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Ideology, Subjectivation, and the Dialectics of the Plane of Immanence: Prolegomena to Future Revolutionary Theory

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Sociology at Massey University New Zealand

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Abstract

The capitalist mode of production is tantamount to a mode of subjectivation. Ideological objects, discursive formations, artifactuality, disciplinary apparatuses and mnemotechnologies all contribute to the determination of subjects within the capital-relation. This thesis examines just how this is possible. Through the work of Foucault, Althusser, Marx, Derrida, Stiegler, Donati and other social theorists an account of ideology and subjectivation is developed which argues that processes of material production and processes of subjective development are not mutually exclusive. Rather the capital-relation reproduces itself dialectically through objective and subjective transformations. This study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter articulates a relationship between ideological analysis and relational sociology. The second chapter argues for the identity of the mode of production and the mode of subjectivation. The third chapter deals expressly with subjectivation in advanced capitalism. The final chapter details the dynamics between the forces and relations of subjectivation and the immanent contradictions between time, space, nature, and technology within the capitalist mode of production.
Introduction

Sociality is inherently dialectical. The recognition of this fact is being registered in much contemporary sociological debate. Ideology too is dialectical, indeed, the very activity of sociality is mediated through various ideological constructs. In chapter one I consider the relationship between classical ideological analysis, and the contemporary paradigm of relational sociology. I contend that ideological objects can be cogently understood from a relational perspective.

Chapter two develops these arguments further and examines the conditions for the development of subjectivity within the capitalist mode of production. Here I argue that Marx also considered aspects of what Foucault called ‘subjectivation’ and that the particular processes of subjectivation within capitalist society also are a necessary part of its ideology. I look at specific processes of subjectivation as they are constituted through time, specifically, the value of labour time in capitalism.

The most recent forms of subjectivation in advanced capitalism are described in chapter three. The work of Derrida, Stiegler and some members of Frankfurt school are presented, as well as the work of Carcedi and others to argue that changes in capitalist production have necessitated changes in processes of subjectivation.

The fourth and final chapter examines the contradictions of capitalist production through the objects of time, space, technology, and nature. Each of these objects is dialectically related to the other and society can be viewed as the means by which sociality is expressed through these objects.
1. Ideology, Method, and Dialectics

All enquiry proceeds within a cultural matrix which is ultimately determined by the nature of social relations – John Dewey (1938: 488)

Introduction

Sociology, is, or at least ought to be, the scientific study of social relations. The question of how to objectify these relations is a methodological concern. How a social object is validated depends entirely on the means by which one comes to know it. The creation of this knowledge is a social process and so there is a risk of entering a hermeneutic circle of veridicality. That is, if the objectivity of social objects is socially legitimated, where does the foundation of this knowledge lie? Is it a matter of particular groups validating forms of knowledge to suit their own purposes? Do domination and exploitation exist through ways of knowing? Can specific classes use knowledge to oppress others? These are all ideological questions, and questions that, I believe, must be analysed dialectically.

The notions of social relations and dialectics have seen a recent resurgence in sociological literature, including within Gugliemo Carcedi’s Behind the Crisis: Marx’s Dialectics of Value and Knowledge (2011); Pierpaolo Donati’s Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences (2011); Paul Paolucci’s Marx’s Scientific Dialectics: A Methodological Treatise for a New Century (2009), and Marx’s Politics of Abstraction (2011); and Michael A. Lebowitz’s Following Marx: Method, Critique and Crisis (2009). What is present in all these works is the emphatic articulation of a need for a dialectical mode of social enquiry; in other words, the demand for a relational methodology. Marx’s method was, of course, by virtue of its dialectical principles, a relational one. As David Harvey (2010) explains in his Dialectics of Social Change lecture: ‘Marx does not use a language of causality; he uses a language of interaction and dialectical internal relations’. Perhaps the most summary expression of this in Marx’s own work is found in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In this text Marx (1951a: 327) details a prospective analysis of ‘the system of bourgeois economics’. This system finds its final phenomenal form in civil society. Here Marx provides an overview of
bourgeois society which reflects total dialectical integration. Relations of production, relations of distribution, juridical forms, modes of consciousness, productive forces and state power are dialectically interacting in such a way that ‘[t]he mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general’ (ibid). Similarly, in *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels (1976: 42) explain that ‘Men [sic] are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms’. Ideological analysis then, if one follows the analytical strategies of Marx and Engels, necessitates a dialectical approach. Dialectical modes of analysis have been developed by many eminent social theorists including Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as well as those already mentioned above and many others besides. What remains to be done in this chapter is to explain what ideology is and why a dialectical mode of analysis is best suited to understanding it.

**Ideology and Relational Sociology**

In *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings* Althusser (2003: 23) defines the concept of ideology in the following way: ‘We are aware, that, in the practical use we make of this notion, that ideology implies a double relation: with knowledge on the one hand, and society on the other’. Implicit within Althusser’s definition is an expression of the dialectical relationship between forms of sociality and forms of understanding. He further explains that: ‘The nature of this double relation is not simple, and requires some effort to define’ (ibid.) In order to develop his definition he sets up a distinction between historical materialism and dialectical materialism. The object of historical materialism is ‘constituted by modes of production, their constitution and their transformation’ whilst the object of dialectical materialism is ‘the history of the production of knowledges’ (Althusser, 2003: 8-9). Ideology, for Althusser, represents the conjunction of social formations and the knowledge that is used within them. He expresses how ideology brings ‘into play a properly social reality and function’ and also ‘while having something to do with a certain representation (and thus a certain ‘knowledge’) goes far beyond the simple
question of knowledge’ (Althusser, 2003: 23). In Althusser’s work, the concept of ideology expresses the interrelation of social reality, social function, and the social production of ‘knowledge’.

Given that ideology, as Althusser presents it, is relationally constituted, the work of Donati in *Relational Sociology* is a cogent way to extrapolate Althusser’s ideas. Donati (2011: xvi) argues for the creation of a ‘relational paradigm’ within sociology. Social phenomena are, according to Donati, comprised of ‘relational facts’ and subsequently the ‘configuration of any social relation’ should be analysed as an ‘interlacing of subjective and objective elements’ (ibid.). In this way, the dialectical intersection of ideology’s particular modalities (both material and ‘immaterial’) makes it amenable to being analysed as a relational fact. By analysing ideology in this way, it is possible to identify the relational aspects that comprise it, and in so doing, make a complex concept more intelligible. Donati also establishes new concepts for his relational sociology, including relational goods, relational differentiation, and relational reason. Furthermore, because Donati is ontologically committed to a relational framework, he claims that ‘society does not host relations, it is not a space-time where relations happen, it is relations’ (ibid.). Society, for Donati, like Marx, is not a thing but a process, a field of relations. Moishe Postone (1993: 153) in his book *Time, Labour, and Social Domination* provides a similar definition: ‘Society is not simply a collection of individuals; it is made up of social relations’.

If society is then a relational object consisting of relational facts and one of these relational facts is called ideology, which represents social realities, knowledges and functions, how is ideology produced relationally? What kind of dialectical constitution does ideology have, and how can it be known? Donati’s work is once again useful. He argues that: ‘Relational sociology aims at disclosing the fact that every human being is relationally constituted as a person, and the same holds true for any social institution....We are our “relational concerns”’ (Donati, 2011: xvi). If we follow Donati, the question then becomes how can ideology be substantiated as a relational fact and how does such a fact determine our ‘relational concerns”? The notion of relational concerns was broached in the introduction to this chapter, where I presented some questions regarding the potential effects of ideological constructs on social relations. I believe relational sociology is a paradigm well suited to understand the connection between ideology and social relations.
Ideological Statements

Taking Althusser’s general definition of ideology as our point of departure it is now possible to introduce Foucault’s work as a means to further explicate ideology relationally. Paolucci (2011: 194) in Marx and the Politics of Abstraction argues that:

Throughout Foucault’s texts one finds analyses of relations, mutual connections, transformations, clusters and connections across history and social structures, and all the relations in between. Foucault argued that power and knowledge intimately interconnect. And, contrary to conventional readings of his work he does not deny the concerns Marxists have with political economy. For Marx (1976b: 318), ‘Property, at all events is a kind of power. Economists call capital, for instance, ‘power over the labour of others’. Likewise for Foucault (1980b: 100-102), we should ‘investigate... how mechanisms of power... have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful... in a given context for specific reasons, and, therefore we should... base our analysis on the study and tactics of domination’.

In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault makes a number of important remarks concerning the relations between ideology and discursivity. In Marxism and Epistemology, Dominique Lecourt posits that ‘the most positive thing’ about The Archaeology of Knowledge ‘is the attempt made in it to install, under the name of “discursive formation,” a materialist and historical theory of ideological relations and the formation of ideological objects’ (Lecourt, 1969: 198). The following quote from The Archaeology of Knowledge exemplifies Lecourt’s claim well:

Broadly speaking... it can be said that political economy has a role in capitalist society, that it serves the interests of the bourgeois class, that it was made by and for that class, and that it bears the mark of its origins even in its concepts and logical architecture; but any more precise description of the relations between the epistemological structure of political economy and its ideological function must take into account the analysis of the discursive
To consider this paragraph further it is necessary to define a ‘discursive formation’. According to Foucault:

whenever between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience that we are dealing with a discursive formation. (Foucault, 1972b: 38)

In order for a discursive formation to exist there are what Foucault calls ‘rules of formation’. These ‘rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of co-existence, maintenance, modification and disappearance) in a given discursive division’ (ibid.). These conditions of existence form ‘objects, modes of statement, concepts [and] thematic choices’. In Politics and the Study of Discourse Foucault defines ‘archaeology’ as the analysis of the discursive rules in operation ‘for a given period and a given society’ (Foucault, 1991: 59). These rules include: the limits and forms of discursive production, conservation, memory, reactivation, and appropriation (Foucault, 1991: 59-60).

It is worth pausing here before we unpack Foucault’s ideas further. ‘Political economy’, is, of course, a specific conceptual representation of economic relations within society. Within capitalist society, according to Foucault, political economy, as a form of knowledge, ‘serves the interests of the bourgeois class’, it was ‘made by and for that class, and... it bears the mark of its origins even in its concepts and logical architecture’. He additionally posits that ‘the description of the relations between the epistemological structure of political economy...and its ideological function must take into account the analysis of the discursive formation that gave rise to it...’ Foucault clearly states that capitalist political economy serves the capitalist class and he also makes some important methodological points that follow Althusser’s. The ‘epistemological structure of political economy’ can be viewed as what Althusser calls ‘knowledge’. This ‘knowledge’ is related to society in terms of social function and reality. That is, bourgeois economics reflects the social reality of
capitalist society and according to Foucault serves an ‘ideological function’. To understand the relations between knowledge, society and ideology, one has to take into account the conditions of discursive production.

Discursive formations are comprised of statements and it is the statement that is at the centre of Foucault’s analytic approach in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. As he writes: ‘I have undertaken, then, to describe the relations between statements.... I have decided to describe statements in a field of discourse and the relations of which they are capable’ (Foucault, 1972b: 32). This means that ‘we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, and show what other forms of statement it excludes’ (Foucault, 1972b: 28).

Ideology, understood relationally, is, at least in one of its aspects, expressed in statements. According to Foucault, statements possess four attributes: a referential, a subject, an associated field and a materiality (Foucault, 1972b: 115). Each of these attributes has a function. A referential does not refer to a specific object or state of affairs but is a ‘principle of differentiation’. A subject is not the rational self-determining individual or the agent who uttered the statement but a ‘position which may be filled under various conditions by various individuals’. An associated field is where the statement exists in its differentiation; its ‘domain of coexistence’. Materiality, finally, is ‘not only the substance or support of the articulation, but [also its] status, rules of transcription [and] possibilities of use and reuse’ (ibid.). What Foucault calls a discourse is a group of statements that belong to the same discursive formation. If one follows Lecourt’s contention, a discursive formation can be identified as an ideological ensemble made up of ideological relations which form ideological objects.

Foucault explains that an object of discourse has its own socio-historical conditions of appearance. Firstly there are what he calls ‘surfaces of emergence’. Mapping these involves demonstrating how ‘degrees of rationalization’, ‘conceptual codes’, and ‘types of theory’ may emerge. These surfaces of emergence vary. They are ‘not the same for different societies, at different periods, and in different forms of discourse’ (Foucault, 1972b: 41). There are also what he calls ‘authorities of delimitation’. These authorities determine the veridicality of discursive constructs. They are comprised of already existing bodies of knowledge, institutions and those individuals socially recognized to be legitimate purveyors of discourse. Lastly there
are ‘grids of specification’ where discursive formations are ‘divided, contrasted, related, regrouped [and] classified’. Thus, for Foucault, the object of a discursive formation ‘does not preexist itself... It exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations’ (Foucault, 1972b: 45). Foucault states that within a discursive formation:

These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization...They do not define its internal constitution, but are what enables it to appear...(ibid)

Furthermore: ‘a discursive formation will be individualised if one can define the system of formation of the different strategies that are deployed in it; in other words, if one can show how they all derive... from the same set of relations’ (Foucault, 1972b: 69). Discursive objects can be studied by analysing the socio-historical modalities of statements; however, this is done in a way that is different from formal logic, or Kantian transcendental analysis. As Joseph Cronin writes of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*: ‘it seeks to define the conditions of existence, rather than the conditions of possibility for the appearance of statements’ (Cronin, 2001: 180). The way this is achieved is to examine the four attributes of the statement so as to reveal their material basis.

Ideology possesses material continuity and this continuity is provided, in part, by institutions and if, following Lecourt, discursive formations are ideological constructs then it follows that institutions must be examined as conditions for the existence of ideology. As Lecourt writes: ‘it is clearly necessary to think the history of discursive events as structured by material relations embodying themselves in institutions’ (Lecourt, 1969: 195). Cronin comes to a similar conclusion:

...a statement is necessarily a material event, the status and function of a statement are mostly determined by the discursive field it is articulated through. The discursive field, in turn, is largely supported by a number of institutional factors (libraries, universities, research traditions, etc). Thus the analysis of institutions is essential to his [Foucault’s] account, and it suggests that one can analyse the impact of a statement as an event by determining the
social and institutional factors which make its repetition possible. (Cronin, 2001: 189)

The repetition or continuity of discourse, what Cronin calls, ‘the sameness of statements’ is controlled by ‘the rules governing their repetition’ (ibid.). Within capitalist social relations, the ‘sameness of statements’ can arguably be identified as an instance of ‘overdetermination’, that is, ‘the Althusserian conception of the mutual implication of every process in every other’ (Gibson-Graham et al., 2001: 4). Gibson-Graham et al argue that, for Althusser, ‘each social entity bears within itself the traces of all the other social entities that, together, comprise its overdeterminants. Indeed, each entity’s existence is nothing other than the combined effects of all the others in the social totality’ (Resnick and Wolff, 2006b: 71).

