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Talking about anger

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree

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in Psychology at
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Catherine M. O'Connor

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Abstract

This project takes place within poststructuralist challenges to psychology’s dominant discourses of theory and research on anger. These dominant discourses of psychology produce anger as an entity which is categorised separately from other emotions, is located within individuals as essential and physiological, and which must be controlled by reason; discourses which reproduce mind/body and individual/social binaries. This study deconstructs anger talk in transcripts of interviews with twenty counselling students, eight experienced counsellors, and seven of the original group three years later. The texts are read, discourses producing anger and subjectivity are explicated, and the constitutive power of language is instanced in detailed analysis of textual fragments. In my reading of these texts, anger is a product and is productive of social relations, and I read the texts through three overlays: discourses of anger, the constitution of subjectivities, and specific language forms. I have braided three plaits of themes in anger talk: psychology discourses, moral evaluations, and social relations. Detailed analyses of fragments of the texts capture the constitution of subjectivities in the grammatical and syntactical textures of anger talk which enact the social interweave of claims and conflicts, protests and renegotiations of power relations. In the counsellor study and the follow-up of students, discourse production varies as subject positions are enabled among professional discourses. Finally, this study illustrates the general relevance of poststructural approaches as research methodologies for social psychology. Multiple discourses constitute subjectivities in social relations, and constitute the objects of psychology. The deconstruction of discourses weaves us as researchers into the fabric of discursive processes, not as observers, but as weavers and woven.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is a weaving of many voices, and this page acknowledges those voices which have given me my notes, kept me in tune, and woven harmonies around my melody. I wish to begin these acknowledgements by thanking the twenty students and eight counsellors whose cooperation and generosity of spirit provided the stories which are the materials for this project. I have enjoyed the ongoing dialogues we have had throughout this project. Your words are the sounds I took for my notes.

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Collaborative work with colleagues which has richly informed this project, has provided the harmonies, and enabled the methodologies incorporated into this work. Thanks are particularly due to Kerry Chamberlain for the work we have done exploring discourse analysis, and Jon Patrick, for our cooperation in devising and trialling methods of language analysis. I am very grateful to other colleagues and friends for their support throughout this endeavour, and especially those who have made vital contributions in the latter stages; to Leigh Coombes and Mandy Morgan for their readings and feedback on the draft, to Maria O’Connor for her thorough checking of citations and references; and to Dennis Horton for his meticulous (and classy) proof reading of the finished work.

I am also indebted to those philosophical conversations which transgress the logical and create magical possibilities. I wish to thank especially Lyn Jowett, who introduced me to postmodernism and the politics of research, Murray Hill, who challenges me to transgress the edges of illusions of safety, Leigh Coombes whose narratives frequently run alongside mine, and the elusive meta-measurer who inspired the Glossary. This music reverberates with ancient, mysterious rhythms, and is indebted to many voices, only some of which are notated here.
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Prologue

Talking about anger

in which the story of this research unfolds
and the author's position as researcher is placed in context

The story of this research has many beginnings. One was six years ago when I discovered the work of Michel Foucault and began hearing of the possibilities of discourse analysis as a methodology for research in psychology. At an earlier beginning, I had already enjoyed qualitative research and the advantages of working with interview transcripts as data. I had also been disappointed that so much rich information about people's lives was left behind when participants' accounts were sifted according to a previously determined method of analysis. A discourse approach promised to honour people's stories. I was particularly interested in the possibilities of surfacing the power relations in texts as a social psychology sited in the social rather than in the traditional individual/social split. I moved from reading Foucault to detour through the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) and was disappointed that discourse analysis in psychology seemed to be positioned outside poststructuralism and political analysis avoided. Discovering the writing of Erica Burman, (1991, 1992) Ian Parker (1988, 1989, 1992) and Bronwyn Davies (1989, 1993) rekindled my energy, and I decided to work from a discourse perspective in a major piece of research. I set out then to plan this project and to enrol for a PhD.

I found the topic and supervision necessary to undertake the quality of work that I desired. In 1992 and 1993 I worked with John Spicer and Keith Tuffin as supervisors and formulated a research proposal with the goal to research the social construction of anger. In psychology, emotion is a domain fraught with inconsistent theories and inconclusive research. Positivist approaches have failed to explain emotion and anger is possibly the most problematic of emotions. The construct ‘anger’ has been at the forefront of social issues in recent years in discussions of violence and aggression, stress and health. The work of Averill (1980, 1982, 1986, 1990a, 1990b) and Harré (1986, 1995) in particular has laid foundations and
recommendations for research into the social construction of anger. As the work has progressed I have moved from working with anger as 'socially constructed' to 'socially constituted' to position my work outside the discourses of structuralism.

I am a practising counsellor and a counselling trainer. In 1993 I was the tutor in a community based counselling training course. The students on this course were available and enthusiastic participants in the research. They were willing to talk about their own experiences of and ideas about anger in their own lives and as the focus of counselling interactions with others. Our conversations about anger form the texts central to this project. My reading of talk about anger is informed by my humanistic counselling training and background which in turn acted as a filter for my later training in academic psychology. I have enjoyed the rigorous approach of empiricism, although at the same time I have been dissatisfied by the incomplete explanations of people's lives positivist methods produce. At the same time my desire has grown to dissociate myself from the expert diagnostic approach of clinical psychotherapy. My own counselling practice works best when people are affirmed as experts in their own lives. Phenomenological lenses clarify my vision when working with people and encourage me to come to clients' stories from a position of unknowing (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988) yet these same lenses throw social contexts out of focus.

My interest in language is informed by my education in classics and romance languages. Poststructural critiques were disturbing to me at first, and later liberating even while unsettling. The premise that language creates rather than represents what is being spoken of now deeply satisfies me. In both the practice of counselling psychology and in psychology research, I welcome the possibilities that unfold and increase when inconsistency and multiple explanations are valued. I am in similar ways enthusiastic about the challenges poststructural critiques offer the institutions of psychology and counselling in what constitutes knowledge and power and the recognition of the power relations that infuse counselling and research relationships.
I have enjoyed the interviews with participants and the ongoing collaboration with those who have been involved in the long-term project. Reading and interacting with the texts has been a dynamic process with layer after layer of meanings resurfacing and submerging. I am increasingly intrigued with the words and arrangement of words in and around anger, at times at a microscopic (and myopic?) degree of granularity. At the time I have been analysing these texts, I have also been working with Jon Patrick on a linguistic analysis of texts of interviews for a study with a different group of people on a different topic. That collaboration has informed this analysis at a detailed level, producing the analytic method I decided to employ.

Finally, in the last year I have been writing and rewriting this thesis. The actual writing of the text has been a difficult and at times frustrating experience. Consciousness of terminology has made the choice of language akin to picking my way through a minefield. I come from a past of using language somewhat pedantically, and at times I have been unsettled by my choice to nominalise and compound words. At the same time I am delighted by the liberation of using language flexibility to enable speaking positions outside epistemologies I wish to separate from. There are usages in this text that I have scorned in the past, and that some of my friends now read with sidelong looks, and so on occasion I have chosen Latinate expressions as a sidelong look in response. With practice I intend to write fluently and simply, carving safe and sure paths away from the minefields of past positions. This thesis is completed as that greater work is still in progress.

I desire to work from a poststructural position, and find my position continually shifting. Constantly I slide back into the familiar comfort of humanism with all its seductions of personal growth and actualisation, inner worlds, agency and free will. The metaphor of humanism is the reality I have believed in (deeply), and now at the end of 1996, after being immersed in poststructural epistemology for six years, I am able only momentarily to live as not I. I am increasingly able to distinguish among theoretical positions but with neither confidence nor consistency. When I
began writing this text three years ago, I was not able to distinguish among social constructionism, postmodernism and poststructuralism. I have moved in these three years, frequently and simultaneously in different and nonlinear directions. My reading of poststructural theory is different each time I engage with a text, and these shifting understandings over time are constantly refining my discriminations of differences within poststructural positions. My tentativeness in using language has increased, as has my dissatisfaction with text as I produce it to the extent that once any sentence is completed it is out of date.

Ideally I would like to introduce myself as a spinner and weaver, creating stuff from natural fibres into ideas and insights of beauty, but this vision is an illusion. My craft is patchwork. I take bits of stuff from a range of sources, some already well used, others of newer fabrication. I cut these in shapes copied from books, arrange them this way and that, and finally piece them together in a variety of blocks. Some blocks are appliqued rather than pieced, and no two blocks follow the same pattern. My stitches are not fine despite my convent education, but I have set my own standards of integrity which value what is robust and generous rather than dainty and correct. Some of the pieced blocks please more than others, and I set aside those that do not please me. I arrange the rest into a quilt sized whole, and while the quality of the work and effectiveness of the parts are unevenly pleasing, I decide to leave this stage of the work as it is, and move on to the next step. The whole piece is then layered with backing and batting, now becoming cumbersome. My quilting is minimal, in the ditch, and reveals that the batting is weightier than desirable. However it holds the piece together, and serves to emphasise the patterns as I have planned them. I have yet to put a border around the edge to bind the completed work ready to hand it in. This analogy has been at the front of my consciousness these last few months to such an extent that such a quilt has been constructed parallel to the thesis, and, like the work which motivated it, is still in progress.

Since first writing this metaphorical account of thesis writing, I have discovered that the patchwork quilt metaphor recurs throughout
poststructural writing and I am pleased to place myself among this company. As this text is written and rewritten, pieces are reworked and added in, and at times are indistinguishable from the earlier text, and at times are obviously layered on the surface, as appliqués.

In the following chapters I unfold my text, a quilt pieced from the psychology literature on anger and the accounts gifted to me by the participants in the research endeavour. Chapter One discusses the theoretical implications of my research goals. Chapter Two presents the dominant discourses of anger in psychology and Chapter Three explores social constructionist accounts of anger. Chapter Four gives rationales for the methodologies I have chosen. The major study in this project is the analysis of the student texts, and the method of this study is laid out in Chapter Five, and the design of the analysis is explicated in detail in Chapter Six. Chapters Seven to Fourteen present the results and discussion of the analysis and Chapter Fifteen concludes this study with reflections on the effect of limitations of linguistic resources on the constitution of discourses. Chapter Sixteen presents the Counsellors' study, which discusses the discourses evident in the texts of interviews with experienced counsellors which were not evident in the student texts. Chapter Seventeen is the Follow-up study, where the objects of analysis are interviews with some of the students a year after graduation. These texts are read for similarity to the counsellor texts, on the premise that professional training is training in the production of professional discourses. Chapter Eighteen is the conclusion which quilts the project, going back over the patterns produced throughout and bringing into relief the implications of this work for the social psychology of anger.

As chapters reach their final form, positions become available for me outside the text and I am able to read my own words critically. As notanda of the recursive reflection that results, I have written reflexive pieces on that re-reading of my own text and inserted them on the left hand page from time to time. These pages are appropriately purple as a background for these self-indulgent and sinister appliqués.
The subject of this thesis is not anger but discourse, that is language and social practice. Discourse produces anger as an object, and positions people as subjects within and outside discourses and in relation to other objects. This text discusses anger as an object re-produced in and through the discourses of psychology which is itself a discourse informed by other discourses, for example positivism, humanism and capitalism. Since language objectifies, positions, and constitutes that which it speaks of, language is the grammatical subject and object of study throughout this text.

Finally, this work presents my reading of the texts of psychology theory, research and practice and my reading of the accounts of interviews with research participants. Other readings are not only probable, but certain. My reading is selective and biased. The selectivity and biases are frequently stated and almost always acknowledged. You are invited to approach your reading as an adventure in a landscape that is of your own making, informed as you are by your previous readings of the discourses of psychology in general and anger in particular.
Chapter One
Theoretical positions

in which the project is introduced in terms of
the theoretical issues raised by studying the social embodiment of anger

The premise on which this research project is based is that anger is constituted in discourse, that is in language and social practice. This premise involves examining epistemologies and ontological issues. The poststructuralist challenge to psychology goes to the core of the discipline’s central tenets, creating a “crisis in representation” (Gergen, 1994, p. 412) and brings into question the epistemological basis from which pronouncements on truth and knowledge are made. Language replaces the subject, and opens possibilities for the constitution of subjectivities.

Poststructuralism, postmodernism and social construction
Knowledge is not mental representation held in our heads, but rather negotiated in interactions in the social sphere. The hegemony of academic psychology has investments in setting standards for truth, and believes it can discover the actual terms by which reality exists (Rorty, 1979; Sampson, 1991). Through poststructural lenses, psychology is seen to refer to opinions, beliefs and values about how humans operate (Billig, 1990). Poststructuralism challenges conventional psychology’s power as the enshrinement of knowledge of how humans operate, the means by which this knowledge is sought and maintained, and the practices of the profession (Parker, 1992).

I use the terms “social construction”, “postmodernism” and “poststructuralism” in this thesis as I read them presently, as overlapping rather than separate and distinct. Social constructionism focuses on accounts as a way to understand the social world and how participants in the social world experience and participate through specific language uses. I read social constructionism as reproducing realism, because of the emphasis on structures, and how structures are set up and maintained. The person who produces an account is a participant in the construction,
In citing sources in this text I have chosen to follow the standard APA format. The choice is in effect the default option. I am very aware that every phrase I use is echoing what I have read/heard. At times my paraphrasing is close to the original, however the context is my own and is likely to distort the meaning intended by the source I borrow from.

I was tempted to follow the example of Patti Lather and quote directly in recognition of my indebtedness to the work of other authors and indeed especially her work. But that has limitations. By now I have adopted phrases as if my own that have been weaned from their originators, and I am not able to find the quotations to give just due to their authority. Besides, I desire my text to be accessible, and continual punctuation impedes ease of reading.

I would like to write fluently, my words streaming from pools of ideas that are my own solutions. Such fluidity escapes my grasp. I have instead cut and patched, arranged and coordinated many pieces from many sources. The pattern is my own, and I have used some of the fabric for a long time. Other material is new to me, and the stitching is obvious throughout. In many places I can no longer remember where the scraps originated. Where I do know, I tell you as reader so that you can follow any leads that beckon to you.

And so, I have followed the orthodox format in citing references. I have no desire to obscure the richness of reading that this text relies on. Disruption of my own text is one thing. Order is desirable in acknowledging the texts of others.
producing language for particular social ends, and is a unitary, rational actor, at times agent, at times acted upon. Language constitutes meanings rather than represents reality. In social construction accounts, anger is (re)produced in social contexts for interpersonal and social ends, within socially culturally and historically agreed rules and practices.

The postmodern condition (Lyotard, 1984) is characterised by multiplicity, ambiguity, uncertainty and fragmentation. The modernist faith in science, technological innovation and systematic design has been disappointed by the unfulfilled promise of social liberation. There has been a breakdown in belief in scientific truth and objectivity. The information explosion and progress in consumer capitalism is undermining the hegemony of Western capitalism. There is no disembodied knowledge, no neutral observation point, no view from nowhere, and all views are culturally and historically located. The rational and unitary individual is replaced by fragmented and multiple subjectivities which are socially and culturally contextualised. In postmodern accounts, anger is a possibility through which subjectivities are constituted in particular contexts inconsistently throughout various explanations.

Poststructuralism refers to the work of French philosophers such as Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault. Poststructuralist positions open up possibilities of taking apart the how as well as the what of the constitutive process of language/social practice or discourse. To deconstruct texts is to track how a system is defined by what it excludes, how the discursive mechanisms and structures are subtle and beyond sight, and how discourses enable and constrain subject positions. In poststructuralism the focus is on the processes by which subjects are subjected to and constituted by structure and discourse and how practice may be turned against what constrains it. Critical readings of texts expose the constitutive power of discourse, disrupt dominant discourses and make space for discourses of resistance to transform practices and reconstitute the world.

As I read the anger stories in this research, I employ all these foci; how anger is constructed in language, and is enacted in social practices; how
storying anger constitutes subjectivities in varied and inconsistent ways; and how anger talk constitutes social practices of enablement, constraint and possibilities of resistance. I desire to work poststructurally, to validate the discontinuous, particular and local knowledges which unsettle the bases of privileged knowledge/power (Foucault, 1982; Freedman & Combs, 1996).

**The constitutive power of language**

In modernism, the constructs of psychology rely upon language as representing realities. The talk of science is designed to create a sense of reality that is independent of talk (Edwards, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1992). By this linguistic practice, the illusion of objective reality is created and maintained. While psychology continues to formulate and disseminate the prevailing discourses in non-reflective uncritical manner by simply reporting its findings as if they are disembodied, then psychology is perpetuating modernism/structuralism. The language of psychology forms the objects of study (Foucault, 1972; Sampson, 1993). As psychologists we are the objects of our own curiosity, and in self exploration we construct abstractions, objectify our constructions, and then proceed to construct measures to measure the objectifications we have created (Gergen 1991; 1994; Shotter, 1992). We objectify the sheer fact of being alive (Foucault, 1982).

In psychology, anger is studied as a reified entity, defined and redefined in each theoretical position the discipline has developed. Emotions are constituted as things located within the individual psyche and are experienced, expressed, dealt with, and managed. Reification is the process of concretising the abstract, typically by extending verb usages into abstract nouns, making a process static. The term ‘reification’ defines itself; a linguistic process which in describing a dynamic action causes it to become static, a state, an entity. Once reified, anger is an object “out there”, observable and available for study.

The traditional procedure in psychology is to develop a theoretical construct, define it, operationalise the definition by structural models, and
then test the structure empirically. However, the construct(ion) anger as studied in different theories is not a consistent entity. Problems of theoretical difference in psychology are problems of linguistic entanglement (Gergen, 1985). The focus of this thesis is therefore not anger, but rather talk about anger.

All forms of theory are constructions inseparable from historical and cultural contexts. Realising the relativity of the modernist perspective opens up places for multiple truths. Poststructuralism is therefore not concerned with discovering a 'real' truth but is rather concerned with the social processes by which accounts are legitimated as accounts of representations of reality (Gergen 1991). There is no single truth which can be discovered and represented as positivist accounts would have us believe. Instead, multiple truths are created among people in social contexts for various interpersonal and social ends.

Meaning is ascribed to human experience in social and linguistic practices (Wittgenstein, 1953; 1958) which structure and organise human experience in the social life and conventions of practice of communities. Social conventions emerge in historical contexts and particular localities. They are not grounded in a 'reality' that exists independently of the conventions that support and constitute it. Language is the primary human reality (Shotter, 1992), the background to all human action (Harré, 1992), a cultural practice that constitutes reality (Gergen 1994). Language forms are tools for performing certain tasks. Words are deeds that give meaning to what we do (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Human realities are maintained by being continually remade in everyday social activities and conversation (Harré, 1983; Shotter, 1992). In conversation we create, sustain, reproduce and transform social and societal relationships. Language does not represent reality, but rather functions in social practice. Rorty (1979) suggests that psychology abandon the fruitless search for objective truth and participate in broader social dialogues.
PRONOUNS OF THE FIRST POSITION

“I surround myself with poststructuralist writers to guide my work.”

Who is this I?

Pronouns are problematic in this text. I now reflect upon my own use of pronouns of the first position. Some of these first positions are taken by Kay O'Connor, researcher and writer of the text, the author speaking from a position of authority and after all, if I cannot so speak, who can? Any of these positions might be Kay the fragmented person who is multiply present in (and absent from) this enterprise and makes patchwork quilts to get a grip on the metaphor of the whole research endeavour or perhaps as displacement activity and who lives and loves in the spaces she creates between this research and her paid work as counsellor and educator. Perhaps Catherine O'Connor is here - she with whom I cannot identify, who sneaks around only in the most publicly official moments of my life whose name is/will be on the cover of this text and who is seeking to impress the very institution I critique by this text. She is the I who will get any credit that is going, driving all the multiple and fragmented Kays underground.

Who is we? There is the we as people in general, humans, a pronoun I use as a way of avoiding the impersonal they, humans, people as objects of study. This we also includes psychologists as research objects, our discipline as up for scrutiny. I cannot divorce myself from the institution and indeed do not wish to - however I would like to renegotiate our relationship from time to time both in terms of my place in it and its ways of being. There is the we who are researchers who explore, find, interpret, and pronounce on truth. In this work I feel most warmly about the we who are the participants, whose transcripts are the texts, the teacher and taught, trainer and trained, researcher and researched in myths of collaboration. I have only momentarily belonged with - in this company, but those moments blew my cover as distanced unemotional expert observer.

Even more importantly, I live and relate with new awareness of how I/we are constituted and emoting as the energy of our relating. There are those vertiginous moments of dcentredness when my knowledge of myself lets go the stranglehold on my sense of self, and I fly out of me and flow in through and among all life all time all space diverse multiple unbounded, - and with a sickening lurch, relocate my self in my individual sense of unique centrality once more, with relief and yet a sense of loss.
Theoretical positions

The concerns of this project
I surround myself with poststructuralist writers to guide my work. I am informed philosophically by the works of Michel Foucault and pragmatically by Ian Parker (1988, 1989, 1992) as I set about unravelling discourses in texts within the discipline of psychology. My reading of Bronwyn Davies (1989, 1993) encourages me to explore subject positioning and the constitution of subjectivities. In giving rationales for my methodology and the challenging of power relations in research practice I draw heavily on the work of Patti Lather (1988, 1991, 1993). As a counsellor, I am enthusiastic about the possibilities of locating counselling practice in poststructural theory, and am informed by the praxis of Michael White and David Epston (1990) who openly address the politics of power (Freedman & Coombes, 1996). Dominant counselling practices locate anger within the person, as part of the person's 'identity', and clients learn 'anger management'. Poststructuralism seeks to undo the construction 'anger' as socially constituted, and so opens possibilities for persons to create optimistic futures (Drewery & Monk, 1994).

The concern of this research, then, is not to discover the 'real truth' about anger, but is rather to explore the social processes by which accounts are legitimated as accounts of representations of reality (Gergen, 1991). Some social arrangements of power, advantage, and privilege dominate other arrangements in the very terms by which people's lives are understood. I have no desire to establish the illusion of a neutral position to study anger from. I am interested in the very processes of bias, influence, domination and resistance that talking about anger enacts, and it is these biases which in-form the methodologies I embrace.

The term 'discourse' has been used in a variety of ways in psychology referring variously to talk, to texts of talk, and to communication in wider senses. In this thesis I use the term in the Foucauldian sense, as social practices which re-produce power relations. I am interested in how discourse embodies models of the world and ideologies, in the operations of power between and among people, and in how social institutions are maintained and challenged in talk about anger (Parker, 1992).
“The audience is not only a target, but are active interpreters and respondents.”

Each person who has read this text has brought the singular/plural inconsistency of these verbs to my attention. The lack of agreement is deliberate, and was intended as a subtle subtextual comment on the pluralities inherent in every singular example. There is no singular audience, no collective reaction, neither to anger nor to this opus. An audience is a collection of disparate listeners/readers and all hear and read different sounds and meanings in opera. In anger plays the audience are not ‘out there’ as observers, but are involved in the interactions in which anger is reproduced. Reading is not passive, but is interactions with the text, a dynamic and immediate practice which involves interpretation, dialogue, and is inevitably partial, unfair and incomplete.

I wrote the sentence within the traditional rules of collective nouns. “The audience is in agreement,” “The audience are of diverse opinions,” and the sentence as I wrote it failed to achieve the effect I intended. Language is social practice, and words have meaning only as the audience understands them, and in this case the audience all miss(es) my meanings.

Discourse is limited by the language resources within any given speech community, not only within the agreed practices of that language, but also within common understandings of usage. And so with talk about anger: linguistic practices prescribe (and proscribe) particular usages, and it is always the readings of audiences which imbue words with meanings.

There are satisfactions in the recursivity of these misunderstandings: the readers of my text actively interpreted the grammar of my sentence and responded, not only interpreting my words but also re-forming the text.
I expect therefore to read discourses supporting the status quo, discourses offering possibilities of resistance, and discourses co-opting resistance into an adapted status quo (Foucault, 1972; Parker, 1992). I also expect inconsistencies and variability within any participant’s talk as they deconstruct and construct anger as a reified influence in their lives. Language purports to represent realities that lie beneath/outside the words spoken, but there is no beneath/outside language, and words themselves manage the interactions of that moment and the wider social practices that maintain the power relations in society.

Emotions themselves are discourses and are involved in the interweave of power in social relations, enacting a transitory social role (Averill, 1982), a relational practice (Brenneis, 1990). The audience is not only a target, but are active interpreters and respondents. The language of emotion, verbal and nonverbal, is discursive, and is an interactional process, a way of interpreting the world, and also constituting it. Counselling conversations are saturated with talk about emotions. In a therapeutic conversation about anger, for example, the participants collaborate to imbue the term anger and the story about anger with agreed meanings.

**Discourses support institutions**

At times discourses strengthen the status quo, at times competing discourses challenge dominant practices. Social practices enable dominant institutions to utilise anger discourses to maintain the power relations of the status quo. Anger is also constituted in the formation of discourses that resist dominant practice and challenge institutional power. While all emotion talk will operate in these many and varied ways, anger is typically constituted in conflicts of control and resistance. Talk about anger is usually talk about morals, and negotiating positions of righteousness and demands for justice.

The institution of family in the modern Western culture which dominates Aotearoa divides society into small ‘nuclear’ units where the private is kept separate from the public. Linguistic binaries are dividing practices which set up opposites and privilege one and silence the other.
The public/private split privileges the public and silences the private. In the sanctity of privacy of the family what constitutes 'normal' family relationships is informed by and informs wider social moralities. The private is made invisible, yet is unable to escape practices of morality since practices are reproduced in power relations, and the power relations of the public are reproduced from the bottom up. There is no place outside the surveillance of dominant practices, and anger talk re-enacts surveillance in talk of legitimation, justification and moralising. Moralities maintain power relations between, for example, men and women, and parents and children, and moralities are reproduced in social institutions, for example in families, schools and workplaces. Schools embody social values which constrain knowledge and ways of learning to reproduce the status quo in the name of education, and the social contexts of schools reproduce the power relations of homes. Children are restricted and have little voice in home or school (Burman, 1994; Davies, 1989, 1993). Gender politics maintain power relations in interpersonal relating and in the wider social practices of liberation and constraint. The discourses of gender, family, and interpersonal relating suffuse people's anger talk with language of power appropriated and resisted.

Of particular interest in this project is the institution of psychology and the discourses of research and practice that structure the discipline's privileged production of power/knowledge. Psychology informs the social practices and politics of social relations in intimacy, gender and family. It is not surprising that talking about anger produces and re-produces psychology discourse. Psychology is colonising (Gergen, 1994) in that it does not describe and explain but shapes the contours of social life. At present academic psychology is accommodating qualitative research, for example discourse analysis, as an 'add-on' without changing its basic frameworks for understanding. Discourse analysis is reconstructed as another empirical tool for analysing language use and function (Burman, 1991). The practice of psychological research is expanding the range of psychological methods to consolidate its privileged knowledge claims. It is characteristic of institutions to thus incorporate and disempower resistant discourses. This thesis is sited in that process as I conform to the
in institutional requirements to gain my PhD. while disrupting traditional practice sufficiently to demonstrate in my research practice the theoretical positions I take.

Psychology is applied in practice in the profession of counselling. Counsellor training embodies the principles and strategies of counselling and re-produces psychological discourses of behaviourism and humanism. As knowledge and skills are re-produced, so too are the discourses of the discipline which enable possibilities of multiple subjectivities. To be a counsellor is to reproduce the talk and actions of counsellors, and simultaneously to co-create counselling discourses. There is no simple ‘right’ way for a counsellor to talk and act, and in constituting ‘counsellor’ subjectivities, varieties of discourses are produced and re-produced that jostle for acceptance, dominance and resistance in the broad domains of counselling psychology and psychotherapy.

**Discourses constitute subjectivities**

I use the phrase “constitute subjectivities” to deliberately avoid terms such as “constructing identities” or “constructing the self” so that I am able to disclaim the connotations with which in psychology the terms ‘identity’ and ‘self’ are imbued. I am thereby enabled to stand aside from psychology’s traditional constitution of the subject as a unique ‘identity’ (Sampson, 1989) which is separate from and indeed opposite to the social (Hollway, 1989). The ‘self’ as the focus of psychological scrutiny is constituted as unitary, consistent, and containing an inner reality, informed by Western cultural discourses of science and humanism. From a poststructural position, individuals are constituted in the social domain in and through discourse. To use the terminology of modernism reproduces the objects of modernism, and to create terminology outside modernism opens opportunities for deconstructing the entities modern ideologies have constructed. The term ‘subjectivity’ replaces the problematic subject and enables a destabilised, inconsistent ongoing process of positioning in a variety of discourses (Davies, 1989, 1993; Weedon, 1987). The poststructuralist phrase is an example of how language can enable subject positions outside a dominant discourse and
can open possibilities of alternative discourses to resist dominant practices. Discourse becomes the grammatical subject of sentences in which multiple subjectivities are constituted and multiple positions made available.

As I became familiar with the texts I became intrigued with anger talk as a medium for multiple subjectivities. It is as if images are established in overlapping layers as speakers struggle to build a unitary, coherent image, a process Bronwyn Davies (1993) calls imbrication (p. 9). In Western cultures subjectivities are constituted as unique individuals with discrete personality, history, identity, and integrity. Emotion talk is an important vehicle of this work. In talking about anger, sequences of images are layered and subjectivities are constituted that are inconsistent in the very attempt to achieve coherence. Language is constructed to define by contrast and similarity, and anger talk is rich with dualisms. Inner is pitched against outer, emotion against reason, private against public, right against wrong. In opposing binaries one is privileged and the other discredited, and in each of these dualities anger is located in the alternative to be avoided. Anger is inner, of the body, irrational, private and prohibited and at the same time expected as a reaction to injustice and legitimate for some people in some circumstances. Within any one account, all of these positions may be taken as yet more images are layered to constitute subjectivities. Discursive practices open up subject positions which provide conceptual and ideological repertoires and particular relations with other subjects and objects constituted in that discourse (Davies & Harré, 1990). To be positioned as a counsellor, for example, is to be positioned in discourses of humanism and to access humanistic objects of volition, agency, individuality, personal growth and change.

Informed by these theories and practices, I explore the social constitution of anger in this project. I read texts of interviews for discourses of anger, and bring together fragments to illustrate how anger talk constitutes persons and practices. I reflect on the role of social institutions particularly psychology in framing anger discourses. It is my desire to disrupt the power relations inherent in the traditional practice of psychology research by how I relate to the other participants, how I read the texts we generate,
and how I compile the format of my text, this research report. In the following introductory chapters I present my reading of the dominant discourses of anger in academic psychology, paying particular attention to socially contexted explanations in social construction accounts. I then complete the introductory chapters with the rationale for my research approach.

Throughout this work, I position myself in and through poststructuralism to explicate the constitutive power of language in the texts. I examine how anger talk enacts power relations, supports and challenges social practices and institutions. I am particularly interested in the discourses of the discipline of psychology which produce anger from a position of expert knowledge. In these introductory chapters I outline the premises for the analysis of texts in which subjectivities are constituted appropriate to counselling students and counsellors.
Chapter Two
Modernist discourses

In which psychology is a discourse of modernism,
anger is categorised, re-produced in the body, controlled by reason,
is hazardous to health, inherent in the ‘self’, and has social implications.

The discipline of psychology is informed by discourses of modernism and empiricism. Matters of description cannot be separated from issues of power (Foucault, 1982), and the scholarly outputs of the discipline form objects which are re-produced as objective truth. Studies of emotion constitute emotions as independent entities and observable objects which are available to the researcher’s gaze.

Studies of anger in psychology re-produce a variety of inconsistent discourses, and in this and the next chapter I present my reading of those which inform counselling psychology. In this chapter I read modernist studies of anger, not to uncover any essential ‘nature’ of anger, but rather as producing and re-producing constructions of anger that are established by research measures that employ those same constructions (Gergen, 1994). I do not approach anger as a reified construct based on the assumptions of representationalism. Instead I write of the discourses of psychology which constitute anger as an object.

The psychological discourses of emotion re-produce binaries of mind in opposition to body, inner in opposition to outer worlds, individual in opposition to society, and feeling in opposition to behaviour. Anger is constituted in the problematic alternative in each case, and in counselling contexts, is constituted as an internally located problem that the client needs to learn to ventilate or to manage and control. In poststructuralism, anger is located in social rather than individual contexts, and is deconstructed to unravel the social and interpersonal plots and subplots in which anger is written. In counselling contexts, this unravelling opens up possibilities of reading angers as opportunities.
Definition and classification

The psychology emotion literature abounds with discourses of definition by locating (for example) anger in categories of emotions. Natural science disciplines employ taxonomies, and psychology positions itself among sciences (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The formistic model of the world (Pepper, 1942) is concerned with definitions, finding similarities and contrasts, capturing the essence of things. These “dividing practices” (Foucault, 1982 p. 208) objectify the subject by classification, containment, and control into already dominated or formed groups and award ‘identity’ through the manipulations of the dividing procedures. Through scientific practices of classification, emotions are produced as objects of systematic, sustained political attention and intervention.

The search for definition re-produces emotions as arising from ‘essential nature’. Studies pursue such questions as what is and is not an emotion, as distinct from a reflex, a mood or temperament. Emotion is set against feeling, behaviour or judgment (Izard, 1977) and is separated from feeling and expression (Bedford 1962). Anger is distinguished from hostility and aggression (Izard, 1977). Emotions are sifted to find which are the essential or pure emotions, typed variously as, for example, coarse (James, 1890), fundamental or discrete (Izard, 1977), primary (Plutchik, 1962), and basic (Oatley, 1992). The number of the basic emotions defined varies widely, for example five (Oatley, 1992) ten (Izard, 1977), and eighteen (Frijda, 1986). Some emotions are included on some lists and excluded from other shorter lists. Ortony & Turner (1990) present a table of taxonomies of emotion (p. 316) and conclude that the idea of “basic” emotions does not hold, and that because emotions vary according to culture, the term “culturally common” might be more appropriate.

The process of categorisation is an attempt to find preexisting patterns in ‘objective reality’. Categories cannot be deduced or derived from observation, because identifying the attributes of a category relies on having a preexisting verbal category or label. Words do not map experience, because words are themselves constrained by existing language conventions (Gergen, 1985) and the labelling process creates the
distinctions (Edwards, 1991; Sampson, 1993). Categorising is a discursive activity, concerned with negotiating and debating particular positions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Allocating membership is morally saturated. For example, emotions are frequently evaluated as positive or negative. The usual interpretation of positive and negative is the extent to which the emotion experience is pleasurable on a hedonic continuum from positive through indifferent to negative (Young, 1961). The linguistic use of the positive-negative binary divides the continuum and emphasises two polar opposites, and the 'organism' is described as striving to reach the positive pole. The positive-negative polarity recurs throughout emotion theory for example when each emotion is ascribed a value of pleasant or unpleasant to some fixed degree (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988). Positive and negative as descriptors have quite a different meaning in Oatley (1992), who defines positive as when the probability of attaining a goal is increased, and negative when the probability is reduced. Positive and negative by this definition are not qualities of the emotion, but of the context. The positive-negative labels may refer to some quality of the emotional 'experience', of the person's judgment of the situation or of the context itself. The problem with competing theories of the objective is that they do not measure the same entity. Positive and negative, pain and pleasure, good and bad are binaries which present one desirable alternative and the other to be avoided. Anger in some contexts and for some purposes is cast as an emotional villain - negative, bad, painful, and to be avoided - and in other contexts and for other purposes, anger is cast as a hero - positive, pleasurable, good, and to be appreciated. The distinctions are discursive differences and are moral evaluations producing effects in the linguistic interaction. One of those effects may be to construct an illusion of objective scientific classification.

When defined and classified as similar to and different from other emotions, anger is constituted as innate, basic, and essential to 'human nature'. In counselling conversations, anger is therefore a given, a problem, an entity to be contended with and controlled. Anger is defined
as a response to situations which exact it in accordance to some ‘natural’ process even while anger is a response which is in most contexts unacceptable. It is a negative emotion which may be justified, but rarely welcomed, an expression of the uncontrolled body. Clients are referred to counselling to search for means of increasing control of the physiological experience of anger in order to manage its expression more effectively.

**Physiological discourses of anger**

Physiological discourses of anger are positioned in a mechanistic model of the world (Pepper, 1942) and construct anger in terms of instincts and drives located in the viscera. According to Charles Darwin in *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), emotions are biologically primitive instincts related to needs for survival. Research into cross cultural (and cross species) facial expressions (Ekman, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Izard, 1977) demonstrate the Darwinian position. William James defined emotions in *Principles of Psychology* (1890) as perceptions of bodily states and located the “felt” emotions in the viscera. He decreed that emotions are properly studied by the methods of natural science, investigating bodily changes and physiology. He defined some emotions including anger as “coarse” because the emotion language is associated with bodily changes which are physiologically measurable, and focused on them - a pragmatic theory that fits the anticipated limitations of measurement.

The innate fight/flight response is also located in the viscera. Cannon (1927) described experiments on cats, in which the viscera were totally separated from the central nervous system. Results showed that the emotional (sic) behaviour of the research participants was unaltered except for the lack of erection of hairs in hissing and spitting cats. Reductionism of this kind is still prevalent in emotion studies. Zajonc (1980, 1984; Zajonc & Mcintosh, 1992) argues that emotions require no antecedent cognition, and that affect is separate from cognition. Such theory frames emotion as reflexes, affective reactions to stimuli and entities which can be measured for example by changes in heart rate, salivary secretions, galvanic skin responses, changes in rate and depth of respiration, brain
activity - psychophysiological and neuropsychological measures (Arnold, 1960). Neuropsychology locates anger and emotion in specific parts of the brain, for example the hypothalamus (Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992).

Physiological discourses list prototypical expressions of anger, for example furrowed brow, square mouth, compressed lips, rounded upper eyelids. Cross cultural studies discover parallel physiological signals (Ekman, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Izard, 1977) and conclude that anger is an emotion that transcends cultural difference. Ethnographic studies (Lutz & Abu Lughod, 1990) which attend to the cultural and social context rather than the individual observed ‘other’ reach quite different conclusions. Modernist accounts of emotion constitute emotions as innate within individuals and deeper than cultural difference. While non-verbal language is conceded to vary across cultures, prototypical expressions of emotion transcend cultural and linguistic variations.

Psychoanalytic explanations present a story that reads differently at first reading, and then in subsequent readings becomes familiar. In this story, emotions are located in the psyche, the central core of the person, a part not accessible to empirical measurement, but of the body none the less. Emotions are framed as vestiges of our animal and infantile history that distort adult mental functions, psychic energies (or the discharge processes of such energies) of instinctual origin. Inherited, they arise from the unconscious, are felt in the body and are related to instinct and innate drives. Freud (1910/1957) explained emotion as instinctual energy, a thermodynamic model. In one place he defined emotions as hysterical attacks (Breuer & Freud, 1937) which are presumably located in the uterus - emotions are therefore gendered. In Freud’s account, depression results from anger being suppressed, a premise still subject to experimental research (Clay, Anderson & Dixon, 1993).

In physiological and psychodynamic discourses, therefore, anger is framed as a set of physiological responses and bodily perturbations, to be controlled by reason. Therapy functions to face up to basic innate physiological realities and to constrain the expression of these bodily
In challenging the truth claims of the dominant discourses of psychology, I struggle to speak in a different voice. The language of psychology has its specificities, its particular demands, and characteristics. The strategic contamination creates the illusion of objectivity, the passive voice and exclusion of the subject authorises the mirage of a writer position outside the text, the observer position, the view from nowhere.

My desire is to inhabit texts, to explore and unsettle them. To this end, I use kinesthetic language, metaphors of landscape, of geography, of craft. Visual images send me out again as observer who perceives, sees, catches glimpses, is blinded. And so I get in there in and among the objects I speak into play, rearranging them in relation to each other.

The texts of this chapter are the bodies of literature in the discipline of psychology caught in the act of constituting anger in particular orders and arrangements. I am reluctant to belong in here and yet I want to be heard as knowing about how these games are played. As I read these efforts, I catch myself outside the texts using the old ploys of passive voice, deleted referents, as if I wish to deny allegiance to any of these practices. Despite myself, I am again the invisible author, the disembodied voice, the objective scientist.

The very terms ‘analysis’ and ‘method’ reproduce order and discipline, the division of objects into components and elements, in orderly arrays. In writing this text I am caught in dilemmas of intent. I undertake the project with outcomes staked out in advance. I am using a process of disruption to achieve recognition within academic institution. In order to succeed, I must demonstrate order, consistency, logical argument. I am exploiting the resistance movement for institutional ends. And yet, to keep poststructuralism outside the academy may be to successfully exclude its challenges, to maintain the dominant discourse which is psychology.

And so I gladly entangle myself in these dilemmas, optimist that I am, and work towards transformation of the discipline I have chosen as my environment. And I am at times mute, as I search for a voice, and at other times, as in this chapter, I hear myself speak in old dialects. And I have no desire to silence the voices of modernism, only to add to them, to value the rich variety of ways we know and to share our knowledges.
reactions into socially acceptable communications. Reason is separate
from and struggles with these irrational impulses of the body. Thus are
humans distinguished from ‘other’ animals which want ‘discourse of
reason’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, I i).

