residence</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Activities

The sixty-five survey participants who did engage in extra-curricular activities identified their involvement in sport teams and lessons (such as tennis lessons), religious activities, social groups such as dance clubs, Amnesty International or cultural groups, music lessons and groups like the school choir, as well as other interests, such as a Radio Control Car Club. The specific types of activities were not deemed to be as significant in the analysis as the predominant language used in these activities. For example, participation on a sports team, whether soccer or badminton, was considered to be of less importance than whether the language used in coaching and instruction was English, or Mandarin, or Korean - or indeed, some other language, as was the case with the French club. The rationale for this was that the language used in the activities - the French club excepted - would indicate whether the group was specifically a co-ethnic group, or comprised members of the wider community. Participants’ involvement in extra-curricular activities, coded according to the predominant language used, are presented in Table 8.3. Between a quarter and a third of the sample (29%) were engaged in team sports where English was the primary language used. This was more than half of the survey participants who indicated any extra-curricular involvement. Interestingly, equal proportions of the sample – nearly one in ten - took part in
religious, social or cultural activities involving their origin languages as those who were engaged in similar English-language activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.3 Respondents’ Most Common Extra-curricular Involvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sports (English language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious/social/cultural (English language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious/social/cultural (Origin language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music groups or tuition (English language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports (Origin language)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As migrant communities become more established in any society, the opportunities expand for migrants to engage in a greater number of activities and associations which reflect their origin language and culture. That the development of such community life is taking place in Auckland is evident by the fact that twenty-seven percent of the survey sample indicated that they took part in clubs or other extra-curricular activities in which the predominant language used was their origin language. Just over half of those respondents, or fourteen percent of the sample, were simultaneously involved in clubs or activities in which English was the language used (Table 8.4). However, the data also show that nearly half the sample (48%) were not involved in any clubs or out-of-school activities.
Table 8.4
Participation in Origin-language AND English-language Clubs and Extra-curricular Activities (N=11943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in Activities in which Origin-language is Predominant</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56 (47%)</td>
<td>30 (25%)</td>
<td>86 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16 (13%)</td>
<td>17 (14%)</td>
<td>33 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72 (61%)</td>
<td>47 (39%)</td>
<td>119 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The texture of the engagement between survey participants and ‘Kiwi society’ is shown in the interview data, where – consistent with survey participants – interviewees who were involved in extra-curricular activities or clubs tended to be engaged in a variety of different activities.

Because after school, or during my free time I worked in a Mandarin-speaking church. I also work with a group of mentally disabled people. . . . And the [intercultural] group, which is like heaps of other cultures, which is really, really good. And I’m doing Amnesty International, I’m doing a year in the Youth Enterprise Scheme, which is like running a business. And I play badminton – but not many Kiwi like to play though, but there are a few. . . . What else? I joined the choir. I’m like really into school. (Louise)

I wouldn’t be as involved in Taiwan as I am now. Parents might not let you, because those things are just not as important as school work there. But here everyone is getting involved – here, not getting involved is bad. (Kyle)

43 Two respondents listed “French Club” as their only activity. As this was not specified whether English or the participants’ origin language was the transmission language, those responses were not counted in this table.
Clubs, yes, like I belong to [the school’s inter-cultural club] and Amnesty International, SADD [Students Against Drunk Driving], and I was involved in tennis and badminton in Form 5 and Form 6, but I stopped this year because it was too much. And the school production, Joseph. I helped to organise the international day. (Shona)

Why Participants Got Involved in the Community

There was clear agreement amongst interview participants that levels of extra-curricular involvement are much higher in New Zealand than in their origin countries, and several themes emerged which suggest why this may be the case. Prominent among these was that there is more time and opportunity to pursue other activities, away from the pressures of study that are pervasive in their origin countries. Activities such as music or sport lessons are far less expensive in New Zealand than in their countries of origin, and so are more accessible here. In addition to greater opportunities for involvement, interviewees highlighted further motives for taking part in clubs and other activities, not least of which was that they were encouraged by their parents to do so. Being involved in various activities in the community helped them to meet local New Zealanders, to improve their English language skills, and learn more about aspects of what they considered to be important elements of ‘Kiwi culture’, such as Christianity.44 Participants also mentioned involvement in origin-language clubs and activities as a way that they, and their parents, maintained contact with local co-ethnics.

Opportunities to Participate

There was ready agreement amongst the interview participants that it was far easier to pursue extra-curricular interests as secondary school students in New Zealand than in Hong Kong, Taiwan or South Korea. The pressure to study is not as great in the New Zealand school system, and the interviewees received encouragement from both the school community and their parents to become involved in other activities.

44 As highlighted in the discussion which follows, quite a number of the interviewees’ families assumed that Christianity would be a significant element in New Zealand society, and incorporated church attendance into their acculturation strategies.
Well, I wasn’t involved in anything in Taiwan. I think in Taiwan schools they didn’t offer as much as they do in New Zealand, in terms of things like sports or other extra-curricular activities. (Shona)

In my old school, they had a lot of things, but nobody cares because they just don’t have any time. And although my parents encouraged me not to take part in those things in Taiwan, but I try to do some of those things here. (Louise)

I play the guitar, and I used to do ballet. I wouldn’t have time to do those things in Taiwan. You’d just be studying. They don’t give you as much opportunity to learn those things as the schools here, they don’t have as much choice. (Vivienne)

Several participants mentioned that most leisure activities in their origin countries are prohibitively expensive. These interviewees had been surprised that activities such as golf or tennis lessons, and music tuition, were relatively accessible to them in New Zealand.

I go to tennis lessons in New Zealand. And in Taiwan it’s only rich kids go to tennis lessons, and the tennis court itself is very expensive, and the coach is like the national coach, the coach for the people going to the Olympics. (James)

Of course, even if a young person’s family could afford tennis lessons from the national Olympic coach, the pressure to succeed in such circumstances would likely be enormous, perhaps transforming the activity from a hobby into a career goal. James, the same young man who related this detail, also suggested that a similar dynamic prevailed in the study of music.

When I was in Taiwan I bought a clarinet, and my teacher asked me to bring it to school and play it in front of other people, and she told me that it was the first time in her life that she’d seen a real clarinet. The only instruments they play are piano and violin, but if they tried to have a school orchestra, they’d have no clarinet, no flute, no trumpet. If you want to do orchestra, you have to go to a special music school, where you are prepared to be a musician when you grow up. (James)
Engagement with Kiwi Society

Many times in interviews, participants told of being encouraged by parents to get involved in out-of-school activities and clubs, and gave as the reason for such encouragement “to meet Kiwis”. Participants were able to take part in activities or associations which brought them into regular contact with Pakeha New Zealanders outside the context of the classroom. It is impressive to note the lengths beyond their normal purview some participants were prepared (or required by insistent parents) to extend themselves in order to engage with ‘Kiwis’ in the community. A perfect example of this is church. A number of participants told me how their parents had determined that since New Zealand is ‘Christian’ that they should go to church and learn what Christianity was about, as this would help them both learn English and make New Zealand friends.⁴⁵ This was despite the fact that many of the participants were not Christian, had never before been in church and were not particularly inclined towards converting to Christianity. Instead, it is assumed that attending church is one way to reach across the boundary into ‘Kiwi’ society. The following excerpt from a group interview illustrates this strategy.

James: My mother used to force us to go to church because she wanted the whole family to meet New Zealanders there, but I didn’t like it: you have to sing...

Monica: It’s really boring.

James: You have to listen to the priest talking.

AB: So your mother had that idea, though, that if you go off to the church you’ll meet New Zealanders?

James Yeah, and learn English.

⁴⁵ In the 2001 New Zealand Census, nearly two-thirds (62%) of New Zealand’s population indicated an affiliation with a Christian denomination (2001 Census), the same proportion of the population as in the 1996 Census (Statistics New Zealand 1997:37). Pakeha New Zealanders comprised just over half (55%) of those indicating an affiliation to a Christian denomination in 2001: as such, one might reasonably expect to meet at least some Pākehā at church. However, few New Zealanders would describe New Zealand as a ‘Christian country’.
AB: Is that the same for you, Monica?