It is helpful at this point to return to Althusser’s definition of ideology so as to contextualise the preceding ideas. Althusser suggests that ideology ‘implies a double relation: with knowledge on the one hand, and society on the other’. What we see in Foucault’s work is an attempt to create, as Lecourt puts it, ‘a materialist and historical theory of ideological relations and the formation of ideological objects’. Foucault’s work in The Archaeology of Knowledge is, above all, I believe, a relational account of the conditions for knowledge production within social formations. It is an account which provides the means to analyse the dialectical integration of social reality, social function, and social knowledge. We see that Foucault’s statement can be analysed as what Donati calls a ‘relational fact’. That is, as a social relation constituted by an ‘interlacing of subjective and objective elements’. For Donati (2011: 14) ‘[e]very sociological object can and must be defined in relational terms. To do this it must redefine its objects and then its concepts as relations’ (ibid).

We can see then from the preceding analysis that Althusser’s concept of ideology is an exemplary sociological object in Donati’s terms and that Foucault’s work in The Archaeology of Knowledge can similarly be identified as a relational approach to studying the connection between knowledge and society.
The Production of Knowledges and Ruling Ideas

Marx and Engels both did a considerable amount of research on the relationship between knowledge and sociality. They contend that many forms of knowledge are contingent upon certain forms of socio-historical activity (Paolucci, 2009: 80). For Marx and Engels, material production modifies the history of social formations and the ideas that support them. Historical materialism, the constitution and transformation of modes of production, is in reciprocal development with dialectical materialism, what Althusser calls the ‘the production of knowledges’. In a well known passage from The German Ideology Marx and Engels (1976: 67) state that the ruling class ‘regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch’. What Marx and Engels are developing here is the notion of class-determined knowledge. In Behind the Crisis: Marx’s Dialectics of Value and Knowledge, Carcedi (2011: viii) argues that within capitalism there are two opposing rationalities: ‘one is the expression of capitalism’s tendency towards its own supersession and the other is the counter-tendency towards reproduction’. Carcedi’s work confirms and builds on the analysis of Marx and Engels regarding the class basis of ‘the production of knowledges’.

At the beginning of this chapter I posed a number of questions about the legitimation and veridicality of social knowledge. I asked whether particular groups can validate forms of knowledge to suit their own purposes and whether forms of domination and exploitation can subsequently ensue. The objectification of social knowledge is of immense political importance and so there is a significant interest in its control. Within capitalism it is clear that there is regulation and distribution of ideas and that this regulation and distribution has a class basis. Nikolai Bukharin, in Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology, claims that scientific inquiry has a particular class character depending on which social groups within society are producing knowledge (Bukharin, 1925: xi). More recently, as I stated above, Carcedi has given this idea renewed attention. He argues that knowledge production under capitalism has a specific class-content and that even supposedly class-neutral forms of knowledge such as natural science are actually used for the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Paolucci (2011: 3) argues a similar case:
The business class long ago learned to put money into research and development and to fund universities, which is all the more useful when scientists rent out their services. Marx examined how capitalists apply scientifically generated knowledge and technology in the production process to expand output and control labour, none-too-seldom crushing people in the process.

The notion of the class-determination of knowledge leads Carcedi (2011: xi) to claim that ‘a radically different type of society will require and produce a qualitatively different type of knowledge, including the natural sciences and techniques’. For this reason, according to Carcedi, ‘the thesis of the class-neutrality of knowledge has thus devastating effects on the struggle for a radically alternative form of society’ (ibid.).

What Marx, Engels, Carcedi, Bukharin and Paolucci describe, as the class-determination of knowledge, is indeed expressed in the logic of capitalist production. In The Limits to Capital David Harvey (1982: 29) explains that what differentiates the capitalist class from all other social groups is the fact that ‘they all have a common need: to promote the conditions for progressive accumulation’. The rule of ‘accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for production’s sake’ is ‘enforced by competition, operates independently of individual behaviour, and thereby stamps itself as the distinguishing characteristic of all members in the class of capitalists’ (ibid.). Furthermore Harvey argues that: ‘In so far as individuals adopt the role of capitalist they are forced to internalise the profit-seeking motive as part of their subjective being’ (Harvey, 1982: 28). What Harvey proposes is particularly relevant to what has been outlined in terms of relational sociology. He argues that:

competition forces progressive concentration of activity...and the progressive tightening of authority by the capitalist of structures and control mechanisms in the workplace. Hand in hand with this goes the hierarchical organisation and forms of specialisation which stratify the working class and create a layer of administrators and overseers who rule – in the name of capital – over the day-to-day operations in the workplace. (Harvey, 1982: 31)

Here Harvey presents the dialectical constitution of the capitalist as a relational fact. This fact is produced by a multiplicity of social relations, such as the
laws of coercive competition, power structures and the disciplining of labour-power. One can also see here that Althusser's analysis of the threefold constitution of ideology expresses the necessity for there to be an accompanying ideological component for the relations of capitalist re/production. Firstly there is social function. In order for there to be objective production there must be subjective production, that is, there must be a distribution of social functions for the requirements of capitalist production. Function expresses the social reality, which is the second of Althusser’s conditions for ideology. Thirdly there is social knowledge, the ‘production of knowledges’, that is grounded in material activity. Many aspects of the knowledge created within capitalism will be geared towards progressive accumulation and in this way have the potential to create the opposing rationalities that Carcedi mentions.

The Träger-function and Discoursing Subjects

In Althusser’s text *Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses* he makes some important remarks about what he calls the ‘träger-function’. This notion of Althusser’s is a unified expression of function, reality and knowledge within a mode of production. As Althusser (2003: 52) explains: ‘the base requires the support-[Träger] function as a function to be assumed, as a place to be occupied in the technical and social division of labour’. Ideology, for Althusser, is the means by which the träger-function is effected: ‘Ideology is articulated with the economic and political structures in that it enables the Träger-function to function by transforming it into a subject-function’. Here function is coupled with reality, that is, capitalist production. However, in addition, there is also knowledge, what Althusser calls the ‘reasons-of-a-subject’. As he writes (2003: 52):

Ideology interpellates individuals by constituting them as subjects (ideological subjects, and therefore subjects of its discourse) and providing them with the reasons-of-a-subject (interpellated as a subject) for assuming the function defined by the structure as functions-of-a-Träger.

Recall that for Donati (2011: xvi) ‘Relational sociology aims at disclosing the fact that every human being is relationally constituted as a person, and the same holds
true for any institution... We are our relational concerns’. Through the ‘reasons-of-a-subject’, as constituted by capitalist social relations, our relational concerns are arguably ideological concerns as constituted by the mode of production. Harvey’s work expresses this idea well, through describing both the internalisation of the ‘profit-seeking motive’ on the part of the capitalist, and the hierarchical structures of control within the workplace which are brought about by the subjective determinations peculiar to the capitalist mode of production. As Althusser (2003: 56) notes: ‘the structure requires Träger: ideological discourse recruits them for it by interpellating individuals as subjects to assume the functions of Träger...’

In *Politics and the Study of Discourse* Foucault makes some comments that concur with Althusser’s work in *Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses* (1966). Foucault (1991: 58) explains that: ‘discoursing subjects form a part of the discursive field – they have their place within it (and their possibilities of displacements) and their function (and their possibilities of functional mutation)’. Furthermore ‘[d]iscourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions’ (Foucault, 1991: 58). This indicates that Foucault was not only familiar with Althusser’s work, as his student, but also shared some of his master’s views.

It is possible at this point to return to what was outlined earlier in this chapter on Foucault’s description of the statement, and to see how this can be understood to concur with Althusser’s and Lecourt’s views on ideology. The two aspects of the statement that concern us here are those of the subject and those of materiality. For Foucault, as for Althusser, the subject does not preexist the discourse, the subject is embedded within it. Discourse forms the subject and in so doing, as Althusser says, interpellates it. Foucault writes that the subject is ‘a position which may be filled under various conditions by various individuals’. Althusser (2003: 56) argues similarly that within ideology:

the conscription carried out by the structure is blank, abstract, anonymous: the structure does not care who will assume the functions of Träger. Ideological discourse provides the who: it interpellates individuals in the general form for the interpellation of subjects.
Materiality, like the subject, is one of the conditions for the existence of discourse and is also an essential aspect to consider for the functioning of ideology. As Foucault remarks, by virtue of its materiality discourse has a status, rules of transcription, and possibilities of use and reuse. What this means is that discourse, under capitalist relations, is subject to certain forms of determination. However, as Foucault remarks, one should ‘relate... discourse not to a thought, mind, or subject which engendered it, but to the practical field in which it is deployed’ (Foucault, 1991: 61). This returns us to the work of Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* where they explain that knowledge has a class basis insofar as the ruling class ‘regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age’. As Harvey points out, however, the capitalist class has its own ideological limits insofar as they must ‘promote the conditions of progressive accumulation’. In *The Condition of Postmodernity* Harvey explains that the main problem for what he calls ‘the regime of capitalist accumulation’ is to:

...bring the behaviours of all kinds of individuals – capitalists, workers, employees, financiers, and all manner of other political – economic – agents into some kind of configuration to keep the regime of accumulation functioning. (Harvey, 1990: 121)

This is of course, an ideological problem and one which will be realized in various discursive formations. It is quite clear then, as Gibson-Graham et al write, that ‘it is a matter of (political) consequence rather than a matter of indifference what kind of knowledge we produce’ (Gibson-Graham et al., 2001: 5).

In his discussion of capitalist elites Eric Fromm (2002) in *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* argues that: ‘The motivating factor is that their social function forms their consciousness, and hence their conviction that they are right, and their aims are justified and, in fact, beyond doubt.’ This concurs with Harvey’s observations regarding the need of the capitalist class to submit to the laws of coercive competition. Carcedi’s work on the class-determination of knowledge can be seen as extension of the preceding analyses where he relates ‘the objective working of the economy to the subjectivity of the social agents, that is, to the subjective manifestations of the contradictory objective foundations of the economy’ (Carcedi, 2011: 183).
Materiality and the Ideological Chain

In his significant yet little known work *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, Valentin Nikolaevic Voloshinov undertakes some research which is of considerable importance for the development of the ideas in this chapter. As his translators in their introduction state: ‘every word as a sign has to be selected from the inventory of available signs, but he [Volishinov] emphasises that the individual manipulation of this social sign in a concrete utterance is regulated by social relations’ (Matekja and Titunik, 1973: 3). Voloshinov like Foucault critically analyses ‘meaning’ within ideology. Where Foucault analyses the statement, Volishinov analyses the sign. According to Volishinov, ‘without signs there is no ideology’ (1973: 9).

Foucault, Cronin and Lecourt all highlight the materiality of ideology. It is through its materiality, as determined by social relations, that ideology is produced. Voloshinov also considers this to be the case: ‘Every phenomenon functioning as an ideological sign has some kind of material embodiment, whether in sound, physical mass, color, movements of the body, or the like’ (Volosinov, 1973: 11). The imputation of ideology is a central question for Volishinov and he argues that ideology is realised through what he describes as an ‘ideological chain’ (ibid). It is through this chain, as mediated by various aspects of materiality, that ideological relations are produced. The production of signs, and hence of ideology, is by its very nature social because, according to Volishinov, ‘signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another... Consciousness becomes consciousness only... in the process of social interaction’ (ibid). Volishinov repeatedly emphasises the social nature of ideology, thus expressing the need for a relational understanding of it: ‘it is essential that the two individuals be organised socially, that they compose a group (a social unit); only then can the medium of signs take place between them’ (Volosinov, 1973: 12). Any truly materialist theory of ideology will have to consider that: ‘Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs, created by an organised group in the process of its social intercourse’ (Volosinov, 1973: 13). Similarly, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault contends that ‘it must now be recognised that it is neither by
recourse to a transcendental subject nor psychological subjectivity that the regulation
of enunciations should be defined’. According to Foucault:

Instead of referring back to the synthesis or the unifying function of a subject,
the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion. To the various
statuses, the various sites, the various positions that he can occupy or be given
when making a discourse. To the discontinuity of the plane from which he
speaks. And if these planes are linked by a system of relations, this system is
not established by the synthetic activity of a consciousness identical with
itself, dumb and anterior to all speech, but by the specificity of discursive
practice. Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding
manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary a
totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with
himself may be determined. (Foucault, 1972b: 55)

Foucault (1972b: 49) remarks that ‘of course discourses are composed of
signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things’.Discourses
must not be treated merely as representations of things ‘but as practices which
systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (ibid.). Apprehending them in
this way, following the work of Foucault and Volishinov, we can question how
discourses are produced, what unifies them, and how they function as an ‘ideological
chain’.

The Knowledge-Shaping Process

In Critical Sociology, Eric Bonds presents a paper entitled ‘The Knowledge-
Shaping Process: Elite Mobilization and Environmental Policy’. He discusses the
way in which corporate and military elites manipulate knowledge to influence the
development of U.S. environmental policy by means of what he calls the
this process has four distinct parts. Firstly there is information suppression ‘in which
elites purposively act to suppress knowledge damaging to their interests’. Secondly
there is knowledge contestation ‘in which elites fund experts to attack and disqualify
knowledge that poses a threat to their power base’. Thirdly there is knowledge production, in which ‘elites fund or otherwise promote the production of particular knowledges, either through peer-reviewed scientific research or governmentally administered tests and analyses’. Lastly there is knowledge administration, whereby elites ‘influence the selection of what information counts as knowledge and what information does not’. Following his analysis of the knowledge-shaping process, Bonds, citing Foucault, states that:

Scientific knowledge is never a pure reflection of the world. Social relationships of unequal power distort, and are reproduced by, its image (Foucault, 1995). This has a great deal to do with the fact that social organisations bring into the world knowledge that suits their interests. Some organisations have much greater ability to produce knowledge, compared to others, because they are replete with resources and/or legitimacy. (Bonds, 2011: 435)

Bonds’ work concurs with both Foucault’s and Volishinov’s. What Bonds describes as the ‘knowledge-shaping process’ occurs by way of sign manipulation, or if one uses Foucault’s more nuanced expression, the manipulation of statements. There is suppression, contestation, promotion, administration and production of knowledge on the part of elites as a means to determine what should or should not be known. Volishinov (1973: 23) remarks that ‘Sign becomes the arena of class struggle’ and it is evident from the work of Bonds that this is clearly the case. We see corporate elites having a specific interest in the ‘knowledge shaping process’. In Politics and the Study of Discourse Foucault also considers the struggle around knowledge when he asks:

What individuals, what groups or classes have access to a particular kind of discourse? How is the relationship institutionalised between the discourse, speakers, and its destined audience... How is the struggle for control of discourses conducted between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural or ethnic collectivities? (Foucault, 1991: 60)
When discourses are appropriated and shaped by way of knowledge production, suppression and contestation, these events influence not only objective conditions but also subjective conditions, such as self-identification and knowledge of social position. Discourse is a valuable object. Foucault explains that discourse ‘poses the question of power’ and therefore it is ‘the object of struggle, a political struggle’ (Foucault, 1972b: 120). In Foucault (1999: 95) Gilles Deleuze expresses the idea that: ‘Knowledge, power and the self, are the triple root of a problematisation of thought.’ Moreover: ‘Seeing and speaking are always caught up in the power relations that they presuppose and actualise’. For Deleuze, questions of subjectivity are always bound up with questions of knowledge and given that knowledge is a social product, the problematisation of thought arguably amounts to an ideological analysis, an analysis of the social conditions of knowledge production. In the work of Harvey, Fromm, Bonds and Carcedi there is an articulation of the power relations that provide the conditions of existence for the ideological positions of subjects. What Foucault’s work suggests is the extent to which representation and articulation are grounded and effected within a framework of social relations. In the case of capitalist societies these social relations are based in the mode of production.

