Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
PRIVACY AND RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUALITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF SOME CONTEMPORARY
EDUCATIONAL TRENDS

A thesis presented
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in
Education at
Massey University

NICOLE MARIE BISHOP

1993
ABSTRACT

The threats to privacy which arise from technologies and institutions are of considerable contemporary interest, as is illustrated by a large literature upon such threats within the liberal tradition. Of particular contemporary concern are the subjective routes through which privacy may be undermined. This concern arises from the contemporary trend for institutions to become concerned with the internal and subjective lives of their charges. In education, these trends may be found in an advocacy of increased self-disclosure in the classroom, and in a call for increased personal and emotional involvement in the activities of the classroom.

The purpose of this thesis is to extend and develop the liberal case for the importance of privacy in the development of a respect for individuality in a way which pays special regard to the significance of the inward and subjective dimensions of human experience for the development of, and respect for, individuality. I argue that a regard for the distinctive character of such processes is crucial to the fostering of individuality. Central to my case is a defence of the critical role which privacy plays in preserving the virtues of character which develop through a sensitivity to these subjective dimensions of human experience.

The methodology involves, firstly, a normative characterisation of the attitudes and dispositions which are required for the exercise of respect for individuality, with a particular emphasis placed upon their subjective and inward features. This task involves an analysis of the distinction between on the one hand, the personal forms of respect, which pertain to individuality, and whose character is essentially subjective; and, on the other hand, those impersonal forms of respect whose character is essentially objective and impartial. Secondly, I undertake an analysis of some, crucial ways in which these dispositions and attitudes may be undermined by values and practices which disregard their subjective character. This analysis proceeds by way of a critical examination of two trends which may be found in some educational literature: a/ Classroom self-disclosure; and b/ Cooperative Learning.

The thesis contains two sections. In the first section, I delineate the essential features of a respect for individuality, and the virtues of character required for the proper exercise of such respect. This will involve showing this form of respect differs, both conceptually and normatively, from impersonal forms of respect. In the second section, I show the special significance of a context of privacy for the development of the virtues of character which are required for the proper exercise of personal respect.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor I. Snook, for his encouragement and helpful criticisms of my work. Thanks also to Professor Graham Oddie, my second supervisor, for his comments and criticisms.

I wish to thank also my fellow students whose interest, conversation, and criticism were of help to me during my work on this thesis: Celia Short, Jenny MacKenzie, and Rosemary Mercer. I am also grateful to those who provided helpful advice in seminars and academic conferences, especially John Hattie, Donald Vandenberg and Brian Hill.

Thanks also to the patient and dedicated efforts of my mother, Sharon Bishop, who offered to proofread this thesis, and to Kip Marks, for his helpful editorial suggestions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Two Forms of Respect</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impersonal Forms of Respect</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The Basic Features of Impersonal Respect</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Generic Respect</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Evaluative Respect</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Claims on Others: Character and Limits</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Personal Forms of Respect</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The Basic Features of Personal Respect</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Personal Respect for the Self</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Personal Respect for Other Selves</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Constraints</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts and Contexts</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Introduction</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Concepts</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Contexts</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 4  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECTIVE PRIVACY

CHAPTER 5  PRIVACY AND PERSONAL RESPECT FOR SELF
The Case of Self-Disclosure

5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Spectator Perspective and Self-Disclosure
  5.2:1 The Affirmative Context
  5.2:2 The Oppositional Context
  5.2:3 Conclusion
5.3 Social Accountability and Self-Disclosure
  5.3:1 Accountability and Rationality
  5.3:2 Accountability and History
5.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER 6  PRIVACY AND RESPECT FOR OTHER SELVES
The Case of Cooperative Learning

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Value and Principle
6.3 Practice and Procedure
6.4 Constructive Directions
6.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER 7  THE WELFARE ARGUMENT

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION

The big institution has traditionally been the target of vehement charges of impersonality, of lack of caring, concern and respect for individuals. It is almost a cliche to associate the big, impersonal institution with the obliteraton of the individual, who is lost among the anonymous masses to which the institution caters. Schools are no strangers to this charge. Perhaps this is why there is a strong emphasis within educational literature upon developing a more 'personal' approach, one in which the individuality of students is recognised and appreciated. A manifesto may be found in the following promotion of the aims of pastoral education:

[The] form tutor's task should be...To...develop good relationships...These good relationships involve talking with and listening to children in a less formal setting and on a reasonably personal level...[The teacher] builds a family-type atmosphere in the group, using simple group work skills, as well as the effect of his or her personality (David 1987, 164).

This all seems rather straightforward: a commendable spirit of caring and concern. Surely, it may be supposed, it is simply commonsense to believe that respect for persons can be fostered by 'being personal', by respecting those particular values and perceptions which differentiate each individual from 'the mass'. And surely, too, it is common sense to suppose that impersonal settings are hostile to such respect.

So, it is reasonable to suppose that we cannot feasibly expect to cultivate respect for individuality in institutions which are dominated by an impersonal ethos. It is reasonable to suppose that individuality cannot flourish in anonymity, and neither can the social virtues which require a respect for individuality, such as friendship, cooperation, and the spirit of cooperation and mutual concern. Therefore, if we wish to cultivate such respect within institutions, we must change the institutions by making them more personal. 'Personal' concerns are, accordingly, to be regarded as
appropriate concerns for the school to cater for. Students are to be encouraged to
bring their private concerns - inner thoughts, hopes, dreams, fears, and even loves -
to school, where they may then become the concerns also of the teachers who are
entrusted with their welfare.

This reasoning, however familiar, may be challenged. It is the task of the following
work to mount such a challenge. Institutions such as schools, I will argue, are not
appropriate places in which to cultivate respect for individuality. Their efforts to do
so involve a far-reaching encroachment upon the privacy of their students. In doing
so, they undermine the very values they intend to promote.

The threats to privacy which arise from technologies and institutions are of
considerable contemporary interest, as is illustrated by a large literature upon such
threats within the liberal tradition\(^1\). Of particular and novel interest, though, are the
peculiarly \textit{subjective} forms which such threats may take. The novelty of this concern
arises from the particular, and perhaps unprecedented, trend for institutions to become
concerned with the \textit{internal and subjective} lives of their charges. As informed social
commentators have remarked (Sennet 1976; Bok 1982; Rose 1990), it is a relatively
recent phenomenon, peculiar to contemporary society, to accept, and even encourage,
the exposure of introspective concerns to a public audience. Witness the phenomenon
of television talk shows. Educational institutions are not, of course, immune to these
general trends. In education, these trends may be found in the advocacy of classroom
self-disclosure. Or they may be found in the call for increased personal and emotional
involvement in the activities of the classroom.

In the light of this trend, there is a need for a deeper analysis of the \textit{subjective}
implications of a disregard for privacy. The liberal defense of privacy should include
an analysis of how individuality, and a respect for individuality, may be sacrificed by
a failure to respect the privacy of internal, subjective dimensions of human experience.

\(^1\) For a sample of such literature, refer to the volumes edited by Schoeman (1984)
and by Pennock and Chapman (1971).
My task is to do just this. Respect for individuality, I shall argue, requires a fine sensitivity to the internal and subjective dimensions of human experience. And such sensitivity requires privacy if it is to flourish.

The discussion will be divided into two sections.

In Section 1 - "The Two Forms of Respect: Personal and Impersonal" - the task will be to delineate the essential features of, and requirements for, the development of respect for individuality (personal respect). The distinctive features of this personal form of respect will be identified, and in doing so I will show how this form of respect differs, both conceptually and normatively, from impersonal forms of respect. This section will contain three chapters.

Chapter 1 - "Impersonal Forms of Respect" - will be devoted a characterisation of the internal attitudes which appropriately accompany impersonal respect.

Chapter 2 - "Personal Forms of Respect" - will be devoted to a characterisation of the personal forms of respect, and of the virtues of character and of attitude which are presupposed by the nature of such respect. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the particular significance of the subjective and internal dimensions of human experience for the realisation of such respect.

In Chapter 3 - "Concepts and Contexts" - I will show the broader implications, both ethical and pragmatic, of the distinction between personal and impersonal forms of respect. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the relevance of the 'private domain' and 'public domain'.

In Section 2 - "The Role of Privacy in the Development of Personal Respect" - I will show the significance of privacy for the development of the dispositions and virtues of character which are required for the exercise of personal respect, for self and for others. The section will be divided into four chapters.
In Chapter 4 - "The Significance of Subjective Privacy" - an introduction to the topic of privacy - the particular import and significance of privacy for the subjective and internal dimensions of human experience will be developed. I will explain the significance of internal privacy, or privacy which pertains to the inner, subjective aspects of human experience.

In Chapter 5 - "Privacy and Personal Respect for Self" - I will examine the implications of 'subjective' privacy for the expression and development of one's own individuality.

In Chapter 6 - "Privacy and Respect for Other Selves" - I will consider the implications of violations of privacy for a respect for the individuality of others. This I will do through the topic of cooperative learning and its cultivation.

In Chapter 7 - "The Welfare Argument" - I will extract, and critically evaluate the arguments from social and emotional 'need' which may be invoked to override considerations of privacy.
SECTION ONE

THE TWO FORMS OF RESPECT: PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL
1.1 The Basic Features of Impersonal Respect

An important feature of impersonal forms of respect is impartiality. Such impartiality demands a willingness to assess oneself by the same standards as one assesses and treats others. Considerable attentions has been given to the procedures which may best ensure that impartiality enters into a respect for individuals (for instance, in Rawls' (1971) concern with social justice). My concern, though, is with the internal attitudes which should characterise those forms of respect which are impartial.

For the purposes of this discussion, two basic forms of impersonal respect may be identified. The first - 'Generic Respect' - is grounded in generic personhood, and is hence owed to all in equal measure in virtue of their possession of basic interests which all alike possess (Singer 1979). The second - 'Evaluative Respect' - is based upon standards of excellence, or principles.

1/ 'Generic respect': Respect which is owed to all and is not contingent on their personal qualities or character, and which, accordingly need not be earned.

2/ 'Evaluative respect': Respect which does pertain to qualities and performances. It is based upon standards of evaluation which apply to all equally. Sachs (1981) points out that respect of this kind should be applied equally to self and others. To respect oneself for a particular quality - eg intelligence - is to be obliged to respect in equal measure others who show this quality. What must be emphasised is the importance and appropriateness of impartial standards of evaluation. This, in turn, presupposes the existence of
a common idiom, a common set of standards or rules to which all alike must be subjected.

Although distinct, these forms of impersonal respect have in common the feature of *impartiality*. This implies, firstly, that the relevant standards are to be regarded as *universally applicable*. It implies, secondly, that the standards must be applied *consistently*, and in a way which prohibits the arbitrary or erratic application of rules. This requirement for consistency rules out, among other things, the grounding of self-respect on the responses of others to self. Such responses are arbitrary, depending, as they often do, upon idiosyncrasies of others’ personal taste. Similarly, it rules out the 'subjectivising' of one's self-respect - the adjustment of standards to suit subjective states, of mood and affect for instance.

So let us turn now to an analysis of the two forms of impersonal respect - generic and evaluative.

### 1.2 Generic Respect

Dillon (1992) captures well the essential features of the form of self-respect which we shall characterise in this section:

[There is a] type of self-respect, call it *interpersonal recognition self-respect*, that is a matter of comporting oneself in light of an understanding of one's fundamental interpersonal worth. This would include understanding and properly valuing one's equal basic rights, and acting congruently with a
conception of certain treatment as one's due as a person and of other treatment as degrading, beneath the dignity of persons...(Dillon 1992, 133).

Such respect is based on that 'generic worth', which is common to all persons \(^4\), and which dictates their right not to be subject to gratuitous indignities. As self-respect, it is essentially the attitude of preparedness to stand up for one's dignity, one's right not to receive gratuitous contempt or maltreatment from others or from self (as in the case of gratuitous self-condemnation). It may take either an interpersonal form which aims to prevent others from abusing the self, or an intrapersonal form which aims to prevent self-inflicted indignities (for instance, gratuitous guilt or self-condemnation).

Generic respect justifies, we could say, a basic self-acceptance. Indeed it is often maintained that deficiencies in self-acceptance are the main barrier to the exercise of such self-respect in both its intrapersonal and interpersonal forms (Rogers 1942; Coopersmith 1967; Beane and Lipka 1984). Although 'self-acceptance' is often construed more strongly, I shall here focus on what I consider to be the proper, and minimal, construction of self-acceptance: the recognition of what is minimally entailed by the 'generic worth' upon which such respect is properly founded.

The intuition is that simply in virtue of being a person one possesses a generic worth. This worth does not need to be earned, and should not be narrowly tied down to functions, performances, or attributes. It is this generic worth which dictates a baseline attitude of self-respect and the expectation of respect from others. From this analysis emerges one important element of self-acceptance: the recognition that such respect is properly founded.

\[^2\] Other similar accounts may be found in Hill (1991, 4-24); Darwell (1977); Telfer and Downie (1969, 14-22).

\[^3\] I am here assuming Tooley's definition of a 'person' as one who possesses 'a concept of self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, together with the belief that it is such a subject. (Tooley 1986, 84)

\[^4\] A description of the basic features of such respect, and its implications for education, may be found in Bailey (1975).
based on generic worth which need not be vindicated or earned. It is a 'birthright', and as such need not be earned by positive efforts. A person displays a lack of self-acceptance, for instance, where her self-respect is made to hinge upon the meeting of stringent positive standards. Having said this, I must also emphasise the need to guard against going too far in the other direction: implying that self-condemnation is incompatible with self-acceptance, a point which will be developed below.

1.3 Evaluative Respect

Unlike generic respect, evaluative respect pertains to earned excellences. The distinctive features of this form of respect have been remarked by several philosophers:

*evaluative self-respect*...involves an appreciation of one's own earned worth, a positive appraisal of one's quality as a person in light of the standards given in one's self-ideal (Dillon 1992, 134).

It also plays an important role in the conceptions of psychologists and educators, and may accordingly be found in the writings of an influential authority in these fields - Coopersmith:

Self-evaluation...refers [in the present research] to a judgemental process in which the individual examines his performance, capacities and attributes according to his personal standards and values and arrives at a decision of his own worthiness (Coopersmith 1967, 7)

---

5 A similar characterisation may be found in Darwell (1977) and in Hudson (1980)
The distinguishing feature of evaluative forms of respect is the presence of standards or ideals. Unlike generic respect, it is not ours by right; rather, it must be earned through merit.

In keeping with the emphasis upon the impartial character of the forms of respect which are being considered in this section, I wish to emphasise particularly those features which such evaluative respect must possess if it is to meet the requirement for universal applicability.

To be properly impartial, such forms of respect must be subject to standards which are determinable independently of the subjective preferences of individuals, but which nonetheless apply to all equally. This requirement serves to restrict the applicability of such respect to those features of persons which may in principle be compared. It applies properly only to those performances or attributes which can be ranked and compared consistently along a common dimension.

The requirement for impartiality applies to attitudes as well as to behaviour towards self and others. This is an important point, which enables us to reconcile the requirements of self-acceptance (which arise from generic respect) with the self-criticism (or criticism of others) which is often demanded by impersonal standards of evaluation. For instance, it may, at a cursory glance, be thought that to develop evaluative respect, it is necessary to abandon the self-acceptance which is an essential requirement for the development of generic forms of respect. It may be supposed, in other words, that one cannot simultaneously accept oneself (qua person) and possess high standards, because, as a matter of fact, one must inevitably, at some time or another, fall short of such standards; and such shortcomings would appear to demand the forfeiture of self-acceptance. Since one cannot coherently hold standards and principles without admitting the possibility of such dissatisfaction; and since, moreover, self-dissatisfaction is an essential prelude to the development and change of the self, we would not want to construe 'self-acceptance' so strongly that it excludes such reasonable dissatisfaction with the self.
The resolution of this apparent dilemma lies in the central place of *impartiality* in the attitudes which characterise evaluative respect. Brandon makes a similar point:

Self-acceptance asks that we approach our experience with an attitude that makes the concepts of approval or disapproval irrelevant: the desire to see, to know, to be aware (Brandon 1987, 45).

Brandon emphasises, moreover, that it does not imply liking:

But remember: 'accepting' does not necessarily mean 'liking'; 'accepting' does not mean we cannot imagine or wish for changes or improvements. It means experiencing, without denial or avoidance, that a fact is a fact; in this case, it means accepting that the face and body in the mirror are your face and body, and that they are what they are (Brandon 1987, 46).

Self-acceptance should, moreover, be fully compatible with an ethical commitment to self-improvement, with the recognition that there are aspects of self which are able to be changed and whose change is to be desired. 'Self-acceptance' should not, accordingly, be construed in such a way as to exclude a commitment to self-improvement. That is, the recognition that one is 'acceptable' should not preclude a commitment to self-improvement:

Now, to be self-accepting does not mean to be without a desire to change, to improve, to evolve. The truth is that self-acceptance is a precondition of change. If we accept the fact of what we feel and what we are, at any given moment of our existence, we can permit ourselves to be aware fully of the nature of our choices and actions, and our development is not blocked (Brandon 1987, 46).

As we can see, the resolution of this apparent dilemma implies an assumption of impartiality which is so thoroughgoing that it affects internal attitudes as well as behaviour. In its internal aspect, it requires the adoption of an impartial attitude
towards oneself, a readiness to view oneself with detachment and freedom from emotional bias and preference; a readiness, in other words, to view oneself as one would view a third person. Impartiality presupposes the capacity to view self 'as it is', factually, while suspending the affective responses which accompany the application of evaluative predicates to self.

The requirement for impartiality, then, should extend beyond the governance of *behaviours*; it should govern also one's *internal attitudes* towards oneself. This is perhaps where such requirements become particularly demanding. Although it is often easy to accept and to allow for the failures of others to meet objective standards, it is often more difficult to accept oneself in a similar impartial spirit. This is perhaps why self-deception is so ubiquitous in this regard.

It is perhaps this difficulty in applying 'third-person' objectivity of perception to one's own failures that motivates those who propose the renunciation of objective standards *tout court*: one can judge oneself as would a third person where there exist no standards, for then anything goes. This would be an inadmissible concession to human weakness.

This is no trivial prescription. The ubiquitous tendency to self-deception in the face of failure to meet one's own standards attests to the psychological difficulty of this detachment. It is not always easy to adopt a purely factual and impartial attitude towards oneself, one which is perfectly first-person/third person symmetrical. We only need to consider the (well-documented) propensity on the part of many people to devalue the significance of another's intelligence (or any other such virtues which they particularly value) where it equals their own because they feel threatened and wish to maintain a 'superiority' over others (Hamachek 1978, 263). Motives such as

---

6 In effect the Rawlsian principle of justice, which consists in adopting a 'veil of ignorance', should be regarded as applicable to the sphere of internal attitudes just as it is to actions which aim to secure the equitable distribution of resources.

7 A full description of the various forms this self-deception may take may be found in Hamachek (1981, 258-266)
dominance and vanity more often than not impair efforts to maintain an impartial stance towards one's own virtues and/or shortcomings, but, nonetheless, this is just what self-acceptance demands. To free oneself of the undesired psychic discomforts which accompany negative information about oneself, one must also be prepared to renounce those things which make one's own virtues sweeter than those of another.

The admissible resolution of this apparent dilemma must then, be in the direction of further objectivity, in keeping with the impartial form of the evaluation.

What is not admissible, but which is nonetheless given credence by many, is a solution which 'goes subjective' as it were. To understand and appreciate more fully the significance of this point, let us now look at what may follow from the adoption of this alternative resolution - 'going subjective'.

**The 'Subjectivisors'**

It is often maintained, correctly, that self-acceptance is an essential good, and a necessary condition for the development of all other desirable self-attitudes (Rogers 1942; Coopersmith 1967; Ginnott 1972; Combs 1962). Although 'self-acceptance' is often ambiguously and variously construed, one element which is common to all accounts is this: self-acceptance entails the belief that one is adequate as one is, and should not need to change oneself in order to justify the suspension of negative self-judgements. The assumed trade-off occurs precisely where it is supposed that self-acceptance cannot occur alongside a serious commitment to self-betterment, a commitment which presupposes the existence of standards of excellence which can be set and determined objectively.

---

8 The inadmissible forms of self-acceptance may be based upon a 'double-standard'. For an illuminating description of the role of double-standards in self-deception, I recommend Wood’s (1973) paper "Honesty". It may also take the form of a renunciation of standards tout court. The latter is the form with which I shall primarily be concerned.
We find such a presupposition, for instance, in the 'should-avoidance' which is advocated in the writings of a popular educator who is often cited in manuals of instructional technique for enhancing self-esteem (Canfield and Wells 1976). In an exercise labelled "the tyranny of 'should'", Canfield and Wells (1976) give the following advice to teachers:

Many of the words your students used to describe 'bad' things about themselves [in a previous exercise] implied that they should or ought to be this or that. For example, some kids are apt to say "I'm ugly" or "I'm fat", or "I'm afraid". All these words imply that they should be the opposite: "I should be beautiful"; "I ought to be thin"; or "I should be brave"... Our mental health can be improved by understanding that 'should' and 'ought to', when applied indiscriminately to culturally induced values, are, in fact, prejudicial - because we believe in advance that we should look or behave in certain ways...

When you've discussed this idea with your class, have the students form small groups...[and] list as many examples as they can of things we should believe according to our culture. For example:
It is 'good' to work.
It is 'good' to own many things..
Blondes have more fun
If you are a man working in an office, you 'should' wear a tie.
Everyone 'ought' to be a good reader.

When the groups are done...[have] each individual write a page about his two 'bad' things in which he tells why it is damaging for him to continue to believe that he ought to (whatever his 'should' is) (Canfield and Wells 1976, 198).

This eschewal of objective standards is clearly evident in the emphasis on avoiding 'should'. Canfield and Wells are not alone in advocating the avoidance of objective standards. Such avoidance is recommended also by MacKay (1987), a qualified psychologist:
How does a person addicted to self-attack stop judging? It takes constant vigilance to stop the little voice that wants to say, "He's a jerk...she's lazy...he's corrupt...I'm selfish..." You have to find a way to quiet [that little voice]. The concept of abstinence is the key here...Nothing is worthy of judgment...judging...depends on the illusion that people are totally free to do as they wish. And when they make mistakes that bring pain to themselves or others, it can only be because they were too lazy or selfish to do the right thing (MacKay 1987, 215)

In these cases, a sacrifice of objective standards is demanded in the name of self-acceptance.

Apart from failing to distinguish those things which can be changed (body weight, ability to read) from those things which cannot be changed (eg being 'ugly'), such advice presupposes that the desire to improve upon oneself, and to act in ways which counter one's natural inclinations, is evidence of a lack of self-acceptance. In other words it tacitly communicates the message that one should avoid trying to improve or change oneself, because to do so is to show that one does not accept oneself. Since, moreover, 'self-acceptance' is given the status of a virtue by these authors, the message would be doubly powerful: to adopt attitudes which lead to a lack of self-acceptance is to default on one's responsibility to oneself. The authors are of course erroneously taking self-acceptance to be incompatible with self-betterment. This is no insignificant error, for it carries with it certain ethical implications.

To sacrifice standards (or to sacrifice the consistent application of standards by adjusting them, arbitrarily and at whim, to generate subjective well-being), is to foster heteronomous and cynical attitudes.

Firstly, such a sacrifice of standards produces a situation which is hostile to the development of autonomy; a situation in which cognitive dissonance rules; a situation in which, moreover, the apportioning of blame and/or praise occurs in random and
arbitrary ways. Rules are not being consistently applied. A rule or standard cannot be bent at whim (for instance, where it creates uncomfortable perceptions of self). To do so is to violate the very concept of a rule. This point was captured nicely by Kant, who argued with considerable cogency for the connection between consistent application of rules and autonomy. To create and live by one's own rules and standards is, Kant argued, the essence of autonomy, and, contrariwise, to change the rules to suit one's emotional shortcomings, or to create good feelings, is a form of heteronomy.

Secondly, the sacrifice of such standards promotes attitudes of cynical resignation. To get rid of 'shoulds' and 'oughts' is to cease to imagine a situation or a self which is better than that which exists at present. It is, in effect, to discourage idealism and imaginative vision in favour of brute realism. It may of course be argued that such realism is to be preferred to idealism. However, to do so would be implicitly to identify realism with resignation. 'Resignation', which is emphatically not to be confused with self-acceptance, may take either a 'defeatist' or a 'cynical' form. In its 'defeatist' form the perception of all of one's faults is accompanied by the attitude: "I can do nothing to remedy these faults so may as well not try", an attitude which is indiscriminate in its failure to even attempt to distinguish what can realistically be changed from what cannot realistically be changed. Defeatist resignation may, indeed, accompany considerable dissatisfaction with self, or lack of self-acceptance: "I do not accept what I am, but there's nothing I can do about it, so I have to live with this dissatisfaction forevermore". In its 'cynical' form, resignation eschews visions of 'the

---

9 The value judgements are also flagrantly hypocritical when set within the context of the educational system. There is considerable hypocrisy to be found in the act of disowning an aim - self-betterment - which is the very raison d'être of the educational system; and, moreover, doing so while continuing to work within an institutional structure which is founded upon principles of 'betterment': doing better, achieving more, etc.

10 This of course contravenes another condition which has been shown to be essential to the development of high self-esteem (Coopersmith 1967): to produce a cognitively manageable environment in which children can learn to trust in their own competency.
ideal’ and ‘the good’, visions of conditions which improve upon the existing state of affairs. Cynicism refuses to see beyond the brute facts ‘what is’. To fail to acknowledge that self-acceptance is fully compatible with an ethical commitment to self-betterment, with the recognition that there are aspects of self which are able to be changed and the change of which is to be desired, is to risk encouraging these unacceptable attitudes.

These implications of such ‘subjectivising’ are particularly instructive for my purposes, for they show what may happen if clear boundary is not maintained between those impersonal forms of respect which fall into the public domain, and which require standards that are objective and independent of subjective feelings; and those forms which are better conceived privately and which properly pertain to subjective and inward aspects of human individuality - the personal forms of respect with which I shall deal in Chapter 2.

1.4 Claims on Others: Character and Limits.

The attitudes associated with impersonal respect are those which we associate with rights, and hence with obligations, both to others or to the self. The imperative to exercise respect for self, for instance, implies an obligation to oneself in an employment situation may involve not allowing oneself to be discriminated against on the basis of morally irrelevant qualities (eg race, gender); or refusing to allow oneself to remain in a situation where one is being humiliated gratuitously; in other words, standing up for oneself. The right to self-respect implies an obligation to oneself - to ensure that one receives due regard as a moral agent, and as one whose interests possess equal weight to those of other moral agents. It is an obligation to ensure, in other words, that one’s right to be treated with respect as a moral agent is not disregarded. This implies a rejection of those forms of disrespect which involve treating one as of little account, or of lesser account than others where this judgement is made gratuitously, without dessert or justification.
Respect implies rights and obligations, and hence may be regarded as essentially a social concept. If one were, for instance, living in complete isolation, this concept would be irrelevant. From this essentially social reference of the notion of such respect, however, it should not be inferred that the responsibility for the maintenance of self-respect should be vested entirely in the reactions and responses of others to the self. It should not, in other words, be invoked to legitimise the grounding of self-respect in the respect of others.

The qualification "within reasonable limits of concern" must be written into the conception of such respect. Without being defeatist, the claims one makes upon others for respect need to be consistent with a realistic understanding of the limitations of others and of the imperfect society in which we live. The responses of humans are often unreliable and unpredictable, and, as such, do not constitute appropriate foundations for self-respect. To make self-respect conditional upon their responses is often to put its realization beyond one's control, for it would follow that self-respect would not be warranted in cases where one does not succeed, for reasons beyond one's control, in maintaining one's principles or one's dignity. It would follow, thus, that if an individual failed to ensure that she was not discriminated against gratuitously, she would not be justified in having self-respect. This would be tantamount to making self-respect something which must be earned by successes. This would imply that self-respect should be made contingent upon conditions which are beyond one's control; for instance, power structures and other entrenched structural features of society which obstruct one's interests.

To make such claims would be to ground self-respect in a way which would make it virtually impossible to consistently maintain such respect while upholding a respect for others. It would militate against the development of the attitude of respect for others which should be fully compatible with the exercise of respect for self. This is because it may create needless resentment, bitterness, and even a blinkered view of others, a view which narrowly focuses upon their function as givers of respect rather than as individuals in their own right. We need only consider the all-too-common case of the person who is always 'on the alert' for signs of exploitation or ill-treatment, while
disregarding altogether concerns with intent, motivation, and context (e.g., in distinguishing intended from unintended slight). This is an attitude in which concerns for one’s ‘right not to be exploited’ come to predominate to such an extent that the ‘afflicted’ individual lives his life on the basic premise ‘distrust all and sundry’, and ‘complain or resent bitterly whenever anyone (wittingly or not) treads upon one’s toes’.

This kind of attitude is to be deplored; firstly, because the pursuit of self-respect in such a case sacrifices the other, equally important, value of a respect for others; and secondly, because the individual who took on such a maxim would also be unduly prone to self-condemnation (for instance, those occasions where others take advantage of her because she let down her guard momentarily). Continual bitterness, resentment, guardedness, and self-rejection is not self-respect. Perhaps, though, the most significant reason why such an attitude of demand is to be deplored arises is that it precludes the adoption of those detached and impartial stances which are an essential correlative of impersonal forms of respect. Detachment enables the perspective to see where the demanding of respect from others is unfeasible and unrealistic. The exercise of detachment is integral to the pursuit of impersonal forms of respect, for self and for others (as will be argued more fully later).

It is the development of intrapersonal attitudes, then, which should be taken as primary. A realistic assessment of the pragmatic difficulties and obstacles which limit one’s control over others should make clear the limitations of a self-respect which makes excessive claims on others. Self-respect must be characterised primarily in terms of internal attitudes and motivations. To be concerned with self-respect is to possess a basic disposition to care about one’s rights and principles within limits, and to act in such a way as to preclude their violation by others. Trying - but not necessarily succeeding - is sufficient to justify self-respect in cases where success is debarred by conditions beyond one’s control. The motives count more than the consequences. This means that, in cases where it is inappropriate to act upon self-respecting principles, self-respect is characterisable only in internal terms. It may, for instance, take the form of internal resistance to humiliating treatment, of a refusal to internalise disrespectful treatment of self - a refusal, for instance, to infer from repeated, and
unavoidable, exposures to disrespectful behaviour towards the self that one deserves such treatment and is not worthy of respect.