Monica: Yes, and I suppose to meet people in the community. And my dad wants me to explore into Christianity.

James: I find it very weird too, because my mother is not even Christian but she asks the whole family to go to church. I heard the story about Jesus when I was very young, but I didn’t know it had anything to do with Christianity, and then I heard it in church again, and go “Oh, it’s a Christian story.”

While becoming involved in groups and associations identified as ‘Kiwi’ certainly exposes migrants to elements of Pakeha culture and allows migrants to meet members of the host society, such engagement may also reinforce – in the sense of confirming, as well as of buttressing – a migrant’s identity as an outsider. This was illustrated for me by James, whose family are nominal Buddhists, and whose mother insisted that his family should begin going to church. James’ lack of fluency with the language and culture was compounded in church-group settings, where an additional set of shared expectations and unfamiliar jargon became doubly alienating.

My mother used to force me to go to Bible reading clubs. I would spend two hours and they’re just discussing Bible, and each one would read a section, and there would be some big word there that I couldn’t pronounce, and I just tried to pronounce it and everyone laughed. (James)

At this point in the group interview, James began to detail one of the ways in which the social distance between himself and ‘Kiwis’ was maintained. To begin, he is ‘Asian’, a racialised Other; his mother has sent him to church, where at some point he made the discovery that the Jesus he heard about in a story when he was very young is the dominant figure in Christianity, in ‘Western’ religion; he was ‘forced’ into this setting in order to meet Pakeha New Zealanders and learn English. When he is ridiculed because he cannot pronounce a biblical term, these various elements combine to form the cornerstone, as it were, of an edifice between himself and ‘Kiwi’ society. In such an encounter with this boundary, the message he hears is, “You do not belong”.

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Maintaining Contact with Co-ethnics

A number of commentators have described strategies employed by new migrants to fit into established co-ethnic community relationships or develop new associations where none already exist (Owusu 2000). For some migrant groups – Koreans in particular – church is one site where these strategies are positively employed (Min 1992; Ko 2001:B1). Migrants may use co-ethnic churches not only – and sometimes not principally – for spiritual nurture, but also for the purposes of maintaining strong relationship ties with other co-ethnics, of fostering and reinforcing the use of the origin language amongst their children, and of maintaining cultural identity and practices. Min discusses the role played by ethnic Korean churches in the maintenance of ethnic identity for Korean immigrants in New York City (Min 1992). Min argues that the Korean churches fulfil a major function in providing social and cultural services to immigrants, highlighting the high levels of church participation among the Korean community, including 40% of those who described themselves as non-Christians when they lived in Korea (ibid: 1381). In addition to providing a site where friendships and networks for mutual support and cultural maintenance may be nurtured, Min suggests that church involvement also provides Korean migrants with critical opportunities for attaining social status, through providing titled roles and offices in the church. Such opportunities help to mitigate against ‘status inconsistency’ for those who have been unable to replicate the sort of economic or occupational success they enjoyed in Korea (ibid.:1391-2).

Church attendance featured prominently in interviews with students, including amongst those whose families had had no previous church affiliation, as well as those who did not personally attend church but knew of many others who did.

Personally, I'm not heavily involved in the Taiwanese Christian church but I know it's a really good place for socialising, especially seeing all the people who speak your own language so you feel like being at home, more closely.

(Shona)

When I asked interviewees about their co-ethnic ties, they tended to focus on informal activities with friends. They talked about friends from school, and the social activities they would do with these friends, such as attending parties or going into the city.
However, when I asked specifically about formal co-ethnic activities, groups or associations, the conversations tended to shift towards their parents’ involvement in such groups, rather than their own. This is despite the fact that more than a quarter of the survey participants took part in clubs or other activities in which their origin language was the predominant language used (Table 8.4). Interviewees were either not involved in specifically co-ethnic clubs or associations, or such involvement did not feature prominently enough to be mentioned by them. For instance, as illustrated in the previous section, when they talked about attending English-language churches, they were the actors; however, when referring to Chinese-language or Korean churches, they highlighted their parents’ involvement.

I mean I go to church. I go to a Taiwanese church, but the reason we go there is because Mom wants to know the religion, because she doesn’t know anything about Christianity before she comes here. But my auntie, my mom’s sister, is a Christian but she encourages her to take us to the church to know the religion, and she’s quite interested. And I think the reason she chooses the original language is because she can understand it more easily. Rather than go to the English church and you can’t understand what they were talking about and you would get bored. (Louise)

One Korean participant mentioned that her family, who were regular church-attendants in South Korea, maintained that regimen in New Zealand by joining a Korean church. Like the literature dealing with Korean Americans and the role that church plays in their communities, this church had become a site for the formation of an ethnic community, in which parents were able to develop and maintain friendships with other Korean migrants as well as take steps to ensure the reproduction and reinforcement of Korean culture for their children.

*AB:* So how do your families go about meeting other Koreans in the community? Where do they find them?

*Lara:* Church.

*AB:* Did your family go to church in Korea as well?
Lara: Yes. And since, you know how about five years ago people from Korea started moving in, people brought heaps of little kids, and they didn’t know Korean and stuff, so they made this little Korean school so they could go and learn subjects that they teach in Korea. So parents go there and meet other parents.

However, church was not the only setting for the establishment and maintenance of co-ethnic relationships. In fact, several of the interviewees had observed that parents’ networks, whose foundations were in the country of origin, were also producing ties in New Zealand. These activities tended to be gendered: the many times that golf was mentioned in the interviews, it was in the context of activities in which their fathers engaged. Their mothers, on the other hand, might form new acquaintances and friendships amongst co-ethnics through involvement in other associations, or via their husbands’ and children’s friends.

In Taiwan there’s only a few medical schools and in a big hospital, most doctors know each other. So when they move to New Zealand he goes, “Oh yeah, I knew you from the hospital, or when I was in year 2 or year 1”, or whatever. (James)

It’s like they can meet a lot of people when they play golf, because they have Taiwanese golf clubs. And they just go, “Oh, I know you, I know you.” (Monica)

There’s a Chinese Parents’ Association, and my mom is in that. It’s mostly women I think, oh, maybe not. Most parents in this area are in that I think. And they hold events like the Mint Blossom Festival and they get Chinese decorations and celebrate. My mom’s in that. (Vivienne)

My mother makes friends with my father’s friend’s wife, so that wife introduced my mother to the wife of one of my father’s other friends as well. (James)

And our friends’ parents as well. They might get together and talk about school and how we’re all doing. (Lara)
This is not to suggest that interviewees perceived their mothers as being isolated, or passive in their engagement with the community. In fact, I pointed out the scenario often mentioned in the literature, of migrant families where the children make friends and learn English at school, and the father makes friends and learns English through employment, while the mother may be left isolated at home, lacking opportunities to develop new friendships and unable to communicate easily in English. As the following transcript excerpt illustrates, interviewees rejected that depiction and stressed that their mothers had been actively engaged in learning the language and making new friends.

Monica: Mothers do go to lessons. They go and learn English.

Vivienne: Mine goes to learn English.

James: My mother goes to lessons as well, and she says this kind of situation is quite common.

Lara: My mother tried full-time and part-time, and she went to classes, and she tried private lessons, but she still can’t learn English.

AB: So what does she do with her time?

Lara: She doesn’t like socialising, so she just stays home. My auntie married a European, so she has lots of European friends, and they’re real into Asian other cultures and stuff. So they come around and my mother cooks dinner for them and we all sit around and talk and stuff. My mother likes that, but she doesn’t like meeting other Asians because if they say something — rumours go around so fast because there are so few of them, so she’s uncomfortable talking to them.

In this exchange, Lara introduced a dynamic which the other group participants did not particularly identify with, but which clearly was a concern her own mother had voiced; that the ethnic community with which she might otherwise identify was small and intense enough to be an effective grapevine — so much so that she had taken steps to disengage from that network. Instead, she chose to pursue friendships with her sister’s
Pakeha friends, with whom she could selectively share valued aspects of her culture. In fact, Lara’s mother actively employed her cultural capital as active currency in those friendships, by preparing meals to be enjoyed by Pakeha New Zealanders engaging in intercultural relationships and exchanges.