Legality and Social Form

Legal forms, as ideological constructs, are an indispensable means to maintain the relations of production within a social formation. In his work The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions Renner analyses the way legal systems are intrinsically related to economic systems. As he writes ‘all economic systems are at the same time institutions of the law’ (Renner, 2001: 57). As was argued above there is a need for ideological continuity within capitalism to, as Harvey puts it, ‘keep the regime of accumulation functioning’. Within capitalism there are differing rights and obligations depending on one’s position within the mode of production. As Renner writes: ‘For the capitalist, production is the exercise of right of ownership, since the factory and machines are his property. For the worker it is the fulfillment of a legal obligation by the contract of employment’. Legal relations in the form of norms and imperatives, ‘regulate the relations among men’ (Renner, 2001: 45). This returns us to Foucault’s notion of the statement and its analysis, as Cronin posits, by
‘determining the social and institutional factors which make its repetition possible’.
The repetition of legal statements within capitalism has a dual character. Firstly, following Harvey, they keep the ‘regime of accumulation functioning’ through laws which allow for a continuation of the existing social relations. Secondly these statements can be identified as being produced by capitalist relations of production. Renner explains this idea well: ‘The same society which economically transforms the wage labour of the miner into stocks and bonds, transforms it legally into the clauses of a statute or deed’ (Renner, 2001: 53). Volishinov articulates the notion of the ‘ideological chain’ as a means to understand ideological mediation. This idea is helpful in understanding transformations of materiality that occur within the production process of capitalism. As Renner states there is a transformation from production relations to legal relations. The kinds of transformations that occur through capitalist production are not always specified to those individuals engaged in production but are always legally enforced in terms of the social relations that are created and maintained through productive processes. The kind of legal subject that is created within the capitalist mode of production is a socio-historical construct. As Althusser states:

The subject-form is actually the form of historical existence of every individual, of every agent of social practices: because the social relations of production and reproduction necessarily comprise, as an integral part, what Lenin calls (juridico-) ideological social relations, which, in order to function, impose the subject-form on each agent-individual. The agent-individuals thus always act in the subject-form, as subjects.... The subject-agents are only active in history through the determination of the relations of production, and in their form. (Althusser, 1976: 95)

This concurs with Marx’s analysis in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy where he argues that: ‘neither legal relations nor political forms could be considered...by themselves or on the basis of the development of the human mind but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life’ (Marx, 1971: 21). Relations of production and forms of subjectivity are dialectically related. That is, as is presented in the second chapter of this thesis, the mode of production is at the same time a mode of subjectivation.
Summary

In the work of Marx we are presented with the argument that the mode of production ‘conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general’. An appropriate methodology for ideological analysis has to be ascertained to determine how such conditioning occurs. Given that that society is above all relational, I believe that ideology, as a social phenomenon, should be analysed dialectically. Althusser’s work reveals that ideology expresses the relations between social knowledge, social function, and social reality. Within capitalism, as David Harvey argues, the capitalist class – those who are compelled to accumulate capital – are made to do so by the laws of coercive competition. This creates a form of knowledge unique to the conditions of capitalism, a form of knowledge which is historically determined by its social conditions. This analysis concurs with that found in *The German Ideology* insofar as the ruling class ‘regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age’. Under capitalism the knowledge that is required for progressive accumulation is valorised while other knowledge is not. In the work of Carchedi we find that this leads to a number of significant conclusions. Firstly, the idea that knowledge is class neutral has negative consequences for the struggle for an alternative form of society. Secondly, capitalism is inherently conflictual, generating opposing forms of rationality, one geared towards supersession and the other towards reproduction. Thirdly, these contradictory rationalities are embodied within agents. There are ‘subjective manifestations of the contradictory objective foundations of the economy’. Carchedi’s work, expanding on the work of Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*, also concurs with Donati’s work in *Relational Sociology*. Methodologically, Donati maintains that social objects should be analysed as ‘relational facts’. These relational facts are comprised of an interlacing of ‘subjective and objective elements’. What Carchedi’s work confirms is the preeminence of ideology as social object insofar as social subjects themselves form part of an ideological reality. These subjective objectifications of capitalist relations form part of the contradictory conditions of capitalism. The work of Althusser, Fromm, Volishinov, and Bonds attests to the fact that subjects constitute ideological relations in themselves through their lived material conditions. In the case of Althusser there is
the interpellation of individuals through ideology to assume the subject-function and its associated ‘reasons-as-a-subject’. Fromm’s work affirms this idea through his argument regarding the link between social function and consciousness. Volishinov’s analysis of the sign and its place within social formations expresses how ‘sign becomes the arena of class struggle’. The work of Bonds represents the creation of ideology through the ‘knowledge-shaping process’. Knowledge-shaping is arguably the attempt to influence the struggle over social knowledge via the medium of signs so as to determine the ‘reasons-of-a-subject’. What Foucault’s analysis offers, as Lecourt explains, is an analytical explanation of the formation of ideological objects. Foucault presents an analysis of the statement, similar to Volishinov’s analysis of the sign, which offers essential tools for the analysis of ideology. For example, it is possible to apply Foucault’s analysis of the statement to the field of bourgeois legal relations in order to see how such statements are discursively determined. Because statements are grounded materially, it is cogent to argue that there is a class basis to the construction of statements within the capitalist mode of production. This is an analysis latent in Marx’s work entitled *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* where social, political and intellectual forms are ‘conditioned by a definite development of... productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms’.

Taken as a whole, these findings and methodological conditions are sufficient to provide a basis for further analysis in subsequent chapters. The next chapter examines the relationship between the mode of production and the mode of subjectivation. The capitalist mode of production is tantamount to a mode of subjectivation insofar as capitalism does not simply create productive relations but also creates subjective relations. Through the production of knowledge, ideology is realised within social formations. This ideology takes form by means of subjectivation.
Notes

i In *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre studies historical materialism by means of examining the conditions of dialectical reason. He states that ‘if dialectical reason is to be possible as the career of all and the freedom of each, as experience and necessity, if we are to display both its total translucidity (it is no more than ourself) and its untranscendable severity (it is the unity of everything that conditions us), if we are to ground it as the rationality of praxis, of totalization, and of society’s future...we must realize the situated experience of its apodicticity through ourselves’ (Sartre, 1976: 39).

ii In an interview entitled *Questions of Method* Foucault makes the following methodological statement: ‘I like to open up a space of research, try it out, and if it doesn’t get anywhere, try again somewhere else. On many points – I am thinking especially of the relations between dialectics, genealogy and strategy – I am still working [and I] don’t know yet whether I am going to get anywhere’ (Foucault, 1991: 74).

iii Bourdieu’s use of dialectical methodology is expressed in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. He writes that ‘methodological objectivism... demands its own supersession..., it is necessary to pass from the opus operatum to the modus operandi, from statistical regularity or algebraic structure to the principle of the production of this observed order, and to construct the theory of practice, or, more precisely, the theory of the mode of the generation of practices, which is the precondition for establishing an experimental science of dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality, or more simply, of incorporation and objectification (Bourdieu, 1987: 72).

iv In terms of what they call ‘desiring production’ I believe Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* can be read as a dialectic between the ‘psyche’ and the capitalist socius. As they write: ‘The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire.... There is only desire and the social and nothing else’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 29).
2. The Mode of Production and the Mode of Subjectivation

Our productions would be as many mirrors from which our natures would shine forth – Karl Marx (1844/1992: 278)

Introduction

In the preceding chapter it was argued that ideology should be studied relationally. As ideology is a social object with a dual character representing the relationship between society and knowledge, it was posited that it should be understood as a dialectical phenomenon. As such an object, following Donati, it can be analysed as an ‘interlacing of subjective and objective elements’. Ideology, within capitalism, as presented in the work of Marx, Althusser, Volishinov, Foucault and others, is exactly that. Ideology involves both subjective and objective determinations. Ideology articulates relationships with objective phenomena and simultaneously effects the subjective requirements pertaining to these objective relations. Due to this, it can, I believe, be argued that the capitalist mode of production is at the same time a mode of subjectivation.

Principles of Subjectivation

In the first chapter I demonstrated that Foucault considers many ways in which discursivity develops within social relations. In particular I drew on The Archaeology of Knowledge and Politics and the Study of Discourse to explicate some aspects of the relationship between discourse and subjectivity. However, within Foucault’s work there is not a complete theory of subjectivation; what one is presented with in various texts is what I am calling ‘principles of subjectivation’. These principles suggest a way of understanding the development of subjectivity within a materialist framework. In The Government of Self and Others Foucault sets out to understand the subject not as a pre-given theoretical entity but as a process of material development. As he writes: ‘instead of referring to a theory of the subject, it seemed to me that one should try to analyse the different forms by which one is led to
constitute himself or herself as a subject’ (Foucault, 2008: 5). His method involves the ‘analysis of these forms of subjectivation through the techniques/technologies of the relation to the self’ (ibid.). In *Introduction to “The Use of Pleasure”* he articulates very similar aims for his analysis of the subject. He writes: ‘It seemed to me appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject’ (Foucault, 2000: 362). These ‘forms and modalities of the relation to self’ are traditional ideological considerations and as such they can be analysed as relational facts conditioned by social relations. Gilbert Simondon in *The Genesis of the Individual* argues, in a similar vein to Foucault, that one should ‘understand the individual from the process of individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual’ (Simondon, 1992: 300). That is, one should not start from an ideal subject to identify its subjectivity, but examine the processes of subjectivation that condition the subject. What this reveals, as Simondon describes, is that ‘[i]ndividuation... not only brings the individual to light but also the individual-milieu dyad’ (ibid). The subject, as an expression of the ‘individual-milieu dyad’, is, according to Foucault, an embodiment of various technologies. Foucault argues that any individual subject is constituted and conditioned by four technologies. They are technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, technologies of power and technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988: 18). He remarks that:

> These four types of technologies hardly ever function separately.... Each implies certain modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the sense of acquiring skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes. I wanted to show both their specific nature and their constant interaction. For instance, the relation between manipulating things and domination appears clearly in Karl Marx’s *Capital* where every technique of production requires modification of individual conduct – not only of skills but also of attitudes. (ibid.)

This is the essence of this chapter; namely that the capitalist mode of production possesses, as a necessary counterpart, a mode of subjectivation.
Subjectivation and the Capital-Relation

Processes of subjectivation, I believe, are a central feature in many of Marx’s works. For example in *The German Ideology* he writes that the mode of production:

...must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life so they are. What they are, therefore coincides with their production, both what they produce and how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production. (Marx and Engels, 1976: 37)

These expressions or modes of life that are engendered through the mode of production must be traced back to their material basis. Within the capitalist mode of production this is what Marx calls ‘the capital-relation’. He states that: ‘The capitalist process of production produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but also produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself: on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer’ (Marx, 1976: 724). Capitalism, as a mode of production, produces modes of life that extend beyond mere commodity production into the realms of subjective production. This subjective production, as an expression of life, is determined by objective production: ‘Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production’.

Foucault’s analysis of what he calls ‘technologies’ provides an excellent means to understand the social relations that mutually effect production and subjectivation within capitalism. Insofar as he wanted to demonstrate both the specificity and interaction of the four technologies (production, sign, power and self), it becomes possible to discern the dialectical dynamic between subjectivity and objectivity inherent within capitalist production. Commenting on Marx’s concept of the mode of production and the way it conditions ‘social, political, and intellectual life,’ Sartre states that ‘we cannot conceive of this conditioning except as that of dialectical development (contradictions, surpassing, totalisations)’ (Sartre, 1963: 34). Foucault’s
technological analysis provides a matrix to identify dialectical development within capitalism including that of subjective totalisation.

A germane representation of the relationship between the mode of production and the mode of subjectivation within capitalism is that of worker discipline. The need for a disciplined workforce has been in effect since the inception of capitalism and has brought about considerable changes in subjectivity to meet this demand. As David Harvey writes:

The habituation of wage labourers to capitalism was a long drawn-out (and not particularly happy) historical process.... The disciplining of labour power to the purposes of capital accumulation – a process I shall refer to as ‘labour control’ - is a very intricate affair. It entails, in the first instance, some mix of repression, habituation, co-optation and co-operation, all of which have to be organised not only through-out the workplace but through society at large. The socialisation of the worker to conditions of capitalist production entails the social control of physical and mental powers on a very broad basis. Education, training, persuasion, the mobilisation of certain sentiments (the work ethic, company loyalty, national or local pride) and psychological propensities... all play a role. (Harvey, 1990: 124)

Following Foucault, the mode of subjectivation can be identified as a concept which represents the processes, what he calls ‘forms and modalities’, by which, ‘an individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject’. What Harvey outlines above in terms of ‘labour control’ exemplifies those specific processes of worker subjectivation that are present within the capitalist mode of production. Foucault himself explains how the specific requirements of nascent capitalist production methods required new relations between subjects, that is new forms of intersubjectivity, in order to generate new ways of harnessing labour-power. As he writes:

Take the example of the division of labour in the great workshops in the eighteenth century: how could this separation of tasks have been attained without a new distribution of power on the plane of management of the forces of production? (Foucault, 1984: 158)
Foucault (1984: 159) also expresses that: ‘It’s impossible to get the development of the productive forces of capitalism if you don’t at the same time have apparatuses of power’. This engages once more Foucault’s idea of mutually constituting technologies, such as those of production and those of power, that represent ‘the relation between manipulating things and domination [that] appears clearly in Karl Marx’s Capital’. In Security, Territory and Population Foucault provides an analysis of power that develops these insights further. In this work he describes how power is ultimately a social relation given that ‘[p]ower is not founded on itself or generated by itself’ (Foucault, 2009: 2). Instead:

...we could say, more simply, that there are not first of all relations of production and then, in addition, alongside or on top of these relations, mechanisms of power that modify or disturb them, or make them more consistent, coherent or stable.... Mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of... these relations, and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause. (ibid)

Power is, in part, realised through discipline. In the case of the capitalist mode of production, discipline is a reproductive requirement. As Foucault states:

Discipline only exists insofar as there is a multiplicity and an end, or objective or result to be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity. School and military discipline, as well as penal discipline, workshop discipline, worker discipline, are all ways of managing and organising a multiplicity, of fixing its points of implantation, its lateral or horizontal, vertical and pyramidal trajectories, its hierarchy, and so on. (Foucault, 2009: 12)

Foucault also describes discipline as ‘normation’ or ‘normalisation’ where it:

consists first in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of disciplinary normalisation consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm.
Discipline is effected, according to Foucault (2009: 57), in four ways: it ‘analyses and breaks down’, ‘establishes optimal sequences of co-ordination’, ‘classifies the components’, and finally ‘fixes the processes of progressive training’. Power, for Foucault, is an intricate phenomenon; however, it cannot be considered separate from the mode of production. As Foucault writes:

Power is constructed and functions on the basis of particular powers, myriad issues, myriad effects of power. It is this complex domain that must be studied. That is not to say that it is independent or could be made sense of outside of economic processes and the relations of production. (Foucault, 1984: 188).