The imperative to meet the claims of self-respect does not, then, demand that we do everything in our power to ensure that nobody ever exploits us, or treats us like a 'non-person'. Self-respect requires the development of certain internal, intrapersonal attitudes, and it is the presence of these which should be taken as the primary ground for self-respect. In its internal aspect, self-respect implies a refusal to subject oneself to gratuitous indignity or ill-treatment, and that one excludes from one's psychic life gratuitous feelings of guilt or self-condemnation. It is these intrapersonal attitudes which should be taken as the primary bases of self-respect.

According primacy to the internal, or intrapersonal, features of respect allows us to free such respect from the baggage of emotional need and demand which often accompanies the notion as it is popularly conceived in educational and psychological literature.

Finally, and importantly, it must be emphasised that such respect is properly regarded as impartial, which implies that it cannot be cultivated without simultaneously cultivating respect for others. To accept and respect oneself for one's own human dignity is to be bound at the same time to respect and accept others for the same reason. And, as in the case of efforts to gain respect from others, efforts to offer respect to others must also be informed by a realistic appreciation of the limits of realistic control. The moral requirement that respect be offered does bring with it a requirement to ensure the acceptance of such respect. This is because acceptance demands internal conditions in others which are beyond the control of the respect-giver.

---

11The significance of this point will become increasingly apparent later, as the discussion progresses.
I have argued in this chapter that there is a kind of respect which is properly regarded as impersonal, and hence is accountable to standards of impartiality, consistency, and coherence. The dictates of such impersonal respect embrace behaviour and internal attitude, both of which should be characterised by an impartial and consistent adherence to rules. Respect for self which partakes of this impersonal character should not be prejudiced by vanity or arrogance, nor by any such attitude which would serve to create affective responses which do not apply both to oneself and all others in equal measure, affective responses which are skewed towards the first person. It may of course be argued that such impartiality is very demanding. In reply to such an objection, it could be pointed out that the fact that self-acceptance is often such a rarity should be taken to suggest that there is considerable (internal) sacrifice to be made in obtaining it, and not that impartiality and consistency should be jettisoned in concession to human weakness.
CHAPTER 2
THE PERSONAL FORMS OF RESPECT

2.1 The Basic Features of Personal Respect

So far I have examined the impersonal forms of respect. There are also forms of respect which are best construed as essentially personal, and to which impartial standards do not appropriately apply. Personal forms of respect pertain to those aspects of self which are singular, individual, particular, and hence which, while possessing value in virtue of such singularity, cannot be compared by a common yardstick. The value of individuality looms large in the case of properly personal forms of self-regard.

Before explaining further the import of these personal forms of respect, we will look at passages within educational literature which imply the acknowledgement of such distinctively personal forms of regard or respect.

Consider the following passage:

Throughout the book we refer to 'accepting the students' responses without judgement' or maintaining a 'nonjudgmental attitude'. By this we mean that when a student shares an experience, a reaction, a feeling, a thought, or whatever, we must accept it as an expression of his reality...Owing to our unique set of past experiences we may have come to hold different values from our students...The same is true of our students. (Canfield and Wells 1976, 9-10)
There seems to be a natural and innate self-healing and self-actualising process that occurs when one truly accepts oneself and the world as it is. Whole systems of psychology and many Eastern religious faiths are based on this single premise. (Canfield and Wells 1976, 10)

The authors’ points are vitiated considerably by their propensity to lapse into total relativism. Nevertheless, the essential point is worth making. The point is that there are at least some aspects of self which should neither be accommodated to universal prescriptivism nor evaluated by impartial standards. And there is accordingly a form of respect, and of self-respect, which does not imply the valuing of generic worth or the adoption of impartial standards of excellence. It is a respect for the singular and individual, for those distinctive characteristics and qualities which pertain to each individual.

There is a strong and developed tradition which deals with the basic character of this respect. Hampshire (1989) characterises such respect as an ‘erotic attitude’, which characterises ‘sexual love...and...the varieties of friendship and of insight into the minds of other persons’. This erotic attitudes is characterised as

the desire to know an individual person...which becomes a desire to enter into another inner world, and to take possession for a time of another person's consciousness...The object of desire is the embodied soul of a singular person coming to the surface in an individual style of moving and standing and looking and talking. The imagination of the lover is set in motion by the particularities and distinguishing features of the person loved (Hampshire 1989, 125).

---

12 "We do not need to preach about better ways of being or moralise about how one should be...This way of thinking may seem foreign to you. It is easy to get attached to a set of absolute values, but we do not intend to preach to you about a better way." (Canfield and Wells 1976, 10)
Such respect is concerned with the person 'as a whole', rather than some particular aspect or function. Parts only gain their significance through their expression of this 'singular essence'. Kant also stresses this point:

"Amongst our inclinations there is one which is directed towards other human beings. They themselves, and not their work and services, are its Objects of enjoyment (Kant 1963, 162)."

To respect a person as an individual involves, then, an aesthetic attitude which is sensitive to the whole person. In the positive sense, it requires the cultivation of those dispositions which are associated with aesthetic appreciation; and from this, of course, flows the negative prescription: to eschew instrumentalism, to eschew those forms of regard or treatment which focus primarily or exclusively upon an individual's functions, his utility.

'Respect', in this case implies the appreciation of what is unique in an individual. This implies both understanding the nature of the object of respect and acting in accordance with that understanding. The respect for such uniqueness is emphatically not, however, to be understood as merely a cognitive exercise:

"Particularly when we come to deal with people (including ourselves) full respect will deal not just with the cognitive but with the imaginative, intuitive, evaluative and feeling aspects of (both the respecting and) the respected person (Farrell 1992, 3)."

As the notion of 'aesthetic attitude' will feature prominently in what follows, the task of delineating the essential features of this attitude is an important one, to which I will now turn. For this task I will focus upon the active and existential forms which such respect can take, and not upon the passive, reflexive, or disinterested forms. In justification of this preference for activity and involvement the following important considerations may be adduced: Respect must accord with the character of its object and its distinguishing features. Where those 'objects' are humans, as distinct from
inert works of art, that character is dynamic, creative and often unpredictable. Accordingly, a respect for the individual must be consonant with these very features - creativity, dynamism, unpredictability - which contribute to that individuality.

Proust’s theory of the self (described here by Hampshire) captures well the essential character of the attitude of respect for individuality in both self and others:

We should strive to extract and express the singular responses of our sensibility and of our unique perceptions. We know the responses to be an authentic disclosure of our own true nature when they are associated with an emotional force which cannot be explained by any reasonable calculation.

The only style that is in the long run interesting is a highly personal style, a revelation of a ...slanted vision which...lights up a dark face of reality from an unpredictable point of view...not the style... which is dominant at a particular period of history, burying the different individuals behind the common fashion. (Hampshire 1989, 128-129).

This prescription is coined in the language of 'the authentic' and 'the true', and hence may appear to assume a contentious essentialism. Of course, insofar as essentialism draws upon the notions of purity and of permanence, upon the idea of an enduring 'essential self' whose character exists prior to external influences, it may be claimed with justification to be objectionable. Such essentialism presumes, among other things, that the cultivation of this essential self requires the eschewal of 'contamination' by the influence of others or of the social environment.

Hampshire's notion of individual authenticity, need not imply, and is indeed distinct from, the forms of essentialism which many philosophers have with justification called into question. By 'essential' self, Hampshire means something rather different: 'the true self' implies those experiences and idiosyncrasies which distinguish one 'self', taken holistically, from another self. There is nothing in this to rule out the influence
of society. 'Individuality' implies, rather, a singular manner of synthesising these external influences:

Many of our dispositions and capacities seem to form themselves by...processes of holistic accumulation, whereby a person by stages in her development acquires a character and an everyday style, and a set of physiognomic and expressive properties, which are distinctive and, when fitted together seem to others peculiarly her own. This is not a surprising fact, given that her stored experiences form an immensely complex networking of interactive associations, a network that will not be duplicated in all its particularities in any other mind (Hampshire 1989, 123).

Individuality, then, refers not so much to the content, or what is assimilated from the environment, but rather the manner in which such material is synthesised. Respect for such individuality accordingly requires a sensitivity to 'the whole'. Moreover, as Hampshire has argued, a precondition for its development is the capacity to form, and dwell upon, memories.

Respect for individuality is in important respects third-person/first-person asymmetrical. The notions of appreciation and admiration, while appropriate for the third person, would, if translated into the language of first-person, strike one as repellent rather than admirable. The idea of regarding oneself in an aesthetic manner, strikes one as rather repellent, as a form of narcissism. The metaphor of mirror-gazing may be an apt one in this case. This repulsion exists for good reason. We cannot admire ourselves as we would others without sacrificing an essential aspect of our experience - that pure self-expression which results from unself-conscious participation in process. The first-person/third-person asymmetry arises from the fact that it is possible to appreciate and admire another person's individuality without interfering with her experience of herself; whereas it is not similarly possible to do so with oneself.

To understand respect for self reflexively or passively would be to do injustice to the normative dimensions of such self-attitudes. It would appear, then, that in the particular
case of the self-referring attitudes, the metaphors which may accompany the notion of aestheticism - metaphors which suggest reflection and contemplation of an object which stands outside oneself - break down. This only serves to bring out the limitations of a conception of aesthetic appreciation which underestimate the significance of the active and the existential.

As respect for self and respect for others are in many important ways different, I will deal with them separately, in two sections.

2.2 Personal Respect for the Self

The respect for self is inextricably tied to the active expression of the self rather than the reflexive contemplation of one's own personality. Moreover, respect for one's own individuality brings with it the responsibility to develop that individuality, rather than simply to admire and appreciate it as one would that of another person. We are responsible for our own individuality, while we cannot be made responsible for the individuality of others. As Buber puts the point:

Every single man is a new thing in the world and is called upon to fulfil his particularity in this world. (Buber, cited in Moustakas 1967, 27)

Lukes, in his illuminating conceptual analysis of the forms of individualism, identifies a Romantic form, which is to be differentiated from the rational, economic idea of the individual which pervades modern liberalism. It is concerned with 'qualitative (as opposed to numerical) uniqueness and individuality' (Lukes 1973, 67). It emphasises the value of innocence and diversity. Humboldt describes it as a

Condition...in which each individual...enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies, in his perfect individuality...according to the measure of his wants and instances, and restricted only by the limits of his powers and rights (Humboldt, cited in Lukes 1973, 68)
It is well-understood, both in common sense, and in the liberal tradition, that certain external conditions promote the development of individuality. Mill, for instance, argued that 'experiments in living' are an essential means to developing individuality; and that a precondition for unhampered experimentation is the absence of interference from society:

As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is useful that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks to try them (Mill [1859] 1972, 115).

'Absence of interference' may, of course, be couched in terms entirely of the external social conditions which enable freedom of action. Clearly, though, certain internal conditions must also be present if individuality is to flourish. For instance, to be capable and disposed to engage in 'experiments in living' one must possess those internal attitudes which are associated with the cultivation of the novel and the different.

So far two important values which are essential to a respect for one's own individuality have been identified. Firstly, there is the value of expression of one's own individuality (self-expression), and accordingly of the capacities which contribute to such self-expression; and secondly there is the value of the development of one's own individuality (self-development), and accordingly of the capacities which contribute to such development.

To express one's individuality through activity is to engage in such activity purely for the sake of the expression of self, and for no other reason. The important clause 'for no other reason' implies the (negative) imperative to avoid instrumentalism: to avoid, in other words, subordinating one's own individuality to a instrumental goal or plan. Instrumentalism of attitude is hostile to the values of self-expression. While clearly it is neither possible nor desirable to engage at all times in a non-instrumental manner,
the cultivation of individuality does require the suspension of instrumentalism at least some of the time.

The development of individuality requires the possession, in a least some degree, a spirit of experimentation, of openness to the novel. The notion of development, being normative, presupposes that a condition of stasis is undesirable, and whatever aids the growth of the self, and its increasing differentiation is to be desired. We find this aspect of individuality emphasised for instance, in Mill’s insistence on as much freedom as possible within the restrictions of the need to adjust to society and avoid harming others. Of crucial value to the development of full individuality is the idea of experimentalism, of being creatively open to the new, and of being open to change.

An important value associated with self-development, then, is that of change, of avoidance of stasis. While such openness does not entirely rule out premeditation or planning of one’s activity, it does constitute a presumption against that overemphasis upon rational planning which is characteristic of some philosophers’ characterisations of self-respect. It constitutes a presumption against the one-sided emphasis upon the virtues of rationality which we find, for instance, in Rawls, who characterises self-respect normatively:

We may define self-respect...as having two aspects. First of all, it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And, second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as is within one’s power, to fulfil one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot...take delight in their execution...

The conception of goodness as rationality allows us to characterise...the circumstances that support [self-respect. They include]...having a rational plan of life (italics mine) (Rawls 1971, 440).
It may be argued that this lopsided emphasis upon planning is objectionable precisely because it is hostile to the experimentation and openness to the novel which are integral to development of individuality. Development requires change. Change requires openness to the novel; and such openness is very difficult where one’s conceptions of the significance of one’s activity are set within the fixed boundaries of a predetermined plan. Farrell makes a similar point:

Although the surrounding world may change...our interests and desires for a rational Rawlsian, stay essentially fixed...The Aristotelian principle...if seen my way...leaves us open to the perpetual possibility, indeed actuality, of fundamental revision (Farrell 1992, 12).

This is not of course, to advocate complete aimlessness. That would be absurd. ‘Planning’ comes in degrees. The kind of planning which one must be capable of suspending at least some of the time is that kind which dictates a constant, exclusive and narrow focus on certain, rather limited aspects of one’s experience: those which are considered relevant to one’s plans. The focus is both narrow and unchanging and rigid. It is one in which ‘unified experience’ degenerates into ‘one-dimensional’ experience.

As well as an understanding of, and capacity to cope with, the external, material world, the development of autonomy requires the ability to cope with one’s internal world. Accounts of the significance and role of autonomy in the development of individuality may be (implicitly) skewed towards instrumental values, with the assumption that what counts for autonomy is the effectiveness of an agent’s efforts to secure functional goals. Where this is the case, the conception of autonomy may be skewed in favour of the rational and that which can be consciously planned, while being prejudiced against the attitudes and dispositions which are associated with play: spontaneity, and experimentalism. Such virtues cannot readily be accommodated within a scheme of values which places priority on temporal continuity - ‘coherent life plan’- because they require for their exercise a kind of temporal dissociation which by
the lights of such a scheme would be regarded as 'irrational', and hence to be deplored.

The Value and Relevance of the Concept of Play

Since values which are associated with play will be informing my critique, it would perhaps be desirable to look to the literature on this topic to find a fuller elaboration, and justification, of the relevant values as well as the associated dispositions and virtues of character.

The practices and principles I am concerned with here are perhaps best embodied in the concept of play. The cultivation of personal respect for self is not unlike the cultivation of those capacities and dispositions which we associate with the ability to play. Play, par excellence, embodies pure self-expression, the non-instrumental activity and spirit.

To value play is to value the virtues of disinterest, spontaneity, fun and experimentation; virtues which require for their full realisation the development (or perhaps, better, the preservation), of certain capacities: the capacity for disinterested activity, an absence of rigidity, openness to the novel, and above all the capacity to approach at least some of one's activities in a purely expressive manner - to be undertaken 'for their own sake'. Of great importance also is the spirit, the internal capacities and dispositions which characterise the subjective life of the player while he is engaging in play; as well as the longstanding dispositions, or virtues of character which must be cultivated in order to be capable of engaging fully in play activity and of realizing the important values which play enables.

The following explication will take the form of two sections, one in which I focus on the capacity for play, or the dispositions and internal attitudes which must be present before one can be said to be 'playing'; and another in which I focus on the context of play, or the conditions which are appropriate and conducive to the activity of play.
The Capacity for Play

Spontaneity

This implies a cluster of attitudes: absence of rigidity, a deliberate de-emphasising of rational planning in order to allow receptivity to that which is novel, experimentalism. In essence, though, spontaneity implies freedom from control. Such control may be externally imposed, as is the case where we are told that we must conform a prearranged format or plan. Or it may be internally imposed. It implies freedom from those things which we associate with a surfeit of conscious planning: rigidity, closure, lack of joy. The connection between spontaneity and creativity is a well-established one; and, accordingly, we would expect spontaneity to be essential to the creative aspects of self-development.

Process-Oriented Participation

To be process-oriented is to be capable of detaching one’s present activity from considerations of products, goals, which are extrinsic to that activity.

It may be objected that this point relies on an untenable distinction between intrinsic and instrumental motivations. Surely, it may be argued, it is possible to participate in the processes of one’s activity while simultaneously aiming towards an extrinsic goal. Witness the not too uncommon phenomenon of people who enjoy the work which they undertake in order to make money.

13 Many descriptions of such internal control through ‘management of feelings’ may be found in Hochschild’s book: The Managed Heart: Commercialisation of Human Feeling (Hochschild 1983).

14 This, of course, presupposes an empirical thesis about the nature of human psychological processes which enable creativity. It presupposes the existence of psychological processes which, while ‘irrational’, in the sense of being inaccessible through conscious planning, nonetheless possess their own meaning and order which is crucial for the exercise of at least some kinds of creative process; and, accordingly, the necessity to ‘submit’ to such processes in order to reap the full rewards of creativity.
To meet this and like objections, it is important to make clear at the outset that I am referring to subjective, or internal, attitudes rather than external conditions or circumstances. 'Participation in process' refers to the spirit in which activity is undertaken: a spirit of self-sufficient absorption in activity which allows the experience of a given activity to be fulfilling in its own right, even if such activity also brings extrinsic rewards.

To claim that the spirit is of essential importance, and the external circumstances of secondary importance is, not, however, to dismiss the significance of matters of context and of environment. Indeed a central argument in this discussion is that it is important to ensure as far as possible that the context is consonant with the character of the attitude (or 'spirit') which is to be cultivated. We turn, then to a consideration of context.

**The Context of Play**

**Seclusion**

An important, indeed essential, aspect of such activity is its temporal self-containment, or 'seclusion', whereby the context of play is 'framed off' from other aspects of one's life. The game takes place in a self-contained space of its own. (Huizinga [1949] 1970). Huizinga offers an apt characterisation of this aspect of play:

> We might call [play] a free activity standing quite consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not serious', but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity [which] proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space (Huizinga [1949] 1970, 32).

This aspect of play has been described by Gadamer:

> The movement which is play has no goal which brings it to an end; rather it renews itself in constant repetition. (Gadamer [1960] 1975, 93)
This need not imply that play must be undertaken without aims or goals. But what it does imply is that the relevant aims or goals are internal, rather than external, to the game.

Play is often associated with liberty and freedom. Such an association is far from arbitrary. Some very liberating attitudes are made possible by the seclusion of play - suspension of commitment, free and unencumbered experimentation with possibilities:

[We] say of someone that he plays with possibilities or plans. What we mean...[is that] he still has not committed himself to the possibilities as to serious aims. He still has the freedom to decide one way or the other...If someone, for the sake of enjoying his own freedom of decision, avoids making pressing decisions or play with possibilities that he is not seriously envisaging and which, therefore, offer no risk that he will choose them, and thereby limit himself, we say he is only 'playing with life' (Gadamer [1960] 1975, 95).

What we mean by 'suspension of commitment' in this case is not, of course, a failure to 'take seriously'. As many have pointed out (Huizinga [1949] 1970; Gadamer [1960] 1975; Lieberman 1977), a game can be taken very seriously. Indeed the whole spirit of some kinds of play would be lost if one were to play halfheartedly, and without taking seriously the rules: the 'risk' element, the tension, would then be lost. 'Lack of commitment', then, is not to be equated with lack of seriousness.

In promoting non-committal experimentalism, seclusion also promotes the openness to the novel which was earlier identified as important to the expression and development of individuality. The willingness to experiment and to be open to the novel is more likely to develop where risks are minimised; and risks are best minimised by containing the sphere in which such experimentation takes place, hence ensuring that they do not ramify, or penetrate into areas of one’s life where one can less afford to take risks. It is, of course, the self-contained character of the context of play which makes possible this suspension of commitment.
'Seclusion' may imply the drawing of distinct temporal boundaries between 'play time' and 'ordinary life time'. These boundaries mean that whatever happens in 'play' has no bearing on what happens outside, in 'ordinary life'. As another illustration of this, there are societies which make a sharp distinction between 'the sacred' and the 'profane': they set aside a period of festivities every year. The festivities are established in such a way as to exclude everything which is suggestive of 'profane' - ie 'ordinary workaday' - life.

However, while this temporal implication of 'seclusion' is a fairly straightforward one, easily understood by extension of the analogy of a 'game', such as chess or cricket (which is clearly set apart temporally from the context of ordinary activity), it is far too simple to be applied plausibly to the more complex forms of human activity and of commitment. The root concept, however, yields itself to more complex and subtle extensions. Indeed, the concept must be extendable in these ways if it is to apply to the more complex forms of human activity, where the boundaries between 'ordinary' and 'non-ordinary' can be drawn only ambiguously, or not at all. As I will be focusing on social relationships, it would be appropriate to explore one such complex extension of the concept, that which is implicit in the idea of personal disguise, or anonymity.

Disguise is, it seems, a rather different, and non-temporal, way of reinforcing the boundaries between play and non-play. The role of disguise in play is often evident. In its cruder forms it involves various kinds of 'masking' and 'dressing up' to reinforce the distance from ordinary identity. But whether crude or sophisticated, the important function of disguise is that of making possible the suspension of 'ordinary' identity through anonymity.
The Importance of Anonymity.

The principle of seclusion may be expressed through personal anonymity. As the importance of such anonymity will be stressed constantly throughout the following discussion, it would perhaps be a good idea to look more closely at its importance and significance for the expression and development of individuality.

It may, on the face of it, sound rather paradoxical to maintain that personal anonymity, such as that which is afforded by 'masking' or disguise, will aid self-expression. The benefits which anonymity affords would appear to result from the effacement rather than the expression of the self. The apparent paradox disappears when it is seen that it hinges upon the assumption that 'the self' is defined entirely by its personal history, autobiography, and ongoing personal projects. All of these facets of 'identity' are denied in conditions of anonymity, which serve effectively to sever one's present expressions from these history-bound features of identity. The 'self' which is effaced through anonymity, then, is the self of the past, the self or identity of personal history.

A self severed from its history is not, however, a self severed from its expressiveness. The kind of expressiveness which is available to the anonymous person is akin to the kind of self-expression that actors have access to, and which is enabled by their capacity and readiness to disengage the self of daily life from the personae which are expressed through their acting. Actors often report a sense of liberating expressiveness through their acting, an expressiveness which, while issuing from themselves, is nonetheless 'self'-effacing. Indeed an important condition for the dramatic expression of actors is the fact that they are 'framed off': the actor is not expected or required to carry her dramatic self-expressions over into everyday life.

As the phenomenology of 'drama' is crucial to my case for the value of anonymity in the development of individuality, I will now turn to a closer look at this phenomenology.
On the face of it, the advocacy of those values which we associate with dramatic acting may seem to be one which buys into a rather dubious set of value-judgements. Surely, it may be supposed, the actor is purely and simply a dissimulator, one who goes 'in disguise' while expressing nothing of himself. It may be thought, in consequence, that to value acting is also to value deception, even insincerity. As deception and insincerity are not desirable dispositions in everyday social life, it is not desirable to encourage play acting. To encourage this is to put too high a price on the cultivation of non-committal experimentation.

Such an objection would be apposite in cases where the 'act' involves motives of shame and consequent self-rejection (henceforth to be referred to as 'shameful acting'). This form of acting, born of shame, is essentially duplicitous. It is the 'act' that an individual puts on because he fears exposure of his real motivations and concerns, or fear that his audience will not like him 'as he is', even if 'as he is' is acceptable and good, but just doesn't happen to 'fit in' with the preferences of his audience. Such duplicitous acting is described aptly by Park:

Being actors, we are consciously or unconsciously seeking recognition, and failure to win it is...a depressing...experience. This is one of the reasons why we all eventually conform to the accepted models...In our efforts to conform, we restrain our immediate and spontaneous impulses, and act, not as we are impelled to act, but rather as seems appropriate and proper to the occasion. Under these circumstances our...conventional and proper behaviour, assumes the character of a mask(Park 1927, 738-39).

This form of acting is essentially one of dissimulation, involving rejection of one's real motivations or concerns. It is with justification regarded as hostile to the exercise of personal integrity.

The form of acting which I wish to commend (henceforth, for convenience, 'expressive acting') does not involve motives of shame and self-rejection. The phenomenological character of such expressive acting is distinct from, and rather more complex than, the
phenomenological character of shameful acting. Shameful acting involves 'disowning'. Expressive acting involves 'not owning'. 'Disowning' implies a categorical negative judgement: "This does not apply to me". 'Not owning', by contrast, implies a suspension of commitment: "This may or may not be worth taking on board, but I will keep my mind open until further evidence comes in". Such acting is characterised, above all, by a suspension of the question of ownership. It manifests clearly through the activity of 'dressing up' in which children often engage:

Children’s delight in dressing up…does not seek to be a hiding of themselves, a pretence, in order to be discovered and recognised behind it but, on the contrary, a representation of such a kind that only what is represented exists. The child…intends that what he represents should exist (Gadamer [1960] 1975, 102)

It is this form of acting, then, which is made possible by conditions of anonymity. The condition of anonymity is thus one in which it is permissible to leave open the option of not incorporating some aspect of 'self' into one's ongoing and permanent sense of identity. The seclusion which impersonal anonymity preserves is one which enables an individual to take leave, at least temporarily, of his personal history; to suspend the item from a context which would mark it out definitively as 'belonging to the self.'

An important implication of this line of argument, and one which will be repeatedly emphasised, is that highly personalised contexts are not always appropriate for fostering individuality. An impersonal context allows individuals to avail themselves of the option of 'not owning'. It leaves open the option of not incorporating aspects of one's behaviour into one's ongoing and permanent sense of identity, for the important reason that others cannot so readily compel such incorporation. Such a context allows people to maintain a distance between 'the present' and 'the past' which is much more difficult in a personal context where one may be constantly exposed to reminders of one's personal history by others who are acquainted with that history. Among strangers, there is little risk of being 'made accountable' to one's behaviour, of being pressured
to take a definitive stand and uphold it on a continuing basis. This 'out' is not so readily available, if at all, in a highly personal context.

Anonymity, then, makes possible the adoption of non-committal stances which involve detachment from identity concerns. As value and significance of this non-committal stance will be repeatedly emphasised and defended throughout, and in particular in the section on privacy, I expect that the importance of anonymity will become increasingly apparent as the discussion progresses.

So far I have been concerned primarily with the self-regarding implications of the values of respect and development of individuality. To 'complete the equation', I will now move to a consideration of the other-regarding implications of such respect.

2.3 Personal Respect for Other Selves

Unlike the self-regarding forms of personal respect, the exercise of respect for the individuality of others does not bring with it the responsibility to develop such individuality. The relevant virtues instead are those we associate with the moral character of friendship, and of those virtues of character which enable the formation of worthwhile friendships.

Where emphasis is placed upon the virtue of friendships, and the intrinsic value of one's relationship with another, it is appropriate to cultivate such values as mutual respect among equals, the sharing of experiences, like-mindedness, sympathy, sincerity, spontaneity of response; and, most importantly, the enjoyment of the other's presence for its own sake.

The notion of friendship has received extensive and intensive treatment by philosophers both ancient and contemporary. Although philosophers may disagree on the particulars, we find a general consensus about the fundamentals: friendship implies sympathy, and is based upon shared interests or values.
Now friendship is just this and nothing else: complete sympathy in all matters of importance, plus goodwill and affection (italics mine) (Cicero, in Pakaluk 1991, 87).

Affection implies of course an affective disposition or capacity to like the other person, but the presence of such liking is not in itself sufficient for friendship. As Lewis pointed out, we may develop affections for many people purely on the basis of propinquity. In this way we come to like our neighbours or the people we live with. Affection is necessary for friendship; but friendship requires more than the capacity to be pleasantly affected by another. It requires also an element of respect which is based upon a sensitivity to the particular.

Thus, although the capacity to form affections is an essential one, we would regard with justifiable suspicion the individual who formed affections indiscriminately, without regard to the particular character of the object of those affections. Such indiscriminant affection would presuppose a social universe in which all are to be regarded as equally significant, and in which all alike are to be regarded as prospective friends. It would ignore the distinction between 'the casual' and 'the intimate' which underlies our conception of the importance of privacy in human relationships. In doing so it would effectively disregard a virtue which most would deem an essential part of one's emotional and affiliative life - that of being able to select and discriminate and to choose companions who command respect, not for their generic personhood, but for those idiosyncratic and peculiar features which constitute their distinctive individual character. It is this feature - respect for the particular - which sets 'friendship' apart from other forms of affectional bonding.

It is the presence of respect for the particular which distinguishes friendship from the Christian ideal of agape. A person who loves all, equally and indiscriminately, might be the perfect Christian, but her attitude would not be one of friendship. As Friedman points out, in her analysis of the moral dimensions of 'friendship', a regard for the particular is essential to friendship. The respect involved in friendship is sensitive to
the personal qualities of the other, qualities which may be shared by some, but which are certainly not shared by everyone:

commitment to a person, such as a friend, takes as its primary focus the needs, wants, attitudes, judgments, behaviour, and overall way of being of a particular person. It is specific to that person and not generalisable to others. It acknowledges the uniqueness of the friend, and can be said to honour or celebrate that uniqueness...We show partiality for our friend by attending selectively to her needs (Friedman 1989, 4).

The kind of respect which we give to friends is not that kind of respect to which deontologists subscribe, and which is supposedly due to all on the basis of their humanness. Rather it is

the sort of respect involved when someone is admired for her worthwhile qualities, her excellences. Respect in this sense is not owed to all persons and is usually something which must be earned (Friedman 1989, 5).

An important point which Friedman does not make is that the determination of what constitutes a 'valuable friend' depends as much upon the character of the individual who values as it does upon the character of the individual who is valued. What is admirable to one person may not be admirable to another. Our valuing of a friend’s character is to a large extent contingent upon our own character and personal qualities. Thus, not only do the individual and particular qualities of the object of affection count at the 'receiving end', but they also count at the 'giving end'. To that extent it must be subjective.

The concern with and interest in the character of another person which informs respect for a friend is distinct from (although it may exist alongside) those impersonal forms of respect which were identified in the section on impersonal respect. Standards of comparison, and universal criteria of judgement are not relevant to personal respect for another, because such respect involves a concern with individuality which takes an
essentially non-comparative form. Insofar as judgements of value are made, these pertain to 'the whole' person, rather than to his attributes and functions. Whatever virtue inheres in the 'parts' or aspects - intelligence, beauty, etc - is appreciated in relation to 'the whole person' rather than taken in abstraction and evaluated relative to that of another. Where distinct attributes are valued, it is only in relation to their contribution to 'the whole'. A friend’s intelligence, for instance, is valued not as a generic quality, which is commensurable with similar qualities in others, but rather because it is a particular 'brand' of intelligence, informed by her singular personality.