Another interviewee’s mother had established a different role for herself, but one which also extended beyond the boundaries of (in this case) the local Taiwanese community, by becoming an ESOL tutor at the local Polytechnic. In this way she was not only meeting other migrants, but was also involved in helping them achieve the goal of improving their English.

My mother made most of her friends at school, at Polytech. There’s an English class, but her English is too good to learn English. So the teacher told her she could learn to teach others how to learn English. So she just went and got a qualification so she can be an English tutor. (James)

As detailed above, these Asian migrant adolescents were motivated to take part in clubs and other activities in their communities because they had greater opportunities to do so than they had had in their origin countries. They also pursued involvement – or were persuaded to do so by their parents – in order to meet other New Zealanders and become more familiar with English and with Pakeha culture, as well as to retain important links with co-ethnics also living in New Zealand. In revealing their motivations for participation in extra-curricular activities, these migrant adolescents support the established literature on migrant acculturation patterns. However, participants in both the survey and the interviews problematised the assumption in the literature that involvement in the community – for migrant adolescents this means participation in clubs, lessons, team sports, student government and so forth – necessarily leads to social integration, or that integration necessarily influences settlement outcomes. Analysing the data to determine the effects of community involvement on participants’ settlement experiences and aspirations was the most difficult and intriguing problem I confronted in this research.
The Effects of Community Involvement

As illustrated above, in Table 8.4, thirteen percent of the survey sample took part only in extra-curricular activities in which their origin language was the predominant language, while a quarter of the sample participated only in activities in which English was the predominant language. An additional fourteen percent took part in both sorts of activities. It was important in the analysis to specify the predominant language used in the participants’ extra-curricular activities because doing so helped to clarify the segments of the local community with which the participants were actually engaging. This distinction in the data was made to further specify the relationships between extra-curricular participation and the range of key acculturation and aspiration variables described earlier in this chapter. I anticipated that students participating in extra-curricular activities in which English was the primary language also would have experienced a greater degree of social integration and acculturation, which would be demonstrated by patterns of responses across the other variables.

However, the data did not produce that result. Firstly, there was no noteworthy association between participants’ involvement in activities in which their origin language was the primary medium and any other variable. In other words, participation in such activities was not influenced by their gender, the school they attended or how long they had lived in New Zealand. Nor did such participation have any measurable effect on how they configured their cultural identity, the ethnic diversity of their friends, where they identified as ‘home’, or even whether they agreed to take part in the interview phase of the study. Patterns of association were apparent when the data were controlled for participation in English medium activities, however no variable demonstrated a strong association with such participation. Table 8.5 lists the correlation coefficients of thirteen variables which were correlated with the students’ participation in extra-curricular activities and controlled for the language predominantly used in such activities. The four variables indicating the strongest relationship to extra-curricular involvement were friends’ ethnicity, participants’ assessments of whether moving to New Zealand was a good idea, whether they had lost more than gained by migrating, and their assessment of their own English-speaking ability. These were all positively associated with involvement in English-medium activities, but the association was relatively weak.
Table 8.5
Association Between Assorted Variables and Participation in 
Extra-curricular Activities (Controlled for Predominant Language)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations: Participation in Extra-curricular Activities By...</th>
<th>English Language Activities</th>
<th>Origin Language Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlation Coefficient (Kendall's tau,)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Attended*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Self-description</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.10 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of New Zealand Residence</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.04 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing to Take Part in Interviews</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.03 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Hard to Adjust to Using New Language</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.03 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Respondent Identified “Home”</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.03 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent Living in 5 years</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.06 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Hard to Adjust to Making New Friends</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.05 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends’ Ethnicity</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.07 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to New Zealand Was a Good Idea</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.07 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Lost More than Gained</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.04 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Ability (Self-assessment)</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.07 119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The statistical tool used to compute the correlation for School Attended and Country of Origin was Cramer’s V.

Statistical Control

The absence of any patterns of association between the acculturation and aspiration variables and participation in extra-curricular activities motivated me to investigate other means of statistical control. After all, I reasoned, participants’ engagement with members of their local communities should have some effect: perhaps there were patterns hidden in the data that could be revealed by controlling for particular variables. The four independent variables described earlier (gender, country of origin, school attended and length of New Zealand residence) were used as control variables, in order to specify the relationship between participants’ involvement in extra-curricular activities and the other variables described above. Strong patterns did not emerge from the data as a result of this strategy, a near-constant feature of this dataset. However, three of the control variables did produce noteworthy results: these were gender, school
attended and length of New Zealand residence. Given the discussion in the previous chapter regarding gender, and the findings in other research (e.g. Wolf 1997) indicating the gendered nature of migrant adjustment, it is notable that participants’ gender did specify the relationship between their extra-curricular involvement and a number of the other variables to a greater extent than any of the other control variables. This discussion of statistical control is organised around each of the three control variables: participants’ gender, the school they attended, and their length of residence in New Zealand.

Gender
The use of gender as a control variable in crosstabulating the respondents’ participation in extra-curricular activities with the acculturation variables – that is, examining males’ and females’ responses separately in order to gauge the extent to which the association between those variables is mediated by gender – did produce something of a pattern, albeit one which did not apply consistently across all the acculturation variables. Despite similar proportions of males and females participating in extra-curricular activities (57% of females, 54% of males, with three-quarters of both groups participating in English-medium activities), the relationships between virtually all the ‘acculturation’ variables and participants’ extra-curricular involvement was notably stronger amongst the females in the sample. However, these second-order relationships were shown to be even moderately strong in only a few instances. Weak-to-moderate associations were calculated for the female respondents in four variables, as illustrated in Table 8.6. This suggests that girls in the sample who took part in extra-curricular activities were slightly more likely than the other girls to: take a positive view of the decision to migrate to New Zealand; positively assess their ability to speak English; have found it easier to adjust to making new friends; and have more friends who were ethnically different from themselves.

The notable feature of these relationships is not that they are strong – they are not – but rather that the patterns amongst the boys’ responses are so much weaker. While one might argue that extra-curricular involvement has had only a minor effect on the females in the sample, it is clear that it had no discernable effect on the males. One explanation for this might be that, for the females in this sample of Asian migrant
adolescents, participation in clubs or other extra-curricular activities, such as sport teams, music lessons or church involvement, allows them to experience greater freedom than they might otherwise be allowed. In the previous chapter I discussed the fact that several of the interviewees noted that their parents were more strict with girls than with boys, especially in terms of curfews and other aspects of their social lives. It is possible, though not fully explored in this research, that the young women in the sample who were involved in activities in the community had found avenues towards greater social involvement that would gain their parents’ approval and support. Instead of going to parties, or into the city with friends, activities their parents were more likely to restrict, they could go to sport practice, or rehearsals, or meetings of the Amnesty International club or the Youth Enterprise Scheme. In doing so, they would not only comply with their parents’ stricter controls, but they would also engage with a wider section of the host society, make a more diverse group of friends, improve their English skills and come to the conclusion that moving to New Zealand was a good idea after all.

However, similar associations cannot be established for other acculturation variables, such as where they think of as ‘home’, where they would like to live in the future or indeed how they describe their own ethnic or cultural identity. As a result, conclusions cannot be drawn from the data about whether either the girls’ or boys’ participation in extra-curricular activities in the community – and therefore increased formal and informal contact with ‘Kiwis’ – results in the perception of these 1.5 generation Asian adolescents that they have become socially integrated, or that they belong here. Future research may fruitfully explore the suggestion that female 1.5 generation migrants find a degree of freedom in club involvement due to a situational relaxation of their parents’ stricter controls on their social lives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Coefficient (Kendall’s tau,)</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moving to New Zealand a Good Idea</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Well Respondent Speaks English</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease at Making New Friends</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends’ Ethnic Diversity</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
School Attended

As explained in Chapter Four, the survey sample comprised students from eight Auckland area schools: three were public co-educational schools; two were public single-sex schools (one boys', one girls'); two were private single-sex schools (again, one boys', one girls'); and the eighth was a private co-ed school. Because the eight schools are located in different parts of Auckland, with differences in terms of the historical presence or concentration of migrants, as well as variation in the manner in which the schools dealt with the presence of migrant students and an increasingly heterogeneous student population, it is reasonable to expect some differentiation in the experiences and perceptions of 1.5 generation Asian adolescents across the schools. However, while school attendance as a control variable is noteworthy because of the differences specified in the first-order relationships between participation in extra-curricular activities and the range of acculturation variables, such differences are not consistently specified across those variables in a way that allows conclusions to be drawn.