In *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault draws on a notion of Althusser’s called the ‘subject-function’ which was outlined in the preceding chapter. Althusser discusses this concept predominantly in *Three Notes Towards a Theory of Discourses*. In *Psychiatric Power* Foucault relates the notion of the subject-function to that of discipline. He states that:

In disciplinary power... the subject-function is fitted exactly on the somatic singularity: the subject-function is applied and brought to bear on the body, on its actions, place, movements, strength, the moments of its life, and its discourses, on all of this. Discipline is that technique of power by which the subject-function is exactly super-imposed and fastened on the somatic singularity. (Foucault, 2006: 55)

Furthermore he states that: ‘disciplinary power, and this is no doubt its fundamental property, fabricates subjected bodies, it pins the subject-function exactly to the body’ (ibid). The need for capitalism to fabricate subjected bodies is a useful way to articulate much of the argumentation contained herein. At the beginning of this chapter I explained Foucault’s theory of four technologies: production, sign systems, power and self, and how he aimed to show ‘both their specific nature and their constant interaction’. Discipline, as a technology of power, is clearly related to
production within capitalism. Disciplinary power is the power to subjectify and subjugate.

Marx describes the discipline necessary for the development of capitalism from its earliest days of primitive accumulation as being ‘anything but idyllic’ (Marx, 1976: 874). It was through primitive accumulation that, according to Marx, the labourers were put in a position where they had ‘nothing to sell except their own skins’ (Marx, 1976: 873). He explains this in the following way:

The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, is none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other the immediate producers into wage labourers. (Marx, 1976: 874)

Discipline is a means to maintain, reinforce, and create the conditions necessary for this particular type of production. Marx argues that the emergent capitalist mode of production created a ‘bloody legislation against the expropriated’ (Marx, 1934: 734). He states that (1976: 896) ‘these men, suddenly dragged from their accustomed mode of life, could not immediately adapt themselves to the discipline of their new condition.’ They were ‘forcibly expropriated from their homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible into the discipline necessary for the wage system’ (Marx, 1976: 899). In this way ‘legislation treated them as “voluntary” criminals, and assumed it was entirely within their powers to go on working under the old conditions which in fact no longer existed’ (Marx, 1976: 896). Within the capitalist mode of production forms of subjectivation, i.e., the ways in which one develops a relation to oneself and society, are based on the dynamic between the forces and relations of production. Marx argues that:

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another.... In order to produce they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations, does their action on nature, does production, take place (Marx, 1978: 30).
Antonio Gramsci, in his *Prison Notebooks*, considered the forces of subjectivation that were developing in the United States during what he calls ‘Americanisation’ and how there were specific strategies undertaken to maximise worker productivity. He explains that ‘Americanisation requires a particular environment, a particular social structure (or at least a determined intention to create it) and a certain type of state’ (Gramsci, 1971: 293). According to Gramsci, Americanisation and with it Fordism demanded a new type of individual. This individual had to be disciplined in order develop new relations to self that concur with the rationale of industrialisation. Gramsci (1971: 302) explains how ‘the new methods of work are inseparable from a specific mode of living and of thinking and feeling life.’ He states that:

American industrialists are concerned to maintain the continuity of the physical and muscular-nervous efficiency of the worker. It is in their interests to have a stable, skilled labour force, a permanently well adjusted complex, because the human complex (the collective worker) of an enterprise is also a machine which cannot, without considerable loss, be taken to pieces to often and renewed with single parts. (Gramsci, 1971: 303)

Gramsci (ibid) considered many subjective aspects of the productive requirements of early industrialization, such as moral imposition and the development of a ‘psycho-physical equilibrium’ which ‘prevents the psychological collapse of the worker, exhausted by the new methods of production’. New technologies of self in the form of Puritanism and budgeting for workers were utilised to exact a subject suited to the productive requirements of the capitalist mode of production. According to Gramsci there were ‘attempts made by Ford, with the aid of a body of inspectors, to intervene in the private lives of his employees...to control how they spend their wages and how they lived’ (Gramsci, 1971: 304).

It will be recalled that Donati argues that society does not host relations but *is* relations. The order and discipline of social relations are of crucial importance to the capitalist mode of production, and it is through the ordering of space and time via the interaction between nature and technology that this order is determined. Subjectivity is realised in and through the needs of progressive accumulation as it bears on the
reproduction of the relations of production. Discipline is one of the determinant requirements of the capital-relation.

The Exigencies of the Capital-Relation

Sartre in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* suggests how important social organisation is for inter and intra subjective development and indeed expresses the extent to which it is socially determined. He writes:

Organisation, then, is both the discoveries of the practical exigencies of the object and a distribution of tasks amongst individuals on the basis this dialectical discovery. In other words, the organising movement settles the relation between men on the basis of the fundamental relation between group and thing. (Sartre, 1976: 447)

Sartre’s observation is a revealing one. Capitalism, as social system, has its own exigencies. The needs of capitalism are many; for example, there is progressive accumulation, a disciplined workforce and the separation of the worker from the means of production. Moreover there is a distribution of tasks within capitalism that aids in the efficiency of its methods of production, such as its highly specialised division of labour. Ultimately the relations between individuals are based on the determinations of the capital-relation. According to Sartre this has specific consequences for subjective formation. He states that:

Subjectivity, then appears, in all its abstraction, as the verdict which compels us to carry out, freely and through ourselves, the sentence that a ‘developing’ society has pronounced upon us and which defines us a priori in our being. (Sartre, 1976: 71)

Sartre conveys that the production of subjectivity cannot be divorced from social relations and how it is naturalised to suit the needs of the relations of production. Marx states, similarly, that:
the advance of capitalist production produces a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. The organisation of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance (Marx, 1976: 899).

In chapter one, I drew on the work of David Harvey to express the idea that the capitalist class exists insofar as it embodies a collective need, namely, that of progressive accumulation. Following Sartre we can see how indeed it is the verdict that produces the sentence. Capitalists must progressively accumulate and workers must realise this accumulation. It would of course be an oversimplification to argue that society was comprised of only two classes. As Harvey notes there are various forms of stratification within the working class such as administrators and overseers. The point, however, is clear: within capitalism there are objective conditions that must be met for value to be produced and these conditions require subjects to produce it. Where the concept of ideology represents the connections between social reality, social knowledge, and social function, subjectivation expresses the particular subjective aspects of these relations. Indisputably, ideology has a subjective aspect; however, as a concept it deals more broadly with the integration of the phenomena listed above. Subjectivation examines more acutely the specific processes that determine the socio-historical development of subjectivity. It is helpful to think of the distinction between ideology and subjectivation in the following way. Subjectivation deals specifically with subjective determination within a mode of production that explains the ‘individual-milieu dyad’. Ideology explains more broadly the relationship between ideas and the purpose they serve within a social formation. Thus one can speak of capitalist ideology, a phenomenon that integrates the social field of capitalism and provides explanations on the basis of that integration. Within this ideology, one can identify the specific modes of subjectivation which reproduce, maintain, or challenge the existing ideology. While both concepts represent processes they refer to different objects. To develop this idea further I will draw on Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s work in Intellectual and Manual Labour. In good part the ideology of capitalism is determined temporally. Driven by the coercive laws of competition, labour-time as the basis of value within capitalism is an object of principal importance. Time is a condition for subjectivation and an object of capitalist ideology.
Scientific Management as a Mode of Subjectivation

Sohn-Rethel (1978: 148) remarks that ‘if we look back to the beginnings of the search for so-called scientific management we can see that it was economy of time that spurred it on’. According to Sohn-Rethel, the purpose of Taylorism, i.e., ‘scientific management’, was more about capitalist power relations and truth-effects that anything objective. He writes:

It is of the essence of Taylorism that the standards of labour timing are not to be mistaken for the empiricism of the work as the workers themselves do it. Taylor does not learn his time measure from the workers; he imparts the knowledge of it as the laws for their work. The whole claim of ‘science’ for his functional task management hinges upon the “accurate and scientific study of time units, the most important element in scientific management”. Coercive timing would be a more appropriate name to give to this element. It corresponds to the treatment of productive human work in accordance with the logic of appropriation. (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 154-155)

The general ideology around scientific management is that of capitalist appropriation. Questions of profit-maximisation necessarily involve questions of time management and these questions in turn involve relations between subjects and objects: workers and their relation to tools, management and their relation to time etc. We can identify here social reality as it relates to social function and social knowledge. But in addition, there are also the specific practices that must be created and instantiated for the logic of appropriation to be realised. The practices are the actions of subjects as they are immersed within capitalist social relations. They are the subjective counterpart of the objective demands of capitalist production; that is, they are the accompanying modes of subjectivation. Taylor’s ‘scientific’ methods were, according to Sohn-Rethel, designed to shift power relations in the workplace from the workers to the management by way of time-and-motion studies (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 153). This represents a manifestation of class interest in a form of knowledge as a means to generate subjective control. Smith (2000: 34), describing the effects of
Taylorism, remarks that ‘once complex jobs have been fragmented into a series of discrete operations performed by different workers, knowledge and control of the work process as a whole lies with management, not the worker’.

What is identified here is that through a particular process of subjectivation – that of coercive timing - we can see how a social function is generated - i.e efficient workers - that relates to broader ideological considerations, such as those of capitalist reality and knowledge production. Subjectivation is an important concept to utilise in order to comprehend the processual specificities that could be otherwise overlooked in a notion like function. It will be recalled that, according to Carcedi, ‘the thesis of the class-neutrality of knowledge has devastating effects on the struggle for a radically different form of society’. As Sohn-Rethel’s argument illustrates, knowledge that is presented as scientific can potentially have a class basis. Paolucci (2011: 3) remarks that:

Engineering, business, and management schools today, though often repudiating Taylor’s open supplication to capital, engage in similar practices, studying ways to make labour costs and practices as efficient and profitable as possible, with actual human beings a secondary or tertiary concern.

Having presented the idea that the there are processes of subjectivation directly related to the time of capitalist reproduction and how this is an expression of the need to accumulate, I will now explain the foundations of this position.

Subjectivation and Temporal Discipline

For Marx, value is the phenomenal form of abstract labour and it is the capturing of this value, through time, which is essential to capitalist relations of production. What Marx develops in many of his works is how the constant conjunction of labour and time provides the basis for capitalism, complete with its inveterate class divisions. According to Marx, commodities on the market possess a common measure, that is, a value, because they all contain the same essence, abstract human labour. And how is this ‘crystallized social labour’ measured?
By the time labour lasts, in measuring labour by the hour, the day... We arrive therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has a value because it is the crystallization of social labour. The greatness of its value, or its relative value depends on the greater or lesser amount of that social substance contained in it... (Marx, 1951b: 44-45)

This is Marx’s labour theory of value. Value, for Marx, is grounded in labour time. This means that the more effectively labour time can be utilized, the more effectively value can be generated. Thus labour time, according to Marx, is the fount of value in capitalist society.

E.P Thompson in *Time, Work Discipline and Capitalism* discusses in great detail the way industrialisation brought about considerable changes to processes of subjectivation. In particular, he argues there was the development of a new time-consciousness determined by the capitalist mode of production. He poses the following question:

If the transition to mature industrial society entailed a severe restructuring of working habits – new disciplines, new incentives, and a new human nature – how far is this related to changes in the inward notation of time? (Thompson, 1986: 57)

Thompson argues that, due to shifts in the mode of production, industrialisation brought about changes in the apprehension and use of time. There was a change from what he calls ‘task orientation’ to ‘timed labour’ (Thompson, 1986: 60-61). Non-industrialised communities experienced, according to Thompson, ‘the least demarcation between work and life’ (Thompson, 1986: 60). Within task orientation ‘social intercourse and labour are intermingled... [the] working day lengthens or contracts according to the task... there is no great sense of conflict between labour and “the passing of the day”’ (ibid). However when an employer hires an employee with the aim to capitalise on that time ‘the shift from task orientation to timed labour is marked’ (Thompson, 1986: 61). The capital-relation instantiates a new temporal reality:
Those who are employed experience a distinction between their employer’s time and their “own” time. And the employer must use the time of his labour, and see it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time when reduced to money is dominant. (ibid)

What Thompson is describing here concurs with Marx’s theory of value, that is, because it is the time of the labour that is valuable, it is this which must be put to use. Money, as a representation of abstract labour, is the value of time. As Thompson (ibid) remarks: ‘Time is now currency, it is not passed but spent.’ Industrialisation also necessitates synchrony: “attention to time in labour depends in large degree upon the need for the synchronisation of labour’ (Thompson, 1986: 70). This presents Thompson (1986: 80) with two analytical strategies for understanding the industrialisation of time, that of ‘time-sense in its technological conditioning, and... time-measurement as a means of labour exploitation’. Thompson’s work can be understood dialectically. From an objective position, the value of labour engenders a need for increased synchrony, and from a subjective position, this is internalised as ‘time-sense’. It provides an excellent example of the integration of Foucault’s technologies. Technologies of production in the form of industrialisation influence the need for synchronic relations which are expressed through technologies of sign systems. These sign systems are implicated with systems of power that take the form of labour control and these are unified through technologies of the self. Thompson’s research also indicates how, within the division of labour, specific subjective relations are engendered to deal with the demands of managing time for the purposes of capitalist production. Wage-labourers submit time-sheets and factory wardens monitor and enforce productivity. As Thompson writes:

in all these ways – by the division of labour; the supervision of labour; bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings...new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline imposed. (Thompson, 1986: 90)

But what of those who would not submit to the time-sense and time-exploitation of the developing capitalist mode of production? Or who were surplus to requirements and were not needed by employers? The counterpart of discipline is
punishment, and punishment as a mode of subjectivation played an essential role in the determination of subjectivity during the development of capitalism.

Punishment and Capitalist Development

In their work *Punishment and Social Structure*, Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer argue that there is a link between any given mode of production and its forms of punishment. They write:

> It is self-evident that enslavement as a form of punishment is impossible without a slave economy, that prison labour is impossible without manufacture or industry, that monetary fines for all classes of society are impossible without a money economy. (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968: 6)

In addition, they contend that, ‘the disappearance of a given system of production makes its corresponding punishments inapplicable. Only a specific development of the productive forces permits the introduction or rejection or corresponding penalties’ (ibid). During the early stages of the development of capitalism they claim that ‘houses of correction’ were abundant in Europe (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968: 42). They argue that:

The essence of the house of correction was that it combined the principles of the poorhouse, workhouse, and penal institution. Its main aim was to make the labour power of unwilling people socially useful. By being forced to work within the institution, the prisoners would form industrious habits and would receive vocational training at the same time. When released, it was hoped, they would voluntarily swell the labour market.