Friendship, then, requires sensitivity to the whole. We shall now look more closely at what such sensitivity involves.

Sensitivity to the Whole

Sensitivity to the whole is an aesthetic sense which cannot properly be said to involve evaluative comparisons. Moreover, the form of valuing is very unlike the impartial and rule-governed form which characterises impersonal forms of respect. The latter requires analytical process of dissection, and comparison by fixed and impartial standards. It would involve, for instance, taking an individual’s 'beauty' in abstraction from the individual and the comparing it with the beauty of another.

Buber’s description of the attitude of love captures the character of such holistic sensibilities well:

In the eyes of him who takes his stand in love, and gazes out of it, men are cut free from their entanglements in bustling activity. Good people and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and ugly, become successively real to him; that is, set free they step forth in their singleness...In a wonderful way...exclusiveness arises - and so can be effective, helping, healing, educating, raising up, saving. (Buber [1937] 1987, 29)
Such an attitude could in principle be developed in a world in which there was only one other person, and hence no means of deriving a measure of comparison. The non-comparative character of such appreciation means that it is not consonant with the adoption of instrumental or functional perspectives. Buber again:

As soon as the relation has been worked out or has been permeated with a means, the Thou becomes an object among objects - perhaps the chief, but still one of them, fixed in its size and its limits... The human being who was... single and unconditioned... has now become a He or a She, a sum of qualities, a given quantity with a certain shape (Buber [1937] 1987, 31).

This incompatibility arises from the fact that holistic forms of respect are essentially non-comparative, while instrumentalism is accompanied by comparative forms of evaluation: to determine how 'good' someone is in his performance of a particular function, it is necessary to compare that performance with standards of performance, to adopt comparative standards of excellence (Nozick 1980, 239-246).

It could be objected that to encourage non-comparative forms of respect is to encourage the very lack of discrimination which was earlier repudiated. At first glance, in other words, it may appear that a principle of judgement which does not compare is one in which the values of discrimination and judgment can have no place. Such an objection would, however, be based upon a failure to make the appropriate conceptual distinctions. The salient conceptual distinction, in this case, is between the principles of discrimination which may be called 'internal' and those which may be called 'external'. To provide a rather crude illustration of this distinction:

A sunset contains many subtle and variegated hues. X fails to distinguish those hues, perceiving the sunset as an undifferentiated 'reddishness'. Y perceives the fine detail; but her appreciation (or valuing) 'frames off' this particular sunset from others: the sunset is valued in virtue of its self-contained internal character, an appreciation which does not involve comparison with previous sunsets. (Internal discrimination.) Z, like X, perceives only the 'reddishness', but he nonetheless values the sunset highly, and
his high valuation is based upon the belief that this particular 'reddishness' is far superior to the reddishness which he has observed in other sunsets. (External discrimination.)

From this example, it is apparent that 'discrimination' may take either an internal or an external form. External discrimination involves comparison and measuring. It is that form of discrimination which yields, for instance, the Platonic conception of forms, or of universal prototypes or ideals. Internal discrimination, on the other hand, considers the values of the parts in terms only of their contribution to the singular whole. Take another case - that of the valuation of the personality feature of 'bluntness'. The external discriminator, the impersonal evaluator, would make a universal judgement such as the following: "Bluntness is good/bad"; compare degrees of bluntness; and evaluate the person's attribute of bluntness as (relatively) good or bad on this basis. The internal discriminator, however, would get an overall 'feel' for the personality in and though which such bluntness is expressed, using such criteria as harmony, and balance. Bluntness 'sits better' on some people than on others. In some bluntness becomes stridency, whereas in others it may come across as a refreshing directness: the direct approach just seems to 'fit'. It requires internal discrimination, however, to make such judgements; it requires sensitivity to the whole personality.

As can be seen, there is a large and important role for the exercise of judgment in the erotic. A concern with the personal should not imply the absence of standards tout court; but rather the absence of common measures and rules. The criteria exist - they involve such concepts as harmony, balance, proportion\(^\text{15}\).

\(^{15}\) Talk of 'harmony' and 'balance' may misleadingly be taken to imply something like the norm which Aristotle expressed - "moderation in all things". This is, however, far from what I mean: A genius may spend 20 hours of the day working, while swinging daily from the heights of elation to the depths of despair. They 'fit' this person's overall personality.
I have established, then, the importance of one disposition, or virtue of character to the
development of personal respect for others: a disposition which involves the possession
and exercise of holistic sensibilities.

Instrumental attitudes or contexts are, as has been shown, hostile to the exercise of
such sensibilities. Such conclusions suggest strongly that wherever individuality is
valued or cultivated, the values which we associate with non-instrumentalism must also
be cultivated.

This holds, as I have shown, with regard to the self - the expression and development
of one's own individuality. It also holds with regard to one's respect for the
individuality of others. The ability for unself-conscious participation in process is as
necessary for the appreciation of the individuality of others as it is for the expression
and development of one's own individuality, as I shall below. We shall look, then,
more closely at the implications of these non-instrumental attitudes as they apply to
other-regarding attitudes.

The Non-Instrumental Attitudes and Respect for Others

Process-Oriented Participation

Friendship can be distinguished on normative grounds from those relationships entered
for more prudential, or self-interested reasons. The big difference, to put it simply,
is that we value a friend, at least some of the time, for who she is rather than for what
she can do for us. If a relationship is to qualify as friendship proper, it is important
that we value the friend for her own sake and not purely for the sake of the self-
interested benefits which may ensue from the association 16. A friendship is to be
enjoyed for its own sake rather than endured for the sake of something else which is

---

16 The claim that there should exist forms of friendship which are not formed for
the sole purpose of furthering self-interested goals is, of course, an old one. Aristotle,
for instance, discussed this issue extensively in Chapter 10 of his Nicomachean Ethics
(Books VIII and IX, in Pakaluk 1981, 28-69)
deemed more valuable. To be capable of this form of concern for another is to be capable of valuing her in ways which do not involve concern with one’s own interests or needs. Such concern, is, moreover, of an essentially subjective, or internal, character. Its value is not exhausted by those *behaviours* or actions which may be designated 'caring': behaviours, such as that of 'standing by somebody through thick and thin', being prepared to support them when they are not particular 'well-disposed', and so forth. A person may adopt behaviours of commitment, loyalty, and such like, yet completely lack the spirit of friendship. She may behave loyally, for instance, in order to prove to herself that she is a 'loyal' person; yet in the very act of proving herself in this manner, she may 'forget' the particular person whom she is supporting in this manner. She may hence effectively regard her 'friends' as substitutable instruments for the expression of her emotional need to demonstrate care-giving propensities.

A person who was 'cared for' in(46,472),(985,561) this dutiful spirit would not, intuition suggests, find this form of 'caring' satisfying. It would lack a certain 'spirit', which can only be translated in subjective terms:

> The posture of noticing is a central constitutive element in the great human goods of friendship, love and community. As such it is intrinsically valuable. Both the rightness of expressive action as such and (at least part of) the special moral worth of kindness itself are grounded in the intrinsic value of that trait (Y Trianosky 1992, unpublished manuscript).*17

Such concern requires a quality of subjective participation, a capacity to be emotionally engaged in, to 'be involved in', the processes of interaction. It implies concern with

---

*17*For an extended argument against a narrowly utilitarian interpretation of the concept and value of 'concern for others', refer to Blum's (1973) paper "Deceiving, hurting and using". Blum's central argument is that the moral objectionability of 'using others' cannot be explained in terms of the 'hurt' or pain which may be inflicted upon others through such use. Hence it cannot be accommodated within a utilitarianism which maintains that "what really counts is people's happiness, pleasure, avoidance of pain or hurt" (Blum 1973, 56)
the other 'for his own sake' or 'in his own right'. Of course 'for his own sake' carries the clear, though tacit, clause: 'and not for the sake of self or the needs of the self'.

As we know, concern with self often masquerades as 'concern with the other for his own sake'. Self-interest at the expense of the other can take obvious forms, such as economic exploitation and emotional blackmail. But it can also take more subtle forms. It can be conjoined with any number of apparently selfless behaviours. An emotionally demanding individual may, for instance, do many things to obtain the affection of the other, some ostensibly virtuous and self-sacrificing. A common case is that of the person who always wants to 'help' and inspires universal resentment. In one of these more subtle forms, self-concern can manifest as a desire to 'prove oneself to oneself' by means of another person. (It is this form of self-concern which some educators are liable to promote, as I shall show later.)

To illustrate this point, we may contrast a self-absorbed and a non-self-absorbed form of sexual attraction. It has been argued that a woman's experience of sexual desire differs in very important ways from that of a man. This is because (so it is maintained) the socially acceptable passive role of women forces them to rely, in a passive manner, on their 'drawing power' to obtain sexual (or romantic) gratification. As a consequence, a woman's attitude towards the other whom she wishes to attract must contain an ingredient of reflexive self-concern, or concern with her own appearance or impression upon them. Orbach puts the point well:

[The] emphasis on presentation as the central aspect of a woman's existence makes her extremely self-conscious. It demands that she occupy herself with a self-image that others will find pleasing and attractive...She must observe and evaluate herself, scrutinizing every detail of herself as though she were an outside judge...She is brought up to marry by "catching" a man with her good looks and pleasing manner (Orbach [1978] 1979, 20).

In contrast, men (so it is argued) have a very different experience of erotic love. As Berger puts the point:
Men *act* and women *appear*. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and women but also the relations of women to themselves (Berger, cited in Orbach [1978] 1979, 20)

As a consequence of this 'acting orientation' in men, affection may be more readily directly deployed without the requirement of reflexive concern with one's own impression. It thus has a direct, spontaneous quality, wherein focus is on the character of the object of such affections, and not upon the character or appearance of the self. Men are free to concern themselves directly with how the object of their desire appears to them, rather than how they appear to the object. Women on the other hand, are conditioned or expected to attract by means of their appearance.

This description of the supposed condition of women serves to illustrate a point of more general significance - viz., the existence of forms of affection which are bound integrally with reflexive self-concern. Such 'affection' is characterised by the absence of direct, spontaneous 'connection' with its object; and its substitution by a concern with one's own performance or appearance.

Such self-concern militates against the spirit of friendship because it precludes spontaneity. Spontaneity, as I argued earlier, is an important element in the cultivation of those forms of creativity which are necessary to the development of one's own individuality. Nonetheless the other-regarding value of spontaneity could be questioned. To value spontaneity is to value effortlessness and planlessness, among other things; and it could be queried: Why should there be some special virtue in not planning one's interactions with another? Surely, it could be argued, planning requires effort, and effort is a measure of how important or valuable one regards the object upon which one lavishes one's labour.

My reply to such an objection consists in the observation that spontaneity is a precondition for the realisation of important goods. Such goods cannot be directly cultivated; rather, their cultivation requires a kind of 'planlessness', and absence of
Elster (1983) describes many cases in which a desirable subjective state, such as that of happiness or of 'naturalness', may only be obtained indirectly, often by the unself-conscious pursuit of activities in which one becomes wholly absorbed. Indeed, to introduce an element of reflexive self-examination is often to preclude the development of the desired state, perhaps by introducing a detachment which is incompatible with the participation in process which is required in these cases.

This is particularly true of important subjective states, or affections, which cannot be cultivated directly, but, if desired, must be courted indirectly. It is not possible, for instance, directly to invoke in oneself a liking for another person, however much one may desire to. There are certain features of our affections or emotions which prevent their being amenable to such direct self-control. 'Liking', like other affections, implies spontaneity. People cannot be commanded to 'like one another', for instance. There are certain (empirical) features of our affect which render ineffective the direct exertion of force.

This is of course quite clear where the compulsion is external. To put two or more people together and command them to 'like one another' just would not work. The most that one could hope to achieve through such commands would be a display of affection, a 'going through the motions'. Clearly, however, the internal, subjective aspects of affect cannot be relied upon to flow from 'acts' (although, granted, this may sometimes happen). This holds even more so with regard to purely internal efforts at self-control. It is pragmatically impossible to exert control directly over how one feels about another - for instance to replace indifference with love. (This does not, however, preclude the possibility of indirect control, whereby such states occur as essential by-products of one’s other activities.)

The Importance of Shared Interests

It is this pragmatic requirement for spontaneity which underlies the well-understood, and highly significant, fact that friendships arise and are most successful, in the context of shared interests. This is, of course, an empirical truth about how friendships in fact
arise and function rather than a conceptual truth about the nature or value of 'friendship'.

It is a fact which apparently has a direct bearing upon that property of our affections which dictates indirect cultivation of such affections. The affections involved in friendship are best cultivated, it seems, where there is mediation by a third factor, common interest or commitment. It is thus a well-known fact that affections arise organically from participation in such interests; that, although friends appreciate each other 'for their own sake' (in a quasi-aesthetic manner), such appreciation rarely arises 'in vacuo'.

It is this feature of friendship which renders strategies of direct aiming pragmatically self-defeating. As Lewis puts it:

> Those pathetic people who simply 'want friends' can never make any [because] the very condition of having friends is that we should want something else besides friends...There would be nothing for the Friendship to be about; and friendship must be about something, even if it were only an enthusiasm for dominoes or white mice. (Lewis, 1974, 63)

Buber also makes some relevant points during the course of a penetrating analysis of the misguided efforts of institutions to generate that communal spirit in the absence of shared commitment:

> [The claim is that] the...community [of love] will arise when people, out of free, abundant feeling, approach and wish to live with one another. But this is not so. The true community does not arise through peoples having feelings for one another (though indeed not without it), but through first, their taking a stand in living mutual relations with a living Centre and, second, their being in living mutual relation with one another...Living mutual relation includes feelings but does not originate with them. The community is built up out of
living mutual relation, but the builder is the living effective Centre (italics mine) (Buber [1937] 1987, 65).

This requirement for shared interest or commitment implies at least some measure of exclusion in one's choice of friends. Exclusiveness may not be part of the concept of friendship. We can imagine a 'perfect world' in which everybody respects and likes everybody else. Nonetheless, in the world in which we live this is such an unlikely possibility that, for all intents and purposes, we should regard exclusion as a requirement for friendship. In this world, where all alike do not share our interests or values, the act of choosing as friends those who share our values or interests, is at one and the same time an act of exclusion. As Lewis put it:

Friendship arises...when two or more...companions discover that they have in common some insight or interest or even taste which the others do not share...

(Lewis, 1974, 62)

Or as Fried put it:

To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each other.... [I]ntimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone (Fried 1984, 211).

The self which a friend admires is not a self taken in abstraction from the context in which she finds meaning. Respect for the individuality of others, like respect for one's own individuality, must also include respect for those things which contribute to that individuality: the interests, activities and values through which she expresses her self.

Spontaneity is, it would seem, better cultivated by the absence, rather than the presence of intervention. And, as spontaneity has loomed particularly large in the whole of this chapter on personal forms of respect, I would like to devote the concluding sections
to a fuller elaboration of that which must be avoided if those goods which require spontaneity are to be successfully cultivated.

2.4 Constraints

Negative Implications: What is to be Discouraged

*Reflexive Self-Concern: 'Self-Absorption'.*

I have been suggesting throughout this section on personal forms of respect that self-absorption is to be avoided. In essence, it is hostile to that process-oriented participation which is essential to the respect for individuality, whether in self or in others. From an other-regarding perspective, such self-absorption precludes the development of the affections which are appropriate to the attitude of respect for another’s individuality. And from a self-regarding perspective, it is hostile to that spirit of play which is essential to the expression and development of one’s own individuality.

In accordance with these strictures against self-absorption, it may be maintained that those educational or psychological practices which discourage participation in process, or which discourage the development of those dispositions which enable such participation, will be counterproductive in regard to the development a respect for individuality.

To describe some of the important dispositions which contribute to self-absorption:

*Excesses of Emotional and Social Demand*

The exercise of respect for individuality presupposes freedom from need. A person who is busy meeting his or her basic material or emotional needs all of the time will hardly be capable of engaging in her activities in a way which is free from concern with gain. Similarly she will, of necessity, view others in light of what they can do
to satisfy those needs. A starving person who meets a rich person is likely to respect him only as a supplier of food or money. He is far less likely to respect the rich person as an individual in his own right than is an individual who is well provided for and not driven by desperation. 

Personal inadequacy and the desire to 'prove oneself' are not good reasons for forming friendships. Not only are such motivations morally repellent but, moreover, they just do not work in producing high quality friendships. An individual who is always 'bound' by her own needs, and who seeks out friendships because they satisfy those needs, is not likely to see beyond the person 'qua satisfier of needs', or to be able to appreciate the individual for who she is in her own right. The person who is forever under the sway of emotional or material needs is, in virtue of such neediness, unlikely to be able to respect others in their own right, or to be able to regard them as individuals in their own right, except insofar as they can satisfy her demands. Cicero put the point well: 

If anyone thinks that this [friendship] is to be attributed to a mere sense of inadequacy - that it exists solely to provide men with assistance in the achieving of their ambitions - he surely leaves friendship with a very humble beginning.....He wants it to be the child of insufficiency and poverty! If this were so, the less confidence a man had in himself, the better suited he would be for friendship - but this is far from the truth.

For the more confidence a man has in himself, the more he finds himself so fortified by virtue and wisdom, that he is completely self-sufficient and believes that his destiny is in his own hands, so much the better will he be both at making and at keeping friends. ...Did [my friend] have some 'need' of me? Of course not, nor I of him. .....To be sure many great advantages came from our

---

18 A person who took seriously the following advice, for instance: "[Your emotional needs are]...to love and be loved, to have companionship, to feel that you are respected, and to respect others..."(MacKay 1987, 160)
association, but it was not in expectation of these that we first began to feel drawn to each other. (p91)

... And it is far from the truth to say that friendship is sought because of our poverty and weakness. This is proven by the fact that those very individuals who have wealth and power, and, being endowed with virtue...have least need of other men who are the most generous and kindhearted among us (p99) (Cicero, in Pakuluk 1991).

Cicero’s talk of wealth and power perhaps overemphasises the material and economic dimensions of need at the expense of the psychological and emotional dimensions of such need. Cicero’s essential point, though, concerns the spirit in which friendships should be sought: a spirit which precludes the conscious and direct seeking of self-interested benefits. Although such benefits may arise from the relationship, such benefits are to be regarded solely as by-products of a friendship which is valuable in its own right, irrespective of whether such benefits exist.

An essential concomitant of process-oriented participation is, then, the cultivation of those dispositions which may be associated with the development of emotional self-sufficiency.

Self-sufficiency may be either material or emotional. In keeping with the overall theme of this discussion, with its emphasis upon the internal and subjective dimensions of experience, the social and emotional expressions of self-sufficiency will receive particular attention. Accordingly, I will emphasise the subjective constructions and interpretations which individuals may use to bind themselves or free themselves from need. The significance of such subjectivity may be illustrated by the following case. Suppose two individuals live in identical material and social situations. Their objective needs are being met equally well. Nonetheless, these two individuals place radically different subjective interpretations on these identical conditions. X believes that he is deprived, and hence always approaches prospective friends with a spirit similar to that of a starving individual in the presence of potential food-providers. Y, on the other
hand, is perfectly happy with the conditions in which he lives. The difference between these two is one of subjective construction\textsuperscript{19}.

It may be asked how an individual would find himself motivated to form friendships if he were emotionally self-sufficient. In reply, it is important to distinguish between two classes of motivation. On the one hand, there are those negative forms of motivation which involve a sense of 'lack', of insufficiency, of 'being incomplete'. On the other hand, there are those positive forms of motivation aimed at qualitative enhancement of that which is in itself good. The motive in this case is to make the good better, rather than, as in the case of negative motivation, to redeem that which is unsatisfactory in its own right (saviour-seeking). An emotional life which is 'good' in its own right can be made 'better' by adding friendships. This puts friendship clearly within the realm of choice rather than compulsion.

It is only in the absence of 'need' that one can develop the discriminating sensibilities associated with friendship. And this brings me to another important requirement: that of social exclusion: the requirement that on approach one's potential friends with some measure of discrimination.

\textit{Indiscriminateness}

There would indeed be something rather odd about an individual who classified as 'friends' individuals whom she did not respect, whose personal qualities she found unappealing. Such a person may be motivated by agape, or at the opposite extreme, by neurotic emotional neediness. But one thing she would not be motivated by is the spirit of friendship. Indeed, it has often been remarked that the propensity to treat all as equally significant, and to exercise no discrimination, shows signs of emotional immaturity: to display an abject dependence upon approval which is a sign of emotional illness rather than of health. This is for good reason: lack of the capacity for

\textsuperscript{19} I do not intend to deal with arguments for 'basic rights', and the contentious issue of objective needs. I will assume for the purpose of argument that all basic needs are well met.
discrimination implies an attitude and approach which is effectively blind to the other person. The appropriate discrimination can only be developed where some measure of privacy is afforded to the conduct of social relationships, a point which cannot be overemphasised in light of some current educational practices, as will be argued more fully later.

2.5 Conclusion

What has emerged from the foregoing discussion is a description of the dispositions which are essential to the development of personal respect. These include emotional self-sufficiency and the exercise of discrimination and judgement (social exclusion). These dispositions are, I shall argue later, best cultivated under conditions of privacy.

These dispositions may be undermined through the transmission of values, or systems of values, which are different from those to which I subscribe. The high valuation of non-instrumentalism, for instance, may be challenged by the transmission of the values associated with ethical egoism. The importance of discrimination, or social exclusion, may be challenged by the transmission of a set of values which ranks the values of self-interested, or conversely agapic, love above those which are developed in and through friendship.

As I shall show, those educators who seek to promote personal respect often hold values which are consistent with the ones espoused above. The forms of instruction which they adopt, however, are often inconsistent with those values because they involve procedures which do not coordinate with those values²⁰. Such miscoordinations are (as I shall show) very prevalent within educational and psychological literature on self-respect. They result, in large part, from a failure to distinguish the conceptual dimensions of 'personal' and 'impersonal' which have above

²⁰ For this distinction between 'aims' and 'procedures' I am indebted to R.S. Peters (1973).
been identified, and from a failure to ensure that the contexts in which respect is to be cultivated accord with the character of that respect, personal or impersonal. To show why this is the case will be the next task.
CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS

3.1 Introduction

Schools aim to develop the virtues of respect: respect for individuality, and respect for task-related excellence. They aim to cultivate both impersonal and personal forms of respect, in both self and others, as is attested by a vast educational literature on self-respect and respect for others. This is a fitting educational aim: that much cannot be disputed. Nonetheless, the efforts of educators (and psychologists) to promote such aims may be undermined by a failure to sort out, both conceptually and pragmatically, the relevant contexts and procedures. Of course, there may be numerous reasons for such a failure, but my focus in this section is upon those errors which are attributable to a failure to take into account the distinction between personal and the impersonal forms of respect.

This chapter will begin from the premise that in order to cultivate respect for individuality, it is necessary to:

1. Recognise the relevant concepts, and accordingly the conceptual boundaries, between a/ the personal forms of respect, in which regard for individuality

---

21 From among the very numerous examples which may be found, the following are a representative sample: Coopersmith 1967; Glasser 1969; Wilson 1969, 2; Ginnott 1972; Bailey 1975; Samuels 1977; Hamachek 1978, 190-237; Ward 1980, 130; Clemes and Bean 1981; David 1983; Beane and Lipka 1984; Pring 1984. 85.
plays an essential role; and b/ the impersonal forms of respect, where regard for individuality does not properly play an essential role.

2/ Ensure that the context (or 'place') accords fully with the personal or impersonal character of the respect which is to be cultivated. This requires, I shall argue, a respect for privacy, and a readiness to draw boundaries between 'private life' and 'public life' and the norms which are appropriate to each.

In other words, if efforts to cultivate respect, in both its impersonal and personal forms, are to succeed, is it necessary to take into consideration: a/ the appropriate concepts, and b/ the appropriate contexts, which are associated with both forms of respect.

3.2 Concepts

The Conceptual Confusion of 'Personal' and 'Impersonal'

There may be a failure to draw the important conceptual boundaries between personal and impersonal forms of respect. This conceptual negligence may take the form of a failure to take into account one or the other form; or of 'collapsing' all phenomena of respect into either one category or the other, personal or impersonal; or of over-inflating the significance of one while discounting the significance of the other.

As an example of the discounting of personal forms of respect, let us consider Nozick’s conception of self-respect. Nozick, correctly, maintains that the very possibility of evaluating one’s performance or attributes presupposes a form of comparison:

...we evaluate how well we do something by comparing our performance to others...a mathematician works very hard and occasionally thinks up an interesting conjecture...He then discovers a whole group of whizzes at mathematics...
In each of these cases, the person will conclude that he wasn't very good or adept at the thing after all. There is no standard of doing something well, independent of how it is or can be done by others. (Nozick 1980, 240-241)

Nozick concludes from this that self-respect must be competitive, and hence forever vulnerable to challenge 'from outside', from others who exceed oneself with respect to the relevant, comparable ability or attribute. Nozick, however, betrays the impersonal bias of his conception of self-respect, and hence his (implicit) discounting of the relevance of the essentially subjective features of distinctively personal forms of self-respect.

The personal forms of respect are, as argued earlier, integrally connected with individuality, with singularity. It may appear, at first glance, that Nozick does take account of the role of such individuality for self-respect, as indicated in the following passage:

People generally judge themselves by how they fall along the most important dimensions in which they differ from others...When everyone, or almost everyone, has something or attribute, it does not function as a basis for self-esteem. Self-esteem is based on differentiating characteristics; that's why it's self-esteem (Nozick 1980, 243).

This does not, of course, correspond to what I have characterised as properly personal forms of respect, or regard for individuality. The concept of individuality with which Nozick works is, in essential respects very much unlike the concept which accords with properly personal forms of self-respect. He abstracts 'distinguishing features' and compares them along a common dimension with similar 'distinguishing features' in others, but his very use of the word 'dimension' presupposes that there exists a common scale. The existence of a common scale (or dimension) is, of course, antithetical to the notion of singularity. Moreover, the idea of 'an attribute' which appears in the above passage is, in essence, partial. An 'attribute' must be taken in
abstraction from the 'whole person' if it is to be compared with similar attributes in others.

Nozick is not alone in neglecting the personal forms of respect. Mead maintains that to establish one's individuality, one must differentiate oneself from others; and to differentiate oneself from others, one must demonstrate one's superiority in the performance of comparable functions:

superiority...is a means for the preservation of self. We have to distinguish ourselves from other people and this is accomplished by doing something which other people cannot do, or cannot do as well (Mead, cited in Diggory 1966, 104).

William James also portrayed self-evaluative processes in primarily comparative terms, and in respect of comparable attributes:

[There] is no reason why a man should not pass judgement on himself quite as objectively and well as on anybody else. No matter how he feels about himself...he may still truly know his own worth by measuring it by the outward standard he applies to other men (James 1890,328)

James characterises the processes of maintaining self-respect in a way which makes very clear his view that the kinds of self-respect which count are those which are vulnerable to measures of comparison:

we have the paradox of a man shamed to death because he is only the second pugilist or the second oarsman in the world. That he is able to beat the whole population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has 'pitted' himself to beat that one; and as long as he doesn't do that nothing else counts. He is to his own regard as if he were not. [In contrast the] puny fellow, whom everyone can beat, suffers no chagrin, for he has long ago abandoned the attempt to 'carry the line'...of self at all (James, cited in Diggory 1966, 97)
These authors' views serve to exemplify way of failing to observe the boundaries and separateness of the two kinds of respect. This route involves excluding the personal and subjective dimension from one's conception of the salient bases of self-respect. The obverse side of this is to discount the importance of the impersonal forms of respect. Consider, for instance, the following clear example. Here we find the personal forms of respect described:

[The ideal classroom] climate calls for a deep respect of the uniqueness of the individual. The discovery of self is a deeply personal matter that does not come about in blanket ways...The full discovery of self as a unique individual of dignity, value and worth can only be found in an atmosphere where uniqueness is encouraged and difference valued (Combs 1962, 105)

Along with this emphasis on pride in uniqueness goes a vehement denunciation of pride in forms of social distinction, reminiscent, in a fashion, of scathing moralistic denunciations of vanity that we find in the works of eighteenth Century moralists such as Rousseau:

Whenever a value is set forth which can only be attained by a few, the conditions are ripe for widespread feelings of personal inadequacy. An outstanding example in American society is the fierce competitiveness of the school system....Children are constantly being ranked and evaluated. The superior achievement of one child tends to debase the achievement of another (Morris Rosenberg, cited in Canfield and Wells 1976, 20)22.

---

22 Both of these were cited as recommended references in an instructional manual on the teaching of self-esteem. The sources of these two quotes occur on the reference list of a much-cited manual on the enhancement of self-respect in the classroom (Canfield and Wells 1976), which suggests that the authors would subscribe to the views expressed in both.
Or, from Moustakas' defence of individualism:

Often a person is known in terms of...what he represents and what he can do rather than who he is. Evaluating a person from his products reveals only a fragmented picture of where he has been, but not who he is...Potential and promise are more clearly disclosed in man's desire for experience and his thirst for knowledge than in records, scores and grades (Moustakas 1967, 3).

What is implicitly assumed here, of course, is that the impersonal forms of respect are not viable in themselves; and that, accordingly, where there is a clash, the personal forms must be allowed to prevail.

The consequences of this (implicit) devaluation of impersonal respect are highly instructive. In this particular case, one such consequence is that measures of comparison are then allowed to intrude, without proper acknowledgement, into the province of personal forms of respect, where they do not properly belong. The confusion, and resultant unacknowledged boundary-crossing, is, for instance, quite evident from the following exercise for enhancing self-esteem amongst schoolchildren:

Construct a "magic box" which can be any kind of box with a mirror placed so as to reflect the face of anyone who looks inside. Begin the activity by asking the class, "Who do you think is the most special person in the whole world?" After allowing the children to respond with their individual answers, you may then continue, "Well, I have a magic box with me today, and each of you will have a chance to look inside and discover the most important person in the world.

After all the children have had their turns, ask the group who the most special person was... After each child has had the opportunity to say 'me', explain that the box is valuable because it shows that each of them is a special person. You might then want to ask how it is possible for everyone to be the special one. A discussion of each individual's uniqueness may ensue (Berg and Wolleat, cited in Canfield and Wells 1976, 42).
Through this case we can clearly see how a failure to draw the appropriate conceptual boundaries between personal and impersonal forms of respect may result in untenable, even incoherent, principles. Concepts associated with comparative self-evaluation are allowed to enter, if indirectly and unobviously, into those aspects of self-concept which are properly personal, and hence inherently non-comparative. Respect for uniqueness, which can only be understood in non-comparative terms is allowed to take on the features of comparative forms of respect: "most special", "more unique", etc. This is essentially an untenable, even incoherent, position, tantamount to claiming: "I am better than you at being me".

