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Quo Vadis Bundeswehr?
The Renaissance of the German Armed Forces

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Abstract

In the year 2012, the German Armed Forces can look back on almost 60 years of successfully contributing to the safeguarding of peace in Europe, twenty-two years of which as the armed forces of a reunited Germany. The Bundeswehr has a longer service history than the Wehrmacht and the Reichswehr combined and even longer than the armed forces of the German Empire. However, the successful security architecture of the Cold War is no longer adequate for the new challenges lying ahead. In the 21st century, all tools of preventive security have to be measured by the answers provided to various new threats and challenges, which have replaced the dominant and clearly recognisable threat of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. The scope of duty of the German Armed Forces would have to be newly defined and prioritised. The Transformation of the Bundeswehr, and the resulting need for modernisation had been the subject of fierce domestic political disputes. The Cold War legacy was particularly heavy on the Bundeswehr and made any change complicated. Considering the new challenges, the approach chosen, as difficult as it may be, is nevertheless the way forward.
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Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the global strategic environment had substantially changed, and since then, the German Bundeswehr is in a state of constant change. With the full restoration of Germany’s sovereignty, it was necessary to redefine its position on the international stage. For the political realities, this new role was closely linked to the fortunes of the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr of a reunited Germany was primarily characterised by its out-of-area missions and the overcoming of old structures. Within a decade, out-of-area missions became the norm and an important cause of its self-perception. Soon, the Bundeswehr transformed into a valuable and acceptable tool of German foreign policy.¹

In 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, the focus was on domestic, economic, and socio-political issues. The question of external security was completely overlaid and superseded. To discuss external security issues with memories of the lost war fresh in mind was not communicable then. Despite much opposition, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer tried to push West Germany’s integration into the West forward. In his opinion, this also included the military issue. His expectations for post-war Germany were met when he won the federal elections in 1957 with an absolute majority. Despite his crushing victory, large parts of the population saw rearmament as necessary evil motivated by the deteriorating security situation.

Since its formation, the Bundeswehr was orientated, organised and equipped for a high intensity conflict against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. It was initially designed to be exclusively used within the borders of Germany for defence purposes only.² This was of major importance, in order to calm the many critics of a new German Armed Force. The peace movement in Germany accompanied the build-up of the Bundeswehr, while the trust in a peaceful coexistence in the world became the alleged normality. The result was a

¹von Neubeck Arne Freiherr, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr von der Verteidigungs- zur Einsatzarmee, Eine sicherheitspolitische Analyse unter Berücksichtigung politischer, verfassungspolitischer, militärpolitischer Aspekte,(Transformation of the Bundeswehr from a defence force to a operational force) Augsburg 2007, 26; Sven Gareis, ‘Soldat für den Weltfrieden,’(Soldiers for world peace), Informationen fuer die Truppe, Nr. 3-4/2005,14-23 (15)
movement, which continued even after the Cold War. However, the so hoped for benefit in foreign security, the “Peace Dividend”, was proven to be illusory.

During the Cold War, the roles were clearly defined and the parts assigned. In the strategy of NATO, the defence orientated Bundeswehr took a more static and reactive role. However, a military conflict seemed to be unlikely considering the devastating results of a possible nuclear war. Yet, with the end of the face-off between the blocs, a decisive change in the threat assessment was unavoidable. The Warsaw Pact was falling apart and the end of the bipolar confrontation was in sight, it seemed that NATO had fulfilled its mission but lost its reason for being at the same time.

Although the direct threat for Germany’s security and stability had notably decreased, the possibility of a real use of the Bundeswehr grew. Over decades, the Bundeswehr had provided its service for a country with limited sovereignty as an integral part of NATO. Thus, the compulsory military service for men expressed the special degree of danger Germany was facing, and the special bond between population and armed forces. According to its scope of task, the Bundeswehr’s area of operations was limited to national territory. The only exceptions were missions within the framework of NATO or based on multilateral agreements and for humanitarian reasons. This had materially altered to a partnership role in international peacekeeping missions. Peace-making missions should soon complement the picture. The Bundeswehr had increasingly moved away from its original design as a static and defensive orientated force with no strategic capacities and power projection capabilities. Thus, a process of deliberation had started to face the new realities. The reunification, Germany had waited so long for, constituted to be an additional challenge, and tied up important capabilities. Yet suddenly, Germany was confronted with demands from its allies to take part in the UN mandated mission against Iraq in 1990/91. Hence, it was important to clarify if a reunited Germany, which had so far enjoyed protection from its allies, could actually refuse to get involved. Then again, a worldwide performing Bundeswehr with or without UN mandate seemed inconceivable.

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for the near future. The balancing act between international demands and national limits lead to the expensive chequebook diplomacy of the Kohl government in the 1990s. It has now been almost 20 years since the Bundeswehr had its first foreign assignment. Since then, it had joined over 35 international missions armed and unarmed. Around 6,700 citizens in uniform are actually deployed all over the world under the command of NATO, the EU or the UN. Germany had since undergone a long journey and a complex process to come this far. It was a difficult struggle that was made up of constitutional and political challenges. An atmosphere, which was marked by a self-blockade of parliament caused by the constitutional uncertainties regarding out-of-area missions and non-parliamentary confrontation. Simultaneously, the Federal Constitutional Court was busy to decide about the legality of out-of-area missions. During this whole discussion, one aspect was, either by carelessness or intentionally, forgotten. Namely if the Bundeswehr, under consideration of its capabilities, could fulfil the expectations. In reality, the Bundeswehr was confronted with vague policy guidelines, a controversial legal position and a drop in monetary means. In combination with the expanded spectrum of responsibilities, the Bundeswehr paid heed to run internal structures more efficiently. Strangely enough, critics of the Bundeswehr interpreted the improvement of efficiency as preparation for war. Some already saw the primacy of politics over the Bundeswehr threatened.

Nevertheless, the experiences of earlier missions in the 1990s highlighted the drawbacks in equipment and training. The Cold War legacy still weighed heavily on the Bundeswehr. The more intensive the missions became, the more comprehensive the need to adjust to the underlying conceptual framework became. Over time, the political guidelines, the armed forces itself, and the perception of the population had changed. The announcement to alter the Bundeswehr from a static defense force of the Cold War era into a highly mobile and deployable expeditionary force remained almost unnoticed by the public. This was in radical contrast to the intensive debates in the early 1990s, when every single mission of the Bundeswehr was publicly questioned. The so-called “Berlin

5Gregor Schoellgen, ‘Zehn Jahre als europäische Großmacht, Eine Bilanz deutscher Außenpolitik seit der Vereinigung,’ Ten years as European great power, a resume of German foreign policy since the German reunification), Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 24/2000, 6-12 (6)
6Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Einsatzzahlen – Die Stärke der deutschen Einsatzkontingente, (Numbers, the strength of deployed units) BMVg
http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/ut/p/c/4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8x8xBz9CP3I5EyhpHK9pPKUV L3UzLzixNSSKdp8KoqMSmNu- InIRQD2RLYK/ accessed 29/11/2012
Republic” established a new strategic culture and imparted a new “naturalness” on the use of the Bundeswehr. It was an attitude that was more relaxed on the use of force and outlined Berlin’s national interests with more self-assurance than ever before. These developments marked a decisive turning point in Germany’s security and defence policy. Thus, the question had been raised if the presumption of Germany as a “civilian power” was still valid or if the armed forces would become an inherent part of the foreign policy.\(^8\)

The inevitable adjustment to the changed security environment together with the ambitious political efforts of German politics to use the Bundeswehr as a tool of foreign policy resulted in extensive reform efforts. However, as a rediscovered instrument of practical considerations in politics, “Realpolitik”, its range of tasks experienced a necessary expansion. Conflict prevention and management had supplemented the national defence duty. Unfortunately, the ambitious reform efforts did not correspond with the necessary financial means and therefore remained incomplete.\(^9\)

The terror attacks in the United States of 9/11, constituted a watershed in international security policy.\(^10\) The experiences gained in out-of-area missions, inter alia in Afghanistan, with the continuing “War on Terror” against a new kind of global terrorism made it necessary for the Bundeswehr to adopt new strategies. The out-dated Cold War structures and strategies could not keep up with the new demands. In several policy studies, Germany had pursued a direction of restructuring the German Armed Forces and applying its own interpretation of the term military Transformation. Since then, successive reviews aimed at adapting to the new security environment had been undertaken. While each achieved important improvements on its own, a series of internal constraints left the Bundeswehr still oversized, ill structured, and ill equipped.