In fact, the introduction of school attendance as a control variable produced such divergent correlation coefficients within each of the first-order relationships that it is difficult to grasp any meaningful pattern at all. In part, this may be due to the sample size: given that the 121 students who participated in the survey were distributed across the eight schools, the elaborated tables contained between two and forty-six cases. In most of the elaboration tables, school attendance would specify the relationship between community involvement and the particular acculturation variable, indicating a weak-to-moderate positive association amongst the students of one school and an equivalent negative association amongst those of another. That elaboration table would be followed by another which would demonstrate a completely contrary result, and so on. Table 8.7 illustrates this dynamic with the ethnic diversity of survey participants' friends. Responses from School D (a public co-ed school) indicate a moderate positive association ($r=0.49$) between the ethnicity of most of their friends and their involvement in extra-curricular activities. That is, amongst the student at School D, there is a tendency for the participants who engage in extra-curricular activities to have a larger proportion of friends whose ethnicity is different from their own. Respondents from
School F, on the other hand (also a public co-ed school, relatively near to school D), indicate a slightly weaker negative association \((r = -0.41)\), suggesting the tendency for participants at that school who engage in extra-curricular activities to have a more homogeneous group of friends than their peers who do not participate. The other schools demonstrate weak association – both positive and negative – between involvement in extra-curricular activities and friends’ ethnicity.

Other variables are equally inconsistent. In fact, the strongest correlation produced amongst the variables when controlled for school attendance was actually reasonably strong: participants from School B (a private, single-sex school) indicated a strong association \((r = 0.79)\) between extra-curricular involvement and the ease or difficulty with which they made new friends. That is, those students from School B who participated in clubs or out-of-school activities were more likely to indicate ease in making new friends than those who had no such community involvement. However, no other school produced a meaningful association between these two variables. These inconsistencies are compounded in that no school produced a coherent set of results across the acculturation variables. School B, which demonstrated such a strong association in the variable just mentioned, otherwise showed no meaningful association with any other variable. The results of the data – surprising to me, given my expectations – suggest that the school attended by survey participants did not meaningfully impact on the first-order relationships between community involvement and the acculturation variables. In other words, knowing the school that survey participants attended, and therefore the local communities with which they were likely to be engaged, was not useful in predicting their levels of social integration, their acculturation, their sense of their own ethnic identity, their belongingness, or their aspirations to remain in New Zealand or move elsewhere.
Table 8.7
Correlation of “Friends’ Ethnicity” Variable with Participants’ Involvement in Extra-Curricular Activities (Controlled by School Attended)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Attended</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient (Kendall’s tau_c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (N=11)</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (N=18)</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (N=43)</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (N=7)</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School E (N=10)</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School F (N=14)</td>
<td>-.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School G (N=7)</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School H (N=2)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Computation rejected because variables are constant

Length of New Zealand Residence

The use of the ‘length-of-residence’ variable to specify the relationship between participants’ extra-curricular activities and the other acculturation variables produced a strong result for only one other variable: how well they speak English. Unsurprisingly, those respondents who have lived in New Zealand the longest, and who participated in extra-curricular activities, were far more likely than all other respondents to positively assess their own ability to speak English (Table 8.8). The data indicate that those respondents who had lived in New Zealand for between three and eight years, on the other hand, were only somewhat more likely than their peers to positively assess their ability to speak English. However, the fact that the length-of-residence variable demonstrated only a weak positive association with participants’ English-language self-assessment ($r=21$ – Table 8.9) indicates that, at least for those resident for longer than two years, participation in extra-curricular activities made them somewhat more positive about their ability to speak English. The most newly-arrived migrants, those resident in New Zealand less than two years, who were also involved in extra-curricular activities, actually were somewhat less likely to indicate confidence about their ability to speak English than those who were not involved in such activities. This apparently incongruous result would seem to reflect a dynamic highlighted in Chapter Six, where heightened contact with fluent speakers had the effect of making interview participants...
more self-conscious about their limited English language skills, and more reticent for fear of committing embarrassing linguistic errors. This was most compellingly explained by Louise when she described that, in the student representative meetings, the Asian student reps would tend to agree with every idea put forward, rather than contributing and advocating for their own ideas. At first, Louise had attributed this to a “natural” or cultural difference in self-confidence between Asian and Pakeha young people. She then qualified that answer by suggesting that self-consciousness about their English language skills caused many Asian young people to hold themselves back from full participation with native English speakers, at least until they had lived in New Zealand for a number of years, and had become far more confident with speaking English.

Table 8.8
Correlation Coefficients: How Well Respondent Speaks English, By Participation in Extra-curricular Activities (Controlled for Length of New Zealand Residence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Length of Residence</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient (Kendall’s tau)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2 Years</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Years</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 Years</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The use of participants’ length of time in New Zealand as a control variable also produced inconsistencies which were difficult to explain. For example, as shown in Table 8.10, the two strongest correlations between respondents’ identification to ‘home’ and community involvement, as specified by length of residence, are counter-intuitive.

Those participants who had been in New Zealand for up to two years demonstrated a moderately negative association ($r = -.48$) between their involvement in extra-curricular activities and where they identified as ‘Home’. This result was similar to that produced by those who had been in New Zealand between nine and eleven years ($r = -.44$). In other words, not only were the participants in both cohorts, who were involved in clubs or other out-of-school activities, less likely than others to identify New Zealand as ‘home’ (or to be even more contingent in their sense of ‘home’ by suggesting that ‘home’ was wherever they happened to be living), but in fact they were somewhat more likely to identify their country of origin as ‘home’ than those whose residence in New Zealand was more extended.
Zealand was of a similar length but who had no community involvement. A similarly counter-intuitive result arose when length of residence in New Zealand was used to specify the relationship between participants’ extra-curricular involvement and the ethnicity of most of their friends (Table 8.11). While the nine-to-eleven year cohort specified a very weak association, and both the three-to-five year and six-to-eight year cohorts specified weak-to-moderate associations, the zero-to-two year cohort specified a moderate negative association – suggesting that respondents in that cohort who were involved in clubs or other out-of-school activities were somewhat more likely to have more friends of the same ethnicity as themselves than were those with no involvement in extra-curricular activities. However, these results are not consistent across all the acculturation variables when controlled for length of New Zealand residence. In fact, the two variables cited are the only ones in which the suggestion of a pattern emerges at all.

The fact that length of residence in New Zealand was not an effective control variable for the other acculturation variables suggests that, while a strong factor for helping boost confidence in their language abilities – especially provided they also took part in English-language clubs or other activities – the amount of time migrant adolescents in this sample had lived in New Zealand was not a strong predictor of their acculturation, nor of their attachment to New Zealand.
### Table 8.10
Elaborated Table - Where Respondent Thinks of as 'Home', by Involvement in Clubs or Out-of-school Activities (Controlled by Length of NZ Residence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Length of NZ Residence</th>
<th>Involved in clubs or out-of-school activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0-2 Years</strong> ((r = .48))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent thinks of as 'Home'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Wherever living&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3-5 Years</strong> ((r = -.33))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent thinks of as 'Home'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly NZ, but partly Origin Country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Wherever living&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6-8 Years</strong> ((r = .07))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent thinks of as 'Home'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly NZ, but partly Origin Country</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9-11 Years</strong> ((r = -.44))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Respondent thinks of as 'Home'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin City/Country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland/NZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>
Table 8.11
Correlation of “Friends’ Ethnicity” Variable with Participants’ Involvement in Extra-Curricular Activities (Controlled by Length of NZ Residence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Length of Residence</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Correlation Co-efficient (Kendall's tau_b)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2 Years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 Years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Transnational Explanation

After strenuously manipulating the data, the worrisome question remained: why did these data yield no strong or significant patterns? Just over half the survey sample participated in clubs or other activities, and most who did so were involved in at least several different sorts of activities. These are markers of social integration; so why did their involvement in these activities, and their subsequent engagement with at least some segments of the host society in their local communities, not significantly influence their sense of identity as New Zealanders, or their belonging, or the ethnic diversity of their friends, or their geographic aspirations and identification with place? How was I to explain such anomalous data?