The implicit assumption in the above devaluation of impersonal forms of respect is that to elevate competitiveness, and thus to promote impersonal forms of self-evaluation, is simultaneously to undermine all other forms of respect. However, of course, what may remain untouched by impersonal self-comparison are those forms of self-respect with arise from the successful development and cultivation of individuality.

Unlike Nozick, who simply fails to acknowledge the existence of another, complementary form of respect, the authors in this case do acknowledge the existence of the other form of respect; but this acknowledgement is accompanied by a devaluation of such forms of respect. This devaluation, moreover, involves a conception of the relationship between the personal and the impersonal dimensions of valuing wherein it is assumed the personal and impersonal must be traded off against one another; that these two dimensions of valuing, and of valuing persons, are antithetical. An undesirable consequence of such a conception of their relationship is that the promotion of respect is then regarded as a matter of sorting out one's priorities, and hence ranking one above the other. One will regard it as a matter of choosing that which one values most highly, and eliminating the other altogether from one's repertoire. Thus, one may fall on the side of the personal and subjective aspects of respect, and sacrifice the impersonal (as in the above denunciation of competitiveness). Conversely, one may fall on the side of the impersonal -comparative and evaluative - forms of respect, and accordingly one may allow
competitiveness free rein, untempered, and unhampered, by concern with the value of the personal and individual aspects of self.

Neither of these alternatives is admissible. An overdose of impersonality is not properly remedied by cutting it out altogether. It is remedied by allowing the other, neglected aspect - the personal - to assume equal importance. The relationship should be conceived as one of complementarity rather than one of mutual exclusion.

To suppose that there exists a trade-off is to misrepresent the relationship as one in which the dimensions are mutually exclusive. The relationship between the two forms of valuing is, however, better represented as one of independent worlds. The metaphor which should inform our understanding of the relationship between personal and impersonal forms of respect is that of independent worlds, 'separate spheres', different but of equal importance.

This important point will feature prominently throughout, so it is worth elaborating further.

'Personal' and 'Impersonal': Separate Worlds

If we are to offer personal respect to others, we need to be capable of experiencing and deploying that range of affective dispositions which accompany such respect. These include, as argued earlier, the capacity and readiness to engage in activity for its own sake, freedom from instrumental concern, openness to the novel, and so on. Such respect thus demands that a whole range of capacities and dispositions be brought to bear upon one's relationships with another person. We must, in addition, spend considerable time engaging in shared, and mutually valued activity.

If, on the other hand, we are to offer impersonal respect for others, we need to be capable of detachment, impartiality, and adherence to rules, and understanding of principles of justice and 'fair play'. We are, in effect, in a different 'world',
emotionally in each case. Personal respect involves a spirit of 'play', of doing 'for its own sake', a spirit which suggests love. Impersonal respect involves detachment and neutrality.

Solomon captures this idea of independent and separate emotional worlds nicely in his description of the contrast between the 'loveworld', and other worlds, such as that of work:

I love you in so far as I am a lover, but I am only rarely just a lover. No matter how much I'm in love, I do not live just in the loveworld. You may be the essence of my loveworld, but you don't fit into my career...I love you when I feel romantic...but when I'm frustrated about my work...the self that is so involved is not the same self that loves you. It's not that I don't love you, or that I love you any the less; it's just that the loveworld isn't my only world, or yours either (Solomon 1981, 134)

Solomon argues, convincingly, that love can only be understood holistically. To love someone is to construct a 'world'. The emotions involved thus structure the way in which one perceives everything, not merely the lover; and the phenomenon is such that one is, in effect, a different self when one loves than one is when one is in another world, such as that of work. He uses as an analogy the experience of anger:

Anger too defines its world...The world of anger is very much a courtroom world, a world filled with blame and emotional litigation...It is a magical world, which can change a lackadaisical unfocused morning into a piercing, all-consuming day, an orgy of vindictive self-righteousness and excitement (Solomon 1981, 127)

He then goes on, rather tellingly, to suggest that the world which anger (and, by extension, any like emotion) produces, is fragile, and liable readily to be broken by irruption of a different, and incommensurable, world - for instance, that which arises from humour:
It is a world with a certain fragility; a single laugh can explode the whole pretence of angry self-righteousness (Solomon 1981, 127)

Solomon’s points are, in this particular case, rather vitiated by his emphasis on the irrational features of the emotion of anger ("magical", "pretence"). It may, of course, be replied that it is perfectly in order (reasonable) for unreasonable extremes or misdirections of emotion to be 'fragile'. But to allow the issue of rationality (of 'reasonableness') to preempt the essential point in this manner would be a red herring. The essential points, without the red herrings, are:

a/ At least some emotions can only properly be understood holistically, as essentially creative, structuring 'the world' and, correspondingly, the character of the self which perceives that world: "...an emotion is a world, or, in part, a way of 'seeing' the world..." (Solomon 1981, 134).

b/ There are at least some emotions, and hence worlds, which cannot exist concurrently (for instance, the world whose theme is that of lighthearted, playful humour and the world whose theme is that of murderous resentment).

These important points are enough for my purposes here, for they are sufficient to give a general idea of what is meant by the concept of 'a world', and of independent and incommensurable worlds. These points bear directly upon the distinction between personal and impersonal forms of respect: These two forms of valuing persons exemplify different, and irreconcilable, emotional worlds.

It may appear that the above assertion that the personal and impersonal forms of respect are irreconcilable directly contradicts my earlier claim that the relationship should not be regarded as one of mutual exclusion. Such an objection would be misdirected. The earlier claims were to the effect that the values associated with personal and impersonal forms of respect not mutually exclusive. What is being maintained above, though, is that the processes through which such values may be realised may be rendered pragmatically incompatible in virtue of the contexts - or 'worlds' - into which they must be fitted.
From the point of view of practice and procedure, this point has far-reaching implications. It implies that context is of essential importance. Accordingly, to cultivate either form of respect, it is necessary to ensure not only the concepts are in order, but also, and far more challenging, that the context accords with the character of those concepts. The process of moving from one such world to the other is, psychologically, analogous to the perceptual phenomenon of 'gestalt shift', wherein an ambiguous representation may be seen to depict either one object or another, but never both. From this arises the paradox that one cannot simultaneously 'see' both aspects at once. What may make all the difference with regard to what one sees in the ambiguous representation is, of course, the context which surrounds it.

This brings me to the next section on contexts which are appropriate for the development of personal and impersonal forms of respect.

3.3 Contexts

In this section the task is to locate each form of respect in an appropriate context, or 'world'. The context which corresponds with the personal forms of respect is that of 'the private life' - the private domain of social life. The personal forms of respect have an affinity with those areas of life which we call 'private'. And the world which corresponds with the impersonal forms of respect is 'the public life'. It will be argued that the distinctive features of the forms of respect serve to give each in turn an affinity with the public or the private domains of social life, which are to be regarded as separate domains, each with its own rules and norms.

To presume a 'natural' association of personal forms of respect with the private is, concomitantly, to presume a 'natural' lack of affinity of these forms of respect with those things which we associate with 'the public life': impersonality, impartiality, stereotyping, rules and regulations. It has thus often been remarked, particularly
within the liberal traditions, that the development of individuality requires freedom from interference, and such freedom is more likely where one is not visible to, or accountable to, the public.

This is, of course, the traditional liberal argument for privacy, an argument which may be given considerable additional substance by taking into consideration the particular character of the processes which contribute to the development and respect for individuality, in self and others. The lack of affinity of such forms of respect with 'the public life' is attributable to the distinctive character of those processes which are essential to the development of individuality; a distinctive character which may be undermined by exposure to those forms of judgement which are employed in public life. Let us now turn to an examination of some justifiable grounds to support these presumed affinities/disaffinities.

**Personal Respect and Privacy**

In Chapter Two, on personal forms of respect, several essential processes and attitudes were identified. Salient among them were those associated with play and experimentation: a non-committal stance which enables openness to the novel; a capacity for non-instrumental participation in process; the whole pervaded by a spirit, which is only characterisable in essentially 'inward' terms, and hence incapable of being understood under the description of an impartial, detached, third person. Privacy may enter into the cultivation of such dispositions as follow (I will explain more fully the significance of this issue later, but for now, a preliminary sketch will suffice).

**Non-Committalism.**

To adopt a non-committal stance, and hence to be open to the novel, it is often necessary to resist, with some forcefulness, the exertion of social pressures to behave in a rational, regulated and self-consistent manner; to behave, in other words, in a predictable manner which displays conformity to a set of rules, whether implicit or
explicit, whether such rules issue from the self or from the conventions of one's society. We are, in other words, expected to behave, and account for ourselves, rationally (Shotter 1984; Gergen 1977; Festinger 1959).

Of course such pressures towards rational self-accounting are entirely reasonable in themselves, and in the right places. But, nonetheless it is possible to be 'overexposed' to such pressures, and resultantly to allow rigid rule-regulation and processes of rational self-accounting to intrude into activities where they do not belong. They may intrude, for instance, into those phases of the creative process which require a suspension of rule-government or accountability to a rational plan.

Non-committalism and openness to the novel are not likely to thrive alongside such a concern with rational self-accountability. Rigidity is, more often than not, imposed by society upon the child, through various kinds of conformity pressure (Murphy 1958). The 'cultural mould' often imprints itself on a child in ways which preclude the full exploration of, and 'playing with' a range of options.

It follows, then, that to foster the openness, and experimentation which is involved in play, one will need to 'create a space' in which such pressures cease to operate. This is the space which privacy allows, as I shall argue extensively later.

**Participation in Process.**

The subjective processes which contribute to the development of individuality - spontaneity and participation in process - are difficult to maintain in the face of impersonal and public judgements, as I shall argue more fully later. Spontaneity may also be threatened by misplaced concern with, and scrutiny of, the self which arises from the internalisation of the perspective of an impersonal third person. One can be concerned overly with one's 'appearance' through the habit of regarding oneself as the object of the detached scrutiny of another, disinterested third person.

**Inwardness.**
Those attitudes and dispositions which we associate with the development of individuality possess an essentially 'inward' character which is accessible only upon direct acquaintance with those aspects of an individual's life and activity which possess deep personal value and significance. It is, as a matter of fact, difficult, if not impossible, to get a full 'sense' of those things which constitute an individual's distinctive personality and individuality until one has, as it were, 'got to know' the person, or entered his subjective world. This kind of knowledge is best developed in the context of friendships and intimate relationships, and not in the context of impersonal, shared public life. This is because to develop an understanding of an individual requires the suspension of generalisations and stereotypical preconceptions. Many such preconceptions are derived from those social rules and roles which are characteristic of an understanding of, and participation in, the life of the wider community.

To say that those things which we associate with the public life should be excluded, as far as possible, from the context in which personal forms of respect are to be cultivated is emphatically not to say that there is no place for such affairs. The rules, conventions and regulations which properly belong to the public life require acknowledgement and cultivation, so far as this is compatible with the exercise of autonomy.

Nonetheless, such dismissals of the norms of public social life have been known to occur in the name of respect for individuals. It may, for instance, be maintained that respect for individuality requires no less than a total suspension of the human penchant for fitting individuals into conventional social categories or roles. It may even be suggested that the egalitarian individual who is truly committed to a respect for individuality will approach everybody with a like open-minded absence of preconceptions.

23 Moustakas (1967) Creativity and Conformity: refer especially to Chapter 1 - 'Uniqueness and Individuality'.

24 The relevance and importance of this point will become evident in my later section on self-disclosure.
Such an unqualified dismissal would be both unwise and unworkable. To rule out altogether such practices as those of stereotyping and pigeonholing would be to put an unrealistically, and unnecessarily high price upon the development of, and respect for, individuality. To suppose that a respect for individuality cannot co-exist alongside such widespread and entrenched practices as that of stereotyping, pigeonholing, ranking, is to invite sure failure, for it presupposes an accomplishment which is, and should be, practically unfeasible. Such tendencies are, it seems, so thoroughly ingrained as to be virtually impossible to eliminate. Nor would it be desirable to eliminate them, even if it were possible to do so. They serve an important and indispensable function in making the world cognitively manageable. We could not cope so well (if at all) in our instrumental and functional activities if we did not possess, and use, simplifying schemata which make the world manageable and comprehensible. The tendency to fit humans into such categories is but one extension of this function, adaptive in itself, and there is no compelling reason why it should be suspended simply because the 'object' to be managed and controlled happens to be a human being. While one is engaged in instrumental activities, which involve control and management of the world (and others) it is appropriate and fitting to rank people by a common measure, as when one's purpose is to determine their potential utility in furthering one's instrumental aims.

Importantly, however, what this does imply is that instrumental contexts are not appropriate contexts for the development of personal forms of respect. Such respect is better cultivated in contexts in which the rules and standards which we associate with competence, with task-orientation, may be suspended: Contexts in which there is no need to adopt the above cognitive managing strategies because there is no need to manage either others or the self.

The general principle to be drawn from the above discussion is that the development of respect is, like the development of all other kinds of social disposition, crucially dependent upon context and environment. It is these which serve to define the 'world' through which one respects another. The crucial parameters in this case are defined
by the character of the respect one wishes to cultivate: personal or impersonal. A person cannot be expected to exercise and develop and appreciation of individuality in a context in which socially defined rules and norm-referenced criteria prevail. To do so would be wrong for the same reason that it would be wrong to expect a lover to describe the features of a loved one in comparative terms: "What I like about x is that he is better than y in looks, intelligence, sexual prowess (etc)". The context must be consonant with the character of the disposition which one is aiming to cultivate.

What is being espoused, then, is a cognisance of the implications of the independence of the two forms of respect. There is set of principles which apply to the private life, the appropriate context for the development of personal respect, and an entirely distinct set which apply to the public life, which is the appropriate context for the development of impersonal respect. The simplifications, rules and regulations of public life have their place. For the educator who aims to foster the attitude of respect for individuality, the onus lies in the identification of that place, and in ensuring that her practices and methods respect the proper boundaries of that place. And, since that place is not always made clear, much of the remainder will be devoted to showing what that place should be.

The importance of the determination of this place, and of a regard for the essential separateness of the spheres, cannot be overestimated. The far-reaching implications of failure to develop such a regard for context, have been remarked by several social commentators, albeit in the context of a more general critique of social trends.

For instance, a pervasive emphasis upon self-scrutiny, and preoccupation with personal and interpersonal 'functioning' and performance in all areas of social life has been observed by several social commentators. As Rose puts it:

Life has become a skilled performance...You can learn self-regulation, combining an awareness of the messages from others with a monitoring and adjustment of the messages you give off yourself in your choices of language and behaviour. You can learn how to manage social situations by combining
self-regulation with previous imaginary rehearsal of the situation... You can learn the arts of relationships, to show others you like them, to recognize when they like you, and to sequence the interchange of glances, words and acts... But these progressive principles are double edged. They institute, as the other side of their promise of autonomy... a constant self-doubt, a constant scrutiny and evaluation of how one performs, the construction of one's personal part in social existence as something to be calibrated and judged in its minute particulars. Even pleasure has become a form of work to be accomplished with the aid of professional expertise... The self becomes the target of a reflexive objectifying gaze... (Rose 1990, 239).

The instrumental character of these values which pervade social life is not in itself at fault. Management, fixed rules and regulations, detached third-person scrutiny, objective evaluation, performance criteria (etc.) are important features of social life. What is wrong, rather, is the sheer pervasiveness of such instrumental values. They appear, through that very pervasiveness, to have intruded into areas of social life where they do not belong. The intuition is that there should be at least some places in social life in which these values may be suspended; places in which we may, with impunity, suspend our concern with managing and controlling ourselves or others. These are the places we need for the development of individuality, places which are, in essence, private.

Rose's comments present a preliminary description of what may be lost in social life if respect for privacy is overridden. Most saliently, the values which require as their precondition a spirit of spontaneity and subjective participation may be overridden by a one-eyed preoccupation with instrumental values in all areas of one's social life. This point has been remarked also by many with regard to the decline of the spirit of play (Sennet, Huizinga).

---

25 Examples which show the extremes to which such 'management' may be taken may be found in Lewis (1989) The Secret Language of Success, which describes in great detail the mechanics of body language which may be used to manipulate people; and in Kakabadse (1983) The Politics of Management.
As Huizinga puts the case:

A far-reaching contamination of play and serious activity has taken place... The two spheres are getting mixed. In the activities of an outwardly serious nature hides an element of play. Recognised play, on the other hand, is no longer able to maintain its true play-character as a result of being taken too seriously and being technically over-organised. The indispensable qualities of detachment, artlessness, and gladness are thus lost (Huizinga, cited in Lasch 1978, 103).

What is wrong, in essence, is that no space is left for the cultivation of those non-instrumental attitudes which are a precondition for the development of, and respect for, individuality. An individual who is out to perform and to test herself all the time would be disposed to 'use' others for the purpose of such self-testing. In doing so she may not be adopting what we would traditionally refer to as a straightforwardly instrumental or Machiavellian attitude towards others; but at the same time her attitude is not compatible with respect for others in their own right. Similarly, the individual who works full time on pursuing her interests, leaving no time for disinterested activity, would seem to be manifesting a profound disrespect for herself, not as individual qua pursuer of interests, but of her individual personhood.

Schools are not entirely immune to such trends (as will be amply demonstrated later). Schools are, however, public institutions: the institutional context, has historically been regarded as a 'public space'. In virtue of this fact, there is a strong presumption in favour of the cultivation of those forms of respect which fit into the context of public life - viz, the impersonal forms of respect, which are more amenable to publicly determined standards. This presumption needs to be cogently argued against in order to justify encroaching upon the privacy of students in order to cultivate such virtues as that of respect for the individual.

Perhaps it is just the recognition of the impersonal setting of institutional life in schools which provides the rationale for those recent practices, such as that of encouraging personal self-disclosures in the classroom, which will supposedly allow the subjective,
inner aspects of identity to take their place alongside the objective. It is thus argued that personal respect may be promoted by giving the subjective and inward dimensions of social life the recognition it deserves, and this requires setting aside a space in the curriculum which is devoted primarily to its cultivation (Porter and Smith 1989, 30-31).

Personal respect is a worthy educational aim. Nonetheless, educators' efforts to cultivate it must be informed by a regard for the significance of the *context* in which education may be undertaken. The context in many cases, is an institutional setting in which norms of public accountability prevail. In the next section - "The Role of Privacy in the Development of Respect for Individuality" - I will show how the presence of such norms, which are an indispensable part of institutional life, may undermine the bases of personal respect which have been described above.

The following defense of privacy will be dominated by two themes, which pertain to misplaced intrusions of impersonal concerns and standards into the provinces of personal respect.

1/ The intrusion of *spectator perspectives* or perspectives which may be adopted by an impartial third-person.

2/ The intrusion of public *criteria of performance and evaluation* into one’s subjective and private life.
SECTION TWO

THE ROLE OF PRIVACY
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PERSONAL RESPECT
INTRODUCTION

The task of this section is to show the importance of privacy for the respect and development of individuality. This I shall do by way of showing how the activities, dispositions of character, and internal attitudes which are essential to the development and respect for individuality may be undermined by a failure to respect this requirement for a context of privacy.

Section Two contains four chapters:

In Chapter 4 - "The Significance of 'Subjective' Privacy" - I will explain the significance of internal privacy, or privacy which pertains to the inner, subjective aspects of human experience. This will involve an examination of some of the more well-known arguments for privacy within the liberal tradition.

In Chapter 5 - "Privacy and Personal Respect for Self" - I will examine the implications of violations of privacy for respect for self - the expression and development of one's own individuality. The topic of self-disclosure will be used to explore these issues. Chapter 5 will be dominated by two themes: "the spectator perspective" and "social accountability".

In Chapter 6 - "Privacy and Respect for Other Selves" - I will consider the implications of violations of privacy for the development of personal respect for others. This I will do through the topic of cooperative learning and its cultivation.

In Chapter 7 - "The Welfare Argument" - I will extract, and critically evaluate the arguments concerning social and emotional 'need' which may be invoked to override considerations of privacy.
CHAPTER 4

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECTIVE PRIVACY

'Privacy' possesses many meanings, of course; and it is not my intention here to engage in an extensive analysis of this concept. Since I am primarily concerned here with the relationship between contexts of privacy and the cultivation of respect for individuality, however, I will focus on two aspects of privacy, as it is usually understood:

1/ 'Privacy' as this refers to a particular type and character of human relationship, or attitude towards human relationships. 'Privacy' implies a principle of social exclusion based upon a distinction between those of one's associates who belong to the public sphere, relations with whom are governed by the rules and conventions which characterise 'the common life of society'; and those associates who belong to 'the intimate sphere'.

2/ 'Privacy' as this refers, more generally, to the notions of seclusion, of retreat, of a 'space' in which one may conduct one's activities free from observation, whether bodily or emotional.

Privacy has traditionally been regarded as essential to the respect of individuality, both in self and others. The connection between privacy and the expression of individuality is an oft-made one. Thus, a concern with privacy is often closely connected with a concern to resist the exertions of societal power over the individual. The connection between privacy and the successful resistance to undue conformity pressures is, of course, a commonplace assumption within the liberal tradition.

---

26 The sources of reference for this observation are too numerous to be cited singly. However, a representative selection of authors who claim this connection between privacy and individuality may be found in Pennock and Chapman (1971).
The broad function of privacy within the liberal tradition, then, consists in its enabling the maintenance of personal autonomy and freedom, without interference from others. The fact that privacy is often defended in a way which draws heavily upon the basic values associated with liberal individualism (Benn 1971; Weinstein 1971) attests to the strong presumption which may be made in favour of the preservation of privacy in cases where the aim is to cultivate the personal forms of respect.

Upholders of that tradition have, however, remarked uneasily upon the potential of excessive social participation to undermine individual autonomy, the development of which often requires the ability to withdraw, either physically or emotionally, from the demands of groups. As Bloustein eloquently put it in his philosophical study of privacy:

> The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy, or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual (Bloustein 1984, 188).

As Victor pointed out in his study of the French, the capacity for critical appraisal of conventional norms may require for its development the readiness to remove oneself, either in mind or body, from the pressures and demands of indiscriminate social participation:

> [T]he French do not learn to regard peer group associates, co-workers and neighbours as sources of psychological gratification...This...when compensated by emotional gratifications found in intimate relations...enables considerable psychological autonomy and independence of judgment (Victor, 1980, 113).
As Bloustein and Victor point, an important way in which the right to privacy may be exercised is through the option of withdrawal, of disengaging oneself from the demands of participation. Such disengagement may be behavioural, as in the case of the individual who either withdraws bodily, or fails to engage in the bodily activity - for instance, speaking - which is associated with participation. It may also take a more subjective and internal form, as when one refrains from becoming emotionally or personally involved with the others in the classroom.

The violation of privacy may involve various forms of intrusion on an individual’s physical space. Such intrusions may take the form of unwanted observation of an individual’s activities. In these cases an individual’s privacy is being affected through her behaviour; and the restrictions, if any, which a lack of privacy imposes will be ones which affect the actions of an individual. In addition to these external intrusions on privacy, violations on privacy may also take more ‘internal’ forms. An individual’s privacy may be violated by ‘intruding’ on her thoughts, her subjective life. It is these subjective, internal forms of privacy with which I shall be primarily concerned in this discussion.

Of course, the educational context has always traditionally been one in which students are compelled to be present ‘in body’, one in which literal, physical privacy is debarred by the very context of communal activity. However, a rather novel development, upon which some have remarked (Rose 1991; Silber 1971) is the tendency to discourage the internal forms of privacy.

The significance of such internal intrusions should not be underestimated, particularly as institutions are becoming increasingly concerned with the subjective lives of individuals, to an extent perhaps unprecedented. Rose, for instance, comments upon a more general trend for public institutions to concern themselves with the subjectivity of individuals, aspects which were, in his view, formerly assigned to a clearly private domain:
We have witnessed the birth of a new form of expertise, an expertise of subjectivity. A whole family of new professional groups has propagated itself, each asserting its virtuosity in respect of the self...Not just psychologists...but also social workers, personnel managers, probation officers [etc] have based their claim to social authority upon their capacity to understand the psychological aspects of the person and to act upon them...The multiplying powers of these 'engineers of the human soul' seems to manifest something profoundly novel in the relations of authority over the self (Rose 1990, 3)

This trend is also remarked by Silber (1971). Rather less dispassionate than Rose, he expresses considerable disquiet at the self-exposure which is widely sanctioned, and even encouraged, by movements such as the encounter group movement:

I fail to understand the complacency of both the general public and the professional psychologists toward the encounter-group movement with its indiscriminate disclosures. How do we know that self-disclosure of all that is unworthy of oneself can be made within the context of an encounter group without the risk of losing that minimum of self-respect on which the respect and trust of others depends? Self-revelation before encounter groups will, in my opinion, ultimately debase the notion of intimacy through realizations which, even if genuine in themselves, become spurious by mere repetition (Silber 1971, 229)

In defending privacy in education, it would be tempting to focus exclusively upon the external circumstances, to focus, for instance, upon the ways in which freedom of action may be precluded by the presence of public scrutiny. Such an approach would be tempting because such circumstances are observable, and hence readily amenable to monitoring and control. However tempting, though, an exclusive focus on external circumstances may result in a failure to consider the damaging consequences of a loss of internal freedom, or freedom of thought, a consequence which may be ill-considered or neglected. These subjective freedoms are, however particularly important for the development of a proper respect for individuality in self and others (personal respect).
This is a highly significant point, in view of some trends within education. Current educational literature is, as I shall show, full of recommendations for practices which, at least on the face of it, possess the potential to violate a student’s right to subjective privacy. Self-disclosure is, for instance, widely advocated, and in a way which suggests that the implications of such practices for internal privacy have not been thoroughly considered. Cooperative activity is promoted in a way which puts heavy pressure upon students to participate, not only bodily, but also personally and emotionally with other students. These practices are, moreover, often accompanied by an implicit devaluation of the activities and dispositions which are associated with efforts to obtain seclusion, or retreat from the public view or the common arena.

It may of course be acknowledged that such practices may infringe upon the privacy of students. Indeed justifications are often produced. Although not often not made explicit in educational literature; such justifications can be found elsewhere. Thus, the advocacy of classroom self-disclosure goes along with a set of arguments and considerations which emphasise the undesirable states of shame, fear, and self-rejection which self-disclosure supposedly removes, along with an emphasis upon the supposed emotional needs of individuals to receive public affirmation of their self-concepts.

For instance, the views of Schutz, a leading representative of the encounter group movement, are aptly summarised as follows:

For [advocates of this position].. privacy itself becomes one of the fundamental barriers to personal fulfilment. These movements extol the virtues of complete disclosure - the abnegation of all privacy - as the sole means of personal fulfilment. It is their confident assertion that only through sustained efforts at disclosing one's self to others - the conquest of all 'guilt, shame, embarrassment, or fear of punishment, failure, success, retribution' - is one capable of full self-realization (Silber 1971, 229).

And the high valuation of social participation may be attended by arguments which emphasise the supposed undesirable features of the state of, or propensity to, social
withdrawal which attends privacy. Such withdrawal thus may be supposed to represent an undesirable and unhealthy departure from the natural state of communion (Leach 1968). It is, moreover, argued by some that privacy which takes the form of social withdrawal removes an individual from the conditions under which she can be fully and adequately socialised: The individual who withdraws will often be inadequately socialised into the rules and norms of her society. As such, privacy is just a mechanism for maintaining social irresponsibility (Mead 1965, Hicks 1959, Bettelheim 1968).

These arguments can be effectively countered by making the rather obvious point that they misrepresent the phenomenological character of privacy: Privacy is not always accompanied by feelings of shame and fear. They can also be countered by pointing out that they neglect to consider the full range of reasons why privacy might reasonably and justifiably be sought, reasons which do not imply either social irresponsibility or fearful self-defense. The latter point of course requires for its defense a presentation of alternative justifications.

It is these alternative justifications with which I shall primarily be concerned in this section, where I intend to focus upon and elaborate upon those reasons for seeking privacy which do not necessarily 'reduce' to shame, fear and the evasion of social responsibility.

The aim of the remaining three chapters, then, is to establish that both aspects of privacy are essential for the development of personal respect - respect for individuality. Accordingly, the context in which such respect is to be cultivated should be one which pays due regard to the values which are associated with intimacy, and hence principled exclusion of at least some others from the arena in which such respect is cultivated. It should, moreover, pay due regard to the values of seclusion, of retreat, and of freedom from the demands of public scrutiny and judgement.
CHAPTER 5

PRIVACY AND PERSONAL RESPECT FOR SELF

The Case of Self-Disclosure

In this chapter I will use the case of self-disclosure in classrooms to show how personal forms of respect may be undermined by a failure to give due regard to the internal privacy which is essential to the exercise of such respect. In the course of this I shall identify some important conditions, in both self and other, which militate against respect for individuality.

In an introductory section (5.1), I will outline the arguments for the use of self-disclosure in educational contexts. This will be followed by analysis and evaluation, which will be guided by two themes: "The Spectator Perspective" and "Social Accountability".

In 5.2 - "The Spectator Perspective" - I will defend the case for selective and discriminating self-disclosure by exploring the implications of misplaced internalisation of 'outsider' perspectives by examining the implications of two important contexts which may be considered hostile to the aims of self-disclosure: the context of 'affirmation' and the context of 'opposition'. This chapter will be divided into two subsections, the first of which will deal with the context of 'affirmation'; and the second of which will deal with the context of 'opposition'.

In 5.3 - "Social Accountability" - I will examine some of the ways in which public performance criteria may be inappropriately deployed.
5.1 Introduction

Some Arguments for Self-Disclosure

Self-disclosure is often advocated as an important way to enhance self-esteem and mental health in education. For instance, many psychologists and educators have remarked upon the considerable benefits to self-esteem which may accrue from such self-disclosure (Jourard 1971; Canfield and Wells 1976; Beane 1984).27

Would it be too arbitrary to assume people come to need help because they have not disclosed themselves in some optimum degree to the people in their lives?...[S]elf-disclosure is a means by which one achieves personality health...Every maladjusted person is a person who has not made himself known to another human being and in consequence does not know himself (Jourard, cited in Chelune 1979, 111).

The experience of self-disclosure, of sharing with sympathetic others one’s deep and intimate concerns, is undoubtedly a very rewarding and valuable experience. This much is uncontroversial. It can reasonably be assumed that self-disclosure in the right circumstances confers many benefits to self-esteem and general psychological health, especially where it is received in the spirit of benevolence and acceptance.

The purposes and likely consequences of such self-disclosure for the individual’s self-concept are many and varied. To enumerate just some of the commonly described consequences of self-disclosing encounters with others, self-disclosure may:

---

27 A review of the literature in support of self-disclosure may be found in Belle and Burr (1991).
-Reduce or eliminate egocentricity by enabling someone to see how his view or interpretation is partial and subjective, and particular to himself. As a correlative of this, it may

-Promote the development of humility by enabling an individual to see that his viewpoint is just one among many others, confronting him with evidence which shows up the one-sidedness and limitations of his own perspective.