**Discourses of reason**

Cognition has had a role to play in explanations of emotions in all but the
purest behavioural theories. Since William James, cognitive appraisal has
had an important role in emotion processes, mediating between the
perceived threat and the appropriate physiological response. Emotion is
construed in these accounts as the sensation of organic changes. Lazarus
(1966) frames emotions as responses to threat within the coping process.
First the threat is appraised, then a learned coping process is selected,
followed by a bodily reaction. Appraisal arises from experience, the
“affective memory” (Arnold, 1970) upon which Crawford et al. (1992)
predicate their “memory work” approach. The language of memory,
sensation and experience are warranted by empiricism (Gergen, 1985).
Cognitive psychology recognises the power of linguistic labels in emotion
talk (Schacter and Singer, 1962) while constructing a reality in the head
that language represents. The cognitive tradition of emotion constructs
complex linear processes of appraisal, coding, allocation of significance,
evaluation, and readiness for action (Frijda, 1986).

Cognitive theories of emotion are predicated on an organismic model of
the world (Pepper, 1942) which locates emotions once again in biology. In
this account, emotions are entities within the individual’s body in the
mind/body split where reason constantly battles for control over passion,
in the cleft between inner and outer worlds. Emotions are of the body and
irrational as opposed to thoughts which are of the mind, and rational.
Emotions are constituted as universal, individually and internally located
bodily responses over which reason struggles to exert control.

The feelings/thoughts binary is the basis of cognitive-behavioural
therapies. In Rational Emotive Therapy, Ellis (1989) not only splits the
rational from the emotive but theorises thought to precede and cause the
emotion. The therapeutic ‘intervention’ is to reason with clients and teach them to construct discontinuities of space and time in reading their emotions. Most Anger Management literature and training that I am aware of use cognitive behavioural frameworks and self-control techniques to avoid violence. The clients are able to use such techniques as ‘time out’ to refrain from aggressive behaviour and to learn ways of ‘expressing anger’ that do not endanger themselves or others. Anger is employed in these discourses to reconstruct a more socially acceptable ‘self’ that is trained to self-surveillance (Ellis, 1989, McKay, Rogers & McKay, 1989).

Cognitive-behavioural discourses construct anger as a site of battle within and between individuals. Others are involved in triggering events and consequential behaviours. The focus on the individual who expresses anger places the source of anger onto another character in the story, an ‘other’ who carries the blame, and who is responsible for instigating the complex sequence of anger. The interpersonal/social is allocated a role but not included in the anger process, which is inside the angry individual. This account re-produces the split between individuals and society and psychology’s dominant practice of locating anger within the individual body and precludes the exploration of anger as a production of power relations in society.

The essential 'self'
Discourses of the ‘self’ as ‘unique individual’ have permeated psychological theory. William James (1890) formulated a theory of the ‘self’ as comprising two selves, a subjective and objective self, the ‘Me’ and the ‘I’. The ‘self’ as theorised in self psychology produces and reproduces the individual of Western cultures; individualistic, consistent, and unitary, with agency and reflexivity. The ‘Me’ is objective, available to the observation, reflection, organisation and management of the subjective ‘I’, which eludes observation, and is essential. This model underlies constructions of the ‘self’ in modern psychology (Harré, 1991).
The theoretical discourses of psychodynamic psychology re-produce intra-individual essentialism, locating emotions in the psyche, the centre of the essential 'self'. Arising from the unconscious, emotions are felt in consciousness or can be repressed and kept in the unconscious. The 'inner world' of the individual is compartmentalised, and some parts may be at odds with others. Jung (1940) describes affectivity as the essential basis of personality ultimately originating from the archetype. It is within individuality at depth that the deep unconscious social realm of the collective unconscious can be contacted. This account of the 'self' is predicated on Western cultural formations of individual ideologies and language practices, and does not take into account social networks in which peoples are contextualised.

Humanistic psychology embodies ideals of individuality, autonomy and conscious identity. 'Choice', 'agency' and 'volition' are constituted as objects without recognition of the constraints of the rules and structures of the social world. Humanism is predicated on continuities of development, freedom and the centrality of human consciousness, and is a coherent set of ideologies by and through which the world is interpreted. The ideal of humanistic psychology is the autonomous self-actualised 'self' which can be discovered by increased awareness and introspection, and which is then presented as integrated, unitary, consistent and essentially unique. In practice, 'identity' requires 'getting it right' by practising the culture in an identifiably individual way within the acceptable variations of the culture (Davies, 1993). Resistance and setting up alternative choices are acceptable only if the existing rules are demonstrably known. The subject is liberated only within the constraints of rationality and consistency. The humanist 'self' is separated from the social world and identified by wants and desires controlled by reason into a particular pattern which marks that subject as distinct from other subjects. The constitution of humanistic selfhood excludes social explanations and depoliticises social relations.

In humanistic counselling discourse, emotions are touchstones of personal reality (Abu-Lughod, 1990). The counselling process encourages
clients to develop sophisticated vocabularies of emotion language (Cameron-Bandler & Lebeau, 1986) establishing hermeneutics of feeling into which counselling talk is grounded. Emotions are located as intra-individual and separated from (although having an impact on) the flow of social life in meaning and consequence. In the humanistic world view, emotions are natural, internally located, personal and individual, and opposed to reason. Emotions have ontological being, in that in and through emotion talk individualist developing unitary subjectivities are constituted and the problematics of existence are accounted for.

The postmodern condition constantly re-locates subjects in a complex interaction of contemporaneous and successive positions in complex, shifting, cultural settings. Talk about anger positions subjects within dynamic social relations and social practices (Drewery & Monk, 1994) and these multiple positions enact multiple purposes.

Discourses of essential selfhood are sustained by the ongoing developmental tradition which constitutes continuity and direction with meaning. The ‘self’ is constructed as a ‘unique identity’ which is constrained by systems of normalisation (Foucault, 1982). Thus persons are compelled by discourses of ‘selfhood’ and practices of self-surveillance within regulatory discourses of the ‘normal’. Broughton’s (1978) theory of the development of the self concept illustrates how developmental theory describes cultural norms in the guise of innate organic inevitability. This theory describes six levels of self understanding which are building blocks of enculturation. In the first stage, ages 4-7, children make no distinction between the mind and the body and perceive themselves as physical only. At about eight, children differentiate between mind and body. At 12, they begin to recognise two selves, the 'self' in itself and the 'self' as an object. From 18 on, truth begins to be viewed as objective, then truth is viewed as purely subjective, and finally, truth is viewed as a combination of subjective and objective. This theory embodies the social prescription of the Western individualistic ‘self’ complete with mind/body split according to the cultural norm. Developmental theory constitutes the ‘self-concept’ in the individual head. Deconstruction of this theory locates the
constitution of the 'self-concept' in social discourse and saturated with cultural and historical ways of knowing (Burman, 1994; Gergen, 1985).

The developmental model of growth is re-written in social constructionist accounts of anger. Averill (1986) suggests that adult development involves the development of heuristic 'rules' that guide socially appropriate emotion experience and expression. In this way old 'rules' are discarded and new 'rules' taken up for interacting in the social domain, and emotions are involved in the adoption, maintenance, and discarding process. This account re-produces humanistic developmental discourses of historical continuity and normalised social relations. I read developmental accounts as culturally framed and re-producing and conserving dominant social practices and institutions.

Humanism is informed by essentialism which frames emotion as an 'inner state' and nominalisations such as the language term 'anger' as a name for an 'inner state' (Bedford, 1986). However 'inner states' can be the same and given different names as a result of social context, and also the same name can be given by different people for different 'inner states'. In practice, language labels as 'angry' a behaviour that communicates 'angry' without reference to the person's inner state. The binary of inner/outer reality is sustained by emotion talk. Emotions are not constituted in introspection, but from the language others use. Human action does not spring from an interior world of the mind but arises in the social body (Gergen, 1985).

In my reading of traditional psychology accounts, 'selves' are constituted in and through language and social relations in a particular culture and historical context informed by theories of 'self' that are articulated and that are implicit in the language of that society (Harré, 1983). In Western cultures, dominant discourses of humanism and modernism constitute subjectivities constrained into independent developing 'selves', which are discursive formations, the subjects of the discipline of psychology. By these ideological practices, the individual is divided from society, and psychology re-produces particular privileged and privileging knowledges.
The social animal
Social psychology produces 'social context' as separate from and impacting on the individual. The individual is defined therefore not only as separate from other persons, but as separate from society. Individualism is the stuff of psychological discourse, and social psychology weaves the individual into the social fabric as if the individual were separate from society. Culture and social context of emotion expression has been increasingly acknowledged while maintaining the individual/social split. Emotions are positioned at a meeting of two worlds; the 'natural' world in which people are embodied in time, place, and biology, and the cultural world of imagination and language (Oatley, 1992). In this discourse 'nature' and 'culture' are placed in binary opposition to each other, on one side the body as a 'natural' construction and culture on the other side as 'other' than 'natural'. Emotions are sited at the crossroads of the body and the mind, social in effect, but positioned within individuals.

Social theories of the emotions in modernist psychology do not locate emotions in the social, but reproduce the discourses of emotion as physiology and of the inner world. For example, Fischer & Frijda (1992) use a metaphor of scripts which are culturally and internally based, incorporate emotion rules and are shaped by behavioural models. The principles of the emotional appraisal process, while sensitive to cultural imperatives and group norms, are biological givens. Oatley's (1992) communication theory proposes that emotions are mental states that can be defined, and that have components and communication functions. These theories are individualistic rather than social, and construct emotions as internal mental processes accompanied by bodily disturbance and expression. While these theories have social and communication implications, they frame emotion as constituted biologically, and reproduce dominant psychobiological discourses.

Anger and health
Anger has been implicated in mental and physical health since the psychodynamic theory that depression is suppressed anger (Freud, 1910/1957), and the relationship between anger expression and depression
is of ongoing research interest (Clay, Anderson & Dixon, 1993). The role of anger, hostility and aggression in physical health and emotional well-being is investigated thoroughly by Johnson (1990). Along with theories that suppressed anger is detrimental to health are contrasting theories that the outward expression of anger is hazardous. Keinan, Ben-Zur, Zilka & Carel (1992) summarise the inconsistent findings, and suggest that the social undesirability of anger expression in many contexts may well affect the sometimes beneficial effects of intense anger expression. Counselling practice has also inconsistent approaches to anger which reflect the anger-in anger-out debate. The current popular anger management (Ellis, 1989; McKay et al., 1989) courses encourage anger-in, and encouraging people to ventilate "their" anger is still prevalent in gestalt therapy and neo-Reichian approaches such as bio-energetics where anger is located in the body and needs to be exercised (exorcised?) out.

**Social psychology**

Social psychology is an oxymoron. Typically and paradoxically social psychology has re-produced the individual in the discourse of traditional psychology, and enacted tensions between individuals and their social contexts. In recent theories, emotions have been credited with social 'functions' (Oatley, 1992) and some (not all) emotions are referred to as social emotions. In realist accounts emotions are constituted from socially learned evaluative representations of reality and external reality has an existence separate from the observer. Emotions have a reality of their own within the person, although this reality is socially constituted. And some emotions are more socially constituted than others. Greenwood (1992) instances shame, jealousy, pride and guilt as "constituted by socially appropriate intensional contents, and not by anything else" (p. 31, his italics). Rage and fear, he argues, are best theorised in terms of physiological arousal or innate cognitive appraisal. This theory reproduces two kinds of reality, the physical and 'other', a separation constantly made in and maintained by psychology. Claiming realism is maintaining a positivist position, allowing social constructionism as an add-on to psychology's truth claims, suitable for investigating the 'purely' social, while keeping positivism for 'real' psychology. Poststructuralism
challenges these practices, and in recent years, social psychology has been a site of epistemological debates, and emotions are frequently the object of those debates. In the next chapter I discuss social constructionist accounts of anger which take up these debates and inform my work.

Physiological explanations of emotion are so overlaid with cultural and linguistic factors, that they have become one layer of sociocultural phenomena (Harre, 1986). While bodily sensations certainly are associated with emotions, and emotion talk is about feelings, no one feeling suffices to define any emotion (Armon Jones, 1986). The word “feel” in ordinary speech frequently denotes cognition rather than bodily perturbation. Emotions are framed in most contexts outside psychology as experiences that involve the whole person including the body.

Traditionally the academic discipline of psychology constitutes the object ‘anger’ within the physical body. This location is reproduced in defining practices, in physiological, psychodynamic, cognitive and health psychology, in theories of the ‘self’ and paradoxically in traditional social psychology. The social construction approach re-constitutes anger as a cultural product produced in embodied experience, reflecting and reproducing social and political relations.
Social construction accounts of emotion in psychology shift the focus of attention from the individual to the social, and in this chapter I discuss the social construction of anger in psychology. This and the previous chapter review psychology’s discourses of emotion that produce anger as an object.

In social construction accounts, anger is constituted in social interactions, is a culturally/historically contingent social performance (Averill, 1982, 1990b), and a derivative of social exchange (Gergen, 1985). Emotion is embodied, not ‘natural’ nor ‘shaped’ by environment; and the body reflects and reproduces social relations (Foucault, 1978). Talk about anger enacts social relations in the context of social relationships and institutions, and the social morals, rules and expectations in which they are embedded. This account disrupts modernist epistemologies which constitute anger and emotion within individuals, and posits a completely different explanation. Anger is produced as a ‘construction’ in contexts of ‘social rules’. I discuss the social constitution of anger taking each of the following themes in turn. Anger is informed by cultural themes and values, has social effects, and is constituted in socially contested evaluations. Ethnographic studies point up the cultural relativity of emotions and how anger is constituted in communities where emotions are positioned in the social. The social construction accounts of Averill (1986, 1990b) and Harré (1986) constitute anger in a structure of ‘social rules’. Discourses of gender structure emotion talk (Crawford et al., 1992; Lutz, 1990) re-producing discourses which legitimate and discipline through status and power.
Cultural variation

The social constitution of emotion is demonstrated by cultural variation (Heelas, 1986). This variation can be tracked from culture to culture, across space and across time (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Harré & Finlay-Jones, 1986, Stearns, 1995). Ethnographic studies within specific cultures have identified emotions that are not present in current Western culture, and emotion words which are not at all translatable from one language to another, for example the Japanese “amae” (Morsbach & Tyler, 1986), a form of affection in intimacy which has no English/Western equivalent. There are wide cultural variations in the social acceptability of the expression of emotions, as explored by Stroebe, Gergen, Gergen, & Stroebe (1992) in their cross-cultural discussion of grief. Across time and within a culture, emotions also change. A mediaeval emotion that has become completely out of date is “accidie”, and “melancholy” is little spoken of in present emotion talk (Harré & Finlay-Jones, 1986). Depression, on the other hand, is a twentieth century Western emotion that is widespread (Gergen, 1994).

These reports of cultural variations locate emotions in the social rather than within individuals as innate characteristics that transcend cultural differences. Cultures are not only of various time/space such as history and geographies, but differing cultures for example, ethnicity and gender co-exist within the same time/space. Studies of anger in psychology and ethnography have explored the social constitution of anger within the cultures ethnicity and gender.

Cultures of ethnicity

Studies of anger in other than Western cultures show how anger operates communally. Anger among Hindu in Fiji (Brenneis, 1990) and in the Solomons (White, 1990) is interpersonal and social. In these cultures, emotions are not located as internal states, but in social events, and are not the possessions of individuals, but are constituted in social relations. Brenneis (1990) writes about emotion in Bhagaton, a Hindu village in Fiji, as belonging to the group. Anger is excluded lexically from group emotions (bhaw), and is individually enacted, a ‘solitary’ emotion. The
person who is angry is a passive sufferer of the anger, though in relation to others. Anger arises as a result of specific actions of others and happens to the person. How it is expressed is a different issue; people who express anger frequently are regarded as dangerous. While anger sets the person apart, it is a community concern. The language of this people marks anger as different in that the emotion is not communally shared, and yet the story it appears in is a communal story. I am intrigued that anger in this culture as in ours is a marginalised emotion, the property of the individual and problematic for the group.

Talk of a specific emotion cues an action or event as being an example of a general type. For example anger is talked of as a reaction to injustice and justifies some form of retribution. By using the term “anger”, a whole interactive scenario is signalled with evaluations and behaviours understood. Anger assumes an antecedent moral breach and need for corrective action (Averill, 1980). It also indexes social relations. Among Solomon Islanders, anger functions to increase solidarity (White, 1990), and if it is suppressed, there is increased danger to 'self' and others. The functions of anger in that society are recognised as interpersonal and social. Anger talk operates indirectly as moral idiom, involving presupposition and implication, interpretation and evaluation of contested events. The rhetoric of anger offers remedies, and repair of social relations. In the Solomons the community is involved in group talk about anger which White (1990) translates as “disentangling”, and this process reforms socio-emotional reality. In the disentangling act White describes, the use of the term translated as anger implies the desire and intent to repair social relations, to reconstrue the conflict towards reconciliation rather than retribution. In this context anger is a sociocultural institution that depends on the culture and the interactive situation for meanings and effect, not simply expressed in social situation, but constituted by the types of activities and relations in which anger is enacted. Anger discourse in this particular speech community evokes particular and expected responses interpersonally and socially and opens opportunities for collaborative solutions and group cohesiveness.
Variation in emotion talk among cultures reported in these studies suggests that emotions are not the property of individuals, but are constituted in the social arena. Emotions belong within larger cultural systems of meanings, are relational actions, and the relationships constituted in and through emotion talk are given value and meaning by the social process in which they are embedded. Anger talk may constitute feelings as internal and produced within individuals, but anger talk inevitably involves other people and events as causes or effects. A social casting of the story rearranges the anger as inherent in the interaction and wider social mores rather than within subjects.

**Western individualism**

Western cultures construct the social within the constraints of Western ways of knowing. In the previous chapter I discussed the ‘self’ as reified and constructed romantically in psychological discourse as unchanging, authentic, and essential, and how emotion talk constitutes ‘self’ and others in relation to ‘self’. Psychological theories of the ‘self’ produce and are produced by Western models of the world which locate emotion in self perception, relating to the ‘core’ of the ‘self’, self-concept, and self awareness. Western cultures have socially constructed individualistic selves, dating back to the philosophy of Plato, the New Testament, and with new vigour in modernism following Descartes. In the individualist position, act and actor are presented as separate one from the other, as are intention and action, outer forms and inner states, the body and the mind. Thus emotions are interwoven into the meta-theories of personality, of what constitutes a human being, and thus are created and maintained discourses of the ‘self’, personality, a biological ‘self’, a developing personality, a moral unit, the individual. This topography of the ‘self’, an elaborate cultural discourse, is based on a culturally bound foundation (Appadurai, 1990).

The ‘self’ is a site of diverse social practices produced and positioned socially without an underlying essence. Poststructural deconstructions decentre and destabilise the unitary ‘self’ (Sampson, 1985). According to Foucault (1985), we search for the truth of our being in our desire, or
emotions, feelings. As Foucault traced the production of sexuality, we can trace how emotions have been constituted as physiological forces, located within individuals, and how subjectivities are constituted as unique with an inner life (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990). In each historical period it is not always the same part of ourselves or of our behaviour that is relevant for ethical judgment. In contemporary Western society, the main field of morality, the part of ourselves which is most relevant for morality is our feelings, because feelings are currently constituted as the core of the 'self', the seat of our individuality. Emotions are discourses which continue to constitute the 'self', and the constitution process is not located in the individual, but with-in the social.

Emotion talk is therefore in and about social life. Human realities are maintained by being continually remade in everyday social activities and conversation (Harré, 1983, 1995; Shotter, 1992). In conversation we create, sustain, reproduce and transform social and societal relationships. Emotion is created in rather than shaped by language (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990), and involves issues of sociability and power, the politics of everyday life, and is warranted by the situation as culturally appropriate (Armon Jones, 1986) and constituted in discourse or situated speech practices.

Social construction accounts
The study of emotions in social constructionism is now accumulating some body of literature in psychology (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Averill, 1982, 1986, 1990a, 1990b; Harré, 1986; Crawford et al. 1992; Stearns, 1995). Constructionist versions agree that all psychological phenomena and the beings in which they are realised are produced discursively, that is in language and social practices. Discourse is person-produced in joint action, and discourse and person are mutually produced (Harré, 1992). Emotion talk is ontological, since in and through emotion discourse, subjectivities are constituted, contextualised socially and culturally. Talk about anger positions subjects in social relations, and enables the renegotiation of status and power.
Social ‘rules’
The most detailed account of the social construction of anger is that of Averill (1980, 1982, 1986, 1990a, 1990b) which explores the background of philosophy, history and law that has constructed anger in Western society. He examines the empirical studies of anger as physiology, cognition, and social interaction and brings together a coherent argument of how anger is used in interactions. He defines anger as:

- a conflictive emotion that is (biologically) related to aggressive systems, and, even more important, to the capacities for cooperative social living; (psychologically) is aimed at the correction of some appraised wrong; (socioculturally) functions to uphold accepted moral standards of conduct (1982, p. 317).

In this account anger is an institutionalised way of interpreting and responding to injustice in social settings, sourced by internal representations of social norms and rules that guide appraisal of situations, organisation of responses, and self-monitoring (interpretation) of behaviour. Adult development is recast as increased concern for heuristic ‘rules’ and the possibilities in adulthood of discarding old and taking on new emotional cognitions and behaviours (Averill, 1986).

Social construction accounts constitute societies as structured by ‘rules’, and anger as structured by social ‘rules’. Averill (1982, 1986, 1990a), presents elaborate classifications of constitutive, regulative, and heuristic ‘rules’ which regulate the appraisal of the social situation that triggers anger and govern how anger is perceived and evaluated. Harré (1986) draws on dramatic metaphor to frame emotions as strategic ‘roles’ in social contexts, and produces anger as a ‘role’ in a standard dramatic scenario.

Both Averill (1982, 1986) and Harré (1986, 1987, 1992) recommend that studies of anger would best focus on the systems of ‘rules’ that surround the use of anger words to illustrate how anger involves social conventions, moral orders, moral judgments, and social prescriptions and proscriptions. Averill (1982) suggests that study of ‘systems’ and ‘rules’ will reveal the “prototypic attributes” and social “functions” of anger.
In my reading, both Averill’s and Harré’s accounts reproduce anger as a unitary, predictable entity which is innate and located within individuals. Social ‘rules’ are produced as objects available to be discovered and categorised. Anger is also predictable within these structures as an innate response to injustice. A poststructural approach focuses rather on unfolding how angers are produced in inconsistent and various social practices. Anger is frequently constituted in challenging practices and in negotiating resistant discourses. Social ‘rules’ are constituted in the talk itself, the talk does not reveal ‘rules’ which exist outside discourse. Social practices which produce anger are not simple or predictable, but are multiple, overlapping, inconsistent and reproductive.

**Injustice and the relocation of blame**

The social construction approach to emotion tends to fix anger as a response to injustice. This discourse is utilised by Lakoff (1972) and Kövecses (1986) in their work on metaphors of anger. They describe anger as a response to a moral violation that infringes on the person who is then angry. Warner (1986) unravels how this discourse warrants anger. Anger is self-deception in that it is read by the angry person as response to another who is ‘causing’ the anger. Talk about injustice sets up an external cause, another person who is to blame, and warrants a range of responses according to social contexts that presents the angry person as right. In this way, there is a subtle shift of responsibility away from the angry person who becomes a catalyst for exposing wrongdoing. My reading of the texts in this study suggests that while injustice is a dominant discourse of anger, other warrants are also invoked.

In our culture we use the term ‘anger’ more widely and in more disparate and haphazard scenarios than as a response to injustice. Anger is frequently claimed when there is little or no physiological arousal and disclaimed amid all the physiological signs of prototypical anger. Stories include anger at one telling and not in another telling. Anger is a potent character in storying lives for particular effect in the conversation of the moment.
Cultures of gender

Emotions are particularly engendered in science discourse (Lutz, 1990) which links women and emotionality, the biological and universal features of the female role in physical and social reproduction. Instances of this are visible in studies of premenstrual syndrome and mood, sex differences in facial expressions of emotion, and the affective components of motherhood. The scientific discourse supports the dominant discourse that women are more emotional than men, although the scientific evidence is weak (Lutz, 1990). So wombs, menstruation and hormones predict emotion, and sex differences in aggression are retrospectively predictive of anger. Anger is the one emotion ascribed as male and approved in men, a reversal of the usual legitimation. The argument that anger is connected to testosterone is weak and yet enthusiastically taken up (Fausto-Sterling, 1985). Social science disciplines women and their psyches, presents emotion as individual and intrapsychic, and supports the popular discourse of women as emotional, and requiring control.

Traditional studies of sex differences in experiences and expression of anger have found no significant difference (Averill, 1982). Lutz (1990) examined language use for personalisation measured by speech patterns of tense, voice and pronoun use, and asked whether the cause of anger was personalised, and whether anger was disclaimed. Her findings showed no difference between men’s and women’s personalised language in talking about anger. However the content of anger talk is infused with discourses of gender difference, and constitute femininity as emotional, uncontrolled and dangerous. The metaphor work of Lakoff and his colleagues (Lakoff, 1972, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989) instances these discourses. The qualities that define emotional also define women, natural rather than cultural, chaotic rather than ordered, irrational rather than rational, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, hence dangerous (Lutz, 1990), qualities which are highlighted in the title of Lakoff’s (1972) book, Women, fire and dangerous things.
Crawford et al. (1992) question whether Averill’s statement that anger in the face of injustice is a cultural imperative applies to women, while they agree that moral judgments and justice are interwoven in anger stories. Their stories recalled condemnation for expressed anger, and cite Tavris’ (1982) suggestions that men and women differ in what constitutes injustice and that the context of anger is gendered. In my readings, angers are culturally specific, and men and women belong to different cultures. However men’s and women’s cultures are in the same time/space, so the conflation of anger and aggression which is constituted in men’s culture dominates in the shared culture, and women’s anger is therefore not read as anger by men. Crawford et al. (1992) suggest that women and men experience anger differently because anger is read differently according to the gender of the angry person. The texts they studied are their own memory work on emotion and are present tellings of their stories of children’s and women’s anger. I read their text as gendered discourses which tell stories of women and children being expected to restrain anger, or being labelled as hysterical and emotional. They speak of men’s anger as accompanied by violence or aggression and as expected to be so. They suggest that when anger is associated with violence then the anger may be directed towards inferiors. A person who has power can ensure it with anger (and violence). Anger in these contexts has the underlying threat of violence or power aimed to reduce a challenge to the angry person’s rights. They frame women’s anger as experienced in the status of victim, and found in their stories instances of bursting into tears associated with angry feelings. Frustration and powerlessness are part of their memories of anger, and crying is ineffectual in that the anger of the crying person is misread as hurt or grief. Crawford et al. (1992) conclude that women construct anger as negative, and their anger stories are scenarios of unsuccessful experiences of expression. Anger is invalidated, and misunderstood if the angry person is a child relating to an adult or a woman relating to a man.

Crawford et al.’s (1992) work re-produces the positioning of women as more emotional than men, less violent, more angry, hurt, emotional, and depressed. In reading their text, I am captured by the positioning of
women as powerless and their anger as invalid and diminished in the sight of others. The competing discourse of anger as empowering as valorised in the women’s movement (Chesler, 1972; Schaef, 1986) was not evident in the texts studied by Crawford et al. (1992). When I stand aside from their text and alongside Bronwyn Davies, I begin to wonder anew about the multiple functions that anger talk performs in how gendered subjectivities are constituted, and I read Crawford et al. (1992) from this position as a potent web of discourses re-producing traditional femininity.

**Status and power**

Each of the studies I have outlined that speak of anger as socially constructed, casts power and status in different and inconsistent positions. Averill (1982) states that anger is expressed most often to those of lower status than the angry person. Crawford et al. (1992) tell stories of children’s and women’s anger in relation to adults and men of higher status. Lutz (1990) suggests that anger elevates at least temporarily the social status of the one who is claiming the need for more control. White (1990) tells us that in the Solomon Islands, anger is inappropriate if the parties in conflict are not peers.

Society is hierarchical, and hierarchies are concerned about control of the inner emotional ‘self’, and, further, one ‘self’ over the other (Rosaldo, 1984). The body politic is replicated in the individual body, where cognition controls the physical. Surveillance operates in society and as control over the internal emotional process, so avoiding the need for coercive external control (Foucault, 1977). The socially constructed emotionality of women is full of contradictions, weak and pliant and powerful and uncontrollable, dangerously eruptive and weakly breaking down. These paradoxes consistently attend dominating relationships, and can be found in the relations marked by, for example, gender, age, race and class, where the subordinate are portrayed as weak and requiring protection or discipline, and yet periodically threatening to break out through the ideological boundary in riot or hysteria and as needing to be disciplined and limited.

Each of the accounts of anger presented in this chapter constitutes anger
differently. Social construction accounts use language which restricts the constitution of anger into unitary intra-individual performances. In a Foucauldian analysis we expect power to be a productive network which runs through the whole social body. We expect angers to be reproduced throughout that network, multiple and inconsistent, enabling and constraining subject positions.

In reading the participants' accounts which constitute the texts of this research, I do not follow the recommendations of Averill (1982) or Harré (1986) as to how such a study might be undertaken. I position myself outside social constructionism, and outside unitary constructions of anger within predictable sets of 'rules'. I am interested in pursuing a range of questions; how the word 'anger' and other expressions that cluster around it, are used in this or that cultural milieu and type of episode, (Harre, 1987) how persons are given location and subjectivity within anger discourses (Sampson, 1993), how anger discourse produces and re-produces power relations, how social institutions are maintained by dominant discourses of anger, what are the resistant discourses and how have the dominant discourses adapted or accommodated them, and how anger gets its meaning and force from its location and performance in the public realm of discourse (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990).

“Discourses systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, p. 49). Texts and talk and practices construct the realities in which we live, the truths which we talk, and relate to social life and to power. As I read the texts which form the objects of study in this project, I do not read the language as reflecting thought or experience, but as produced in the interaction of the interview and acting out our common and overlapping cultures and ideologies. The texts are analysed as social practices, and relations of power as well as sociability, both of the interview interaction itself and as stories which open opportunities for the constitution of subjectivities.
Chapter Four
Methodologies

in which the research is designed,
biases are declared, validity is discussed, and
reciprocity and reflexivity are chosen as criteria for evaluation

The primary aim of this research is to study anger as socially constituted in and through language. The methodology arises from the political implications of the theoretical position I am taking. In common with all researchers and their methodology, the approach that I take reflects my beliefs about the world I live in and want to live in (Habermas, 1987, Lather, 1991). Poststructuralism disrupts the sanction of objects of study as observable, unchanging entities. When objectivity is undermined research practice is challenged by questions, for example, how ‘objects’ of study are formed, what are the criteria for validity, and which methodologies are justified. My desire is to do research that is overtly political, that is empowering for participants, and that offers strength to discourses of resistance (Davies, 1993). The prerequisite of this project is therefore to create methodology which enables research practices congruent with values of participant empowerment (Lather, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1993).

Research design
The project is designed around texts which can be read to explore the social constitution of anger. I wanted the array of texts to have qualities of length, that is to span time, and width, that is to vary among productions of anger. Length was achieved by interviewing the counselling students who are the participants in the major study at the beginning of the two years of their counselling training and some of them again three years later, a year after they had completed the training course. Width was provided by interviewing a second group of participants, practising counsellors whose anger talk might be different. The whole project comprises four studies.
The main study is the Student Study in which texts of interviews with counselling students are analysed to identify discourses producing anger. Within the Student Study is nested a Metaphor study, where a group of student and counsellor participants collaborated to identify metaphors of anger in our interview transcripts. In the Counsellor Study, the texts of interviews with experienced counsellors are analysed for discourses producing anger and read for differences from the student texts. A subgroup of participants in the Student Study who had attended the anger workshops were interviewed again after three years, and these texts are read in the Follow-up Study to explore shifts in anger talk over time.

Bias

Now that objectivity is displaced, criteria for "good theory" and rigorous research practice are to be established elsewhere. The question is not are the data and analyses biased, but in whose interests are the data and analyses biased (Lather, 1991), that is, who is privileged, disempowered, empowered or constrained by the research practices. I address the inevitability of bias in the researcher's intentions, in the interviews which produce the texts, in the relationship between the researcher and the research participants, in the reading of the texts that constitutes analysis and in the writing of the text that is the research report. I explain the criteria I employ to ensure validity, using reciprocity and reflexivity as criteria for evaluating validity.

Researcher bias

My decision to be explicitly political arises from my conviction that every act is political and that by making the covert overt we can trace the power relations in the research practice itself as well as in the social practice we are studying. Not to take an overtly political approach is also of course taking a political approach. Psychology's traditional discourses of research which construct values of objectivity, the neutral observer, and value-free findings have powerful political effects by their very silence. My biases are seeded and nurtured by the feminism I read, talk with and act out in my daily work and life. The work of feminist researchers, especially Patti Lather, informs this rationale for the methodologies I choose.
Interview bias

In the interviews, the biases of my beliefs and ideas about anger influence my hearing, listening, responding and shaping the stories that are told. Power is inherent in the relationship between researcher and researched regardless of the method used. This imbalance of power was emphasised in the planning for this study. The participants in the Student Study are students being researched by their tutor, and in the Counsellor Study, are counsellors who are themselves researchers as well as colleagues and perhaps friends of the researcher. The texts are produced subject to these wider influences and the immediate interview environment. Traditionally we would view such data as confounded by the demand characteristics of the interview situation. We would assume that the validity of the research was undermined. Such reservations are predicated upon a belief that "pure" data is possible, that objective truth, however elusive, is theoretically attainable, and that we should endeavour to capture as close to the pure objective truth as we can, humbly admitting the limitations our process imposed upon the elusive goal. Such are the processes of knowledge production and legitimation in psychology (Lather, 1988). In the postmodern context we are interested not in ever elusive objectivity but rather in subjectivities. We focus on the discourses which constitute 'experience' and the texts in which it is inscribed. Validity is still a central concern in research, and rigour is still vital, but our concerns are founded in a different epistemology.

In any verbal exchange language manages subject presentations to produce particular interpersonal and social effects. In this research, demand characteristics are no longer a problem of the interview method of gathering data, but rather become the focal interest of the data. I am interested in how anger is constituted in texts, how anger talk is crafted to constitute subjectivities in the interpersonal situation of interviews. Any interviewer influences the stories told so that they are the coauthors of the story (White & Epston, 1990). My dual/multiple relationships with these participants give permission to the power relationships to enter the texts, and I read the texts accordingly.
Analysis bias
Bias permeates the next stage of the project, reading the texts and constructing the analysis. I read the texts that are produced from the interviews through lenses curved by my cultural and historical location and the biases of the epistemological position I take. I select fragments of these texts to produce a coherent and persuasive argument. My intent is to be consciously partial (Mies, 1984) and to declare my partialities. Another person reading these texts would quilt a different pattern over the pieced together fragments of the interview material. Power is inherent in how I give persons a location and subjectivity as actors within their own stories (Sampson, 1993).

Reporting bias
Bias is present in the crafting of this text, as I carefully build a case for viewing anger (and any other social/interpersonal construct) as socially constituted in and through language in particular ways for particular social ends. To achieve this, I select which research to cite, to critique, to emulate. I craft my words to convince readers that research is political practice and that declaration of political bias and intent is a sound criterion for 'good theory'. The final form of this work is constrained to meet the requirements for my PhD. The writing itself struggles to constitute rather than represent, and I am constrained not to choose words that reproduce the representational assumption (O'Connor, 1996). Language, not persons, becomes the subject. I write this text influenced by my intent to unfold the social constitution of anger, to present the research as true to my methodological values and to fulfil academic requirements. This is my reading of the texts constrained by these contexts. Other readers will read different stories.

Validity
Objective validities of a construct that can be established then retested in different populations to test external validity are illusions of positivism. In this research, validity is located in practice among persons rather than in reified psychological constructs. The focus is on how constructs are produced in talk, in social practice, in the interview process itself.
Participants decide what is valid for themselves in talking, in reading their transcripts and in reflecting on the texts that are formed as they story their lives. Multiple, inconsistent, shifting truths are valid if they are ‘true’ for the participants. For participation to be valid, participants have access to the research goals and rationale, physically in explanations and familiarity with the project planning and materials, and psychologically in the intelligibility of explanations and the accompanying literature.

Reciprocity and reflexivity
In planning and carrying out the project, I have checked my practice against the criteria of reciprocity (Oakley, 1981) and reflexivity (Lather, 1991). Reciprocity was enacted throughout the project. I returned transcripts to participants after interviews. Anger workshops were provided free of charge for participants at the end of the first and second year of their training as extra training, and transcripts were available again as part of those workshops. Participants were invited to collaborate in the data analysis, so that they would understand at least some aspects of the analyses, and this collaboration formed the Metaphor Study. At the workshops, I gave information on the progress of the research project, and I provided copies of articles and books I was using that related to counselling.

These checks on reciprocity ensured that participation maximised opportunities for self reflection and deeper understanding for the researched (Lather, 1991). Self reflexivity means that the theories of knowledge are applied to the person propounding the theory. I aimed to disrupt the distant and privileged role of the researcher and to address directly the implications of the positioning of researcher and researched for the inquiry (Lather, 1993).

Involving the participants in the research endeavour is an attempt to offer a discourse of resistance to the dominant discourses in psychology research (Rose, 1979, Lather, 1993). Concerns for neutrality and objectivity have produced power relationships which privilege the researcher as expert and locate participants as passive objects. Power is produced in locating
persons as the objects of the researcher’s gaze. In this work, I attempt to subvert these power relationships. As researcher I refused the role of expert on participants’ lives/experiences, affirmed participants as experts in their own lives and became a participant myself. I gave the interview transcripts back to participants for checking to bring us together as collaborators in cooperative enquiries (Heron, 1981; Reason, 1988; Reason & Rowan, 1981) about our conversations about anger. I arranged workshops for participants focussed on working with clients who identify as angry, to ensure reciprocity (Oakley, 1981). I included participants in the analysis of the data, and I wrote up my reading of texts positioning discourse as the subject of the constitution of anger.

**Researcher as participant**

To position myself among the participants, I was interviewed by a colleague who is also a participant, and the text of that interview forms part of the research material in the Metaphor Study and the Counsellor Study. My story is included among the texts that form the objects of study which challenges the traditional researcher-researched divisions.

**Expert power**

These efforts to disrupt research practice do not remove the expert power of the researcher, and in some ways even add to it. There is however, acknowledgement of and sharing of that power, constantly asking whom the research discourses serve. My goal is to ensure that being involved in the research programme empowers participants and enables research as praxis (Lather 1988; Mies, 1984). The design of the project enabled the participants who were students in a counselling course to be involved in psychology research as experiential learning alongside acquiring counselling skills, with the intent of providing reciprocal education (Reason & Rowan, 1981). Tacit/subjective knowledge is interwoven with and mutually informing propositional/objective knowledge (Heron, 1981). This mutually educative practice modelled the philosophy of the counselling training; person centred, affirming clients/students as experts in their own lives, with the counsellor/lecturer coming from a position of unknowing. The learning thus enabled for the participants was not so
much about anger as about the negotiated relationships within the research process. The endeavour to include participants in the research in these ways is a check on validity.

While participation on these terms is enabling, it also imposes constraints on participants because of the complexities of the relationships with the researcher/lecturer and the colleagues/fellow students. Power is generated from the bottom up, and research participants readily comply with the researcher’s goals and methods. To break through compliance and collusion (Reason, 1988) I returned copies of the transcripts to participants at three stages of the project, and made available opportunities for re-reading and re-telling their stories.

Validity in the postmodern context requires self reflexive consideration of the research premises (Gergen 1991; Lather, 1993; Reason, 1988; Reason & Rowan, 1981). Reflexivity problematises our positions as distanced observers and the desire to fill the space, as Parker (1992) warns, adds nothing to validity if it is not biased and politicised. Reflexivity acts to make the covert overt, and to surface the power relations implicit in the research process. As I read the text I have constructed in writing up the research, I inscribe notanda on the left hand pages, as appliqués on the surface of the text. From these reflexive positions, I am able to insert a critical distance from my reading of the texts as I record my reflections.

Validity is also involved in how a priori theory is changed by the logic of the data. That this occurs in empirical studies is a ‘truth’ that is obscured in the practice of objectivity in writing the texts of research reports. In this research I have surfaced the dance between theory and data both in the ongoing communications with participants and the construction of this text which stories the research. I intend in doing this to establish construct validity that will illuminate and change social practices by allowing multiple and contrary patterns and alternative explanations. Participants at each stage are re-authoring their anger stories, and over the four years of the research, these stories become palimpsests, new stories overlay the old, and earlier writings are discernible if illegible under more recent script.
The methodology used in this study claims transgressive validity as it transgresses traditional practice (Lather, 1993). Validity is achieved only insofar as I reject the construction of truth as correspondence between thought and ‘reality’. My work is valid to the extent that I am able to undermine traditional structures. I am successful when I subvert and unsettle research practice with multiple beginnings, and complex interactivities opening up possibilities for everyone involved in this project including those who read this text and I am successful when those involved question the practices of psychology teaching, research and applications in counselling psychology. Finally, validity is ensured only if I go too far, repeat myself, exceed the boundaries of the expected and approved (Lather, 1993).

Power resides in the very forms of knowledge and understanding that traditional research and scientific practices generate (Sampson, 1993). Participatory research challenges psychology’s research discourses of measuring behaviour and making truth claims and exemplifies a shift to the dynamics and power plays of meaning making, and overt struggle with the ontological and epistemological issues that are raised. In this project, I include participants in the research process to open opportunities to respond to these challenges. As I do so, I am aware that as the researcher, I retain the power of deciding on the design of the project, the process of the interviews that produce the texts, and the methods of analysis which read and interpret those readings. I structure the collaborative study, facilitate the group process and write up the work within my overall design. Throughout the process, I have endeavoured to surface the power plays in the research process. Wishing to abdicate power, however, does not preclude that power from entering the process, and the responsibility for empowering participants remains. We are inscribed in that which we resist and attempt to transform (Lather, 1991).
As I have been working on this thesis, people have frequently asked me what method of analysis I am using. That is quite a question. I read my way into where I am now, beginning with Foucault and then through various forms of discourse and conversation analysis, and then back to Foucault. These reading adventures continued, and in recent months I have been enjoying Derrida and Lyotard whose texts were inaccessible to me five years ago.