It was at that point in the data analysis phase that Kyle’s solo interview took place, and – as also described in the previous chapter – the insights he offered provided the elusive explanation that was not apparent in the survey data. Perhaps the relationship between these migrant adolescents’ community engagement and patterns suggestive of assimilation were elusive because there actually were no patterns to be found. I examined Kyle and his responses more closely. He was heavily involved in a number of clubs and activities: he was a student representative, he took part in the school’s inter-cultural club46 and he held a part-time job in a retail outlet. At first glance, he would appear to be an Asian migrant adolescent who is well-integrated into his local

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46 Organised by a school counsellor, this club provides structured opportunities for students from different cultural groups to meet, socialise and develop positive inter-cultural friendships. It also provides a forum in which to discuss and work through issues of misunderstandings, conflict, discrimination and racism.
community. However, as the previous chapter made clear, such integration did not affect Kyle’s foundational assertion of his identity, his belonging, or his intentions: he is Taiwanese, he belongs to Taiwan, and he is returning there when he has completed his university education. His confidence in his Otherness – his insistence on it, in fact – had not prevented him from taking advantage of the many opportunities available to young people living in New Zealand, especially to those attending a well-resourced school in an affluent Auckland suburb. Originally I had conceptualised Kyle as an exception, an outlier from the typical survey cases. The persistently problematic nature of the quantitative data made me less certain of Kyle’s singularity. The possibility that other participants, in addition to Kyle, may be characterised as transnational migrants opens the possibility of reconciling the apparently contradictory data presented in this chapter. Transnational migrant adolescents can participate meaningfully in the community, and in that sense be socially integrated, while at the same time they can continue to perceive themselves to be outsiders, whose ‘home’ is elsewhere, whose circle of friends may be mostly of the same ethnicity as themselves, and who aspire to leave New Zealand for other destinations.

Such a transnational stance, held by any number of participants, would produce contradictory data across the survey variables, when the responses were analysed from within the assimilation paradigm. Researchers would be confounded were they to search these data for evidence to support the thesis that individuals’ social integration – which for these migrants was indicated by participation in extra-curricular activities – necessarily leads towards assimilative outcomes, in terms of individuals’ identity, attachment to place, inter-cultural friendships or intention to settle permanently. On the other hand, consideration of a transnational – or transmigrant – explanation presents the opportunity more adequately to address these apparent contradictions. The data required to produce such explanations lay in the interplay of motives and aspirations in migrant youths’ habitats of meaning.

Conclusion

The data analysed in this chapter suggest that the boundaries – structures of social distance – between this group of Asian migrant adolescents and the host society are more durable and more elastic than conventional assimilation theories posit. The social
distance may persist even as 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents reach across it to engage with the wider community. Their interaction with Pakeha New Zealanders, and with institutions that reflect New Zealand’s dominant culture, such as education – which in their habitats of meaning are part of ‘Kiwi society’ – does not cause a necessarily progressive lowering or dismantling of the boundaries between themselves and the host society. Instead, the 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in this sample located themselves in disparate positions regarding a number of variables typically related to acculturation (including ethnic identity, location of ‘home’, language acquisition, geographic aspirations, etc.), little affected by their participation in extracurricular activities or their length of residence in their country of migration.

Such results undercut the assumption of settlement which is so often made in regard to migration, and which traditionally has characterised successive waves of immigration. They also present a potentially subversive alternative to the normative migration/settlement discourses. Many of these young people whose families have migrated to New Zealand have managed to build a degree of social and cultural capital by taking advantage of the experiences and opportunities presented to them by the education system and the local communities into which they have integrated (to a greater or lesser extent). Yet they may choose to mobilise those newly-acquired forms of capital in other parts of the world, either back in their countries of origin – where they may hope to re-capitalise some of the social and cultural capital lost by their families due to the ‘exchange rate’ in New Zealand – or in the same destinations their New Zealand-born peers aspire to, namely Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Such transnational possibilities seriously challenge the normative assumptions of migrant settlement and ‘loyalty’. The link between some participants’ ambivalent sense of belonging and their perception of not being allowed completely to belong, suggests that these transnational possibilities should also challenge the ambivalent reception offered to migrants by the host communities in which they live. The evidence in the literature, supported by the interview data in the research detailed in this thesis, is that the host society’s reception of migrants influences their sense of belonging. This applies not simply to migrant adolescents, but also to their parents, many of whom have been unable to gain employment in New Zealand that is commensurate with their qualifications, skills and experience. This fact motivated the fathers of most of the interviewees to engage the ‘astronaut’ strategy, thus modelling
transnational migration for their children. These young people are unlikely to encounter the difficulties their parents have, in terms of English language skills or the uncertain commensurability of overseas qualifications, given their hard work and determination to gain university qualifications in New Zealand or Australia. Any future decisions they might make to deploy their own transmigration strategies may, at least in part, be a reflection of an ambivalent sense of belonging on the part of the 1.5 generation.
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the perceptions and experiences of 1.5 generation Asian migrant adolescents in Auckland. Focusing on their sense of identity, their experiences of cultural adjustment and engagement with the local community, and their family relationships, I sought to develop a critical explanation of the interplay of these factors in shaping their settlement outcomes. My intention in this concluding chapter is to tie together the key elements that have been developed throughout the thesis into a brief concluding statement that reaffirms two contentions. My primary contention is that many 1.5 generation Asian migrants in New Zealand, and their families, are able to be theorised as transnational migrants. Transmigration, as initially developed by Glick Schiller et al. (1992a; 1992b; 1995), Portes et al. (1997a; 1997b; 1999; 2001), and Faist (1999), and subsequently extended by others, challenges conventional notions of migrant settlement, migrant identities and the process of assimilation as the presumed outcome of their incorporation into receiving societies. The other contention – addressed first, both in the body of the thesis, and in this conclusion – is that New Zealand is uniquely positioned as a site for exploring the transmigrant phenomenon amongst 1.5 generation Asian migrants. In addition to those conclusions, I point towards several possibilities and opportunities raised in the study, both for the development of social policy in New Zealand, and for ‘doing sociology’.
Cultural Diversity in New Zealand

New Zealand is uniquely placed as a site in which to explore the possibilities of the generational transmission of transnational migration strategy. As discussed in Chapter Two, this stems from New Zealand’s immigration policy framework, which was historically oriented towards a ‘whiter than white’ preference for British migrants, and a particularly aggressive and enduring resistance to Asian migrants. The institutionalised practice of these two imperatives created a structure of immigration in New Zealand which was remarkably homogeneous for over a hundred years. While somewhat weakened in the 1960s, with labour migration from Pacific Island nations, that immigration structure was dramatically dismantled in 1987. At that time, immigration policy was reoriented around the principle of non-discrimination and a desire to build New Zealand’s “multicultural social fabric” (Burke 1996:10). This was done in an effort to draw migrants with high levels of human capital – in the form of educational qualifications, high-level skills and valuable work experience – and migrant entrepreneurs, whose investment capital might stimulate New Zealand’s economy. As a result of the radical changes in the immigration policy framework, the ethnic composition of New Zealand’s resident population has undergone a very significant shift since 1987. In the 2001 Census, those who were categorised as Asian numbered nearly 240,000 – almost seven percent of the total population, for the first time slightly outnumbering Pacific peoples (Statistics New Zealand 2001).