-Enable an individual to refine or expand her self-concept by incorporating the experience and/or perspective of another.

-Provide a sense of connectedness and reduce alienation.

An interesting and rather controversial feature of the defense of self-disclosure in educational contexts is the challenge it presents to our time-honoured assumptions about appropriate contexts for intimate self-disclosure. Instead of confining intimate self-disclosures to persons with whom she has a deep and personal relationship, the discloser is expected to confide intimate details to others with whom she may have superficial, even impersonal relationships. Indeed the conditions which we often associate with sensitive self-disclosures - viz, privacy and deep, close relationships - are often treated as if they were effectively irrelevant. Thus it is usual to find recommendations of deep personal disclosures in the rather impersonal setting of the classroom (Canfield and Wells 1976; Button 1982).

Work out agendas in small groups for deeper personal conversations....Special attention should be paid to the framework/agenda for deeper conversation, eg. hopes, joys, anxieties, disappointments (Button, 1982, 37).

This is an agenda for discussion in small groups...It is intended to extend the expression of feelings within the groups, and to help the groups to see individual members in new ways...What makes you sad? What makes you glad? Do you ever have an empty feeling inside? And what about? Are you sometimes so full of joy that you want to share it with everyone? What about? What makes you really angry? What do you fear most? ...Do you ever have
difficulty holding on to your feelings? What is it usually about? (Button, 1982, 220)

Whenever it is requested, allow students a short period of time...to make a public statement to the class...If one's self-concept is to grow, he [the student] must have the opportunity to publicly affirm the things he believes in...The public statement..indicates to the class that the teacher respects student ideas(Canfield and Wells 1976, 143).

These views are characterised, then, by a disregard of those values which we traditionally associate with privacy. What is lacking is a concern with those issues which we associate with such privacy: most notably, intimacy, concealment, discrimination in choice of partner.

Although, of course, it is often difficult to find explicit and reasoned philosophical defense of ideas which have pervaded the cultural ethos, it is, nonetheless, possible to find elements of a philosophical defense. Wasserstrom, for instance, remarked upon the presence of a 'counterculture', and put forth in summary the basic principles and arguments which could, in his view, be imputed to proponents of this counterculture:

We have made ourselves vulnerable...by accepting the notion that there are thoughts and actions concerning which we ought to feel ashamed or embarrassed... When we realize that everyone has fantasies, desires, worries, about all sorts of supposedly terrible, wicked, and shameful things, we ought to see that they really are not things to be ashamed of at all. We regard ourselves as vulnerable because in part we think we are different, if not unique....Indeed our culture would be healthier and happier if we diminished substantially the kinds of actions that we now feel comfortable disclosing only with those with whom we have special relationships...This way of living is hypocritical because it is, in essence, a life devoted to camouflaging the real, private self from public scrutiny (Wasserstrom 1984, 330-331).
Or, as Gross puts the point:

...insistence on privacy is often taken as implying admissions that there is cause for shame. The assumption is that the only reason for keeping something from others is that one is ashamed of it...Those who seek information and wish to disregard interests in privacy often play on this notion by claiming that the decent and innocent have no cause for shame and so no need for privacy.

(Gross 1967, 176)

Defenders of this view would maintain that the private/public boundary is untenable, kept alive and supported on the strength of defensive emotions, fear, shame and territoriality. Thus, it supports and is supported by, lack of self-acceptance. Bettelheim (1968), for instance, maintains that privacy involves the concealment of things which one would be ashamed to have exposed in public. Moreover the 'need' for privacy, and hence for confining one’s personal self-disclosures to close and exclusive relationships, may be identified with the 'need' to keep clear (territorial) boundaries between self and other. Sartre puts the case as follows:

I think transparency should always be substituted for what is secret...There is an as-for-myself, born of distrust, ignorance, and fear which keeps me from being confidential with another...I feel that this dark region that we have within ourselves...can only be illuminated for ourselves in trying to illuminate it for others...(Sartre 1975)

Or, as Leach would put it:

Privacy is a source of fear and violence...[We] human beings are forever creating artificial boundaries between men who are like us and men who are unlike us...I am isolated, lonely and afraid because my neighbour is my enemy

(Leach 1967, 46)

So, to summarise this aspect of the case against privacy: The public/private boundary which dictates that individuals should disclose only in circumstances of privacy and
close intimacy, perpetuates a lack of self-acceptance. In doing so, it reinforces self-attitudes - shame, self-defensiveness - which are profoundly hostile to self-respect. An aversion to self-disclosure can thus be ascribed to the effects of an oppressive social system and the cowardice of individuals who 'acquiesce', often as a result of deficits in moral courage which render them overly defensive and self-protective.

We are said to be a society dedicated to the pursuit of truth. Yet, disclosure of the truth, the truth of one's being, is often penalised. Impossible concepts of how man ought to be...make men so ashamed of his true being that he feels obliged to seem different, if for no other reason than to keep his job (Jourard 1971, 6).

A cause for concern, however, is the fact that these justifications for the use of self-disclosure often invoke values and principles which are, to say the least, rather controversial. The case for self-disclosure in educational contexts apparently disregards without scruple the principles which we associate with the preservation of privacy.

As I shall show later, this case, and the premises upon which it is founded, is profoundly mistaken. It misrepresents and even trivialises the case for privacy, and hence for cautious and selective self-disclosure, by reducing it to dubious motives of shame, fear, and neurotic self-defensiveness. As I shall argue, privacy involves much more than the avoidance of shame. Indeed it is often crucial to the development and maintenance of self-respect. And, insofar as it functions to sustain such privacy, the boundary between public and private, or intimate, relationships should be maintained.

Before embarking on this challenge, however, I will now describe another aspect of this case against privacy. This case emphasises the positive benefits of self-disclosure rather than, as above, the negative effects of non-disclosure. Running alongside the negative argument, there is a positive argument, which emphasises the benefits of greater self-disclosure for the development of self-concept and for the satisfaction of emotional needs for recognition and understanding. This is 'the argument from identity
affirmation' which is so clearly expressed in Porter and Smith's defense of the use of autobiographical self-disclosure in classroom contexts.

In Porter and Smith's sustained philosophical defense of the use of autobiographical self-disclosure as an educational 'tool' to enhance student self-concept, the identity-affirming consequences of acts of self-disclosure are described:

[E]ducation cannot leave the inner life completely untouched....If education wholly ignores the inner life it weakens it by attaching authority to the idea that it is shadowy by comparison with brisker realities. And where education attaches a high priority to monitoring, grading, assessing...as, of course, it increasingly does, its customers must concern themselves more and more with the self they present to the world.

In autobiographical writing... we find the possibility of living life more richly 'from the inside': of acknowledging and starting to make sense of those experiences, motives and feelings we really have instead of continuing to present the image which those around us (who for children, include their peers as well as their teachers) find acceptable (Porter and Smith 1989, 30-31).

From this line of argument it is evident that self-disclosure is supposed to promote respect for individuality, and hence it falls clearly within the province of those personal forms of respect which were identified in Chapter 2. The argument rests upon the premise that self-disclosure confers benefits on, or enhances, the development of individuality. According to Porter and Smith, such individuality may be enhanced by affording the internal, subjective aspects of one's self-concept greater visibility and prominence within the domain of public social life, thus enabling a greater congruence between public and private aspects of one's identity. Public self-disclosure supposedly

28 Although such arguments are supposed to justify autobiographical writing, it must be noted that they are not used only to justify the purely private exercise of recording one's own personal thoughts, feelings, etc in a journal. Rather, this journal is intended for public consumption, to be read by the teacher.
serves to acknowledge and confirm the private aspects of identity, and in doing so, it acts as an antidote to the overemphasis upon the public roles which we find in the education system, or, for that matter, in society in general.

So far I have described some central features of the general case for self-disclosure. Now let us turn to the specific educational context, with a view to determining some salient features and liabilities of this context which would have a direct bearing on the character of self-disclosure which occurs in such contexts.

The Educational Context: Special features and Problems

The case of self-disclosure with which I am dealing here is specifically verbal. It takes place in the context of a dialogue between self and at least one other, and reveals information about the internal, subjective construction of values, perceptions, and activities. Such information is to be regarded as subjective, insofar as it cannot be inferred from behaviour or context alone. To use a rough definition, self-disclosure, as implied (or 'stated') in the context of the educational literature on transparency of the self, means something like "the intentional and sincere verbal disclosure of one's interpretations of, or feelings about, one's experience." Such disclosures are supposed to be subjective, to deal with the individual's own interpretations of his behaviour rather than what can be 'read off' by another.

In accordance with the 'affirmative' context which is implicitly presupposed by the practice of self-disclosure in classrooms, the recipients of self-disclosure would be expected to receive disclosures in a rather passive, reflexive, and acceptant manner: to 'affirm' already existing identity-commitments in a reflexive manner, rather than to set out to change the self-discloser's values and constructs so as to better accord with their own. It is, it seems, a context in which criticism and opposition are to be firmly discouraged, one in which the emotional needs - to be liked, accepted, approved of - are brought into play.
To provide a preliminary overview, there are several objectionable features in both practice and principle amongst those who advocate the use of self-disclosure in the particular context of education. Several aspects of privacy may be denied such students in an educational context which disregards their need for subjective privacy.

They may be denied the option of internal seclusion from the rules, regulations, and conformity pressures of public social life through an education which encourages intense emotional and personal investment in the social activities of the classroom. They may be denied the option of exercising social exclusion, of choosing for themselves the appropriate context for self disclosure. Moreover, the fact of opposition may be inadequately accounted for: In practice teachers would, I suspect, possess a very limited amount of control over responses to self-disclosures; and could not realistically be expected to be able to anticipate, and prevent, invidious judgement and criticism of the self-discloser. What is denied through the denial of privacy is the means to resist the influence of others and of the institutions which possess the power to exert considerable influence over the lives of those who are 'caught within its clutches'. Another very important feature of the educational context, one which does not occur in other contexts, is the implicit backdrop of compulsion, where all activities carry the implicit communication "You have no choice". Such an authoritarian context could be expected to put a rather different complexion on activities than would be the case if activities were freely and voluntarily chosen.

29 This authoritarianism is very evident in cases where self-disclosure is necessary for the achievement of grades, and is hence effectively enforced. The following example of this practice is quite illustrative:

A major goal of Jefferson County Open High School is to help students become capable of realistic self-evaluation...There are three levels of evaluation required for all students [one of which is as follows:]

At the end of each activity, either class, trip or apprenticeship, the student is expected to evaluate the experience and to share the evaluation with the person who led the activity. That person will respond in writing as part of the procedure (Langberg, cited in Beane (1984, 132))
5.2 The Spectator Perspective and Self-Disclosure

The scrutiny of an 'outsider' may be impartial, neutral, a 'third-person' perspective, which subtracts from its reckoning those forms of valuation which arise from an appreciation of singularity and the subjective interpretations which contribute to an understanding of such singularity. Such scrutiny may be passive and neutral in character, or it may involve hostile value-judgements, as in case where the external observer denigrates the worth or value of what he observes. Whether this scrutiny issues in weak neutrality or in strong judgement, what makes it impersonal, and hence hostile to the development of personal forms of respect, is its failure to respect the peculiarly subjective character and value of those essentially inward processes and interpretations through which persons develop their individuality.

It is the purpose of this discussion to show just how the objective character of such scrutiny may undermine respect for individuality. An important point, which must be made at the outset: The following arguments should not be taken to imply a rejection of objectivity tout court, or as an argument to the effect that such objectivity has no place where the aim is to develop personal forms of respect and self-respect. As I argued earlier, objective forms of scrutiny do have their place. Rather, the argument is that objective scrutiny is best avoided where the overriding aim is that of cultivating a respect for individuality. One very important way of doing so is ensuring that the context in which self-disclosures occur is one which observes those values which we associate with privacy. The two aspects of objectivity mentioned above are conceptually distinct.

The problems of objectivity may be associated with an oppositional context, or a context in which the discloser meets with opposition and challenge. Or, a perhaps less well-recognised fact, such problems may be associated with a non-oppositional or 'affirmative' context, one in which the attitudes of acceptance, approval, sympathy, etc, predominate, or are expected to predominate. Each has its own, distinct set of liabilities. In a supposedly 'affirmative' context, the problems are those which we associate with neutrality and impartiality, and which arise from the assumption of the
perspectives of detached, or emotionally removed, observers. In an oppositional context, the liabilities for the development of self-respect are those which we associate with judgmentalism and the consequent imposition and intrusion of dissonant perspectives or values.

These potential difficulties may, of course, be recognised yet nonchalantly 'passed over' as unavoidable risks which anyone who discloses will have to learn to cope with. They may accordingly be written off as 'a valuable learning time' for the child. They are not to be dismissed lightly, as I shall argue. This is because of the threats to respect for individuality which may arise from the misplaced internalisation of objective perspectives and/or evaluations.

5.2.1 The Affirmative Context: Detachment

The right to privacy is often conceived of and defended in ways which imply the existence of opposition (Kelvin 1973, 249-250). Thus, in the individualist tradition, it is usual to think of the individual pursuing privacy as a way of maintaining himself against the prescriptive impositions of others, fortifying himself against a hostile world. Accordingly, the damaging potential of opposition is well recognised. Of equal significance, however, are the potentially self-alienating and de-individualising effects of various kinds of 'positive' or affirmative response. Although, on the face of it, attitudes such as tolerance and acceptance may not seem to present much of a threat to a self-discloser's self-concept, this is not the case if we look closer.

In the context of classroom self-disclosure, the presence of emotional detachment becomes evident in cases where the discloser may meet with 'affirmation' which is of the wrong kind, which is, for instance, too weak or of the wrong kind to do justice to the intensely personal character of her self-disclosures. In other words, there may exist a lack of 'affective congruence' between discloser and recipient of disclosures. Alternatively, the discloser may be caught off guard with opposition for which she is not prepared because she has been led to expect affirmation.
'Affirmative' responses come in differing kinds and intensities. They may range from weak and rather 'neutral' to intense, as in the shared experiences that come from intimacy. These often require nothing less than full sympathy, or even empathy, the ability to adopt an inside perspective based on similarity of experience. A very important concern for the self-discloser, or for those who are responsible for arranging the conditions of self-disclosure, is that of maximising what I shall call 'affective congruence', whereby the intensity or quality of the response to the disclosure 'matches' the weight of personal significance which is attached by the discloser. If such a concern, where relevant, is disregarded, a discloser may among other things, meet with a situation where a disclosure of immense personal significance meets with a mild and neutral form of acceptance.

To illustrate the significance of 'affective incongruence', consider the case of a Vietnam War veteran who has incorporated into his self-concept a deep sense of pride in having managed to come through and conquer the psychic traumas inflicted by war. Essential to the development of this central aspect of his identity is the experience of the horrors of war and the attendant emotional and physical suffering. Supposing he winds up, either through ill-judgment or indiscretion, making a deep personal disclosure of this fact, hitherto held close to himself. Moreover, he discloses it to someone who had never experienced any consequential form of suffering, and who, in consequence, bases his own estimates of the magnitude of the veteran's emotional accomplishments purely on, for instance, his experience of having overcome the emotional traumas he suffered from being taunted at school. Thus having little idea or experience of suffering, he responds with a rather lukewarm "I know what you mean".

Such detachment may, in circumstances of deep personal disclosure serve effectively to trivialise an individual's self-concept or the values which form its basis. The consequences of such trivialisation may range from mild offense (wherein the 'arrogance of inexperience' is just felt to be rather trying) to a deep sense of negation of one's sense of identity, depending upon the motives, intentions and psychological
status of the discloser. Since it is the purpose of this discussion to examine some of the ways in which trivialisation of deep personal concerns may undermine the sense of identity of vulnerable individuals, I will now look more closely at some important aspects of this strong affirmation, and the likely consequences of its absence.

The case of the emotional requirements of a war veteran illustrates some components of what I shall call 'strong affirmation' - understanding, appreciation, sympathy based on personal experience or commonality of interests. One very important aspect of this sympathy - the aspect with which I shall primarily be concerned - involves the ability to adopt the 'player perspective', to approach the experience 'from the inside', as would a participant, rather than 'from the outside' as would a spectator. This requires something rather different from the purely cognitive exercise of entering another's world 'at one remove', as would a detached and value-neutral investigator. The significance of this point is captured cogently by Gerstein in his defense of privacy:

When I have been involved in intimate communion and then am made suddenly aware that I am being observed, I am also suddenly brought to an awareness of my own actions as objects of observation... The temptation now to appraise the appearance I make... would certainly be very strong... I would... be pulled out of the experience into the perspective from which meaning is to be read off from appearances.... These are cases in which there is potentially a serious contradiction between the significance the intimacy has for the relationship out of which it grows and the meaning that the outsider could be expected to read from it. (Gerstein 1984, 268)

The ability to adopt this insider perspective would seem essential to the complete and emotionally satisfying acknowledgment and appreciation of certain aspects of self and of human experience. This holds, as in Gerstein's example, particularly in the case where the qualitative aspects of experience can only be gained from participation in process.
Moreover, a precondition for the adoption of this insider perspective is the presence of shared values, experiences, perceptions. A 'sympathetic response' implies much more than mere forbearance, a negative stance which requires only that one refrain from imposing one's beliefs or values on the other person; it implies 'attunement', 'accord', 'resonance'. There must exist a degree of accord between recipient and discloser, some 'common ground'. This requirement for common ground is, moreover, a very demanding one; assuredly much more demanding than is often assumed by those who imply that it is readily and universally available. Whatever gets in the way of such congruence of values and/or experiences will, of course, serve to preclude the possibility of adopting this insider perspective. Of course, the more undiscriminating the self-discloser, the more likelihood that she will encounter an audience who cannot adopt such a perspective. This is because there are many factors which can, and do, debar such sympathy: Differences in temperament, intelligence and background, among other things, serve to separate human beings from one another, and present barriers to the exercise of sympathy. This is, I believe, a modest and rather uncontroversial claim, and it certainly should not commit me to the charge of holding to an 'essential self'. Differences may also arise from the (contingent) fact that no two individuals will undergo identical experiences or form identical associations. It may arise from the fact that, in any individual there will always exist highly arbitrary and subjective associations. Dreams, for instance, often carry a highly personal significance.

Apart from these differences in nature and/or nurture, there also exist aspects of human experience the subjectivity of which constitutes their essential character, a character

30 A case in point. Canfield and Wells justify classroom exercises in self-disclosure as follows: "In addition to discovering that other people share some of the same deep concerns, the student will experience the ideas, feelings, and thoughts of others as being worthwhile and important; he will thus begin to believe in himself as more worthwhile and important also." (Canfield and Wells, 1971, 63). The assumption that there will exist amongst any random and arbitrarily selected group of individuals sufficient 'common ground' to allow a sympathetic response to the personal information disclosed by every member of the class is, to say the least, an interesting one.
which is not compatible with the detached perspective which exposure to 'objective scrutiny' introduces. The quality of such experiences are accessible only by direct participation in process.

It is the existence of these differences which, in my view, constitutes the single most important defense of the indispensable place of privacy, and, accordingly, of selective intimacy, in the maintenance of self-respect. Despite this, though, the significance and import of these differences for the act of self-disclosure has, in my view, been seriously underestimated. Indeed, some educators appear simply to assume that there will exist amongst a classroom of individuals of different cultures, intelligences and temperaments sufficient common ground to enable sympathetic responses which 'affirm' the specific identities of each and every individual in the class. (Button 1982; Canfield and Wells 1976).

If what is required by the self-discloser is merely a 'weak' form of acceptance, such as that of tolerance, then this assumption may be a reasonable one. If the self-disclosures are to be confined to the discussion of shared activities, then it is also a reasonable assumption: 'common ground', at its most superficial level, may be provided by shared activities, such as playing football together. At this level, the mere fact of common participation may provide sufficient common ground to enable the adoption of the insider perspective. If, however, the context for self-disclosure, is highly personalised, and the discloser expects, or is led by context to expect, the deeper affirmation, then this assumption is not only unreasonable, but also dangerous. Such conditions may render the self-discloser vulnerable to the repudiation of his experience.

Rather unfortunately, the type of self-disclosure advocated often suggests just such a context. Recommendations for self-disclosure in education often draw upon the supposed merits of highly personalised contexts, in which the individual is encouraged to disclose aspects of his personal history, or autobiographical details. Moreover, the content of self-disclosures is often such as to encourage the investment of personal and emotional 'need' in the activity of self-disclosure.
It is in these cases that the requirement for common ground becomes more problematic and demanding. To encourage emotional investment is also to encourage the development of those expectancies and motive which would make a discloser all the more vulnerable to the effects of the absence of strong affirmation. And, moreover, the further the content of self-disclosures departs from the context of immediate shared activities, the more salient becomes the problem of a lack of common ground. It is in these contexts, then, that a/the effects of lack of common ground are unavoidable; and b/ the discloser is most likely to be emotionally vulnerable to these effects, for good or for ill.

The ill-effects, if subtle, may be far reaching. They arise from the infelicitous intrusion and internalisation of a detached and spectatorial perspective on aspects of one's experience which cannot 'survive' such a perspective: 'death by objectivity'.

The significance of much of our experience may be highly subjective, and even in some cases irredeemably solipsistic, but this factor does not, and should not, serve to reduce their import or significance for ourselves. The experience of intimacy, for instance, often carries a deeply subjective character or 'tone' which is very difficult to translate into the language of objects and behaviours. Such experiences are part and parcel of human experience: to deny them would be to lead a truncated inner life, and to be less of a human being as a consequence. We would have to say that there was something seriously amiss with an individual who systematically excluded such experiences from her sense of 'who she is' or to disown their legitimacy as bases of self-respect. Such disowning is, however, a likely consequence for the individual who overexposes her 'inner life' to an unsympathetic audience.

Where the insider perspective is absent from one's audience, a likely consequence of self-disclosure would be the exposure to objective scrutiny of aspects of self which are charged with highly personal significance. Such objective scrutiny presents perils. It is not simply that objective scrutiny may put such things in a harsh light. Nor is the threat just the obvious one which pertains to the personal affront which are received from indifferent or hostile reception of self-expressions. It is not merely the threat of
belittlement, of, for instance, attracting labels which serve, by their very banality, to diminish or 'shrink' experience. Although it is all of these, it is also, and more profoundly, and subtly, a threat of the loss of such experience. In effect, exposure to objective scrutiny may simply dissolve those experiences, which cannot be translated into the language of the objective observer without losing their, essentially subjective, character. The mere fact of translating such experience may introduce an element of detachment which serves to negate the very quality of the experience.

The individual who discloses to 'outsiders' may put himself in a similar position to that of Gerstein's intimate lovers 'under observation': All aspects of his subjective experience exposed to, and even killed off by, objective scrutiny. At the extreme limit of this process, for instance, there is the paradigm case of the 'all-public' individual: the individual who possesses no private life which can truly be called his own, and whose spiritual poverty can be traced to a consistent devaluation, and neglect of, those 'inner' aspects of self which cannot readily be communicated to others, or made the object of their reflected appraisal.

Importantly, the presence and internalisation of the 'spectator perspective' is in itself sufficient to create these effects. It is the form rather than the content of the judgment which carries the weight - detached, neutral, spectatorial. There need not be any opposition or invidious judgment.

This, then, is the main problem with an affirmative context. It constitutes a good argument against even those forms of disclosure which are often considered the least harmful; for instance, the practice of encouraging students to 'hand in' their autobiographical writings to teachers. Although we would expect teachers to be able and willing to withhold invidious judgment, or at least keep such judgement to herself; and it may even be realistic to expect tolerance, acceptance, and the other forms of weak affirmation. But disclosures include material which possesses this essentially subjective, or deeply personal character, the mere presence of objective scrutiny may suffice to undermine those aspects of his identity which are exposed to such scrutiny.
Although in theory the environment in which self-disclosures in educational contexts takes place is supposed to be controlled in such a way as to avoid the invidious effects of opposition, nonetheless, this is a rather unrealistic assumption. Some educators may even write off exposure to opposition as 'a learning experience'. However, the possible consequences of such opposition are not to be lightly dismissed, as I shall show.

As we have just seen, the subjective bases of self-respect may be compromised by the 'intrusion' of the perspective of detached indifference, the perspective of a value-neutral 'observer'. As well as taking this rather passive and neutral form, lack of sympathy may take more active and oppositional forms, wherein differing values or perceptions are imposed upon the discloser. Unlike the affirmative context, this is a context where lack of sympathy is expressed in the form of disagreement, of clashes and conflicts of value and perception, etc. The recipient of self-disclosures may for whatever reason fail to share the values of the discloser. And he may consequently impose these values, or perceptions, on the discloser in ways which can lead to self-alienation. This holds particularly if the values of the audience happen, for whatever reason, to hold the ascendancy (perhaps because they are shared by the majority), or if the discloser is, for whatever reason, insecure in his identity, or particularly vulnerable to influence.

Empirical research suggests that it is in these conditions that severe 'casualties' of group-work may emerge. Anderson, in his paper "Working with Groups" (1984), dispels several myths about group work, one of which is the myth that "everyone benefits from group work". He cites research which shows that approximately one in ten are psychologically damaged by group work (Anderson, 1984, 269). And the conditions under which this damage is, according to research most likely to happen, are rather instructive:
Those who join groups and have the potential to be harmed by them have unrealistic expectations. These expectations tend to be fed by the leader, who coerces the member to meet them. When the member fails to achieve the accepted, he or she is often relegated to a deviant, nonviable role by the leader, by other members, and in terms of self-acceptance. Many of these expectations focus on the expression of intense, innermost feelings immediately in the group...[An] attack by a powerful, aggressive leader, rejection by a power clique in the group, or overstimulation almost assure injury (Anderson, 1984, 269)

It has, then, been established empirically that ill-judged and enforced self-disclosure in groups may result in emotional damage to minorities. These conditions would appear to have direct relevance to the position of minorities in conditions, such as those of a classroom, where public self-disclosure is expected.

'Emotional damage' can, of course, cover a multitude of sins, obvious or subtle and insidious. My focus here is upon the way in which enforced exposure to public judgement may undermine respect for individuality by robbing the participants of the privacy which is essential to the development of the dispositions and attitudes associated with such respect.

In the case which I shall use to illustrate this process - the case of the creatively gifted adolescent - both these conditions hold. The creatively gifted adolescent is likely to be vulnerable in his sense of identity like most adolescents. Moreover, being 'different', he is likely to encounter values or perceptions which, while being unlike his own, happen to be shared by the majority, and hence hold the ascendancy.31

31 This is, of course, a more general point. I have used the specific example of the gifted adolescent to illustrate problems which apply equally in other cases: cultural differences, gender differences, the problems in communication presented by mental or physical handicap, and many other such cases.

32 There is a considerable amount of literature on social influence. Jones and Gerard (1967) showed that influence tends to flow from the direction of the majority to the minority. Other research demonstrating the effects of social influence may be found in Asch (1952).
The difficulties the creatively gifted have in being understood and accepted by their peers are notorious. These difficulties are well-documented in educational literature:

[The creatively gifted adolescent] is better able to see the artificiality of the frames of reference created by his peers. His peer groups are less adequate for him than for the normal adolescent... (Willings 1980, 87)

It is well established that the imaginative leanings of the creatively gifted may result in perceptions which differ from those of the majority (American Association for Gifted Children 1978), the experience of being gifted may bring differing values as well as differing perceptions. For instance, empirical research has shown that imagination develops best in conditions where the individual is free from pressure to conform (Torrance 1964; Amabile 1983). It is thus common to find that creative individuals prefer to develop their imaginations in solitude, and to prefer solitary study over cooperative study. Because of his imagination and preference for solitary study, the creatively gifted self-discloser in a 'mainstreamed' classroom is liable to be particularly at risk of meeting an unsympathetic audience to his self-disclosures.

In order to minimise the threat which may be presented by such a lack of sympathy, the gifted adolescent may adopt the strategy of deception, of changing the impression he creates so that it may be readily comprehended by his peers. If he does not anticipate this threat, he may go ahead and disclose his dissonant perception or values. Whichever strategy is adopted, the failure of sympathy may adversely affect the gifted student's self-image. The social processes to which the gifted discloser is subjected may, for instance, result in a truncated self-image which does not do justice to essential aspects his subjectively constructed identity. This is because interactive processes possess immense power to 'lock' self-representations that are made public.

33 A gifted child's description of the experience of being gifted in school, included in an anthology of such descriptions.
This 'locking' may happen through processes of selective reinforcement, whereby the approval, or disapproval, of others is brought to bear upon the individual. Or it may happen through processes of interactive consolidation, whereby the force of expectation serves to crystallise a stunted or otherwise unsatisfactory self-image. We shall now examine more closely the implications of each of these processes.

Selective Reinforcement: Approval

The processes of selective reinforcement are a subtle, yet powerful way, of imposing one's values upon another person. In this case the impetus is provided by the presence of approving (or disapproving) attitudes towards the discloser. Kinder captures this process nicely in his description of encounter groups:

[During one of my many marathon encounter groups]...the people were asked what they wanted in life. One after another, some tearfully, some radiating a sense of inner courage, expressed what they believed were their innermost wishes: to be able to 'risk joy', to be 'free to love', to 'live in the now', or to 'shed their ego'.

One of the last to speak...looked around and said "I want to be a better tennis player'. Instantly the group pounced on him with shock and righteous indignation, accusing him of being shallow and emotionally bankrupt. In fact, I thought he was probably the most well-adjusted person there. The only person who defended him [said] "They all seem like hyenas sitting on their

34 There is a significant difference between expectation-driven and approval-driven forms of 'interactive locking'. The latter involves the desire to please, and so an individual may be said to be vulnerable to it only to the extent that he wishes to please. Expectations, however, may lock behaviours which do not receive the approval of the 'expecter': For instance, the common case of the adult individual who 'regresses' into childish behaviours when he goes to visit his parents.
haunches waiting to devour any feelings that might come out (Kinder 1990, 10-11).

It is a commonplace in psychology that approval will reinforce behaviours, while disapproval will tend to discourage them.

To illustrate the effect which such processes can have upon the unwary self-discloser consider again the case of the gifted adolescent. Suppose the gifted individual divulges his preference for solitary study to a classroom of individuals who prefer cooperative study. Initially, at least, he understands his impulse to be one of healthy independence. The motive, as he accurately perceives it, is one of attraction towards what she enjoys rather than of escape, 'getting away from people'. It is an act of positive choice rather than of escape.