Furthermore:

The institution of houses of correction... was not the result of brotherly love or of an official sense of obligation to the distressed. It was part of the development of capitalism. Hallema, the historian of the Dutch prison system,
is right, therefore, when he says that the houses of correction were primarily manufactories, turning out commodities at a particularly low cost because of their cheap labour. It is probable, then, that they were generally paying concerns. That was clearly the intention of their founders. It is equally certain that the houses of correction were very valuable for the national economy as a whole. Their low wages and their training of unskilled workers were important contributing factors in the rise of capitalist production. (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968: 50)

The hallmark of industrialisation, for Cronin, is ‘disciplinary society’: ‘in which institutions became central to the efficient functioning of Western capitalism’ (Cronin, 2001: 247). Given that capitalism requires a steady, disciplined, time-conscious workforce and that the valorisation of capital is grounded in labour-time, it is tenable to posit that there could be a link between surplus labour, those individuals unable to realize value, and punishment. In their work ‘Labour Surplus and Punishment: A Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence’ Theodore G. Chiricos and Miriam A. Delone investigate this proposition. They state that ‘theorising around punishment and surplus labour has clustered around three principal issues: the value of labour, systemic needs of capitalism, and judicial action’ (Chiricos and Delone, 1992: 421). These three principal issues ‘are not mutually exclusive... they complement one another by reflecting different levels and issues of analysis... the first is principally economic, the second political, and the third ideological’ (ibid). Within capitalism, labour-power is a commodity like any other: it can be bought and sold and is subject to the principles of supply and demand. When there is a glut in the market the value of labour drops. The surplus created by lack of demand means that there are workers who cannot find employment and additionally the value of labour-power as a whole falls because workers can be easily replaced. If labour-power was scarce the opposite would apply; that is, there would be little unemployment and the price of labour would be high. What Chiricos and Delone investigate is the relationship between labour surplus and punishment. They claim that the ‘mechanism of criminal motivation is a direct consequence of the diminished value of labour during labour surplus’ (ibid). Because surplus labour is not a valuable commodity it is unable to exchange itself through work and so turns to crime as a means of subsistence. Surplus labour is then punished as a consequence of its low
value; however, this condition is imposed upon the worker by separation from the means of production in the form of wage labour. The value of labour power, which can be identified as a problem regarding the value of labour-time, is the first ‘theoretical linkage’ Chiricos and Delone articulate between labour surplus and punishment. The next linkage Chiricos and Delone (1992: 422) consider is the relation of punishment and surplus labour to the ‘systemic needs of accumulation, legitimation, and control’ within capitalism. From this position, the state is seen to take on the role of reproducing capitalist relations insofar as ‘the control of surplus populations is considered a means to preclude questions about the legitimacy of a system of productive relations that continually makes human workers redundant’ (ibid). The last perspective is that of judicial agency and ideology where analysis is directed towards ‘the human “agency” and ideology of criminal justice personnel, primarily judges’ (ibid). Here Chiricos and Delone cite Melossi who offers explanations for punishment in terms of a ‘discursive chain’ that ‘links business cycles with the conditions of punishment’ (Chiricos and Delone, 1992: 423).

The research of Chiricos and Delone, Harvey, Sohn-Rethel, Thompson and Foucault provides a sound basis to understand the reciprocal demands of capitalism both objectively and subjectively, that is, as a mode of production and a mode of subjectivation. Moreover, it also important to note that all the social theorists mentioned above deal either directly or indirectly with issues of time within the capitalist mode of production. In the following two chapters this relationship is pursued further. In chapter three, the next chapter, the theme of subjectivation in advanced capitalism is considered. I chapter four I address what I am calling the ‘modes of contradiction within the capital-relation’, namely, time, space, nature and technology.

Summary

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels explain that ‘individuals who are productively active enter into.... definite social and political relations’ (Marx and Engels, 1976: 41). Consequently ‘the social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-processes of definite individuals’ (ibid). These individuals,
according to Marx and Engels, ‘work under definite material limits, presuppositions, and conditions independent of their will’ (ibid). This applies directly to what has been argued in this chapter. In the first instance, relations of production cannot be considered independently of social and political relations. Furthermore, it is not just that social and political relations cannot be considered separately from the relations of production but social and political relations are engendered by the relations of production. They are ‘evolving out of the life-processes’ of subjects. However, these life-processes are not arbitrary forms of activity. Individuals cannot change these relations, nor their position in respect to them, on a whim. There are objective determinations they must contend with as they produce. According to Harvey there is ‘labour control’ and the ‘socialisation of the worker to conditions of capitalist production’. For Sohn-Rethel there is the manifestation of class control through ‘scientific management’. Thompson remarks that there is the development of new forms of time-sense and time-conditioning within an emerging capitalism. In all of these cases, and the others mentioned above, one can identify the relationship between the needs of economic production and those of subjectivation. Althusser summarises this idea remarkably well:

That human, i.e., social, individuals are active in history – as agents of the different historical processes of production and reproduction – that is a fact. But considered as agents, human individuals are not ‘free’ and ‘constitutive’ in the philosophical sense of these terms. They work in and through the determinations of the historical forms of existence of the social relations of production (labour process, division and organisation of labour, process of production and reproduction, class struggle etc) (Althusser, 2003: 95).

The concept of subjectivation allows one to develop an understanding of the peculiar ‘forms and modalities’ of subjective development within a mode of production in a way that the more broad concept of ideology cannot. By revealing these processes of subjectivation it is possible to understand how subjects are an immanent and inextricable part of economic processes.
3. Subjectivation in Advanced Capitalism

Precisely because it is social, production finds its exclusive centre in communication, in the processes of information and in the spheres of the communicative structure. Under the domination of capital, however, the mode in which communication functions and takes shape is simultaneously a mode of expropriation – Antonio Negri (1989: 58)

Introduction

In both chapter one and chapter two, theoretical and substantive considerations were broached which bear directly on a number of arguments presented in this chapter. From chapter one, ideas that are relevant here include: the class determination of knowledge, relational facts, the accumulation of capital, and the reasons-of-a-subject. From chapter two: Foucault’s technologies, worker discipline, capitalist organisation and temporality, and, of course, subjectivation.

The capitalist mode of production is the outcome of ongoing socio-historical activity. Although the capital-relation remains its necessary condition the forces of production change through technological innovation brought about by the coercive laws of competition. As the forces of production develop so do what I am calling the ‘forces of subjectivation’. Within advanced capitalism the dominant mode of subjectivation arguably takes place through its communications apparatus.

The Technological Development of Disciplinary Apparatuses: From Discipline to Control

Discipline, as evinced by the work of Foucault, Sohn-Rethel, Harvey and Marx, has been at the core of capitalist development since its inception. Discipline goes hand in hand with the formal subsumption process based on worker control and juridical subjugation. From the days of primitive accumulation where ‘bloody legislation’ served as a means to develop industry to Taylor’s ‘scientific management’
discipline has been needed to ensure capitalist production. Gilles Deleuze (1992: 3-4), however, contends that a systemic change has taken place within the capitalism. According to his analysis, we are moving from disciplinary societies to societies of control, and he argues Foucault identified this shift first. When a mode of production changes so does the mode of subjectivation. The ways in which subjects are constituted change as production methods are altered; the dialectic between sociality and technology mutually determines both people and things; discipline becomes control because it is technologically efficacious. Deleuze (1990: 169), in an interview with Antonio Negri states that ‘we’re definitely moving toward “control” societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary...We’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication’.

It is this socio-technological variation that concerns Deleuze in Postscript on Societies of Control. He describes the technological evolution of computers as bringing about a ‘mutation of capitalism’ (Deleuze, 1992: 6). What typifies disciplinary societies is enclosure, whereas for control societies it is modulation. To use an image from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus we can say that control society is a smooth space whereas disciplinary society is a striated one. According to Deleuze (1992: 3) Foucault has ‘brilliantly analysed’ the striated space of ‘these environments of enclosure’. The effects of this are particularly apparent in the factory where the aim is to: ‘concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of its component parts’ (ibid). The smooth computer modulation of control society is considerably different from the die cast mechanics of disciplinary society. Deleuze (1992: 4) explains that ‘Enclosures are like molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point’. This imposes new demands of subjectivity, subjection and subjectivation. ‘The disciplinary man... was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network’ (Deleuze, 1992: 5-6). We have, according to Deleuze, a society today where ‘the corporation replaces the factory, perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination’. The individual of control, the subject of control, is
socialised with different aims in mind to that of the subject of discipline. Technologically, the subjects of control live amongst just-in-time production and web 2.0. Disciplinary individuals lived amongst the conditions of the printing press and the Fordist production line. Deleuze (1990: 170) argues that:

One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic and computers to control societies. But the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyse the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component.

Furthermore: ‘types of machines are easily matched with each type of society – not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating and using them’ (Deleuze, 1992: 6). As Deleuze suggests, technology does not explain anything in itself. It is necessary to articulate the dynamic between the technological forces of production and the relations of social subjectivation of which they are a part.

The Production of Subjectivity

The mode of production within a society of control requires new intra- and inter-subjective relations. French sociologist Pierre Lévy is also aware of the necessity for new subjective determination within the conditions of advanced capitalism. He argues that:

New abilities must continuously be imported, produced, and introduced (in real time) in all sectors of the economy. Organisations must remain receptive to a constantly renewed stream of scientific, technical, social, and even aesthetic skills. Skill flow conditions cash flow. (Lévy, 1997: 2)

People are the ultimate commodity, not just in terms of the value they can produce, but in the potential value they possess subjectively. It is through the
mobilisation of this subjectivity that value can be realised. As Lévy states, it is the ability to quickly produce new skills and relations that is the locus of profit. He argues this is well known by those in the subjectivity business:

The corporation no longer only consumes and produces goods and services, as in traditional economics. It is no longer satisfied with implementing skill and knowledge, as illustrated by the new cognitive approach to organisational structure. We must recognise the fact that the corporation, like other institutions, both encourages and promotes the development of subjectivity. Because it conditions all other activities, the continuous production of subjectivity will most likely be considered the major economic activity through the next century. (Lévy, 1997: 5)

It is tenable to posit that a new form of worker discipline, albeit a form of discipline that corresponds to a control society, is expected of the workers under these new economic relations. There is less of a focus on a discipline of stasis and an increased interest in the discipline of continuous change. Lévy remarks that:

Beginning in the nineteen sixties, it became increasingly difficult for the labourer, employee, or engineer to inherit the traditions of trade, to exercise and transmit this ability almost unchanged, to assume a lasting professional identity. Not only did technologies change with increasing velocity, but it became necessary to learn how to compare, regulate, communicate, and reorganise one’s activity. It became necessary to exercise one’s intellectual potential on a continuous basis... But this constant mobilisation of social and cognitive abilities implicitly assumed a considerable degree of subjective involvement. (Lévy, 1997: 2-3)

Corporations seek to mobilise and valorise subjectivity because it is the primary source of value. In his work The Nature of Capital Richard Marsden (1999: 11) asks ‘what have hyperreal marketplaces and reengineered workplaces to do with each other?’ The conclusion that he comes to is that new work practices and a modulating market are the outcome of postmodernity which is ‘an empirical
condition, characterised by a compression of space and time, driven by the imperative of capitalist accumulation’ (ibid). According to Marsden the conditions of postmodernity brought about the following changes to the capitalist mode of production:

Mass markets broke out into niches and became more competitive. Public goods commodified and went to market. The shelf-life of commodities reduced through innovation, branded proliferation and ‘accelerated decrepitude’. An aesthetic of the instantaneous, the disposable and the temporary developed, by which taste could be manipulated. Flexible consumption necessitated flexible production. (ibid)

Jason Read (2003: 2) also suggests that significant changes to production methods have taken place within advanced capitalism and these changes include the direct manufacture of subjectivity. He states that:

Capitalist production has undergone a profound mutation in the past thirty or so years. Stated briefly, it is no longer possible to separate capital, as the producer of goods and commodities, from what used to be called the superstructure: the production of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, and tastes. Capitalist production today has either directly appropriated the production of culture, beliefs, and desires or it has indirectly linked them to the production and circulation of commodities.... This transformation also entails a fundamental mutation of labour: It is no longer physical labour power that is put to work but knowledges, affects, and desires. In short capitalist production has taken on a dimension that could be described as ‘micro-political’, inserting itself into the texture of day-to-day social existence and, ultimately, subjectivity itself....

The work of Deleuze, Lévy, Read and Marsden opens up a number of objects of enquiry in relation to the theoretical development of the preceding chapters. For example, if ‘new abilities must be continuously imported, produced, and introduced... in all sectors of the economy’, to what extent can these abilities become subject to
class determination? What is the relationship between the production of subjectivity and the production of discursive formations? What kind of opposition to capitalism is possible when the gap is closing between the development of productive forces and the production of subjectivity?

Communicative Subjection

In *Ecographies of Television* Jacques Derrida is concerned with the extent to which, within the ‘political present’, namely that of advanced capitalism, the public space is ‘constantly transformed, in its structure, and its content, by the teletechnology of what is so confusedly called information or communication...’ (Derrida, 2002: 5). The teletechnology of media apparatuses produces what he calls ‘artifactuality’. To understand artifactuality ‘is to register the fact that the time of this very speaking is artificially produced. It is an artifact. In its very happening, this time of this public gesture is calculated, constrained, “formatted”, initialised...' (ibid). It is the production of statements that are mediated through teletechnologies and the effect these statements have on the public sphere that is the object of Derrida’s analysis. What is presented as ‘information’ or ‘communication’, is, according to Derrida, ‘not given but actually produced, sifted, invested, performatively interpreted by numerous apparatuses which are factitious or artificial, hierarchising and selective, always in the service of forces and interests to which ‘subjects’... are never sensitive enough’ (Derrida, 2002: 5). Derrida states that:

We ought never to forget the full import of this index: when a journalist or politician seems to be speaking to us, in our homes, while looking us straight in the eye, he (or she) is in the process of reading... a text composed somewhere else, at some other time, sometimes by others, or by a whole network of anonymous authors. (ibid)

According to Derrida it is imperative to ‘learn how the dailies, weeklies, the television news programs are made, and by whom’ (ibid.). Derrida is not alone here. Balnaves et al (2009: 304-309) in their book *Media Theories and Approaches* describe, in the language of media studies, precisely what Derrida is concerned about.
They delineate concepts such as agenda setting, cultural imperialism, monopolies of knowledge, and perception management. The analysis of the capitalist media apparatus has also been a long time preoccupation of the Frankfurt School. In *Minima Moralia* Theodor Adorno argues that:

> Each statement, each piece of news, each thought has been preformed by the centres of the culture industry. Whatever lacks the familiar trace of such pre-formation lacks credibility.... Truth that opposes these pressures appears not only improbable, but is in addition too feeble to make any headway in competition with their highly-concentrated machinery of dissemination. (Adorno, 1974: 108)

In *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* (1973: xii) Adorno and Max Horkheimer argue that public opinion has become a commodity. This position has been argued again more recently by Jakob Arnoldi in his article *Informational Ideas*. Arnoldi’s (2007: 60) proposition here is that ‘political communication has become increasingly mediatised and is increasingly marketed and branded like any other commodity’. Moreover, ‘symbolic constructs, like knowledge and ideas, have become commodified and become part of ever increasing knowledge economies’ (ibid). Arguably then, within advanced capitalism even political activity is prefabricated by the system itself; that is, in a system of commodity production, the means of political expression takes a commodity-form. There is no lack of evidence for this phenomenon. David Kurtz and Louis E. Boone in their recently published textbook *Contemporary Marketing* propose a new category which they call ‘Non-traditional Marketing’. They describe five new marketing objects within this classification: person, place, cause, event, and organisation (Kurtz and Boone, 2010: 15). Person marketing involves: ‘efforts designed to cultivate the attention or preference of a target market towards a person. Examples... celebrity Toby Smith, country singer, political candidate James De Mint, U.S. Senator from South Carolina’ (ibid). Cause marketing is ‘the identification and marketing of a social issue, cause or idea to a selected target market’ (ibid). Organisation marketing represents the efforts of ‘service organizations, and government organizations that seek to influence others to accept their goals, receive their services or contribute to them in some way’ (ibid). It
is evident here that what is sought is subjective preferences. Subjectivity is a market wherein individuals are targeted as sources of subjective value. What Marx calls the general equivalent, i.e., money, mediates between all the objects mentioned above insofar as they are on the market in a commodity form. These objects, social causes, personal identity, and government institutions are also, in many respects beyond price, that is they have a value that cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. However, within capitalism they all become commensurable.