After a period of relative calm between the years 2005 to 2009, a new awareness of priorities of how to handle the present shortages accrued which was initiated by an intensification of the Afghanistan operation. This development was further aggravated by large budget cuts. Thus, Germany had carried out a comprehensive defence assessment executed by the Weise Commission. This assessment triggered one of the most intense reform undertakings of the Bundeswehr so far. Although revolutionary in its way, the

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\(^10\)James J.F Forrest Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, International Perspectives, Lessons From Fight against Terrorism,(Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2007), 228
reform was internationally misunderstood. On the contrary, it was frequently characterised as just another story of Europe’s defence spending cuts to consolidate a federal budget. Nevertheless, the ambition of the Transformation was more serious than ever before and its result should be ground-breaking. To abolish compulsory military service and move to more professionalism in the armed forces underlined its revolutionary character. At the end, the Bundeswehr should step out as a smaller but more capable armed force.¹¹

This academic paper has set itself the task to picture the Transformation of the German Armed Forces from a Cold War force to a modern force designed for the tasks lying ahead. This path was fraught with enormous difficulties, which can be explained by the unique situation of West Germany after 1945. Germany was a country divided for over 40 years, which had been rebuilt and was forced to redefine itself. A country with limited sovereignty, which had to bear the general mistrust of its neighbours and of its own population. It was during this period that the Bundeswehr was founded and it was a difficult process full of risks, to become an apparently equal partner on the international stage. It must be stressed that this process has not yet been completed.

Chapter One considers the immediate time after the Second World War with a militarily defeated Germany. The societal environment was characterised by an antimilitaristic attitude by large parts of the population. However, the emerging Cold War would become the dominant feature for the next decades and would make a rearmament West Germany’s possible.

The Second Chapter looks at the first four years after the Cold War and the German unification. The attainment of full sovereignty and the raised expectation of its allies to take over more political and military responsibility as well as the constitutional limitations dominated this period.

The subject of Chapter Three is the governments’ dynamic approach to the deployment of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 was a decisive turning point and constituted the legal base for out-of-area missions. The deployments revealed valuable knowledge about the shortbacks of the Bundeswehr as the Cold War structure was not suitable for this kind of missions.

¹¹Bjoern H. Seibert,‘A Quiet Revolution,’The RUSI Journal, 157:1,(2012), 60-69(67)
Chapter Four describes the intensification of out-of-area missions. The Kosovo conflict in 1999 had exacerbating impact on the situation in the Balkans. The active participation of the German Bundeswehr in the Kosovo conflict marked a turning point, as it was the first combat mission after the Second World War. The first Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Green coalition government in German history made more use of the Bundeswehr as a foreign policy instrument than any previous government before. The terror attacks of 9/11 in the US completed the difficult foreign policy picture of this era.

The Fifth Chapter describes the so far most difficult out-of-area mission of the Bundeswehr, the Afghanistan mission. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan was a direct consequence of 9/11. The re-elected Schroeder government had to deal with the specific challenges of this deployment and with the rearrangement of the two most important organisations for Germany, the European Union and NATO.

Chapter Six highlights the ambition of the German government to push ahead with the Transformation of the Bundeswehr in the light of the global financial crisis and in times of lean public budgets. Germany, ruled by a grand coalition government of CDU/CSU and SPD also tried to regain the role of a mediator between the European countries and the US, which had suffered due to the Iraq War.

Chapter Seven points out the processings of the Bundeswehr to become a modern expeditionary military force. The abolishment of conscription was just one milestone to become a modern force. Faced with an enormous financial pressure on the defence budget and the on-going missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan the Transformation of the Bundeswehr is still an ongoing process and is not completed.
Chapter One

Foundation of the Bundeswehr at the Time of the Cold War from 1945-1990

To be prepared for the future, it is important to be familiar with the past. This applies particularly to Germany and its armed forces. The end of the Second World War, the early stages of the Federal Republic of Germany and especially the Cold War played an important role for further development of the Bundeswehr. The German Armed Forces founded in this period embodied the peculiarities of this time extremely well.

The “Victory in Europe” day commemorated on 8th May 1945, and marked the end of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, when the World War II allies formally accepted the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.¹ The Allies had already decided that, in the case of victory, Germany would be demilitarised and denazified.² The reason was simple; there should never be another German military aggression. As a country, that had already started two world wars, it seemed unable to keep its political, economic, and military power. Yet, soon after the war, serious discrepancies had arisen between the Allies in regards to the future treatment of Germany.³ The Soviet Union demanded hard actions, which was in contrast to the United States who soon supported and encouraged the prompt

economic reconstruction. They wanted to set up West Germany as an anti-communist stronghold.

Based on the Conference of Potsdam, Germany not only lost large areas of its former territory but was also split up into four occupied zones. The agreed treatment of Germany as an economic entity failed and the Allied Control Council turned out to be incapable of making decisions. From the beginning, varying strategies and developments in the West and East occupied zones made a common strategy for whole Germany improbable. Yet, irreconcilable disagreements about the general dealing with post-war Germany resulted in a growing gap, mainly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Thus, the British and Americans united their occupied zones into the Bi-Zone on 1st January 1947, and with the accession of France in April 1949 into the Tri-Zone. Eventually the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) originated out of the Tri-Zone on 23rd May 1949.

The question of an own military force was of the utmost importance for the West German government. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was determined to anchor West Germany deeply within the Western alliance. The political coherence in the Council of Europe and economic cooperation in the Coal and Steel Union was just the beginning. He also wanted a military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This development provoked a storm of controversy among the population and political opposition in West Germany. Especially the SPD and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) showed their objections openly.

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6 Joshi Srivastava, *International Relations, Wartime Conferences and Alliances*, (Krishna: Prakashan Media Ltd, 2005), 15
Due to the recent past and horrifying acts of two caused world wars, they condemned every effort of the Adenauer government for rearmament. Chancellor Adenauer needed to enforce the rearmament issue even in the light of resistance from his own cabinet. Gustav Heinemann, then Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, resigned as a sign of protest against the rearmament efforts.11 In contrast to the First World War with its anthem of the undefeated German Armed Forces, the defeat in 1945 was absolute. The awareness of what had happened had set itself deeply into the German consciousness. The military profession had lost its magic in the aftermath of the Second World War. Too many Germans had experienced the cruelty of war to be open minded for a new German Armed Force.12

Yet, the debate had arisen in response to the unstable global political situation.13 Disparities between the former Allies, especially the United States and the Soviet Union about political, ideological, and economical interests between 1945 and 1949 resulted in increased tension. The two Germanys mirrored the growing tension and competing ideologies between these superpowers.14 The atmosphere between the former Allies became increasingly contaminated and strained as both countries tried to consolidate their spheres of influence. This resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Allied Control Council in 1948 and eventually the Cold War was born.15

Meanwhile, the Allied Leadership saw West Germany as a buffer state against the Soviet Union and as a forward edge of a possible battlefield.16 The continuous military build-up in Eastern Europe was paid serious attention by western intelligence services.17

14Molt, Von der Wehrmacht zur Bundeswehr 2007,20 ; Prof. Dr.Dr.h.c. Detlef Junker, Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1968,(The US and Germany during the Cold War) Band 1 (Stuttgart and Muenchen: Dt, Verlaganstalt, 2001), 181; Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, Emergence and Development of East – West conflict 1939-1953 ( Lanham Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) ,243-245(244)
16Dieter Krueger, Das Amt Blank. Die schwierige Gruendung des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung (Amt Blank, the difficult establishment of the defence Ministry)(Freiburg: Rombach, 1993),15 ; Molt, Von der Wehrmacht zur Bundeswehr 2007, 20 ; Thomas Vogel, ‘The Himmerod Memorandum’ in Rearming Germany, 3-29, eds James S. Corum 2011, 5
17Daugherty III (2011): ‘Tip of the Spear” (152)
The Berlin blockade of 1948/49 was a first test of strength as well as a forecast of the conflicts to come and the Korean War in 1950 eventually confirmed the most pessimistic views. At the end of May 1950, Konrad Adenauer put internal preparations in place for the set-up of a German Armed Force. An expert panel of former Wehrmacht generals was summoned to discuss the preconditions for the build-up. The panel of experts summarised the results from October 1950 in the monastery Himmerod, known as the “commemorative volume of Himmerod”. The panel not only debated practical questions about the formation itself, but also legitimisation issues of a new military force. The “Blank Agency”, the predecessor of the Federal Ministry of Defence, was established soon after and continued the preparations.

To become socially more acceptable, it was necessary to measure the new military force by democratic standards and strict parliamentary control. Under no circumstances should the Bundeswehr become a state in a state, as the Reichswehr did in the Weimar Republic, or gain a socially exceptional position as previously seen in the Imperial Era. Simultaneously it was necessary to pay tribute to a changed warfare idea. The new approach for an armed force had to combine military command with technical competence. This new military force, much more than the Wehrmacht, should become a high-technology force.

Meanwhile the non-parliamentary “without me” movement, which consisted of unions, intellectuals and peace activists proclaimed the popular statement of a West German state without armed forces. From their point of view, a country without armed forces was not able to wage war at all. The experience of two lost world wars and its

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20 Corum, Rearming Germany, The Founding of the Bundeswehr 1950-1956, 38
21 Werner Widder Major General, ‘Auftragstaktik und Innere Fuehrung : Trademarks of German leadership, German Army,’ Military Review 5, September – October 2002, 3-9(3) et sq
resulting pain and suffering has characterised the German population. Thus, large parts of society had a fundamentally pacifistic attitude and an aversion against another German armed force.\textsuperscript{23} Yet, the increasing tensions from the emerging Cold War and the dependency of West Germany on the Western Allies had made it almost impossible to take a neutral stand.\textsuperscript{24} In the light of the Korean War in 1950, large parts of the population changed their attitude towards rearmament.\textsuperscript{25} The fear of another war on German soil led to the belief that an armed force, for defence purposes only, was necessary. Even so, the antimilitaristic reservations in parts of society continued despite the defensive approach of the Bundeswehr.