So what is the method of analysis? I was very aware that I was not following any one method. Asked to clarify my position among discourse analysts, I would choose a place near Parker, comfortable in the recognition of the politics of discourse, and where I keep Foucault's texts within reach. In the first year of this enterprise, while I was planning the research and putting together the thesis proposal, Kerry Chamberlain and I worked on analysing some interview data to identify discourses of Meaning in Life. In doing so, we focused on the broader meaning of 'discourse', using Foucault and Parker as guides. The difficulty we had in publishing the resulting paper was illuminating in many ways. One journal suggested to us that Foucault talks about discourse analysis, but doesn't do it. Like Picasso doesn't paint! Obviously more detailed linguistic analysis was required. One result of these rejections was that I decided to use detailed and specific analytic tools for this enterprise.

I was aware that I had no models and I desired a rigour that would match statistical analysis. I know that qualitative methods demand a rigour that statistical analyses do not require, but I am also aware that adherents to quantitative methods would not agree. So I set about to weave linguistic analysis into the poststructural meanings of 'discourse'. What did I call my method? Fred. I took pride in my originality.

And now that the enterprise is completed, and I read the text that has resulted, I realise how unoriginal this is. I followed no particular model, and that is at times obvious in the juxtaposition of styles. However Fred does not look unfamiliar. I disclaim conversational analysis or discourse analysis, but my work has elements of these. Foucault would wonder where the social history is. Derrida would shake his head at the whole 'project' and its purposes.

And yet I like this position I have made for myself, on a comfortable quilt patched from a variety of sources, making a new pattern which is recognisably mine.
Chapter Five

Method of obtaining texts

In which the method used to obtain texts is outlined, how participants volunteered, and how interviews proceeded, and the Student Study is described in relation to the other studies.

In this research, texts are read for anger talk and how anger is constituted as an object in discourse. In this chapter, I outline the method used to obtain the texts which are the objects of study in the Student Study, the Counsellor Study and the Follow-up Study.

Participants in the Student Study

The main study in this project is the Student Study. To obtain texts of anger talk, I chose to interview people who were interested in anger and emotion in relationships. I invited participation from a group of counselling students who were undertaking a counselling course of which I was at that time lecturer/trainer. The participants in the Student Study are students who were then in the first year of the Certificate in Counselling at Palmerston North College of Education in February 1993.

Criteria for entry into the course were experience in people intensive occupations and demonstrated skills in interpersonal communication and group cooperation. The group selected for training included eighteen women and two men, eighteen Pakeha and two Maori. Occupations included counsellors in practice, educators in primary schools, tertiary institutions and adult education settings in the community, nurses, and voluntary workers in community groups such as Men Against Violence, Parent Line, Rape Crisis, and Samaritans.

The proposal for the project was approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee. The class of twenty people were invited to participate in the study, and all 20 volunteered. Informed consent was obtained with emphasis on the freedom to withdraw from the study without effect on membership of the training group. Information sheets and Informed Consent forms are included in Appendix A. Keith Tuffin,
TALKING ABOUT ANGER

What is anger

A recent anger story

Anger throughout your life

Society's expectations

Counselling

Figure 1: Interview checklist
one of the supervisors of my thesis, met the group at this stage to check informed consent and to offer support to any participant who might have concerns during the course of the research. In this way, we established an independent safeguard of participant wellbeing, to balance the disadvantages of my dual role as lecturer/trainer and researcher.

Interview Procedure
I interviewed each participant and audiotaped the interview, turning the recorder on after informed consent was obtained and rapport achieved. I use the word interview with caution. Participants were invited to talk about anger, and I spoke little in the interchange. However, I listened and reflected and occasionally asked for clarification, and my presence alone inevitably influenced the authoring of the story. Attending practices are not value free, but are potent and both enable and constrain story telling. I therefore encouraged participants to talk about the topics which interested me out of awareness that I would do so covertly, and I preferred to be open about what I wanted. A list of these topics lay on the table beside the recorder microphone, and is depicted in Figure 1. I ensured that texts would contain defining talk, a recent anger story, a story about the participant’s ‘anger career’, and counselling discourses.

The transcripts of the interview audiotapes were returned to participants for checking and removing any material that was not to be available for analysis. At the end of the first year I ran an anger workshop. During the workshop I shared some literature on anger and counselling, including the work of Albert Ellis (1989), Harriet Goldhor Lerner (1990) and Matthew McKay, Peter Rogers and Judith McKay (1989). We collaborated to pool our expertise in collating our own resources for counselling interventions for clients who are concerned about anger. At the end of the two year course we had a second workshop where participants again received copies of their transcripts, more material on counselling and anger, including strategies suggested by Lesley Cameron Bandler and Michel Lebeau (1986), and a summary of the progress of the project, and we collaborated on the Metaphor Study.
The Metaphor Study

The Metaphor study is nested in the Student Study, and is a re-reading of some of the same texts. My purpose in running it separately was to provide an opportunity to include the student/participants in the research process. The reciprocity (Oakley, 1981) thus established enriched both the educative and research processes (Reason & Rowan, 1981) bringing together counselling training and psychology research.

All participants in the Student Study were invited to take part in a day long workshop. Seven of the twenty accepted the invitation. There were nine of us present, including two participants in the Counsellor Study described below. I facilitated the collaborative data analysis in the morning, and my colleague provided a counselling training session in the afternoon.

We collaborated in a metaphor hunt through the texts. I introduced the tasks by presenting the work of Kövecses (1989) on metaphors of romantic love to give a range of examples of metaphorical language without over influencing the anger task. Participants each reread our own transcript, and then worked in pairs to identify metaphors of anger in those texts. Each example was then recorded on a card. We all gathered into one group, and in turn each put out on the floor one example of a metaphor that differed from the previous example, until overlapping was inevitable. We added similar metaphors to those examples, and rearranged them until clusters of like metaphors were grouped on the floor. Finally we arranged the clusters in relation to each other to find an overriding pattern. Throughout, this process involved talk, argument and laughter as we negotiated decisions about groupings into clusters and the sequencing of clusters. The result was a lineup of bundles of cards. I secured the bundles each with a rubber band and marked with its order in the sequence. Later I transcribed the metaphors on the cards into listed groups and compared our lists to those compiled by Kövecses (1989). I wrote up this study with feedback from three other participants and checked back with all participants for editing. The metaphor study forms Chapter Thirteen of this thesis.
The Counsellor Study
In the counsellor study, I read the texts of anger talk of counsellors who have substantial counselling experience. I was interested in whether counselling experience would make available more/other anger discourses and how participants of the two groups might use various discourses to constitute subjectivities. I invited seven counsellors to participate, six of whom are psychologists. I selected participants deliberately to represent a wide range of espoused counselling approaches, so that similarities across texts would transcend theoretical differences. I am a participant in this study, and was interviewed by a colleague who is also a participant in this study. I interviewed the other seven. The interview was unstructured as in the first study with the same list of topics. Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. Transcripts were returned to participants for checking and editing.

The Follow-up Study
The rationale for the fourth study, the follow up study, was to track the anger talk of participants over time. To obtain these texts I interviewed the six people who had remained involved in the workshops through the three years of the study and who had completed the Palmerston North College of Education Certificate in Counselling. At the beginning of the interview I gave participants another copy of their 1993 transcript and they read them again. I then invited them to talk about their reading of the transcript. In this interview I said I wanted to hear about how they had changed in their ideas and experiences of anger since that interview. Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed, and transcripts were returned to participants for checking and editing. My copies of the transcripts are filed under the pseudonyms used throughout this text.

Once the interviews were transcribed and checked, the texts were ready to be analysed. In the following chapter, I explain the method of analysis.
Full of hope and

Those two came carrying wine and meat and bread,
And healed my wounds with unguents out of flowers
That feed white moths by some De Danaan shrine;
Then in that hall, lit by the dim sea-shine,
We lay on skins of otters, and drank wine,
Brewed by the sea-gods. In urn huge cups that lay
Upon the lips of sea-gods in their day;
And then on heaped-up skins of otters slept.
And when the sun once more in saffron step,
Rolling his flagrant wheel out of the deep,
We sang the loves and angers without sleep.
Chapter Six
The analysis

in which the analysis places
three overlays on the texts; the discourses of anger,
the constitution of subjectivities and the linguistic tools of analysis

The analyses I use to unfold my reading of the texts arise out of the concerns I have outlined in the previous chapter. Postmodern dilemmas are at the forefront of what I like to think of as my mind, and I long (briefly) for a modern clarity of aim and method. I might ally myself with a particular approach, a respect-able mentor. However, there is no formula, no map to follow (Gavey, 1989). The method I have used in this study is informed by my reading in feminisms especially the works of Patti Lather (1986, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1993) and Bronwyn Davies (1989, 1993). To analyse these anger texts, I have chosen to focus in detail on how discourses of anger are constituted in language and on how these discourses are utilised in constituting subjectivities. I do this by pointing out the forms of language which have particular discursive effects.

The three overlays
In reading these transcripts I place three overlays on the texts. My primary interest is in the discourses of anger participants invoke. I am then interested in how anger discourses constitute subjectivities. To illustrate how this process is enacted, I give specific examples of language use in anger talk that re-produce available discourses and at the same time constitute subjectivities.

Discourses producing anger
Anger is produced in the texts in and through discourses which may be deconstructed. These discourses form the first overlay through which I read the texts. To trace recurring ways of talking about anger, I read and reread the transcripts and what I have called themes emerged in my reading. I then labelled these themes and colour coded fragments of the transcripts accordingly. These fragments were collated and filed under 26
| ANGER THEMES |
|--------------|----------------|
| A | Definitions |
| B | Real Anger |
| C | Different from |
| D | Control |
| E | Aggression |
| F | Injustice |
| G | Frustration |
| H | Helplessness |
| I | Expectations |
| J | Past/learned |
| K | Displaced |
| L | Feels physically |
| M | Energy |
| N | Catharsis |
| O | Dissociated |
| P | Suppressed |
| Q | Health |
| R | Interpersonal |
| S | Good /Bad |
| T | Skills |
| U | Mask |
| V | Family |
| W | Children |
| X | Gender |
| Y | School |
| Z | Culture |

Figure 2: Anger themes
theme labels (Figure 2) with many fragments cross coded under more than one label. Some of these themes were clusters of similar content, for example definitions of anger, anger as different from other specified emotions, the recurring connection of anger with other emotions, for example frustration and helplessness, and the physical sensations associated with anger. Other themes were the contexts of anger stories, including injustice, interpersonal interactions, family, school, and gender. I also noted recurring words with associations that spoke to me of social practices and moralities implying warrants of anger expression, and I collected all the instances of that word, for example "good", "bad", "injustice", "control", "real anger", "energy".

Figure 2 lists the files in which these fragments were stored. The theme labels at this early stage of analysis relate little to the final presentation. Each fragment was identified by the letter of the theme label and by the number of its position in that file. I then read and re-read again these fragments in relation to each other, moving back to the full texts to check context and to enable reading the fragment in different ways. As I read, the themes faded into the background, as recurring patterns emerged and I became increasingly aware of how anger is produced in and through discourse in the texts. As I produce fragments throughout this text, I have used pseudonyms which are matched for the sex and ethnicity of the participants. All pseudonyms are from names of herbs and some, but not all, participants chose their own. The only notation of transcripts is the usual punctuation of narrative, since I have worked with transcripts as written texts. The words are transcribed as spoken, with the repetitions, hesitations, and incomplete utterances that are characteristic of spoken words.

As I wrote about how discourses produce anger as an object, I drew threads together and played with them until the thematic material could be braided into three plaits. The first plait of themes tracks the constitution of anger in psychology throughout the participants' anger talk. In Chapter Two I wrote about the dominant discourses of academic psychology with participants' accounts in mind. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I give
instances of how these discourses are realised in participants’ accounts. The second plait brings together various ways in which talking about anger positions the speaker as an arbiter of morality. Talk about anger frequently re-produces values, and anger itself is the object of moral evaluation. This plait comprises Chapter Nine. The third plait braids the themes which constitute anger in the social domain.

Chapters Ten, Eleven, and Twelve discuss how anger is invoked as a reaction to the actions of others, and warranted, tolerated or disapproved of in inconsistent ways as relations are negotiated. These are the key topics of the first overlay. In these chapters, the content is arranged around the discourses which constitute anger in the texts of the Student Study.

**The constitution of subjectivities**

The second overlay is the constitution of subjectivities. Talking about anger has multiple discursive effects. An overarching effect which I explore in this reading of the texts is how subjectivities are constituted in anger talk. This exploration forms the second overlay on the texts. Discourses position subjects in society and constitute subjectivities. In our culture, it is important to negotiate an individual ‘identity’, a ‘self’ with an ‘inner world’, a ‘self’ that is gendered. To stand aside from the dominant discourses of psychology which constitute ‘identity’ and ‘self’ as objects, I prefer the poststructural term ‘subjectivity’, and I am interested in how anger talk constitutes subjectivities as integrated, unitary selves with values and feelings and minds. Subjectivities are constituted as multiple, fragmented and decentred (Hermans, Kempen, & Rens, 1992; Sampson, 1985), and versions of subjectivity shift with and adapt to particular interactions. In this research participants are interacting with me as the researcher and me as the lecturer in the counselling training programme. Some participants already know me in other time/spaces, and these multiple relationships are the contexts for their anger talk. Subjectivities are constituted in the relations between participants and me in multiple contexts, and are re-constituted in the scenarios of their interactions with others as positions are taken within stories of and around anger.
Discourses are reproduced according to appropriateness to social context and speaking subjects are constituted with partial awareness of their positioning. The dominant discourses in our culture in general, and within the sub-culture of humanistic counselling in particular, re-produce volition and choice over actions and, to a lesser extent, over reactions.

Emotion talk is gendered, positioning subjects as in gendered ‘identities’, and as knowing appropriate behaviours, beliefs and values of that position, and as able to step outside those prescriptions in some circumstances. Emotion talk constitutes inner worlds, and individuals with inner depth and self awareness who are unique persons constantly in the process of growth.

These are the key topics of the second overlay. Here I read the texts for how subjectivities are constituted as unique individuals who are gendered, have inner lives, are in the ongoing process of growth, and who are emergent counsellors.

**The linguistic toolbox**
The third overlay on the texts assembles the tools of the analysis. Taking up language use as tools is problematic in this poststructural enterprise. My desire is to decompose anger talk and to enjoy the diversity of words and relations among words rather than to reproduce logocentrism (Derrida, 1978), but I am limited by my own context. I desire to unravel how discourses are employed to constitute subjectivity, and I can only use the means I understand and have within my grasp. These are the tools of Latinate and transformational grammar (Grinder & Elgin 1973) from the toolboxes of my past interests in language. I am aware these are the traditional devices of analysing language as representing ‘reality’, and I handle them with care. In using the language of grammars to talk about speech, I follow the practices of authoritative writers who position grammar as rhetorical rather than referential to the events that are spoken of (Shotter, 1993). The terminology of grammar enables us to talk about how we speak in ways that are responsive to those around us. “In other
words, the crucial event to focus upon is not speaking in general, but upon this or that particular act of speaking; and the task is to describe (critically) the influences at work in its shaping" (Shotter 1993, p. 58). Ways of talking construct forms of 'reality'. Mülhausler & Harré (1990) present an extensive analysis of pronouns as indicative and constitutive of ontology and social relations. In discussing agency, Harré (1995) explores the conventions of the grammar of the first person, and Edwards and Potter (Potter & Edwards, 1990; Edwards & Potter, 1995) use grammatical tools to explicate the discursive construction of attribution. In this project, I use the terminology of grammar to point up the detail of how discourses produce anger as an object and constitute subjectivities.

I am interested in how anger talk positions speakers in relation to the anger that is spoken, whether persons or anger are the grammatical subject of the action, whether anger is internally or externally located, owned willingly or unwillingly or disclaimed, and how distance is set up from the anger the talk produces. Active and passive voices are grammatical indicators of modality. The vocabulary of emotion words connotes modality, for example, hope is passive in relation to expectation, but anger can be cast as actor or object. Pronoun use is a more subtle indicator of modality. Speakers may use the second and third person pronouns in describing their own actions, and shifting pronouns can effect distance from the action of the verb. For example, the second person pronoun "you" may refer to the interviewer, the speaker herself, no one in particular and everyone in general. General words like "people", “society” take the distance from the anger even further. The systematic vagueness of such language usages positions subjects at a distance from the anger the talk constitutes (Potter & Edwards, 1990).

Traditional grammar indicates particular subject position by noting changes in the mood of verbs. In this analysis I bring into question the traditional distinction between moods. The crisis of representation has destabilised the indicative. The indicative frames a statement that represents a ‘fact’, a definition called into question once language is understood to construct rather than describe reality. Once language is cast
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINGUISTIC RUSES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Generalisation</td>
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<td>Deletion</td>
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<td>Distortion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generalised referential index</td>
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<td>Non-specific verb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex equivalence</td>
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<td>Universal quantifier</td>
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<td>Reversed referential index</td>
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<td>Nominalisation</td>
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<td>Implied causative</td>
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<td>Comparative deletion</td>
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<td>Lost performative</td>
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<td>Modal operator of necessity</td>
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<td>Modal operator of possibility</td>
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<td>Mind reading</td>
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Figure 3: Linguistic ruses
as constitutive, then verbs do more than indicate. A statement does not represent some external 'reality', but has an interpersonal function. Making a statement of 'fact' is at least also a request to be heard. In this analysis, I have found it useful to use the traditional terminology of subjunctive and imperative moods to point up specific effects of anger talk.

In ordinary talk, language is used which omits specific references and casts the story in particular ways. In this analysis I have adapted the metamodel distinctions of Bandler & Grinder (1975) into tools of analysis which I call "linguistic ruses". I disclaim the metaphor of language as mapping of territory (Korzybski, 1958) which is associated with the metamodel distinctions (Bandler & Grinder, 1975) and argue instead that language is the territory. I take up a position in poststructuralism to deconstruct the language forms which produce objects and position speakers in the story as it is crafted in the moment of speech. My interest is in how language constitutes subjectivity, and the linguistic terms I use are precise tools to bring into relief some of the subtleties of language use that achieve its constitutive power.

The collection of linguistic ruses presented in Figure 3 begins with the three broad terms generalisation, deletion and distortion. Generalising enables speakers to distance themselves from the specific and to restrict the entry of counter examples. Deletion is the term for language use that omits referents or part of the story. Deletion usually creates distance between the speaker and the action of the verb and shifts the speaker position from actor to acted upon. Thus responsibility and agency are subtly disclaimed. Distortion shapes the account into a particular skew. The other ruses itemised in Figure 3 are specific examples of generalisation, deletion and distortion. A lost performative is an implied command with a deleted author(ity) which positions speakers as acted upon. Universal quantifiers and modal operators suggest unspecified imperatives where the source of the command is deleted, and the commanding is generalised, distorting the logic of the utterance, and imposing limits on what is feasible. These limits might hint at
Figure 4: Three overlays of analysis
LANGUAGE USE

Tense
Voice
Mood
Pronouns
Linguistic ruses
justification for inaction. More subtly still, generalised referential indices, non-specific verbs, deleted referents and deleted comparatives omit specific referents, creating a vagueness with the strategic effect of disclaiming agency (Potter & Edwards, 1990). Complex equivalence, cause-effect and implied causatives constitute causal relationships by language form that are otherwise not spoken. Mind reading is stating assumed thoughts and feelings of others as established ‘facts’ which justify judgments and actions. Nominalisations such as “communication”, “relationship” and, indeed, “anger” distort by creating entities between the speaker and the other, obscuring and setting up obstacles in the space between, and justifying difficulties in relating. As I offer my readings in this text, my use of these terms is explained as I unfold each example.

These then are the tools I use to delineate how anger is produced and subjectivities constituted in discourse. I pay particular attention to disclaimers and denials and linguistic ruses that distance the speaker from the anger they are talking about. I focus on the voice, tense and mood of verbs, the use of pronouns and meta-model distinctions which make available particular subject positions. Metaphorical language enables opportunities to produce objects outside the usual constraints, and I am interested in how metaphors in the texts produce anger. To enable participants to be involved in the data analysis, metaphors of anger have been analysed in a separate study nested within the Student Study and is a reading of some of the same texts. Identifying and opening up metaphors is fun, and seemed to me to be appropriate for the collaborative analysis. The Metaphor Study which resulted is written up in Chapter Thirteen. These are the key topics of the third overlay on the texts in the Student Study.

**Overlapping the overlays**

I present the three overlays graphically in Figure 4 to demonstrate how this text is written in the intersection of these three areas of attention, discourses, subjectivities and language usages. In the space where the three overlap, I unfold participants’ stories as re-productions of discourses of academic psychology, which enable moral evaluations, and produce
anger in social interactions. I portray participants’ anger talk as constituting subjectivities in social relations, specifically with me in the interview context. Their stories constitute subjectivities as unique individuals, gendered, with inner lives, volition and agency, and enable subject positions in and outside agency, distance and responsibility. I am interested in the production of subjectivities appropriate to counselling students at the beginning of the project, experienced practitioners in the Counsellor Study, and emergent counsellors in the Follow up Study. I am also interested in the enablements and constraints the interview contexts place on the constitution of subjectivities.

The writing of this text is linear, and to present the area where the three overlays overlap, the discourses of anger have emerged as the linear plot line of the story this thesis tells. As I discuss discourses, I comment on the constitution of subjectivities and the language forms in anger talk which open up subject positions in relation to the objects of that talk. Such is the (dare I use the word?) structure of my text in the Student Study. The analysis unfolds in the next seven chapters, beginning with the reproduction of psychological discourses.
Chapter Seven

Diverse definitions

in which anger is defined, categorised, and related to other emotions, and 'real' anger is associated with violence and control

The first plait of themes in the student study is the constitution of anger in accounts which draw on psychological discourses. I weave this plait in this and the next chapter. In this chapter, I focus on defining talk and the conflation of anger with aggression and control, and in the next chapter, on the reproduction of psychology's discourses of anger as physiology, sampling a range of theoretical stances, and endorsing anger suppression as unhealthy.

Defining and categorising

Defining and categorising anger among emotions is a prevalent discourse of anger in psychology as established in Chapter Two. I comment there that the search for definition is a search to identify the 'essential' nature of an emotion, and that anger is defined in terms of what it is distinct from. Smedslund (1993) emphasises the importance of distinguishing between the phenomenon of anger, the ordinary language term anger and a scientific term anger. This distinction is in itself scientific practice, separating anger from talk about anger, and further separating 'ordinary' from scientific talk. Where I stand, these separations are fictive. The 'phenomenon' of anger is constituted in language, drawing from scientific and lay discourses. Participants' accounts coopt scientific/psychological discourses for particular effects. Since participants are counselling students speaking to their tutor, psychology discourses are eminently suitable for constituting subjectivities in the interview context.

Defining and categorising activities separate anger as an entity that is distinct from other emotions. As I read the texts for defining talk I find anger produced as an object which is ascribed shifting meanings, frequently mingled with and overlapping other emotion words. Furthermore defining and categorising are themselves discursive acts,
Now that I am presenting my analysis I wish to reiterate (again) that in this thesis I am presenting my reading of the texts. Multiple readings are possible. Other readers will find other story lines and may well consider my reading overly interpretative.

My reading is informed by my context and history and I am aware that moral evaluation has imbued my own story. I struggle to identify its bonds and clinging weblike threads as myself is constituted even as I write this text. Many of my counselling clients tell me stories of such struggles in their lives, and anger talk opens opportunities for speaking ourselves into new spaces and adopting any of a multitude of moral positions.

I can almost hear an imaginary reader deny that language can carry all these meanings. Perhaps the tools of my analysis are too delicate or too clumsy to match the degree of intricacy you read into the textual fragments I have set out for your perusal. I can only say again that this is my reading of the texts. I am convinced that it is in the language we use that we collectively and disparately constitute knowledge of what we then speak of as ourselves, others and the world. I write this text to unravel the complex knitting together of anger, social practice and subjectivity and search for the patterns that guide the craft.

From the imaginary reader who makes critical comments in my head as I write, I ask for patience. I invite you to suspend your disbelief and to read the whole story. When you finish your reading of my text, we can dialogue competing readings. By then, I may well agree with you. Consistency is not my goal, and I continually relinquish the defence positions I find myself in.
Diverse definitions concern with negotiating particular positions (Edwards, 1991). In this chapter, I focus on how defining anger enables subject positions and constitutes subjectivities. In defining talk, anger is located among emotions and in relation to and overlapping with other emotions. Anger is linked especially with frustration, powerlessness and disappointment. Anger is also identified as covering or being covered by other emotions.

Each transcript includes defining talk, usually towards the beginning of the text, occasionally reflectively at the end. Most texts begin with statements that anger is an emotion. The simple definition is typically followed by a particular frame which sets up a context for the story which follows. The following fragments frame anger in turn; as a release, an expression, as part of a person’s ‘identity’, and as originating within a person and as uncontrolled. Each of these frames positions anger differently:

Yeah, anger’s an emotion. It’s an emotional thing. It’s a release valve. (Daphne)

Well, probably what I understand anger to be is, um, an emotion, rather an extreme emotion, um, it expresses something that worries me or or a- annoys me or frustrates me in some way. (Flora)

I would say it’s an emotion. It’s your feelings, something that you feel. It’s part of you, part of your person. (Poppy)

It’s an emotion, um, a feeling. It feels like it’s something that wells up inside me. (Sage)

I think it’s a sort of a - It’s a sort of uncontrolled emotion. (Basil)

Defining talk positions subjects and sets up their stories for particular effects. In the above fragments, defining talk produces anger variously to set up a different story. A “release valve” introduces Daphne’s story of anger as release of tension, and Flora’s story is framed in a context of ‘extreme’ expression of anger for interpersonal ends. Anger as “part of
your person” positions Poppy in an ‘identity’. “Something that wells up inside” Sage constitutes inner worlds at the beginning of her story. “Uncontrolled emotion” locates Basil’s account in discourses of control. Defining is not a neutral activity nor even a matter of description, but is a discursive practice, enabling and constraining the stories which follow.

**Anger and other emotions**
The scientific practice of categorising anger as a distinct entity in contrast to other emotions is not reproduced in participants’ accounts. Indeed, anger is presented as combined with rather than separate from other emotions, and while it is identifiable, it does not stand alone:

I am thinking that, in fact, I find it really hard to isolate anger from other emotions and thinking, I wonder when I experience just anger and it’s probably quite infrequent, that mainly I can experience sadness or frustration or mainly even fear, and anger can come as a result of that. (Iris)

That’s the thing, it’s never anger by itself for me, it can never be. I don’t think I’ve ever really had anger by itself, because there’s all more other emotions heaped in. With anger, you might be jealous as well, or you might be feeling sad as well, it might be sadness that’s making you angry or whatever, and that’s why I often use writing or drawing, because it actually helps you to work out what other emotions there are all mixed in, because I don’t know that I have ever just been angry. There’s always other stuff. (Melissa)

In these fragments, anger is constituted in and among other emotions and is produced as a result of other emotions, sadness, frustration and fear in Iris’ account and jealousy and sadness in Melissa’s. Subjectivities are constituted with complex emotional experience and competence in talking about emotions. These are qualities congruent with counselling expertise, and the language used positions speakers with complexity in their own emotions and as competent counselling students. Counsellors are expected to be able to identify and reflect feelings. This is not simple when feelings are spoken of as separate from each other and co-existent, and
needing to be disentangled from each other. The next fragment produces anger mingled with frustration, hurt and indignation:

For me it's probably a situation makes me angry and I think it's fairly immediate. Because if it started with somebody annoying me, I'd probably tell them they're annoying me and if that didn't resolve it, then probably it might grow to an anger, but normally things latterly that have made me angry, are things that have just happened, I suppose. It's a feeling of - oh it's a mixture, isn't it, I don't know. It's a mixture of frustration, hurt, um, indignance, indignity - ah of course, indignation. (Tansy)

The subject is positioned in passivity, as generalised 'things' 'make' her angry among other emotions. A continuum of annoyance to anger is constructed, within which anger is defined among a mixture of emotions that arise from social contexts. The subject is positioned as powerless by non-specific language, the nominalisation 'situation', generalised referential index 'things', distorted cause-effect 'makes me angry' and unspecified verb 'just happened'.

**Anger and frustration**

The co-production of frustration with anger makes room for abdication of agency. In many accounts, anger and frustration are closely intertwined:

The emotional aspect of it is, yes, it's frustration, I honestly think that anger and frustration for me go very closely together, but not all frustrations make me angry, but I would say that whenever I'm angry I'm also frustrated. (Iris)

Frustration has passive modality, in that the subject is prevented by some external agent from achieving their intended goals. The speaker is positioned with little or no choice. Agency is outside the speaker's range of action, and can be the source of or justification for anger. Anger is warranted as the only option to remove the block which does the frustrating:

I think for me it's really a type of frustration, I suppose, it's an emotion really one that you feel. Thinking about it over the years
I’ve learned through times... where I’ve really been frustrated about things and I’ll expect to come to get angry. (Poppy)

The speaker is positioned as passive subject of both anger and frustration. She has ‘been frustrated’ by an unspecified grammatical agent, and is distanced from anger by two auxiliary verbs to ‘come’ and ‘get’. In the next fragments, frustration is cast as preceding and causing anger:

I think often it’s caused by conflict with others or frustration. (Rosemary)

My kind of, the main things I get angry with is when I’m actually trying to achieve something and whatever it is that I am trying to do and it’s blocked um, I get really frustrated and angry. (Jasmine)

The subject of the first fragment is positioned as observer of the causes of anger, while the second story is crafted in the first person. Both stories warrant anger as a reaction to frustrated purpose. In the next two fragments, anger itself is the cause of frustration:

I always feel frustrated by anger. Powerless in a way, like that I can’t do anything about it, about the things that are happening. I’m experiencing anger. Powerless because this thing is happening. Powerlessness. (Iris)

When you feel helpless, it can make you feel angry. (Linden)

Helplessness is achieved linguistically in these fragments by the generalised referential indices ‘things’ and ‘it’, the modal operator of necessity ‘I can’t do’, universal quantifier ‘anything’, nominalisation ‘powerlessness’ and distorted cause-effect ‘make you feel angry’. These discourses of powerlessness remind me of Crawford et al’s (1992) stories of women’s memories, where frustration and powerlessness warrant anger, and women experience anger as subject to persons who have power over them. Iris and Linden’s accounts support their reading.
Disappointed expectations
In some accounts, frustration is associated with disappointed expectations, and these co-produce anger:

Thinking about it, for me, probably it's frustration, when I get really frustrated that I start to get angry, not that it’s the really ranting and raving type anger, but it's a frustration where I feel that it's a thing that I've planned or expected, things altered. (Poppy)

Disappointed expectations lead to frustration which in turn leads to anger. Disappointment constitutes the subject outside agency. The passive voice and generalised referential index ‘things’ are indefinite and nominalised ‘frustration’ warrants anger. The subject in the next fragment is also positioned as passive; she “gets cross” when her expectations are disappointed because of the “conscious effort” of an unspecified referential index “someone else”, or “just the law of living”:

The things that make me angry probably are when I expect things to happen, or just the law of living, you expect things to happen, and they don’t through the conscious effort of somebody else, that’s when I get cross, and it's more a crossness than an anger. (Flora)

The subject of the next fragment ‘gets angry’ in the family ‘situation’ when the other members of the household do not cooperate:

So I get angry when things aren’t, I expect everybody to cooperate in the family situation. (Linden)

In each of these three fragments, subjects are the objects of their feelings, inevitably “getting angry” or “getting cross” when their expectations are disappointed. The use of ‘get’ as an auxiliary verb shifts agency from the grammatical subject as if into a middle voice. Someone else is responsible for the disappointment. Anger is warranted and indeed inevitable when the fault lies elsewhere, and, indeed, being angry implies that blame belongs elsewhere. Claiming passivity is active in that it positions the speaker outside responsibility for the anger which is re-allocated to an other.
Multiple angers

Throughout the texts, anger is defined in various ways for a variety of purposes. The diversity of the object ‘anger’ enables multiple subject positions which can also be read as differences between individuals:

Oh, anger is different to different people, isn’t it. I can only actually look at it from where I am. Anger to me is when somebody pushes me too far. (Olive)

My angers are different, I mean my anger towards society is different to my anger towards my daughter being a slob, and then my anger towards my son is different to how it was when my daughter did the same thing at the same age. (Karamu)

The contrast between these two accounts brings to the surface two ways to read “different” angers. The first locates difference among subjects, and the second locates difference among angers. Individuality is constituted through differences in subjective ‘perceptions’ in Olive’s account, and positions her as different from other people, having an individual, unique perspective. Angers are multiple in Karamu’s account, and vary according to the social context. The multiplicity of angers is re-produced in the following fragment where anger with children is “different” from anger with others:

I can possibly remember a couple of times in my married life that I’ve really expressed anger other than with my children which I think’s a different sort of anger. (Flora)

Two inconsistent discourses position the subject both as the wife who rarely expresses anger and as the mother who is angry towards children. Subject positions differ according to the person Flora is angry with. The institutional rules of the family warrant anger differently according to the position in the family.

How anger may be defined has implications for counselling practice, and the overlapping of different emotions including anger is frequently
reproduced in counselling talk. Emotions can be construed as multi-layered, and the anger that is presented on the surface may obscure emotions behind or beneath. In the next fragment, ways of working with angry clients are presented, both counsellor and client referred to in the anonymous second person:

You find the cause of it and work out what the cause of it is. You may be angry because you are jealous, you may be angry because you are hurt, to me anger is a cover for something else. Does that make sense? It’s a cover for something else, because you are feeling really sad or hurt, because you are feeling jealous, because you are feeling lost, because you are feeling abandoned, because your self esteem’s been hurt, because your pride’s been hurt, whatever, and anger is just a cover for it. (Melissa)

Images of complex emotions felt simultaneously constitute subjectivities open to the complexity of clients’ emotional presentation. The next fragment suggests a reversal of the layers with other emotions obscuring anger:

I think do I actually mask anger... I wonder if in fact I’ve never really looked at the anger that I feel and thought it out that it’s really okay to be angry. I think I’m getting better at it now than I was, but thinking about it being masked behind all its other emotions makes me think maybe I’ve really buried it quite deep. (Iris)

Speaking of anger ‘buried deep’ constructs personal depth, complex emotions and inner worlds. The subject is positioned in the process of growth/change, self reflection and with an emotionally complex inner life. Both accounts produce anger as a secondary emotion. These are the only texts in the Student Study which do so; in the Counsellor Study and the Follow-up Study reported in Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen, anger is frequently constituted as a secondary emotion. In these texts anger is produced as separate from but co-existing with other emotions, and as variable according to the angry person’s perceptions, or to the social contexts in which anger is produced.
Real anger, aggression and control

While I was listening to Elecampane’s story, the phrase ‘real anger’ captured my attention. I asked her to clarify what she meant by ‘real’ anger, and she replied:

Real anger. I guess when I was talking about real, I meant heavy anger. I was talking about the aggression when I talk about the real anger. I guess there’s a fine line between annoyance, feeling annoyed, feeling pissed off, that’s, to me that’s not anger, that’s not, that’s not full scale anger. I think it’s what can build up to if it’s not dealt with if it goes on and on, but feeling annoyed, feeling pissed off is not what I would call being really angry. (Elecampane)

“Real”, “heavy”, anger and “full scale” anger is equated with aggression. Earlier in the same text another discourse constituted anger quite differently:

Oh, anger is okay, anger is good, I find anger empowering, good fun, I accept that it’s okay to be angry. To me anger is part of a range of feelings. It’s okay to feel angry. Have fun with it.

The contrast between these two fragments of the same text illustrate dramatically the discursive functions of anger talk. In the analysis I combed transcripts for examples of the use of the phrase ‘real anger’. In all cases ‘real anger’ can be read as anger conflated with aggression. Many other texts take up both these productions, anger-as-good and anger-as aggression, and some mark the aggression discourse by the term ‘real’ anger:

The annoying irritating little things I think you deal with on a day to day, but real anger is a different matter. (Flora)

Talk about ‘real’ anger conflates anger with aggression and these co-produce control. Anger is positioned in relation to control in a variety of ways. Anger may be uncontrollable or uncontrolled, the person may be not controlling “themselves”, anger may take control of the person, or the person may control anger. The following fragments illustrate control talk. In Flora’s account, real anger is (almost) uncontrollable:
It's almost uncontrollable, isn't it. If it gets, real anger, real intense anger, gets to the point of being uncontrollable. (Flora)

"Uncontrollable" is a modal operator of possibility which positions anger as beyond the ability of unspecified referents to control. In the next fragment, anger is produced as a response that is not in control. Response talk is behavioural discourse which depersonalises anger and positions subjects as objects of innate processes:

Just, it's out of control. You are just doing it. It's your body's response, or your mind's response. Um, I'm not really thinking, I'm just letting fly all over - the gut feeling is in here and and no it's not in control, if it was in control I wouldn't do it. (Daphne)

Anger is objectified "it" and separate from persons. Persons however "do it" but are not "in control". In the sentence "it" is shifted around. So is the person. The indefinite use of the second person pronoun "you" distances the subject from anger, and in this context outside control. The depersonalising effect is enhanced by taking up behavioural discourses which frame anger as a physiological response. The particle "just" adds to the passive modality. Later in the same text is further talk about not controlling the expression of anger:

I'm not sure how often and well I express it. I don't express it well because I don't control it. I think I've got it all together, and I've turned over it and turned over it, and I've got angry, and angry and tight, and I think that I don't need to let it go, but the person I'm angry with comes and it all comes out, not like I want it to, but it just all comes out, and it's not controlled. And that's a worry. (Daphne)

Anger is reified as a force to be expressed, controlled, got together, turned over, let go and when it escapes control it all "just" comes out. The word "just" suggests involuntary passivity imposed on the person. The "it" moves from anger to the mode of expression which is escaping control. The pronoun "it" allows slipping from referent to referent. In the next fragment, "it" is anger which controls the person:

It can just take control. (Melissa)
Anger has become the agent, the subject of the active verb and the use of "just" again reiterates passivity for the person who is controlled by the emotion. Control plays a variety of roles in anger talk. In the next fragment, two angers are distinguished from each other, and the difference lies in control:

There's an anger where you're in control and there's an anger where you're out of control, I'd like to think I'm controlled in my anger now, I probably wasn't always, but if something makes you angry, you tend to speak faster, higher, louder, those sort of things, but I think my anger has cooled. I now choose my words better when I'm angry. (Tansy)

The indefinite "you" is the subject of uncontrolled anger and the first person pronoun endorses the subject position of being able to control anger, and as able to use anger positively. Tansy's account re-introduces choice as an object of anger that is "in control", and exemplifies the problematics of anger, control and volition.

"Real anger" is conflated with aggression in these accounts and anger/aggression co-articulate discourses of control interwoven with problematics of innate responses and being positioned outside volition and agency.

**Anger and violence**

When anger is not controlled, violence enters the story. Perhaps being out of control justifies or at least excuses violence. Certainly loss of control is incompatible with deliberate action:

(I remember) getting really fiercely belted for that and I'm sure he was quite well out of control. I remember people commenting that he had taken off his belt on one occasion and strapped me and there were marks across my face and in very visible places, so he was obviously out of control. (Rosemary)

The father is positioned as "out of control" since the consequences of his violent actions are visible. Implicit is the suggestion that controlled
violence would result in injuries that escape detection. The next fragment also frames a father's violence as uncontrolled anger:

To me anger was violence and when my father got angry he belted my mother and broke her jaw or broke her foot or threw food across the room or caned us with a cane, so it was violence and whenever anyone got angry and was violent, then I'd try really hard never to get angry, because I was always scared of losing control. (Melissa)

The subject is positioned as observer of her father's violence and her story produces the conflation of "out of control" anger with violence. This story is offered as a justification for not "experiencing" anger later in her life. When violence and anger are conflated, room is made for storying emotional histories which can be drawn on to explain present emotional constraints.