It is also tenable to posit that there is the production of social stratification within the production and distribution of commodities. What Kurtz and Boone call the ‘target market’ is ‘the group of people toward whom the firm aims its marketing efforts and ultimately its merchandise’ (Kurtz and Boone, 2010: 45). This targeting is ultimately analysed in terms of ‘purchasing power’ and specific social typologies.

Time for Consciousness

Bernard Stiegler, a student of Jacques Derrida, is also concerned with the way advanced capitalism is developing into a society of control. Stiegler argues in Acting Out (2009: 52) that ‘the time of consciousness has become a market’. This concurs with the analysis of nontraditional marketing detailed above. As Kurtz and Boone outline in their textbook, mental objects such as ‘causes’, ‘ideas’ and ‘preferences’ are the new nontraditional objects of marketing, and to develop interest in them is a work of time. Controlling mental time is now a coveted market. According to Stiegler ‘mnemotechnics and mnemo-technologies (which govern all processes of human individuation) have passed into the sphere of industrial exploitation’ (Stiegler, 2009: 41). It is the alignment of what Stiegler (2009: 41) calls the ‘process of adoption’ with the reproductive requirements of capitalism that gives mnemotechnologies their exploitative character. Following the analysis of the Frankfurt School, Stiegler states that ‘culture industries serve to create markets’ and these markets, according to Stiegler, strive to possess time-consciousness. As has already been discussed in the preceding chapter, the production of value is determined by labour-time. What Stiegler’s analysis offers is a presentation of how media apparatuses can seize upon consciousness with the ability to determine its temporal objects and the future use of labour-time.
According to Stiegler: ‘a temporal object is an object of time-consciousness’ (Stiegler, 2009: 53). Without temporal objects, there would be no internet, new media, film, television, radio, or iPods. Stiegler’s theory of temporal objects is based on the work of Edmund Husserl. Stiegler extrapolates on Husserl’s analysis by noting how within the practices of advanced capitalism, temporal objects become subject to control: ‘[a]udiovisual temporal objects permit the diffusion and mass adoption of behavioural models through which consumers adopt new products’ (Stiegler, 2009: 60) Temporal objects, are, at the most basic level, the ability the mind has to unify temporal experiences. Mnemotechnologies are designed to control temporal objects. Stiegler suggests that:

A temporal object is a tissue of retentions and protensions. Now, this protentional process also frames the temporality of consciousness generally, and temporal objects permit in one blow the modification of the process of consciousness, and up to a certain point, influence and control this process. (Stiegler, 2009: 54)

Stiegler unpacks this idea by explaining the effects of mnemotechnologies on perception and imagination. He develops the idea of primary and secondary retentions and he uses the example of a melody to explain how they operate. Within the phenomenological experience of time-consciousness, when a melody is heard it is not discordant or discontinuous it is heard as a whole, in its continuity; one note blends into another so that the entire melody is recognised. This is what Stiegler calls a primary retention: the capacity to unify events that are taking place through time into a whole experience, such as that of the melody. The secondary retention, is the ability to recall the melody at a later time, perhaps humming it back to oneself or transcribing it into notation. What Stiegler is concerned about is the dialectic between primary retentions, secondary retentions, and what he calls tertiary retentions. Tertiary retentions are enabled through a ‘prosthesis of exteriorized memory’ (Stiegler, 2009: 54). These prostheses are mnemotechnologies, media apparatuses: film, radio, television etc. In the form of exteriorised memory they manifest, according to Stiegler, ‘materialized time’, and as such it ‘overdetermines the relations between primary and secondary retentions in general, thus in a certain sense permitting their
control’ (ibid). This overdetermination has serious consequences for the relations between perception and imagination, as Stiegler argues:

If it is true that secondary retentions form the selection criteria in primary retentions, then the fact that the same people watch the same programs every day leads each ‘consciousness’ into sharing more and more identical secondary retentions, and thus to selecting the same primary retentions. They end up being so well synchronized that they have lost their diachrony, that is, their singularity, which is to say their liberty, which always means their ability to think. (Stiegler, 2009: 55)

Stiegler’s work then goes some way in explaining why there is such a market for time-consciousness. The successful direction of primary retentions through an embedding of secondary retentions by means of materialised time enables mass adoption of behavioural models and the lucrative capturing of ‘target markets’.

Memory, Imagination and the Capital-Relation

Bernd Huppauf and Christian Wulf in *Dynamics and Performativity of Imagination* argue that there is a dialectical relationship between imagination and sociality which extends Stiegler’s position. They argue that the imagination ‘plays an important role in the processes of perception, recall and projection of social actions, which support processes that lead to the development of images of social life’ (Huppauf and Wulf, 2009: 166). According to Huppauf and Wulf:

in order for communities to be able to constitute and sustain themselves as social units, their members require memories that they can share with each other. Such memories develop rituals that are recalled by their participants as social actions that forge links between them. (Huppauf and Wulf, 2009: 167)

Within advanced capitalism, the image of social life is advanced capitalism and as Paolucci (2011: 11) states ‘social conditioning shapes our assumptions about reality.’ Industrial temporal objects, as Stiegler calls them, perpetually produce
ritualistic versions of the same social system; complete with the same division of labour, the same class differences, state form and legal system. In the language of Marx, advanced capitalism presents an image of itself that is wholly fetishised. There is arguably then a dialectic between what Stiegler calls ‘primary and secondary retentions’ as determined by the media apparatuses, what Guattari refers to as the ‘collective apparatuses (equipments) of subjectification, and the memories and imaginative capacities that ‘lead to the development of images of social life’. In Politics and the Study of Discourse Foucault addresses a number of issues that are pertinent to considerations for the development of social memory. Foucault states that discourses can be conserved, memorised, reactivated, and appropriated. He additionally asks:

> Which utterances are destined to disappear without any trace? Which are destined, on the other hand, to enter into human memory through ritual recitation, pedagogy, amusement, festival, publicity? Which are marked down as reusable and to what ends? Which utterances are put into circulation, and among what groups? Which are repressed and censored? (Foucault, 1991: 60)

Felix Guattari argues that in advanced capitalism, what he calls ‘Integrated World Capitalism’, ‘it is the very essence of capitalist profit not to be restricted to the field of economic surplus value: it also resides in the seizure of subjectivity’ (Guattari, 2008: 22). However, what the work of Lévy, Deleuze, Stiegler and Marx presents is that advanced capitalism and the seizure of subjectivity are completely inseparable. The production of subjectivity, subjection and subjectivation form a unity. The work of Huppauf and Wulf suggests that image and memory are all-important modalities within capitalist relations. The continuity of the image within consciousness and its capacity to be regulated also reflects the arguably pertinent concern of Stiegler, insofar as the bodies of others and their material circumstances are ‘taken in and recalled by other people as “living images”’. In this process emotions, attitudes, norms and values that are implicit in the images also become part of a person’s image world’ (Huppauf and Wulf, 2009: 166). What is occurring through these processes is the social construction of memory. Huppauf and Wulf (2009: 173) state that ‘mimetic
processes produce representations and mental images of social life in the human body’. Through this process:

people produce representations and images of the outside world in their own bodies. Most of these representations and images of social life remain unconscious. When we speak of mimetic references to ritual and other acts we can distinguish the following: 1) The largely unconscious representations of social acts in the body or brain which encompass very different sensory impressions, and 2) the mental images of social life which have a pictorial character and are frequently embedded in synaesthetic experiences (ibid).

In *The Genealogy of Morals* Friedrich Nietzsche develops theory of memory that is grounded in considerations of social discipline and control. Nietzsche writes that ‘man, with the help of the morality of customs and of social strait-waistcoats, was made genuinely calculable’ (Nietzsche, 1921: 36). Developing memory and developing custom are inseparable for Nietzsche. Forgetfulness is according to Nietzsche ‘kept in check’ by ‘an opposition power, a memory’. Nietzsche’s work is relevant here because as Stiegler and Huppauf et al suggest, social image and its remembrance, plays a crucial role in the reproduction of the customs of capitalism today. The question is then: if the basis of this collective memory rests on an injustice is the continued production of it just? Georg Lukacs (1968: 257) in *History and Class Consciousness* contends that ‘revolution can only be accomplished by people who have become intellectually and emotionally emancipated from the existing system’. From Nietzsche’s perspective this involves what he calls ‘active forgetfulness’. There is of course, nothing fundamentally just about capitalism and the way particular groups are treated within it nor about the distribution of income that is derived from the total social product. Capitalism can arguably be identified as a very specific morality of custom and one of the ways that it is sustained is through memory. It is pain, according to Nietzsche, that is the oldest memory aid in the history of humanity. He claims: ‘something which is branded... stays in the memory: only that which hurts incessantly is remembered – this is the central proposition of the oldest psychology on earth’. Mnemotechniques, as Stiegler calls them, have had according to Nietzsche, an unsavory development: ‘there is, perhaps, nothing more frightening and sinister in the
whole prehistory of man than his technique for remembering things’. Furthermore, ‘the worse mankind’s memory was the more frightening his customs appear...’. It would seem that now under the conditions of ‘civil society’ in advanced capitalism that mnemotechniques are not flagrantly brutal, instead, they are softer, more technologically advanced forms of violence. David Neilsen (2007: 117) in *Formal and Real Subordination and the Contemporary Proletariat* states that Antonio Negri develops theoretical perspectives around new forms of capitalist control involving ‘mind management underpinned by new information and communication technologies’. Nietzsche’s question then is a crucial one for developing ideas regarding the mode of subjectivation within capitalism: ‘How does one give the man-animal a memory?’ Lukacs claims that ‘every system of state and law, and the capitalist system above all, exists in the last analysis because its survival, and the validity of its statutes, are simply accepted as unproblematic’. One way to maintain the unproblematic acceptance of a system is to reproduce its images ad infinitum. According to Guattari, capitalist subjectivation has reached gigantic, effectively total proportions. It is a ‘huge machine’ and ‘this mighty capitalistic machine also produces what happens when we dream, when we day dream, when we fantasize and so on’ (Guattari, 2008: 22).

**Intensive and Extensive Capitalist Development**

Scott Lash in *Intensive Culture: Social Theory, Religion & Contemporary Capitalism* argues that within advanced capitalism there is both intensive and extensive culture. What he proposes bears importantly on the preceding arguments of this chapter and on those of the next. He states that ‘Contemporary culture, today’s capitalism – our global information society – is ever more expanding, is ever more extensive’ (Lash, 2010: 1). Lash distinguishes between extensive culture and intensive culture in the following way: ‘Extensive culture is a culture of the same: a culture of equivalence; while intensive culture is a culture of difference or inequivalence’ (Lash, 2010: 4). What Guattari calls Integrated World Capitalism is the domination of capitalist society as an extensive culture. According to Lash ‘growing extensity has meant, first, a gain in geographical spread’, however, ‘it has at the same time brought homogenization’ (Lash, 2010: 2). Lash adopts a Marxian explanation of how this
geographical spread occurs: ‘These homogeneous units of space have run parallel to an effective homogenization of (Newtonian) time and the spread of homogeneous units of value in the commodity’ (Lash, 2010: 4). Capitalism as what Lash calls an extensive culture, a culture of equivalence, is a reality engendered by specific spatiotemporal relations. The relations between time, space and value within advanced capitalism create the conditions for extensive culture. Following Marx, Lash argues that: ‘The commodity takes on value as it incorporates greater quantities of labour power or homogeneous units of market exchange’ (Lash, 2010: 4). However, Lash also posits that capitalism is developing intensively, that a condition of its extensive development is intensive development. Extensive capitalism, Lash states, ‘works from a logic of identity’ while ‘intensive capitalism works from logic of difference’ (Lash, 2010: 100). Lash’s distinction between intensive and extensive development within capitalism is consistent with the preceding arguments in this chapter. Lévy, it will be recalled, claims that ‘new abilities must continuously be imported, produced, and introduced (in real time) in all sectors of the economy...Skill flow conditions cash flow.’ Here we are presented with an economic demand for difference and it is arguably from the production of new subjective relations that it is derived. Stiegler also expresses this intensive development: ‘Cultural industries serve to create markets...Marx said it already: capitalism is essentially the creation of new needs’. What Kurtz and Boone identify in their textbook as non-traditional marketing indicates quite clearly how these new objects of marketing: person, place, cause, event and organisation can be marketed so as to produce intensity, that is difference, within the homogeneity of capitalist extensity.