In 1952, the Western Allies and West Germany settled the German Treaty, which ensured West Germany’s sovereignty from May 1955 onwards. In October 1954, the Parisian Agreements were signed, which stated, that West Germany was allowed to set up armed forces in a maximum strength of 500,000 soldiers. Yet, Atomic, Biological and Chemical (ABC) warfare capacities, strategic bombers, and large battleships were excluded.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, on 9\textsuperscript{th} May 1955, West Germany joined the NATO alliance and the Western European Union (WEU). Each represented an important milestone, a further step towards the full involvement in the international community.

“The Federation shall set up armed forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the budget”.\textsuperscript{27} That was the

\textsuperscript{24}Daugherty III (2011): ‘Tip of the Spear’(149)
way the only six year-old constitution was complemented by Article 87a (1).\textsuperscript{28} With the later passed legislation, the establishment of the Bundeswehr was constitutionally legitimised. At 10 o’clock on 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1955, the 200\textsuperscript{th} birthday of von Scharnhorst\textsuperscript{29}, the first 101 troop volunteers received their letter of appointment from Theodor Blank, the first Federal Minister of Defence.\textsuperscript{30} After more than ten years without armed forces, West Germany was able to announce the birth of the Bundeswehr. Hasso von Manteuffel, a former general and politician recommended the name Bundeswehr to the Bundestag, which confirmed the name.\textsuperscript{31} Any resemblance to the Wehrmacht should be avoided. Several constitutional safeguards were installed to ensure that history would not repeat itself. The Bundeswehr was explicitly defined as a defence force only. Any preparation or continuation of an aggressive war was declared a criminal offence.\textsuperscript{32} The high command of the Bundeswehr was placed under civilian control and in the time of peace was subordinated to the Minister of Defence. The responsibilities of the Minister comprised the power of command of the armed forces and the management of the administration. Besides, the parliament exercised its control role through its budget approval powers and via the Defence Committee. In a state of war, the German Chancellor would only have command over the territorial forces of the Bundeswehr; all other forces would be under NATO’s command.

Please note that the Bundeswehr, despite its size and capacities, was not able to operate independently. Based on still existing worries about a German Armed Force, West Germany had to forego its national command, except for its Territorial Army.\textsuperscript{33} It was agreed between the West German government and the Allied Command that no general staff should be established in the command structures. Consequently, the “Generalinspekteur” Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff (Inspector General), as the highest-ranking position in the Bundeswehr, only had restricted powers. He headed the Armed Forces Joint Staff, and was the direct military adviser to the Minister of Defence.

\textsuperscript{28}Molt, \textit{Von der Wehrmacht zur Bundeswehr} 18; Knut Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non – Combatants,’ \textit{In The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts}, eds Dieter Fleck, Michael Bothe (Oxford:Clarendon Press 1995), 86
\textsuperscript{29}Gerhard Johann David Waitz von Scharnhorst, 12 November 1755 – 28 June 1813, General in Prussian service and responsible for reforming the Prussian Army.
\textsuperscript{30}Jay Lockenour, \textit{Soldiers As Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany}, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1966), 119
\textsuperscript{31}David Clay Large, \textit{Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era}, (Chapelhill: University of North Caroline Press, 1996), 243
\textsuperscript{32}Carin Laurin, ‘Changing Views on the Use of Force: The German Position 2005,’ \textit{Baltic Yearbook of International Law}. Volume 5 ,2005, 49
and his Ministry. However, he was not directly integrated in the chain of command. In the respective services of the Bundeswehr, the chiefs’ of staff responsible for the readiness of duty were only answerable and accountable to the Minister itself and not to the Inspector General. This resulted from lessons learned in the past and represented a system of check and balance. The disadvantage of this system however was its cumbersomeness in planning and decision-making process.

Within the first eight months since its establishment, 155,000 volunteers had signed up for the Bundeswehr. The ambitious commitment of the government to NATO for the build-up of an armed force in strength of 500,000 soldiers within three years proved to be difficult and put the undertaking under unnecessary time pressure.

In 1956, the general military service was introduced and on 1st April 1957, the first 100,000 draftees had started their service. Introducing conscription was a necessary measurement as the intended number of 500,000 active soldiers and 700,000 soldiers in reserve units could not be achieved with just volunteers. Especially in the beginning, the Bundeswehr depended on former Wehrmacht soldiers to become active. The colossal task to set up these numbers and the build-up of an armed force from scratch made these actions necessary. Inevitably, these soldiers, especially the generals in charge, had shaped the early years of the Bundeswehr. Their relationship to the Bundeswehr was ambivalent and they did not save on criticism. Especially the primacy of democratic control and the new idea of responsible “citizens in uniform” was critised by them. The innovations went too far for these battle-hardened veterans. Integrating former Wehrmacht soldiers also created many fears among Germany’s neighbours, especially for France.

34 James Sperling, Germany at Fifty – Five: Berlin Ist nicht Bonn, (Berlin is not Bonn) (Manchester: Manchester Press, February 2005), 332
38 Klaus Naumann, Generale in der Demokratie, Generationgeschichtliche Studien zur Bundeswehrreform, (Generals in a democracy) (Hamburg; HIS Verlag, 2007), 34; The Atlantic Times, Martin Herzog, ‘We Had to Start From Scratch,’ November 2005
39 Dietrich Genschel, Wehrreform und Reaktionen. Die Vorbereitung der inneren Fuehrung, 1951-1956, (Army reform and reactions, the preparations of the Innere Fuehrung), (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 1972), 23; Martin Herzog The Atlantic Times, ‘We Had to Start From Scratch’ - November 2005
40 Daugherty III (2011): “Tip of the Spear” 160
the personnel of the new German military force would consist of war-experienced soldiers was not a pleasant thought for them. The Soviet Union also had particular concerns about rearming Germany, which later resulted in the second Berlin crisis in 1958.41 Then again, the United States of America, already thinking ahead, was not too concerned.42

Another important feature of the Bundeswehr was the concept to maintain a strong bond with the German society; the ideal picture of the new German soldier was that of a responsible “citizen in uniform”. The conscripting of young men from all social classes that would serve in the same military should guarantee a reflection of West Germany’s society in the armed forces. Germany should never again experience a disconnection of military forces and the democratic system.43 Since fundamental rights and the principles of law would be valid in the new founded force, the Bundestag appointed a Parliamentary Commissioner to safeguard these rights and to help the parliament in exercising its parliamentary control.44 The goal was to avoid any isolating tendencies from the beginning.

The reformers responsible for the Bundeswehr wanted a more transparent force, one that:”45 described the recruit to be a human being first, second, a citizen, and third a soldier."46 Besides, the use of soldiers could only be justified as a last resort for defence missions and crisis management. Human rights and the international law had to be accepted as binding. Only if there was a justified military reason these rights could be restricted. The legitimate duty of the soldiers should be to secure and create peace. The

relations within the triangle of state, society and armed forces had to be defined in a new way to comfort all parties about the concerns against the German Armed Forces.

It seemed West Germany had learned its lesson and found a formula, which satisfied all parties. In reality, the internal rift in the young republic revealed itself when parts of society, especially rebellious student groups, showed their protest against everything related to the military. The new left movement was a melting pot for various protests. It would stay a part of German society and politics down to the present day. Therefore, the slogan “never war again” placed itself next to the official “never alone again” statement. That mixture determined and shaped the future strategic culture and resulted in a moderate manifestation of West Germanys’ security thinking. The scope of duty for the Bundeswehr was unambiguously clear and strictly limited to national purposes, yet within the NATO context.

The key task of the German military forces was to discourage a possible enemy and if unsuccessful to defend West German and respectively NATO territory. It was of urgent concern for the German militaries that the defence efforts would start as far east as possible. This idea matched with official NATO strategy and the Bundeswehr should play a major role in it. Especially the Army with its 334,000 soldiers was considered a backbone of the NATO defence strategy. The ground forces compiled of 12 divisions with 36 brigades and relied on heavy tank units, warplanes, and far-reaching reconnaissance equipment. Its strategy and equipment was set up for the conditions of Central Europe. The Bundeswehr of the Cold War was simply not capable to practise power projection. In contrast to other European countries, the Bundeswehr had no strategic capabilities at all. The only foreign mission thinkable of would have been for training or humanitarian purposes.