"Out of control" and "loss of control" are reproduced in the metaphorical language of anger, for example "losing temper" and "letting loose":

Mum used to, sometimes used to lose her temper and get into us with the ironing cord. (Basil)

I feel that I'm angry, but I know what the consequences would be if I really let loose, and it's just not worth it. (Karamu)

Accounts of control are produced separately from accounts of suppression. "Control" is produced as desirable, while "suppression" is undesirable. Ironically, suppressing anger leads to lack of control, and as we have already discussed, lack of control leads to violence:

Suppressing it, yes, it's very damaging, because it's not as, like you push it down, and you get layer upon layer upon layer and then it's like a volcano, then you just you just blow, and that can be quite dangerous for you and for others around about you. (Linden)

Suppressed anger is produced as a form of energy that must be released. In the above fragment, the subject is separated from the suppressed anger by the shift to the second person pronoun and casting the person who
"blows" as the object (dangerous for you) of the blowing. The following
fragment produces violence as a result of suppressing anger and separates
the speaker from the action by putting generalised “people” as the subject
of getting physically violent:

It accumulates. Um, people can get physically, physically violent if
they don’t deal with it. (Daphne)

If anger is not expressed in ways to allow release of the energy that is
anger, then violence acts as a default option. This story of suppressed
anger as potentially destructive energy explains a wide range of violent
acts, positioning subjects as socially aware and compassionate of violence
they are positioned from at a distance:

But thinking about that as an expression of anger, I can understand
how anger can lead to assault and those sorts of things because of that
rush of energy. (Iris)

People haven’t ways of expressing emotions in an honest acceptable
way and instead we have violence, rape and crimes against property
are deeply rooted in anger. (Iris)

In the past people turned to things like drugs and alcohol and beating
up their wives and um, cutting themselves and abusing themselves
and abusing other people mentally and physically and all those kind
of really not adaptive kind, forms dealing with anger. (Jasmine)

Suppressed anger is a potent object which is positioned as subject, and as
the cause of assault, rape, crimes against property, drug and alcohol abuse,
domestic violence, self harming and mental and physical abuse. So anger
and violence are co-produced whether the anger is expressed or
suppressed. The invocation of anger as explaining violence shifts the
responsibility from the violent person onto others in that person’s context.
Psychology discourses separate emotion from behaviour, and therefore
anger from aggression. However, stating such a distinction also opens up
the opposite as an unstated possibility. For example, Averill’s (1982) text is
entitled Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion. While in the text
anger and aggression are distinguished, they are linked by that very distinction. The distinction between emotion and behaviour also produces linking effects.

The next fragment takes up the co-production of anger and violence and positions the speaker's husband in both - with a time lapse:

His anger is aggression. His anger is aggression, he can be angry for about five minutes and then it's into aggression and oppression, so I try to defuse it in five minutes of pure anger before it hits into the abuse and the aggression. (Ngaio)

This fragment constitutes both the separation and the conflation of anger and violence. "Pure" anger is not violent, although aggression follows. It is the anger that "hits into abuse", not her husband who is grammatically removed from responsibility for aggression and oppression. At the same time as the husband is positioned as the object of anger and thereby freed of responsibility for his violence, the subject Ngaio is constituted as able to defuse the anger and prevent the aggression which have been constituted as separate from the violent man.

Anger is produced conflated with violence and distinguished from violence, and is sometimes produced inconsistently within the same account. In the following fragments the conflation of anger and violence is attributed to other people, and the 'professional' separation discourse is claimed:

I've certainly grown up with what I believe to be a fairly common perception in our society of anger as a violent response, an uncontrolled response, an undesirable response and I've changed my views about that or let us say I've come to have some views of my own. (Rosemary)

Times have changed for me and I think for a lot of - I think that a lot of people say that, feel that when you feel angry, you hit out and I suppose it's been for them, so I think anger and violence even verbal and physical violence go hand in hand and they still do. I suppose
for a vast majority of people, things haven't changed, so, they have for me but they haven't for a lot other people. (Tansy)

The second person pronoun and generalised referential index “people” refer to the conflation of anger and violence, and the first person pronoun positions the speaker among those who have changed with the times. We will meet this counselling discourse again in Study Three where the participants are experienced counsellors who are positioned apart from “the majority of people”.

Definitions in talk about anger in these texts do not reproduce the defining talk of psychology. In these texts, defining talk opens opportunities to set out positions for anger and for subjects in the stories that follow. While anger is reified in these accounts, stories and processes rather than categories and states are produced in defining talk. Rather than producing anger as separate from other emotions, these stories tell of many emotions overlapping and interweaving with anger, especially frustration, powerlessness and disappointment. “Real anger” is produced in these texts to co-produce anger with aggression and control. Both conflating anger and aggression and distinguishing between anger and aggression open opportunities for varied and contradictory speaker positions in anger talk. Defining talk functions discursively, opening spaces for participants to take up discourses to position themselves as they constitute subjectivities. In the next chapter the focus shifts onto other discourses reproduced in the discipline of psychology which constitute anger as an object.
Chapter Eight

Psychological sup-positions

... in which anger is constituted in discourses of psychology, is located in physiology, is energy, endangers health if suppressed, and dissociates subjects from themselves

This chapter continues the first plait of themes, the discourses of psychology reproduced in the texts. In the last chapter, I discussed the discourses of psychology which are not evident in the texts. Participants' defining talk does not re-produce psychology's discourses of definition and categorisation and does conflate anger and aggression. This chapter focuses on the discourses of psychology that are invoked in the texts. To begin, I read in the texts a range of theoretical explanations of anger available within psychology which locate anger in the body and enable physiological talk. Physiology is inscribed with anger meanings and read accordingly. A prevalent metaphor in the texts is anger as energy, and I trace in participants' accounts the implications of the energy metaphor for the constitution of anger. To complete the chapter, I present the suppression discourse in the texts which constitutes anger within the body, and endangering psychological and physical health.

Psychological discourses

As texts reproduce psychological discourses, anger is re-produced as physiology. A wide range of psychology theories are invoked which reproduce anger and constitute subjectivities appropriate to the counselling profession. The fragments that follow (re)produce discourses of instinct, heredity, behavioural responses, social learning and modelling, and humanistic discourses of personal growth, communication and change. The anger as instinct discourse has a long history in psychology, producing anger as an innate potential within the individual that will respond automatically to threat:

I get angry when I'm given a fright, and I always hit and my family know. I mean, my daughter actually the other day gave me a fright and I didn't, I really, I mean she often does, but I mean they do that,
but you can usually hear them giggling and sniffling and snuffling
and she, I didn't know she was there and I lashed out at her, and
she'll never do it again. I mean, it's absolutely instinctive. If I could
see the threat coming, in fact, I'm more likely to be fearful and not be
able to react, but if it's thrust upon me suddenly, and I think that's
why I got so angry with my sister that time because it was thrust
upon me suddenly, I couldn't see it coming and I guess still that's the
times I get the most angriest when things are thrust on me, when
I'm pushed into a corner, I'll come out fighting. But, I don't the
same way if it sort of slithers in towards me. Yeah, it's my method of
survival I think. Gets me prepared for flight if necessary. (Olive)

In this fragment, anger is co-produced with aggression, and constituted as
an 'instinctive reaction' which is justified as the fight-flight response.
Thus the action of a mother hitting her child is justified.

The nature-nurture argument in psychology is frequently woven into the
texts. The anger-as-inherited explanation does not stand alone, but is
entwined among psychodynamic and social learning explanations:
    I actually find with children at school the ones that get really angry,
it's much more deeper than that. It's more like they've missed out.
Maybe that's just been their lifestyle. They've lived with it and
they've just learned to live like that. One little boy I've just had, a
week or so ago, I do happen to know his mum quite well, and it's just
that he's got a really bad anger problems, it's like his dad has never
been there for him. I don't whether he inherited this inherited
thing. I don't know whether anger is inherited. (Poppy)

Psychodynamic explanations present anger as 'deeper' than behaviour,
and cast anger as a logical result of the boy's father's being 'never there for
him', a nonspecific verb phrase modified by the universal quantifier
'never'. The heredity explanation is introduced and neither denied nor
confirmed. A selection of possible explanations places the subject outside
commitment to any one explanation as presented in the next fragment:
AN EXTERNALISING CONVERSATION

I am aware in reading this analysis, that the exposition of linguistic ruses may carry connotations of disapproval. Maybe this text reads as though I have extracted examples from the texts and put them out for the reader's gaze "Look at this; here is another objectification of anger, or modal operator, or whatever." That is not my intention. What I want to do is to use a particular set of agreed language, so that I can talk to the reader about how anger is constituted in social relations, how anger talk puts anger between and among people in interaction with each other, as they negotiate positions of status and power in social contexts. To speak of anger in the social realm, it is useful to use linguistic ruses of reification and externalisation.

In narrative therapy we deliberately use linguistic ruses to constitute client feelings, beliefs and actions as external to the clients. This opens spaces between the person and the 'problem' and focuses on the relational field rather than the internal world which is the focus of humanistic counselling approaches. Rather than being stuck in the chasm between the ideal and real self, and confronted with the mammoth task of bringing these selves together, we position the client outside and contending with or rejoicing in the objects of their worlds.

This is not a ruse to reduce self responsibility, but rather to create possibilities for change; for reconstruing the past and for enabling satisfying futures.

And as I have worked through the anger talk in this thesis, I have come into a new space myself, a space where anger and other emotions are externalised, not only because it helpful to reposition them, but because that is where they belong. And now I talk about "them" and places to put "them", and I reify with ease and a sense of liberation. The belief and concomitant 'experience' that emotions are internal is exposed as an illusion, a trick of Western individualism. We are and act as if individuals, but once the talk is read in a context of social relations, the social constitution of anger comes into the foreground. Emotions are relational, are constituted in and among groups, cultures, ways of positioning and repositioning some persons in relation to others.

And if I nominalise and reify and constitute process as an object to break open the strictures of moralisations, that is fine. All discourses facilitate some practices and restrict others, privilege some people and silence others. When I am able to conspire with clients to enable and facilitate their hopes and desires, I am satisfied and pleased. Satisfactions and pleasures collaborate with me.
It does seem to be hereditary, I mean, it does seem to be passed on. The response to anger seems to be a learned thing for a lot of people. That is why it's so important to stop the hitting cycle, because little - big people hit little people and they get angry and then other people - the response to anger is hitting. (Violet)

Multiple causes are posited from a range of psychological explanations. Anger "seems" to be hereditary. The word "seems" distances the subject from the heredity claim. Aggression is produced as a "response" to anger, and as a "learned thing". "Seems" and the generalised referential index "thing" continue to distance the subject from commitment to any one explanation. Systems theory is suggested in the complex interrelationships among "people" - "big", "little" and "other people". In the next fragment, the cause of anger is located in learning theory:

I do think now, you know, thinking about anger, that it is a learned thing in some ways. Like if I had a parent who probably wouldn't have talked about anger, but we thought about it then and we waited to try it and I suppose you get parents who are very controlled, you learn from them how they do it, maybe not consciously. (Basil)

In constituting anger, subject positions move from singular to plural in the first person then to an unspecified second person and generalised "parents". Uncertainty is effected by "in some ways", "I suppose", and "maybe not consciously". In the fragment similar uncertainty is achieved by the anonymous use of the second person pronoun "you" with generalised referents and the adverb "perhaps". Uncertainty and shifting subject positions create various observer angles (re)located around psychological constructs, constituting subjectivity as open minded and flexible in approach to learning about anger and observing the behaviour of others. Common to all these explanations is that anger has causes which lie in the past:

Perhaps, um, your past perhaps leads into it, what sort of a background you come from. (Daphne)
Psychology discourses produce ‘causes’ of behaviour in childhood experiences in otherwise competing theoretical positions, for example psychodynamic, developmental and social learning explanations. The following two fragments offer different and contrasting sets of family stories that position children as passive objects shaped by familial experiences so that as adults they are unable to express anger. Both these fragments produce causes of not being able to express anger, the first because anger was prohibited in the family of origin and the second because anger was frequent:

Well, we weren’t allowed to be angry as children, same old story, anger wasn’t, wasn’t expressed. I only ever heard my parents angry or arguing with each other as I grew older. (Ginger)

So we grew up in a very violent background. There were nine of us and I was the oldest and I saw the worst of it. It was awful. It was an awful, awful childhood... No; never, never, never; you were too frightened to be angry. You just didn’t. (Linden)

In these two accounts, children were not allowed to express anger and inhibition is explained by contrasting ‘causes’ located in childhood. The next account reproduces childhood ‘causes’ of anger with a hypothetical example of learned behaviour:

Probably when they were little and they got angry because Billy pinched their doll or their toy and they smacked and then got probably smacked back for smacking a brother or a sister and therefore to get angry was a no no. (Tansy)

The “Billy” example is set up as a hypothetical example of a general rule. Verbal action is generalised by the third person plural pronoun with deleted referent and a fictional ‘Billy’. The next fragment invokes conditioning and a chain of behaviours; distress, inability to cope, anger, and then violence:

I guess it’s your conditioning and you become disturbed and distressed and and unable to cope with it, and then that anger comes through as a rage or physical violence. (Herb)
Modelling is a dominant construct in causal accounts realised through learning discourse:

But I think that they are affected by the way that they are brought up and what they are actually seeing in the parents’ dealing with anger. ... A lot of people don’t know they have got alternatives because they may have been shown not very good forms of coping by their parents and friends in the past, so therefore they’ve, their options are very limited. (Jasmine)

The following fragment of the same account positions the subject as arbiter of “right” and “wrong”:

I try to talk to them more about what it is actually I’m feeling but, I know that’s the right thing to do, because I kind of know because I work in that area. so when I know what’s right and what’s wrong, but still you can’t help reacting the way you’ve been taught or been brought up with so you do what’s natural in your natural environment. (Jasmine)

The ‘right’ option is not chosen from those available, but action arises from what is ‘natural’. The lost performatives ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ position Jasmine as the passive object of moral imperatives while being the grammatical subject of knowing. Moral imperatives are in turn overcome by what is ‘natural’. Jasmine is positioned as knowing ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in the first person by the first person pronoun then is removed from the helplessness of knowledge in the face of nature by the move to the second person without any referential index. The professional discourse is active and agentive, “I try”, “I know”, “I work” while the lay discourse is modified by a passive unspecified second person “you can’t help” “You’ve been taught”.

Modelling locates responsibility outside the angry person, for example in the next fragment where the locus of responsibility is within ‘society’:

Society tells us what we should feel in certain situations. Through modelling, through parenting, through school, through media, through everyone that interacts around us... I think a lot of it, I think
modelling is just the most powerful thing that happens in our society and unfortunately a lot of the modelling that we get is not positive modelling and it is so bloody powerful. (Melissa)

Modelling is so powerful that a ‘behaviour’ which does not belong to the person can ‘pop out’ from ‘in there’:

You might find yourself saying something and it might only be when you’re arguing, and you think “Fuck! Where did that come from?!” It’s something you’ve heard your parents say and it may not have risen its head until then, until you actually had an argument and a volatile situation and you are asking me who you revert back to? Your parents and I’ve done that and it has just really shocked me and I thought where the hell has that come from because that’s not me because that’s not a me behaviour, what’s it doing in there and sat down and thought about it and it’s just completely copy-catted my parents, and I never knew I had it. It was there just waiting to pop out. (Melissa)

The general rule is constituted in the subjunctive ‘might’ and unspecified second person, and then the subject is located within the general rule, and the story is told in the first person. The behaviour however is separate from subjectivity, and comes from elsewhere. Although ‘it’ has been located within the subject, ‘it’ has volition and mobility that escape her. The split between thought and behaviour removes responsibility for the behaviour.

Talk about family of origin and present family unit utilises the systems approach discourse of repeating family patterns:

My father is probably more like my husband. He doesn’t actually talk it out. My mother would not necessarily talk it out with the person that made you angry or the person she was angry at, or whatever, but she would talk about it incessantly and I suppose that got rid of it for her. I suppose, I’m a bit the same. I’ve never thought of that before. (Tansy)
The subject is constituted as the observer of her social context and as a person who shifts perspective and allows new ideas. These are qualities appropriate for counsellor subjectivity. Counselling talk is grounded in humanistic discourses of personal choice, change and growth:

I think there are very definite skills involved. The recognition that anger is purposeful, it’s not, it needn’t be, and it shouldn’t be uncontrolled, occasionally I suppose it may be caused by factors beyond one’s control, but I think often it’s caused by conflict with others or frustration and it’s in many cases it’s just simply having the skills to verbalise the cause of the anger to the other person in a way that they can accept without feeling threatened or, or made more angry too. (Rosemary)

Discourses of humanism in-form education, training in interpersonal skills and communication, and locate the causes of anger in personal relationships. The modal operator of necessity ‘needn’t’ and lost performative ‘shouldn’t’ validate skills learning. Personal skills are expected to be part of the counselling course participants are beginning:

I hope to learn the skills to say to people or a person who has done something that makes me angry, to express that anger in a way that allows both of us to address the problem. (Iris)

The subject is positioned as learner, about to utilise the training opportunity to express anger to enable cooperative problem solving. In doing so subjectivity is constituted as a ‘good student’ who understands the principles of humanistic counselling. In the next fragment, the discourses of humanism are constituted in identifying feelings, self presentation, and ‘dealing’ with anger:

I think it’s really important to actually say oh or to actually identify to how I was feeling angry and kind of think about what are the kind of symptoms or what are the feelings that I am having and what am I showing to other people and what am I putting out. Your internal feeling or thoughts, so you can initially recognise it and then I don’t know, you probably have to recognise it, actually come across it more than a few times before you actually do anything. You have to be
able to identify it before you can know what to do. I think it’s really important to say so at the time and to deal with it then and there.

(Jasmine)

Counselling is positioned in discourses of humanism and existentialism, and these interviews position speakers as counselling students. The next fragment reproduces Gestalt counselling and positions the speaker among popular counselling discourse:

There might be an imaginary person in a chair that you might direct your anger at. Imagine that person might be your mother and talk to that person about how you are feeling. Um, and then I guess there is the other, just by talking to that person, and encouraging them to actually think about why they are angry and to look inside more inside themselves, um, and to think about why they might react the way they do and asking them if they can think of any ways that have been really successful in the past, that have worked very well, and um, any ways that don’t work really well, perhaps focussing on the good ways they have used, that have been really good in the past, you know, giving them some credit for using, to use really good ways and building on those. (Jasmine)

This fragment reproduces a smorgasbord of objects of counselling practices: chair work, feelings identification, self awareness, accessing past psychological resources, and client validation. These re-productions constitute the subject as knowledgeable about counselling while the language used incorporates uncertainty as appropriate for a beginner. Certainty is modified by the subjunctive auxiliary “might”, the indefinite second person pronoun, and the phrases “I guess”, “you know”. In the next fragment, the personal change discourse is framed more assertively:

I think that a lot of it is tied up with people’s self esteem and how valued they feel as a person. You follow examples you’ve been taught until you realise, I can change if I want to. I believe people can change. That’s where counselling is. (Poppy)
The generalised referential indices "people", "they" and "you" and the non-specific verb "think" distance the subject, and then the subject is positioned in humanism by the shift to the first person pronoun and specific verbs "want" and "believe". Subjectivity is thus constituted as appropriate to an emerging counsellor who is positioned in humanism while having knowledge about psychology discourses of behaviourism and learning theory.

Anger as physiology
Talk about anger opens opportunities for the constitution of subjectivities which are embodied, sensate and agentive, presenting as competent individuals according to the expectations of our culture. The body is central to the communication of emotion. Movement, gestures and nonverbal subtleties have socially regulated meaning. The body is central also to the discourses of 'identity' and 'self', as people are constituted as 'individuals' with a 'self' which experiences, motivates, and acts. It is in and through the body that we establish 'self' in relation to 'other', and to the 'environment' we speak of as surrounding us.

Voicing instances of these bodily sensations constitutes 'anger experience' and achieves embodied 'individuality'. In this discourse, 'experience' arises from an 'inner world' within and separate from 'others', and 'expression' renders emotion available to the gaze of others. The body is the boundary between these inward and outward worlds, presenting emotion with discursive effects. The texts constitute bodies as vehicles for anger messages, including sweating, tension, flushing, pallor, heart pounding, weeping, diarrhoea, altered breathing, nausea and increased strength. The following fragments illustrate accordingly:

I start sweating across the tops of my lips, down my back, I'm sweating, my hands are wet. (Ngaio)

I really get sweaty palms. I noticed it today. (Violet)

When I do get angry, I think my whole body actually tenses, tenses up. I tense up, my muscles in my stomach tense up. (Olive)
Physical things that I notice. I start, my tummy starts screwing up and I find that, that I start tensing my hands and I put them out of sight so that nobody knows that I’m doing that. (Ngaio)

I don't think you can be angry and slouch, I think your muscles start to tense, they must do, you’re sitting upright, you want to say something or, um, you have reacted, you’re showing reaction, I think. (Tansy)

I get very stressed when I get angry, I still get stressed, my neck tightens up and I get a really bad, tight neck and shoulders. (Linden)

It’s a way of hairs rising on the back of your neck. (Herb)

My whole body is mobilised... you know, it is, it is my whole body, it’s um, and my face is red... (Elecampane)

Oh, I think I go red, my face goes red. My eyes probably bulge. I get I probably get quite tense and sweaty. (Jasmine)

I’m certainly not one of these persons where the blood drains from the face with anger. (Tansy)

Oh, just sort of um, yeah in my chest, I suppose, you know, the real heartfelt bump I suppose. (Cicely)

I probably feel that you actually get slight palpitations so it obviously increases your heart rate. (Violet)

Well, I feel it in my stomach; I’m bound to have diarrhoea afterwards. Yeah. (Elecampane)

Not all physiological markers of anger are undesirable. Strength is co-produced with anger in the following fragments, constituting subjectivities as the passive objects of physiology:
It gave me strength in my arms (cough) great strength in my arms. I suppose it’s a feeling for me coming up from my stomach and up and that’s yeah that’s where I imagine it, in my stomach. I was aware also of the great strength in my arms, yeah, in my upper body, my upper body. Mmm. (Sage)

Yeah, the adrenalin pumped through, really did, and I got very strong. (Linden)

For me it comes from right here (points to solar plexus) and I really get sweaty palms I noticed it today and my breathing sometimes becomes deeper and I probably feel that you actually get slight palpitations so it obviously increases your heart rate. Sometimes you actually feel a real tightness in your head when you’ve really really been angry and today I actually felt physically sick because I was really angry. (Violet)

In the above accounts of the physiological markers of anger, the present tense and first person pronoun present subjectivities as if the sensations of anger are coexistent with their speaking. In the final fragment palpitations, heart rate, and tightness in the head are the objects of the unspecified second person pronoun, distancing the subject from that part of her story, and the first person is then used to talk about feeling sick. Discomfort of head or heart is distanced from the subject and is thus subtly disclaimed. Even while the present tense and first person achieve immediacy, they do not achieve agency. Auxiliary verbs ‘go’, ‘get’, ‘start to’ weaken agency in some sentences. Ngaio ‘starts’ sweating, Jasmine ‘goes’ red, and Linden ‘gets stressed’. The nominalisation ‘stress’ is a popular construct which accounts for a very wide range of life’s ills. In these fragments the body or body parts are often the grammatical subjects of middle and passive modality, for example Olive’s body and muscles are the subject of the verb ‘tense’, and Jasmine’s eyes are the subject of the verb ‘bulge’. Anger and related physiological markers of anger are thus externalised and persons are removed from agency. These accounts are reproducing knowledge of anger according to the discourses of psychology.
Anger is a set of physiological responses and bodily perturbations split from the mind. The reproduction of this knowledge constitutes subjectivities accordingly, dissociating minds from bodies, and locating emotions in the irrational body.

**Anger as energy**
Throughout the texts the prevalent metaphor is anger as energy. The Metaphor Study in Chapter Thirteen reports in detail the metaphors of anger in a group of texts. In our exploration of metaphors, we formed clusters of similar usages, and were able to group all clusters around anger as energy as a central prototype, a root metaphor of anger. In anger talk, energy is framed as separate from persons, scientific, pure, and value free, and speakers position themselves as channels of energy rather than agents. Energy/anger is the grammatical subject of active verbs and the implied although deleted agent of passive forms:

> It’s some sort of energy rush that, the physiological aspect of it. (Iris)

> I feel very energised, my body feels very energised now. (Ginger)

> Anger makes you charge your energy. (Daphne)

Anger as energy invokes scientific discourse framing anger as a force that is dynamic, and perpetual:

> I mean it’s an energy, well, energy can’t be lost, it’s here, it’s all around us, it doesn’t just disappear, it’s got to be used or transferred to somewhere else. (Melissa)

The potency of energy is constituted in modal operators of possibility “it can’t be lost” and necessity “it’s got to be used”. It is ‘the law of physics’.

> Yeah, that explains, I think, why when you pour out your anger, you pour out your energy. It’s like a kettle boiling, bubbling over the top, once that’s out, you feel so much more relieved, because you’ve lost that energy which is kind of natural I suppose and you are able to handle it. It’s kind of the law of physics. (Jasmine)
The energy metaphor relegates persons by analogy to inanimate objects in the passive position, containers or channels of a potent force, the law of physics. After the energy has run its 'natural' course, the person is relieved, and able to handle 'it'. The pronoun 'it' has no referent. The anger-in anger-out discourse is reproduced in the next fragment, where agency is effected by the use of active voice and transitive verbs:

I really believe if you don’t deal with it you just store it up. I mean you can think of it scientifically, too, because energy is never lost or gained, it is simply transferred. And you can either turn it into a positive energy and send it somewhere else, or keep it and send it out into the community or someone around you as a negative thing, by being aggressive or whatever, or you just keep it stored up until something makes you go pop and you explode. (Melissa)

These fragments access scientific explanations of energy and move to the indefinite second person to effect a position of neutrality which is appropriate to scientific discourse. The neutrality of the energy is evidenced in the potential of positive or negative frames for anger according to where/how it is 'sent'. It is interesting that each of these stories of intact and undiminishng energy omits to account for the energy before it becomes anger. In some accounts the energy is attributed to adrenalin, a biological discourse:

It's certainly an energy rush maybe it's chemical like adrenalin or all those things, but it feels to me like it gives me this enormous bundle of energy and I've just got to do something sudden with it and that's it. (Iris)

Well, I don't know, maybe it's like adrenalin, but certainly I know, I know when I'm angry I get a real surge of energy. (Rosemary)

The energy of anger can be used to make positive changes:

It creates good energy, for me it's that good energy that comes from the anger that puts things right. That changes the look, changes laws, changes whatever, it's, yeah, it's a really really good energy, very productive energy, life giving energy, and I like it. (Melissa)
Rosemary: It's the sort of energy I think that lots of women get which enables them to clean the whole house up in one morning, do all those jobs that they've been, felt too tired and too depressed about to even do, and that energy is channelled in a physical way.

Kay: A physical expression of the energy.

Rosemary: Yes, yes, but I think, I don't think that that's the best way to use it. It might be a jolly good way of getting housework done, or the garden or whatever but I think it should be used to attempt to understand and resolve the cause of the anger in the first place.

The anger-is-good discourse and counselling discourses of reframing constitute anger positively, in that it enables useful social and interpersonal actions. The reframing is ascribed to the third person narrative, constituting as subjects anger in Melissa's account and the generalised "lots of women" in Rosemary's account. The speakers are positioned at a distance from anger, the subject of 'like' and 'think', thus constituting subjectivities as observer of the process of others, and as approving the potentiality of other people's anger.

In the anger-as-energy discourse, energy is inside the person, utilised, then expended leaving the person 'drained':

I don't stay angry for very long and I peak and then I just, it goes.
And I feel very drained afterwards. Very drained afterwards, and, um, it takes a lot out of me, when I get angry. (Linden)

Anger as energy is constituted as an entity separate from the subject which travels through the body. In effect the body is separated from subjectivity. Energy is framed as powerful and value free, with potential positive results if it is utilised effectively. If it is not utilised effectively and kept 'in', its power becomes destructive.

**Anger suppressed can kill**

When anger is located within individuals, expression of anger is an externalising manoeuvre. Lack of expression keeps the anger in. Failure to express anger is therefore maladaptive and destructive to the angry
person. Not expressing anger has been related to a wide range of psychosomatic symptoms (Holt, 1970). In the texts the suppression discourse describes destructive effects on health and wellbeing. As this fragment puts it succinctly:

Anger suppressed can kill. (Elecampane)

Unexpressed anger is held in the body:

Elecampane: Any part of your body can feel it; it depends where you hold it.
Kay: You hold anger in the body.
Elecampane: I think so. Like in the cells.

Holding anger in the body affects physical, mental and emotional health:

Physically, you can be physically sick and also, too, more so though, it’s emotionally and mentally you’ll be sick if you’re unable to express yourself. (Ngaio)

I think if you suppress anger, that builds, that creates more anger, because you are unable - and frustration because you are unable to get it out, unable to deal with it and it’s just yeah, it’s a vicious circle, if you can’t break it then eventually it’s going to get you. I think you probably perhaps have a breakdown, I think you burn out. (Linden)

For people who can’t talk, I imagine it would make them ill, physically ill. (Tansy)

Subjects are positioned outside these stories by deleted referential indices. The unspecified second person and generalised ‘people’ are characters in these cautionary tales told from observer positions. The discourse of anger suppression as a cause of disease recurs throughout these accounts. A wide range of physical and psychological ailments and diseases are attributed to unexpressed anger, including M.E., asthma, headache, stomach ache, chest pain, ulcers, eczema, diarrhoea, bulimia, alcoholism, cancer and heart disease. The following fragments illustrate:
I would say that a lot of ailments today like I have seen the connection between anger and M.E., between anger and asthma, psychosomatic headache, stomach aches, um, chest pains. (Ginger)

I think that it'll be this this, like a, like a horrible sore somewhere inside them that’s just going to affect their life and and pull them back from being what they could be. Yes, ulcers, headaches. I wonder about eczema and things like that, even diarrhoea. (Sage)

Well, there would be insomnia and those sort of things, probably eating illnesses. Not able to eat or stomach things, sort of, um, yes, upset tummies, loss of appetite, or ulcers, of things worrying lots of stomach acid I imagine. I don’t know, it could probably even go to things like bulimia or that sort of things, I suppose. I don’t know. There would be a tension all the time that I don’t think would ever go away if there was all that anger. I think that there would be a knot in the stomach. (Tansy)

Subjects are positioned away from the suppression discourse as observers. In the first fragment, the conditional “would say” sets up a mood of conjecture, and then moves to observer position “I have seen”. In the second, suppression is allocated to unreferenced ‘them’. In the third, the conditional phrase “there would be” achieves a general hypothesis removed from personal agentive account. The level of assertion is lowered by generalised referential indices “things” and the phrases “I imagine, “I suppose”, “I don’t know.”

The next set of fragments are more assertive. Anger is swallowed, and is then located in the stomach, the guts, and eats away at the angry person, both psychologically and physically. Among psychological effects are damaging growth and development, self esteem, feelings, and identity:

They’ll be stunted in some form of their growth and development and restricted by that anger, you know.... the anger will be there but they won’t be able to say, “Hey, this is, I feel angry about this,” they’ll swallow it, and no one is going to know. (Sage)
I think the inability of being able to express it, it goes in and it needs an out and if it doesn’t get out it goes in and eats away inside you. It eats away at your self esteem, eats away at your doubt feelings, you start to doubt if you had any valid reason to be angry and yeah, it undermines who you are. (Ngaio)

It eats away at your guts. Yeah. Well, and then it’s there and it will erupt sooner or later, you know, I’ve I’ve I’ve seen it. (Elecampane)

Anger is reified “it” and is the subject of active verbs. Re-production of health discourse in these fragments distances subjects from positions of illness and anger suppression by using second person pronouns with deleted referential indices. Language use also effects subtly the mind/body split. Physical effects of anger on health are sustained by metaphors of the corrosive power of anger suppressed and held within the body:

When you when you are angry when you are stressed you don’t eat then, the first time it’s really still releasing acid. You end up with stomach ulcers and cancer. (Daphne)

It has to have some physical manifestation, it could be heart disease, it could be cancer. Both of my parents have got cancer, I think that’s anger and guilt. They don’t deal with any of their stuff at all, and they’re rotting. (Melissa)

Yeah, I sort of feel that is a lot of the cancers and stuff like that would be, that’s just my own opinion, sort of just carrying around too much negative sort of stuff or just not letting it, not relieving yourself of those feelings properly, in some way. (Cicely)

You begin to wonder what causes cancer cells to develop, what causes the sudden burst of growth of cells that we know as cancer is it triggered by some sort of chemical. (Elecampane)

Heart disease as a result of suppressed anger is another prevalent health discourse:
It's your body, put it under stress then something goes. You'll have a heart attack. All those things relating to stress to anger and I believe anger is stress related. Because when you are angry, your body is under stress, everything is going, the heart rate's up. (Daphne)

My mother died of a heart attack, that's probably how she dealt with her anger, and my father's an alcoholic, so um, I guess that's probably how he deals with his. (Ginger)

The following detailed account of how suppressed anger affects the heart draws on scientific discourse:

If you think of the heart as being a muscle depending on all sorts of chemical reactions in your body to function well if in fact you have a build up, in a way anger is a stimulus, and that rush of energy I was talking about is actually chemical. I honestly feel that it's the body releasing fear, that all of these shoots of adrenalin all this sort of stuff your body uses. What does the body do with them? It would have some affect on the physiological function of heart. (Iris)

Bodies are depersonalised by the use of the definite article 'the heart' 'the body' and by adopting the mechanistic metaphor of bodily processes. The suppression discourse demonstrates the problematic of dualistic constructs of mind/body, emotion/reason, passion/action, and subjectivity/embodiment. In each of these binaries, anger is constituted in the alternative to be rejected. Anger is an irrational passion of the body, and if suppressed will destroy the instrument of containment.

The dissociated 'self'
The destructiveness of anger not only harms the body, but also the mind. Being angry divides the mind against itself, producing dissociated subjects. A range of language uses enable separation and dissociation of subjects from the object 'anger'. In the following fragments, subjectivity is dissociated from anger, achieving explicitly an observer position towards behaviour. The observer is split from the actor:
I ranted and raved on and on and really told him what I thought of it, which were things I really didn’t mean. I could hear myself going on about these things. It was like someone else had kind of wound me up for it. (Poppy)

I really let rip until the end, I felt that I was on the outside looking on? and I couldn’t stop? (Flora)

Subjectivities are split between actor and observer, the “I” of the agentive self removed from the actions of ‘going on’ and ‘letting rip’. The reflexive verb ‘hear myself’ and middle voice ‘felt’ disclaim agency. In the next fragment anger is a response of the body or the mind. The language of behavioural psychology depersonalises anger and splits thought from action:

Just, it’s out of control. You are just doing it. It’s your body’s response, or your mind’s response. Um, I’m not really thinking, I’m just letting fly all over. (Daphne)

Anger is framed by this account as a behavioural response which disallows thinking and is beyond control. Agency is abdicated by the phrase ‘lets fly’. The next fragment constructs a detailed story of dissociated subjectivities. Emotions are split from cognition and two subject positions are established, the ‘feeling self’ and the ‘rational self’. As “I”, the subject is constituted with the ability to ‘slip’ into whichever is appropriate:

The other self, yeah, yeah, just slip in and out, thinking about it. Yeah, I’d slip in and out and there’s a feeling self in there but, there’s an emotional self and there’s a rational self and when I need things to function, to go and to organise, to go and do things like that I slip into the rational self and take on that, so that I can look at all that, all that’s going on around and rationalise why everyone is where they’re at and because of that behaviour it doesn’t really affect me because they’re not directing it at me, it’s because of this and that that’s going on around... So it’s all right and I can handle everyone and all what’s going on around and therefore I don’t get angry, because all what’s going on doesn’t have to do with me personally.
It's just all what they bring on. Hmm. Then when I slip into the emotional self, which isn't very often, um, that throws me because it's really frightening to have um, to have feelings, they're besides the good feelings that I can take on board when I'm in the rational, you know slip into the emotional. That's hard, it's hard, it's sort of a new scene, it's a new territory. It's really funny, actually, I don't go there very often. (Ngaio)

Multiple subjectivities are constituted in this account, the rational self, the emotional self and the self who chooses to slip between other selves. Agency is achieved by active verbs and consistent use of the first person as the subject is relocated among positions for different functions. Discourses around mind/body and mind/mind splits constitute subjectivities with multiple positions available.

In this and the previous chapter, I have traced through the texts the discourses of psychology around anger. In Chapter Seven, I presented contrasts between academic and popular discourses in defining talk, and the conflation anger with aggression. In this chapter participants’ accounts of anger produce and reproduce psychology discourses as they utilise theoretical terminology, locate anger in physiology and warn of the damaging consequences of suppressing anger.

Anger talk positions subjects among the discourses of psychology. These discourses enable the production of legitimated knowledge about human behaviour and subjectivities as 'good' students and potential counsellors. At the same time participants’ accounts are constrained as anger talk reproduces binaries of mind/body, emotion/reason, and action/passion. Constituting subjectivity as knowledgeable, self aware, and agentive is problematic in stories of passion, control, and physiological energy. Psychology dominates knowledge production about anger, and these texts illustrate how ordinary talk authorises that knowledge/power.
In the previous two chapters, the first plait braided the themes through which psychological discourses constitute anger. In this chapter the second plait of themes braids complex moral evaluations of anger. The texts abound with explicit appraisals of anger as morally contentious, amply demonstrating the importance of emotions in forming and negotiating social relations. The stories tell of anger as interwoven with moral evaluations which shift anger from intra-individual to social contexts. These multiple and competing discourses of the moralities of anger are opportunities for multiple subjectivities, taking and changing positions constantly. In talking to me, the participants are students talking to their tutor, and are emerging counsellors talking to an experienced counsellor. This interview context positions participants in the discourses of humanism and re-produces as objects ‘unique individuality’, ‘inner depth’ and ongoing processes of ‘personal growth’ and ‘change’.

Talk about anger provides opportunities to constitute subjectivities in humanistic positions where the objects ‘values’ and ‘integrity’ inform ‘choices’. Presupposing ‘choices’ provides positions from which ‘values’ may be challenged while at the same time familiarity with ‘social norms’ can be demonstrated. Anger is sited at the conflict of differing moral evaluations on questions of justice in interpersonal relating, and talk about anger opens opportunities for multiple subject positions in the evaluative domain.

In this chapter I write about how moral evaluations constitute anger in the texts, and how language morally evaluates anger as good, bad or value free, and how evaluating practices constitute subjectivities. To do this I write about the anger-as-good discourse, the anger-as-bad discourse, and I quote fragments that invoke these evaluations, including some which invoke them both in the same utterance. I then turn to the value-free
discourse which separates emotion from behaviour, a psychology discourse, which claims that it is not the emotion that has any value, but how it is expressed.

Anger-as-good
In Chapter Two, I wrote of the popular counselling discourse that valorises anger and rescues it from the category of negative emotions. In this discourse, anger resides deep within the person and counselling serves to enable the client to “get in touch” with anger, to “feel their feelings”, to “bring them out” and “express anger” constructively. This discourse evaluates anger as good, as internal, and as requiring to be expressed in sustained metaphors of containment and deliverance.

Averill (1982) locates the anger-is-good argument in feminism, and this observation is supported in popular psychology (Schaef, 1986). This discourse acts as resistance to the constraining discourse of the inappropriateness of anger for women. However, the potential of anger as a positive force has a long tradition as far back as Aristotle, and Averill traces its history from classical times through to the present. Moral evaluations of anger are complex, and to constitute knowledge about anger requires the production of contradictory evaluations. Counselling talk includes a discourse of anger-as-bad, evidenced in the flourishing industry of anger management, where anger is conflated with violence. Constituting counsellor subjectivities, then, requires production (and thus re-production) of complex and even contradictory evaluations.

In any utterance a number of effects are achieved simultaneously. In this analysis I focus on the production and re-production of discourses/social practices and the constitution of subjectivities. In this chapter, the discourses of interest are explicit moral evaluations of anger and anger talk. Talk about moral evaluation at the same time constitutes subjectivities in its particular uses of language. For example, in the following extract anger-as-good constitutes Elecampane as competent, and able to enjoy anger:
Oh, anger is okay, anger is good, I find anger empowering, good fun, I accept that it’s okay to be angry. To me anger is part of a range of feelings. It’s okay to feel angry. Have fun with it. I think it can be. I think people are scared of anger. A lot of people are very scared of it. I can’t say. Yeah. I actually rather enjoy it sometimes. (Elecampane)

In the fragment above Elecampane is positioned in contrast to others. The first person pronoun claims anger as fun in contrast to other unspecified ‘people’ in the third person. These others are in the third position, further away from Elecampane by pronoun use as well as further away from the anger-as-good position. Pronouns suggest distance from the action of the verb. The speaker (‘I’, ‘me’) is in the first position, and is closer to the verb than the ‘you’ who is in the second position in the dialogue. Still more distant than ‘you’ are those in the third position over there. There are degrees of distance within third person pronouns, from ‘he’ or ‘she’ who are specified to ‘they’ who may be anonymous, ‘one’ who is coldly impersonal, and ‘people’ in unspecified anonymity. The next fragment places Rosemary in transition to an anger-is-good position. At the same time she is associated with others, ‘we’ as humans, who are able to take anger as a gift and use it positively:

I now think, although I don’t think I have the skills yet to put it into practice, I now think anger is fundamentally a good and beneficial emotion, that we have been given the, we’ve been given it, the potential for it, for some reason, and I think if we can learn the skills to use it, it should be effective in improving and enriching our lives and our relationships. (Rosemary)

The passive voice in the clause “We’ve been given it, the potential for it, for some reason,” enables a position at a greater distance still from anger. In my reading of this fragment, Rosemary is positioned among those who get (and acknowledge the gifting of) such gifts from an unspecified source. The giver is hinted at and deleted by the use of the passive voice. Anger is a ‘gift’, and it is up to “us” to learn the skills to use it beneficially. The next fragments also present anger-as-good discourse and simultaneously create speaker positions as socially aware, on the side of justice and social change:
Anger creates good energy. For me it’s that good energy that comes from the anger that puts things right. That changes the, the look, changes laws, changes whatever, it’s yeah, it’s a really, really good energy, very productive energy, life giving energy, and I like it. (Ginger)

Anger and energy are the agents of change rather than the persons who are angry and who act with energy. In this way the speaker is removed from the first position as agent or actor, and thus the position of an angry person is avoided at the same time as the anger-as-good discourse is produced. The next fragment achieves a similar double act:

I think life would be very bland if we didn’t get angry. Imagine it if people didn’t get angry, if things didn’t make them angry, what an awfully bland society we would have. We wouldn’t have any political movement, women still wouldn’t have had the vote if somebody didn’t get angry about it. (Tansy)

The agent of anger shifts from the first position singular which constitutes the speaker as thinker, to the first person plural, where the agent is the collective ‘we’ who are capable of anger which achieves justice. The agent then shifts to the third position of angry people who enable political movement (that “we” have), the general class of women who have the vote and an anonymous ‘somebody’ who got angry. In this way, claims are made for a desire for justice, for approval of others who have enabled just change, and for the capability of being angry. At the same time, subjectivity without anger is subtly established. The observer position enables aware and tolerant subjectivities:

I’ve seen it in the positive things, in the people around me, because it motivates them to do things, to change things, hmm. Oh, (my husband) gets angry with things, goes out and changes it for the positive and that’s good. (Ngaio)

The speaker is positioned as observer while others are angry. The anger-as-good discourse constitutes the speaker who knows that anger can be positive while the grammar of the utterance distances her from anger.
Emotions have frequently been categorised into two exclusive groups, negative and positive, paralleling the good/bad binary. Anger is valorised in this fragment. Anger-as-good has left behind the other bad/negative emotions such as jealousy.