Mental Use-Value

According to Lash (2010: 100) ‘capital now begins to accumulate as difference’. Implicit within Lash’s account of the accumulation of difference is what Carchedi calls mental use-value. Advanced capitalism is not merely concerned with the production of material use-value; it must also produce mental use-value. It is through the creation of mental use-value that capital can accumulate as difference. As Carchedi argues:
The use-value of knowledge is mental use-value. Accordingly, new knowledge (a mental transformation) is, by definition, a new mental use-value, because, by transforming our perception, theorisation and comprehension of objective reality, it transforms the use to which new knowledge can be put. (Carchedi, 2011: 221)

Carchedi (2011: 193) distinguishes between objective transformations and mental transformations: ‘Objective transformations are the transformation of objective reality, or reality existing outside our consciousness, while mental transformations are the transformations of knowledge, be it knowledge of objective reality or of previous knowledge’. Though different types of activity, ‘both objective and mental transformations require the expenditure of human energy and, are thus material processes’ (ibid). Following this analysis Carcedi delineates some new concepts that bear importantly on the analysis above. He describes what he calls the ‘means of mental transformations’ and the ‘means of objective transformations’. The subject is the mediator of both. Both objective and mental transformations are brought about by processes of learning:

the reason why knowledge is material is that thinking, the learning process, is an expenditure of human energy that causes a change in the nervous system. This is a change in synapses, the functional connections between neurons in the brain... New knowledge is the outcome of a material process, or synaptic changes.’ (Carchedi, 2011: 194)

It is tenable to argue that in advanced capitalism the majority of what Carcedi calls ‘the means of mental transformation’ will be in the hands of the capitalist class. Therefore they will be able to direct the use to which mental transformations are put. This concurs with the argument that Marx and Engels present in the German Ideology:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it.
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, therefore the ideas of its dominance. (Marx and Engels, 1976: 67)

Summary

In this chapter, through Deleuze’s notion of the society of control, it was argued that changes in the mode of production are dialectically related to changes in subjectivity. These changes in subjectivity are brought about by socio-technological shifts. Levy analyses these shifts as the need for the conditions of advanced capitalism to produce subjectivity insofar as productivity is ensured by the generation of new needs. I then drew on the work of Derrida to state that the content of public space is constantly transformed by what is called ‘information or knowledge’. Derrida argues that the time of ‘political present’ is indeed an artifact, something which has been ‘calculated, constrained, initialized...’. The statements that circulate within public space, according to Derrida, are ‘not given but actually produced, sifted, invested, performatively interpreted by numerous apparatuses... always in the service of forces and interests to which “subjects”... are never sensitive enough’. The composition of statements and their political significance was then examined in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Arnoldi who come to the conclusion that political communication within advanced capitalism is mediatised, marketed and branded like any other commodity. Developing the idea of the production of subjectivity further I then presented the content of Boone and Kurtz’s 2010 marketing textbook and cited their explanation of non-traditional marketing objects. These objects: person, place, cause, event and organisation are the new objects of marketing which suggests that subjectivity is now being overtly and deliberately produced. Stiegler’s theory of time-consciousness gives further strength to this argument, wherein ‘the time of consciousness has become a market’. In order to influence memory, through primary and secondary retentions, tertiary retentions are sought, through the materialised time of temporal objects. By means of mnemotechnologies, perception and imagination can be influenced. The arguments of Huppauf and Wulff were cited to detail the importance of mental images of social life and how these have the capacity to become embodied through ritualised activity. The political significance of this was then
expressed insofar as alternative visions of society can be potentially eliminated from view. In this way advanced capitalism, and the perpetuation of class society, simply goes without saying thanks to the determination of primary and secondary retentions having a devastating effect on the social imaginary. It is ‘simply accepted as unproblematic’. It is tenable to posit that what Guattari describes as ‘Integrated World Capitalism’ is produced by what Lash calls extensity, that is the homogeneity brought about by commodity production. Commodity production unifies space and time through the ‘homogenization of... time and the spread of homogeneous units of value in the commodity.’ However, Lash argues that as capitalism develops extensively it must also develop intensively and as such produce difference. Arguably it is through what Carchedi calls mental use-value that capitalism can produce intensively, that is generate difference. Capitalism is then arguably caught in the contradiction mentioned in chapter one between ‘capitalism’s tendency towards its own supersession’ and the ‘the counter-tendency towards reproduction.’ That is capitalism must continuously produce difference but the at the same time maintain the identity of the existing social relations. Supersession is arrived at through the production of difference, however, this must be kept in check by the socio-historical necessity of capitalist reproduction.
4. The Modes of Contradiction

But what is a revolution, if we follow Foucault and Deleuze? Perhaps it is a metamorphosis; perhaps it is a product of a continually open subjectivity, which must nevertheless be determined. – Antonio Negri (2009: 208)

Introduction

Capitalism is a contradictory social system (cf. Althusser, 1976, Lukács, 1968, Postone, 1993, Badiou, 2009). In this chapter I will extrapolate on the analysis of the preceding three chapters in light of what I am calling ‘the capitalist modes of contradiction’. Four modes of contradiction will be examined: time, space, nature and technology. I aim to demonstrate that objective contradictions between time, space, nature and technology within capitalism produce subjective contradictions, and the dialectic between these four modes of contradiction represents the possibility for a potentially revolutionary transformation of the existing mode of production.

The Essential Contradiction

In chapter two I introduced Marx’s notion of the capital-relation. According to Marx: ‘The capitalist process of production produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but also produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself: on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer’. The capital-relation represents the essential contradiction within the capitalist mode of production: the separation of the worker and the means of production. As Oscar Lange (1971: 20) explains in Political Economy:

under capitalism hired labourers use the means of production owned by the capitalists...In such a case we say that society is divided into social classes and that production relations, and the whole of mode of production are antagonistic.
The separation of workers from the means of production leads to class struggle which according to Brian Roper ‘whether over or latent, is an inevitable and enduring feature of capitalist society’ (Roper, 2005: 92). However, following the work of Althusser, this apparently simple contradiction is in reality manifested in an immense variety of ways: it is, in fact, a complex contradiction. According to Resnick and Wolff, every social entity:

is the site of the different effectivities of all other social entities....As such sites, each entity contains different effects that push and pull it in all directions with varying force. In this precise sense, Althusser refers to the contradictions within every entity as complex: they emanate from the influences exerted by all other entities. Instead of the dualistic (Althusser calls it ‘simple’) notion of contradiction... Althusser counterposes the notion of overdetermined and hence infinitely complex contradictions constituting every entity. (Resnick and Wolff, 2006a: 71)

The seemingly simple contradiction between capital and labour is realized in a diverse range of social forms. That is, within capitalism there are various modes of contradiction that express the dialectic between capital and labour. As Resnick and Wolff (2006b: 72) write, ‘Every entity in society exists as the site of effects from all others: it is overdetermined and hence complexly contradictory.’ The four modes of contradiction that will be considered here are time, space, nature, and technology. Each of these modes expresses contradictions between capital and wage labour.

**Time**

Andrew M. Koch in *Poststructuralism and the Politics of Method* explains the temporal contradiction of capitalist social relations in the following way:

Marx correctly points out that the logic of capitalism, in its purest form, simply cannot accommodate the objective of returning surplus labour time to the workers. Capitalism thrives through the process of extracting surplus
labour time from the workers. Private enterprise is successful to the degree that it can maximize both the productivity of labour and the amount of time to which it can put the labourer to the wheel. (Koch, 2007: 104)

According to Koch (2007: 92) ‘Capitalism does not allow the productive value of the machine to be manifested as liberation from labour time’. Thus, rather than technological advancements bringing about the liberation of labour, the dynamic of capitalist accumulation enslaves it. As Koch writes (2007: 92) ‘Necessary labour time is reduced, but because of the internal logic of capitalism, there is continual pressure to expand the total work time expended by labour.’ This is also why technology is a mode of contradiction within capitalist social relations. Technology can be manipulated in such a way that its potentially liberating effects can be used for subjugation rather than emancipation. Through the needs of the capitalist class to progressively accumulate, technology becomes a means to compete for the production of surplus value that is realized through labour-time. However this has negative consequences for those in the working class. Koch (2007: 99) states that: ‘competition among the bourgeoisie, the increasing use of mechanization, works to impoverish the workforce through creating downward pressure on wages and demands for labour time’.

Antonio Negri in Open Marxism: Theory and Praxis explicates the same position as Koch, albeit in more overtly political terms. He writes:

In the political constitution of advanced capitalism, the fundamental function of power is that of stripping from the social process of productive cooperation the command over its own functioning – of closing social productive power within the griddings of the system of power. The time of power is, therefore the exploitation of social time, in the sense that the machine is predisposed to emptying out the meaning of its liberatory goals. Exploitation is therefore the production of an armoury of instruments for the control of the time of social cooperation. The labour-time of full, whole social cooperation is here submitted to the law of the maintenance of domination. The time of liberation, which is the very time of the highest productivity, is therefore cancelled in the time of domination. (Negri, 1992: 75)
Negri explains the contradictory use of time under capitalism well. The teleological purpose of technological advancement is the emancipation of labour, however, under the conditions of capitalism, the teleology of emancipation is substituted for the teleology of control. Koch (2007: 100) is emphatic that: ‘Capitalism must be forced by political means to address its logical tendencies. It must confront the matter of time, as it was forced to confront the tendency to produce monopolies and its tendency to impoverish workers.’ What Koch describes as ‘the matter of time’ is central to any analysis of capitalist re/production. In *Time for Revolution* Negri problematises the time/labour relationship in such a way that he reveals something of singular importance. He explains that:

The value of a commodity is related to the value of any other commodity as the labour-time necessary for the production of one is related to the labour time necessary for the production of the other...[it] changes with every variation in the productive forces of labour. (Negri, 2003a)

This, in itself, is not anything new, however it is what follows that is of considerable significance:

Therefore, time measures labour in so far as it is reduced it to a homogeneous substance, but also determines its productive power in the same form: through the multiplication of average temporal units. Therefore, in relation to labour, time is at once measure and matter, form and substance. (ibid)

Time measures labour because the value of labour is, as was presented in chapter two, measured ‘by the time labour lasts’. However the value of commodities is also linked to the value of labour. Changes in productivity alter the value of labour, however, labour produces these changes in productivity. The problem is that value can’t be measured by time, according to Negri, because it is the substance of that time. Time is a universal and is not bound by particularities or singularities. Time is a condition for sociality and it is labour time that produces changes in productivity which in turn effects the value of labour, that is, the value of time. This is what Negri in *Empire and Beyond* calls ‘a paradox and a formidable hypothesis’. For ‘if social temporality constitutes the substance of production... it is clear that time-measure of
exploitation loses any accurate capacity of dealing with reality’ (Negri, 2009: 221). This is a different kind of question from those concerning the falling rate of profit within capitalist production. It is a question of social ontology and the conditions of possibility for any kind of temporal measurement for the value of labour. Capitalism doesn’t just secure private property rights and the reproduction of labour power by maintaining separation between labourers and the means of production. It also secures the ongoing measurement of labour-time as a measure of value. Koch explains that:

the importance of Marx, in relation to the worker, centres on who controls labour time. Capitalism is a system of laws that protect the owners of means of production and establishes their rights, in written law, to control the labour time of the work force. (Koch, 2007: 103)

However the contradiction inherent within use of time under capitalist production is revealed, according to Koch, because: ‘The liberating potential of heavy industry, and today, high technology, computerization, and other techniques of the electronic age, have not been brought to bear in a way that enhances the liberation of the individual’s labour time’ (ibid). Arguably the reason for this is that capitalism must continue to exploit labour time and in this way, as Koch puts it, continue to ‘put the labourer to the wheel’.

Postmodernity, for Negri (2009: 164), is defined as a ‘situation where the antagonistic relationship of capital dominates all social relationships, all nexuses of life, whether in production, culture, or ways of living.’ This has occurred according to Negri: ‘through the real subsumption that capital has perpetrated in its absorption of society – and globalization of social, economic and political relationships’ (ibid). Postone, it will be recalled from chapter one, posits that society ‘is not simply a collection of individuals; it is made up of social relations.’ Real subsumption then can be identified as the absorption of all social relations into the capital-relation and one of the necessary consequences of this is the total subsumption of time. As Negri writes: ‘The labour-time of full, whole, social cooperation is here submitted to the law of the maintenance of domination.’ According to David Harvey (2000a: 8): ‘Any search for an alternative to neo-liberal globalization must search for a different kind of spatio-temporality’. The conditions of real subsumption lead him to argue that we must confront the reality that capital has changed the nature of time and space. He
writes that: ‘Speed-up of turnover time and reductions in the frictions of distance have meant that spatio-temporality must now be understood in a radically different way from was operative in say, Classical Greece, Ming Dynasty China or Medieval Europe’. The particular spatio-temporality of advanced capitalism is produced by the dynamism of particular methods of accumulation. The capital-relation determines temporal relations insofar as it materially realises, though the form of value, the need for reproduction based on the relationship between wage-labour and capital.

Space

Capitalism requires a specific kind of space in which to reproduce the relations of production. The capitalist system has specific spatial exigencies and because these spatial requirements concern the determination of social relations this necessitates a particular kind of social space. In *The Production of Space* Henri Lefebvre (1991: 73) argues that:

Social space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder.... Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.

Lefebvre’s analysis of social space is a dialectical one. We can identify here subsumption, interrelationship, coexistence, and simultaneity forming a unity which both enables and disables certain types of social action. Indeed, Lefebvre’s analytical strategy expresses the fact that social space can be constructed in different ways so as to produce to different social outcomes. In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels explain how the spatial expansion of capitalism into the ‘New World’ ‘provided a fresh territory for the rising bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels, 1998: 15). Harvey remarks in ‘Cartographic Identities: Geographical Knowledges Under Globalization’ that the delineation of space through cartography has serious political consequences:
In the imperialist era, the cartographic basis was laid for the imposition of capitalist forms of territorial rights in the areas of the world that had previously lacked them (Africa, the Americas, Australasia and much of Asia). Cartographic definitions of sovereignty (state formation) aided state formation and the exercise of state powers. Cartography laid the legal basis for class-based privileges of land ownership and the right to the appropriation of the fruits of both nature and labour within well-defined spaces. (Harvey, 2000a: 6)

These spatial arrangements are also a means of controlling time. The time of the labourer is subject to the requirements of the mode of production that takes place within any given spatial configuration. The control of space is the control of time. Cartography writes Harvey, ‘is about locating, identifying and bounding phenomena and thereby situating events, processes, and things within a coherent spatial frame. It imposes spatial order on phenomena’ (Harvey, 2000a: 6). Processes of subjectivation are also deeply implicated with issues of spatio-temporality. Harvey explains that:

positioning, individuating and bounding are operations that play a key role in the formation of personal and political subjectivities. Who we consider ourselves to be (both individually and collectively) is broadly defined by our position in society and the world. (ibid)

Regions of space, in Harvey’s view, ‘are “made” or “constructed” as much in the imagination as in material form and... though entity like, regions crystallize out as a distinctive form from some mix of material, social and mental processes’ (Harvey, 2000a: 8-9). Insofar as ‘capitalism thrives through the process of extracting surplus labour time from the workers,’ it does so, at least in part, through specific spatial and temporal modalities. As Castree (2009: 27) argues: ‘capitalism would be evanescent without producing space; but, equally, this space is inconceivable in abstraction from the guiding force a specific, socially constructed dimension of time’. It is through these modalities that conflicts arise. Moreover these modes of contradiction within capitalism are simultaneously in both a realised and a potential state. They are realised insofar as seizing the time and subjectivity of wage-labour is a prerequisite for capitalist accumulation and they are potential insofar as the need to accumulate can
potentially lead to further, and more developed, forms of contradiction. Spatial determination under capitalism can be identified as a type of structural coercion that realises the exploitation of subjectivity through the organization of social space.