The other factor that makes New Zealand an especially noteworthy site for exploring the incorporation of culturally diverse migrants is its contemporary social policy framework, which presents both unique tensions and unique opportunities for migrants. In part, this is characterised by New Zealand’s institutional commitment to biculturalism over multiculturalism. The bicultural partnership between Māori and the Crown in New Zealand, based on the Treaty of Waitangi, is a foundational component of the social policy framework. The manifestations of this bicultural stance result in Māori having a relationship with the state that is fundamentally different from those of other ethnic minorities. The state’s relationship with Māori is characterised, in Soysal’s ‘regimes of incorporation’ typology, by corporatism: there are considerable institutional relationships between various state agencies and Māori corporate entities. These involve iwi and pan-iwi bodies, such as the New Zealand Māori Congress, as
well as large organisations claiming to represent the interests of the many urban Māori who are unaffiliated with any iwi. In contrast, the state’s role vis-à-vis immigrant minorities takes on a liberal manifestation, bearing little resemblance to the highly-institutionalised, collective engagement with Māori. Immigrant minorities in this increasingly multicultural society have generally perceived themselves to be outside the bicultural relationship, viewing biculturalism as an arrangement between Māori and Pākehā which excludes them. The New Zealand state has demonstrated an apparent reluctance to engage with this tension between its bicultural policy framework and an increasingly multicultural population. Such a reluctance may stem from an assumption that biculturalism and multiculturalism are binary opposites, and mutually exclusive. This tension will continue to present a hurdle to the incorporation of ethnic minority migrants until alternatives can be developed that are unique to Aotearoa New Zealand, which posit a model of multiculturalism that is also biculturally just.

Despite that limitation, New Zealand’s policy framework also contains elements that provide unique opportunities for the incorporation of migrants. Amongst these is a near-equivalence in the rights of New Zealand citizens and non-citizen residents. This means that there are no official barriers to the social, civic, economic or political integration of migrants, other than residency criteria for certain social welfare benefits. In addition, New Zealand’s provision for holding dual and multiple citizenships is amenable to transnational strategies, as naturalised New Zealanders are not required to relinquish prior citizenships, nor are citizens discouraged from gaining additional citizenships. This is useful for migrants as a strategy to disarm nativist discourses about preserving “New Zealand for New Zealanders”. Also, given trans-Tasman political and economic arrangements, a New Zealand passport is useful for transnational migrants desiring to position themselves for educational or career opportunities in Australia.

‘Doing’ Sociology

The research presented in this thesis has not simply offered insights into future directions for social policy in New Zealand, or into the lives of the young people who participated, though this is its major focus. In addition, the thesis has given me the opportunity to reflect upon the practice of ‘doing’ sociology. Though of course the precise research methods employed for any given project must inevitably be
circumscribed by the particular set of questions and circumstances involved, the work of this thesis has helped to establish my preferred stance as an empirical sociologist. As I described in Chapter Three, the decision to utilise mixed methods was not merely a pragmatic course. Instead, a dialectical approach to developing, producing and interpreting both quantitative and qualitative data offers possibilities to establish links between the macro and the micro, between history and biography.

The research that informs this thesis was designed around both quantitative and qualitative approaches, comprising a survey of 121 secondary school students from eight schools. The survey was followed by semi-structured group interviews of self-selecting participants, and a further round of in-depth, one-on-one interviews. A dialectical approach, of which the current study is one example, offers the greatest possibilities for making the connections between global historical processes, social institutions and structures, and the habitats of meaning maintained in the lives of individuals, families and communities.

**Research Findings**

The study that informs this thesis relied on a mixed-method approach, making use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative research took the form of a survey of 121 secondary school students from eight schools around Auckland, and utilised a self-administered questionnaire as the survey instrument. Accessing the participants was through a process referred to in Chapter Four as “multi-stage availability sampling”. The survey was designed to be exploratory, and the sampling method reflects this. It was not based on random sampling techniques, and the survey sample has not been taken to be representative of the population of all migrant adolescents from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea living in Auckland.

The qualitative process of data collection, which came into play after the survey had been administered, comprised two stages. The first was a pair of group interviews with students from two schools who had participated in the survey and had indicated a willingness for further involvement in the study. The second phase of the qualitative data collection process was a single solo interview with each of four group interview participants.
During much of the process of data analysis, the quantitative data seemed to present a puzzle of contradictory results that resisted efforts to read in them patterns of associations from which to derive meaningful explanations. Particular aspects of the survey responses were consistent with explanations derived from the literature – such as manifestations of a ‘reactive ethnicity’ in the face of perceived barriers to incorporation, as described in Chapter Five. However, these discrete elements of the data appeared to contradict other findings, such as the high levels of community involvement by those same individuals maintaining what could be identified as a reactive ethnicity, as detailed in the discussion of the Community Engagement Indicator data. The data were full of such contradictions. The initial findings from the survey were used to form the basis of a semi-structured interview format for both the group and individual interviews. It was during these interviews that insights began to develop which could offer explanations that account for these contradictions. In one interview in particular – in fact, after the formal interview had ended, as described in Chapter Seven – the participant explained his circumstances in a way that seemed to unlock many of the apparent contradictions thrown up in the data. Complexities and contradictions had emerged in relation to three general themes: participants’ understanding of their own cultural identity; their experiences of acculturation; and evidence of their sense of belonging and attachment to place, or ‘home’. The integrated analysis of the multiple modes of data, described in Chapter Four as ‘dialectical analysis’, led me to draw the conclusions grouped around these three themes.

**Identity**

As presented in Chapter Five, the identity of nearly all the participants in the research was characterised primarily by Asianness. The social distance that all the interview participants identified between themselves and the host society was structured by racialised difference. This had to do not just with the fact of their Asianness, but also the closely-related identification of Pakeha New Zealanders as “Kiwis”. Participants’ perceptions of the manner in which Pakeha culture dominates their understanding of the host society, as manifested in their habitats of meaning, is apparent by the fact that when participants talked about New Zealand society, or New Zealand culture, they referred exclusively to “Kiwi” culture. Māori occasionally were mentioned, but always
as a separate category. New Zealand culture was “Kiwi” culture and, as Asians, they were not, nor unlikely ever to be, accepted as “Kiwis”.

However, this identity as a racialised Other did not stop them from participating in the local community. Nearly all participants acknowledged that they had at least some friends who were culturally different from themselves. However, even those who had an ethnically-diverse group of friends identified a structure of social distance between themselves and “Kiwis”. As detailed in Chapter Five, several of the interviewees were able to identify clear delineations between the types of activities in which they engaged with groups of Asian friends, and those in which they engaged with groups of Kiwi friends. When comparing the two, they described the latter group as invariably more enthusiastic, more active and ‘sporty’, and significantly less focused on school work.

*Acculturation*

Individual acculturation to New Zealand society is shaped by the dynamic interplay of factors that must be continuously rearranged within individuals’ habitats of meaning. Their migration circumstances and histories; their family relationships; institutional structures, and social arrangements that determine their opportunities for engagement with members of the host society; relations with their peers, friends, teachers and other members of the wider community; co-ethnic community relations; all these interactions – and others – filter across individuals’ own aspirations, abilities, dispositions and motives, to shape the meanings that migrant adolescents ascribe to their experiences. These determine the stance they take, and the strategies they employ, with regard to their adjustment to their new cultural environment. More than half the sample were actively involved in clubs or other extra-curricular activities, and most of these participants maintained involvement in several types of activities, such as sports teams, music lessons, church and cultural groups, social clubs like Amnesty International, or part-time employment. Participants acknowledged that the variety and availability of such opportunities for involvement were far greater in New Zealand than they would have encountered had they remained in their origin countries. In another departure from the familiar patterns in their origin societies, participants found that their parents encouraged them to pursue a broad range of social activities beyond the realm of academic study.
Patterns in the data indicated that many participants actively and selectively pursued acculturation strategies, including the opportunities for social integration described above, while also maintaining an orientation towards their origin ethnic identity. While building their social and cultural capital, acquiring language and cultural skills, making friends, and working hard at school, most of these migrant adolescents did not consider that they were ‘becoming New Zealanders’. Not that such a process necessarily occurs in a straight line: as described in Chapter Six, Sharon was one participant who had originally pursued assimilation, wishing to ‘lose’ her culture to become a ‘true New Zealander’. However, she later re-evaluated that stance, and determined to retain what she considered vital elements of her origin culture. Despite recognising considerable changes in her own cultural identity, she continued to consider herself Taiwanese. Two reasons for this apparent contradiction between participating and becoming – consistently reiterated in the qualitative data – are the contingency with which participants viewed the future, and the perceived boundaries between these migrants and “Kiwi” society. Together, these two considerations shaped their sense of belonging in New Zealand and their identification of New Zealand as ‘home’.