47 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force; Still a “Civilian Power”?‘ Survival The International Institute for Strategic Studies vol. 42 no. 2 Summer 2000,56-80(66,67)
50 Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military Power, 34; like air to air refuelling, strategic airlift capabilities etc.; Imo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘All the way? The evolution of German military Power,’ International Affairs 84: 2,2008, 211–221, (212)
So any change or adjustment of the Bundeswehr was not triggered by its own command. In fact, it resulted from changes in the NATO strategy that again showed the degree of interrelation and dependency.\(^{51}\) Altogether, the Bundeswehr was seen as a contribution towards the defence efforts of NATO and never as an independent military force. Because its units were integrated in NATO structures, no national general staff was needed and its role was limited to one of a “local player”. The unquestionable principle of West German security culture after 1945 was that there could be no more individual national security interests for Germany.\(^{52}\) That was unique, as other member states continued to be “global players” or at least “regional player”.\(^{53}\)

The period between 1960 and 1990 was a turbulent time for the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr gained positive publicity at an earthquake mission in Morocco in the early 1960s, which was its first-ever deployment outside of the Alliance territory. Especially, the humanitarian mission in Hamburg of 1962 caused by a storm tide was a success for the Bundeswehr. The degree of acceptance was still low and the fearless service of Bundeswehr soldiers who had endangered their own lives and sometimes at loss of their lives to save thousands, made sure the acceptance was rising.\(^{54}\) Then again, the numbers of conscientious objectors increased substantially and the positive image of the Bundeswehr suffered because of the NATO Double-Track Decision in 1979 and the Kiessling scandal in 1984.\(^{55}\) Especially the Double-Track Decision, which offered a mutual limitation of

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\(^{53}\) Von Neubeck, *Die Transformation der Bundeswehr*, 53; Steinhoff, *Determinant and Politics of German Military Strategy* 35; Detlef Bald, ‘Das Paradigma der Sicherheitspolitik in Deutschland, Die Rechte der vier Mächte, (The Paradigm of security policy in Germany, the rights of the four powers), *SOWI- Arbeitspapier* No 36, (Munich : 1990) , 6


NATO Update, [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/70-79/1979e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/70-79/1979e.htm) accessed 19/07/2012; NATO, 12 Dec. 1979 Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear
medium-range and intermediate ballistic missiles to Moscow in connection with an announcement in the case of disagreement to deploy more nuclear weapons in Western Europe, caused turmoil.

The need to take over international responsibility was almost non-existent in the 1950s. In general, the foreign policy of West Germany between 1945 and 1973 was not distinct at all. The late accession of West Germany to the United Nations (UN) in 1973 was due to the East–West tensions. Eventually, Willy Brandt’s successful East policy allowed Germany to join the United Nations. This enabled the late Chancellor Brandt to explain on 26th September 1973: “We have not arrived here to use the United Nations as our wailing wall for our German problems but to take over global political responsibility.” The German Foreign Minister Scheel went on to say, that West Germany would always be at the forefront to support people who fight for their pure existence. The Defence White Paper from 1973/74 highlighted the willingness of West Germany to fulfill its duties of the UN Charta, potentially even supporting the UN at peacekeeping missions. Yet, a broad based discussion how this support could be achieved, had never taken place. Bearing in mind the recurring crisis on the world stage, an urgent clarification would have been needed. Then again, the government pointed out that the Basic Law would not allow using Bundeswehr troops for out-of-area missions. Luckily, the UN was reluctant about demands from West Germany. Yet, in contrast to the public opinion, the West German government had already taken part in various missions, either financially or with its Air Force. In 1973, the Bundeswehr provided transport capacities for “Blue Helmets“from Senegal to Cairo and in 1978 it supplied material and personnel to Tel Aviv.

57Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Weltmacht wider Willen, (Germany’s foreign policy, world power against owns will) 3. Auflage, (Berlin: VS Verlag, 1997,) 391; Von Neubeck Transformation der Bundeswehr, 42
59von Neubeck, Transformation der Bundeswehr, 42; Oskar Hoffmann: Bundeswehr und UN – Friedenssicherung: die friedenssicherernden Maßnahmen der Vereinten Nationen und die Fragen einer Beteiligung deutscher Streitkräfte (Bundeswehr and UN peacekeeping missions) (Bern: P. Lang, 1991), 279
60Christoph von Buelow, Der Einsatz der Streitkräfte zur Verteidigung. Eine Untersuchung zu Artikel 87a II GG (Deployment of the armed forces for defence purposes, an examination of Article 87 a II Basic Law) (Bern: P. Lang 1998), 198; Alexander Coridass ,DerAuslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr und der Nationale
Eventually during the 1980s, West Germany’s practically non-existent foreign policy and its minor role on the world stage had resulted in notable dissatisfaction among its Western Allies. As a result, the German government under Helmut Schmidt Commissioned an expertise about the constitutionality of possible out-of-area deployments. The result of the assessment was that the Basic Law would not allow any military engagements outside the borders of the Alliance. Based on the result, the German Security Council decided that any involvement of German troops in out-of-area missions, even for the UN, would be unconstitutional. This evaluation conflicted with the full membership status of West Germany in the UN, as it had agreed to fulfill all duties of the Charta. Although not legally bound through the accedence, there was still the political debt. In the end, West Germany joined the UN unconditionally.

The German government tried to balance the lasting military reluctance with financial compensation payments. The reasoning behind the reluctant attitude towards out-of-area missions was diverse and not only based on its Basic Law. Yet, in the eyes of many Germans, the burden of history made it impossible to join out-of-area missions. Matters were made more difficult by the fact that West Germany had taken up the role of a mediator between East and West. There were fears that this role could be endangered through an increased military engagement. West Germany’s foreign policy campaign to the East, started by Egon Bahr in the late 1960s, proclaimed a change towards the East. It should become the main feature of West Germany’s foreign policy during Chancellor


\textit{Hacke, \textit{Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland}, 391; Rudolf Steinberg, ‘bruestungs- und Ruestungskontrollverwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,’ (Disarmament and Arms Control in the Federal Republic of Germany). Development Research Center \textit{Schriften zum Oeffentlichen Recht} Band 425, (Berlin :Duncker & Humboldt 1982), 105

\textit{Dieter Walz, ‘Die Bundeswehr und die Vereinten Nationen,’ (The Bundeswehr and the United Nations), in \textit{Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung}, Nr. 4 / 1988 . 143-144(143); Keine rechtliche verpflichtung solange keine Vertrag auf Basis des Art.43 CVN gechlossen wurde


\textit{Manfred Goettemaker, ‘Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gruendung bis zur Gegenwart,’(The history of Germany: from the foundation to the present), (Munich: Beck, 1999), 525}
Brandt’s time in office between 1969 and 1974. At that time, the atmosphere in the West German society was shaped by pacifism and antimilitarism and an international operating Bundeswehr would have been unthinkable. German politics, as well as German society, were not ready to take the step towards more international responsibility. As a result, West Germany was no active player in security matters in the post-war period but rather a beneficiary of alliance security guarantees. Yet, the German government’s verbal expressions of solidarity with its allies but its rejection for any direct participation created a lack of understanding. The policy of financial compensation and verbal solidarity became questionable in June 1985. Then, minesweeping capabilities were needed to guarantee free shipping routes in the Red Sea. The German government rejected any participation, though German mine sweeping capabilities were internationally recognised and needed. Again, Germany referred to its Basic Law, which was in a way surprising, as the blockade of international trading routes would have hit the export nation Germany in its core. It should have therefore been of highest priority for Germany’s national interests.

In the course of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran in 1987, German minesweeping capabilities were once again in the political discussion; to support the American troops. The request for Germany’s professional mine sweeping units triggered an intensive domestic dispute about a possible military involvement. Defence Minister Manfred Woerner told his American counterpart Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberg that it would be unlawful because it was unconstitutional for the Bundeswehr to get militarily involved. Shortly after, Woerner Commissioned an inquiry to examine the legality of Bundeswehr participation in out-of-area missions again. This time, the result of the report was a surprise for some, as it assumed that out-of-area missions were in principle possible. This result had however questioned the “status quo” of the domestic political non-party agreement that out-of-area mission would be unconstitutional.

67 Kataezyna Stocklosa, 'Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik: 1945-1990,' (Poland and Germany’s East policy), (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht, 2011), 206/207
68 Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 392; OECD Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030, 2012, 37
70 Randolph Nikutta: ‘Bundeswehr out of area,’ in: Blätter Nr. 8/1992, 934-945(936); Mathias Oldhaver, Öffentliche Meinung in der Sicherheitspolitik, Untersuchung am Beispiel der Debatte ueber einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Golfkrieg,’ (Public Opinion in the security policy, the debate about the
In this period, the United Nations were busy as the Afghanistan treaties were nearing completion in 1988 and the negotiations of the Iranian-Iraq ceasefire were held in August of the same year. To cope with an increasing build-up of missions, the United Nations needed more support of its members. This again fuelled the discussion in Germany to take over more responsibilities on the global stage. It was then, that the focus of the debate had shifted away from possible out-of-area missions as part of the NATO alliance towards a participation of UN missions. The discussion about an attendance at UN missions benefited from certain foreign policy events. When Namibia declared its readiness for elections under supervision of the UN, Germany could not refuse to take part because of the joined historic heritage. On 30th August 1989, on request of the UN Secretary-General, the Federal Cabinet approved the deployment of 50 police officers from the Federal Border Guard. This was the first time the West German government reconsidered its policy of refusal and provided personnel for a UN mission, without changing the constitutional law. Legal experts raised doubts whether the deployment of a police force was legal because the legislation only allowed a domestic deployment of the federal police. Interestingly enough, politicians from all parties agreed to use the Bundeswehr for such missions rather than the police. Yet, the interpretation of the Basic Law was seemingly the barrier to do so. The debate was shaped by legal questions instead of looking after the requirements of the Bundeswehr to fulfill these kinds of missions. The important questions about the need of technical and operational abilities and

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75 Rolf Clement, ‘Die Unschuld laengst verloren?’ (The innocence already lost) in *Loyal* Nr. 9/1991.16-17 (17)

receiving the acceptable equipment were not asked. The same occurred with the psychological conditions of the soldiers.