Technology

In a footnote in volume one of Capital Marx makes a statement that is essential for the development of the remainder of this chapter. It reads as follows:

Darwin has directed attention to the history of natural technology, i.e., the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for sustaining their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man in society, of organs that are the material basis of every particular organisation of society, deserve equal attention?... Technology reveals the active relation of man [sic] to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from those relations. (Marx, 1976: 493)

The prospective analysis that Marx details here in terms of a history of technology is an important one to consider in relation to the themes of this thesis, namely, the relationship between the mode of production, the mode of subjectivation and ideology. Technology, under the conditions of capitalist production, definitely ‘lays bare’ the social relations that are mediated by it insofar as technological innovation, following Koch and Negri, creates a ‘time of domination’. The mental conceptions that are derived from the dialectic between productive relations and social relations reflect the needs of accumulation. This represents a unity between time (the source of value), space (capitalist spatial conditions), nature (labour, material resources), and technology (instruments of production). By understanding the extent to which capitalism integrates various aspects of reality in its re/productive processes, it is possible to potentially identify sources of both objective and subjective contradiction. It is also possible to consider how the immanent dialectic between these elements could generate potentially revolutionary conditions. For Marx, as the
paragraph above suggests, mental conceptions and social relations are to be discovered through technological forms. Thus social relations and mental conceptions are immanent aspects of technological development. In his brief but incisive essay *Ethology: Spinoza and Us* Deleuze explains that:

> It should be clear that the plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes affects, does not make any distinction between all things that might be called natural and things that might be called artificial. Artifice is fully part of Nature, since each thing, on the immanent plane of Nature, is defined by these arrangements of motions and affects into which it enters, whether these arrangements are artificial or natural. (Deleuze, 1991: 627)

In the preceding chapters, many examples were given regarding the specific productive requirements of capitalism and how these requirements determine subjectivity. The forces and relations of production affect the forces and relations of subjectivation. What Marx and Engels call ‘a mode of life’ is engendered through the totalisations of nature-artifice as an immanent relation. In his work *Foucault* Deleuze expresses the socio-historical constitution of what he calls the ‘man-form’:

> Foucault’s general principle is that every form is a compound of relations between forces. Given these forces our first question is with what forces from the outside they enter into a relation, and then what form is created as a result. These may be forces within man: [sic] the force to imagine, remember, conceive, wish, and so on.... One needs to know with what other forces the forces of man enter into a relation, in a given historical formation, and what form is created as a result from this compound of forces. (Deleuze, 1999: 124)

What Deleuze expresses here is a means to grasp the constitution of subjectivity through objectivity and vice versa. Space, time, nature and technology are all relations between forces that have, ultimately, determinant socio-historical effects, both in terms of subjective and objective relations. To further our understanding of capitalism, I believe it is necessary to understand the relationship between the objective forces of time, space, nature, and technology and how these dialectically
interact with subjective forces. In a conversation with Antonio Negri entitled *Control and Becoming*, Deleuze states that (referring to himself and Felix Guattari):

we think any political analysis must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the ways in which it has developed. What we find most interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalist as an immanent system that’s constantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is capital itself. (Deleuze, 1990: 169)

What Marx suggests as a ‘history of technology’ would have to figure in the political analysis Deleuze proposes. This opens the door to a politics of affect. Deleuze (1991: 626) remarks that ‘if you define bodies and thoughts as capacities for being affected many things change’. Harvey argues there has been a tendency within scientific research to view ourselves as either the objects of evolutionary forces or as active subjects transforming our environments. However he argues instead we should:

think about this issue in a much more dialectical mode, treating the subject-object distinction as arbitrary, and understanding that in changing the world we change ourselves and that we cannot change ourselves and our society without changing our environmental condition, sometimes in dramatic and radical ways. (Harvey, 2000a: 10)

Nature

Eugene Holland (1998) claims that Marx was familiar with the work of Spinoza. Indeed, his aspirations for a history of technology can be identified as having Spinozist influence as can this statement from the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*: ‘To say that man’s [sic] physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is part of nature (Marx, 1992: 328). In her work *Nature and Class: A Marxian Value Analysis*, Andriana Vlachou makes a number of points that are invaluable to developing a dialectical understanding of nature and capitalism from the position of class analysis. She argues that:
Natural processes also play distinctive roles in shaping the kinds of class processes that exist in a society, how they interact, how they evolve. If natural processes are depleted or changed through some natural process, class processes based on them may collapse or relocate to other social formations; in some circumstances, the tensions and contradictions within a class structure may explode under the burden of depleted resources. Any alteration in natural processes will participate in altering class processes. Indeed, it is ultimately impossible to separate the social impacts of natural changes from the social impacts of class changes. (Vlachou, 2001: 106)

Vlachou (2001: 106) explains that ‘class processes are themselves part of any individual’s environment, impacting his or her life alongside natural processes. Exploitation, like pollution, damages, injures, and kills’. It is because nature is inextricably linked to ‘production, realization, and distribution of surplus value’ that it cannot be conceived in any way independent of class relations (Vlachou, 2001: 108). The inherent contradictions of class appropriation coupled with natural limitations lead Vlachou (2001: 108) to state that:

economic and social crises may arise out of the tensions and struggles created by the reduced availability or quality of natural resources. In the case of such crises... class processes may not be able to continue in their habitual ways; they may be interrupted and reorganized in drastically different ways, including the way nature is appropriated.

State environmental policy, according to Vlachou, has is subject to thoroughgoing class antagonism and ‘one important way to assess environmental policies is to reveal these confrontations and their outcomes.’ Vlachou refers to the shaping of environmental policy development as a process ‘full of contradictions’, because:

natural conditions and resources are among the sets of conditions that capitalism has to secure for its existence. All kinds of possible conflicts can arise in the effort to secure as many of them as possible. In particular... capitalists struggle against each other and against state regulators over the
nature of environmental regulation. In addition labour and ecological movements are fighting for quality of life and thus may constitute a threat to capitalism’s existence. Policies toward nature are affected by all these social processes and tensions. Indeed, they are constituted by them, and as such they are contradictory and their outcomes uncertain. (Vlachou, 2001: 121)

Thus ‘environmental policies are the outcome of various social struggles over the appropriation of nature’ (Vlachou, 2001: 127). Because these social struggles are based on labour processes, this leads Vlachou to posit that: ‘a strategy to create a sustainable relationship between nature and society could be based on the organization of social labour, different from that currently existing in capitalist societies’ (Vlachou, 2001: 128).

The Capitalist Regime of Truth

Foucault (1972a: 131) argues in Power/Knowledge that:

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Furthermore:

In societies like ours, the ‘political economy’ of truth is characterized by five important traits. ‘Truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is the object of constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body,
notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‘ideological’ struggles). (Foucault, 1972a: 131-132)

Following Foucault’s work above we can say that capitalism constitutes a distinct regime of truth. This regime of truth is arguably determined by the mode of production. In his work Language and Production: A Critique of the Paradigms Gygory Markys contends that ‘Marxian materialism, in all its aspects, entails a far-reaching transformation of the conceptual framework in which questions about “ideas” should be posed’ (Markys, 1986: 44). Markys argues that “ideas”, from the analytical framework of Marxian materialism:

are posited initially as products (as objectivations) of definite, historically specific human activities, so that the question to answer first of all is about the relation of this type of ‘production’ to the structured-differentiated totality of all those social activities by which men [sic] produce and change their existence and with it themselves. (ibid)

Markys (1986: 41) claims that ‘It is in this realm, according to Marx, [that] both the elementary causes of human suffering and the forces to do away with it can be found, and both the conditions of a revolutionary change and its basic direction can be specified’. That is, in recognising that ideas constitute a terrain of social struggle, it is possible to identify the extent to which material production engenders these ideas through specific types of social activity. It is well known that Marx believed that the inherent contradictions of capitalism lead to the realisation of revolutionary conditions. This theory of revolution is an essential aspect of historical materialism. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy he states that: ‘At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production... From forms of development these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution’ (Marx, 1971: 425). Revolution in Marx’s view is engendered by technological development, that is ‘material productive forces’, coming into conflict with existing relations of production; in the case of
bourgeois society, these existing relations of production are the class basis of the control of productive forces. This is why I argue that Marx’s footnote on the history of technology is of immense importance for any theory of revolution. Technology as Marx puts it, ‘lays bare’ the process of material production and in doing so ‘also lays bare the process of production of the social relations... and of the mental conceptions that flow from those relations’. Technology generates affects and truth-effects, it is an artifice, as Deleuze notes, which is ‘fully part of nature’. It can be argued then that capitalism will generate truth-effects of a specific type that reflect the needs of that mode of production. Moreover it may also be posited that the class relations of capitalism will be driven by the logic of the capitalist productive forces to generate specific subjectivities that concur with the needs of its production methods. There is then a question of the extent to which capitalist relations have been naturalised and in so doing have produced an individual whose ‘nature’, whose ‘physical and mental life,’ is a reflection of those relations. Indeed, as Winner (1974: 254) argues in his work *Technologies as Forms of Life*: ‘the very act of using the kinds of machines, techniques, and systems available to us generates patterns and activities that soon become “second nature” to us’. In ‘The Technical Constitution of Society’ Winner (1974: 109) remarks that ‘In our time techne has at last become politeia. What appear to be merely useful artifacts are, from another point of view, underlying preconditions of social activity.’ That is, technology is a politics. Marcuse argues a similar point:

the traditional notion of the ‘neutrality’ of technology can no longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques. (Marcuse, 1964)

It is worthwhile to note here that Winner claims that technological artifacts are ‘preconditions of social activity’. Technology mediates sociality insofar as it is a distinctively social product. This also suggests that a relation to technology is also a condition for class activity by virtue of its social character. Marcuse (Marcuse, 1964: 18) remarks that ‘political power asserts itself through its power over the machine process and over the technological organisation of the apparatus.’ Moreover, as Winner (1974: 251) writes:
As a society builds factories, electrical power networks, transportation systems, and the like it is also rebuilding its framework of political order. Thus the kinds of things we are apt to see as mere technological entities become much more interesting and problematic if we can begin to notice the way in which they are broadly involved in conditions of moral and political life.

What then is the relationship between Foucault’s notion of ‘regime of truth’ and Marx’s footnote on the history of technology? As mentioned above, Markys argues that ideas (objectivations) should be considered as products and to understand their development we ought to reflect on the ‘relation of this type of “production” to the structured-differentiated totality of all those social activities by which men produce and change their existence and with it themselves’. Thus, as Winner points out, it is then possible to identify how through material production we are also constructing a political order and ‘mere technological entities... are involved in conditions of moral and political life’. The application of technology is arguably subject to a regime of truth. Foucault states that: ‘We have to produce truth in the same way, really, that we have to produce wealth, and we have to produce that truth in order to produce wealth’. The production of truth is not independent of the production of wealth and arguably capitalism produces a particular type of truth that reproduces class relations through spatial, temporal, natural, and technological modalities. According to Koch (2007: 15) ‘political revolutions occur around the rules that govern truth production.’ However, as Winner remarks, ‘in our time techne has at last become politeia. What appear to be merely useful artifacts are, from another point of view, underlying preconditions of social activity.’ It is apparent that within advanced capitalism the space between politics and technology is closing fast; hence the importance of Deleuze’s remarks on control society, Stiegler’s work on mnemotechnologies, and Derrida’s comments on ‘artifacts’.
Subjectivity: A Contradiction within the Plane of Immanence

David Harvey (2000b: 98) in *Spaces of Hope* articulates a ‘relational meaning of the body’ where corporeality is a site for capital accumulation. The body with all its plastic subjective capacities is a reservoir for the accumulation of surplus-value; capital circulates through the subjectivity of individuals thus fashioning them to the end of capitalist reproduction. He proposes a ‘dialectical way of understanding the body’. This dialectical understanding reflects the dynamism between the internal and external processes of subjective development. He suggests that ‘the body is not a closed and sealed entity, but a relational ‘thing’ that is created, bounded, sustained, and ultimately dissolved in a spatiotemporal flux of multiple processes’ (ibid). According to Harvey:

"The body is internally contradictory by virtue of the multiple socio-ecological processes that converge upon it. For example, the metabolic processes that sustain a body entail exchanges with its environment.... The net effect is to say that different processes (physical and socially) ‘produce’ (both materially and representationally) radically different kinds of bodies. (Harvey, 2000b: 99)"

Within capitalism, the subject is pushed and pulled in all manner of directions. The demands of capitalist production on the bodily subject are manifold. Depending on its place within the division of labour, differing expectations will be demanded of it. At some moments a complacent type of subjectivity will be required; at other times an innovative variety. At all times, however, the social relations within capitalism are generating affects. This affective production is, as Deleuze explains, immanent. Through the uneven and contradictory relations between time, space, nature, and technology, it is the subject that expresses both the unity of these contradictions and potentially their displacement. Harvey describes the human body as a ‘battle ground’ where:

"subjectivity and consciousness... are partially if not predominantly forged in the fiery crucible of the labour process, the passionate pursuit of values and..."
competitive advantage in labour markets, and in the perpetual desires and glittery frustrations of commodity culture. (Harvey, 2000b: 114)

Harvey, however, also sees subjectivity within capitalism as possessing the possibility of contradicting the existing relations of production due to its own immanent potentialities. What he calls ‘dialectical utopianism’ is expressive of this: ‘It presumes, for example, a dialectics able to address spatio-temporal dynamics openly and directly and able to address the multiple intersecting processes that so tightly imprison us in the fine-spun web of contemporary life’ (Harvey, 2000b: 199). The spatio-temporality of capitalism is, as we have seen, inextricably linked to natural and technological processes. Thus dialectical utopianism would have to take into account the four aspects of time, space, nature, and technology and their possible modification through subjective contradiction. Dialectical utopianism, following the work of Foucault and Harvey, is the search for a new regime of truth.

Summary

The work of Koch and Negri suggests how our relation to nature within capitalism contains a fundamental temporal contradiction insofar as technological development produces a relation to nature which capitalises on time and in this manner subjugates both time and nature for future valorisation. The work of Harvey and Lefebvre presents the idea that capitalism must take place within its own spatial configuration in order to re/produce the social conditions it requires for production. It is then possible to see how revolutionary conditions are arrived at through these four modes of contradiction. The material forces which capitalism develops through coercive competition produce technological improvement. These developments are primarily produced by efficiencies of production. Thus the reduction of necessary labour-time drives technological development. However, to maintain a capitalist space this potentially emancipatory relation to nature must not be allowed to escape the conditions of the capital-relation. Arguably then future revolutionary theory will have to consider how to further the already realized contradictions within capitalism to greater levels of antagonism. The body as the primary site of unification for the objective contradictions between time, space, nature and technology is also the site of
subjective contradiction. It is through the body that revolution becomes a possibility by means of dialectical utopianism and a new regime of truth.

**Conclusion**

The struggle for an alternative to capitalism is the struggle for the production of another space-time. The space-time of capitalism is contingent upon the continued exploitation of labour-time as the measure of value. This exploitation sets up contradictions with nature and technology and is produced within specific capitalist spatial determinations. These spatial determinations are not only constructed materially they are also constructed ‘immaterially’ in the minds of subjects and take form through various ideological constructs and discursive formations which are realized as relational concerns. Much of the ‘knowledge’ that circulates within capitalism has a class-character insofar as it serves the needs of progressive accumulation. Furthermore just as the means of objective transformation are in the hands of the capitalist class so too are the means of mental transformation. The means of mental transformation within advanced capitalism are utilized to accumulate capital through the production of subjectivity. Total subsumption within advanced capitalism demands a new space-time, a new regime of truth, a new measure of value and new revolutionary subjects.
References