**Belongingness and Attachment to Place**

The contingency that characterises the stance held by many of the migrant adolescents in the study is summed up in this series of statements, versions of which were articulated in most of the interviews:

- I sort of belong.
- I belong for now.
- This is home for now.
- I don’t need to feel like I belong, because I probably will not stay in New Zealand.

Participants’ sense of belonging, and their identification with a particular place as ‘home’, was ambivalent and contingent. After having invested time and effort to adjust to life in New Zealand, participants did identify a sense of belonging, however. The data presented in Chapter Six indicate that they were generally positive about the
decision to move to New Zealand. Their ambivalence was demonstrated in the quantitative data, for example, in the fact that a majority of the sample identified New Zealand as ‘home’, while also identifying other destinations as where they would prefer to be in the future. The qualitative data supported and illustrated this ambivalence. In a reiteration of the structured social distance they perceived between themselves and “Kiwi” society, all the interviewees suggested that a necessary element in gaining a sense of belonging was being made to feel as though they belonged, or could belong. It is particularly telling, therefore, that all of the interviewees were actively engaged in community activities and organisations, while simultaneously planning to pursue transnational strategies abroad.

The data suggest other reasons, in addition to those already mentioned, for why many of these Asian migrant adolescents might be inclined to leave New Zealand in favour of transnational opportunities. These are two do with their family dynamics. All of the participants would have known families in which the main breadwinner was unable to gain employment in New Zealand that was commensurate with their education and skills. The parents of all but one of the interviewees were either underemployed (e.g. the international architect working as a factory labourer) or had withdrawn from the labour market in New Zealand, or else one parent was engaged in the ‘astronaut’ strategy. That is, the parent (in all cases it was the father) continued his career in the country of origin, maintained the family home there, and commuted to New Zealand for holidays with his family. This common situation reinforced to many participants not only that such a strategy was possible, but also that career opportunities in New Zealand were not as great as they might be elsewhere. As several interviewees suggested, New Zealand would be a great place for retirement.

The transnational family strategy – or, as Ho (2002) terms it, the multi-local residence strategy – also contributes to migrant adolescents’ sense of contingency about ‘home’, because the settlement outcomes for those engaged in such a strategy are uncertain. In other words, those children do not currently know where their parents will be living when they complete their education. It may be that the parents do not know themselves whether their long-term outcomes will entail return migration, settlement in New Zealand, or the maintenance of a multi-local lifestyle. Under these conditions, many members of the 1.5 generation, at least for the near future, must reconcile themselves to
a notion of ‘home’ which problematises conventional images of a single location, characterised by stability and settlement.

Finally, as suggested in Chapter Three, many of these migrant youths may be drawn to participate in the time-honoured New Zealand tradition of the OE – the “Overseas Experience” to which many middle-class, well-educated New Zealanders with ambitious goals aspire. There is a certain appeal for such young people to pursue postgraduate study, or embark on ambitious career paths, in overseas destinations. The levels of human, social and cultural capital most have developed during their years in New Zealand make them at least as competitive as other New Zealanders; most could also expect generous economic support from their families for such ventures. Of course, even in this scenario certain questions remain about the future of the 1.5 generation. Having experienced their OE, many of the New Zealand-born return to New Zealand. Will members of the 1.5 generation do the same? There are certainly strong pull factors for them to do so: the “clean, green” experience in New Zealand contrasts with the crowded and polluted conditions that helped to motivate their parents to decide to migrate to New Zealand in the first place; the education system in New Zealand is familiar to them, which may become a consideration if they have children; and New Zealand is considered to be reasonably safe. Their current view of New Zealand as “quiet and boring” might later be transformed into a nostalgic virtue, given current concerns about the operation of global terror networks, and the war rhetoric of global counter-terror strategies.

Ultimately, the acculturation difficulties and the persistent structures of social distance encountered by the participants in this study may be transitory, and may simply reflect the struggles of the 1.5 generation, caught between societies. Significant numbers of the 1.5 generation of post-1987 migrants have yet to complete their New Zealand education. If they stay in New Zealand, and choose to raise families here – and a certain number of them may do so – their children may proceed along the path towards assimilation, as previous generations of migrants have done. However, given the special characteristics of this group of migrants – and the intersection of histories, biographies and transnational opportunities – it is more likely that at least some of them embody a new mode of migration. I believe that these 1.5 generation Asian migrants are, indeed, harbingers of transmigration.
The Future of the 1.5 Generation

One attempt to research a given social phenomenon can never be sufficient to ‘explain’ it. Further research, involving a far larger sample, is needed to explore in greater depth the issues canvassed in this thesis. Future research into 1.5 generation migrants must fully explore the question of transmigration; it also should be longitudinal, in order to account for their future trajectories, about which we can only now speculate. As this cohort of migrant adolescents completes the transition to adulthood, how different will their sense of identity be from the point in 1999 when they completed my survey? In what ways will other New Zealanders have adjusted to a much more culturally diverse population, and have taken strides towards minimising the social distance between themselves and these ‘new’ migrants? How will those who attempt further transmigration – either to return, or to on-migrate – find the experience? Will they return to the great urban centres of Taipei, Hong Kong or Seoul, only to discover that they no longer really belong there? Or will they find the barriers to belonging even greater in destinations like Australia, or the United States? These are not merely intriguing questions; rather, they have implications for the development of theories about the ‘new’ migration, and for the sustainability of transmigration as a new set of practices that bring potentially vast networks of people, ideas, and forms of capital, into a single social field.
During the 2002 election campaign, it was widely reported in the New Zealand media that Winston Peters and the New Zealand First Party were fighting for their political survival. The party’s tumultuous tenure in the 1996 coalition government with National ended when the coalition dissolved in 1998. New Zealand First splintered, and nearly a third of the party’s MPs left the party to support the National minority government as independents. New Zealand First was punished in the 1999 election, gaining only four percent of the party list vote — below the crucial five percent threshold required for parties to gain representation in Parliament. However, Winston Peters won his electoral seat by 63 votes. By virtue of winning an electorate seat, under the rules of MMP, New Zealand first was awarded five seats, commensurate with its proportion of the list votes.

Determined to gain a greater proportion of the list vote in 2002, the New Zealand First campaign focused on only three issues: law and order; an end to the “Treaty grievance industry”; and the restriction of immigration. Revisiting the ‘threat’ discourse that New Zealand First had exploited so successfully in the earlier 1990s campaigns, Winston Peters once more declared that immigrants threatened New Zealanders’ safety, security, way of life and — in a new twist to the discourse — New Zealanders’ health, by the introduction and spread of ‘Third World diseases’. As Mr Peters expressed the threat:

New Zealand First sees these basic rights as threatened, and make no mistake, the New Zealand we value is under threat from:
- rampant lawlessness;
- a Treaty industry that foments racial division and discord;
- a flood of immigrants totally without parallel in any first world country (Peters 2002a).

While again specifically targeting Asians, Mr Peters expanded the threat to include other, unidentified but nonetheless clearly racialised groups.

In many parts of the world, there is an explosive ethnic mix of religions, customs and cultures. We are bringing in people from these societies, yet I am sure no one gives any more than a passing thought about what happens when they get here. And what will happen in future decades.

Under this government the floodgates have opened. The number of people approved for residence over the past three years is:
- 1999/00: 35,000;
- 2000/01: 44,000, rising to over 53,000.