As Defence Minister, Manfred Woerner shaped the fate of the Bundeswehr in the 1980s decisively. Under his leadership, the defence budget had gradually increased and reached its peak in 1990/91. The Ministry had followed the recommendations of the Bundeswehr concept of 1984 that implied a necessary increase of the defence readiness. The draft highlighted the need for more investments in areas such as the command level, the reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as air defence and installations. Thus, the Minister was accused of lacking ideas for the revolutionary changes in Europe. This was underlined by the fact that Woerner had still spoken about the atomic threat in 1987. He further highlighted the importance of displaying strength and deterrence. This was in contrast to the Foreign Minister who wanted to increase the diplomatic aspect of Germany’s foreign policy. It was only with Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in 1989 that the debate gained the needed relevance. His maxim was one of a political realism, which should succeed in the end.

The foundation of the German Armed Forces was shaped by various factors. The direction, orientation of Germany’s political system, the security, and defence awareness of its population and politicians as well as experiences played an important part in the developing process. Setting up the Bundeswehr not only had the intention to write a new chapter in Germany’s book of history but to start a new book. Its label as an integrated defence force became the characteristic trademark of the Bundeswehr. However, the expectations towards a reunited and eventually fully sovereign Germany had risen significantly. It was now expected to take its proper place on the international stage.

77 Jürgen Merrath, ‘Implications of Germany’s declining defense spending,’ (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 46 et
79 Bald, Militäruer und Gesellschaft 1945-1990, Die Bundeswehr in der Bonner, 46
Eventually it should become an “exporter of security” and provide its contribution towards a global security policy.\textsuperscript{83}

Chapter Two

The Bundeswehr Between 1990-1994/95
A Phase of Reorientation in the Light of Unification

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policy initiatives, Restructuring (Perestroika) and Openness (Glasnost) in the second half of the 1980s, which had undreamt results for Germany and the world. The world changing events of 1989/90, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and the Berlin Wall, proved to be decisive points for the Federal Republic of Germany and especially for the Bundeswehr. Germanys’ well known and used to strategic environment of the Cold War broke down and the familiar equilibrium of its security and defence culture had ended drastically.\(^1\) Equipped and trained to face the forces of the Warsaw Pact, it now had to face a new and uncertain future. Suddenly confronted with out-of-area missions and restructuring measures, it became obvious that a new chapter of security and defence culture for Germany had started.\(^2\)

The early 1990s served as a reminder of politically troubled times, a time of change and transition. On one hand, Germany benefited the most of the radical changes; on the other hand, it also had to meet the biggest challenges.\(^3\) Already prior to the German reunification, some European countries like France and the U.K expressed their concerns about a reunited and sovereign Germany. It was feared that a reunited Germany, as an economic and military power, would try to achieve a dominant position in Europe. During the Second Gulf War (Desert Storm) in 1990/91, these concerns had eventually changed into wider expectations towards a German contribution. This resulted into an intensive internal discussion about out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr. Desert Storm began when Germany’s internal politics were still dominated by the unification process.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Bundeswehr on Operations,’ 28 et sq.; Robert Owen Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Stanley Hoffmann, ‘After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe,’ (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993), 3; Steinhoff Determinants and Politics of German Military, 39

\(^2\) Tom Dyson,‘The Bundeswehr in its historical and structural Context,’ in The Politics of German Defence and Security 2008 (Chapter 2), 36 ; Federal Ministry of Defence. ‘Bundeswehr on Operations,’ Publication to mark the 15\(^{th}\) Anniversary of the First Parliamentary Mandate for Armed Bundeswehr Missions abroad, The Bundeswehr as an Army of Unity, 2009, 26 et sq;

\(^3\) von Neubeck, Transformation der Bundeswehr, 73 et sq.

\(^4\) Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context, (State Pennsylvania: State University, 1993), 11
negotiations of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” between the two German governments and the four victorious powers, the “Two plus Four” agreement, in regards to the German reunification, were still not completed. At the same time, over 300,000 Soviet troops were still stationed in the eastern parts of Germany. For Germany itself, the reunification process was an issue of highest national significance. However, the constant need for more transfer payments to East Germany threatened the financial and political endurance of West Germany. During the 1990s, West Germany transferred up to 80 billion Euros every year to the new five German states in the framework of the reconstruction aid for East Germany. The problem was further aggravated by the decision of the Federal Security Council from 1982/83, which still confined the government. The narrow interpretation of the German Constitutional Law was complicating any deliberate participation in out-of-area missions.

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Germany and its European allies were faced with the question, whether to take any actions. At their meeting in Paris on 21st August 1990, the WEU Ministers decided to coordinate possible actions when executing UN Resolution 661. Nevertheless, it was only when the United States Secretary of State Baker called for a joint approach of NATO that a new discussion about out-of-area missions in Germany was triggered. While the conservative party considered a possible involvement based on a justified mission, the liberal party (FDP) and the social democrats had serious reservations against any kind of military involvement. However, even the

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6Joerg Bibow, ‘The economic consequences of German unification, The impact of misguided macroeconomics policies,’ Public Policy Brief Institute of Board College, No.67, [http://hdl.net/10419/54312](http://hdl.net/10419/54312) accessed 27/10/2012


very idea of involving Bundeswehr units in direct military actions against Iraq was, even though legitimised by the UN, constitutional of unfeasible nature, not to mention the lack of public support.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) expressed his concerns, because the “Two plus Four” agreement was still not ratified from the Soviet parliament. Genscher revealed that an active involvement of Germany could have endangered the ratifying process and therefore the reunification itself, as the Soviet Union was sceptical of any military operation against Iraq. Genscher explained that he had received respective information. Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg was also backing the decision not to participate because of the constitutional situation. He went on to explain that the allies should consider and respect the special constitutional limits Germany was subject to. However, the presented decisive reason not to attend, suggested to the careful observer that this was a political decision rather than a legal one.

To soothe the international frustration about Germany’s decision, the Inspector General Klaus Naumann was looking for a small but symbolic involvement of the German Navy. Yet, he could not assert himself and his demands against the Foreign Minister’s position. Over time, the US government asked for NATO military support in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to secure shipping routes. The NATO alliance, under the leadership of its General Secretary Woerner turned the American request down. Germany saw this request as an opportunity to meet American expectation and to deflect from the decision not to join the Americans at the Persian Gulf. The internal debate of the pros and cons of a participation clearly gained momentum as allegations from other countries came up, that Germany tried to escape its international responsibility. At the same time, NATO member Turkey sought military support against a possible Iraqi aggression. It

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Transformation der Bundeswehr, 86; Bernhard Fleckenstein, ‘50 Jahre Bundeswehr’, (50 years Bundeswehr) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 21/2005 Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, 5-14(13)

11Martin Wagener, ‘Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr,’(Bundeswehr missions abroad) Universitaet Trier, Trierer Arbeitspapiere Nr. 2 2003, 9 et seq; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 86;


13Oldhaver, Öffentliche Meinung in Sicherheitspolitik, 134;

14Gregor Schoellgen, ‘Zehn Jahre als europäische Großmacht Eine Bilanz deutscher Außenpolitik seit der Vereinigung,’(Ten years as European great power, a resume of German foreign policy since the German reunification) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 24/2000 Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, 6-12(6); Oldhaver: Öffentliche Meinung in der Sicherheitspolitik 138; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 87
demanded the deployment of the air unit of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF). After an intense political debate, Germany decided to send 18 Alpha Jets aircraft and 270 service personnel to Turkey. Yet, Germany was not willing and ready to use any ground combat troops. Even though the military significance of the Alpha Jets was limited, it was the first time since the Second World War that Germany had used its armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. Interestingly, the militarily more important participation of German personnel in Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft over Turkey had not created any problems in Germany.

However, the involvement was not enough to quieten the calls for more military engagement. Under increasing international pressure, the German government decided to deploy Roland and Hawke air defence missiles systems including 530 support personnel to Turkey. Critics in Germany conveniently ignored the fact that the military systems were purely defensive. Legally, the NATO treaty did cover the deployment as it was within the alliance territory. However, some considered it an out-of-area mission out of psychological and political reasons because of the long distance to the operational area and the possibility of an Iraqi attack. The opponent’s main argument against any military involvement in Turkey was the burden of the reunification process. Even though the political reunification was completed, to bridge the social and cultural differences between east and west would take much longer. The antimilitary participation mood in large parts of the population made it very difficult for the government to meet internal and external expectations. Nevertheless, the German Bundeswehr had broken new ground with its mission in Turkey. Interestingly, the majority of the population approved military actions against Iraq, in general, just without German soldiers. This underlined the difficult relation between the German population and the use of German military forces. Furthermore, the fact that the reunification was also the result of the approval of the Soviet Union could not be ignored, as its leadership had opposed any military action against Iraq.

15NATO,‘ Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land Headquarters to be dissolved in Autumn 2002,’ http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-098e.html accessed 3/06/12; Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, ‘Germany and the use of military force: total war the culture of restraints and the quest for normality.’ 2001, 11 in German Politics 10:1
17Von Neubeck,Die Transformation der Bundeswehr,88
18Bundestags-Plenarprotokoll 12/5 vom 30.01.1991, 68
from the beginning. Politically, Germany was not in the position and not willing to test a possible negative reaction of the Soviet Union.