Initially, the values of the gifted adolescent are congruent with his temperament and mentality, and he is very much at ease with this preference. After repeated self-disclosures to classmates who prefer cooperative study, however, this 'ease with his own values' erodes. Repeated exposure to the indifference, or downright disapproval, of his classmates, causes the student to doubt his values, and consequently to doubt himself virtue of his possession of them. If he is vulnerable to disapproval (as many are), he may be led through such processes to conformity with the values of the majority. He may, thus, begin to re-interpret his experiences in the light of the ascendant values of his classmates, doubting his original motives, and becoming self-alienated in the process: "Perhaps I really am trying to escape from people. Perhaps there's something wrong with me here. I'd better learn to enjoy studying with other people more."

This process cannot be evaded even where a neutrally descriptive account of activities is presented. Even if the gifted individual presents an account of his activities which reveals nothing about her values, he will still expose herself to the pressures of selective reinforcement. For instance, he spends half of his study time alone and half of his study time in cooperation with others, and values the solitary activities over the
cooperative activities (at least initially). In disclosing this information about his activities, he reveals nothing about his preferences. The audience expresses approval of the cooperative activities only. As a result of his strong desire for approval, he develops a bias for such activities, even if they do not 'fit' with his personal temperament or original values.

The option of resistance, although possible, is not always a plausible one. It is an option available only to those rare individuals who possess unusual strength of character and presence of mind, which enables them constantly to be on guard against, and able to resist, the effects of constant exposure to selective reinforcement. Of course, it is hardly reasonable to rely upon the presence of such strength of character in any case, but particularly in the case of children or adolescents, whose identity is yet unformed and vulnerable to influence.

Interactive Consolidation: Social Expectation

As social constructionists are aware, identity is a dynamic process, which is constructed and reconstructed through processes of interaction with others. It is almost a commonplace in psychology that an individual can be 'trapped' by the expectations of others into behaving in ways which conform with those expectations. Expectations constitute powerful forms of control. This, of course, is a general threat, which applies irrespective of whether the agent discloses his or her subjective self-interpretations.

This unavoidable aspect of human interaction is a two-edged sword for the self-discloser. It can do much to affirm his sense of identity in cases where the expectations or perceptions of others are fully congruent with his actual or ideal self-image. But it can also lead to a frustrated sense of identity where those perceptions are not, or cannot be, made so congruent.

Porter's arguments from self-affirmation, which I considered earlier, are intended to address this very problem: Self-disclosure, so it is argued, is supposedly just another
way of ensuring that such processes do not lead to a frustrated 'sense of identity'. Porter's defense of self-disclosure in educational contexts appeals largely to the indisputable benefits of maximising accordance between subjective self-representations and the representations - and thence expectations - of others. Self-disclosure supposedly produces support and affirmation of subjective self-identifications by ensuring that interactive processes reinforce them, or at the very least do not disregard them.

This holds only in cases where expectations can plausibly be made congruent with the discloser's own identity-commitments. Where there exist factors which preclude such congruence, the potential identity-denying effects may eclipse any such self-affirmative potential.

To illustrate the operation of such identity-denying forms of interactive consolidation, consider again our case of the creatively gifted self-discloser among others who do not share his imaginative capacities. To 'play to his audience' he needs to downplay the substantial role of imaginative processes in the construction of his identity. However, since those imaginative processes play a central role for him, to downplay them is also to downplay essential aspects of his self-image. Whether he chooses to truncate his self-representations in this way, or whether this process occurs by default, the resultant of this process is a set of expectations which do not, and cannot, do justice to essential aspects of his self-image. His very self-concept may, through this process, come effectively to be constrained by his peers' lesser imaginative capacities, and his respect for his own individuality thus suffer from the undermining of some of the core values upon which it is based.

What may result is a form of self-stunting which is all the more thoroughgoing because it comes to affect the private life as well as the more public aspects of one's personality and manifest behaviour. This is because whatever is made public is made vulnerable to the 'locking' which arises from interactive processes.
The foregoing highly plausible examples illustrate the operation of two kinds of social process which impose impersonal values on the construction of personal identities. As these examples show, the discloser whose disclosures cannot, for whatever reason, be received in the spirit in which they are given may suffer considerable losses to his self-respect.

The problems arise from the presence of misunderstandings, or incomplete understandings, of the motives, values, and perceptions of the self-disclosure. To the extent that the argument against indiscriminate self-disclosure rests upon such considerations, it may be vulnerable to the criticism that if, as can be reasonably supposed, individuals will be misunderstood just as much, if not more, if they do not disclose, then some self-disclosure may be preferable to none: With self-disclosure at least there is a possibility of reducing such misunderstanding, whereas without self-disclosure there is no such redeeming possibility. Why, then, is the self-discloser who is misunderstood worse off than the non-self-discloser who is misunderstood?

To this kind of argument, I would reply that the case of misunderstood self-disclosure enables certain undesirable conditions which may be less likely where no disclosure takes place: Others may become more arrogant, using their (false) 'understanding' as a licence which opens the doors to prescriptive and intrusive practices which would be less than acceptable to one who clearly recognised the limitations of his knowledge or understanding of another person. Or, for the discloser herself, the false but comfortable illusion that she is 'understood' may, besides setting her up for disillusionment, serve to postpone the recognition and confrontation of those aspects of self which must be upheld alone.

Perhaps most important, though, is the likelihood that a discloser may come to misunderstand himself because of the misunderstandings of others. This is because, as Restak showed in his study of the psychology of imposters, a deception can, if often repeated, and reinforced by the responses of others, come to be believed by the deceiver. As research on the psychology of impostures has shown, a deception repeated
often enough often comes to be accepted as truth, or at least appropriated into the identity of, the deceiver.

It is from the confirming reactions of the audience that the imposter gets a 'realistic' sense of self...But reality and identity seem for the imposter to be strengthened rather than diminished by the success of the fraudulence of his claims (Greenacre, cited in Restak 1982, 218).

In support of this contention, the evidence of considerable empirical research can be adduced, research which shows that re-interpretations of one's motives often follow from one's public self-expressions or role-play (Bem 1962; Gergen 1977).

For the individual who places a high premium on self-disclosure, a public self-disowning readily shades off into a private self-disowning. Information about the self which is withheld will not be accessible to such a dynamic.

5.2:3 Conclusion

I have considered several ways in which respect for individuality, or the bases of self-respect, may be undermined through exposure to spectator perspectives. A loss of inner, subjective life may occur through overexposure to killing detachment. Identity may be diminished, reduced, stunted, through the power of interactional processes to 'consolidate' and 'lock in' a self-misrepresentation. A discloser may make herself vulnerable to having her private self-constructions 'made over' to accommodate the values and perceptions of others.

The arguments above commend one form of privacy - that form of privacy which we associate with exclusive intimacy and which dictates the selective use of disclosure.

Additional research upon the impact of expectations in the formation of student self-concepts may be found in Good and Brophy (1973, 75) and in Rosenthal (1968).
amongst people who are 'intimate', to the purview of intimate and exclusive relationships. They effectively constitute arguments against indiscriminate self-disclosure, not against self-disclosure per se. And they are more applicable in cases of disclosures of a certain depth, quality, and emotional charge. The defense of privacy in this context arises from the desirability of maximising congruence of affect, values, and perceptions so as to enable sympathy between discloser and disclosee.

In such cases the right circumstances are circumstances in which: a/ the audience is capable of, and disposed to, adopt a sympathetic perspective; b/ the discloser freely chooses to disclose rather than being 'compelled' to disclose. This 'a priori' argument can also be supplemented by empirical research. Anderson puts the case as follows:

> In...theories about the mechanisms of change in small groups there is the assumption that most of the member learning comes from an exchange of self-disclosure for feedback (Jacobs 1974)...To a large degree, this unqualified hypothesis is a myth...The consistent facts from research suggest that self-disclosure and feedback per se made no difference in relation to outcomes...Rather...the actual contribution of self-disclosure and feedback relates to the way in which these processes aid intermember empathy...Self-disclosure...appears useful only when the intention of sharing deeply personal material is understood, appreciated and correctly interpreted by the group (Anderson 1985, 275).

These are, of course, the conditions which characterise healthy intimacy. Intimate partners (or friends) often come together because they share values, interests, and, moreover, tend to spend time engaging in shared activities. All of this, of course, provides a firm basis for sympathetic rapport. In the context of such intimacy, talk of 'compulsion' is not only incongruous, but, indeed antithetical to the very spirit of voluntariness and spontaneity which characterises intimacy. Disclosures are freely offered by individuals who are in a position to control how much they choose to reveal. This freedom is enabled by the absence of both internal and external pressures to disclose.
Of course, these arguments are not intended to constitute a devaluation of objectivity per se, or of those forms of perception which arise from the spectator perspective, or from the presence of evaluative stances. It is, rather, an argument for making the context accord with the character of the respect which is one intends to cultivate. In the case of self-disclosure, the avowed aims are clearly to promote personal forms of respect. Accordingly, the context should be one which fosters the values which we associate with privacy.

In Chapter 2, I identified several salient features of personal respect. As has become apparent from the above discussion, these features of personal respect may be undermined through the internalisation of objective perspectives. The value of participation in process may be lost. The development of respect for the individuality of others may be sacrificed through the constant cultivation of instrumental forms of regard, wherein one is unable to respect others except through their 'function' as ego-enhancers, indispensable providers of the 'identity-affirmation'.

The focus in the foregoing section has been upon the role of objective perspectives in the subversion of respect for individuality. In the next section on social accountability, I will focus upon another important dimension of public intrusion in the private lives of individuals - via standards of performance.
5.3 Social Accountability and Self-Disclosure

In this section the effects of internalisation of publicly determined performance standards will be examined through the issue of rational self-accountability. I will examine ways in which the development of respect for individuality in self may be undermined through over-exposure to social norms of consistency and rational self-accountability.

5.3:1 Accountability and Rationality

In an earlier section\(^{36}\), it was argued that respect for individuality requires an openness to change, which necessitates the adoption of an experimentally non-committal attitude towards at least some of one's values or activities. The value of such attitudes arises from the fact that self-development presupposes self-transformation. In order to develop one's individuality, it can be safely assumed that there will be times and occasions where change is both unavoidable and appropriate. Except for, perhaps, the rare individual who is 'perfect' (if there is any such), such self-development will require change, and a willingness to discard values which have been 'grown out of'.

The process of self-transformation is, in essence, a creative process; and, like all forms of creativity, it requires a willingness to live with uncertainty, to live with 'transitional periods' of indefiniteness which precede the successful assumption of new identities. The creative process has been described by many as one which requires prolonged periods of uncertainty, suspense, and fluidity. The successfully creative person is one who is prepared to put up with such suspense. This much has been borne out by countless studies on creativity\(^{37}\).

\(^{36}\) Chapter 2 - "Personal forms of Respect".

\(^{37}\) A review of such studies may be found in Amabile (1983, 67-77) and in Torrance (1964, 98-100).
This state of indefiniteness, if necessary, is not always comfortable. As many have remarked, a state of prolonged suspense is, at least for some, not always easy to live with. The state of certainty, of ‘being settled’ is often a more comfortable one. Creativity, however, requires continuous effort to resist the temptation to ‘lapse’ into the more natural and ‘easy’ state of certainty. There is a continual temptation to commit prematurely, to ‘cut off’ the process in order to remove the tension and psychic discomfort which accompanies such uncertainty. Dewey puts this point eloquently:

The undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation... It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats them as such without due warrant. Familiarity, common repute... are readily made measuring rods of truth (Dewey [1944] 1966, 188).

The individual who is in the processes of defining, or re-defining her identity commitments will, of course, have to deal with this ‘creative tension’. The process of taking on a new identity is one which may, for some time, require a suspended, non-committal, undefined state of identity. This internal pressure towards closure which Dewey describes may or may not be present in any given individual. People vary temperamentally in this respect. Whatever own leanings may be, though, an individual’s attempts to remain ‘open’ would more likely be hindered than helped through self-disclosure to others. This is because there exist strong social pressures towards consistency and stable commitment, as is well-attested by empirical research (Gergen 1982; Shotter 1984).

The self-discloser may thus reasonably expect to have to contend with the pressure which others will bring to bear on her to ‘take a stand’. Smith, in his book on ‘assertive rights’, presents a rather caricatured version of this situation, but nonetheless he makes the point well, and is worth quoting:

---

38 The Myers-Brigg temperament sorter distinguishes, for instance, between ‘judges’, who prefer closure, and ‘perceivers’, who prefer open-ended receptivity to ‘whatever comes up’.
As human beings, none of us is constant and rigid. We change our minds; we decide on better ways to do things; we even change the things we want to do; our interests change with conditions and the passage of time....But if you do change your mind, other people may resist your new choice by manipulation based upon [the childish attitude that]: *You should not change your mind after you have committed yourself*. *If you change your mind something is wrong. You should justify your new choices or admit that you were in error*. *If you are in error, you have shown that you are irresponsible, likely to be wrong again, cause problems. Therefore you are incapable of making decisions by yourself* (Smith 1975, 53).

This rather anecdotal account is, of course, supported by a considerable quantity of research on 'cognitive dissonance', research which demonstrates the human tendency to avoid such dissonance where possible (Festinger 1959). Of course, the demand for consistency may be entirely reasonable and understandable. It is not the reasonableness or otherwise of such a demand which is at issue here. Obviously this human tendency is not 'fixed and unalterable' - people are capable of suspending their tendency to demand consistency. It is even possible to set up a situation, such as an encounter group, in which people, at least temporarily, suspend this tendency to demand consistency and accountability. It may be cultivated under special circumstances, such as encounter groups; and particularly in situations where interaction is sporadic rather than constant and regular. Nonetheless, as research on cognitive dissonance has shown, a readiness to tolerate experimentalism is the exception rather than the rule.

The individual who is undergoing change is, to some degree 'a mystery to himself'. He cannot comprehend the self which is emerging in terms of those values and interpretive constructs which are in the process of being discarded, but he has not yet replaced them with new ones. A public self-commentary which accurately represents his phenomenological state would probably include many phrases such as "I don't know why I did/thought/felt that.", or "I can't describe what I thought/felt" in response to
queries about motives\textsuperscript{39}. Or, take as an example the case of the person who undergoes a religious crisis, as a result of which he swings, at daily intervals, from extreme atheism, to extreme religious devotion. Such obvious inconsistency would, one suspects, test the limits of tolerance of even the most 'accepting' group. This would hold even more pointedly in cases where the group is led by an authoritarian figure (the teacher) who is specifically instructed to encourage 'self-clarification', as would a teacher who follows the recommendations of Beane (1984), an established authority on matters of self-esteem in education:

Our position is that...teachers should make an effort to identify systematically the nature, quality, and improvement of self-attitudes as part of an ongoing evaluation of students and their work.

The person whose self-perceptions tend to be unclear and/or negative frequently...avoids expressing personally held ideas or opinions...refuses to talk about personal interests...rarely asks questions that search for personal meanings...is very inconsistent, constantly changing his or her mind...cannot make decisions... (italics mine) (Beane 1984, 126-127).

If such a person were to 'reveal' to others, say in a moment by moment commentary, how he was thinking and feeling, valuing, there would be considerable pressure to 'fix', perhaps prematurely, and to provide rationalisations which defy and misrepresent the phenomenological character of his experience.

And, of course, a rationalisation repeated often enough often comes to be believed by the rationaliser. Deception of others often all too readily shades off into self-deception,

\textsuperscript{39} An account of this process may be found in Shotter's (1984) report on recent research on the phenomenon of 'Telling More than We Can Report' (169-171).
as psychological research on the psychology of impostures (Restak 1982) and of retrospective re-interpretation (Gergen 1977; Spence 1982) has demonstrated amply.40

As an illustration of this, Smith, again, describes his experience of returning house paint 'because he changed his mind' and the pressure that was put upon him to produce a justification:

In spite of the official policy of the store [to refund item without question if client dissatisfied], the clerk could not bring himself to write 'changed mind' or 'didn’t like it' in the blank space and persisted in asking for a reason why the paint was being returned...In effect the clerk was asking me to invent a reason to satisfy him...to be dishonest, to find something I could blame as an excuse for the irresponsible behaviour of changing my mind (Smith 1975, 54).

In view of this likely social pressure towards self-consistency, and towards rational self-justification, the individual who wishes to maintain an undefined, fluid and even inconsistent state, would be well-advised to maintain some degree of secrecy with regard to those aspects of her identity which are 'undergoing' such creative tension.

Weinstein makes a similar point about the process which he calls 'query':

All the components of query - contrivance, risk, a wide range of alternatives, and rigor of selection and choice, define this process as indefinite. Until the person is satisfied that query has resulted in an object which he wants to reveal to others, he will have good reasons to desire secrecy. First of all, if his product is incomplete he will not want others to waste their time judging it. Further, he will not want others to misjudge his capabilities and thereby

---

40 A prominent psychotherapist offers an apt description of this process: "The liar...intends to deceive, and does not hide his intention from himself...[However] It "happens often enough that the liar is more or less the victim of it, that he half persuades himself of it". There's the rub, there's the treachery of it. The lie...begun in self-defense slips into self-deception." (Shlien, cited in Moustakas 1967, 65).
prejudice them against his final product... The dignity of the human being requires that he be judged only on the basis of those products he decides to make public so long as he is fulfilling his moral obligations (Weinstein 1967, 101-102).

Weinstein introduces some other-regarding considerations over and above those primarily self-regarding ones with which I have so far been concerned. The self-regarding benefits of privacy - those which pertain to its function in preserving the creative elements involved in self-development - are not the only benefits. It enables other-regarding virtues, such as that of refraining from the imposition of one's 'dirty laundry' upon others, not only because one wants to avoid being misjudged, but also out of respect for others' sensibilities and sensitivities. This is an interesting and important point, and one which is often overlooked by those who defend self-disclosure in often purely self-regarding terms.

In summary, query necessitates privacy because query demands concentration and implies incompleteness and indefiniteness. The experimental nature of query demands that the burden of proof be placed on the person who would deny privacy to an individual who is fulfilling his other moral obligations. Some minimum grant of privacy is morally necessary if only because contemplation is a part of the good life. The human being who understands the full range of his consciousness will be more fit to participate as a full person in social relations than one who does not have such knowledge (Weinstein 1967, 103-104).

Interactive processes ensure stability of identity, and assuredly such stability is an important aspect of identity-formation. On the other side of the coin, though, such processes can impose powerful inertial forces which render the processes of change and self-re-definition extremely difficult. The capacity and readiness to re-define one's identity-commitments is an important one for the individual who wishes to develop her own individuality optimally. Privacy is one very important way of allowing 'room to move', leeway for self-redefinition. This benefit, however, is one which is denied the
injudicious self-discloser, whose self-disclosures effectively serve to curtail the range, freedom and flexibility of the processes of identity formation. The self-discloser may find himself 'locked into' premature identity commitments, and hence effectively denied the freedom to change.

Perhaps, then, there is wisdom in the following advice:

We all talk too much' said Esther to Phyllis...‘One has to be careful with words. Words turn probabilities into facts, and by sheer force of definition translate tendencies into habits.41 42

Privacy, then, is an important means of maintaining a state of open-ended indefiniteness against external pressures to closure. As such, it is an important condition for the operation of creative processes.

5.3:2 Accountability and History

In the cases which I have so far considered, pressures to conform to norms of rational accountability apply to explicit verbal self-disclosures. Pressures to account for oneself may also take root where no such explicit verbal self-disclosure takes place or is expected to take place. They may take root, for instance, in conditions in which an individual is denied the possibility of freeing himself from the ties of history.

The connection between anonymity and freedom from the past has often been remarked and invoked in defense of privacy. Glover (1984) thus argues that a very compelling argument against institutional or state access to personal information is grounded in the fact that such intrusion may hinder (or preclude) the processes of personal reformation;

42 The implications of the role of conversation in ‘fixing’ identity are expanded in Berger and Luckman’s (1966) work on the theory of social construction.
the fact that, as a result of such invasions of privacy the individuals concerned may be judged on, and hence often handicapped by, a personal history which has since become irrelevant in virtue of personal reformation.

Freedom from the past may be precluded in many ways; for instance, when people are required to talk about their private lives in interviews for employment43, or when students in classrooms are required to talk or write about themselves in ways which draw heavily upon their personal histories. They may be asked, for instance, to talk about their family history, their childhood, adolescence, past interests in front of others in the class; or to write detailed autobiographical histories for graded assignments 44. Although apparently harmless, such practices have been challenged on the grounds that they are overly intrusive (Swartzlander et al. 1993), and may even cause considerable emotional damage to unwilling participants. As one student eloquently put the case:

I like to write journals, but I don’t write a lot about myself. The reason is that I have had a terrible life throughout my adolescence. Therefore, I believe that some things are better left unsaid or unwritten...My English teachers always say that I am too general in my writing. The way I see it, I don’t want my teachers...to know about me. From my greatest fear to my first date, I just don’t feel comfortable writing about some topics45.

43 A horrific description of such invasions of privacy by employers was given on an edition of the TV documentary "48 Hours". In this case, an airline - Delta Airlines - conducted probing investigations into sexual habits, divorce rates, etc; and, on the basis of the information obtained rejected some (who possessed excellent job records) in preference for others, less competent, but whose sexual and intimate habits happened to conform with what they desired.

44 Many such cases are reported in a report entitled "The Ethics of Requiring Students to Write about Their Personal Lives" (The Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb 17 1993).

45 An extract from a student’s journal, reported in Swartzlander et al (1993).
It is often supposed that respect for the past plays a major role in the development of respect for individuals\textsuperscript{46}. Beane's view is quite representative, and hence worth citing:

A...source of materials that may support self-perception development is the collection of personal items young people and their families have collected. Personal memorabilia may provide an opportunity to look back at experiences and events and to examine how these may influence present and future thinking about the self. For example, learners may be interested in developing a personal timeline complete with photographs...and the like to depict major personal and family events...Young people might also be encouraged to keep journals...as a source of continuing self-knowledge, to interview parents about important past events...These and similar activities offer an excellent opportunity to use personal materials to clarify self-concept, self-esteem and values (Beane 1984, 123-124).

Clemes and Bean (1981) make a similar point:

Children need to symbolise their membership with groups that are special to them. This means that children need to label their connectiveness in real or symbolic ways, for example, "I'm Smith"; "a member of classroom 4A"; "an American"; Dressing like Dad, wearing the school emblem and team uniforms, having the same sneakers...are ways that a sense of group identity becomes concrete and specific (Clemes and Bean 1981, 39).

The discourse within which such recommendations occur often leaves very little room for talk of relinquishing ties, with tradition or with family. What is required as a counterpoint to this is an account of why the act of developing a sense of identity in which personal history plays no major role may be regarded as virtuous or good in its

\textsuperscript{46} A list of some of the literature which emphasises the role of the family and of the past in self-concept may be found in Beane (1984, 139-150).
own right; how, accordingly, such a decision may be the result of a positive act of choice, rather than of a purely negative reaction against a feared evil. Why, in other words, it may be a good thing to develop a respect for one's own individuality in and through the suspension of the traditional history-bound indices of 'identity' - family, culture, place, race, social role. What, in other words, may be gained from a context of impersonal anonymity.

Highly personalised contexts rule out the possibility of seclusion. Seclusion, it will be recalled, aids the development of individuality in many ways. It enables us to pursue some of our activities in a disinterested fashion, free of the encumbrances of accountability to enduring commitments, or to personal history. It enables a non-instrumental attitude or approach by freeing one's present activity from accountability to ongoing interests or commitments, freeing one to dwell in the present, without 'thought for the morrow' (or of the past). In short, the benefits of seclusion are those which arise from a suspension of concern with personal history and public roles.

Seclusion is fostered by social environments in which an individual can 'go incognito': contexts in which those social pressures which serve to tie individuals to their personal histories may be suspended. It follows from this, of course, that the option of seclusion may be denied in contexts which are highly personalised, and in which anonymity is denied. The full significance of this point will now be made clear.

Researchers in education discovered that shy, reticent children would suddenly become very daring and outgoing in the context of a game where all of the children wore disguises. That is, they would disclose more about themselves in a context in which they were 'allowed' to be anonymous. Moreover, the classic encounter group context is also, for the most part an impersonal one, in which the anonymity of participants is preserved (Lieberman et al. 1973). Similarly, there is the not uncommon case of the person, who, perhaps contrary to commonsense expectation, find it easier to disclose to strangers than even to his most intimate friends. In many cases, then, people are willing to reveal all sorts of information about themselves if the context ensures
anonymity. Impersonal anonymity would seem to perform an important function in these cases.

We may remark that to perform this function, such anonymity need not be absolute. It need not take the form of being unknown to, or unobserved by, anyone (or going under disguise). It may be provided by the presence of strangers, as when people do things in foreign lands which would be unthinkable at home, among people they know or are familiarly acquainted with. These strangers, or passing acquaintances may, moreover, be people whom the discloser respects and accords full moral status as human beings and potential judges of self.

An important principle operates through such anonymity, one which is generalisable beyond the specific case of the conquest of shyness. It is a principle of 'self' expression which requires, perhaps rather paradoxically, the effacement of the 'self'. The example of 'masking' which I gave earlier is but one instance in which an impersonal and anonymous context enables forms of self-expression which are less accessible in a highly personalised setting.

These are the forms of self-expression to which actors have access through their capacity and readiness to disengage the self of daily life from the personae which are expressed through their acting. Actors often report a sense of liberating expressiveness through their acting, an expressiveness which, while issuing from themselves, is nonetheless 'self'-effacing. Indeed an important condition for the dramatic expression of actors is the fact that they are 'framed off': the actor is not expected or required to carry her dramatic self-expressions over into everyday life. This condition would appear to be essential to the creativity of actors. Suppose, for instance, we were to put in effect a norm which dictated that actors should act everyday as they do on stage 'in the interests of consistency and sincerity'. The presence of such a norm would no doubt serve to put a damper on an actor's creativity by reducing the range of expressions with which he would be prepared to experiment.
Actors, travellers, persons 'in disguise' find their expressions gratifying in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that there is no possibility of having their identities 'affirmed', or their needs of personal recognition met. It could be objected that such acting can do little to develop a sense of identity or self-worth: the 'self' is not being expressed. To make such an objection would be tantamount to asserting that a/the 'act' does not connect in any significant way with those aspects of 'self' which are expressed more constantly and continuously; and b/ 'secluded' activities possess less value than those which connect in a significant way within the broader context of permanent concerns.

The latter assertion takes the form of a value-judgement. To such a value-judgement it may be replied that to disqualify such acting purely on the grounds that it is 'secluded' - or divorced from personal history/family background/ongoing interests - is effectively to devalue a very significant dimension of human experience which is highly valued by many: the 'inner freedom' which results from disconnecting identity from a specific activity or social role, or even group of activities or social roles. Mystics and travellers, who have chosen to cut off ties with the past, experience a liberating, and much sought after, sense of inner freedom. In sacrificing personal history they have not thereby sacrificed identity.

An impersonal context aids the possibility of disengagement from self-expressions. This is a very significant aspect of privacy. And, like other aspect of privacy, its significance goes beyond mere matters of self-defense or self-protection. Although these negative aspects of emotional disengagement are important ones, which should not be disregarded, there are other, more positive kinds of social self-expression which require as their precondition a form of disinterest, or self-distancing.

It is the possibility of the effacement of this 'self' which is denied through activities which draw extensively upon personal autobiographies. Such activities effectively impel individuals to bind their acts or expressions to their permanent and ongoing identity 'projects'. They impel individuals to account for all self-expressions (ie "is
this really me?"), and to regard them as worthwhile and valuable only insofar as they contribute to the ‘serious and important’ project of identity formation and validation.

Constant accountability to the past prohibits seclusion from wider contexts and ramifying concerns, thereby disallowing experimentation and play. As Sennet puts it, in his sociological analysis of the consequences of the collapse of public and private:

[An individual] loses the capacity to play and playact, in a society which allows him no impersonal space in which to play...[It]... set in motion a force making it more and more difficult for people to utilize the strengths of play. This intrusion...burdened an expressive gesture to others with a self-conscious doubt; is what I’m showing really me" ...Self-distance was on the way to being lost (Sennett 1976, 266-267).

What is denied, in effect, is the possibility of play, which, requires enough self-distance - distance from accountability to personal history or 'serious' ongoing concerns - to experiment with various forms of self-expression.

'Playful' expression requires disinterest - the ability to keep the 'self' out, to disengage self-interested concerns from self-expressions. This disinterested approach is enabled by an essential aspect of the context of play which was earlier discussed: that of 'seclusion': the existence of a self-contained setting which is suspended from other contexts, in such a way that whatever activities occur within that context have no repercussions for what goes on outside of the special context of play. The rules and conventions are set apart from 'everyday life. Such self-distance is impossible where self-interested concerns are inseparably bound up with self-expressions. Such spontaneity does not emerge readily in the presence of compulsions, either external or internal, to identify oneself with everything one expresses: too much is at stake.

Such freedom is essential to the cultivation of the experimentalism and non-committalism which were identified earlier as important for the cultivation of respect for individuality. Anonymity provides the seclusion under which it can be best
developed. In addition to promoting the values associated with enhanced expression of individuality, anonymity also, if indirectly, enables a degree of immunity from the threats of over-identification with publicly-defined social roles\textsuperscript{47}. Impersonal, anonymous contexts possess a political significance. Thus, anonymity may afford an individual space in which to 'play with' predefined conventions, roles and rules in a way which would be impossible where personal contexts pressure him to bind his sense of identity with those conventions; or where, or to conceive of his sum social worth in terms of his efficacy in adhering to such rules/conventions. Sennet puts the case as follows:

\textbf{[N]arcissism is now mobilized in social relations by a culture deprived of belief in the public and rules by intimate feeling as a measure of the meaning of reality...The result of [such a version of reality] is that the expressive powers of adults are reduced. They cannot play with reality, because reality matters to them only when it in some way promises to mirror intimate needs...}

On the empirically demonstrated effects of the erasure of distance between personality and institutional position, Sennett (1976) describes the cogent arguments which Mills presents in a famous article:

\begin{quote}
the more people connected the facts of class to their own personalities, the less did injustice of class arouse them to political action. He...observed that when education, work, even income, became felt as ingredients of personality, it became difficult for these people to rebel against injustices they perceived in their education or work. When...class passed through the filter of personality, what emerged were problems people perceived 'in getting along with each other'...Mills particularly noticed a kind of absorption in matter of how others felt, what their impulses were in the midst of action, which deflected people from pursuing ...impersonal aims (Sennett 1976, 330).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{47} An account of the moral liabilities of such over-identification may be found in Sartre's classic account of 'bad faith' (Sartre 1969, 47).
In essence, an impersonal context enables the maintenance of that form of internal privacy which is expressed through subjective disengagement, and through the capacity and readiness to self-distance. Where such privacy is denied, so too are many important dimensions of social experience, most significantly those which pertain to play, creativity, and the readiness to challenge the injustices of the system in which one is enmeshed. All of these are essential to the development and expression of individuality in the self; and all alike presuppose a capacity for disengagement and self-distance.