Jealousy I see as a very negative emotion, I think you can't win with that one, but anger, anger can be a very positive thing. (Olive)

The anger-as-good / jealousy-as-bad contrast positions Olive as observer, the second person as jealous (and a loser) and anger in the third person as the subject of being positive. Multiple positions are established in the same utterance. While producing anger-as-good, the language used constitutes subjectivities that exclude anger. By evading anger while talking anger-as-good, space is left in which anger-as-bad is silently affirmed.

**Anger is bad**

Anger is valued negatively in many accounts. It is something to be ashamed of, or guilty about:

I still wasn’t proud of the act, that I had let myself get so angry, and the way I had treated her. (Flora)

Any feelings of anger are immediately followed by feelings of guilt. (Rosemary)

In telling the story of anger that is regretted, subjectivity is constituted as concerned for the other, as a person who can express anger and evaluate their own behaviour now and find it in breach of a personal standard. Anger is regrettable. In the next fragment, Violet is positioned without choice by the modal operator of necessity “have to” which signals an unspecified performative:

I still have to feel awful about losing my temper. (Violet)

Subjectivity is constituted as controlling emotion and simultaneously able to express it. This shift between good/bad evaluations allows multiple subject positions. In this fragment the options are left open:
WHOSE STORY IS THIS?

Let us take another look at this interchange and read a different story:

Rosemary: But I've certainly found it very difficult to accept that it's okay to be angry.
Kay: It's a recent awareness for you.
Rosemary: Yes, and I have to be alert all the time, really, or I start feeling - any feelings of anger are immediately followed by feelings of guilt.

This fragment illustrates the mutuality of language as we dialogue ourselves into existence. Rosemary tells me that she finds it very difficult to accept that it is okay to be angry. I respond with a statement in the apparent indicative mood that is framed as if a simple reflection of content. However the response is also a subtle command to Rosemary to reframe her anger picture. I speak as if Rosemary has already moved to a new position, one in which expressing anger is acceptable. Rosemary's response gives agreement that the acceptance is in place. The difficulty has moved from acceptance, and is now located in guilt.

The interview itself is a dynamic interaction, and participants are speaking anger discourses and constituting subjectivities in relating to me as interviewer. While I say little throughout the interviews, what I say is certainly not neutral. Although the words are mild, the utterance is coercive. I do not need to be speaking or even reacting non-verbally to have this influential effect on participants' stories. My presence is enough to manipulate their language production. Such manipulation is intrinsic to talk and therefore to the constitution of knowledge.
You're allowed to get angry, there is nothing wrong with it, I can see how it can border on being very destructive. (Poppy)

The permission to be angry is shifted onto the anonymous second person, with the referent who gives permission unspecified by using the passive voice. The claim "there is nothing wrong" with getting angry leaves the impression that there might well be something "wrong", an implication underlined by the lost performatives "allowed" and "wrong". Not only is the idea of 'wrongness' introduced while being denied, but the reader cannot know who is the authority who says that anger is wrong. By locating the subject as an observer who is able to see that anger has the ability to be on the edge of being destructive, the moral choice is finely balanced on a linguistic fence. By these linguistic ruses, position on the moral question is delicately avoided, and subjectivity is constituted as reasonable, observant and neutral.

Personal change is a central object of humanistic counselling, and the tutor-student context of these interviews encourages stories of personal change. The ability to change is demonstrated in describing the shift involved in the acquisition of new behaviours and attitudes, and the discarding of the old. This interchange illustrates:

Rosemary: But I've certainly found it very difficult to accept that it's okay to be angry.
Kay: It's a recent awareness for you.
Rosemary: Yes, and I have to be alert all the time, really, or I start feeling - any feelings of anger are immediately followed by feelings of guilt.

The wording of this fragment shifts subject positions among discourses and in doing so simultaneously achieves moral finesse. The anger-as-good discourse is accepted while the anger-as-bad discourse is not disclaimed, and subjectivity is constituted as being open to change. This talk is overtly about inconsistency, and frames inconsistency as acceptable, at least in the context of this particular conversation. The next fragment demonstrates similar re-positioning:
The anger that I have, the way that I express it is, um, inappropriate in a lot of ways because, um, in all ways really, but it doesn’t do any good in the long run, and I’ve learned that and I’ve promised myself that I will never do it again, and then I go ahead and I do it again. (Cicely)

In this anger story the subject is positioned within knowledge of the social proscriptions governing the expression of anger and as able to act outside approved limits. Subjectivity is constituted as emotional and spontaneous and at the same time self monitoring and concerned. A gap is created between intent and action. The next fragment suggests that such a gap may be filled with control. Anger as loss of control (therefore bad) is distinguished from positive anger which is resolved:

To me anger is sometimes losing control, but I think that positive anger is actually expressing that you are really upset with the situation as it is and that it’s not acceptable... And I think if you do try and resolve when you have been angry, for me anyway, that I feel good. But I still have to feel awful about losing my temper. (Violet)

The first person pronoun is used to claim a rational position in contrast to anger as controlled (or not) by reason, and subjectivity is distanced from being ‘upset’ by moving to an anonymous second person. Awareness of the social constraints on anger expression is presented by the modal operator of necessity “have to feel awful”. Positioning is shifted from the first person to feel “good” about resolving conflict and “awful” about losing control, to the more distant anonymous second person pronoun “you” for the riskier expressing-anger-is-positive position.

Accounts are frequently framed in language that distances the speaker from the anger instanced. In this next extract the narrative perspective moves from the particular example (my day) to the general rule (your day).

I get angrier and angrier, it almost spoils my day? It almost spoils your day. (Flora)
Other examples distance the speaker further still, by moving to the third person narrative position:

I have talked to some people, and people, yeah, most of them I have talked to have at some stage been afraid of anger, or afraid of venting anger for fear of losing control. (Melissa)

A lot of people feel guilty about feeling angry. They feel as if they shouldn’t be angry. (Tansy)

A greater distancing still locates the source of moral evaluation to society as a whole. The first person pronoun indicates the speaker identifying with the general population as acted upon by society:

Um, I still feel that perhaps people don’t like people being angry. It makes them feel uncomfortable. And I think as a society we don’t handle our anger very well at all. (Violet)

Distance from the anger-as-bad discourse brings speakers close to the anger-as-good option that is identifiable as a counselling discourse.

**Anger-as-value-free**

The good/bad binary is not the only binary produced by moral evaluations of anger. There is also the feelings/behaviour split. This story casts anger as value-free, and feelings as morally neutral, leaving moral evaluation to be applied to behaviours. The value-free discourse locates moral evaluation not with anger itself, but rather with how it is expressed. Anger itself is value free, and is separate from behaviours which are available for evaluation. Actions are thus separated from emotions, and to learn how to make this separation is desirable. The feelings/behaviour split is re-produced by psychology discourse in cognitive-behavioural approaches to counselling.

The constitution of subjectivities in our culture requires children to take up subject positions as unique individuals who re-produce anger appropriately. The school is a powerful social institution which shapes, constitutes and controls social practices (Foucault, 1965). The education
process seeks to privilege some discourses and to subjugate others. In recent years there have been programmes in school curricula which set out to shape children’s knowledge and practice involving conflict and anger. More potent are the social practices that operate in classroom and playground as children relate to each other (Davies, 1989; 1993).

Educational programmes reproduce discourses of anger as value-free and locate moral responsibility within the choice of behaviours. Rosemary and Melissa are teachers, and in these extracts are responding to my invitation to talk about how a counsellor/teacher might work with angry clients/pupils:

I try to encourage them to see that anger can be a useful emotion if people and kids too, can learn the skills to use it in a constructive way that it is a form of energy and having energy is always good, provided its channelled in a beneficial way. (Rosemary)

And unless we are going to start actually teaching people strategies and empowering them first of all not to be afraid of anger, anger is not a bad thing, there’s the huge myth that anger is bad. Anger is not bad. It can be used very destructively, in which case it can be negative and bad, but anger itself is not bad. (Melissa)

The family is another social institution in which subject positions for children are constrained by disciplinary practices. Parents are constituted in this process as guides, re-producing the psychological discourse of separating the emotion anger from the behaviour of its expression. Parenting involves multiple tasks; constituting subjectivities as parents and at the same time as guides:

I’m trying to teach my kids, I suppose I’m trying to teach myself, it’s okay to be angry, it’s just what you do with that anger. (Ngaio)

Control of expression makes the difference between anger-as-good and anger-as-bad. Anger that is controlled is good, and anger that escapes control is bad. We are able then to maintain ‘good’ by reason and will power. ‘Good’ is located in rationality and the restraining of emotion.
This fragment introduces the notion of choice as well as control:

I think we can choose to have control over our emotions. Yeah, that’s an interesting one. Um, It can be good and it can be bad there are two sides to that. We can choose to have control over our emotions um, for our good, or- and for the good of others. (Ginger)

Subjectivity as a free agent is constituted with the option of choosing whether to control an emotion or not. The moral evaluation is located in the area of choice rather than simply in control, and the choice will be made on the criterion of whether the outcome will be beneficial. Personal responsibility and choice are products of humanism, and counselling practice re-produces humanistic discourses. In the next fragment, subjectivity is constituted as a successful client and emerging counsellor who knows that expression of anger is a desirable outcome of counselling. The following sustained metaphor illustrates:

To me, for me, learning how to get angry was just like finding another gear, for my counselling, like in a car you’ve only got first and second and third, for me, finding anger was like having a fourth and an overdrive. It was really good, because I could only move my process so far and then I’d get stuck, I would always invariably get stuck, and I never knew how to get out of it, you know, I was stuck. But once I got angry, it was like put it into fourth and off you go again and when you got stuck you just whack it into overdrive and I’d go. It was really good. (Melissa)

Moral evaluations of anger are complex and inconsistent. Conflicting evaluations are utilised for discursive effect as participants tell their stories. Discourses of anger-as-good, anger-as-bad and anger as value-free are interwoven with discourses of control and reason. This array of discursive materials is available to speakers as they talk about anger and the same words constitute subjectivities with multiple abilities - to be angry and not to be angry; to know appropriate and inappropriate expressions of anger and to be able to act outside the constraints of those knowledges. Intricate networks of social relations and practices producing and re-producing anger and anger expression are evident in the texts.
Chapter Ten
Interpersonal politics

in which anger is constituted in the interpersonal,
is a response to injustice, and escapes Western individualism

The third plait of the discourses of anger which form the braid of the analysis brings together the threads of interpersonal discourses in anger talk. In this and the two chapters following, I examine discourses which position anger in social relations. In this chapter I focus on anger as a response to injustice. In Chapter Eleven, I focus on anger as a means of negotiating social and interpersonal communication. In Chapter Twelve, I look at age and gender in participants’ accounts to examine issues of status and power for women and children.

The previous two chapters traced in the texts the reproduction of the traditional construction of anger in psychology. The construct ‘anger’ is a compilation of discourses which reify anger, locate the constructed entity within individuals and within the body split from the mind. The practice of counselling within the discipline of psychology is theoretically constrained by these discourses to privilege cognitive-behavioural approaches which emphasise cognitive control of barely controllable emotion. Wider counselling practice also takes up psychology discourses and talks about expressing internal anger for psychological and physiological health, and controlling anger for social safety. Throughout this thesis I have argued for a wider view, that anger is of the social body, and arises in the spaces between persons, from social interactions with social functions. Social construction accounts (Averill, 1982, 1986; Harré, 1986) take up this approach, yet continue to reify anger as a unitary predictable phenomenon which is the socially appropriate response to injustice. Crawford et al. (1992) take a different position in their memory work and state that anger is constituted in more social and interpersonal purposes than simply to protest against injustice.
Ethnographic studies of other cultures find anger spoken of as belonging to groups (Brenneis, 1990; White, 1990) which suggests that anger is culturally relative. Produced discursively and constituted in social practice, anger maintains and is maintained by the dominant world view of the given culture. In Western cultures anger is therefore reified and located within individuals. Psychology as a social institution produces and re-produces knowledge/power (Foucault, 1972) and informs anger talk accordingly. The discourses of psychology I read in the texts were discussed in the previous chapter. While participants’ accounts do reproduce traditional psychology discourses, other explanations are also utilised as in the defining talk presented in Chapter Seven. Interpersonal discourses in these texts are likewise varied, protesting injustice and also calling for changes in communication and power relations.

**Anger constituted in the interpersonal**

In our individualistic society, we place great importance on interpersonal relationships and intimacy. The social is constructed around the individual. The term ‘interpersonal’ connotes dyads, and many examples of anger in the texts are between the speaker and one other person. Emotions are spoken of as if on the boundaries between persons, as a form of communication. The telling of anger stories constitutes subjectivity in relation to an other. Anger is an indicator of power in that relating, and frequently functions to claim and shift power in relationships.

Anger stories have characters, usually the narrator and the people they live and work with. Subjects are frequently positioned in an observer metaposition which enables comment on how anger operates in interpersonal networks:

> I now think anger is fundamentally a good and beneficial emotion, that we have been given the we've been given it, the potential for it for some reason, and I think if we can learn the skills to use it, it should be effective in improving and enriching our lives and our relationships. (Rosemary)
The first person plural and lost performative “should” position the subject in the discourse of anger as interpersonal. All the texts include stories about being angry in relating intimately:

Which is the saddest part of it all I think because I get really angry with the ones I am closest to. But it's not just angry about them, it's angry about overall everything. (Karamu)

The auxiliary verb ‘get’ positions Karamu as subject of a middle voice action, with little agency. Anger is directed towards the generalised referential index ‘ones’ she is closest to, but the cause of anger is located not in (just) ‘them’, but in ‘overall everything’. The double universal quantifier ‘overall everything’ adds to the linguistic helplessness of the subject who is grammatically re-placed by the unspecified referential index ‘it’. Anger in this utterance has no specificity, and the subject is a passive object of emotion. The close others are indeed indirect objects in this account, both indirect objects of the verb and of anger. This suggests that anger arises from wider social contexts outside the subject and that the legitimate expression of anger is limited to few people. The family recurs as the usual arena for legitimate anger expression, especially for women. In the next fragment, anger is the object in a communication game between partners, something like a tennis rally, where both players express anger nonverbally, leading to verbal negotiation:

Say, say I was angry at (partner) for doing something and I didn't tell him, then I'd become resentful at him because of what he'd done, and I hadn't told him so I'd become stressed and I'd be banging things around, or I'd not talk to him or I'd set up behaviours, set up conversations so that I could snap at him, he would then get angry at me for being angry at him and he wouldn't know why I was angry at him because I hadn't told him and then he would in turn, it's a just a vicious circle, just end up bouncing off each other. So you've got to at some point sit down and work out what's going on and what you're going to do about it, because if you don't it's finished our relationship. (Melissa)
The conditional tense constructs a hypothetical example. The auxiliary verbs ‘be’ and ‘become’ add to the conjectural language, and the negotiating phase is framed in the unreferenced second person. The last phrase ‘our relationship’ positions the example in Melissa’s own life. The conditional constitutes anger in general rather than a specific personal example, enabling subjectivity with knowledge of general principles about anger as interpersonal communication.

Anger stories in the texts are interpersonal stories, where anger is produced in social relations. Discourses of justice and fairness are invoked to bring into the centre of the story justifications for anger.

**Anger as a response to injustice**

Social construction accounts of anger frame anger as a response to injustice (Averill, 1982, 1986; Harré, 1986, 1992), a discourse which is prevalent in the texts. Anger talk in the texts frequently warrants anger as a response to injustice and unfairness:

One day we had to bike to catch the bus to come into school and I had a comb stuck in my blazer pocket and we all used to carry combs then to make sure we looked how nice girls ought to look, and we got down to the bus stop and she had forgotten her comb. I didn’t want to share my comb with her, not at all, but she was powerful big sister and made me give her not only share it with her, but give her my comb for the day. I was really angry at that, there was nothing I could do about that except to feel angry. We were out in the middle of a road, there was no door to slam, nothing to do except just anger. I can remember that feeling of anger. We talked about it since, she doesn’t actually remember the incident, but it’s so clear in my mind. I think it was the unjustness of it that made me angry. I’d taken care to bring it, and perhaps I could have lent it to her, but she wanted it for the whole day, but it was the unjustness of it that triggered the anger.

(Iris)

Sharing the comb would be just, but the person with more power, Iris’ “powerful big sister” “made” her give it to her for the day, and that was
SWORDS AND PLOUGH SHARES

Throughout this analysis, I use the language of grammar to dissect and name the language games that are at play. My discomfort is evident as I disclaim that my method is conversation analysis or even what is rapidly becoming orthodox discourse analysis. The tools of language were the best I could locate to carry out my desires, and they were very useful. But as I reread the analysis, I glimpse vestiges of past uses that remain by association. No matter how hard I scrub them, the dust of representationalism clings to them. Perhaps the purposes we enact cling to us. The actor, instrument and action are forever one, and cannot be separated, bound as we are in the effects of the actions our union brings into being.

And so with the tools we use. They are not separate from us or the purpose they fulfil. Once contaminated with representation, grammar terms may be partially ineffective in a poststructuralist endeavour.

The plough shares of peaceful days were collected and beaten into swords which were used to defend the common good. Images of curly headed Cincinnatus come to mind, ploughing his fields on the top of a right hand page, nudus, you might recall. Through formulations of the subjunctive passive, I dreamed of the golden light of Italy, the glory that was Rome. My visions of that glory were to do with plough shares rather than swords, homesick as I was for the hills and space of home. My admiration for Cincinnatus arose from his ability to plough and by association, from his disdain for hierarchical power, as he put down his imperium. I mean, can you imagine Caesar ploughing? Or having the slightest inclination to lay down either his imperium or his priestly toga? The golden age of the Republic was destroyed by all those swords that were once plough shares. Not the shares, by the way, which were wooden, but the points, which were wrought of iron. (Thank you, Steve.) I don't remember any stories of forging swords back into plough shares.

And when I saw Italy for myself the light was exactly as I knew it would be, dreaming as an escape from the confines of convent walls. The fields and hills of Latium richly fulfil the promise of the black and white sketches in the old text. And the images of honour, virtue and simplicity that have become deeply mine glimmer still in that marvellous golden light.

Perhaps it is impossible to forge swords into plough shares. Their weaponry and bloodshed has rendered them ineffectual for agricultural purposes. Old images do not fade, they are merely overlaid with new images, which do not have the same lasting qualities. Maybe the terminology of representation is irredeemable, and new terms are necessary to enable new epistemological spaces.
unjust. Power and anger are closely related, and notions of injustice connote the use of power. The powerless person claims anger and the cause is located in injustice. Responsibility is re-located on the other, in this example by the distortion of cause and effect “made me”. Anger is warranted in the face of the unjust actions of powerful others. Invoking injustice positions the angry person as ‘right’ (albeit otherwise powerless) and the unjust person as the cause of anger.

In the following fragments, injustice is associated with betrayal, being misjudged, being lied to, and being cast as scapegoat or workhorse.

I just sort of feel there’s days of raw emotion that I get generally when I’ve been betrayed. That’s my main, that would be my main thing that would get me angry. (Cicely)

Anger, often for me it seems to be about unfairness where I think people have misjudged me or my actions where I seem to be accused of having done things that I don’t believe that I have done. (Elecampane)

Room for doubt is achieved by the middle voice auxiliary ‘seem’ and phrase ‘I think’. This doubt makes more allowance for anger while the grounds for injustice are still unclear; the appearance of injustice is sufficient to warrant anger. In the next story, being positioned as the recipient of another person’s displaced anger is unjustified and unfair and warrants anger in return:

But I did feel that it was totally unjustified, the outburst today and I realised that I was only being the scapegoat and I think that also made me angry when I’d actually taken time, which I often don’t do, I had taken time to get my facts and figures, and assess the whole situation, I felt, in a very logical manner, I think it was probably unfair, I felt it was unfair that she really jumped at me. (Violet)

The cause-effect relation is distorted in the phrase ‘made’ angry. The cause is allocated to the other person who acted unjustly and the effect, Violet being angry, is located beyond Violet’s agency. The interaction of two
angry people is cast as a delicate positioning of blame and agency in which Violet is constituted as innocent of injustice and therefore rightfully angry. In the next fragment, the subject is positioned as similarly righteous:

I get angry about people not cooperating. I get angry if they don’t cooperate, if they, if they, if people sit down while I’m busy doing everything, I, I get annoyed and angry about that because I don’t think that’s fair. (Linden)

The unspecified ‘people’ are positioned in the wrong while the angry subject is positioned in the right. In the next fragment anger is presented as justified when Olive is lied to:

I hate people lying to me. If I find out people have lied to me I get very angry. I nearly ran down an old boyfriend once, and I thought, decided, decided that two timing bastard that he might be, as I went towards him in the car, I thought, (laughing) -here’s I saying I never get angry- I thought he wasn’t worth going to prison for, so I veered off, (laughing) but shit, I gave him a fright, and I liked all the looks that came over his face as I got closer. (Olive)

Earlier in the interview, subjectivity was claimed as a person who does not get angry. Now another subjectivity is constituted which is inconsistent with that claim. Anger (and aggression) is warranted as a response to lies, and the story finishes with considerable satisfaction. While the aside “(laughing) -here’s I saying I never get angry-” acknowledges that there is some inconsistency in the account, the justification for anger as a response to lies overrides the inconsistency, and the subject is positioned in the right.

Anger is justified not only as a response to injustice, but also as a signal that injustice is present:

I think for me anger is a protection, anger for me says something’s not right here, something of yours is being imposed on is being hurt, is being threatened, security might be threatened. For me it’s like a warning bell, now, that is OK take stock, have a look at what’s
happening here, and deal with it.... for me it's a real warning, it's a something's not right, something's threatening um, something's unjust. (Ginger)

Anger is the hero of Ginger's story, the subject of active verbs, and the angry person becomes the indirect object. Agency is turned around.

So far the examples I have presented are of the sufferer of injustice taking up anger as a response to injustice. Some accounts are of anger on behalf of others. Anger is warranted when others are the objects of injustice. In the next example parental anger is warranted when children are treated unfairly:

I can accept what happened to me, but when I um, when it affects, when it's about my kids as well then it's, well, then I get angry. (Karamu)

Anger is justifiable on behalf of others who are experiencing injustice:

There's also the anger you feel when you lose a patient, the disappointment and the anger for the family, not for you but for them and for life and things not being fair. It's not such a personal anger, but it's, but it's a disappointment anger. "It's not fair." "Why?" (Daphne)

Anger can be felt 'for' others, on their behalf or possibly in their stead. The subject is positioned separate from the people she feels for, and subjectivity is constituted as compassionate, which is appropriate for a nurse. In the next fragment, anger is justified by injustice on a societal scale:

I don't know how I go about dealing with the anger I feel when I read in the paper about some act of cruelty or injustice, but I think there would are ways of dealing with that also. (Rosemary)

Subjectivity is constituted with awareness of social justice and the potential for anger as a political statement. In the following fragment, anger about social injustice is anger which is displaced from the personal:
I find it much easier to get angry for other people than for myself. I can look at something on television or something in the paper and get really bloody angry about it, and it might be something that has happened to me and yet- oh well, that’s okay, it happened to me. I can actually get really angry about it if it has happened to someone else, and that’s really interesting. (Melissa)

**Anger constituted within the group**

In each of the above examples, individuals are the recipients of unjust action and individuals are angry. In the next, injustice is located in the dominant institutions of the social body and anger is located in the excluded group. This account puts a cultural contrast alongside Western accounts:

I feel like it’s unfair that society is really unfair, because when, as long as we behave like, ideal New Zealanders, we’re okay. As long as we say the right things, um, like stereo-typed New Zealanders we’re okay, think the same and raise our children to be very pakeha-ified, we’re okay but as soon as we, um, feel strongly about an issue pertaining to things Maori, as soon as we want to bring our kids up to identify themselves as Maori, next thing is that we’re being called into the office, called into the Headmaster’s office and that and you know, he throws the education acts at me, and I’m saying well so what, reading and writing isn’t as important to me as them spending time with their great grandmother, you know, and the other anger towards societies, is, it's just trying to be not even bicultural. It's trying to be Maori in a bicultural society. (Karamu)

The first person plural positions the subject as one of the group, and ‘society’ is the context for the headmaster’s position. The pronoun ‘we’ is used even when the speaker is the only Maori in the Headmaster’s office, moving to the first person singular only to quote her own words. The phrase ‘called into’ his office cues images of pupils without power, Maori positioned alongside children to face powerful authority figures. While Karamu is telling a story of her own action as the other participants do, her story contextualises injustice and anger in the social body as the other
accounts do not. Collective language structures position subjectivity not as an individual, but collectively as Maori.

In this chapter, anger is positioned in the interpersonal, a domain usually depicted in the texts as between individuals. These interpersonal discourses reproduce the social constructionist account. Anger is constructed as a unitary construct, cast as a response to injustice, and located within the individual. Injustice is positioned in the actions of other individuals and occasionally in unspecified society. The one account which positions injustice and anger in the social body is an account of racial and cultural inequity and the speaker positions herself among Maori to give her account. This text, by contrast, underlines the dominant discourses of anger in Aotearoa as Western, individualistic and culturally constrained.
Chapter Eleven

Communication scenarios

In which anger is communication, is destructive, is a struggle for power and control, facilitates communication, and renegotiates interpersonal agreements

In the last chapter, I drew together fragments of participants' accounts to point out the discourses of anger as interpersonal and as a response to injustice. In this chapter, anger talk positions subjects in a wider variety of social contexts than responding to injustice. Anger is constituted in social relations and communication as a forceful way to get attention. Anger is interwoven in power relations between and among people who relate closely to each other, and may be a call for change in patterns of interrelating.

Scenarios of anger in communication

I read anger stories in the texts as elaborate scenarios of advance and withdrawal, open talk, silence and withdrawal. There are stories of people who relate to each other in elaborate patterns of agreed movement to and fro, and these agreements are usually implicit. Anger enters the scenario when requests for change have not been made explicitly. Among these complex scenarios, patterns emerge, which I read as three scenarios, as follows. Let us call the angry person the protagonist in the scenario, and the person to whom anger is directed, the antagonist. The expression of anger positions the antagonist in discomfort with limited choices available in turn. These choices can be summarised as three: a return expression of anger, withdrawal, or a peaceful request for negotiation. A return of anger expression places both subjects in mutual anger. There may be a struggle between partners for control over each other or over contested shared interests. Mutual anger finally abates, and the other two alternatives remain. In the second scenario, withdrawal increases the distance between the two, and communication is impaired. When the discomfort that is felt is followed by withdrawal and the avoidance of talking about the dispute,
disagreements remain unresolved and the relationship deteriorates. From this second scenario comes the warning that avoiding anger is wise if the relationship is important. The third scenario, a peaceful request for negotiation, re-opens communication choices. Agreement to negotiate brings the two closer together. In this scenario, the discomfort from the anger episode leads on to talk between the parties involved in the dispute. Disagreements are able to be resolved when the people involved agree to talk about what happened. Anger can be a strategy that is taken up as a call for renegotiating interpersonal boundaries.

As the protagonist's anger leads to the antagonist's discomfort, space is increased between the two. Claiming anger thus claims space for the subject. If talk between the parties does not follow, the space claim results in more power for the protagonist and possibly less for the antagonist. When talk follows, space and boundaries can be (re)negotiated explicitly. It is unlikely however, that the protagonist loses ground. The risk is that the antagonist will yield all the ground and leave the whole territory, ending the relationship. Anger then is a resource that a person may utilise to increase power in interpersonal disputes, or to bring an end to the relationship. When both parties agree to talk, they are able to renegotiate ways of relating.

In the texts, anger-as-communication discourses are dramatised in all of the above scenarios. Anger is framed as destructive to communication, as a struggle for power and control, as enabling communication and as a call for renegotiating interpersonal boundaries.

**Anger as destructive to communication**

In these texts are stories that cast anger as destructive to effective communication. Even when being angry is construed as an attempt to communicate, the antagonist may not read the communication accordingly. Being angry is therefore risky:
I think trust is perhaps the greatest, lack of trust is the greatest barricade and handicap to it, really. If I use my anger constructively to speak to a person I’m in conflict with about how I feel, and the consequences for me and perhaps what could be done to resolve it, I may in fact be making myself very vulnerable, so I suppose I have to make a conscious decision whether in that instance I’m prepared to take the risk. (Rosemary)

This fragment is interesting in comparison to Rosemary’s previous claims to anger as constructive. As her account unfolds, her grasp of anger-as-positive discourses becomes increasingly tenuous. Hesitancy is conveyed in this fragment in the words ‘really’, ‘perhaps’, ‘I suppose’. The next fragment positions angry people as trying to get their own way, and getting their own way is ranked as more important than the relationship. According to this ranking, when a relationship is important, anger will not be expressed:

If it’s something that’s vitally important to a person I suppose they need to communicate with whoever it is that’s upset them but is it just getting your own way? How important is it it’s a matter of, what value are you placing? Is your relationship with this other person more important than - are you getting angry because people aren’t doing what you want? (Poppy)

Anger is effectively disclaimed by the second person pronoun with deleted referent. Maintaining the relationship is more important than expressing anger, and the interrogative suggests curiosity rather than judgment. Further on in the same account anger expression is framed as destructive:

I got so angry .... I ranted and raved on and on and really told him what I thought of it which were things I really didn’t mean... (he) never said a word he just sat there and took it and went really quiet... everything just went really quiet and we didn’t have our usual communication. I think I really did something quite destructive. (Poppy)
The first person pronoun and specific verbs give immediacy to this account while the past tense locates the incident and by implication the angry behaviours at a distance from present subjectivity. The next fragment also uses a story of past anger as a warning that expressed anger may be regretted:

I didn't actually, I didn't lose my temper as such, I kept it reasonably cool, but of course I said far too much and you know you can't take that back and it made it awkward for working together, I suppose. (Cicely)

A specific instance in the first person is followed by the unreferenced second person position to draw general conclusions about the potential damage anger can effect in interpersonal relationships. In the next chapter I reread these accounts as gendered discourse, and ask questions about who benefits from unexpressed anger in intimate partnerships. In this reading, anger is destructive to communication and is a dynamic in power relations.

**Anger as a struggle for power and control**

In the dynamic interplay of attack and defence, anger is a means of struggling for power and control:

It's getting harder to express it, but the thing is that when I start to express it he looks on it as a frontal attack and then he retaliates. I think mine is the anger at an event, or is anger at things, that is, it's not personal anger, it's not towards, it's not directed directly at him, it's maybe that something's happened. Yeah, and then I get angry at that event and then he, he swings it around that I'm attacking him, threatening him and so his defences has come up and whoosh and I can't say anything because he's really angry. He becomes very threatening and so I just shut up. (Ngaio)

This dynamic is a guessing game which involves mutual anger and requires mutual mind reading. Power and control are claimed by both parties in acts of aggression and withdrawal. The next fragment gives an account of anger and violence which is a retrospective story of events
located in the past, and the time distance allows different readings in the present. Power is claimed in the position of the recipient of anger and even violence:

I guess for me with my husband there was a certain joy in some power over him that I had control of him that I could make him angry and that’s remembered as well along with the fact that he did this to me also and didn’t I do well there getting him to do that. A certain joy that, um, yeah that I got something over him too. I mean, he was obviously wrong nobody should hit anybody else, it’s obviously his fault. Yeah, that that’s there as well. (Elecampane)

The semantically ill-formed attribution of cause and effect ‘made him angry’ positions the subject as powerful. The lost performative ‘he was obviously wrong’ and ‘his fault’ is turned to Elecampane’s advantage once the subject is positioned as the agent of her partner’s aggression. In this way the story of a violent marriage is re-authored.

The interplay of anger and violence increases the top-down power of a person who has authority. A father who has used violence associated with anger need only use anger for members of his family to submit, and eventually the possibility of his anger is enough:

My father, on the other hand, is and has been, a shouter all his life, has had real difficulty with his personal relationships all his life, he’s nearly 85 now and still does that. He’s a very angry man, I think, still. I was afraid of him, and there were several reasons. I guess in a way I’m still afraid of him because of his unpredictability. I mean, I never knew when he was going to be angry or not, and I never really knew what was going to make him angry, how he’d suddenly flare, and he had a very hard hand and it was to be avoided at all costs, he didn’t use it often, it wasn’t cruel. I guess the cruelty was in the unpredictability. (Iris)
This is a story of parental power which continues into adulthood. Unpredictable anger which was more to be feared than violence places the angry person in a power position. In Flora's account of anger between parent and child, the power positions are reversed. The child is ascribed power and strategic intent, with knowledge of how to be angry to deliberately elicit her mother's anger:

She would take every opportunity to express her anger with me, um, probably when she was little, as I say, I expressed my anger with her when she did things that I didn't think she should, um, which made her worse, of course she would go and find something else to do more annoying. (Flora)

The universal quantifier "every" and unspecified nouns "things" and "something" render the subject powerless in the face of the inevitable "of course". Agency is abdicated, and the child is positioned as powerful other by mind reading "she would go and find", implied causatives, and semantically ill formed cause and effect relationships "made her worse". Further on in the same account is a more recent incident where again the subject is positioned in the passive. A family dinner is being prepared for adult children who are visiting the family home:

The girls chat, and have a high time. There's shrieks of laughter, and it's great, and Mum simmers, and gets angry, and if only I could say to them, would one of you come up and do this, until I get to the point where I am so cross, one of them will come up and say "Can I do something to help?" (Flora)

Non verbal expressions of anger are to be read as requests for help. The third person "Mum" is inarticulate, and justified in taking up anger as a request for help. The modal operator of (im)possibility underlines the helplessness of the position. The next fragment positions withdrawal in the past and in the present a new position of direct communication:

Once upon a time when I got angry, I would say nothing. I couldn't say anything, because I was too frightened to say anything and I didn't want to upset people, either, because I'd think that they'd get upset
and get really mad at me and I didn’t want to deal with that. But now I just say what I think, and if they don’t like it, it’s tough. (Linden)

“Once upon a time” casts past behaviour as a story separate from the present subject position. The old story positioned Linden as frightened and avoiding upsetting others and required to mind read, “I’d think that they’d get upset”. The modal operator of possibility “couldn’t say anything” positions the subject as powerless. The new story re-positions Linden in independent and unassailable agency.

**Anger as enabling communication**

Anger stories in the texts are frequently framed as a strategy to bring about discussion of an issue between the speaker and an important other. In this fragment, anger leads to talk, to renegotiating the relationship:

And I think there is enough energy there usually from anger to persist even if the other protagonist, if that is a reasonable word to use, wants to opt out of the situation rather than face up to it, or behaves in an angry and violent way in response. If one, if the one person has the skills, they can use their energy to quietly persist and say “I feel angry and frustrated by this situation, and I would like you to try and understand and we could perhaps come to some resolution that makes it a bit easier for us both.” (Rosemary)

This account is presented as an example of a general rule, couched in the impersonal “other protagonist”, “one”, “one person”, “they” and “their”. The present tense in the assertive quote effects immediacy, and positions the subject as an advocate of negotiating relationships. The general rule established, conditions follow:

It’s very difficult, I guess, to be angry with someone who won’t connect in any way with that, so perhaps I’m simplifying the whole thing when I say the energy of anger can be used constructively. Perhaps it needs two willing participants. (Rosemary)
Anger is a constructive call for discussing a ‘situation’ as a reasonable explanation. Subjectivity is constituted as reasonable, advocating positive outcomes to anger, and allowing that others may not be willing to negotiate, which demonstrates the ability to view the example from more than one viewpoint. Other accounts take up the discourse of anger enabling communication:

They (children) actually let rip with me, but we then sit down and talk about it, and I think it’s something quite special. (Violet)

The anger is set at a distance from the speaker and allocated to the children, ‘they let rip’. The negotiation is shared in the first person plural connoting cooperation, and the satisfaction belongs to Violet, who is constituted as a mother who is tolerant and communicates effectively with her children. In the next fragment, calm requests for negotiation are framed as ‘adult’ behaviour:

The other person used to get angry a lot with me and I used to deal with it by talking and to say “Do ah - Let’s sit down and talk about it,” and she used to tell me that um “You think you can solve everything with talking, or reason,” and I used to tell her “Yes, that’s what adults do, adolescents do what you’re doing.” So we always had this constant battle about behaviours. (Ginger)

In this story the subject is positioned in adult and reasonable behaviour and the “other person” as adolescent and unreasonable. The imperfect tense “used to” establishes ongoing and continual practice. Adult and reasonable behaviour is appropriate for counsellor positions. Positioned as reasonable and uninvolved, counsellors enable others to articulate feelings. The following fragment invokes this counselling practice in a story of reflecting feelings:

I’m thinking of the child who sticks in my mind, I can’t remember what happened to him. But I can remember my going and sitting there with him and saying to him “I can see how angry you are, I can see that you’re angry,” and the child fighting and struggling and looking at me and nodding, and I just kept on saying “I can see how
you’re so angry,” and letting him be angry and then it was over in a few seconds and he was off and running again. It was like magic. (Iris)

Further on in Iris’ account is another story of the same communication strategy, this time with another adult:

Now the strategy there was let’s identify the issues and handle them and as they arise deal with each one which we did and at the end she stood up and to leave as she did there was a great deal of affection between us we had actually got to the issues and we worked out ways of dealing with them and had to work together. It would have been awful if we had fallen out which we could have quite easily at that point, because she was feeling very angry and it was just a misunderstanding. (Iris)

In these stories subjectivity is constituted as calm, competent in communicating with angry others and skilful in bringing about positive relating. Anger can enable opportunities to improve communication, and to renegotiate how relating will happen.

**Anger as a call for renegotiating the interpersonal:**

In the third scenario, anger can be a call for renegotiating limits around individuals and between people when a peaceful request for negotiation re­opens communication choices:

It’s important to acknowledge and to know as much as possible, what anger is about and where it’s coming from and how you’re going to cope with it, whether it’s setting limits for myself or themselves um, in their own behaviour and setting limits in what they are going to accept from other people as well. This is what I’ll accept. If this happens then this is what I’ll do. (Elecampane)

In this account, anger comes “from” a transgression of acceptable limits. The movement from second to first to third to first pronoun position indicates movement from one location to another in her story. Limits are constructed around the ‘self’ and between the ‘self ‘and others, and these
The focus on language in this analysis is a two edged sword. It has advantages in that we can attend to tangible details to catch power relations in the act. It has disadvantages in that language in its most specific sense i.e. the words, might seem to stand for the whole. And language in its broad sense, is social relations, communication and practices which communicate, that is, everything. There is nothing but language.

The focus on language has advantages to me in this thesis, I can demonstrate scholarly abilities, by bringing together my past enjoyment of language formations and my present passion for the epistemologies of poststructuralism. It is also useful to use fine differences in words to create spaces among them. And in those spaces, we can move around in and among utterances, and get the feel for the geography of positioning of subjects in relation to objects of discourse. The landscape of the spoken word becomes multi-dimensional and invites such explorations.

I also collect disadvantages along the way. The detail of analysis verges on conversation analysis and that is not my expertise. My method might appear to be discourse analysis, and what is fast becoming orthodox discourse analysis is not my game either. The focus on words might obscure my broad intention of deconstructing anger as belonging in the spaces between, in the social. I'd like this work to belong in poststructuralist company, and I suspect that a language analysis reads as if it is predicated on structuralism, and recreates a realism, which is what I desire to stand outside. We are indeed, transcribed with that which we struggle against.

And doing anger is language, is communication, is enactment of social relations, and is particularly of interest in that it is constituted right in the very conflicts of status, of power, of entitlement, of the boundaries set up between the individual selves and competing groups that our society embodies.

And talking about anger is therefore talking about social relations. Do not let the appearances of language analysis distract you from my main purposes.
limits are boundary agreements about what is and is not acceptable. The following story is about personal limits:

He came in and went berserk at me for turning his TV up in his house, and, you know, all that sort of carry on and I really can't stand all that sort of territorial stuff, you know, it really, that really, really gets me going. But anyway, he said that to me and I stood up for myself and he pushed me and that was it. Then I really let loose and um, and you know I sort of said of absolutely everything that I'd been thinking. (Cicely)

Boundaries may be verbal 'stood up for herself', or physical "he pushed me". The physical transgression of personal boundaries opened the legitimate verbal expression of all the boundary confusions that were previously unspoken. The protagonist's anger broke the boundaries the antagonist had tried to set, and mutual anger "let loose" was a step towards new boundaries.