Yet, some observers said the Bundeswehr itself delivered the most important reason against a military involvement in Desert Storm. Under the “Two plus Four” treaty, Germany was committed to reduce its military personnel to 370,000. It was decided to dissolve the National Volksarmee (NVA), in strength of over 155,000 and to integrate useful parts into the Bundeswehr. To complete the demanding process of integrating the NVA and at the same time reducing the numbers, a concentration of all resources was necessary.

Exacerbating the situation further, the Bundeswehr was founded and laid out as a pure defence force and was neither equipped nor trained for the new challenges. At that time, a combat mission in Iraq was also neither compatible with the self–perception of the Bundeswehr nor communicable to its personnel. Interestingly, no discussion took place about possible logistical or medical support. Then again, it would have been doubtful whether the Bundeswehr of the early 1990s would have even been able to provide this kind of support.

To satisfy the US expectations, other nations contributed rather small and symbolic contingents for Desert Storm. In contrast to these countries, the German government found itself constrained to make large financial contributions. Germany stated on 30th January 1991 that it would transfer $5.5 billion to support the war efforts of the United States. Overall, Germany had paid over $10 billion in financial and logistical support. However, these enormous financial transactions had almost no foreign policy effect, as the money was not connected to a political strategy or bound to any exercise of influence. It seemed that Germany was paying without gaining any international recognition for it.

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20Philipp Schweers,’ Still a civilian power?’ DIAS Nr. 27 Maerz 2008, 14
21Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 393; Stefan Maier,‘Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr,’ leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielraeume und Lehren( foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr, central question, scope of decisions-making and doctrines) SWP Studie 2007, 61; The Sun, Diana Jean Schemo ‘Germany's lukewarm support of gulf war leaves its allies cold,’ March 13, 1991 ,Paris Bureau of The Sun http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-03-13/news/1991072044_1_gulf-war-persian-gulf-Germany accessed 4/06/12, Philipp Schweers,’ Still a civilian power,’ 14
23Bundestags Plenarprotokoll 12/5 vom 30.01.1991, 68; von Neubeck Die Transformation der Bundeswehr 91
24Hacke ‘Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 393f; Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, ‘Germany and the use of military force: total war, then culture of restraint and the quest for normality,’ 2001, 11 in German Politics 10:1
The strategy to keep the public at home satisfied by not entering Desert Storm and buying its way out but keeping the international recognition, did not work.\textsuperscript{26} In reality, Germany provided rather unrecognised support units to other regions to relieve its allies.\textsuperscript{27} On request of the United States, Germany also delivered Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) reconnaissance search tanks to Saudi Arabia, again without much international recognition.\textsuperscript{28}

It was one of the drawbacks of Germany’s foreign policy concept that there was no clear definition of its strategic national objective, which could be attributed to the original concept of the Bundesswehr. It almost seemed that Germany was determined to play the part of the starry-eyed idealist, a pacifist nation, whose goal it was to achieve peace and prevent future conflicts by the sole means of development aid and humanitarian support. In addition, large parts of the German society did not want to become a military power with worldwide missions of the Bundeswehr. Yet, the international community expected that Germany should take more international responsibility exactly because of its past. Even though Germanys’ historical burden was initially recognised, the excuse not to take part soon became obsolete. The international expectations towards a reunited Germany had risen dramatically.

The fundamental readiness of Germany to take small steps in the right direction to assume more responsibility had not gone unnoticed by the UN. In 1992, there was some evidence that a German participation in Cambodia was desired.\textsuperscript{29} The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission was a politically acceptable mission for all parties in the Bundestag. Because of its clearly humanitarian character, the

\textsuperscript{26}Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 394et seq; Stephan Bierling, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Normen, Spieler, Entscheidungen.(Germany's foreign policy, norms, players, decisions).(München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 279; Hans-Jürgen Leersch, Welt Online, 02/10/2001,‘Kämpfen statt zahlen ist diesmal die deutsche Devise, Anders als noch im Golfkrieg gibt es beim Vorgehen gegen den Terrorismus kein Ausweichen auf Scheckbuchdiplomatie,’(fighting instead of paying) http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article479160/Kaempfen-statt-zahlen-ist-diesmal-die-deutsche-Devise.html accessed 21/07/2012
\textsuperscript{27}Phlipp Schweers, ’Still a civilian power?’, 14
opposition saw no need to challenge the mission either politically and legally. The

domestic consensus resulted from the fact that the mission was classified below the
threshold for out–of–area missions of the Basic Law. Nevertheless, a deployment in
Cambodia, a country marked by genocide and civil war was inevitably associated with
some element of risk. The great distance put extra strain on the missions’ leadership.
The German government, aware of the political dimension of this mission, tried to silence any
critics from the beginning. The government made a clear statement that the medical
personnel would also offer medical services to civilians. It is noteworthy that the
mission’s primary objective was however to look after UN personnel. The difficult legal
and political situation did not allow to fully integrate the Bundeswehr contingent under
UN authority. The German government had to keep full control, in case the UN wanted to
place the military hospital somewhere else. Despite many difficulties, the mission in
Cambodia was a success as it resulted in a decisive impulse for further developments in
the medical service of the Bundeswehr. This was important given the revealed failings
during this mission. The provided medical service was inadequate, not only for out-of-area
mission standards but also for providing first class service at home.

The other crisis area of that time, which had a lasting effect on Germany, was the
civil war in Yugoslavia. The conflict proved challenging for the European countries
because of its geographical closeness. The already difficult condition soon took a dramatic

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30 Rolf Clement, Sofern noch einer fragt, (provided that someone still asks) Loyal, Nr 1/1992, 26-27 (27); Jan
Philipp Weisswange, ‘Der sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsprozeß der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1990–
2002,’ (German security policy between 1990–2002). University Freiburg, 2003, 56; only unarmed medical
personnel was deployed
31 Bernhard Chiari and Magnus Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,(Bundeswehr deployments abroad
from Escort to Expeditionary Navy , Enduring Freedom at the Horn of Africa) Im Auftrag des
Militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2010),162; Von Neubeck, Die
Transformation der Bundeswehr, 118; Deutscher Bundestag,’ Unterrichtung durch den
Wehrbeauftragten,’ (Instruction by the parliamentary Commissioner) Jahresbericht 1993
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/12/069/1206950.pdf accessed 4/06/12
32 Klaus Naumann, ‘Der Wandel des Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO Manoeuer,’ 482; Andreas M.
Rauch, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, (deployments abroad) (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2006), 33
33 von Neubeck Die Transformation der Bundeswehr 117; United Nations, ‘Cambodia UNTAC Background,’
der noch nicht erfuellte Auftrag, (peace is not yet fulfilled) (Berlin: Mittler&Sohn 2002), 118/119; Sebastian
Stamm, ‘Zwischen humanitärer Intervention und Neuen Kriegen Neue Herausforderungen fuer die
Bundeswehr,’(Between humanitarian intervention and new wards. New challenges for the Bundeswehr)
University Bonn, 2006, 17
34 Klaus Naumann, ‘Der Wandel des Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO- Manoeuer zur Anwendung
von Waffengewalt,’ (The changing character of Bundeswehr missions from disaster aid over NATO
eds Frank Naegler (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 482
35Naumann, Der Wandel des Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO- Manoeuer zur Anwendung von
Waffengewalt,’ 484
turn for the worse and determined actions of the international community became necessary.\textsuperscript{36}

Adopting UN Security Resolution 713 was a direct response to the circumstances in Yugoslavia. The Resolution imposed under Chapter VII\textsuperscript{37} involved an arms embargo against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Resolution 713 was the first resolution in regards to the break-up of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{38} The other punitive measure was a total trade embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, which was passed in Resolution 757 on 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1992.\textsuperscript{39}

In a joint declaration in July 1992, NATO and the WEU Foreign Ministers agreed to oversee the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. The German government decided to support the monitoring mission with its Navy forces. It was very much unchartered territory for the German government and triggered an emotional and intensive political debate in the Bundestag and society in general. One potential source of conflict was the involvement of the German parliament in the decision-making process. The government simply assumed that the decision about the mission would fall under the rule of Article 65a Basic Law, which states that foreign policy is an area of responsibility for the government. The opposition on the other hand argued that the government tried to change the fundamentals of foreign and security policy by bypassing the parliament.\textsuperscript{40}

Less than a year later, in spring 1993, another mission in Yugoslavia put the German government in a difficult political predicament. On 9\textsuperscript{th} October 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 781 after reaffirming Resolution 713 and all following Resolutions for the Balkan conflict.\textsuperscript{41} The Security Council imposed a ban on military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the rules positioned in Resolution 770. To support the enforcement of the Resolution, NATO made AWACS long-range

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{36}Philipp Schweers, \textit{Still a civilian power ?},' 15


\textsuperscript{39}NATO ‘UN Security Council 3082nd Meeting Resolution S/RES/757’ May 30, 1992, IFOR/NATO \url{http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920530a.htm} accessed 21/07/2012;