The number is increasing every month. There are just over 54 thousand births in New Zealand each year, so for every New Zealander born we are bringing in an immigrant. What a birthright! Each new child has to compete against the economic and social demands of an individual from an alien culture.

And what did the last census reveal? That almost 1 in 5 New Zealand residents were born overseas compared with only 1 in 6 a decade earlier. That in the Auckland region 1 in 3 people were born overseas. That there are now more people of Asian ethnicity in Auckland than Pacific Island peoples.

People of Asian ethnicity have more than doubled in a decade. Two thirds of people of Asian ethnicity live in Auckland. The only time over the past decade that the flow of immigrants has been checked was when New Zealand First reduced it to a trickle after the 1996 election.

The trickle is again a torrent (Peters 2002b).

It would be simplistic to argue that the election result was due solely to New Zealand First’s campaign strategy, as many other factors contributed, including the general disarray of the National Party, one of the two traditional major parties in New Zealand
politics. However, New Zealand First gained ten percent of the total vote, and returned thirteen Members to Parliament.

They are the second largest party in Opposition.
Appendix A

A LITERAL TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH, MADE IN NEW ZEALAND, OF THE MAORI VERSION OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Victoria, the Queen of England, in her gracious remembrance of the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand, and through her desire to preserve to them their chieftainship and their land, and to preserve peace and quietness to them, has thought it right to send them a gentleman to be her representative to the natives of New Zealand. Let the native Chiefs in all parts of the land and in the islands consent to the Queen’s Government. Now, because there are numbers of the people living in this land, and more will be coming, the Queen wishes to appoint a Government, that there may be no cause for strife between the Natives and the Pakeha, who are now without law: It has therefore pleased the Queen to appoint me, WILLIAM HOBSON, a Captain in the Royal Navy, Governor of all parts of New Zealand which shall be ceded now and at a future period to the Queen. She offers to the Chiefs of the Assembly of the Tribes of New Zealand and to the other Chiefs, the following laws:

I. The Chiefs of (i.e., constituting) the Assembly, and all the Chiefs who are absent from the Assembly, shall cede to the Queen of England for ever the government of all their lands.

II. The Queen of England acknowledges and guarantees to the Chiefs, the Tribes, and all the people of New Zealand, the entire supremacy of their lands, of their settlements, and of all their personal property. But the Chiefs of the Assembly, and all other Chiefs, make over to the Queen the purchasing of such lands, which the man who possesses the land is willing to sell, according to prices agreed upon by him, and the purchaser appointed by the Queen to purchase for her.
III. In return for their acknowledging the Government of the Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the natives of New Zealand, and will allow them the same rights as the people of England.

(Signed) WILLIAM HOBSON
Consul, and Lietenant-Governor

We, the Chiefs of this Assembly of the Tribes of New Zealand, now assembled at Waitangi, perceiving the meaning of these words, take and consent to them all. Therefore we sign our names and our marks.

This is done a Waitangi, on the sixth day of February, in the one thousand eight hundred and fortieth year of our Lord.

Appendix B
MODEL OF MULTICULTURALISM PROPOSED BY THE CONFERENCE OF CHURCHES, 1990

1. Peoples have come to Aotearoa.

Ideally each 'group' should negotiate its primary relationship with the Tangata Whenua - which is what the Treaty of Waitangi was to be about; between the Tangata Whenua and the Pakeha.

2. The fault in the model.

Each group after the Pakeha thought their primary relationship was with the Pakeha dominant group. The Tangata Whenua are reduced in status to being merely one of the minority groups.

3. The authentic model.

Each group needs to recognise and negotiate its relationship with the Maori - the people who are the land. To ignore the bicultural relationship (with the Tangata Whenua and also between the separate groups within the Tuhuwi) is to confuse and hinder all other negotiations.

Multiculturalism is the network of completed bicultural negotiations.
Appendix C

THE AUCKLAND REGION, WITH MIGRANTS' MOST POPULAR SUBURBS, 1996 (FROM CHAPTER 3)

(Source: Statistics New Zealand)
Appendix D

GROUP INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

I'm a migrant myself, and one of the questions I'm often asked is, "What do you miss most about the States?" (I say, 'Tex-Mex food') And so let me start by asking you the same question: Other than family and friends, what do you miss most about your home countries?

• [Prompt] Is it a food? Entertainment? Or something else?

Think back to when you first moved to New Zealand. How did you feel about moving here?

• [Prompt] Were you involved in the decision to move?
• [Prompt] How did your parents involve you in the decision?
• [Prompt] What sorts of things motivated the move?
• [Prompt] Why New Zealand?
• [Prompt] Is your experience common?

[Check in: Uncomfortable? Happy to continue? Free to leave or pass.]

A lot of respondents said that their parents had helped them adjust to live in New Zealand. However, quite a number of students also indicated that they didn’t really know how their parents felt about living here. What do you think of that?

• [Prompt] Is it common for Asian students to not know their parents’ feelings?
• [Prompt] What factors might make parents’ adjustment difficult?

A teacher at a different school told me that I’d have trouble getting young people to take part if they had to get their parents’ permission. What might stop students from getting parental permission for this sort of survey?

• [Prompt] What is different about parents’ experiences in New Zealand?
[Check in: Uncomfortable? Happy to continue? Free to leave or pass.]

How do you manage the difference between the culture at school and the culture at home?
A lot of people said that although they didn’t think they themselves gave up more than they gained to come to New Zealand, they thought their families did give up more. What sorts of things have your families given up to come here?

Most respondents said they would object to being called “Kiwi”, but felt okay about being called “New Zealander”. What are the features of “Kiwi” that don’t fit? What sort of person is a “Kiwi”?

- [Prompt] Does a Kiwi have to be European? English? Male? Rural, wearing gumboots?
- [Prompt] Are there certain activities one must participate in to be called “Kiwi”?
- [Prompt] Can people from Asia ever become “Kiwis”?
- [Prompt] If being called a Kiwi is one thing that makes you different from most New Zealanders, what other sorts of ways to you think you’re different from most New Zealanders?

[Check in: Uncomfortable? Happy to continue? Free to leave or pass.]

A lot of respondents mentioned having felt misunderstood by teachers, classmates & friends. What sorts of misunderstandings might they be?

Think back to the last time you encountered a situation where you felt misunderstood because of your culture. What was it?

- [Prompt] Are we talking about Pakeha people?
- [Prompt] Are we talking discrimination?
- [Prompt] How bad does it get?

When asked where they’d most like to be living in 5 years’ time, the largest number said Origin Country. What do you think it is that causes people to want to not stay in New Zealand?

Let’s talk about out-of-school activities. What sorts of thing would be likely to be involved in if you were in your home country?

- [Prompt] Involved in activities in New Zealand? (Mentioned in survey: church groups, sports, music, social/cultural groups...)
- [Prompt] What sort of involvement would you have with those groups at home?
What makes these out-of-school activities important to you?

- [Prompt] Do they help you meet people? Who?
- [Prompt] What sorts of relationships do you form?
- [Prompt] Do you participate with your family, or by yourself?

Most people indicated that moving to New Zealand was generally a good idea. Think back to when you first moved to New Zealand. What could have made it a better experience when you first arrived?

- [Prompt] Language learning?
- [Prompt] Stronger ethnic community?
- [Prompt] More Kiwi friends?
- [Prompt] Better advance knowledge?

Now think about your overall experience in New Zealand. How could your overall experience be improved now?
# Appendix E

UNIVARIATE TABLES OF MAJOR SURVEY VARIABLES

## Table E.1: School Attended

<table>
<thead>
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Table E.4: Respondent's Age (in Years)

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### Table E.8: Where Respondent thinks of as ‘Home’

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</thead>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Half NZ, half Origin Country</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
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### Table E.9: Friends’ Ethnicity

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REFERENCES


Lidgard, J., Ho, E., Chen, Y., Goodwin, J. and Bedford, R. (1998) *Immigrants from Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong in New Zealand in the mid-1990s: Macro and


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