In Cicely's account the boundaries were behavioural rather than verbally explicit. In Olive's and in Ngaio's stories, the agreements are verbally explicit:

I'll hold it for three days. I've got a three day rule. If I'm still pissed off in three days then I'll talk about it and he knows it, and he knows that if I've, if I'm, if it's, he'll say like, wait for me to burst, but I just find that I'm not a good arguer. (Olive)

His anger is aggression. His anger is aggression, he can be angry for about five minutes and then it's into aggression and oppression, so I try to defuse it in five minutes of pure anger before it hits into the abuse and the aggression. (Ngaio)

Anger has the function of shifting blame onto another, and in the next fragment, the antagonist refuses to be positioned in responsibility and reason. The refusal leaves space for other family members to take up the positions left vacant:
Prior to this I'd keep quiet and take it and then take it away and rationalise through it, categorise what's happened, (laughing) and take it upon myself to, to correct whatever's going on around the home that whatever made anyone else angry. Hmm, but now I don't take responsibility for it. They wear it (laugh). So that's. I don't take responsibility for everything and whoever owns it they own it. It's not my problem. (Ngaio)

Responsibility is disclaimed, and renegotiations are made. “Time out” product of anger management has become part of the newly negotiated practice:

So we set a time where we're going to talk and one of us walks away. As long as we both agree on the time and so that gives us a time to cool down but it also gives us a time to talk about it, but it's in the time-out time and it's not put on the shelf for whenever. It's a time that we're going to go back to look at it and normally by then one of us has backed down. (Ngaio)

One person in a group can be angry and enable a shift in the group dynamic. In the following story, the angry person is a catalyst for sharing feelings:

It was neat because we all let go of how we were feeling, and I felt today that I was the catalyst for their feelings to all let go. It was quite a nice feeling for the three of us, so we could all share how we were really feeling. She was and the other girl I work with was amazed at this person today, she's been working with us for three days and she hadn't expressed how she was feeling at all, but it was the mere fact of me being so angry and jumping up and down and telling them that I needed to talk about it, that we all came together as a whole and it was a lovely feeling. (Violet)

The discourse of shared feelings positions Violet in discourses of humanistic group counselling, and her story continues within that frame. In the next fragment, the field of change is widened to societal change:
I think life would be very bland if we didn’t get angry. Imagine it if people didn’t get angry, if things didn’t make them angry, what an awfully bland society we would have. We wouldn’t have any political movement, women still wouldn’t have had the vote if someone didn’t get angry about it. (Tansy)

Anger is constituted as a requirement of political change, and the subject is positioned alongside women who change society by the use of the first person plural pronoun “we” while distanced from anger by the third person pronoun “them”. Separation from anger is achieved by deleted referential indices “people”, “them” and “things”. Semantically ill formed cause and effect in the phrase “made angry” externalises the cause of anger. By shifts in subject positions, subjectivity is constituted as approving of anger in the dynamic of social change while delicately disclaiming personal anger. In this way discrepant discourses can be taken up at once and complex subjectivities constituted in a brief utterance. Anger talk requires intricate choreography around multiple positions.

Anger impacts on those the angry person is relating to, and effects distance between the angry person and others in the interchange and anger itself. How that distance is used, and whether it is followed by verbal communication, casts anger as positive or negative in its effects on the relationship. From a metaposition, we can read that the relationship is affected not by anger so much as by whether other ways of communicating are part of the patterns of relating between the people involved. The relationship effects are more likely to be attributed to anger itself by those acting out the scenario. In this position, the quality of relating might be improved or damaged; either way anger plays a part in calls for change in relative positions in the landscape of power relations.

Discourses of injustice are not the only warrants for anger. People talk about anger working as a request for communication, providing opportunities for renegotiating personal and interpersonal boundaries, and in struggles for control and power. Throughout these scenarios, subject
positions are enabled at various distances from anger, responsibilities are claimed and evaded, and opportunities are created for the constitution of subjectivities appropriate for intending counsellors. In the next chapter I re-read the texts to extricate power relations in accounts of women’s and children’s anger.
Chapter Twelve
Power relations

*in which power imbalances are re-produced*
*and resisted in discourses of gender, age and ethnicity*

Anger enacts power and status in social relations, and notions of injustice as discussed in the last two chapters connote the use of power. The powerless person claims anger and locates the cause as injustice on the other. Invoking injustice positions the angry person as 'right' and the unjust person as the cause of anger. I noted in Chapter Three that the status of the angry person varies across social construction accounts of anger. Averill (1980, 1986) states that anger is expressed most often to those who are of lower status than the angry person; Lutz (1990) suggests that anger elevates at least temporarily the social status of the one who is claiming the need for more control. Crawford et al.'s (1992) stories are of children's and women's anger in relation to adults and men of higher status. In contrast to these hierarchical accounts, in the Solomon Islands, anger is inappropriate if the parties in conflict are not peers (White, 1990).

Legitimate power is reproduced in hierarchies, and anger may be constituted in the top-down authority of the workplace:

> It was a fine way of coping with things, it seemed to work. Controlling other people, controlling the work situation, um, it was successful because you didn't have to live with those people. You were only working with them. And they were prepared to accept it. And often I was in the position of power anyway, and those people were working for me so it was O.K. (Herb)

In poststructural readings of anger and power, inconsistency is not surprising. Power is not simply hierarchical from the top down but is relational, is produced and re-produced from the bottom up, and permeates social relations. Anger is a strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies, accentuates, and occasionally challenges existing relations of forces. Power and status are relatively stable dynamic forces, and
legitimations around the use of anger vary accordingly to claims for justice and calls for renegotiating social interactions.

Gender, age and ethnic memberships are organised around imbalances of power and status, and are given inconsistent permissions which vary according to social contexts. The dynamics of anger reproduce and resist the unequal relation of forces in the context of marriage and family, the workplace and school. Anger is constituted by/in all these multiple power relations in shifting social contexts as various discourses are produced and reproduced. In this chapter, I trace the dynamics of power and anger in stories which produce women’s and children’s anger.

**Gender**

Anger is constituted variously in gender talk, where legitimations and justifications for anger produce masculinity and femininity along with gendered legitimations and constraints. Legitimation re-produces gender appropriateness of anger expression according to institutional contexts. The general agreement is that social practice allows men and disallows women from being and acting angry:

I think that society thinks that men are allowed to be angry, and women aren’t of course. (Karamu)

These fragments reproduce stereotypical gender. The phrase ‘of course’ frames the legitimization of male anger and prohibition of female anger as well known, and the imbalance is expected to be agreed ground between Karamu and me. The generalised referential index “society” distances both of us from the lost performative “allowed”. In the following extract men’s anger is legitimated by positioning men as the protectors of women and children, who are compensated by legitimately showing ‘weaker’ emotions:

Ngaio: In society men are. Men are allowed to be angry. That’s their lives, being men and protecting their partner, their property, their business, themselves, they’re allowed to be violent with their anger.

Kay: Who isn’t allowed to be angry?
SILENCING PRACTICES

There is power in naming. One of the uses of that power is to liberate. We name the enemy, detect its boundaries, surround and capture it, and then we can work around it, and dispose of it. And that is very useful to make the space to create preferred alternatives, to create and invigorate resistance. And this is a process that anyone can use, and it can be used to support dominant institutions to disable resistance. In this way, talking about gender can be and is used against feminisms, to formulate counter arguments which position men as disadvantaged by feminist discourses.

I seem to have been in many conversations recently in which feminist resistance is neatly overturned by the co-option of gender analyses to reinstate patriarchal power relations. I admit that I am continually seduced into dialoguing with masculinities. I speak, informed by discursive materials that offer transformations, and I transform those materials as I spin hopes and desires into possibilities. And even within the freely gifted sharing of shimmering visions, the curtain falls, and my vision is obliterated, overtaken by a more important story. Thus we are diverted, avoided, and ultimately silenced. I was mis-taken.

I am left stranded. I turn this way and that, struggling to find a place to stand, racking my mind to discover what was my error. I gather my energies back, pull myself together, hurt, and self reproaching. Gradually, I recall that this has happened before, and the risk to open to the other has been freely and deliberately chosen. Again. My offer has been once again been eluded, circumvented and recaptured, and made over into forms to benefit the dominant stories.

And so we step back into the position where we access power once more, into our own stories. And even there, it is as if the words are whisked away from our mouths as soon as we utter them, there being no valid airspace in which they might radiate and invite listeners. We broke the silence about sexual abuse of children, and our stories are sidelined by boys' own tales. We broke the silence on domestic violence, and we are repositioned as inciting retaliation. We spoke passionately for the honouring of difference, and we are re-burdened with psycho-biological determinants. We make pleas for the discursive production of gender, and we are inundated with the disadvantages men suffer in accessing opportunities to know their feminine side.

No wonder we forgo the dialogue, stop speaking, fall back into the silence where we can be what we deeply and magically are.
Ngaio: Women and children, they are portrayed as helpless, waiting for the male role image to come in, and protect them, they’re not allowed to be, they’re allowed to be frightened, they are allowed to be scared and at times they’re shown to be angry and go to the law for help and that, and get frustrated by it.

Women don’t get angry. We’re meant to be the placators, we are meant to be pleasing, we are the smoother overers. Girls don’t get angry, you fix things up, after the men have got angry and blasted things to bits, come on, girls have to come on, put the band aids on, clean up the mess. It’s completely inconsistent. Women aren’t allowed to get angry, but we are allowed to be dizzy dissolving messes, we are allowed to dissolve into heaps of tears and not cope. We are allowed to cry, and we are allowed to not cope, and we are allowed to become hysterical, and we are allowed to be helpless, because then we need a man to come and fix us up. (Melissa)

In these fragments, lost performatives abound; “allowed”, “meant to” “have to”. In Melissa’s account men are compared to “girls” pointing up the imbalance of legitimate power. Not only are women prohibited from anger, but they are responsible for “fixing things up”, putting on the “band aids”, “cleaning up the mess” which result from men’s anger and aggression. Legitimation of anger for men is conflated with aggression and may be expressed in socially approved rituals. The New Zealand culture of contact sport, especially rugby, is cited in many accounts as “legitimate expression” of men’s anger and aggression:

Men are allowed to be angry, but also men have access to opportunities which are a legitimate expression of anger, like rugby, on the sports field. Men are allowed to go on the rugby field and bash each other bloody mindless, kick the ball, and ruck each other. I mean that’s anger, lots of anger comes out there, and that is a legitimate expression of anger, they are allowed it, I mean a whole national heritage is built on it. So society is set up so that women don’t have as many opportunities to express anger as men do. (Melissa)
Anger positions the not-angry other in “fault”, and women are thus framed as the ‘cause’ of men’s rightful anger:

And if, oh, the other interesting thing is if in a family situation a man gets angry, it’s only because of the woman’s fault, anyway. It’s something she’s done, and he’s got a right to be angry. It’s all her fault and she’s got to fix it up afterwards. She’s not allowed to be angry. (Melissa)

The dominant discourse of gendered anger enables men and constrains women. These are statements of the general, offered by speakers positioned as commentators on society. In the next section, accounts of anger and age are not as smoothly reproduced.

**Age**

As talk about gender reproduces general comments about society, so does talk about age. Texts frequently constitute age as constrained in anger expression at both ends of the life span for people of both sexes. For the elderly, anger is not acceptable:

Old people are not allowed to be angry. (Jasmine)

Children are positioned as enabled and as constrained by social practice. In the following fragments, children are prohibited anger:

It’s not okay for children to be angry because they get labelled as “brat”. (Jasmine)

I guess adults think that they can get angry, but children are not allowed to be angry with them. (Linden)

Children aren’t allowed to be angry. They are certainly not allowed to say anything to adults, and if an adult’s done something that you think is unfair or wrong, you are not allowed to tell them, because you have got to respect your authority, respect your elders. (Melissa)

The prohibition on anger is constituted in lost performatives “okay”, “not allowed”, “unfair”, “wrong”, and “got to”. The opposite story is also
produced, which legitimates anger for "little" children as in the next fragment:

I think little children, um, anger is quite acceptable for little children.
(Rosemary)

Age is not separate from, and interacts with, gender. This account reproduces discourses of socialisation which constitute anger as gendered:

Men are allowed to be angry. So are boys. Boys are encouraged. It's a whole social processing, it's a whole - it's so hard to fight against. It's so hard to change, because it's through every fibre of our whole society. Wherever you look, it's so subtle you can't see it. It's really really subtle. If something goes wrong, kids playing, the boys get angry "Oh, fuck!" and throw the cricket bat down, the girls burst into tears. (Melissa)

Melissa's account reminds me of Crawford et al.'s (1992) stories of women crying with anger. The prohibition on anger for girls lies alongside an inconsistent discourse which allows girls anger on a gendered and limited condition:

Little girls aren't allowed to be angry, they've got to be nice. You know, sometimes they're allowed to be cutely angry when they're little. (Olive)

Being "cutely angry" is not limited to girls of a young age. Discourses of approved femininity which constrain also produce approved childishness:

... and they are a wonderful couple, as a couple, great, and people say to him or say to her when she gets wild, "Sarah, you look beautiful when you are angry." (Flora)

The fragments above re-produce 'known' discourses as common knowledge, or at least knowledge which is common to the participants and me as the interviewer and their lecturer. Common knowledge is conveyed by the lost performatives and generalised referential indices which constitute accepted social practices. Personal stories offer a wider
range of inconsistent legitimations and prohibitions around anger. Some of these stories support the popular discourses, while others reveal more complex and varied possibilities.

Reproductions

Personal accounts of speakers’ anger ‘careers’ frequently embody the ‘known’ legitimations which constrain women and children’s anger. The following fragment reproduces women as obedient wives:

When we got married I was angry with him for many years as well because I’d come out of this childhood where I thought this is what men were like and I was 17 when I was married... and I thought that that was what women were supposed to be like, subservient, do as you were told, because that was the time, if you didn’t, you copped it. (Linden)

Imbalances of gender relations are reproduced in the next fragment which is a retrospective account of parenting:

I think I’ve treated my children pretty much alike in that way except perhaps I might challenge the boy more directly about anger, his anger, and try and distract or divert the girl. (Rosemary)

When open expression of anger is not legitimate for women, indirect expression or suppression are required:

I can remember my mother banging pots and doing very similar things to what I’d feel comfortable doing, banging pots, making noises. (Sage)

But, you see, I think it might have affected my mother, so that her anger was very inner. (Violet)

In participants’ personal stories, the discourse of constraints on children’s anger is re-produced consistently. In both of the above fragments, women’s anger is constrained. No one tells stories of themselves as small children legitimately or “cutey” angry. Prohibitions, however are commonly voiced:
For me to express anger was resulted in complete withdrawal of affection from both my parents, it was very much frowned upon. (Rosemary)

We (children) were never allowed to express our anger, or our feelings really, and it was a very controlled household. (Violet)

These prohibitions are emphasised in Rosemary's account by superlatives "complete" and "very much", and in Violet's by the universal quantifier "never" and lost performatives "allowed" and "controlled". Unequal power and status emphasise the location of fault and responsibility onto the not-angry antagonist. The following example positions children as both less powerful and more responsible for anger. Once more, anger acts to locate responsibility and blame away from the angry person and onto the less powerful other. The anger of the more powerful parent is recollected as being the child's fault. That referred responsibility is referred to in the next fragment as a "little girl feeling":

But there are still times when he (father) is angry that I feel like a little girl and I must be responsible for this, how can I help him with it, or what have I done wrong. (Iris)

Iris the adult is positioned as a "little girl" when her father is angry. As in Melissa's account earlier in this chapter, 'girls' are responsible for cleaning up the mess after men's anger. The powerlessness of a "little girl" is achieved by the modal operator of necessity "must", modal operator of possibility "how can" and the lost performative "wrong". Children are positioned as powerless in stories of family anger.

**Alternative stories**

In the texts, generalisations about who are allowed to be angry are frequently inconsistent with personal stories. This is especially true of accounts of gender difference. Men's legitimate claim to anger is not acted out in the families of some participants' family of origin. Quite to the contrary. There are competing generalisations of men being unable to express emotion:
My father is probably more like my husband. He doesn’t actually talk it out. (Tansy)

My father was a typical Englishman, who rarely to this day doesn’t show his feelings. (Violet)

Accounts suggest legitimations vary according to social context. In the family context, women are legitimately angry with their own children:

Women are allowed to do it over children until until a certain stage and then you’re doing it with your daughters and then you’re being catty again. (Elecampane)

Mum used to, sometimes used to lose her temper and get into us with the ironing cord. I can understand in some ways the pressure on her now, that I’m older. It didn’t make sense then, of course. (Basil)

Mum still likes to scream and shout, my father is still pretty quiet. (Jasmine)

I can remember being angry with the kids once, probably a combination of things, but really losing control and really smacking hard, and feeling really ashamed. (Daphne)

Anger and aggression reproduce the hierarchical power of men over women, and women over children:

And she actually used the words, “This is the only way I can control my children,” and I said that word, what does it mean, and it’s the anger coming out, that she feels the children aren’t doing what she would like them to do. That makes her so angry and then when she speaks up about it, her husband knocks her about. (Angelica)

This account suggests that women may be legitimately angry with children as part of legitimate power of parents to “control” children. One account offers a story of women’s anger and aggression. Prevalent
discourses about anger may mask alternative stories:

I have a friend in (another town) who takes anger management for women, there’s a group of battered husbands down there. I suppose with the climate today there are a lot of angry women who have to hit. A lot of things could make you angry. (Tansy)

Women’s anger is conflated with violence in this account which reproduces the language of men’s anger and violence. The speaker is distanced from women’s violence by generalised referential indices “a lot of” (women and things) and “you”, the modal operator of necessity “have to” and distorted cause-effect, “make you angry”.

Gender is constituted in anger stories as constrained by legitimations which enable male anger and constrain female anger. Participant accounts weave a complex web of legitimation and social context, suggesting that anger is produced among men, women, and children and that gender discourses compete with age and social context discourses.

**Ethnicity**

Prevalent discourse reproduces stereotypical legitimations for variation in legitimate anger expression across ethnic cultures as for gender and age:

My father was a typical Englishman, who rarely to this day doesn’t show his feelings. (Violet)

And I find New Zealanders are diabolical, I found Australians that are Italian much better at being angry, and their children. When I worked in the refuge, the children of the European and Australian backgrounds as opposed to the New Zealanders and they were the three groups we had mostly, um really, the Europeans and Australians were much better at it, um, and I found that the Asians didn’t express it, so, so much either. (Ginger)

Until we can stop people manifesting their anger in a violent way-It’s going to be hard for New Zealanders compared to America, we are very bad about talking about how we feel about things. (Tansy)
The discourse reproduction is at a stereotypical level, and this level is maintained by generalised referential indices. Members of "other" ethnic groups do anger differently from "us". Or, in the following fragment, "we" do it differently from "you". In this fragment of Ngaio's account, Maori are positioned as openly expressive of anger:

If you're really angry you go up and you tell the person straight to their face and you have a good old ding dong go at each other, a lot of verbalisation, and then after that it's it's "Oh, I feel good about that, do you want something to eat," and off they go and you have something to eat, and that makes it all right. (Ngaio)

Later in the same account, gender competes with ethnicity in legitimating anger expression and reproduces the 'men can't express their feelings' stereotype:

With men, the men they um, they're not so open when they're angry. Maori men amongst Maori men. They normally find a woman to talk to, yeah, who they can unload. (Ngaio)

In these texts I read status and power as intrinsic in accounts of anger, but not in any one relation of powerful to powerless. Anger may be claimed legitimately and expressed variously by those who are more or less powerful or by peers, according to the social context. Doing anger claims and resists power in every direction of relating, from powerful to powerless and between equals. Anger is constituted in language and permeates the re-production of power relations, and discourses of anger are multiple, shifting and productive.
Chapter Thirteen
The metaphor study

In which participants collaborate in a metaphor hunt,
arrange anger metaphors in clusters, identify a root metaphor
for anger, and compare our metaphor collection to that of Kövecses

In the previous six chapters, I have unfolded transcripts of student interviews and discussed discourses and practices of anger embodied in the texts, and I have analysed the language to bring to the surface the reproduction of those practices. One particular language use that merits closer examination is metaphor. Given that language constitutes reality, then the metaphors embedded in everyday talk are especially potent in shaping and reflecting how anger is socially constituted. The metaphors used in ordinary talk about anger are produced in and through discourses of anger. This Metaphor Study is nested in the Student Study, and is a re-reading of some of the same texts. My purpose in running it separately was to provide an opportunity to include the student/participants in the research process for reasons discussed fully in Chapter Four.

In this chapter, I use a different voice, speaking from the collaborative exercise which produced the analysis it presents. This study was written up then, and stands alone in its design and execution. In my analyses in previous chapters, I have talked little of metaphors of anger, since this study which comes after the braids of discourses in this text, was written earlier, and was already here waiting for me to catch up with it. The study is ours, not mine, and the different voice is appropriate, a spoken chorus. We begin formally, invoking Oxford texts, and the formal tone reverberates throughout this report.

The Oxford Companion to English Literature defines metaphor as “the transfer of a name or descriptive term to an object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable e.g. ‘abysmal ignorance’”. Aristotle defines metaphor as “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (Poetics 1457b 6-9). Metaphor is more than just
a figure of speech, however. In using metaphors, we draw analogies between one domain of experience and another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). A new idea is talked about in relation to a known idea. Thus what is new is introduced in association with language that is already familiar. This definition of metaphor underlines the pervasiveness of metaphor in talk about ideas. A definition is inevitably in itself metaphorical, since it introduces something new in relation to something already known. In a satisfyingly circular irony, to define metaphor without using metaphor is not possible (Derrida, 1972/1982). When language is read to represent that which it speaks of, all language is metaphorical in that it is a representation of that which is outside language (Hesse, 1980). In poststructuralism, nothing is "outside" language. As metaphors are used frequently and familiarly, the metaphorical nature of the talk disappears from awareness, to the extent that at times a person will say that a metaphor is 'literally' fact. For example a person talking about being angry may say that they "literally exploded". The metaphorical way of talking about 'the something new' has become conventional. The speaker is using a familiar expression of anger as explosive rather than representing a 'something new' in relation to the 'already known'. As a result, the language people use in ordinary conversation contains metaphors that have become conventional and their metaphorical origins lost.

While a range of metaphors in a given domain may compare that domain with a range of others, particular discourses tend to favour particular metaphors. These predominant metaphors or 'root metaphors' (Grace, 1987; Lyddon, 1989; Pepper, 1942) are shaped by and legitimate particular world views. In these ways, emotion talk is constrained in the production of emotions, and anger is produced with the constraints of dominant metaphors.

In poststructuralism, discourse does not represent but rather constitutes that which it speaks of. Anger is not a domain of experience but rather an object constituted in discourse. Metaphors are therefore read as discursive, producing particular effects. The question is not according to what rules has a particular metaphor been made and how therefore can similar
metaphors be made. The question becomes instead how is it that that particular metaphor is made rather than another. The metaphor of the emotion constitutes the emotion in any utterance (Derrida 1972/1982; Soyland, 1994), and therefore metaphors of anger constitute anger. In representationalism, language, and what we are used to referring to as understanding, perception, and conceptualising, are maps that we construct to describe the territory of our embodied experience (Korzybski, 1958). In poststructuralism, discourse shapes not our view of the world, but the world itself.

In talking about emotions, metaphors do not make sense of experience, but constitute experience, and the metaphors available in any particular society constitute emotions accordingly. In this way a social group constitutes covert and overt practices in social relations that come to be known as anger (Harre, 1986; 1987). Therefore the values of a culture are congruent with and identifiable within the metaphors in use. The inconsistencies and contradictions that are in the talk reflect the inconsistencies and contradictions in competing discourses around anger. Anger talk can be expected to contain conflicting metaphorical constructions based on different assumptions and presuppositions, probably for particular effects, for example, persuasion (Soyland, 1994).

Metaphors of emotion have been studied by Lakoff, Johnson and Kövecses (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1972; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 1986, 1989). While these writers critique objectivist accounts, they reproduce them, locating the construction of anger intrapsychically rather than socially. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) talk about “structuring perceptual systems” and describe how metaphor is embedded in embodied experiences pre-conceptually. That their approach is structuralist is evidenced in the metaphors they use to talk about metaphor. For example, they argue that ‘perception’ and ‘conceptualisation’ are interactional and contextualised and are not entities, yet they describe metaphor as “underlying the structures” of experience, and explain thought and emotion as bodily experience in “metaphorical schemata”. They use metaphors of structure that construct the subject as an edifice
with levels, and metaphor is located in the basement of the unconscious. Experience is created by conceptualising unconsciously, automatically, effortlessly (Johnson, 1987), and world is "perceived" from an internal individual position "pre-conceptually" and with a "basic logic". From there, the light of conceptualising proceeds upwards throughout the whole edifice and then outwards to other constructions of "abstract domains". They argue that once the experience is verbalised, abstracting language is used, and this is the language that conveys ideas, that convinces other people, that legitimises the experience. Language is thus abstracted from and splits speakers from 'experience' which is somehow still down in the basement without language. In this account, emotions are 'lived experience' which takes place in individual bodies, and the physiological effects of the emotion stand for the emotion, the physiological effects being part of the whole. This metonymy separates the physiological 'experience' from the intellectual 'awareness' of the experience. Despite his plea for the body in the mind, his explication of how metaphor structures concepts maintains the very mind/body split he is setting out to integrate.

The root metaphor for emotion in these analyses (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1972; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 1986, 1989) is the body as container and emotion as fluid within the container/body. They present anger metaphors in clusters around a prototype of the heat of fluid in a container on the premise that there is a common cultural model of the physiological effects of anger; increased body heat, increased internal pressure (blood pressure, muscular pressure), agitation, and interference with accurate perception. As the physiological effects of the emotion stand for the emotion, metaphors of anger are: anger is heat, anger is heat of a fluid in a container (body is container), and as anger intensifies, metaphors of pressure are steam, pressure, explosion, and what is inside comes out. Anger as solid heat leads to anger as fire. Anger is insanity, anger is violent frustrated behaviour, anger is an opponent in a struggle, anger is a dangerous animal, anger is aggression, anger is a physical annoyance, causing anger is trespassing, anger is a burden.
Figure 5: Kövecses’ anger metaphors
Kövecses’ (1989) work is the most recent exploration of metaphors of anger, and in this study I compare our analysis with the analysis he (in collaboration with Lakoff) presents. He does not state the sources of the metaphors he discusses except for citing Roget’s Thesaurus. I was curious what anger metaphors our texts would include compared to Kövecses’ (1989) collection. We were not deliberately using metaphors let alone generating as broad a range as we could. The first aim of this study was therefore to identify metaphors of anger in our interview transcripts.

Kövecses (1989) presented his collection of metaphors in clusters around prototypes. Categorisation is problematic in the postmodern world. Categories are not definable in terms of essential properties (Wittgenstein, 1953). Examples do not belong in discrete categories, but rather categorisation is a construction of the researcher imposed on data after the event. Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1972), Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Kövecses (1986, 1989) argue that clustering around prototypes is open ended and allows for overlap. Rather than any one example belonging to one cluster only, clusters may overlap in entailments. I was interested to see how sorting metaphors into clusters around prototypical examples would work. The second aim of this study was to collaborate in collating our collection of anger metaphors into clusters around prototypes.

Kövecses (1989) provides a prototype metaphor of emotion based on the metonymy of the physiological effects of the emotion standing for the emotion (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1972: Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 1986, 1989). In this metaphor, the body is a container and anger is the heat of fluid in a container. That seems to me to be only one possible reading of the metaphors of anger they collected. I was interested in how we as a group of collaborators would read the metaphors we collected. The third aim of the study was to identify a root metaphor to group our clusters around, and to compare our clustering results with those of Kövecses (1989), presented in Figure 5.
This study serves a methodological purpose as well, discussed fully in Chapter Four, to provide an opportunity for participants to be involved as researchers in the research process. All participants in the Student Study were invited to take part in this study as collaborators in the research process. The fourth aim of the study was to provide this opportunity for participants to participate in the analysis of their own transcripts.

**Methodology**

All participants in the Student Study were invited to take part in a day long workshop in December, 1994, when they had completed the two years part time counselling training. Seven of the twenty accepted the invitation. There were nine of us present, including two participants in the Counsellor Study. I facilitated the collaborative data analysis in the morning, and in the afternoon my colleague led a counselling training workshop as part of the reciprocity of the research process, as thanks to the participants.

We collaborated in a metaphor hunt through the texts, using the method I have described in detail in Chapter Five, p. 51. The metaphors were identified, arranged in clusters and a root metaphor identified around which the clusters were grouped. I compared our clusters to those compiled by Kövecses (1989) and wrote up this study with feedback from the three other collaborators. These metaphors are not presented as textual fragments, and all examples are owned collectively by the group.

**Our metaphor collection**

We chose ANGER IS ENERGY as a root metaphor since all clusters can be framed within that overall metaphor. While we formed some clusters that did not fit within that overall metaphor, within those clusters each example could be viewed as an entailment (Kövecses, 1989), that is all examples belonged to another cluster as well as that one. For example, a cluster of cooking metaphors are all subsumed under ENERGY IS PRESSURE. I have included at the end the CAT cluster to illustrate both the open ended possibilities of what constitutes a cluster, and that each metaphor in this cluster is also allocated elsewhere.
Figure 6: Our anger metaphors
The clusters are presented in Figure 6, arranged around the ANGER IS ENERGY metaphor. Some metaphors were sustained sequences of feelings and actions surrounding episodes of anger experience and expression, for example:

Learning how to get angry was just like finding another gear... like in a car you've only got first and second and third, for me, finding anger was like having fourth and an overdrive... once I got angry it was like put it into fourth and off you go again, and when you get stuck, you just whack it into overdrive and I'd go.

At the other end of the scale, some metaphors were embodied in one word:

Violence, rape and crimes against property are deeply rooted in anger.

In the collection that follows, I have focussed on words and phrases and give only one instance of each metaphor use within any one cluster. Figure 6 illustrates the metaphor clusters as they cluster around ANGER IS ENERGY which is positioned as the dominant metaphor of our collection. This energy may be EXTERNAL to the body or INTERNAL, can be suppressed and held UNDER PRESSURE, and may then be RELEASED. There is in that sequencing of clusters a chronology of the anger process from the onset, feeling, suppression, expression and release. This chronology parallels Kövecses (1989). I present the metaphors under these five headings, ANGER IS ENERGY, ANGER IS EXTERNAL, ANGER IS INTERNAL, ANGER IS PRESSURE, and ANGER IS RELEASE. Under each heading are subheadings for each cluster, and instead of lists, the metaphors are strung together cluster by cluster, as if in sentences addressed to the reader in the second person.

ANGER IS ENERGY

Anger is a form of energy, a life force, there's an energy rush, you can have an enormous bundle of energy, have a surge of energy, and feel energised.
ANGER IS MOBILISING

The energy can be utilised, channelled, used constructively. Anger is mobilising. Away you go, you go on, it gets you going, gives you strength, your body is mobilised, you are empowered, you jump up and down.

ANGER IS NATURAL PHENOMENA

Energy is never lost or gained it is simply transferred. Anger is nature’s outlet, like a volcano, and an angry person storms out. Alternatively, you are dead calm when you are angry.

ANGER IS ELECTRICITY

There is an underlying current, you are short tempered, or have a short fuse, you defuse the anger with humour, or explode in an electric way.

ANGER IS FIRE

You have a fiery temper, get hot, have a heated argument, see red, flare up, and then burn out. Or you are very cold, in a cold blooded absolute fury. When you are not angry, you are cool, calm, collected and nothing frazzled. Getting angry is losing your cool.

ANGER MAKES PEOPLE DANGEROUS ANIMALS

You ruminate, brood over it, feel trapped, be baited or goaded, get caged in, and then when anger springs on you, you get hairy, go out of your tree, get wild, and go berserk. Anger is fishy. It’s a can of worms.

ANGER IS WAR

You have a constant or running battle, a battle of wills, or a head on confrontation, and you take the flak. There is a time bomb out there. Anger is triggered, you shoot your mouth off. You tear into them, let rip, and tear strips off them.

ANGER IS DESTRUCTION

You destroy yourself, or a relationship, or demolish them.
ANGER IS TERROR
It’s frightening, it’s terrible, you feel powerless and trapped, threatened, scared.

ANGER IS MADNESS
Your perception is distorted. You are beside yourself, on the outside looking on. You are irrational, go mad, rant and rave. Anger sends you loopy.

ANGER IS EXTERNAL
Anger is an entity that comes from outside the angry person. It has mobility, position in relation to persons and physical properties.
Somewhere there is a real source of anger, and you can know where it is coming from. It gets closer and closer, creeps up on you. It sits around waiting; it lies dormant. Anger can grow and be huge, heavy and like a weight upon your shoulders. It’s hard to handle, and you have to cope with it. You can sort it through, throw it around, throw a wobbly and be on the receiving end. Anger can actually physically hit you, overtake you or take you over. You can sit on it, use it as a cover for something else or a mask. You can get into it and wear it. You can direct it to another, let them have it, have a go at them, really let loose and spray it everywhere. Anger goes away, retreats, leaves.

ANGER IS INTERNAL
Anger can enter into you, it resides within you, is in the back of your mind. You are touchy, worked up and uptight and you experience it as tension. Anger is a way of making contact, is contagious, is like a horrible sore. Anger can be internalised, stored in the body, somewhere inside, and is very inner. You have emotions in your blood, tightness in your head, or tight neck and shoulders. Anger gets caught up in your chest, and you can get it off your chest. You have a knot in your stomach, your tummy starts screwing, and you feel anger in your guts. You are pissy, shitty, or pissed off.
ANGER IS TASTE

Anger feeds you. You get cheesed off, stuff your feelings, and you swallow it. Anger wells up inside you, you feel really quite sick, and you have distaste for the situation. Anger chokes in your throat.

ANGER IS SMELL

You have a foul temper, get very foul, something gets right up your nose and maybe your anger is contaminated with aggression.

ANGER IS SOUND

There is a dreadful row, a constant tirade. You swear your face off, curse their hide and scream like a fishwife, or you turn on silent behaviour.

ANGER IS VISIBLE

Anger is a hot sort of colour...my anger is maroon. Your emotions are like a crystal, they turn and move and they change colour. You see red. Anger clears the air.

ANGER IS PRESSURE

Anger can be contained in the body and held under pressure.

You submerge your emotions, suppress, hold on to, repress and seal off your feelings of anger. Sometimes, anger gets stuck. You can’t express it all and lock yourself up. Anger goes in and it needs an out and if it doesn’t get out, it goes in and eats away inside you. Anger suppressed can kill. It fester, eats away your insides, puts you out of balance. Then you get to breaking point, break down, or you are stunted and restricted by that anger.

You crank up the energy, stir, bottle it up, get wound up, wrapped up in it, build up the frustration, simmer, seethe, stew, bubble, boil, be under steam and bring things to a head. The situation or people are volatile, and it all comes to a head. It’s like a pressure cooker.
ANGER IS RELEASE
Pressure is followed by release, loss and relief.

ANGER IS LOSS
Anger is expressed by loss of control as the pressure is contained no longer within the body.
You lose your temper, lose control, lose your cool, lose it. You have had it. You are out of control, uncontrollable. You are out of it, out of control.

There is an outburst, an outlet for that emotion that’s bubbling. It manifests itself in a big blowout, the lid flies off. The floodgates open. You blow your stack, blow up, blow your top, explode, burst, the top of your head blows off. You let off steam, pour out your anger, vent it, spray it everywhere. You let off steam, the tension is released, you simmer down.

ANGER IS RELIEF
You have got rid of your anger, spent it, got it out, brought it to the surface. You have cleared the air, cooled down. Anger clears the air, is freeing, brings back equilibrium. Laughter is just behind the anger, and we are the best of friends as a result of expressing our anger.

ANGER IS A GAME
There’s a lot of game playing around anger. There are power plays and slanging matches. You might be using someone as a pawn or playing their game. You revel in expressing anger, and find other peoples’ reactions funny.

CAT CATEGORY
Categorising is an arbitrary activity, as illustrated by one cluster identified, a category of cat metaphors.
You are catty, pissed off and spray anger everywhere. You turn on silent behaviour, and hide from angry people. Anger is fishy. It’s a
can of worms. People bait each other, carp on, snark at each other and scream like fishwives.

As expected, our reading of how metaphors of anger we found clustered around prototypes differed from Kövecses’ (1989) reading. A comparison can be made of Figure 5, my map of how Kövecses clusters around the root metaphor of ANGER IS HEAT (of fluid in a container), and Figure 6, which maps our clusters around a central metaphor of ANGER IS ENERGY. The chronology of the anger process confirms Kövecses’ suggested sequence, despite the different choice of root metaphor. Other alternatives presented themselves as potential root metaphors, for example, ANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS MOTION or ANGER IS CONSUMPTION. ANGER IS ENERGY has appeal to us as counsellors because of its potential for positive reframing of client anger talk. The construct of a root metaphor wavers somewhat in the face of this array of choices. The notion of “deep level”, “pre-conceptual” root metaphors as presented in Johnson’s (1987) architectural metaphor of the self is not convincing. On the other hand, the discourse approach is well illustrated by the same array of choices.

Anger is a site for competing discourses signalled by these metaphors, which represent the discourses explicated in the previous chapters. For example, the wild animal metaphors support the discourse of anger as irrational, of the body and not of the mind, and as an entity to be managed and controlled. The person compared to the wild animal is also to be managed and controlled. By such metaphors, discourses of resistance may be belittled and disregarded. An alternative set of metaphors of energy that is channelled towards positive change would position the same discourse as desirable. By such metaphors, certain discourses are supported and maintained.

As a sorting procedure, clustering around prototypes shares some of the limitations of categories. Identifying clusters is subjective and a somewhat creative activity, as the catty metaphors illustrate. Membership of a cluster is also arbitrary, again illustrated by including “silent behaviour” as feline.
Separating metaphor examples from their verbal let alone nonverbal context removes cues as to how the speaker visualised/heard/felt. The collator/s collated by our reading of the words in front of us at the time, so there are several levels of subjective interpretation involved in this exercise.

Clustering does have advantages. It succeeds in presenting the abundance of metaphors in ordinary talk about anger. The clustering procedure admits openly that it has limitations. The subjective and creative process is declared and enjoyed. The overlapping ability of clusters reduces demarcation of membership as an issue. Once a cluster includes metaphors which are all entails of other clusters, it is redundant as a separate group, as the cooking metaphors were. A collating procedure that allows for multiple readings and explanations certainly has appeal. Identifying a predominant metaphor that encompassed all the categories is an arbitrary choice as our choices and decision showed. The construct of a 'root metaphor' does not hold.

Including participants in the research is a check on validity enabling both reciprocity and reflexivity. The reciprocity (Oakley, 1981) thus established enriched the research process (Reason & Rowan, 1981) and brought together counselling training and psychology research. As a group of collaborators, we identified plentiful use of anger metaphors in our interview transcripts, and collated them successfully into clusters around prototypical examples. While our clusters paralleled Kővecses' clusters, identifying a root metaphor was a choice of one of several possibilities. Throughout the identification, clustering, sequencing and labelling processes, many options were available. As Soyland (1994) suggests, metaphorical language constitutes anger multiply and inconsistently.
Chapter Fourteen
Linguistic limitations

In which the Student Study concludes,

anger is construed within limited language resources,
verbs are discussed, and the student study is summarised

In the analysis of the texts which comprises the Student Study, I have deconstructed anger talk in terms of the linguistic composition of the texts. I have not addressed questions about what 'rules' might regulate the production of statements. The questions I ask are about practices, which particular statements have which social effects, and how one statement appeared rather than another (Foucault, 1972). To address these social questions, I have used linguistic tools. Anger is constituted in discourse and the texts of this project are written language. The focus of the project is how anger is produced as an object in discourse, and what are implications for social psychology.

In my reading and analyses of the discursive content of the texts, I have become increasingly curious about the language resources that are available in our speech community which produce anger and constitute subjectivities. The language resources available to speakers are limited by 'correct' language use and by common usage within those boundaries. Language is constantly changing and new terms incorporated, as shifts in social practice demand new resources. Throughout my composition of this text, I have struggled against the constraints of anger talk which have required me to use the very language which I wish to deconstruct. I continue to re-produce anger as an entity each time I use the word. My endeavour to make discourse/language the grammatical subject constrains my writing style, and I over-use nominalisations. The dilemmas involved have increasingly intrigued me, and I reread the texts for the restrictions on anger talk that parallel the restrictions of the language resources available.
### Figure 7: Parts of speech available to emotion terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOUN</th>
<th>VERB Intransitive (Emoting)</th>
<th>VERB Transitive (Emoting)</th>
<th>VERB Transitive (Eliciting emotion)</th>
<th>ADJECTIVE</th>
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<td>joyful, joyous</td>
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Parts of speech
As I have already commented, there is no active verb for ‘doing’ anger. Comparison of the vocabulary of anger with other emotions points up the limitations of emotional vocabulary. Figure 7 outlines nouns, verbs and adjectives of anger and a few other emotions in English, to illustrate how various emotion terms enable and constrain the psychological constitution of those emotions. Only four of the emotions listed have transitive verbs where the subject is doing the emoting. These are love, hate, fear and enjoy. Subjects are also able to hope and despair, but not transitively. Transitive verbs of anger and kindred emotions all refer to eliciting these emotions in an other. There is no verb form for doing anger or synonymous emoting (fury, rage, annoyance or irritation).