\textsuperscript{40}Klaus Peter Zeitler, \textit{Deutschlands Rolle bei der Voelkerrechtlichen Anerkennung der Republic Kroatien unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des deutschen AussenMinisters Genscher},(Marburg :Tectum Verlag, 2000), 159

\textsuperscript{41}NATO, ‘UN Security Council 3122nd Meeting Resolution S/RES/781,’ October 9, 1992, IFOR/NATO, \url{http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u921009a.htm} accessed 21/07/2012
\end{footnotesize}
reconnaissance aircraft available with German military personnel on board, to oversee the flying ban. When the UN Security Council extended the mission profile to include an enforcement part, the involvement of German personnel in the AWACS aircraft was seriously questioned. The problem for the Germans was that the AWACS could have been used as fire control centers for warplanes. This would have made the constitutionality of the mission doubtful. Despite discussing the substantial legality of the mission, the objective and purpose of the mission was hardly mentioned. Interestingly, the fact that barely any Bundeswehr unit at that time could be deployed as a complete unit was not disclosed at all.42

Seeking a solution, Moscow’s rejection to vote for the resolution gained the German government time.43 However, the extension was short-termed as the Russian government changed its approach on 31st March 1993 and eventually voted for the Resolution 816. The resolution extended the No-Fly-Zone to civilian aircraft and allowed to apply all necessary means to enforce it. It also declared the besieged cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be safe zones.44 The following decision in Germany’s Bundestag about the participation happened in an exceptional and unprecedented way. The Ministers of the government’s smaller coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), decided to abstain from the vote for Resolution 816. Simultaneously, the FDP had sent a motion to the Federal Constitutional Court to check exactly this decision. The alternative to this extraordinary procedure would have been the end of the Conservative Liberal coalition government.45 However, the larger concern was that a pure political question was shifted to a Courtroom. Something so self-evident in other countries needed a Court decision in Germany. Eventually, the Court did not grant the interim injunction and the German personnel in the AWACS aircraft could stay.46 A possible withdrawal from the AWACS

44Bernhard Chiari & Magnus Pahl, Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr, 55
missions would have been a political disaster and would have endangered Germany’s political credibility and reliability.

Unfortunately, for the German government circumstances were changing much faster than anticipated. The increasing appearances of decisive events around the world demanded determined actions of the United Nations and its member states. The result was that Germany was no longer allowed to hide behind its past, as new demands made by the international community were brought to its attention.

In the case of the United Nations Somalia Operation in Somlia II (UNOSOM II), these new demands precisely placed the German government in political difficulties. Yet again, the international community had paid attention to the situation in Somalia. Since the end of the 80s, the country was seriously stricken by civil wars, which was further aggravated by a devastating drought. On 3rd December 1992, under the United States leadership, the United Nations Security Council approved for several countries to implement Charter VII of the UN Charter. Operation “Restore Hope” stood for creating safe areas in Somalia. On 17th December 1992, the CDU/CSU fraction declared its basic willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr. However, its liberal coalition partner first demanded a change of the Basic Law. Luckily, there was no official request for any troops before 13th April 1993, when the Council adopted Resolution 814 on 26th March 1993. This provided a necessary break to push ahead with the domestic discussion about out-of-area missions. Eventually, with direction No.1 from 21st April 1993, the Federal Defence Minister Volker Ruehe ordered the Bundeswehr participation at UNOSOM II. To avoid unnecessary complications, the basic rules of the mission were clearly defined. The Bundeswehr units were only allowed to operate in pacified areas for medical support reasons only. Due to these operational limits, other countries feared that the Germans

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47 Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, 'Germany and the use of military force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint', and the quest for normality,' *German Politics* 2001, 13 et sq
48 Klaus Naumann, *Der Wandel des Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO – Manoever,* 485; United Nations Somalia UNOSOM II background
50 Deutscher Bundestag ‘Antrag der Faktionen CDU/CSU und FDP Beteiligung der Bundeswehr UNOSOM II’, (Motion CDU/CSU and FDP towards participation in UNOSOM II), Bundesdrucksache 12/5248, accessed 22/07/2012
would try to avoid full military responsibility. Yet, the idea of the German government was to demonstrate successfully the functional ability of the Bundeswehr under operational conditions to the international community. A failure would have been a political and military declaration of bankruptcy. It also seemed the German government tried to take a political advantage out of this situation. The opposition even suspected that the government tried to use UNOSOM II to complement its foreign policy arsenal by a military part. The mission seemed suitable because of its undisputed humanitarian character. The only way for the opposition to cause some political impact was once again to go to the Federal Constitutional Court, regardless of any negative impact. The Somalia mission was the third time within 11 months that a deployment decision was subject to a judicial review. With this application, the opposition tried to achieve an interim measure to stop an advancement of the mission. Simultaneously, the already deployed units should be brought back home. On 23rd June 1993, the court ruling for the Somalia mission stated, that continuing the mission would need the prior consent of the German parliament in the form of a parliamentary reservation. Once again, the Court was forced to make a political decision about the lawfulness of a military deployment. The decision for the Federal Constitutional Court was important, as a withdrawal of the soldiers would have caused irritations about Germany’s international credibility. Eventually, the Federal Constitutional Court decided in the main proceedings for all three complaints on 12th July 1994. The scope of the judgement had an effect for years to come. The verdict stated, the German government would need the prior consent of the Bundestag for any out-of-area deployment. To the surprise of many law scholars, the Court founded its consideration for the lawfulness of out-of-area missions on Article 24(2) instead of the so far favoured and mainly used Article 87 a (2) Basic Law. Article 24(2) allowed the German government the accession to a framework of collective security. The

52Volker Loewe: Peace-keeping Operationen der UN: Aspekte einer Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Peacekeeping Operations of the UN, aspects of the German participation) in Bonner Beitraege zur Politikwissenschaft (Bonn:LIT Verlag 1994), 302; von Neubeck Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 102
53Wagner ‘Abenteuer in Somalia,’ 153; Karl-Heinz Börner,’Germany’s Constitutional Court And Future German Combat Operations Outside of Europe,’ Air and Space Power Journal; Werner Hoyer Dr. 146th Bergedorf Round Table The Role of the Federal Armed Forces in German Foreign and Security Policy, MdB http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/en/international-affairs/bergedorf-round-table/database/search-results contribution-statement/contribution-detail.html?tx_mitbg_pi1%5Buid%5D=29625&tx_mitbg_pi1%5Bs_init%5D=1&tx_mitbg_pi1%5Bband_no %5D=146 accessed 4/06/12
54Werner Börner ,’Germany’s Constitutional Court And Future German Combat Operations Outside of Europe,’ Air and Space Power Journal 1994
accession was associated with the right to take part in missions of this collective system.\(^{55}\) The political relief was huge as the way for further deployments was now paved and the decision making process was back where it belonged, in parliament. Despite the negative assessment of UNOSOM II, the Bundeswehr gained valuable experiences. As an immediate result, necessary questions about training, armament, equipment, and restructuring measures were asked. Somalia was therefore a military success for the Bundeswehr and would be decisive for its future.\(^{56}\)

On 15\(^{th}\) July 1994, shortly after the Federal Constitutional Court decision, the German parliament decided over the mission in the Adriatic Sea (Sharp Guard) and AWACS flights to carry out the UN Resolutions imposed on Yugoslavia.\(^{57}\) Germany had taken part in the joint mission of NATO and WEU with two warships and maritime patrol aircraft.\(^{58}\) The Court decisions finally allowed the German government to run the Bundeswehr as an equal partner with the order to oversee the Adriatic Sea embargo and the No-Fly-Zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{59}\)

The newly emerged strategic environment after the Cold War had not produced a peaceful era, as so many had hoped for. On the contrary, with the Soviet Union in a process of falling apart, a stabilising element in the world was missing. The Soviet Union was struggling to keep control over their areas of responsibility and the political situation become rather unpredictable.\(^{60}\) The result was disillusioning; the high expectations about a

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\(^{59}\) Bundestag-Drucksache 12/8303 vom 19.07.1994, 21169; Börner, ‘Germany's Constitutional Court And Future German Combat Operations Outside of Europe,’ 1995, 1; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 107

forthcoming peace dividend could not be fulfilled. The Cold War configured Bundeswehr was now facing painful adjustments to face a radical changed security environment. In particular, training and equipment could no longer keep up with the growing demands. This resulted in the need for clear political guidelines about the new strategic orientation and the need for a definition of national interests. Yet, the overall awareness for these guidelines was still missing. The primacy of parliament was the only competence that could have decided over the needed change of security policies. At the same time, it should provide and define the necessary basic framework for the Bundeswehr. All of this was now put to the test. It seemed, Germany had been overtaken by global events and at the same time been handicapped by national caveats.

With the order of the day from the Minster of Disarmament and Defence Rainer Eppelmann from 2nd October 1990, the NVA was officially dissolved. By 3rd October 1990, the military and civilian personnel were brought under the authority of Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Integrating the NVA personnel happened under a great deadline pressure as the withdrawal of the Soviet Western Group of Forces from East Germany should not be endangered. Therefore, it was necessary for the German government to fulfill the promised decrease of the military forces to 370,000 soldiers on time. Concurrently, the Bundeswehr had to take care of around 90,000 military personnel that were still in service with the NVA when the liquidation order was given out. The West German Ministry of Defence decided that useful parts of the NVA should be kept and integrated into the Bundeswehr. The idea was to take the NVA apart piece by piece and to keep and use what was necessary to reorganise a military force in eastern parts of Germany. The MIG-29 fighter aircraft was the best known weapon system that had been integrated into the Bundeswehr, as the most other NVA equipment was outdated and did not met the necessary requirements.