These arguments present a strong presumption against the use of personalising approaches, and place the burden of proof on those who would use them.

It could be objected that the foregoing arguments for privacy are only as strong as the rather pessimistic assumptions that it makes about the conditions which surround the self-discloser in educational contexts. Firstly, it may be objected that my arguments presuppose a state of emotional vulnerability which may not be present in many cases. Perhaps, that is, I am assuming that children possess less emotional hardiness than they can be given credit for. And secondly, it may be objected that my arguments presuppose the existence of intolerant and/or hostile responses to self-disclosures. Benn puts the case as follows:

For many of us, we are free to be ourselves only within that area from which observers can legitimately be excluded. We need a sanctuary or retreat in which we can...desist for a while from projecting on the world the image we want to be accepted as ourselves, an image that may reflect the values of our peers rather than the reality of our natures. To remain sane, we need a closed environment, open only to those we trust, with whom we have an unspoken understanding that whatever is revealed goes no further.

Put in this way, however, the case for privacy begins to look like a claim to the conditions of life necessary only for second-grade men in a second-grade society. For the man who is truly independent - the autonomous man - is the
one who has the strength of mind to resist the pressure to believe with the
rest...He is the man who...refused to be anything or to pretend to be anything
merely because the world casts him for the part.

Benn’s reply to this objection is an instructive one:

[However] not many have [this courage]. For the rest of us, the freedom we
need is the freedom to be something else - to be ourselves, to do what we think
best, in a small, protected sea, where the winds of opinion cannot blow us off
course...Not many of us perhaps have gone so far along the road to moral
maturity that we can bear unrelenting exposure to criticism without flinching
(Benn 1967, 24-26).

Benn’s observations about emotional vulnerability can be supplemented by a vast
amount of empirical research on 'the approval motive'. The basic 'weakness' may
even be magnified by conditions in the educational context. Self-disclosure is often
couraged alongside a set of value judgements which ensure that basic vulnerability
is, if anything, likely to be increased: a context which encourages the investment of
emotional need and demand in the act of self-disclosure48.

It could, moreover, be argued that the considerations in favour of privacy may be
overridden by stronger considerations in favour of the use of such approaches. One
such set of considerations, which I will consider in the final chapter, involves the
assumption of 'need'. It could be argued, thus, that children have a need for emotional
and social 'nurturance'; and that the meeting of such a need constitutes a prima facie
case for overriding the right to privacy. If, for instance, one could establish that this
is a 'need' - perhaps on a par with the basic need for food - then perhaps there would
be a case for overriding the right to privacy. The imperative to meet this 'need' may

48 This issue of 'need' will be more fully discussed in a later section.
thus be higher on the list of priorities than is the imperative to respect privacy. Such arguments will be considered in full in the final chapter.

Now, however, I would like to conclude this chapter on self-regarding implications of the threat to privacy which may occur through ill-judged self-disclosure.

5.4 Conclusion

In Chapter 5, I have argued that the disregard of the concern for privacy which occurs through self-disclosure possesses much potential to undermine self-respect. This undermining of self-respect may occur through the threat of detachment, the threat of loss of core values upon which self-respect is founded, or the threat of a loss of freedom, of being trapped by interactive processes into premature identity-commitments. As has been shown, there is far more at stake in the defense of privacy than simply the fear of 'loss of face'.

Privacy is an essential means of preserving personal freedom and integrity. The strategy of setting aside a private area which is inaccessible to the view of others is an essential way of preserving an area of freedom which is outside the 'net' of social expectations and interactive processes. It is important to preserve such freedom in any case - but particularly in cases where one's self-disclosures do not or cannot do justice to essential aspects of oneself. Better to have no hearing than to have an unjust hearing in such cases.

The fact that self-disclosure can lead to self-estrangement or to various kinds of curtailment of personal liberty does not imply, of course, that it will necessarily do so. But, nonetheless we can safely generalise from the above examples that the need for privacy should become more pressing where:

- Self-concept is, for some reason, insecure and 'shaky', and hence unusually vulnerable to influence.
- It is appropriate to keep one's identity commitments fluid and open-ended, at least temporarily.
- An individual wishes to resist conformity pressure or unsolicited attacks on her integrity.
- The presence of an irremovable 'communication barrier' renders an individual's values or perceptions (irremediably) 'out of sync' with those of her audience.

This is not, of course, to advise a strategy of self-isolation as a means of preserving a vulnerable self-concept. That would be rather too extreme. Although perhaps overstated, there is considerable substance in the claim that self-disclosure can enhance identity, and that it is an important means of enhancing self-esteem. But with the important rider 'under the right circumstance. It is clear from the above arguments that the right circumstances are those which are dictated by concern for privacy.
CHAPTER 6

PRIVACY AND RESPECT FOR OTHER SELVES

The Case of Cooperative Learning

In Chapter 5, I used the case of self-disclosure to show how a failure to understand the role of privacy may result in practices which subvert the processes which contribute to respect for individuality. The focus was primarily upon the self-regarding implications of such a loss of respect: how it effects the regard in which an individual holds himself. In Chapter 6, I shall turn to the other-regarding implications of failure to take into consideration the requirements of privacy.

There is currently a trend to encourage cooperative learning in the classroom. In this section I will examine a representative selection of writings by advocates of cooperative learning. I shall argue that the recommended practices and procedures do not promote those values, or qualities of character, which are essential to a full and proper understanding of friendship. More importantly, I shall argue, such practices, and the principles which underlie them, possess the potential to subvert and undermine those very values which the proponents of cooperative learning are so eager to promote.

The underlying principles through which this subversion of respect for individuality occurs may also undermine the regard which one holds for the individuality of other selves. In this section, as in the previous section, I will focus upon two routes through which 'the public' may intrude, interfere with and hinder the development of the capacity to respect the individuality of others:

1/ Through a concern with the perspective of the 'outside observer'.
2/ Through a concern with forms of evaluation which appeal to objectively determined standards of performance.

49 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication by the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory, and should appear in an early 1994 issue.
The virtues of friendship will feature prominently throughout this chapter. The virtues which we associate with the notion of friendship - mutual respect and sensitivity - are just those which are required for the exercise of respect for the individuality of others.

6.1 Introduction

Educators aim to develop the qualities of respect for others through cooperative learning, which is centred upon a task. They also aim to cultivate such skills in more loosely structured, informal group settings which involve the exploration of affect and the rehearsal of interactive behaviours.  

Whether the structure is formal or informal, such activities are characterised by a solicitation of the affective and subjective aspects of human interaction. There is a strong concern with the development of affections such as liking, and with the personal attitudes associated with respect for the individuality of others. It may even be suggested that the presence of such affections is a sine qua non for the cultivation of those interactive skills which may be required for cooperation.

---

50 Cooperative learning is also recommended for the promotion of purely academic goals, as it has, for instance, been argued that learning in cooperative groups is more effective than in the traditional teaching context, but I shall not be concerned with such arguments in this section. (The research of Johnson et al. (1981) is an important source of such claims for the academic benefits of cooperative learning. However, the conclusions of such research have been challenged (Cotton and Cook 1982), and hence the argument from academic benefits may still be regarded as a controversial one.)

51 Others also have criticised this overemphasis upon 'positive affect'. Campbell and Tesser (1985, 112) argue that closeness need not involve positive affect (or for that matter, physical proximity), but is defined primarily by the fact that the individuals concerned "view themselves and others as forming a psychological 'unit'" (an example being that of family members who experience frequent 'negative affect' towards one another). And Maxwell (1990, 182) argues that such an emphasis leads educators to focus primarily upon those social behaviours and attitudes which lead to popularity among the many rather than upon those more complex attitudes which lead to deeper friendships among the few: "...the uncritical promotion of popularity as a desirable end in itself... may lead to an emphasis upon superficial relationships and an unhealthy competitive atmosphere amongst children."
Concern with the Affections

Proponents of cooperative learning will often invoke the tenets of 'contact theory' to argue that such learning will help foster respect and tolerance for other students, (Slavin, 1983, 1991; Johnson and Johnson 1990). For instance, Slavin, whose views are representative of those of contemporary proponents of cooperative learning, states clearly that cooperation will enhance the skills and dispositions which we associate with the development of friendship.

Cooperation almost invariably increases contact... Cooperative contact between individuals occupying equal roles is a powerful producer of positive relationships....More important...is the more frequent formation of friendships within cooperating groups...part of what makes these friendships is [that] mutual help leads to mutual liking (Slavin, 1983, 18-19).

The reasoning is that cooperative learning will encourage the development of friendships by encouraging the development of affections. The argument is essentially about propinquity, increased contact:

However interpersonal relations are defined, there are several established principles concerning how positive relations are formed. The most important is that positive relationships depend on contact....Next door neighbours are more likely to become friends than are second-to-next-door neighbours, roommates more than hallmates...and so on (Slavin, 1983, 18).

This, in itself, seems fairly uncontroversial. Many advocates of cooperative learning go further than this, though, for their writings often contain recommendations for fostering the qualities of intimacy and personal involvement which are usually associated with deeper relationships, such as friendship. Graves and Graves, for instance, list as the 'first principle' of cooperative learning "Establishing ...cohesion, emotional ties, group unity", taking as their explicit prototype for this principle the traditional kinship community and its "Close emotional bonds" (Graves and Graves...
1985, 416). Consider the following, taken from a description of the cognitive and affective elements of the 'prosocial' attitude that is supposed to accompany cooperative learning:

An understanding of others' thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and needs, together with an empathic or sympathetic reaction to them...are considered essential to prosocial behaviour...Consequently, an attempt is being made to train these skills, understandings and orientations directly, through a component that involves role-playing, affect identification, and related activities (italics mine) (Solomon et al. 1985, 382).

In a more extreme version of this line of thought, Button (1982, 224) recommends 'trust' exercises, which involve a high degree of physical contact (hugging) and of disclosure of feelings.

These views, and the educational practices with which they are connected are, I shall argue, profoundly hostile to the principle of respect for individuality (in others). The next two sections will be devoted to establishing my argument by addressing, firstly, matters of value and principle; and, secondly, matters of practice and procedure.

6.2 Value and Principle

Significantly, this advocacy of personal and affective 'bonding' neglects those features of our affections (or more generally our interpersonal attitudes) which would lead us to make qualitative distinctions between persons and between kinds and levels of relationship. This negligence, I must emphasise, is not to be discovered by examining the manifest and stated purpose of such exercises. It is to be found instead in the structure of the social activities and the context in which they take place.

It is for instance almost a matter of principle that classroom groups be formed at random, and without allowing students to choose their groupmates (Button 1982, 173;
Schneidewind and Davidson 1987, 19; Van der Kley 1991, 25). This supposedly enables greater diversity, and in doing so supposedly serves the interest of cross-cultural, cross-racial and cross-gender understanding. (Slavin, 1983, 19; Sharan 1985). Exercises such as Button’s 'hugging exercise' suggest a very high degree of personal and emotional involvement. Although perhaps to a lesser degree, so do the attitudes of 'sympathy and empathy' which Solomon views as a sine qua non for cooperative activity. If they are encouraged in an environment which does not allow for spontaneous choice of partners or groupmates, this may effectively communicate the message that it is appropriate to regard the objects of our affections and attachments as substitutable.

To put it more clearly and unambiguously, the implicit message is this: Our affections, our liking and respect, are to be treated as if they were essentially indifferent to the worth or quality of their object - the person to whom our affections are directed. The quality and character of the object of our affections drops out of our view: He or she becomes a cipher, which may be readily replaced by another, rather than a particular individual. This effectively treats as irrelevant those qualities of character or of personal appeal which would justify our preference for some over others. Considerations of kind, quality, emotional tone, calibre of person, drop out of consideration.

If teachers took any heed of the recommendations of the psychologists and educationalists whose views I have just cited, we would find students being taught to regard others not as particular individuals, but rather as substitutable ciphers; to regard the social universe as one in which all alike are to be regarded as equally significant; and to consider it their duty to regard all alike as prospective friendship material. As far back as 1961, Kneller characterised, rather caustically, the emotional tenor that such an ethos is liable to promote:

[W]e should be... foolish to embrace the kind of 'cooperation' that for so many years progressivism has hawked about the land... I have no time for groups of this kind...Their brittle surface familiarity prevents the attainment of true
intimacy, and an insidious 'togetherness' conceals the absence of genuine fellowship (Kneller, 1961, 443).

Kneller suggested that, among other things, such practices foster superficial and blandly impersonal relationships. However, these practices and principles could also be criticised on the ground that they implicitly represent the affections in an amoral way which does not allow us to make evaluative judgements which are essential to a full and proper understanding of the moral dimensions of human relationship.

Take two cases: In the first case, we have a person who will form relationships with others only on the condition that they are prepared to satisfy his narcissistic emotional needs, who, consequently, likes and respects others only if they exhibit of unswerving adoration of, and devotion to, himself. In the second case, we have a person who chooses to form relationships because she likes and respects the other person in his own right, and without regard to what he can do for her own needs or her own ego.

If we were to construe the affections amorally, to discount considerations of the worth and character of the objects of such affections, we would have no grounds for distinguishing between these two cases. A moral education which, effectively, teaches students to avoid such discriminations is not, I believe, a particularly desirable form of moral education.

My criticism is not, of course, aimed at the goals of cooperative learning. It does not deny that the virtues which we associate with an ability to cooperate are worthy of cultivation. My objections, rather, are aimed at the indiscriminateness which is encouraged via the failure to allow spontaneous choice of 'cooperative companions'. To promote such indiscriminateness while simultaneously requiring a high degree of emotional involvement, is to risk prescribing a norm of 'friendship' which just flagrantly disregards the essential ideal of respect for the particular which is embodied in this notion.
Not only do the individual and particular qualities of the object of affections count at the 'receiving end' but they also count at the 'giving end'. Proponents of 'affective bonding' in classroom group or cooperative work are remiss with respect to the receiving end. They are also remiss with respect to the 'giving end'. Their promulgation of indiscriminate emotional involvement implies that it is acceptable to for a person to discount her own particular character, identity and values as well as those of the person who is the object of her affections.

At first glance, proponents of cooperative appear to recognise the importance of particular characters and values in the choice of friends. Slavin, for instance, states that shared interests and similarity of temperament are often important factors in friendship. This indeed forms part of his defense of cooperative learning, which points out that students who engage in it will have shared interests and common goals, and to that extent will be 'similar' enough to form viable friendships.

One other antecedent of liking between individuals is perceived similarity...Most people's friends resemble themselves in age, race sex socioeconomic status... [One] way to reduce perceived dissimilarity is cooperation between individuals from dissimilar backgrounds. Such groups create a 'we' feeling that, under the right circumstances, can transcend...the perceived dissimilarity [between races, sexes, etc]...by creating a new basis for perceived similarity, membership in the cooperating group. (Slavin 1983, 20)

This is, to say the least, a rather facile account of what it means to be 'similar'. Not everybody would, for instance, consider stereotypical social categories such as race, sex, and socioeconomic status central to their self-identifications. Nor would everyone consider activities performed in the classroom so important and valuable that she would regard them as integral to her identity, part of 'who she is as a person' to use the idiom. Accordingly, we would expect a 'similarity' which is based on activities which are peripheral to both the concerns and the self-identifications of the parties to be a fairly superficial and empty one. The same could be said for a 'similarity' which is based on the absence of stereotypical social categories.
What is omitted by Slavin is perhaps more significant than what is included. What he leaves out is a consideration of the central significance of those self-chosen individual and particular values and commitments through which an individual defines herself. Respect for the individuality of others must pay regard to these considerations if it is to be at all worthy of the name.

Advocates of group work or cooperative learning could simply reply that such procedures are not intended to encourage something as strong as full-blown friendship. As Slavin explicitly states, for instance, the contact involved in cooperative learning is a 'necessary but not a sufficient condition for friendship' (Slavin 1983, 18):

> Cooperation almost invariably increases contact. If two individuals fold sheets together over even a brief period they are likely to...become at least acquaintances (Slavin 1983, 18).

They may maintain, in other words, that they aim for nothing beyond the condition of propinquity; if friendships ensues, then it is a nice bonus. It may, perhaps, be objected that I have imputed to proponents of cooperative learning a far more ambitious project than they in fact intend. They could thus reply that they are merely attempting to create the conditions under which friendships would be likely to develop. And this is rather different from attempting directly to produce, or induce, friendships which meet the rather demanding requirements which I have outlined. Such an objection would not, however, meet my criticism. My point is not that such practices and principles only 'go halfway' as it were (promote 'incomplete' friendships). My point, rather, is that they 'go the opposite way'. They foster attitudes which are hostile to friendship, and, in doing so, actively discourage the development of the moral attitudes associated with friendship.

I have so far shown how the underlying principles are hostile to the principle of respect for individuality. As I mentioned below, this subversion of respect for individuality also emerges at the level of practice and procedure. It occurs not only at the level of
principles, but also at a pragmatic level, through practices and procedures which fail to take into account the particular character of the dispositions which are required for the development of respect for individuality. To this topic I will now turn.

6.3 Practice and Procedure

As I argued in an earlier section\(^3\), it is important to ensure that the context or procedures accord with the character of the respect which is to be cultivated. I pointed to one highly significant way in which such miscoordinations may occur - where public settings, or objective criteria of evaluation surround efforts to cultivate dispositions - such as respect for individuality - which require for their development some degree of privacy.

In the cases which I shall consider below, public contexts are brought to bear (unfittingly) upon essentially subjective values in a way which does a vast disservice to our moral understanding of respect for the individuality of others by undermining the essential features of those dispositions which were earlier identified as essential to respect for others: Those forms of internal and holistically sensitive forms of discrimination which are associated with respect for the individual and particular features of other human beings which may be referred to under the description \emph{capacity for affection}. They do so, I shall argue, through the misapplication of objective scrutiny (the 'spectator perspective') and through the imposition of impartial and impersonal rules and regulations.

As was argued earlier\(^3\), 'the capacity for affection' requires at least an ability to engage in relationships in ways which are free of reflexive self-concern. It brings with it the important negative stricture: to avoid the use of instructional methods which

\(^{52}\) The section on 'Contextual Consistency' in Chapter 3 - "Concepts and Contexts".

\(^{53}\) Chapter 2 - "Personal Forms of Respect", section 4 - "Constraints".
encourage such self-concern. This requirement is a normative one, and derives its force from the moral claim that affections are virtuous to the extent that they are free of subjective self-concern: to the extent that they are concerned purely with their object. Moreover, as was also argued in an earlier section\(^{54}\), the cultivation of the affections demands a regard for spontaneity, and this important feature of the affection constrains pragmatically the procedures which may be adopted in order to 'teach' or inculcate such a capacity. Affection for others, like other affects, cannot be cultivated directly.

Taken jointly, these two claims imply that if practices are to be sound, they must be informed firstly by a concern with the moral character of the affections, a concern which dictates the avoidance of forms of instruction which foster self-absorption; and secondly, that they must be informed by a concern with the genesis of affections, and hence with the requirement for spontaneity.

The following would seem to fly in the face of both of these constraints:

Caring - review of progress:
How effectively do we help one another in this group?
...What about need for companionship and friendship? What about illness, accidents, absence for other reasons? What about helping people with their behaviour? (Button 1982, 43)

In another exercise, Button recommends that students be encouraged to do research on the presence of loneliness in their respective neighbourhoods. Upon completion of this research they are to be drilled as follows:

Enquiry into loneliness - small groups with open exchanges:
a/ How well did we cope with conversations?
b/Report findings

\(^{54}\) Chapter 2, section III - "Subjective Respect for Others".
c/What personal needs did we find?
d/What help could we offer, either individually or as a group?
e/Plan strategies for immediate action in the neighbourhood, especially during the half-term break. Role-play approaches (Button 1982, 40).

Even on the face of it, there there seems to be something rather incongruous about the use of such clinical language in relation to notions, such as that of 'caring'; notions which, almost by definition, suggest spontaneity and the absence of self-conscious cultivation and control. These approaches suffer from more than mere conceptual incongruity: They can, more insidiously, serve to undermine the capacity for affection, and hence discourage those qualities of character and attitude which we would deem essential in a 'good friend': respect for the individuality of another.

It is, at first glance, tempting to lay the blame upon the behavioural emphasis of the approaches which are used to cultivate affection, to suggest that such approaches are morally bankrupt because such behavioural techniques encourage 'going through the motions', mere act without feeling. Affection, it could be argued, surely involves much more than this, and it would be wrong to communicate the message that the act in itself is sufficient.

This line of criticism, though tempting, is vulnerable to the reply that in many cases 'going through the motions' can produce the corresponding affections, a point which must be conceded. It is possible, and sometimes desirable, to generate emotions in this manner. Most of us are familiar with cases where the act precedes, and brings about the corresponding feeling; cases where, for instance, acting as if one really cares for someone for whom initially one has no feeling serves to bring about the 'genuine thing' - a feeling of caring. Indeed, as behaviourists often say, it is often necessary to produce a convincing act before one can get the right feeling. Behavioural techniques may, moreover, be enlisted to foster highly valuable social goals in many cases. We can imagine, for instance, the case of the individual whose demeanour, upon initial contact, does not 'do justice to' her worthwhile qualities of character and personality, perhaps because she is ill-at-ease, as is quite common upon initial contact. In such cases,
where the individual does not spontaneously command the respect and affection which she deserves, it would be desirable, at least initially, to override one's spontaneous reactions, and to 'cultivate' the appropriate affections through the use of behavioural techniques: "This person is not very appealing, but nonetheless she is worthy of respect and love. So I'll try to learn how to love and respect her."

The problem, then, does not lie in the use of behavioural techniques, as it is not 'going through the motions' per se that causes the problems. The problem, rather, is 'going through the motions' in a particular manner, characterised by scrupulous and meticulous attention to the minutiae of one's interactive behaviours, and by a tendency to be bound excessively by rules and preconceptions.

This manner is hostile to the genesis of the affections which are involved in respect for others because it denies the importance of spontaneity. It is also hostile to the moral character of such affections, because it fosters pernicious forms of self-concern.

Perhaps, before pursuing this line of argument further, some examples would be in order. As practice speaks louder than words, further examples will perhaps push home my point here.

The work of Hopson and Scally (1981) is representative and influential. They recommend a checklist for use in monitoring and evaluating interactive behaviours in cooperative groups, a checklist which includes the following items:

Suggesting ways of working, giving information, asking questions, agreeing with or supporting somebody, disagreeing with somebody, personal criticism or conflict with somebody, inviting somebody to comment, interrupting or

---

55 This happens particularly where there is a blurring of the distinction between 'basic good manners' and 'etiquette', as a result of which educators will often take it upon themselves to legislate upon matters of personal style rather than confining themselves to the (more defensible) moral virtues of consideration and respect for others (Pring 1984, 23).
shutting up somebody, summarising what has been said or achieved, use of humour (Hopson and Scally 1981, 90).

From these excerpts we can learn much about authors' ideas about what is, or should be, salient in group interaction. Their preconceptions are blatant. Moreover, and more importantly for my purposes, there is a clear emphasis upon standards of evaluation. It is considered appropriate to evaluate and scrutinise critically, by fixed rules and standards, the interactive performances of both oneself and others.

These forms of instruction foster the development of critical and rather exacting self-scrutiny, but they also encourage a reliance upon rules whose ponderousness often borders on the ludicrous. This is particularly apparent in connection with role-play techniques, which recommend rather painstaking rehearsals of the most minor and commonplace social interactions. Button, for instance, advocates role-play of such commonplace interactions as that of informing one's parents about school activities:

> So what will you say to your parents about what we have been doing, and how will you approach them?" (Button 1982, 15).

Or consider the following recommendation, again from a well-respected writer on cooperative learning:

Students have been assigned a cooperatively-structured activity. The cooperative skill being practiced [sic] is 'sharing ideas and opinions.' A process observer in each group writes down the names of the members and checks off each time (up to five) that a person gives an idea or suggestions for the project. The group grade for cooperation is as follows.

If everyone gives an idea or opinion once or twice - C
If everyone gives an idea or opinion three or four times - B
If everyone gives an idea or opinion five or more times - A
(Schniedewind and Davidson 1987, 516)
Talk of 'skills' is also very prevalent in the area of social education. To take one instance among many, Johnson, a proponent of cooperative learning, says:

If the potential of cooperative learning is to be realised, students must have the prerequisite interpersonal and small-group skills and be motivated to use them. [Ensuring such skills] requires that teachers communicate to students the need for social skills...have students practice them over and over again, process how effectively students perform the skills, and ensure that students persevere until the skills are fully integrated into their behavioural repertoires (Johnson and Johnson 1990, 32).

The authors also enjoin the use of an extrinsic reward system for encouraging the practice of social skills:

Use group points and group rewards to increase the use of co-operative skill [such as] staying with the group, using quiet voices...encouraging participation...criticising ideas without criticising people, asking probing questions... (Johnson and Johnson 1990, 31).

Button recommends that the following questions be considered by students (in their respective discussion groups):

How well do you cope personally with friendship making? Is there anyone with some difficulty in this respect? (Button 1982, 302).

And in her textbook written for the form teacher, Button also includes the following exercise: After being asked to hug one another, and to express their feelings of caring, students are asked to examine their responses to the exercise. The questions to be posed to the students include the following:

How did you feel? Can you really let yourself go in reaching out to other people? Have you a wide range of expressions? For example, can you be
forceful? Or are you always heavy and dominant and do you need to practise being light and gentle? Do you always talk in a whisper, or can you speak loudly, or even shout? (Button 1982, 224)

These are excellent examples of what should not be done to promote respect for others.56

Such a concern with performance standards, and with critical scrutiny, is very evident in the advice for teachers which we find in an instructional manual on cooperative learning for teachers:

The teacher might say, 'As I move around the groups I will be watching for groups - using each other's names, focused on the learning task, asking questions of each other, encouraging each other, reflecting and checking each other's statements. The teacher might focus on one of these skills each week, or assign one member of the group to observe and record certain cooperative behaviours, and then give feedback to the group (Van der Kley 1991, 13).

These forms of instruction point in the direction of impersonality. They are objective and impartial. They rely heavily upon the presence of a non-participant observer, or, to use the jargon, a 'process observer':

Process observer formats use a student observer's notes of member behaviour to evaluate...cooperative skill[s]...A process observer is a student who watches the group interaction...[and] reports her observations back to the group (Schniedewind and Davidson 1987, 515).

They also rely upon standards of evaluation which are supposed to apply to all equally, and without regard for the peculiarities of individual character and personality. This

56Further examples of the same kind may be found in Beane (1984, 43, 130,139); Van der Kley (1991, 25) and Schniedewind 1987, 25).
is evident from the highly regulated and rule-governed character of the cooperative activity which is required to meet the requirements of prespecified checklists.

This strong impersonal bias clearly points away from, rather than towards, the cluster of values - spontaneity, and disinterested participation in process - which we associate with respect for the individuality of self and others. There is, of course, a place for these impersonal values - but this is not it. They are badly misplaced in cases - such as this one - in which respect for individuals must also be cultivated. They foster reflexive self-concern through the cultivation of a (misplaced) concern with appearance and performance. And they preclude spontaneity through reliance upon prespecified goals. The implications of each of these, in turn, will now be examined.

Reflexive Self-Concern:
Misplaced concern with task-oriented self-evaluations

Where the aim, or one of the aims, is to foster values and attitudes appropriate to the respect of the individuality of others, as in friendship, we would not wish to encourage such internalisation of publicly defined rules and standards of performance evaluation.

Participation in process was earlier identified as essential to respect for individuality in both self and others. In the case of other-regarding forms of respect, process-oriented participation implies the ability to engage in a relationship for the sake of that relationship. An essential dimension of such respect is constituted by the subjective quality of the 'processes of relating' for the participants. This may not be the only value, but it is, nonetheless, an essential one. To confirm this intuition, imagine the case of the individual who merely 'appears' to be participating, but who is, as it were, 'going through the motions', not really 'there', but who nonetheless always behaves in a way which would suggest that she is an impeccable and perfect friend. Intuition would suggest that, whatever else such a person might be, her attitudes are not those of a 'good friend'. This is because friendships requires sensitivity to the particular qualities of the object of those affections. However this aspect too is discounted by some advocates of group work.
An individual whose interactions with others are dominated by a concern with task-efficiency, and whose attention is constantly fixed upon monitoring and evaluating her behavioural 'skills', is not likely to be able to engage in a relationship for its own sake. The risk the application of impersonal rules and standards of evaluation to the sphere of human relationships is that they may end up producing an individual whose interactive attitudes are so dominated by her desire to 'prove herself', to demonstrate standards of excellence in friendship, that these self-absorbed concerns displace concern with the supposed object of her affections. Indeed the other may drop out of view altogether. A person may become so preoccupied with evaluating his standards of 'relating' that respect for the individuality of the other person, and the joy of the relationship, comes to be subordinated to a self-absorbed task-orientation.

It is, indeed, possible to find such interactive exercises intrinsically rewarding. But this consideration does not count against my objection to such practices. My arguments do not need to draw for their support upon a crude antithesis between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation\(^\text{57}\). The essential point, rather, is this: Even supposing students found these interactive processes intrinsically rewarding, it is not likely to be out of 'affectionate impulses'. The more likely goal in such cases would be to 'perform': to meet, or exceed, performance standards.

\(^{57}\) For a cogent description and analysis of the liabilities which attend the use of extrinsic incentives for cooperative learning, refer to Kohn's (1991) paper.
The Sacrifice of Spontaneity.

The formulation of the desired social skills or dispositions takes a prespecified form. In this form, it implicitly draws upon a reified conception of the process/product relationship which is inappropriate where the goal pertains to human relationships in which respect for others plays (or should play) a large role.

Educators encourage reification in two ways. Firstly, by the practice of 'dissecting' the processes of relating into separate components, or 'skills'. The successful learning of these is then to be regarded as the end-product towards which processes of 'relating' are aimed. Secondly, reification is encouraged through compartmentalisation, which involves setting aside a certain period for learning social skills. This practice communicates the idea that such skills are somehow separate from one's ordinary activity.

Implicit in such practices is the metaphor of 'bridge-construction': the end-product is a separate thing or state towards which one's processes are aimed. Peters elaborates upon this metaphor:

The commendable state of mind is [often] thought of as an end to be aimed at, and the experiences which lead up to it are regarded as means to its attainment...This model of adopting means to premeditated ends is one that haunts all our thinking about the promotion of what is valuable. In the educational sphere we therefore tend to look round for the equivalent of bridges to be built or ports to be steered (Peters 1966, 85)

This 'bridge-construction' conception of the means-end relationship is appropriately applied to the process/product relationship in highly structured non-social task oriented contexts. These are contexts in which it is appropriate to divorce processes from goals: "This is what we are aiming for; our plan of attack is this; and we intend to have the goal achieved in a month's time". The bridge-construction metaphor does not apply so readily, though, where the goals pertain to the development of human
relationships: "This is what we are aiming for: friendship. Our plan of attack is this; and we intend to achieve the goal of being friends in a month's time" sounds, to say the least, rather odd.