Talking about anger is limited by the available language resources. In language, anger is constituted as an entity which can be the grammatical subject or object of verbs. It is an entity which resides in, outside, or moves through a person. A person cannot, however ‘do anger’ as an active volitional agent. Verb forms are constructed with auxiliary verbs, and in this exploration I focus on the verb ‘to be’ and the verb ‘to get’, since these are by far the most frequent auxiliaries in the texts.

The verb ‘to be’
Talk within linguistic practices about doing anger is limited to adjectives including verbal adjectives, or participles. These require the auxiliary verb ‘to be’ to construct a verb form. The verb ‘to be’ constitutes a state rather than a dynamic action. Korzybski (1958) distinguishes between the ‘is’ of identity, “I am an angry person”, and the ‘is’ of predication, “I am angry”. The ‘is’ of identity constitutes subjectivities. The ‘is’ of predication constitutes anger.

The ‘is’ of identity constitutes subjectivities positioned in a fixed identity and acting accordingly from that position. ‘Identity’ may be defined as ‘absolute sameness in all respects’ which excludes ever-changing processes, multiplicity and variability. The psychological construct ‘identity’ requires reliability across time and circumstance. Since the language of anger
WHAT IS HE?

What is he?
-A man of course.
Yes, but what does he do?
-He lives, and he is a man.
Oh quite! But he must work. He must have a job of some sort.
-Why?
Because obviously he's not one of the leisured classes.
-I don't know. He has lots of leisure. And he makes quite beautiful chairs.
There you are then! He's a cabinet maker.
-No, no!
Anyhow a carpenter and joiner.
-Not at all.
But you said so.
-What did I say?
That he made chairs and was a joiner and carpenter.
-I said he made chairs, but I did not say he was a carpenter.
All right then, he's just an amateur.
-Perhaps! Would you say that a thrush was a professional flautist, or just an amateur?
I'd say it was just a bird.
-And I say he is just a man.
All right! You always did quibble.

D.H. Lawrence.
utilises the verb ‘to be’, the language of anger is also ‘identity’ talk. Because the verb ‘to be’ is the usual way to express ‘doing’ anger, ‘doing’ identity, or constituting subjectivity is inevitable in anger talk. Claiming and disclaiming anger is therefore at the same time claiming and disclaiming being positioned in an angry identity:

I would never have said that I was an angry person, I’m not a person that gets angry a lot, like my childhood is not an angry family. (Poppy)

A language form of ‘doing anger’ would constitute a dynamic transitory action. While such an act might be evaluated as morally undesirable, the actor is not constituted as immoral. The verb ‘to be’ on the other hand constitutes immutable identity with consequent moral implications, and the actors are thereby constituted as immoral persons:

They feel as if they shouldn’t be angry. (Tansy)

I don’t think we are allowed to be angry. (Poppy)

In the following fragments subjectivities are constituted as angry ‘still’, positioned in stable unchanging identity across a long span of time:

I had and I think I still have an angry father... He’s a very angry man, I think, still. (Iris)

So he’s um he’s still angry and still bitter. (Daphne)

The ‘is’ of identity constitutes immutable identity and fixed personality traits. Subjectivities are constrained into a unitary and consistent ‘self’. Emoting and doing (for example anger) challenges constructions of a unitary and centred self, since emoting is variable and unpredictable. Dangerous fragmentation of the unitary self and potential unpredictability is tamed and bound by the verb ‘to be’.

The ‘is’ of predication constitutes emotion states and therefore anger as a state rather than an action, as a reified entity that exists apart from persons:

Yeah, anger is an emotion. It’s an emotional thing. (Daphne)
As I read this chapter, I realise that as I wrote it, I was entranced by the idea of the verb “to be” constituting individual and social identity. In learning a new European language, the conjugation of verbs is a basic step, and the verb “to be” has its own particular forms, requiring special attention. We learn early how to say “I am” and those words constitute unique individual identity. I am Kay O’Connor. I am a New Zealander. I am a counsellor.

In new groups, people are asked to introduce themselves, to say who they are. Responses to such requests position subjects variously and to discursive effect; as spouses, as parents, in relation to specific others. Identifying by culture and nationality, or by occupation, position subjects in wider social relations. Self naming is not disclosure of identity, but rather a discursive act, a positioning in and among others in the social interaction of a particular group at a particular time for particular effect.

In the D.H.Lawrence poem which is appliqued on the preceding page, identification by occupation is effectively disrupted. And yet identification by sex remains. The text is underwritten with gender relations that were invisible in the social context of Lawrence’s time/space, but that script is clearer now as readers are informed by other texts, and question the deeply embedded practice of identification by sex. “He is a man”. Claiming identity as “a man” has greater and deeper meaning than the sociological meanings of possible occupational categories. The implications go far beyond the mere exclusion of women from carpentry. Sex has ontological meaning, and claiming identity as “a man” renders femininities invisible.
I consider that anger is just as valid an emotion as happiness, sadness, joy, whatever (Tansy)

Anger as an emotional state enables passive subject positions. To be angry is to be positioned in a state without agency or volition:

Being angry is out of control, fury whether it’s, whether it’s expressed outwardly or whether it’s you know inward real hurt, or real helplessness. It can be out of control fury um, aggressiveness is one way of expressing it or else the helplessness, the anger and the fear of being totally unable to do anything about it. To me that’s what I think of as anger. (Elecampane)

Just, it’s out of control. You are just doing it. It’s your body’s response, or your mind’s response. Um, I’m not really thinking, I’m just letting fly all over - the gut feeling is in here and and no, it’s not in control, if it was in control, I wouldn’t do it. (Daphne)

Agency is denied angry people by the limitations of the vocabulary and parts of speech that are available. Subjects are thus spoken into separation from anger, and into passive positions within an emotion state. The verb ‘to be’ claims what ‘is’ and excludes complexities of reactions and feelings. The emotional processes of anger are in this way generalised and distanced from the persons who are ‘being’ angry. The verb ‘to be’ constitutes the succeeding predicate ‘angry’ as static and concrete, a state that is ongoing and separate from others:

Because I’m scared, because I know I’m angry, I feel that I’m angry, but um, I feel that I’m angry, but I know what the consequences would be if I really let loose, and it’s just not worth it. (Karamu)

While the language of the verb ‘to be’ constitutes anger as a recognisable predictable entity, alternative constitutions are possible. In the following fragments anger is predicated as multiple and variable according to social context:

My angers are different, I mean my anger towards society is different to my anger towards my daughter being a slob, and then my anger
towards my son is different to how it was when my daughter did the same thing at the same age. (Karamu)

Oh, anger is different to different people isn’t it. I can only actually look at it from where I am. (Olive)

The verb ‘to get’
The other auxiliary verb commonly used to assemble a verb form for ‘doing anger’ in the texts, is the verb ‘to get’. The ‘getting’ is not so much synonymous with ‘to fetch’ as it is synonymous with ‘to become’. The grammatical subject is the sufferer rather than the doer of anger, the passive object rather than active agent:

It’s very healthy to get angry and to let it out. (Tansy)

Even Jesus got angry. You’re allowed to get angry, there is nothing wrong with it. (Poppy)

To ‘get’ implies that the object of the getting is external and away from the speaker. Passivity is suggested by “let it out” in the first of these fragments and by “You’re allowed” in the second. Anger is located elsewhere, and is accessed and constituted as an almost inevitable object in particular social relations:

So my mother would scream and yell at him and he then consequently, he would consequently kind of hit out, and his way of getting, he used to get angry at my mother screaming at him, and that’s how he would resolve the anger that my mother expressed. He very rarely got angry of his own accord. (Jasmine)

My anger is um what do I get angry at? I get angry at unfairness, I get angry if I think I’ve been treated unfairly, I get annoyed. (Elecampane)

The person does not ‘do anger’ but ‘gets angry’. Anger is not constituted as an act of volition, but is rather reproduced in the social situation. The verb ‘to get’ as it is used as an auxiliary in anger talk separates the subject
from the action. The actor and the agent are split once more, and the angry person is subtly cast as passive.

**The verb ‘to anger’**

As Figure 7 notes, there is an active transitive verb ‘to anger’ where the person who is angry is the direct object of the verb. English verbs of anger and synonymous emotions (enrage, irritate, annoy, infuriate) position the other in emotional states. Nowhere in the texts in the studies which comprise this thesis is this verb ‘to anger’ used, either actively or passively. The parallel usage ‘to make angry’ is frequent throughout the texts. The distortion of cause and effect is magnified by the compound verb:

> For me it’s probably a situation makes me angry and I think it’s fairly immediate. (Tansy)

> If something makes you angry, you tend to speak faster, higher, louder, those sort of things. (Tansy)

> That makes her so angry and then when she speaks up about it, her husband knocks her about. (Angelica)

This linguistic construction positions the angry person as powerless object of a situation or interaction. Being angry is not a choice, but an inevitable reaction. Subjectivities are constituted distant from ‘doing anger’ as agents, and are positioned in helpless and censured emotion states.

**Metaphors**

The metaphor study reported in the previous chapter gives a detailed account of metaphors of anger. Throughout the texts a range of active verbs are used metaphorically which ‘do anger’ within the limitations of the metaphor. For example, metaphors of cooking enable anger as a process and constrain subject positions to containers of the anger process:

> Mum simmers  (Flora)
> I was seething  (Violet)
> stewed on  (Flora)
In the same way explosion metaphors position subjects as the vehicles of anger rather than volitional agents of a choice to do anger:

- they blew their stack (Flora)
- blow your top (Jasmine)
- they explode in an electric way (Iris)
- he would suddenly flare (Flora)

Metaphorical language opens opportunities to do anger transitively and agentively. In these texts, however, metaphors constitute anger and angry subjectivities in accordance with the limitations of the metaphorical analogy.

The lack of an active, transitive verb 'to do anger' limits the range of anger stories that can be told. The angry person is not the agent of anger. An active verb of emotion constitutes active and agentive subjectivities. In English few emotions have active verbs available. A person who hates, loves or fears is constituted by the verb form as dynamic and changeable. The active voice and transitive action opens possibilities of specific and transformative interactions. The speaker is positioned using their own voice and in charge of their own actions.

Discourses are produced and reproduced within the limitations of available language, which is constrained semantically and by common usage. There are resources apparently available, such as the verb "to anger" which are not used. It is not the language forms which restrain discourse, but the reverse; the social practices dictate the language forms in use. The constitution of anger in the texts I have analysed in this study reproduces anger from constrained subject positions of passivity and struggle for control over unruly emotional reactions to social challenges.

**Summary of the Student Study**

In the texts which are the objects of study in the Student Study, anger is constituted as a unitary entity and also as multiple rather than centred on prototypical forms as Averill (1982) suggests, escaping simple categorisation and definition and overlapping other emotions. “Real”
anger is conflated with aggression and issues of control. The reproduction of psychological discourse constitutes anger in physiology. The practices of anger expression are multiple and inconsistent. Suppressing anger endangers health, and expressing anger endangers social relationships. Anger talk is saturated with moral evaluations, and while injustice is involved as suggested by Averill (1982, 1986) and Harré (1986), so are negotiations of communication, personal space and boundaries (Crawford et al., 1992) and the rhetoric of control (Lutz, 1990). Legitimations of expression are in-formed by discourses of status and power around gender, age and ethnicity.

The language practices that realise anger in the texts have been examined closely for patterns which produce anger and which constitute subjectivities. Anger is a problematic emotion and is produced in talk which opens multiple and inconsistent subject positions. Anger is constituted as separate from the subject whether external or internal, and the social relations in which it is constituted are intimate, while distance is achieved by various intricate linguistic ruses. Anger is constituted in the social body as a dynamic action demanding response, as a call for alternative and transforming action.

Finally, social practices are constituted in regulated language uses. Linguistic limitations constrain the production of anger as an entity, and as a result subject positions are enabled at degrees of distance from the anger that is produced, and subject positions of agency and responsibility are constrained. Thus anger is produced through complex and intricate social relations.
Chapter Fifteen
The counsellor study

in which traditional psychology
discourses are reproduced and disclaimed,
language constitutes anger as an object, and reflexivity is practised.

The theory and practice of psychology are dominant discourses which claim expert knowledge/power. Psychology is a discipline and produces knowledge statements which are coherent and which are accepted and institutionalised. These discourses position psychology professionals as experts and the transmission and teaching of the professional language from positions of authority produce and re-produce the objects of the discipline, for example ‘anger’. The anger talk of counselling psychologists is informed by the disciplines of psychology and counselling. Psychology re-produces many and inconsistent discourses from diverse philosophical positions. Within clinical psychology, the dominant therapeutic discourses are cognitive-behavioural approaches. Counselling practices are produced in and through humanism, while also re-producing, among others, psycho-dynamic, developmental, cognitive-behavioural, systems, and, more recently, poststructural discourses.

In the Student Study, the reproduction of counselling psychology discourses enabled subject positions from which statements could be formed to re-produce anger as object congruent with counselling and psychology’s expert knowledge. Professional language constitutes professional subjectivities, as discussed by Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) who explored the talk of scientists and found formal scientific discourses alongside informal lay discourses with particular discursive effects.

In this study, the anger talk of professional counsellors is read alongside the student accounts. The texts are analysed for variation and differences, with questions in the foreground which ask whether counselling experience might enable more and/or different discourse constituting anger and also constituting subjectivities as counselling professionals.
The making of comparisons is problematic in a poststructural exercise. Comparisons constitute objects as stable, unitary and continuous. In poststructuralism, texts are read as inconsistent, fragmented and discontinuous. I am interested in variations and difference, and this study is included in the research design to lay alongside the student study, and I read the texts of this study for differences. I expected that the anger talk of experienced counsellors would be both similar to and different from the talk of students. I expected to read more/other discourses, that anger would be constituted as a sometimes different object from that in the language of students, that more/other subject positions would be be taken, and that re-production of different discourses would constitute more/other subjectivities. To explore differences, I compared the anger talk of students at the beginning of their training with the anger talk of counsellors with substantial counselling experience. As anger is constituted socially through discourse, so professional training can be read as training in the production of professional discourse, and thereby the dominance of the profession is maintained.

In this context, the word ‘profession’ begins to reveal layers of meaning which suggest that professing in particular ways positions the speaker among like speakers who profess likewise, and by mutuality of discourses, a discipline is re-formed and regulated, and re-forms and regulates those who profess it. A discipline is akin to a diffuse yet constrained ‘fellowship of discourse’ (Foucault, 1972) which preserves and re-produces discourse to circulate it among a closed community, empowering the chosen cognoscenti and excluding others. While education claims to make available access to any kind of discourse, systems of education maintain and modify the appropriation of discourse with the knowledge/power it carries.

The students in the Student Study are counselling students, and are not necessarily psychology students. The profession in which they are training is counselling, with emphasis on humanistic approaches, although psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, systems and narrative approaches are also included in the content of the course. Psychology is a highly
regulated discipline in its academic qualification systems and research practices, and in the ongoing regulation of practitioners through registration procedures and society membership. Counselling is a looser collection of practices, has plural educations and trainings, and up until now, in Aotearoa, has escaped the regulatory surveillance of registration protocols. The experienced counsellors I interviewed have all completed undergraduate psychology degrees, and all except one have at least Masters degrees in psychology. Multiple discourses in psychology and counselling are available to the participants in this study.

Comparing the texts of these two groups in any usual way for such a project is constrained pragmatically and theoretically. In the student study the interview context, the ways in which I relate to participants differently, the power imbalance in the researcher-participant and student-tutor roles, and then my readings of the resulting texts render invalid any criteria for comparison. In this study, the same interview practice was followed as in the Student Study, but these participants are my peers, interested in research as researchers as well as interested in anger as a psychological construct and as a focus of counselling. In an interview only some of the available discourses and language resources available to a speaker will be taken up. Differences in texts may well be explained by the research context rather than by discourses of professionalism.

A further constraint on comparison is that it is not possible (nor even desirable) to name what are and are not ‘counselling discourses’ and to draw conclusions from analysis of the content of the texts of one group compared to another. Discourses do not exist as separate resources waiting to be accessed, but are discontinuous activities, practices we impose on events (Foucault, 1972).

Despite these constraints, I am curious about how discursive practices position subjects in professions and disciplines, and I read the texts through these lenses. I read for difference, rather than for comparison, awaiting the emergence of more/other discourses and subject positions in the stories of counsellors that were not produced in the student texts.
METHODOLOGY

I invited seven counsellors to participate, six of whom are psychologists. I selected participants deliberately to represent a wide range of espoused counselling approaches. This group includes counsellors who claim to follow cognitive-behavioural, gestalt, client-centred, narrative, NLP, and family therapy approaches. I sought variety to ensure that a variety of philosophies and approaches would be represented which would highlight what similarities presented. I was then able to read for similarities that transcend differences among counselling theories. I told each participant the topic of my thesis and that I wanted them to talk about their ideas and experiences of anger.

I am also a participant in this study. I was interviewed by a colleague after I had interviewed her. These two interviews took place first, as a trial of the interview procedure before I began the interviews for the student study. I decided to be a participant to close the gap between participant and researcher, to disturb at least to some extent the asymmetrical power relations between researcher and researched. The experience of being interviewed enabled me to appreciate the position of participant. Reading the interview transcript assured me that stories are told partially and inconsistently, and that I had not said what I remembered saying, nor how I remembered saying it. I treated the other interview transcripts with more caution as a result. This experience enabled me to read the transcripts as separate from the participants who produced them. As a result, the texts stand alone as the objects of study, and language takes over as the subject of my work.

I interviewed each participant and audiotaped the interview, following the same format as in the student study, turning the recorder on after informed consent was obtained and rapport achieved. Once again, I use the word 'interview' with caution. Participants were invited to talk about anger, and I spoke little. As I stated in the Student Study, even the most minimal participation inevitably shapes what is said and how it is said. My presence and the particular collegial relationship I have with each participant were powerful influences on the conversation. The texts
which resulted are the products of interviews with my peers, colleagues who know my interest in the social constitution of anger and in critical psychology. It was important for me to keep this context in the foreground while reading these texts, and it is important that the reader of this text is aware of the interview context which produced the fragments that are discussed. Foreknowledge of my likely use of the interview materials cannot not influence what is said.

I openly encouraged participants to talk about the topics which interested me out of awareness that I would do so covertly. The interview was unstructured as in the Student Study, with the same list of topics on the table beside the recorder (Figure 1). These topics ensured that texts would contain defining talk, a recent anger story, a story about the participant’s ‘anger career’, and counselling discourses. Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed, and transcripts were returned to participants for checking and editing. Fragments of the resulting texts are presented below, and participants have allocated pseudonyms which are matched for sex, and are otherwise random, and some, but not all, chose their own pseudonym.

FRAGMENTED READINGS
The counsellor texts are varied especially in the theoretical adherences claimed. In this case I do not read for difference, but rather for similarity, on the premise that it is similarities across counselling approaches which constitute ‘counsellor’ subjectivity as distinct from, for example, ‘gestalt therapist’, ‘family therapist’, or ‘clinical psychologist’.

My reading of the counsellor texts is influenced by the Student Study and my desire to find differences from the student texts. The discourses of anger I have written about in the Student Study in Chapters Seven to Twelve are re-produced in the talk of experienced counsellors. These are discourses of moral evaluation and definition, psychology’s discourses, social discourses of injustice and interpersonal communication, and gender, status and power. I do not discuss these further in this study. My attention here is focussed on how the anger talk of counsellors differs from that of students at the beginning of their training.
The difference that is most prominent is the constitution of anger. In these counsellor texts, anger is problematised as a process rather than an entity. The focus is on the wider and longer stories, the history and context that anger is produced in. Along with this wide-angled lens are disclaimers of two popular discourses of counselling, ventilation and control. Another difference is that the discourses of academic psychology are less evident in these texts and are frequently disclaimed. The third difference is the explicit reflection on the role of language in constituting anger as an object in counselling psychology. Threaded throughout the stories are metacommments about anger talk and the constitutive power of language. Throughout, reflexive positions are created from which statements can be made as reflective observers of life, of others, and of self.

The objectification of anger

The reification of anger is problematised in these texts, and anger is re-constituted as a process rather than an entity. The definition of anger as an emotion separate from other emotions is problematic, and the tradition of regarding each emotion term as representing a separate entity is called into question. The ‘doing anger’ chain of events shifts the locus of attention to earlier events such as hurt, frustration and a desire for communication. Anger is recast as a strategy for interpersonal/social effect, and as a chosen strategy, is contextualised in humanistic ideologies of free will and agency.

Defining talk was sidestepped by metacommments on the quandaries of definition and categorisation as dividing practices:

I think we are often more confused you know, our taxonomies that we set up in various ways only cause more confusion when we come to look at how things fit together. (Cormac)

But that kind of dividing up of things, and believing that they are separate compartments, I believe is not very useful. (Medb)

I am the sort of counsellor, I don’t tend to work in classifications very much. (Deirdre)
In these fragments classification and definition of anger as separate from ‘other’ emotions is problematised, and subjectivities as reflective experts are enabled. The first person pronoun positions speakers as individuals outside the dominant dividing practices of psychology and at the same time avoids the request to define anger.

Discourses constituting anger as an entity contained within the body are directly challenged along with the concomitant production of ‘anger-in’:

I don’t think it’s something you have in there to let out. It’s not a thing that you can actually have in and take out. (Sheela)

Ah, that one, get it out. I think that’s a myth, the idea of expressing, of ventilating anger. I don’t think there is such a thing as anger that is in there, that I am a sort of cupboard of unused emotions. Anger trapped in the body. I don’t think like that. (Brigit)

“I don’t think like that” positions Brigit outside the ‘anger-in’ discourse, as expert observer/commentator on the reifying practices of traditional counselling psychology. Alternatively, in the following fragments, anger is constituted as an action, and counselling as deconstruction. The language which constructs anger as an object is disrupted by alternative verbal usages ‘doing anger’, ‘doing stuff’, and these verb phrases reconstitute an active process which is social/interpersonal and which involves series of interactions between/among people:

Being angry is doing stuff, and that is where I get interested, is what we are doing useful, am I relating in ways that give me more choices, what is all this energy achieving. Being angry, doing things, feeling things, let’s break it up into all the bits, find out what is going on, what happened before this, what were the feelings before. (Brigit)

Counselling is deconstruction, taking the process of ‘”being angry” apart and exploring the complexities involved. This fragment exemplifies a common thread in counsellor talk, where the first person singular pronoun is used to exemplify a process, where the speaker is positioned as their own client.
Anger as process

In the student texts, counselling talk re-produced anger as one discrete internalised emotion. In the talk of experienced counsellors, the focus of counselling is to undo the ‘anger’ object into many parts of a process. The process of ‘doing anger’ is contextualised in a sequence of interactions among people, and in this sequence anger comes after “a whole lot of” events which are regarded as more pertinent to counselling:

There’s a whole process that goes in there ah about a whole lot of things are wrong before that stuff happens... Within two sessions they are not talking about anger at all. They have actually gone back in the process, realise the other hurts, the other fears... So you are going further back a chain as it were. (Sheela)

Show me someone who is doing anger stuff and I will show you that there is hurt, pain, silencing that has happened before the anger. (Brigit)

So increasing awareness. Trying to understand the long sequences that things that are laid out in there and approach it from all the angles, the cognitive angle, the other angles. (Grainne)

Anger comes from something that’s deeper and more historical in your, and a particular incident that happens to you that brings that anger up is merely making contact with that history, that history of experience. (Aengus)

Anger is constituted as not an object for counselling attention, but as a signal of a “chain”, “sequence” or “history” of other objects for counselling, which might include ‘hurt’, ‘fear’, ‘pain’ or ‘silencing’.

Yes, I mean as a therapist we often look for the gap don’t we, what is not being expressed, and um, when you are talking are talking to a person who is expressing mainly anger then there is a gap. That’s not really the area that needs to be worked with. They can already express that perfectly adequately. So there’s something about the balance of emotions. (Deirdre)
In these counsellor texts, the objectification of anger is discussed, and anger is opened up into “all the bits” which are material for counselling.

**Discourses of humanism**

In the chain of events that are the context of ‘doing anger’, the process ‘anger’ is a strategy, a chosen form of communication. An angry person chooses angry behaviour for a particular purpose, positioning the subject as agent with choice and volition:

> It’s a strategy of of getting something, I think. (Sheela)

> I’ve got mixed feelings about it, so I opted for anger to get through it, really. (Grainne)

In these accounts ‘doing anger’ is an active and agentive course of action. The word “strategy” and the first person active verb “I opted” constitutes volition. The active forms of language constitute subjects as agents who choose emotion behaviour as effective strategies. The next fragment frames the “strategies” explanation as constituted in readings after the event, readings that implicate me as coauthor:

> I believe that we are talking hindsight, too, eh, that he actually chose angry strategies for results ... and be justified in doing it because somebody else caused it. (Sheela)

One of the advantages of anger as a strategy is to locate blame elsewhere. In the last fragment the acknowledgement of hindsight positions Sheela (and me) outside her own story and aware of the re-storying potential of narrative.

Humanistic discourses of free will and agency make available subject positions from which advocating free choice and personal responsibility can be claimed:

> The other option is that you are sensibly aware of whatever state you are in and it is possible that you may choose to be angry at home or outside and that anger is allowable. (Deirdre)
The life changing bit I think, is discovering something new, so that you have freer choice about what you express in the moment. You don’t just, your repertoire isn’t only anger, it’s all the other range of emotions you can choose from. (Deirdre)

In these fragments, anger is produced as a freely chosen strategy which enables subject positions to advocate self responsibility and optimistic statements about personal responsibility and change. The second person “you” detaches Deirdre from membership of the generalised referential index, positioning her as disinterested commentator on common behaviour. From a reflexive position at greater distance, ‘choice’ is detached from ‘agency’, constituting self-reflexive subjectivity:

I think that being angry was a choice too actually and I don’t mean, I’m not even sure that that’s about agency, either, although it is certainly about not being a victim. (Sheela)

This fragment of Sheela’s anger story claims choice while questioning agency as a construct, producing a multi-layered account. Complex claims are achieved in this utterance.

Psychology discourses
Given the premises stated at the beginning of this chapter, we would expect the talk of experienced psychologists to reproduce the discipline’s dominant discourses. In another context with another researcher, that may well be the case. These participants know me and my interests and are sophisticated in knowledges of psychology, counselling and research. Only in two texts were the dominant behavioural and physiological discourses of psychology re-produced to constitute anger as an internal physiological response.

Problematising psychology’s constitution of anger as a coherent entity and critiquing clinical approaches to counselling opens up subject positions from where discourses of resistance can be proclaimed. My research intentions are known to provide space for resistant proclamations. In this context, it is not so surprising that the discourses of academic psychology
are less evident in these texts than in the texts of the student counsellors, and there is more discussion of language and social contexts. These are not the only stories about anger, however, and psychology’s discourses are reproduced, though in more academic terminology than in the student texts.

The dominant counselling discourse of academic psychology, the cognitive-behavioural approach, was produced frequently, more often to be disclaimed than claimed. Cognitive-behavioural terminologies permeate these texts while disclaimers of the approach are also frequent and at times strongly put. Behavioural discourses constitute anger as an inevitable response:

It’s an arousal thing I’m sure, I think there probably is a level of increased arousal that people find, that has its own reward... By using knowledge and information and thoughts, you can actually change the process of anger and the target of anger and I think also moderate the physiological experience. (Cormac)

The potential to exercise anger has got to be there in us genetically. (Aengus)

Pronouns enable metacommments on anger in these fragments, the anonymous “you” in the first and the generalised “we” in the second. The first offers a behavioural, the second a biological account of anger. While the language of behaviourism is reproduced in all texts, I sifted for differences from the student accounts, where cognitive-behavioural discourses were absent. In these counsellor texts, cognitive-behavioural approaches to counselling occur. These are usually disclaimed on the grounds that thinking and feeling are cast as a binary opposition and that constituting anger as an automatic response removes agency:

I don’t perceive emotion as separate from thinking. I find the whole cognitive-behavioural idea of dividing up things into thoughts and then resulting feelings and restructuring beliefs kind of the RET model, I find, um, really inadequate. (Medb)
I don't actually think of anger as a, as a response, a behavioural response, to something happening. (Sheela)

The next fragment disclaims cognitive-behavioural therapy because it excludes subjectivity, ignores social and cultural contexts and re-produces the power relations which inform medical models:

... ways that do not honour the client’s subjective experience. Nor does cognitive-behaviourism, and it is an ‘ism’, take into account social and cultural ways of thinking and being. I do not like the expert-over stuff of cognitive-behaviourism either, the medical model, the emphasis on problems, dysfunction, diagnosis. (Brigit)

Multiple positions are opened up in this rejection of the dominant cognitive-behavioural discourse. The rejection is achieved in the personal statement expressed simply "I do not like". Subjectivity is constituted with flexibility and awareness of phenomenology, social context, and power relations. Disclaiming the medical model in detail constitutes the ability to work within it. In this way disclaiming re-produces the practices that are being resisted. In the next fragment cognitive-behavioural approaches are conceded to be appropriate for some clients:

You take RET for example, Rational Emotive Therapy. It works for some people, and that means that all of their processing is in their head. (Aengus)

This concession positions Aengus as reasonable and flexible in the practices he chooses, reproducing individual differences as a justification for flexibility. The directive "you take" positions me as listener and as the object of authority, a voice that is associated with dominant discourse reproduction in these texts.

**Anger and aggression**

The association of anger with aggression is problematised in these texts. Anger and aggression are conflated as traditional psychology discourses are reproduced:
If we go right back to the psychobiological sort of ideas, you have got the dominance ideas that aggression and anger are related to maintaining or establishing dominance. (Cormac)

In this fragment, aggression and anger are conflated. Once again, “you have got” positions me as learner, as dominant discourses are reproduced.

The distinction between anger and aggression is reproduced in the following fragment. Anger and aggression are differentiated to produce anger as a process which is chosen as a strategy:

Anger stuff for me too as a child was equated with violence and I think it didn’t have to be and that there were other choices that could have been made in there too. (Sheela)

I’m also not into equating anger with violence and I, I think that that is a dominant sort of thing, but again not in my circles. (Sheela)

Distinguishing between anger and aggression and naming the equation of anger with violence as a dominant “sort of thing” (discourse?) positions the subject in ‘other’ than dominant circles. In the next fragment, the anger-aggression distinction is made from a reasoned observer position:

I do not think that people need to be angry to be aggressive, or to be aggressive to be angry. I think that is over simple. In my observation, aggression and violence can be done quite calmly. And anger can be huge and free without any hurt to anyone or anything. (Brigit)

The reasoned position is achieved by the first person verbs “I do not think” “I think” and the phrase “in my observation”. In the interviews with students and with these experienced counsellors, we discussed possible counselling strategies for working with clients who talk about anger as an issue. The student texts reproduce two popular counselling discourses, ventilation and management. In the counsellor texts these discourses are disclaimed. In the following fragments, ventilation is dismissed as a past fashion:
Anger has been very fashionable ... in the 70's acknowledging anger was quite the thing, and it went with that belief if you've got it all out then everything would be better. I think some people got so good at expressing anger that they thought it was an end in itself. (Grainne)

Anger is framed as a means rather than an end “in itself”. The next fragment also questions ventilation, while at the same time accepting it as a useful strategy for some people:

Um, I think the idea which is popular of expressing anger by hitting things..... that physical expression to vent anger, um, really it works and helps some of the people some of the time. The idea that it has some sort of universal application, I think is silly. (Aengus)

In these fragments, disclaiming ventilation in counselling positions speakers outside ‘popular’ and ‘fashionable’ practices. Subjectivities are thus constituted as considered and discerning practitioners. The final fragment leaves the options open, constituting Aengus as open-minded.

The second popular discourse of counselling for anger which is disclaimed in the counsellor accounts, is the anger management discourse.

The modern teaching is that you can control your own emotions, and I think that’s a practical way to help many people, but I don’t think it’s the end of the story at all. (Aengus)

The anger management discourse is reproduced and its universal application questioned. Again, Aengus is positioned as able to access a range of counselling strategies which vary according to the individual needs of his clients. In the following fragment, anger management is a men’s anger strategy which may miss the underlying issues:

Men often use anger to hide vulnerability and to hide fear, and um hurt and if the anger management stopped at management I’d think it was doing an insufficient job, because ... it wouldn’t actually be dealing with the underlying hurt and fragility of these men. (Deirdre)
Anger is a cover for ‘vulnerability’, ‘fear’, ‘hurt’ and ‘fragility’ and “men” are a generalised referential index for particular clients. Other issues are hidden and underlie anger. Anger is constituted as an object which obscures other emotion objects. In the next fragment, discourses of ventilation and control are disclaimed and the reification of anger emphasised, and Brigit is positioned outside current popular counselling discourses.

There is so much shit about anger, isn’t there. Feel it, express it, get it out. Control it, manage it, deal with it. (Brigit)

**Anger constituted in and through language**

The third difference I read in these texts is explicit discussion of the role of language in constituting anger. The word ‘anger’ is a label for a process that occurs in a social context:

It’s the particular labels that we learn to attach to those physiological experiences and those mental experiences that are what we learn from the culture we live in. And the culture teaches us the types of discriminations which are allowable, because we know that there are emotions and labels in some languages that don’t map in others. (Aengus)

Emotion labels vary across cultures and labels vary across languages, yet languages “map” physiological and mental “experiences”. Language is constituted in this fragment as representational, and culture becomes the grammatical subject which positions Aengus with culturally determined language labels. The plural pronoun “we” positions labelling and language as social processes. The following fragments are more tentative about the construct and the labels, and incidentally more individualistic, using the first person singular:

I’m not sure whether it’s actually angry, I mean I’m not, yeah, but it, but it is something that I would identify as angry, I suppose. (Sheela)

The example of um, a recent occurrence of anger for me was one of the experiences that I think I will never forget, and calling it anger is just for the sake of finding a label for it I guess. (Medb)
Once I see it differently, look at from somewhere else, then being angry has been useful and I don’t need it any longer. Though I might want to keep the energy and label it differently, excitement of anticipation or something that is more useful. (Brigit)

In Brigit’s account there is an energy which might be labelled ‘anger’ or might be relabelled as a more “useful” emotion. The separation of experience and language thus achieved destabilises the existence of anger as a distinct emotion, but retains the experience “energy” as that which anger represents. In the next fragment, similar slippage occurs. In recognising something of the constitutive role of language underlying ‘realities’ are maintained, and language continues to be read as representation:

We learn how to describe particular feelings in particular contexts with words. We learn to label it. (Aengus)

Representation, but a socially constituted process. The language of social construction is reproduced in these accounts, enabling self reflexive speaking positions to comment critically on reification, and the limitations of linguistic resources available in talking about anger:

The words are the problem, aren’t they, nominalisations, abstract nouns, made up thingies, aren’t they? I mean, “What is anger?” doesn’t make sense as a question - or it has sort of pre-formed the answer. The answer has to begin “Anger is da da da da da da” and then we are away into anger as ‘it’ and we have to find ways of dealing with ‘it’, managing ‘it’, controlling ‘it’. (Brigit)

The process of reification is embodied in this fragment, and the lack of linguistic resources to speak anger differently is evident. The plural first person pronoun “we” positions the speaker in the social context where language produces anger. Commenting on the reification of anger positions Brigit outside the practice yet without alternative resources or a declared position to take. The next fragment places Medb in a similar dilemma:
If we talk in terms of anger, for example, as being a physiological experience, that it’s a passion, that, that, we are overwhelmed by a whole lot of physiological responses, um, then that in fact in the end is what it is limited to being. (Medb)

The constitutive power of language is captured in these fragments, even though ‘we’ remain the subjects of that constitution, and ‘we’ have nowhere else to stand.

Another social construction account of anger is reproduced in the counsellor texts. Anger is cast as an enactment of ‘social rules’, enabling speakers to take up positions from which to critique the theoretical argument:

But in general there are dominant discourses which say that men are allowed to be angry women aren’t. (Sheela)

Anger is gendered and subjectivity constituted as aware of ‘discourses of discourse’. The next two fragments position speakers among social construction accounts of anger which place anger as a response to injustice:

Whenever we use emotion language we’re in fact talking about how we relate to other people either other specific people or people in general and anger is the word we seem to use, well in our society anyhow, when we are talking about injustice. (Medb)

It’s not an end point, either, which is interesting, it’s a phase down, a whole um, resolution of some kind of the injustices of the- it might be creating the space again. A lot of that stuff to me is an invasion of space, so leading to clearing that, or to clear things that have been said or being heard. It’s certainly about taking power over a situation. (Sheela)

In the analysis of the students’ accounts, I argued that doing anger positions the other as locus of fault and blame. In the next fragment attributing blame is explicitly discussed:
...and that was set up that was chosen I think yeah that my picture of it is chosen strategies too I believe that we are talking hindsight too eh, that he actually chose angry strategies for results so that he could then slam things and walk out and be justified in doing it because somebody else caused it.... I think it also justifies the men being angry because there's also always somebody to blame their anger on. (Sheela)

**Reflexivity**

The above fragment is also an example of the reflexivity that is threaded throughout the counsellors' stories. There are metacommments about anger talk, re-storying the past, the limitations of language, anger as process, social rules and the role of power and status. It is well to remember again that the context which produced these texts, interviews for this research project, enabled resistant discourses. Self-reflexive consideration enables speaker positions as reflective practitioners and constitutes subjectivities authoritative about their own psychological processes:

I find that I tend to reflect much more on these things than I used to. I find it useful to observe myself, my internal thoughts and feelings, and I am increasingly delighted by my ability to decide how to feel, to dialogue with myself, to find out what is bothering me and how to use the information. (Brigit)

The subject positions in this fragment are multiple. Brigit is the subject “I” and object “myself” of observation, and “delighted” by her “internal” processes. Counsellor talk abounds with self reflection. Perhaps self observation and personal ‘work’ enable counselling professionals to justify their role in society.

In this study, texts of anger talk of counselling psychologists is informed by the discipline of psychology, and the wider practice of counselling, as were the texts of student counsellors in the Student Study. Both sets of participants used similar linguistic ruses as anger was constituted in their
accounts. I have therefore used the linguistic tools less in this analysis, focussed as I was on difference. There are differences between the two collections of texts, both in the constitution of anger as an object, and in the constitution of subjectivities. In the talk of the counsellors, the constitution of anger as a discrete entity is problematised, and anger is reconstructed as a process. The discourses of traditional psychology are reproduced less than in the texts of the student interviews, and resistant discourses of optimism about change and transformation are frequent. Humanism is reproduced, with its objects of ‘choice’ and ‘strategies’. Doing anger is a choice, and choices can be increased and made more effective, and liberating practices established.

Finally, the counsellor accounts reflexively critique the constitution of anger, and provide commentaries on the practices of the disciplines of psychology and counselling. Reflexivity opens spaces for the constitution of fluid subjectivities and of counselling practice as opportunities for deconstructing ‘anger’. This authoritative position lays strong foundations on which is predicated justification for the profession of counselling psychology.
CARMEN XXXVII.

Nunc est bibendum, nunc pede libero
pulsanda tellus, nunc Saliaribus
ornare pulvinar deorum
tempus erat dapiibus, sodales.
antehae nefas depromere Caecul
cellis avitis, dum Capitolio
regina dementes ruinas
funus et imperio
contaminato cum
morbo virorum.

watch down to
the glorious's
the quercus flix
rosegardens and
altar as a girl who
the rose in my hair
red yes and how he knew
well as well as another
again yes and then he asked
flower and first I put my arms
me so he could feel my breasts all
like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes

they called it on the pier and the
house with the thing round his white
the Spanish girls laughing in their
reactions in the morning the
the devil knows who else
and the fowl market all
keys slipping half
the shade on the
the old castle
white and
of a shop
Chapter Sixteen
The follow-up study

in which knowledge
is produced and re-produced, change is explored,
anger is reconstituted as a process, ventilation and control
are disclaimed, anger is constituted socially, and meta-positions are taken.

As language constitutes that which it speaks, professional training is training in the language of a profession. As students learn the knowledge, skills and attitudes of counselling, the discourses of the profession come to the foreground, reproduce knowledge and enable subject positions among counsellors and the authority to speak from these positions. In the previous chapter I discussed ‘professional’ discourses I read in the texts of experienced counsellors and which I had not read in the student texts. These discourses produce anger as an object and position subjects in reflexive positions. In that study, I presented only those discourses which differed from the student texts. In this study, I read the talk of the now graduated students through lenses curved by the counsellor study. I am interested in which discourses re-produce those I read in the talk of experienced counsellors and that I did not read in the Student Study.

As professional language enables the constitution of professional subjectivities, the training context over two years makes familiar professional counselling discourses and ways of knowing. The texts of experienced counsellors access more/other discourses of anger than those of students, and I expected the texts of the graduate students to overlap those of experienced counsellors, as professional knowledge/power is reproduced. The reproduction of counselling discourses enables subjectivities to be constituted appropriate to the counselling profession.