If it sounds rather odd, this is because it implicitly discounts the role of spontaneity in the cultivation of the relevant affections. In cases such as these it is appropriate to conceive of the 'product' as something which is realised in a concurrent fashion, organically arising from the processes themselves, and not as a goal towards which those processes are aimed. The virtues of character which are required for the respect of others can only emerge organically from commitment to, and engagement in, activities which one values. To suppose otherwise is to suppose, wrongly (as I argued earlier) that the affections are amenable to strategies of direct aiming.

Where spontaneity is sacrificed, so too are those important virtues of character whose realisation depends upon such spontaneity. Among such virtues, as I argued in an earlier section, are the qualities associated with free-spirited play, qualities which are essential to the respect of individuality in both self and others. A person who habitually approached her relationships with others in a rule-bound or task oriented manner would clearly be unable easily to engage the spirit of play. An appreciation of novelty cannot flourish alongside a tendency to fixed goal-oriented approaches. Moreover, such rule and preconception-boundedness may bring with it a detached stance which is clearly antithetical to the spirit of friendship. Friendship requires subjective participation. This implies being 'in' the processes, not outside of them, as

58 Such procedures are also vulnerable to criticisms on the purely pragmatic grounds that the substitution of fixed preconceptions for fluid and adaptive responses to the demands of the specific situation is not a particularly viable one: 'Rule-bound' people, who let preconceived ideas dominate their interactions with others, lack the flexibility and adaptability to respond effectively to others in any but the most rule-bound situations. Since such situations are increasingly rare in our society, we would not expect such an approach to be particularly workable. For a deeper analysis of some of the pragmatic difficulties associated with the prespecification of objectives, refer to Sockett (1975). However, my main concern is with the moral implications of such procedures.
would someone who interacts mechanically and according to a plan instead of spontaneously and fluidly.

The procedures which I have considered neglect the ingredients of desire, motivation and spontaneity, and replace them with a set of rules, with a set of interactive skills which are dissected, learnt by rote, and set to standards of evaluation. In doing so, *they effectively undermine the ability to offer respect to the individuality of others.*

### 6.4 Constructive Directions

Having examined some shortcomings, let us now identify some ways in which such shortcomings can be remedied. First, it is important to clarify the goal, or aim, of the interaction - whether it be to develop cooperative skills or friendly affections. Secondly, after having determined the aim, it is important to ensure that the procedures and contexts which are supposed to achieve this aim do so in a way which accommodates the peculiar character of the attitudes or skills which are to be developed.

*Aim: Cooperation or Friendship?*

At the level of principle and concept, as I shall argue, the educators whose writings I have examined err by conflating two kinds of aims: the personal and the impersonal. But, before I proceed further with this claim, let us first delineate the conceptual dimensions which are to be distinguished: 'Cooperation' and 'Friendship'.

*Intimate* and *Instrumental* Relationships

There seem, broadly, to be two reasons for entering relations with others. On the one hand, one may do so because one values and enjoys the company and friendship of others. On the other hand, one may do so because others will help one in some way
to further goals or interests which they could not further so effectively by themselves. Where one is emphasising the virtue of friendships - and the intrinsic value of one's relationship with another - it would be appropriate to cultivate also those values which were earlier identified as essential to the development of friendships: such values as mutual respect among equals, the sharing of experiences, like-mindedness, sympathy, sincerity, spontaneity of response; and, most importantly, the enjoyment of the other's presence for its own sake: all of those things which were earlier identified as requirements for respect of individuality in others.

As well as cultivating those capacities for affiliation which we associate with the development of the affections, educators should also be concerned with developing the interactive skills which we associate with cooperation.

'Co-operation' can be characterised broadly as social interaction which is entered into for instrumental purposes; as social interaction the value of which consists in its enabling the successful completion of a task. It is, moreover, a 'success term': to cooperate is to 'interact successfully'. And success - that is, the presence of co-operation - is in this case properly determined primarily by reference to the product or outcome of the interactive processes. In this respect it differs greatly from the notion of friendship. With friendship, the value inheres in the processes, and consequently the quality of such processes is of paramount importance. Similarly, the capacity to form affectional bonds should not be assigned primary value. In co-operative social interaction, by contrast, processes take second place to products, or outcomes. This is because the direct focus is properly upon the extrinsic goal - the task - rather than upon the quality of processes, whether intra-or interpersonal, of the group members. The success of the co-operation is, accordingly, to be measured by reference to task outcome - to its product, rather than to the quality of the processes which enable that outcome. And it is this success, or instrumental effectiveness, which constitutes its primary value.

This implies, of course, that the presence of personal liking amongst group members, while perhaps desirable, is not essential. To illustrate this point: Suppose we have two
cases of cooperation: In one case, everybody takes a great liking to everybody else, but
the presence of such liking diverts attention from the task and thus reduces
effectiveness. In the second case, all group members dislike each other, but suppress
these feelings in order to concentrate on the task in hand. As a result of their strategy
of detachment, the unfriendly group turns out to be much more effective than the
friendly group. We would have to say that the second group is a more cooperative
group than is the first.

Co-operation also differs in several other important respects from friendship. It is not
essential to enjoy the presence or personal qualities of those with whom one is
cooperating, but only to ensure that the overt quality of one's interactions is such that
it will not hinder the completion of the task. Being essentially functional, cooperative
relationships are not primarily to be valued for their own sakes. Nor is the factor of
discrimination so salient. Provided task efficiency is not affected, members of a
cooperative group effectively may be regarded as interchangeable. What matters is
their performance, which may be readily replaced, rather than their individual and
personal qualities which, being the product of unique and divergent histories, are not
so readily replaced. Nor is the factor of social exclusion so salient. Provided task
efficiency is not affected, members of a cooperative group effectively may be regarded
as interchangeable: What matters is their performance, which may be readily replaced,
rather than individual and personal qualities, which, being the product of unique and
divergent histories, are not so readily replaced.

Cooperation, unlike friendship, does not demand bonds of affection. What may replace
such affectional bonding in the case of cooperation, however, is the presence of shared
commitment to a common goal. As research has shown, the element of shared
commitment to an extrinsic goal is vitally important (Anderson 1985). To be effective,
co-operation requires shared commitment to the extrinsic goal. Whether this
commitment takes the form of self-interest or of a commitment to communitarian
ideals, what is important is that all of the cooperants desire the same goal. We could
not reasonably expect people to cooperate if they see no value, for themselves or for
others as the case may be, in the goal which their cooperation is ostensibly in aid of.
Nor could we expect them to cooperate if they do not see the point of collaboration; if, for instance, they believe that the goal could be better achieved in solitary fashion. Such commitment provides the perspective which enables, among other things, the successful resolution of interpersonal difficulties which may assume an overinflated importance where there is no such overriding interest or commitment.

It must be emphasised, however, that the valuation of such commitment should arise from pragmatic considerations: cooperation works better where there exists shared commitment. The order of valuation in this case is very different from that which occurs in friendship, where shared interests are to be valued in virtue of the access they provide to the subjective lives of other persons. Those things which are essential to friendships - such as the presence of affectional bonds - may facilitate cooperation in some cases, but they should be regarded as an added benefit rather than a necessity.

It is quite clear from the foregoing that the contexts in which cooperation may be cultivated need not foster the development of friendships. For the purposes of developing cooperative skills, all activities could be kept clearly within the domain of publicly defined rules, regulations, and norms without sacrificing any essential values. It is clear, furthermore, that whatever shared commitment may be produced in the classroom for the purposes of encouraging cooperation need only apply to the task in hand. It is not necessary to delve into deeply held personal values, or to know persons intimately. To develop the requisite level of commitment, the onus should devolve upon the intrinsic features of the task upon which students will be cooperating.

It would, moreover, be unrealistic to expect that the 'cement' of common task-oriented commitment within a classroom would be sufficient to ground deep and enduring friendships in many cases. We can safely assume that not everyone would consider activities performed in the classroom so important and valuable that she would regard them as integral to her identity, part of 'who she is as a person' to use the idiom. A

---

59 This does not rule out the indirect and spontaneous emergence of such bonds, however. As often happens, bonds emerge as a function of strength of commitment to the goal or ideal.
'similarity' which is based on activities which are peripheral to both the concerns and the self-identifications of the parties involved is not a viable ground for friendship.

A large part of the educators' conceptual task, then, consists in drawing the appropriate conceptual boundaries between 'friendship' and 'cooperation', and understanding the normative implications of this boundary for matters of practice. This is not a trivial prescription, moreover. The errors examined above may contribute, at least in part, to confusion over these matters. Thinking on the topic of cooperation is prone to conflate two distinct value-dimensions. The cluster of values which we associate with impersonal task-orientation - such as discipline, rigour, duty, structure - is confused with that cluster of values which we associate with friendship, love and affection - such as spontaneity and emotional engagement.

This uneasy merger of value-dimensions is quite evident in relation to the putative goals of cooperative activity in the classroom. Cooperative activity, for instance, is supposed to serve the dual purpose of facilitating friendship and achieving task-goals:

In order to coordinate efforts to achieve mutual goals, students must ..get to know and trust one another... communicate accurately... accept and support one another... resolve conflicts constructively (Johnson and Johnson 1990, 29).

Two of these goals - accurate communication, and resolution of conflicts - are clearly important to the achievement of a communal task. However, the other two goals - 'getting to know and trust one another' and 'acceptance and support' - suggest values which have more affinity with intimacy and friendship than they do with a task-orientated concern with performance. The requirement that we accept and get to know another would appear rather too exacting in cases where the purpose of collaborative effort is just that of maximising collective task-efficiency. It is, of course, possible to perform communal tasks effectively without personal knowledge or acceptance of the other person. This would require not much more than the temporary suspension of our emotional responses to others, the exercise of emotional detachment.
In his *Democracy in Education*, Bridges also remarks upon this point:

I prefer the opinion that open, honest and effective discussion between people must rest not on a satisfactory resolution or understanding of their personal relationships, which are irrelevant to discussions other than those actually concerned with those relationships, but on a capacity and readiness to set these aside (Bridges 1979, 87).

People do not need to get personally involved with others in order to co-operate effectively. It is indeed possible not to like anybody, but to co-operate effectively nonetheless, simply by the exercise of detachment - the temporary suspension of one's personal reactions. To enter all cooperative endeavours with the expectation that such conditions will obtain is to run the risk of a futile misdirection of collective energies.

As a reductio of this 'personal' approach, consider the case of a group in which there are big clashes in personality, but in which, nonetheless, all members agree upon the task and its requirements. Ironically, though, the group members never find this out because they are so intent on resolving their difficulties at a personal level that they have no time (or energy) left to devote to the task which should be the goal of their interaction. Pring voices a similar concern in his analysis of the distinction between 'respect' and 'affection':

Good *personal* relationships do not require having an affection for the person I am relating to. Indeed, affectionate personal relationships...might get in the way of developing respectful relationships with others in the group. Very often respect requires keeping one's distance a little.

These are, if correct, important distinctions to make. Too often teachers seek, out of a mistaken understanding of respect for persons, deeper personal involvement with pupils than is either necessary or desirable (Pring 1984, 29).
So, the errors which bedevil the thinking of proponents of cooperative learning are at least in part attributable to a failure to distinguish conceptually the goal of successful cooperation from the goal of friendship. They also fail to take into account the constraints upon such goals which may be presented by the contexts in which such aims must be realised, and in which the relevant procedures must be implemented. In this case the context is that of a public social environment, the classroom - an environment in which all activities take place against an implicit background of authoritarian sanctions, with its tacit undertones of force and compulsion. It is a context which is, by its very public and authoritarian character, much more congenial to the development and cultivation of concerns with competence, performance, and publicly shared norms than it is to those subjective dimensions of human affect which require a subtle indirectness, a freedom from rules and controls. It is a context in which concerns which fall into the domain of the impersonal and the public are more appropriately developed than concerns which fall into the domain of the personal - the inward and the subjective.

Respect for the individuality of others cannot be fostered by thrusting people into 'caring groups' and encouraging them to develop the 'skills' of caring. This is because the very context emphasises instrumental values, such as management and control. It is a 'world' in which instrumental orientations prevail. As such, it is profoundly hostile to the cultivation of values which presuppose a readiness to 'play'. Similarly, effective cooperation is not appropriately fostered by encouraging people to focus upon how they are responding to one another rather than, or as well as, upon the task at hand. Among other things, such an approach does not allow people the option of exercising emotional detachment where it is in the interests of task efficiency to do so.

6.5 Conclusion

To conclude Chapter 6: Social skills and cooperative skills are undoubtedly important and worthy of inclusion in the curriculum. Nonetheless, educators' efforts to inculcate social skills should be informed by, and made accountable to, the requirement to clarify aims and to ensure that context is coordinated with such aims. If the aims are
associated with friendship, and with the varieties of personal respect, then it is important to ensure that the situation accommodates concerns which are essential for friendship. This means allowing students to choose 'friends', or at least to choose to opt out of a group if they find they do not and cannot like the others. It also means ensuring that the group has shared interests and values. Healthy friendships cannot be expected to flourish amongst people who care neither for each other nor for what they are required to do alongside one another.

If, on the other hand, the aims are primarily instrumental, as in the case of cooperative endeavour, a priority should be set upon ensuring commitment to the extrinsic goal of cooperation. This means explaining clearly why students should 'want' to achieve the extrinsic goal; why cooperation is the most effective way to achieve the goal; and, most importantly, clarifying exactly what the goal is in order to avoid communicating the message that the 'business' is purely and simply 'to cooperate'.

---

60 This conclusion is also supported by recent evidence on the development of friendships in classrooms, as reported by Maxwell (1990, 184): "...encouraging children to have greater autonomy in choosing who they work with seems to have positive pay-offs in terms of more evenly spread and stable friendships within the group".

61 This point has also been emphasised by Galton (1990, 25): "For children to understand the teacher's evaluation they must be party to the criteria under which the judgements were based. It seemed strange, therefore...to find that although teachers emphasised the processes of group work and were usually effective when explaining what the children were required to do by way of tasks, they rarely explained why the children were required to do the task in a particular way...[The] pupils, when interviewed, said that 'if I knew why I was doing it I wouldn't mind, but I don't know why I'm doing it and I can't see the point of it'".
CHAPTER 7

THE WELFARE ARGUMENT

The above critique of educational aims and methods is informed by the value of non-instrumental dispositions, as in play. Thus the internal dispositions which were identified as essential to the attitude of respect for individuality, and whose preservation requires privacy are in essential respects, non-instrumental. Moreover, as argued earlier, such non-instrumentalism presupposes freedom from need - in this particular case, from emotional and social need. The arguments I have considered may, however, be challenged by the claim that such non-instrumentalism is neither feasible nor desirable: the claim that students possess social and emotional needs which make the cultivation of such non-instrumentalism unfeasible, and that the imperative to meet these needs overrides the requirements of respect for individuality.

Often a strong appeal is made to the welfare of students, as in the following case:

Your Children’s Needs
A child whose self-esteem is already high relates easily to teachers and other children, and is likely to take an active part in the activities of this unit. However, a shy, diffident child may find it difficult...to join in freely...in activities that involve talking about personal needs or feelings. Consequently, there may be ways in which you want to adapt and extend these activities to suit the needs of children in your class (Dept. of Education, Wellington 1986, 4).

The personalising approach caters to the supposed affiliative and affective requirements of humans - to be recognised, accepted, even liked, for who they are rather than for what they represent (roles, intellectual positions, etc.). These requirements are, in essence, emotional and affiliative. Accordingly, it is the affective dimensions of human need or desire which are appropriately given prominence in circumstances where it is appropriate to 'personalise'. 'Personal recognition' is supposed to cater to the affiliative and affective requirements of humans, and hence these dimensions of
encounters are often given prominence in circumstances where we choose to 'personalise'. It is associated, with the desire to be liked, appreciated, accepted, and responded to as a particular person, not simply as a 'locus of perspectives' or interpretations. It recognises the particular identities of individuals, rather than being emotionally neutral and impartial.

The 'welfare argument' is supported by several sets of considerations. There is the 'democratic' argument, which emphasises the learning of those skills and dispositions which are necessary for full participation as an equal in a democratic society62. There is the 'social skills' argument which emphasises the value of participation for the learning of social skills. And there is the argument which emphasises the supposed emotional benefits of such participation.

The argument from democratic principles I do not intend to challenge. We will assume, for the purposes of argument, that the cultivation of dispositions associated with democratic participation is worthwhile. Nor do I intend to challenge the argument for the importance of 'social skills'. What I do intend to challenge here, though, is the assumption of 'emotional need' which educators often fail to disentangle, both practically and conceptually, from these other, more acceptable considerations which favour participation. What is unacceptable is the failure in many cases to separate these justifications from the much more contentious assumption of emotional need. It is the presence of this assumption that presents the greatest threat to privacy, as I shall show. Before tackling the doctrine of 'need' head-on, however, I will show why it is worth tackling: that is, what may be lost by the indiscriminate cultivation of need.

It is the assumption of such needs which provides a very important rationale for the promulgation of 'the personal approach' in education. The predominance of such personalising approaches implies that there is a constant requirement and demand to have such needs met. The assumption of emotional need, while permeating much of

---

62 Arguments from democracy may be found in Beane and Lipka (1984, 93). David (1983, 10) also lists a number of reports which appeal to democratic principles in order to advocate greater social participation.
what is said about the importance of adopting a personal approach, is often implicit rather than explicit. It can be found implicit, for instance, in curricular programmes encouraging students to tabulate and enumerate the number and range of their friends and/or social contacts: to write autobiographical descriptions of holiday adventures which focus primarily and almost solely upon the number and kind of contacts made, or organisations joined, and to engage in self-analyses with a focus upon evaluating how they measure up on capacities such as the capacity to experience 'the sense of belonging'. For example, in group discussions, the following questions were to be considered:

To what organisations do you belong? (Belong is used in the sense of being a member of but also feeling that you are fully involved.)...Is there anything special about a sense of belonging to an organisation? (e.g. Does is help to give us meaning as a person) (p326) What will you be doing this Summer -will it bring you within reach of new young people? Do you welcome new contacts or do you try to avoid them? (p202) Have you close friends? Name of friend? Age? Male/female? How often do you meet? When and where do you meet? What do you do together? Are any of your other friends there too? Who? (p200) (Button, 1982).

Examples of this set of values can be found throughout psychological and educational literature. Indeed the emphasis upon social need is often so marked that we find theorists binding together, in a virtually inextricable fashion, self-respect and the supposed need for social participation, with the clear implication that the former cannot occur without the latter:

[The individual of low self-esteem is]..likely to live in the shadows of a social group, listening rather than participating, and preferring the solitude of withdrawal above the interchange of participation....[Their self-preoccupation] distracts them from attending to other persons...The effect is to decrease the possibilities of friendly and supportive relationships...(Coopersmith, 1967, 71).
Of course, a ready logical reply to this claim may be made: From "Low self-esteem implies social withdrawal" it does not follow that "Social withdrawal implies low self-esteem". Nevertheless, there are clearly assumptions being made in these cases which cannot be replied to satisfactorily by appeal merely to logic. A heavy, if implicit, appeal is made to the assumption of social and emotional need.

What, then, is the nature of this 'need'? It is not a universal preference. This much can be verified empirically simply by a consideration of reports which people give of their experiences of social withdrawal. If such accounts are anything to go by, a preference for social withdrawal does not necessarily amount to emotional self-denial; for such an assumption could readily be dismissed as inaccurate, merely by pointing to the reports which many people give of their experience of social withdrawal. For instance, Coleman's (1974, 35-37) research on relationships in adolescence describes the favourable reports which many adolescents, particularly adolescent females, give of their experience of solitude. Moreover, Hite reports that many women prefer withdrawal:

Although living alone is supposed to be lonely, most women love to spend time alone, have time to themselves. Many women can be themselves when alone in a more complete way than at any other time...When asked, "What is your favourite way to waste time? Please yourself?" 92 percent of women mention activities they do alone (Hite 1987, 336).

So, at most, we can say of social participation that it is something which is desired, and even more weakly that it is something which may be desired by some people some of the time; but not all of the people all of the time. This would be rather too weak to justify the moral force of the assumption of social need.

Efforts to ensure that such 'needs' are recognised are often heavily paternalistic. Individuals should participate, or should want to participate. Consider the following advice to teachers on what to do with students who prefer not to get involved in communal activities:
...the large majority of students want to interact with peers, and enjoy working in cooperative groups; but, here's what to try if you have 1 or 2 non-cooperative students...you may consider giving the non-cooperative student an unpleasant assignment to do in another classroom. It is likely that the next time the student will prefer to join in...For students who try to work independently...Limit the group's resources...so that the student cannot work independently (Van der Kley 1991, 23).

Here 'need' is inferred from 'the preference of the majority'. 'Majority rules' is, of course, not a desirable precept for educators who wish also to cultivate respect for individuality.

The problem may arise, at least in part, from a blatant liberalism, whereby all desires, ranging from the clearly 'luxurious' to the clearly necessary are lumped under the category 'need'. Perhaps educators are operating on a definition like the following:

'Need'...is used as an inclusive term to embrace drives, impulses, goals sets, urges, motives, cravings, desires, wants and wishes (Gates et al 1948, 617).

This 'definition' of 'need' would seem a likely one in the case below:

Children need to...feel that they're part of something...feel related to people in positive ways...symbolise their membership with groups that are special to them...feel that something important belongs to them...feel that they belong to someone or something...know that the people or things to which they're connected are held in high esteem by others...feel they're important to others...feel connected to their own bodies. [Many other 'needs' are also cited, but this should suffice to give the general picture] (Clemes and Bean 1981, 39)

If one were to define 'need' in this way, then little sense could be made of the following piece of advice:
It is the function of the teacher to arrange the right operation to the answer of needs, not wants. Wants belong to the sphere of the lesser understanding (Rais Tchaqmaqzade - "A Bokharan Sufi"- cited in Shah 1964)

This piece of wisdom has much to commend it. As I have shown, an essential concomitant of respect for individuality is respect for the value of self-sufficiency. However, if the construction of 'need' is to be made so inclusive that it implies things such as 'symbolising membership with groups that are special to one', there is very little space for even the concept of self-sufficiency.

It would be beyond the scope of this discussion to embark on an exhaustive conceptual analysis of 'need' and 'want'. It suffices for my purposes here to identify a set of general restrictions which should be placed upon educators' promulgation of 'needs'.

Clearly, not all desires are 'needs'. Moreover, 'need' carries a moral force which 'desire' does not. 'Need' suggests compulsion, obligation and lack of choice. When 'desire' becomes 'need', it brings with it this extra baggage. 'Need' implies 'duty to oneself': to fail to fulfil a 'need' is to be denied something, whether biological or psychological, which is essential for one's life. It also implies 'right': to say, in consequence, that someone 'needs' something is to suggest that there is an obligation, on the part of the individual himself, or on the part of others who are responsible for that individual, to ensure that the 'need' is provided for, so far as this is within their power. It is clear, moreover, that the supposed emotional 'needs' which are posited, if tacitly, by educators, do not justify such appeals to principle.

What constitutes a 'need' is often culturally determined. It is all too easy to create supposed needs, while maintaining, in a rather mystifying fashion, that one is meeting innate and preexisting needs. The institutionalisation of 'need' may, in effect, create 'need', with all of the extra baggage this brings in terms of obligation and emotional demands.
It is often difficult to determine which needs are genuinely 'needs' and which are 'mere' wants. Nonetheless, I agree with the Sufi that it would be better to err on the side of parsimony than on the side of excess. This is because the moral baggage which accompanies 'need' brings with it many liabilities which are better avoided. A failure to exercise such parsimony effectively serves to elevate all desires to the status of need, and in so doing to develop in children a disposition to regard many of their desires as matters of obligation rather than choice.

This lack of parsimony with regard to the issue of personal and emotional involvement would be easily dismissed if it were harmless. Perhaps the reason it is not often challenged is that it is supposed that no harm can come from it. This assumption is wrong. It can amount, effectively, to an intrusion on, and violation of, an individual's subjective privacy: that is his ability to distance himself emotionally, if not bodily, from the demands of the interactive process.

The most important and insidious consequence of the misapplication of the concept of 'need' is that it can constitute a very effective means of controlling students. The individual who believes she must engage in social interaction, and who is taught that she has a need for such interaction may, disregarding her own feelings, place herself in situations in which others can gain control over her. What is removed here is the 'right' to withdraw if and when one chooses. Although the compulsion is internal rather than external, those who 'induce' it are culpable just as much as if they had done so by direct compulsion. Similarly, the individual who 'must' engage emotionally in interactions - who 'must' engage all aspects of her personality - is denied the option of emotional distancing, another important internal aspect of privacy. Where the supposed need is a social one, these ingredients, taken together, produce a powerful tendency to encourage emotional dependency and hence a recipe for controlling individuals. The effect is to encourage individuals to develop all of the undesirable side-effects of elevating 'something it would be nice to have' to 'something I must have'. It is, effectively, to create an inner pressure to override those internal conditions which would enable the attitude of respect for one's own right to privacy.
The individual who has strong and entrenched 'needs', or who has many needs is much more vulnerable to control than is the individual who has few. The individual who has many needs may be perfectly adapted to commercial society, and may keep the social service industry paid and busy meeting these needs. Unless the purpose of education is to produce the perfect consumer, this rationale would be, to say the least, a rather questionable one. This is because, as perhaps can be overlooked, an individual who has many needs stands to lose much more than an individual who has few in cases where the need cannot be met. In essence, the more needs, the more likelihood of developing dependency upon the continued presence of satisfiers of those needs.

As was argued earlier, an exclusive concern with the 'external' forms which violation of privacy can take - physical intrusions, observations, etc - may blind those so concerned to the social control, often subtle and invidious, which may result from encroachment upon the subjective lives of individuals. One such form of social control may be exerted via the creation of needs. Control may be exerted by developing or encouraging a need which requires rather demanding conditions for its satisfaction. Although educators might believe they are doing a service by catering to the emotional and personal needs of their students, this service may in fact be a deep disservice, for it encourages an unhealthy dependence on, and hence vulnerability to, the control of the institutions63.

The creation of 'need' may thus serve as a powerful form of social control. It may also produce a form of emotional demand which would make it very difficult indeed to develop respect for others in their own right. To create a 'need' is to create the expectation that it will be fulfilled, and to cultivate the attitude 'this is mine by right', and hence to generate emotional demand and blame-shifting. To institutionalise desires in this way is to encourage what Chapman has called 'the fusion of the public and the private', whereby individuals displace responsibility for their own private concerns and problems into the public arena.

63 For an illuminating further examination of the hazards of producing a 'welfare mentality', refer to Jones (1985).
To quote Chapman here:

Somehow the effort of the young to equate the public and the political with the private and the personal miscarries. Instead of making politics personal, personal relations become politicised. As the sense of privacy becomes weaker, intimacy disappears into ritual (Chapman 1971, 243).

Where desires are institutionalised, or made part of the formal curriculum, there often results a disregard for the proper boundaries between personal responsibility and societal responsibility. As a result of this, an individual may come to expect the public sphere to provide goods (such as happiness) which only he can provide; to expect public institutions to provide what would hitherto have been provided by his own efforts.

Today, difficulties that a mere two or three years ago would have passed for private matters - for conflicts between student and teachers, worker and employers, or marital partners... conflicts between individual persons - now claim political significance and ask to be justified in political concepts (Habermas 1979, 34)

The loss which may result from such blame-shifting is, of course, the loss which follows whenever someone shifts responsibility for problems which only she can solve: viz, a continual postponement of the solution of the problem. More importantly for the theme of respect with which I am dealing, it is also a loss of the ability to respect others in their own right, as individuals rather than as satisfiers of need. Such respect, as I have repeatedly emphasised, requires freedom from need and demand.

The values which we associate with democratic participation are worth cultivating. It is desirable for educators to develop, or encourage, a readiness to take part in, or at least take an interest in, the social and political structures which affect their own welfare and that of others. It would surely be feasible to express such interest without
the accompaniment of 'emotional baggage' such as that which brings the propensity to foist responsibility for one's subjective well-being upon public institutions.

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the proliferation of needs may represent a loss rather than a gain. Regard for the virtue of self-sufficiency may be relinquished only at great peril to those virtues which lie at the heart of liberalism, and which may be summed up in one phrase: Respect for individuality.
CONCLUSION

A regard for privacy is essential to the fostering of respect for individuality. The task of this thesis has been to show why this is the case: to demonstrate the order and magnitude of loss to the dignity of the individual which flows from a failure to respect the privacy of the subjective processes from which individuality springs.

A respect for the subjective lives of persons is, I have shown, an essential component of respect for individuality. This subjective life possesses a 'logic of its own'. To ignore this logic is to imperil the very foundations of a regard for individuality. It is a logic which commends to us a distinctive set of values. They are the values which we express through the virtues of playfulness, spontaneity, and non-possessive appreciation of one's fellow human beings. The development of such virtues requires a measure of freedom from the demands and exigencies of public life. A commitment to these virtues, accordingly, brings with it an obligation to respect, and understand the nature of, the privacy which is required for their full realisation.

It would be tempting to conclude this discussion with a set of well-defined prescriptions for educational practice: with a set of rules about what should or should not be done to ensure a proper regard for privacy. To do so would not, however, be in keeping with the tenor of my discussion. I have chosen to focus upon areas of human experience and identity which are, by their very character, beyond the range of formal sanctions. Clear-cut prescriptions are not to be sought in such areas, which are inherently ambiguous and complex.

It would be tempting also to reiterate the classic liberal sanctions against undue interference in the affairs of one's fellow humans: "Let well enough alone". That would be far too crude and extreme, though: A commendable spirit of concern and caring is not to be dismissed so lightly. Such a sanction would presuppose also that the dividing line between benevolent concern and malignant intrusion could be...
determined in an *a priori* fashion, a clearly untenable supposition, one which, moreover, flies in the face of the need to take into consideration the *contexts* within which educational aims are to be fostered.

Prescriptions, if any, should take the form of guiding principles rather than of a set of fixed, predetermined rules. As a guiding principle, I would enjoin educators to exercise parsimony and humility in the expression of concern for students. Humility is required to appreciate the realistic limits of an educator’s power to secure ‘the good life’ for her charges. Parsimony is required in judging the proper boundaries of such concern. It implies the exercise of a form of judgment which is sensitive to potential *losses* as well as to potential gains which may arise from the exercise of such concern.
REFERENCES