As in the Counsellor Study, sets of texts are laid side by side and I read for differences and movement among student and counsellor positions and knowledges. In these follow-up interviews, we discuss how ideas and experiences of anger have changed since the previous interview. I do not
In and through language, positions and shapes and forms are transformed, and those transformations enable language to speak in diverse and discontinuous ways, allowing possibilities outside old limits and boundaries. Foucault talks about transformations and change in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) as a time/space problematic. “Discourse is snatched from the law of development and established in a discontinuous atemporality. It is immobilised in fragments: precarious splinters of eternity. But there is nothing one can do about it: several eternities succeeding one another, a play of fixed images disappearing in turn, do not constitute either movement, time, or history” (pp. 166-167). Foucault suggests that change should be cleansed of change and the other old metaphors (movement, flux, evolution) through which history is imagined, deprived of its primacy as a universal law and its status as a general effect, and that it should be replaced by the analysis of various transformations. “To say that one discursive formation is substituted for another is not to say that a whole world of absolutely new objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical choices emerges fully armed and fully organised in a text that will place that world once and for all; it is to say that a general transformation of relations has occurred, but that it does not necessarily alter all the elements; it is to say that statements are governed by new rules of formation, it is not to say that all objects or concepts, all enunciations or all theoretical choices disappear. On the contrary, one can, on the basis of these new rules, describe and analyse phenomena of continuity, return, and repetition; we must not forget that a rule of formation is neither the determination of an object, nor the characterisation of a type of enunciation, nor the form or content of a concept, but the principle of their multiplicity and dispersion” (p. 173).

Virginia Woolf used the associative method, which is a poet's method, because it suited her temperament and because it suited her material. Like any novelist, she wanted to use the broad space to handle much matter. She knew the pleasures of the rummaging den, the piling in of stuff, the fight to make the chaos into natural order and not a dead and empty catalogue. She loved words. She was devoted to words, faithful to words, romantically attached to words, desirous of words. She was territory and words occupied her. She was night-time and words were the dream. The poet has an ear that runs in harness with her mind. When Virginia Woolf writes she is listening as well as thinking. Rhythm underpins her thought. Rhythm subjects her thought to a discipline more than intellectual. For the poet, words are ideas. An ill-chosen word, a badly written paragraph can escape in the general slackness of the novel in general, but in first-rate fiction as in true poetry, there is no escape. Any slackness at once draws attention to itself and if you look at an embarrassing paragraph in a splendid piece of work you will find that it is not the thought at fault. It is the language. This is a very curious thing.

If we admit that language has power over us, not only through what it says, but also through what it is, we come close to understanding the importance of poetry and its function in a healthy society.

If we admit that language has power over us, not only through what it says, but also through what it is, we will be tolerant of literary experiment just as we are tolerant of scientific experiment. A writer must resist the pressure of old formulae and work towards new combinations of language.

And in playing with the forms suggested by Derrida's *Glas*, I acknowledge Jeannette Winterson's splendid text *Art Objects* from which I have taken whole paragraphs in order to compose the column on the right, because she is there, in Virginia Woolf's texts rather than writing about them. In doing so, she has achieved what I aspire to in my writing, and to write like that is a transformation I greatly desire.
look for personal change, since such 'change' assumes continuity and coherence. I do not look for converge of 'professional' discourse that can be claimed to be a consequence of training. Discourses are discontinuous, immobilised in fragments, collections of images. Discourse is a practice, and I read the texts of the follow-up interviews as enactments which differ from and overlap those of the first interview and the counsellor statements. I cannot read whether the variety of discourses available to these participants may or may not have increased, and some fallen out of favour. I do trace shifts in how anger is constituted, which discourses are evident, and whether more/other subject positions are enabled. Practices of transformation are enacted in training as knowledges and expertise are produced and reproduced.

In the counsellor study I discussed reconstituting anger as a process, disclaiming of the discourses of academic counselling psychology, particularly the cognitive behavioural approach, the discussion of anger constituted socially in and through language, and the reflexive positions from which the discourses of humanism are reproduced.

In this study as in the counsellor study, the discursive practices of the interview are in-formed by the context. The first interviews were with newly selected students talking to their tutor, enabling positioning as students interested in anger as an object of study. My position in relation to the object anger was obscured at that stage. In the intervening years, I had positioned myself in a variety of discourses as we worked with many varied counselling approaches. We had worked together in two anger workshops which opened up multiple discourses of anger and multiple counselling strategies in and around anger. One of these workshops included collaborating in the metaphor hunt, which positioned these participants for a brief time as co-researchers. I am no longer their tutor, and had not been for more than a year when these interviews took place. By this time, anger and I have become familiar, complex, intimate and inconsistent.
METHODOLOGY

The follow-up study.

I invited seven of the twenty participants in Study One to participate in a follow-up study. All but one had attended both anger workshops and been the collaborators in the metaphor hunt. Over the years, this group were those who had remained involved in the anger study. Two of the seven now identify occupationally as counsellors, and another three have counselling as a substantial part of their job description.

The procedure for this study followed the pattern set in the previous studies. I gave to each participant a copy of the transcript of the first interview which was now familiar to them. I asked them to re-read the transcript bearing in mind that I would be asking them how their experiences and their ideas had changed since the time of the first interview. I ensured that texts would contain defining talk and talk about changes that had taken place in their own anger and in their work with clients. Interviews averaged about twenty minutes, and were audiotaped, the tapes transcribed, and transcripts were returned to participants.

FRAGMENTED READINGS

For the most part, the follow up interviews reproduced the discourses accessed in the first study. What follows in this section is a discussion of the differences I read in the texts, and which of those differences I also read in the counsellor texts. As discourse positions those speakers in similar positions to counsellors, the transformative practices of training and professionalism appear.

I begin this discussion by focussing on the changes that are claimed to have occurred since the first interview. Then I expand on the production of anger as a complex entity, a strategy that enables agency and choice, and intimations of the social constitution of anger. Traditional counselling strategies of ventilation and control are disclaimed and at the same time re-produced in recently learned counselling approaches. The most striking similarity between these and the counsellor texts is the enablement of reflexive positions from which comments can be made on the speaker's own anger stories and on the problematics of anger itself.
Personal change
The follow-up interview sets the scene for accounts of change, and the texts produce change accordingly. Some accounts claim that changes have taken place:

There has been heaps of changes in the last three years, heaps... I don’t feel compelled to have to be just all the time. I can choose when I want to fight for something and I can choose when I don’t feel like I want to do it and um I think that’s a huge change in the way I see anger and experience it. (Ginger)

Other accounts of change include no change:

I don’t think I’ve changed that much, perhaps I’m not focusing on anger as much in my life. (Sage)

If my ideas are different now from what they were then, if I’d read this immediately and commented on it then, I probably would have said some of the things then that I would say now. The intervening time I don’t think has made any difference. I don’t know. Who knows. (Elecampane)

The change is not in the ‘ideas’ but in the production of discourses. Knowledge production is discontinuous and local, and follow-up interviews are different localities from the first student interviews. Each context enables some productions and constrains others, and change in accounts are just that, and do not necessarily reflect change of persons.

Accounts that claim change tend to claim that anger is no longer a problem, or no longer a preferred choice:

I see feel experience anger, a lot differently. It’s like I don’t see it as something that I am reacting to any more so much as something I can use, I can choose to use it. I can choose to get angry now about something or I can really choose not to. (Ginger)

Not only is anger no longer preferred, but is delegated to being a waste of time and energy:
I think it is more of a waste of time than what I did then. Things that could easily have been different, changes, wasted that time I think. (Cicely)

I can now think how I would have experienced it and really have a good laugh at myself, you know, why did I bother? Nobody cared really. (Ginger)

Seems like a sort of foolishness, really, to me. A sort of a thoughtless waste of energy. (Rosemary)

As the importance of anger is reduced, self-monitoring is increased, and reflexive comment made:

But now I can stop and say yeah, I could feel angry about that yeah, I could really get into that, but I don’t really want to. Or I can make a choice about it now. (Ginger)

Humanistic discourses of agency and choice re-locate anger as one option among many, and position Ginger as an observer of her own personal process. The object ‘anger’ has receded and the object ‘process’ has been moved into the foreground:

I think back to my own process. (Ginger)

This ‘process’ is located within individuals and anger remains as an entity. Humanistic discourse produces ‘self knowing’ and ‘self-observation’ and subjects are possessors of their ‘own process’. The inner world becomes a place to live, and change is an ongoing developmental process. Self-monitoring discourse is recurrent in counsellor talk, where counsellors talk of themselves as if they are their own clients.

The constitution of anger
Anger is constituted in these texts as in the texts of the student study. In the counsellor accounts, anger is re-constituted as a process rather than an entity. In these texts, the object ‘anger’ remains discrete, while the complexity of the construct is reaffirmed:
And we sort of talk about anger as though it is one emotion and one response, but it isn’t really, it’s a whole lot of shades of things, isn’t it. (Rosemary)

Now I can see anger is a lot bigger than that and there are a lot more facets to anger. (Ginger)

Anger is not “one emotion and one response” and has “more facets”, but multiplicity is not spoken. The “whole lot of shades of things” remain unexplored.

As in the counsellor study, interest has moved from the anger itself to the chain of events in and around anger:

I have noticed in myself that anger’s, there is a lot of connection between anger and sadness... and that is something that I have noticed in myself and therefore I notice it in other people. You can’t take it out and just work with anger, it has to be holistic. (Ginger)

Ginger is positioned among counsellors, an observer who notices “something” in herself and in other people. The professional rules are constituted in several linguistic ruses; the generalised referential index “you”, modal operator of possibility “can’t” and lost performative “has to be”. These linguistic formations position the speaker as expert knower of the social rules of the counselling profession.

In the following fragments, anger is produced as a ‘secondary emotion’ which hides other emotions:

Melissa: Anger is still, um to me, anger is still a cap, often at the surface. It hides other emotions, hurt or sadness, something like that, disappointment, whatever...I’d probably ask ... what has made them angry, try perhaps to discover what was underneath the cap.

Kay: What is underneath the cap.

Melissa: It’s more often than not, it is disappointment or sadness or it is hurt. Their self esteem has been attacked.
Anger is displaced from counselling attention and replaced by underlying “other emotions” or “self esteem”. In the following fragment, anger as a ‘secondary emotion’ is produced as a reflexive gloss on Elecampane’s reading of her own transcript:

In reading this (the transcript of the first interview) it seemed as though I had an image of, if I was reading this thinking that somebody else had said it I’d think that this person has an image of anger being somewhere residual in your body, something about where it was and how it got there and all the rest of it. I’m surprised that there is nowhere in here that I saw, that is not how I see anger and I don’t think I did then, because I remember at the time it was in my mind that um as anger being a secondary emotion anyway, that anger, I don’t think that anger is an emotion like fear or frustration or any of the other emotions are, joy or any of the more positive ones. I don’t think anger is like that. I think anger is, and I know I felt this then as well, it is not new, I think anger is a reaction to those emotions, that anger is in a way secondary. (Elecampane)

This last account is interesting not only in that it produces the ‘secondary emotion’ discourse and the disclaiming of ‘anger-in’, but also that the interview context restricts the reproduction of particular discourses even when these are available. Elecampane is a graduate in psychology and had available many anger discourses which were not reproduced in the first nor indeed in the second interview. Her reading of her own text is a surprise, and enables a reflexive subject position:

So I am surprised that didn’t come through here. I am surprised that I didn’t say it, because I remember thinking it during the interview that anger is secondary. That seems to me to be pretty important that anger I don’t think is an emotion, I don’t think is residual. (Elecampane)

Disclaimers abound, while anger remains a unitary entity, and escapes definition except in terms of what it is not, including an emotion.
Along with contextualising anger in a chain of events is the reproduction of the humanist discourses of agency and volition which enable the chain of events to be interrupted and a range of possibilities considered. Humanistic counselling is based on philosophical presuppositions that individuals grow and develop towards self-actualisation, and are agents who exercise free choice and volition. In these follow-up texts as in the counsellor texts, increased self awareness is claimed and anger re-located as one of a range of strategies:

But now I can stop and say yeah, I could feel angry about that, yeah, I could really get into that, but I don’t really want to. Or I can make a choice about it now. (Ginger)

But I guess whether it’s getting older or I’m getting older or um, distancing myself more, or choosing to distance myself more, if that is what I want to do, that the same things that I used to feel angry about, I don’t need to now, and I don’t, often. (Elecampane)

Humanistic discourse produces ‘self-awareness’ and enables subject positions at a distance from which to observe the ‘self’ and to make choices about whether to be angry or not. Subjectivities are constituted as apart from and choosing among possible feelings and actions. Such meta-positioning is congruent with discourses of humanistic counselling with emphases on agency and volition, and on self-reflexive comments.

**Disclaimers of ventilation and control**

Discussions of cognitive behavioural approaches do not enter these texts. However, as in the counsellor texts, traditional counselling discourses of ventilation and control are disclaimed inconsistently. In these texts the act of disclaiming ventilation is an act of relocation of ventilation discourse into recently espoused psychotherapies:

I did quite a lot of creative stuff with the anger. I allowed myself to get angry in a more holistic way rather than being controlled in the situation trying to control what was happening. (Ginger)
What I meant really was if someone was angry with another person, rather than actually have it out with the person and be angry with them, I’d encourage them to do a psychodrama about it and come back to the other person without the anger and perhaps have a more objective view of it or perhaps more control over it. I mean I don’t like the word control but perhaps um have the emotions involved more controllable or at least not out of control. (Rosemary)

Gestalt therapy produces ‘holism’ and psychodrama produces ‘catharsis’ and clients who “come back” “without the anger”, and with a “more objective view”. Ventilation is appropriate in psychotherapeutic contexts, but not in the interpersonal context in which anger was produced. In therapy, “creative stuff” is “allowed” and counsellors “encourage” clients to act out anger.

Control is also disclaimed and escapes exclusion. Expressing anger in a “holistic way” is substituted for “being controlled” and “trying to control” in the first fragment, and in the second, the “word control” is disclaimed at the same time as approval of controlling emotion (“or at least not out of control”).

Ventilation and control are problematic, but are appropriately delayed and carried out in therapeutic groups presumably directed by experts who maintain professional power/knowledge over what happens in the group. Expression and control of the emotion are removed from the social interactions which produce anger and relocated in the therapeutic context.

**Anger constituted socially**

It is with delight that I read intimations of the discourses of social constructionism in these texts. Anger is constituted in a “set of situations” according to socially constituted expectations:

I mean, socially we have a set of situations which ought to make us angry. (Melissa)
It is as if we are angry when we are supposed to protest to someone about something. (Sage)

The lost performatives “ought” and “supposed to” constitute an authority which sets standards which can not only justify but expect anger as a moral imperative. Anger originates in the social mores, in the space among people rather than from within individual biology or response systems.

A thread runs through these texts which I had not read in the student or the counsellor texts. This thread disclaims expertise and enables positions of ‘unknowing’:

I don’t feel nearly so sure about anger any more, or anything really. ... But when I read that I sound as if I think I knew a lot and now I know I know nothing. (Rosemary)

Not thinking of myself as an expert. (Cicely)

I’m not sure, either. I’ve got very unsure about a lot of things. (Sage)

The intervening time I don’t think has made any difference. I don’t know. Who knows. (Elecampane)

The ‘not knowing’ position opens possibilities for multiplicity and for clients to re-write their own stories in collaboration with the not-expert counsellor. In narrative therapy which is predicated theoretically in social constructionism/poststructuralism, the potentiality of multiple storying is recognised and utilised (Drewery & Monk, 1994).

In this study, movement and transformations can be read among the accounts of graduate counsellors. New storying of anger is occurring. Anger is reconstituted as complex, and as a chosen strategy rather than the troublesome entity that was produced in the first study. While anger is produced as an object with complexity and social implications, it is, however, a unitary and consistent object as it was in the earlier texts.
Humanist discourses of agency and free choice re-produce anger as a strategy, as in the counsellor texts, and there are instances of discourses of social construction.

The most telling shift is in the subject positions taken. Stories are not as immediate. The first person singular is used more often, but to claim thoughts, and to claim uncertainty. Meta-positions are instituted, from which observation and comment can be made on the speakers' own stories and 'process'. These positions are informed by humanist discourses of individual change and free will, enabling subjectivities appropriate to the counselling profession. These meta-positions are reproduced in these as in the texts of the Counsellor Study, in the talk of experienced counsellors.

The Follow-up Study has unfolded practices of transformation as subject positions are enabled for graduate students that are also evident in the accounts of experienced counsellors. Training makes familiar the discursive practices of a profession in the reproduction of knowledge and professional power.
Inconclusive conclusions

in which the strands of the project are woven together and several escape.

In this thesis, I have presented studies of talk about anger, in which anger is positioned in social relations, and is constituted in and through discourse. Anger is thus relocated in social relations, and the intra-individual positioning of anger in the dominant discourses of psychology has been disturbed. The resulting destabilisation of modernist premises of dominant psychology discourses has important implications for social psychology.

As I bring this project to a close, I gather together the threads of theoretical and research questions that have been raised throughout the work. The aim of the research has been to explore the social constitution of anger in and through discourse, that is language and social practice. In doing this, I have asked who is included and given voice, and who is silenced and shut out. I have asked how is anger constituted in discourses of psychology, and how are those formations reproduced in anger talk. And I have asked how anger talk constitutes subjectivities multiply and inconsistently, and with what discursive effects. The answers to these questions are inevitably partial and constantly variable, and yet a consistent theme resonates throughout our conversations; anger is a product of discourse and belongs in social relations.

Summary of the project
In the first chapters I explained the terms social construction, postmodernism, and poststructuralism as they in-formed my reading of the texts. From this position, I read that anger is constituted socially, is implicated in status and power relations, and enables subject positions in and around power issues including, but not only, injustice. I contrasted this epistemological position with the modernist position which the discipline of psychology commands, and I summarised the production of anger as the object of psychology’s positivist discourses in a variety of
The problematic of acknowledging sources remains, and that statement suggests that this text stands alone, albeit supported by other texts. It doesn't, I have endeavoured to keep language as the subject, to avoid the individual personalisation of individuals, and to bring to the fore the constitutive power of discourse. I have rejoiced in the acknowledgement that this text is not an entity of itself, but is constituted of multiple texts, some acknowledged, others too far from my consciousness to be sightable.

And this text is a nexus of texts; texts which are conversations, texts which are books, texts which are lives; texts which dialogue with each other and texts which but murmur below the surface. We all read life as a text, with a beginning and end, a plot, story line and characters, and these metaphors are inherent in speaking our lived experiences. And we have only texts as the discursive materials we form and reform, interleaving fragments, lines, pages, whole narratives as if our own.

And I have struggled to write from inside the text, constantly abdicating positions of mastery or privileged authority. I desire to stay inside, inhabiting the words/meanings, ploughing destabilisation through the multi-layered levels of grafts of texts I have read which feed off each other. Is this intertextuality? It is impossible to decide, and undecidability enables disorder and deconstruction. And I hesitate at the temptation to claim deconstruction.

Jacques would not be impressed with deconstruction being appropriated by academic institutions, nor that this thesis might make claims to be a deconstructive project. He might nod (or even say "Yes") if I admit that deconstruction is impossible, has no rules, procedures, methods, accessible approaches, although he would possibly add that I might just have to learn patience and wait for any satisfactions from the claiming of that impossibility. There is nowhere to settle among these questions, no stance to adopt.

And I catch myself escaping the text, introducing, summarising, concluding from some place out there, a position of authority which puts boundaries around this text, which will decide on the bindings, the covers of the book which will create the illusion of a textual object, a finished product.
theoretical inscriptions. I then set out the rationales for the methodologies I chose. The analysis involved reading the texts through three overlapping overlays; the discourses that constitute anger, how subjectivities are constituted in anger talk, and particular tools of linguistic analysis bring to the forefront the constitutive power of language.

Anger discourses form the linear plot line of the presentation of the Student Study which is the main study within the project. These discourses are braided into three plaits; psychology discourses (Chapters Seven and Eight), moral evaluations (Chapter Nine), and the constitution of anger in social relations (Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve). Interwoven into these braids are the constitution of subjectivities and the linguistic ruses which enable the production of objects in relation to each other. Language is the focus of the Metaphor Study (Chapter Thirteen), and of my reflections on the limitations on the availability of language resources for anger talk (Chapter Fourteen).

In the Counsellor Study (Chapter Fifteen), differences in the constitution of anger and of subjectivities were read among the texts of students and experienced counsellors (Chapter Fifteen). The follow up study (Chapter Sixteen) focussed on the variations between participants’ first interviews and subsequent reflections on anger and change. The aim of these studies was not to measure variations across groups or time, but to ensure shifts and variability in the contexts of anger talk. The analysis of these transcripts explored differences and variations in discourse production according to social context and how anger and subjectivities are reproduced in the talk of those familiar with counselling discourse.

Such is the form of this text. As I read the texts with these questions in mind, and wrote versions of my readings, patterns have emerged, which I have explicated as I have written about the discourses which produce anger as an object. Throughout, I have presented fragments of the texts to substantiate my treatise. These are the patterns which have come to the foreground as I have written my readings of the texts: Psychology reproduces dominant discourses of Western world view, including
modernism, individualism, and humanism. These discourses enable subject positions with discursive potentialities, and the linguistic analysis has effectively highlighted epistemological problems of representation and structuralism. The aspiration to achieve validity by the criteria of reflexivity and reciprocity is partially met, and the jury is still out on whether I have satisfactorily transgressed orthodox practice while achieving my academic purposes. The research design has highlighted the advantages of reading interrelated texts, while shifting the ground away from modernist premises of comparison and change.

Psychology
Anger is constituted in the texts as an object of discourse, and the discourses of psychology are reproduced in anger talk. Psychological practices of definition and categorisation divide emotions into objects which are available to the scientific gaze. Such dividing practices constitute emotions as realities which preexist our observation and are available for our discovery. Anger is constituted in psychology discourse as basic and innate, an object of sustained political attention, an intra-individual entity embodied in physiological and cognitive process. This text tracks these embodiments through a range of theoretical stances. Even social constructionism tends to frame emotion as arising from an individual’s awareness of and reaction to social ‘rules’. In this thesis, deconstruction of the texts re-positions anger in the spaces among between people, in social relations.

Subjectivity
The discipline psychology produces ‘self’ and ‘identity’ as objects in and through discourses of individualism and essentialism, enabling the individual/social split, and positioning individuals in relation to the social which is separate from them. These productions are reproduced in the texts. The term ‘subjectivity’ disrupts the individual/social binary, and so the epistemological ground shifts. Subjectivity is a social substantiation of a nexus of social relations, and in our Western culture that substantiation is as if individual. Subjectivities are constituted multiply and inconsistently in and through language and social practice, and to
track the constitution of anger in anger talk is to track the constitution of individuality and inner biological (and therefore enduring) ‘truths’ about emotion.

Participants
The three sets of participants, students before training, experienced counsellors, and students after training, are all involved in the counselling. The restricted range of interest was a deliberate decision. Anger talk constitutes subjectivities, and in the contexts of this project, subjectivities which are appropriate to the counselling profession. Counselling theory is permeated with humanism and reproduces the objects of humanism, ‘choice’, ‘agency’ and ‘personal development and growth’. These objects are re-produced in conversations among counsellors.

Interview context
The texts which are the materials of this project are therefore productions of very particular contexts. The biases that are inherent in interview as a method were in this way deliberately woven into this work. Objectivity is deposed as a possible goal, and the influences of multiple relationships of tutor/student, participant/researcher, and colleague have been utilised to heighten the power relations inherent in the research process. I became a participant, and the participants became collaborators in the research, and the power relations were emphasised and then disrupted, at least for a little. And a little disruption is no small thing.

There is no pretence that these conversations produced some “clean” talk that is somehow nearer the “ordinary” talk of “lay” people. Society comprises a variety of overlapping communities, and there will be some communities that do not overlap with others. Another group of participants talking to another researcher may well produce different anger talk. And yet, even as I concede the biases inherent in working with such a homogeneous group with a professional interest in anger, I wonder if anger would be constituted very differently among other predominantly pakeha groups in Aotearoa. That is material for another project.
The linguistic toolbox
In this project, language, not persons, is the object of study, and modernist concerns about objectivity recede into the background. The analysis of the texts involves detailed language analysis as a means of bringing into the foreground the constitutive power of language. The linguistic tools I use are problematic, in that they are fashioned for a language of representation and structuralism. Vestiges of past use cling to the very terminology which constitutes them. And yet I can only use what tools are available, and I used these linguistic tools with care and with effect.

As I have restated frequently throughout this text, my intention has been to deconstruct wider issues in the context of social relations such as the social constitution of anger and subjectivity, and to track whom these social practices privilege, and who is silenced. At times the means of analysis threatened to obscure the larger design, and then I used detailed analysis sparingly. By the careful use of linguistic tools, I have succeeded in assembling a strong argument for the constitution of anger in the social domain, and the fragments of the anger talk I present support my contentions.

Fragmentation
My work has left behind and outside this text most of the interview material. The texts have been fragmented and ripped into shreds, and arranged into patterns of my making. As I have done this, I have been aware that I have not honoured participants’ stories in ways they might have expected. Language is the subject of this work, and as such it displaces persons from the centre of attention, and that sits uncomfortably with my political intent to empower participants.

Reciprocity
I have continued to give chapters of this thesis to interested participants to read in honour of the reciprocity agreement, and that is not entirely satisfactory. The problematics of participatory research remain to a large extent unresolved. Attempts to disturb the researcher-researched power imbalance have surfaced the issues, but not eliminated them. A collegial
group of researchers studying their own texts would avoid many aspects of these problems, but our interests as researchers need to be wider than that. An action research approach enables other possibilities, where the research process is inherent in the participants’ ongoing concerns, and the initiating researcher bows out and allows the participants to take charge of the process. This method is advantageous for some groups and some topics, but is not always appropriate for the wide spectrum of issues we would wish to research in social psychology.

**Reflexivity**

Reflexivity is interwoven throughout the research. Opportunities for reflexivity were provided for participants by returning their transcripts at each stage of the project, by providing occasions for close study of those texts, and by the follow-up interview. On these occasions, participants were invited to comment on their present readings of those earlier texts. When an undertaking such as this takes years to complete, variation and transformation come to the surface. Researcher reflexivity is traditionally excluded from theses, and yet reflexivity is inherent in the writing process. I have enjoyed writing reflexively in the text and on the purple pages appliqued onto the text. It is satisfying to play with images of time/space disrupted and transformation enabled. This text which results is able to reflect the research processes which have structured it.

**Research design**

The research was planned to enable the arrangement of studies beside each other to provide width, and end on end to provide depth. Doing this made space for multidimensionality, and for theoretical problems to surface. If the reader stands in a modernist position, shadows of positivist practices of longitudinal and between subjects designs can be discerned as if earlier inscriptions under this text. To focus on these shadows would involve reading practices which are dependent on modernist notions of comparison and change. I invite the reader to stand over here, where those shadows are no longer visible. From this poststructural position, these design features enable us to read for difference and variability. The shifts are discursive, not essential.
Inconclusive conclusions

Difference
Laying the student texts alongside the texts of experienced counsellors created useful contrasts and similarities. Reading for difference is an endeavour that has validity even while differences cannot be accounted for as results of manipulating variables. While a wide variety of discourses are available to many people, particular contexts call forth particular ways of speaking. Discursive effects are brought into relief as differences come to light.

Variability
Change connotes permanence, consistency of person, and the effect of events, for example, training, upon that person. Discontinuity disrupts the continuity that notions of change constitute. The follow up study does not establish change as a result of training or over time in the traditional, modernist sense. Subjectivities are fragmentary and inconsistent at any time/place, and any talk arises from a particular context and with particular effects. It is a valid enterprise, therefore, to read for differences in discourse production, and variability can be traced between texts produced in different contexts. In the follow up study, this is what was done. Anger and subjectivity were produced differently in the second interview context, by when/where more/other appropriate and possible discourses were available.

These are the patterns that have emerged from the research. While there are many satisfactions in what has been accomplished, I welcome the possibilities offered by the open ended questions which remain. I now reflect on the weaving of this text and the contributions it makes to the field of social psychology, and I consider possibilities for further research.

This text as discourse
This text, just as the texts it studies, is a fabrication for particular effects. The patches that form this quilt come from a variety of materials, including psychology, counselling, poststructuralism, and the stories told to me by counselling students and counselling psychologists. Fragments of these texts are pieced together, batted, quilted, and backed, to make an
effective whole. Other researchers would have designed and pieced a very different product. As I examine the stitching, I detect some work I would like to have done differently. As a result there has been reworking in some places. Other flaws remain, and to be valued, since they emphasise that the work is handcrafted.

One of these flaws is the ongoing constitution of anger as the object of discourse in this text. After all this attention, anger remains problematic. I continue to reify anger throughout my discussion. I talk about “it”, and how “it” works, reproducing anger as “it”. The title of this thesis reproduces “it”. I like the “do anger” active verb, and even more I like the way that deconstructing anger has made available a finer granularity as the events, feelings, actions that constitute the “energy” of anger come into the foreground. I will not simplify anger in my own life, nor in my counselling practice. And I will continue to reify “it” if that is what it takes to emphasise that “it” belongs in social relations, in the spaces among people.

Patchwork has left yards of fabric behind. Some of these are already cut into shapes intended for blocks which have been redesigned and completed. Others are fat quarters that were available and then deemed superfluous to the final design. As I check the references, I realise I have left out much reading and talking that went into this work. And yet these texts are here, not at the surface, but as batting and backing, keeping the finished work strong. And they can be reworked into future quilts, images of which are at the edges of my vision even as I write.

I am not satisfied that I have sufficiently resisted the dominant discourse of psychology, let alone the dominant discourses of positivism and modernism. I am similarly not satisfied with having resisted the disciplinary practice of thesis production, and regard this text as something of a compromise. If I could write this text freely my way, then there would be no need for the compromise, nor, ironically, for the endeavour. Psychology would have acknowledged its epistemological limitations, and would have been transformed.
Transitions & Transformations

This is not a conclusion, but a beginning. The project that this thesis embodies has but begun. Certainly some strands of my life are coming to an end, and the final threads are being stitched into the greater work. The completion of this academic project marks a transition in my life. I have left Palmerston North, and that departure inevitably alters my environment and how I relate to people who matter to me. The Nanawatu River no longer flows at the edge of my mind.

As these threads are woven into the fabric of what has been, new threads are taken up and open up opportunities for what might be. Flakes and even surfaces of familiar subjectivities are lifting, and may be shed, as old reptilian skins. The shedding is in some places painful, and I am tempted to flee back into what was and might have been. But it is time to snip some threads, and tie off the ends, so that there is space for weaving new patterns. I have some images, yet to be made clear, and the myriad of possibilities shimmer in front of my eyes, as if through a waterfall.

I now live in Auckland, and I am renewing old friendships and forging new connections. My new position involves teaching, counselling, and research; three practices which inform each other richly. I grasp the threefold tasks firmly in both hands, knowing that I have the resources I need to work creatively and dynamically. Enthusiasm and energy abound among my colleagues and students, and my way is made easy. I will have the time and space and energy to do what I love, and to discover more than I yet imagine. The text of this thesis is but the first faltering steps towards what will follow. Among these future works, I glimpse ways of writing and reading and being that have been conceived in this project during the last few years.

This thesis is part of the wider and ongoing project of my life. The research has transformed my understandings of what constitutes knowledge, of how power pervades all social relations, including the disciplines of psychology and counselling, and of how that power is relational, in and among the spaces between people. I have gladly abandoned the struggle for a consistent identity, for personal growth. My intellectual, emotional and spiritual ways of being are transformed, and I look forward to the unfoldings of multicoloured possibilities that might take form in and among the connectedness and mutually informed energies that create and sustain all of life.
Inconclusive conclusions

For now, this thesis makes a significant contribution in that it extends the possibilities of psychology research. It confirms the usefulness of studying anger in the context of social relations, as an object of discourse. It supports the contention that anger is constituted in the social arena in and through discourses which enable subject positions in the renegotiation of entitlements, conflicts and legitimations.

The analysis of the texts has significance for the methodologies of social psychology. Deconstructing texts and emphasis on language are effective forms of analysis. This project is a fitting response to poststructuralism’s challenge to the constraints of psychology’s practices in and through which knowledge/power is re-produced.

**Future research**

This project is in many ways a beginning. Threads remain loose which can be taken up and used for weaving new projects. Some of these are threads left available for further exploration of the constitution of anger. I have already suggested reading texts of the talk of a quite different group of people. Texts that constitute anger are plentiful; do-it-yourself anger management texts, educational materials on anger, conflict and peace, advertising for therapy groups on ‘anger management’. I am also curious about how doing anger resists dominant discourses. The conflation of violence and anger constrains effective therapeutic work with people who are troubled by violence. Undoing the conflation is a research project with potential for exploring rich fields of legitimation, entitlement, and power. And, of course, all emotions are available for exploration in similar varieties of texts.

I look forward to poststructuralist transformation of counselling theory and practice. Counselling is not the focus of this project, but keeps reappearing throughout participants’ texts and this text, since counselling is our common interest. Clinical psychology cleaves to the medical model and behaviourism, and counselling is saturated with humanism. In psychology, these differences are pitched against each other, and the resulting humanist/behaviourist binary maintains a homeostatic balance,
excluding other possibilities. Narrative therapy embodies poststructuralist epistemologies and ontologies, and has the potential to disrupt the bastions of counselling psychology in theory and in practice. I look forward to reading and writing deconstructive works on the objects of counselling. Anger has been trendy in counselling, and that trendiness enables clients’ stories to be construed in terms of contending with anger. I am interested in how the trendy gets to be trendy, and whose interests are served by trends in psychology practice.

The multidisciplinary nature of poststructuralism in general, and of narrative therapy in particular, is a great strength. At the same time, transgression of disciplinary boundaries leaves room for the dominant discipline of psychology to restrict poststructural ways of knowing to the margins. The good news is that over here in the margins there are plentiful spaces for creative work we have yet to imagine. I look forward to reading more and more psychology research that is positioned in poststructuralism. My prophecy is that the discipline will endeavour to make just enough room in the margins to include our work, while at the same time ensuring that dominant discourses maintain the status quo. One significant sign of these disciplinary practices will be that publication of our work will continue to be difficult.

The stopping problem
The thesis is but one surface of imbrications bound between hard covers, and the text escapes the final form of the book. Where does a ‘work’ begin and end? We are forever constrained by the limits of the time/space constituted in our culture. The multiple surfaces of time cannot be resolved, and linearity precludes spatial satisfactions. It is time to conclude this conclusion, to terminate this work in progress. I have to stop somewhere, constrained as I am by discourses of scholarship production and academic qualification.

I began this opus by positioning this thesis as a response to poststructuralism’s challenge to psychology theory, research, and practice. I have read texts as discourse which constitutes objects and enables and
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from. And every phrase
And sentence that is right (where every word is at home,
Taking its place to support the others,
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious,
An easy commerce of the old and the new,
The common word exact without vulgarity,
The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together)
Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning,
Every poem an epitaph.

... 

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot
Lines from Little Gidding
constrains knowledge/power. Throughout this project I have worked to disrupt that knowledge/power by the research plan and process, by disturbing the power plays of my disciplines, and by the composition of this text. I am positioned as researcher and researched, teacher and fellow student, writer and subject, counsellor and one who herself seeks transformation.

Readers of this text will bring to it their own reading practices, and some will deconstruct the discourses which have in-formed it. And that brings us recursively and satisfyingly to another beginning.

Talking about anger

in which the story of this research unfolds

and the author's position as researcher is placed in context

The story of this research has many beginnings. One was a few lines ago,
But what if
Have lit upon a woman who so shares
Your thirst for those old crabbed mysteries,
So strung to look beyond our life: an eye
That never knew that strain would scarce seem bright.
And yet herself can seem youth's very fountain,
Being all brimmed with life?

Were it but true
I would have found the best that life can give,
Companionship in those mysterious things
That make a man's soul or a woman's soul
Itself and not some other soul.

That is...
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ANGER

Information Sheet

What Is this study about?
The aim of this study is to explore people's experiences of anger and its expression, and how learning about anger and its management changes perceptions and explanations. The research is being done by Kay O'Connor as a thesis for her PhD under supervision in the Psychology department at Massey University.

What would I have to do?
If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed. During the interview you will be invited to talk about your experiences of anger and how it was expressed, your ideas about anger, and strategies that you use to help others to deal with their anger. Your interview will be audiotaped. A transcript of the interview will be returned to you.

What are my rights?
If you take part in the study, you have the right to:

- refuse to answer any question and to withdraw from the study at any time
- ask any further questions about the study that occur to you during your participation.
- provide information on the understanding that it is completely confidential to the researcher, her supervisor and the person who types up the transcript. All records are identifiable only by code number, and are seen only by the researcher. It will not be possible to identify you in any reports that result from the study.
- have access to your own data.
- be given a summary of the findings from the study when it is concluded.

In the unlikely event of any personal issues arising for you as a consequence of the interviews or workshop, full support and help will be available.

If you are interested in taking part, please let me know. We will then arrange an interview at a time suitable for us both. Please ring me at 3579104 (College of Education) or 3582243 (Home) if you have any further questions.

Kay O'Connor
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ANGER

CONSENT FORM

I have read the information sheet for this study and have had the details explained to me. My questions about the research have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, and to refuse to answer any particular questions. I agree to provide information to the researcher on the understanding that it is completely confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.

I agree to the researcher audiotaping the interviews with me, and also that she may use brief direct quotations from the interview in her reports of the study provided these do not identify me in any way.

I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out on the Information Sheet.

Signed: ________________________________

Name: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________

Researcher: ____________________________

Information for participants
Appendix B: Glossary of validities


Glossary of validities

Validity was always an elusive prey
with tendencies
to ultimate criteria
and blinkered search for objective truth
poking at
but not penetrating
the it being measured

Forces marshalled
instruments at the ready
models constructed
relationships hypothesised
wonderful elaboration of variables
discriminated itemised correlated
moderated mediating
detailed analyses
forcing difference contrast separation
compartments lines cells columns rows
all sacramentalised in the end by numbers

Or letters preferably Greek
though hellenic truth seekers
may prefer runes of a different tongue
to obscure and privilege
interpretation and understanding
of the most immediate of all experiences
sensation awareness reflection connection

Then comes a revolution
yet again.
So much for your validity
the elusive truth is a fiction of your
singular
construction

We do not have a construction
we construct
cooperatively
collaboratively
despite ourselves
and the centuries of pressure
to separate conform obey.

We do not have relationships
we relate
we do not have sex
we do

We have broken your code
we take the shattered images of your words
and create new meanings
multiple overlapping different intertwined collective
shocking warm mysterious magical words
woven through the fragments
of the validities
you still mourn
And so a glossary
At least you did not request a taxonomy
disappointing, that
I’d have polarised your view in the old style

A glossary
an enticing notion
of explication as validities emerge
from the fine pleats of your toga
in orderly clarified and annotated array
footnotes to guide
those blinded by modernism

Taxonomy
there is potential in that tension
between two poles of a continuum
as line becomes circle
and connection made and
new circle curls upwards in a spiral

Glossary
language centred
illusions of understanding
positioned in my part of the world
until the rubber band snaps back
and you are there once more
anchored in the shifting sand
of objectivity
where the familiar language of experiment
enables your collusion
with domination

And yes
a glossary of validities could be assembled
but never even half complete
since we have unfurled
spaces in the dark mysterious
realms of existence that
explode edifices
of time and space
and abundantly
we create images
of how and might and if
and yes
in whirling galaxies
to represent
what is true, but not truth
what is the aha, but not experience

And you of all people
know that time and space
are illusions to obscure and mystify
what living and being and connecting are

So here it is
for you
a glossary of
some of my validities
none of which
will fit into a wheelbarrow
Psychology has been slow to respond to the challenges of poststructuralism. The constructs of the discipline rely on language to represent realities. Reflexivity is inherent but unacknowledged. As psychologists, we are the objects of our own curiosity, and in self exploration we construct abstractions, objectify our constructions, and then proceed to construct measures to assess the objectifications we have created (Gergen, 1991; Shotter, 1989). The language of psychology forms the objects of study (Foucault, 1972; Sampson, 1993).

This poem emerged from a particularly fruitless effort to write up my current research. I was writing a version of how my interviews with people can be read to throw light on the social construction of emotion. Aware of my long training in using language to represent, I became suspicious of every phrase. It was a constant struggle continuously lost. I read poststructural theory, and I understand that language is relational (Gergen, 1994). When I begin to write, however, I catch myself building words to represent. Language delights me. I travel contentedly around many versions of truth and enjoy the many-layered, rich explanations people generate in telling their stories. However, once I begin to impose my own interpretation on what others have said in solemn print, self-consciousness takes over, and the act and the actor are split once again (Appadurai, 1990).

This poem acts out these tensions and contradictions. Issues of validity (Lather, 1991, 1993) lie at the heart of my struggle to write about other people's stories. The phrase glossary of validities crystallises the tensions, dilemmas, and frustrations of my struggle. As soon as I heard it, the multitude of frustrating phrases I had been rejecting all danced together and demanded to be assembled in print. It is as if this concoction of phrases represents my processes and at the same time brings into being my own knowing and not knowing, whether socially constructed, existential, or empirically proven. I am and act out language in all of these epistemological places, inconsistently and incoherently, my language and my self mutually constructing each other (Harré, 1992). In poetry, I am immediate and emotional, and I act out the dilemmas - do them rather than write about them. Multiple, shifting, and contested meanings are possible in the emotional utterances of poetry.

The endeavour to write these "afterwords" (Richardson, 1994) has been another cycle of frustration and tension. Having written them, I will now go through and scatter some academic references to validate my observations. If the poem does not succeed without these words, these words cannot succeed even with the poem. If I were you, I wouldn't read them.
Appendix B: Glossary of validities

References


References


Averill, J. R. (1990a). Inner feelings, works of the flesh, the beast within, diseases of the mind, driving force, and putting on a show: Six metaphors of emotion and theoretical extensions. In D. E. Leary (Ed.),
Metaphors in the history of psychology (pp. 104-132). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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