62 Tagesbefehl des Ministers für Abrüstung und Verteidigung zur Eingliederung der Nationalen Volksarmee in die Bundeswehr anläßlich des Beitrittes der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 02.Oktober 1990,(Order of the East German Defence Minister for the integration of the NVA) http://www.parow-info.de/Parow%201956/Tagesbefehl021090.html accessed 22/07/2012
64 Dale Roy Herspring, Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military, (Lahnman Maryland: Rowman& Littelfield, 1998), 148
At the end of August 1990, the Bundeswehr started to provide the necessary personnel, the financial means, and the concept to perform the liquidation. The newly formed Bundeswehr Eastern Command in Strausberg turned out to be a useful liaison office between the Bundeswehr West and the Bundeswehr East.\textsuperscript{66} At that time, withdrawing the Soviet troops was the decisive political question for Germany.\textsuperscript{67} Given these preconditions, the Eastern Command had to manage the takeover of the NVA in the period from 3\textsuperscript{rd} October 1990 to 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1991, on its own terms. The order was to uphold the management and full operability during this procedure. This ended up being a difficult challenge due to the personnel cuts of professional and regular soldiers. Another task was to provide assistance and to cooperate with the remaining Soviet troops for a smooth execution of the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{68}

In 1989, the Bundeswehr had around 467,300 military and over 164,400 civilian personnel in service. Incorporating NVA personnel, the number in the short term increased to 472,300 military and 187,200 civilian personnel. In 1994, the number was down to 360,200 military personnel even lower than the 370,000 laid down in the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany”.\textsuperscript{69}

In addition, over 2000 NVA facilities were transferred into the responsibility of the Bundeswehr. Most of them were in poor condition and had been disposed or sold.\textsuperscript{70} The Bundeswehr also had to seize control over large amounts of material from the stock of the NVA. In detail over 15,000 different weapons systems, including large equipment and machinery had to be dealt with. Among them 2396 main battle tanks, 7620 armoured combat vehicles, around 10,000 wheeled vehicles, 5095 artillery systems, 5512 missiles systems, 446 warplanes, 87 gunships, 62 transport planes, 101 transport helicopters, 69 combat ships, 122 special purpose ships and 1,209,699 small arms.\textsuperscript{71} At the end only

\textsuperscript{66}Digutsch, ‘Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit’, 469
\textsuperscript{67}Paul B. Stares, The New Germany and the New Europe, (University of Minnesota: The Brookings Institution1992), 21
\textsuperscript{68}Herspring, Requiem for an Army, 147
\textsuperscript{69}Digutsch, Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit, 471
\textsuperscript{70}Olaf Achilles, Ingrid Tegtmeier, Die verhinderte Konversion: Bundeswehr und Ruestungsindustrie auf neuen Wegen, am Beispiel einer Region, (The prevented conversion: Bundeswehr and arms industry on new ways, example of a region) (Kassel: Jenior&Pressler 1993), 34
around 7 per cent of the NVA material was kept for further use. Of the roughly 300,000 tons of ammunitions, 500 tons were given away to approved bodies according to the unification treaty and around 98,440 tons were handed over to third parties. Nevertheless, it was still necessary to make around 204,750 tons of ammunition unusable or dispose of them.

Expenses for the storage, destruction, and removal of contaminated material mounted up to around DM 1.4 billion. Until the mid 1990s, around ten per cent of the German defence budget was channelled to NVA handling costs. Many observers declared the military unification to one of the most demanding periods of the Bundeswehr since its foundation.

In July 1990, the Defence Minister established an expert group by to make proposals for the future structure of the armed forces; it would be the first of many to come. The panel assumed the uncertainties in regards to the former Soviet Union would have a huge impact on German security planning. Thus, national defence was still of the highest priority for the Bundeswehr. Nevertheless, the Commissions’ conviction was also that peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations under the UN authority would be of growing importance.

In the same year, the Ministry of Defence based on the previous results framed its own concept. Later this strategic concept became the groundwork for drafting Germany’s Defence Policy Guidelines 1992. Interestingly, this did not happen in the usual form of a

72Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung ueber den Abschluss der Verwertung,’ (Government statement about the application), 5; Otfried Nassauer Chapter 6: ‘An Army Surplus-The NVA’s Heritage,’ Information Center for Transatlantic Security Brief 3 Berlin June 1995
75Dirk Koob, Deutsche Militaerpolitik in den neunziger Jahren, Wie (Selbst-) organisiert ist die Bundeswehr,(German military policy in the 1990s, how organised is the Bundeswehr?) (Marburg:Tectum Verlag, 1999), 105; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Entschliessungsantrag zu der vereinbarten Debatte zum Bericht der unabhauenigen Kommission fuer die zukuenfigen Aufgaben der Bundeswehr,’(Motion for a resolution, for the decided debate about the future tasks of the Bundeswehr) Drucksache 12/1846, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/12/018/1201846.pdf accessed 22/07/2012
Defence White Paper as happened before in 1985. The defence guidelines in contrast to all strategic concepts before, especially underlined the threat of a regional crisis on the fringe of Europe. The Defence Policy Guidelines highlighted the need for Germany and its allies to analyse and eventually reconsider the role of foreign policy, its strategy, and how it was perceived. Moreover, the use of military means was no longer restricted to pure homeland defence as it could be used to actively prevent and end conflicts in Europe. Yet, the Defence Policy Guidelines were the result of just one Ministry and therefore it missed the wider political back up.

Two years after the Defence Policy Guidelines, the Defence White Paper 1994 was released. It was the first White Paper since 1985 and the first one after the Cold War. It stressed that although there was no reason to assume an immediate aggression against Germany or any other NATO member, the uncertainty about the former Soviet Union would pose a security risk. It referred directly to the results of the Ministry of Defence Commission in 1990. The White Paper also provided valuable insights into the official analyses of Germany’s strategic environment and threat scenario. It became obvious that the old thinking had prevailed, as it was difficult to detach decade old templates. To think in new security and defence patterns was a difficult undertaking for the Cold War hardened militaries. It was disclosed that the future configuration of the German Armed Forces would be a three-part one. In detail, it was recommended to divide the Bundeswehr into three classes of units: a Crisis Reaction Force, which would be able to prevent conflicts and an on mobilisation depending Main Defence Force responsible for territorial defence issues. The third unit would be the military basic organisation for the armed forces.

The White Paper also underlined Germany’s preference for multilateralism, which was in line with the official NATO strategy. However, it also revealed some disorientation about the new world order. The Bundeswehr provided an ambivalent appearance. On one
hand, there was a professional trained and equipped small mobile force for out-of-area conflict management. On the other hand, most of its forces were still equipped and trained to face a massive Cold War like attack against German or NATO territory. Considering the presented threat scenarios of the defence papers, it was not a surprise that the compulsory military service was seen as inevitable.

Nevertheless, the White Paper was seen as the centrepiece of Germany’s new security and foreign policy. It did prove the need for the Bundeswehr to transform from a pure defensive force to a more offensive one. Some observers stated the White Paper of 1994 and the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in the same year represented a cardinal shift in Germany’s strategic culture and of its self-awareness. After all, for the first time since the Second World War, a German government was able to authorise the deployment of military force for more than pure defensive purposes. The Bundeswehr had the duty to take part in NATO conflict management efforts and the Petersberg declaration, which listed the military tasks that the EU and WEU are empowered to do, put the German government under the duty to support the WEU and the UN.

The first half of the 1990s proved to be a challenging time for the German government. The main task was of course to integrate parts and dissolve the remaining parts of the NVA. Simultaneously Germany had to fulfill expectations of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)\(^\text{85}\); the Arms Control Agreement and the “Two plus Four” treaty. The reduction of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 military personnel laid down in the “Two plus Four” treaty had been a challenge.\(^\text{86}\) The already difficult undertaking was further complicated as the Bundeswehr was already in a reorientation process, which had started in 1989.\(^\text{87}\) However, the reduction to 370,000 soldiers should

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\(^\text{84}\) Bono, NATO’s “Peace Enforcement” Tasks and “Policy Communities”: 1990-1999, 2003,57


\(^\text{87}\) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Deutsches Heer,Army Struktur 4 to Army Struktur 5,( German Army, Army structure 4 to 5) [http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/?ut/p/c4/JYoxDoAgDADf4gfa3c1fqbWBhpMJS3g95WYG264](http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/?ut/p/c4/JYoxDoAgDADf4gfa3c1fqbWBhpMJS3g95WYG264)
not be the end of the personnel cutbacks. Because of savings actions of the federal budget, it was necessary to cut the defence budget several times more in the early 1990s. With every new cost-cutting round, the personnel strength had to be adjusted to a new financial situation.  

In July 1994, the governmental plans revealed the official number of military personnel to be 340,000. It was further decided to deploy 50,000 soldiers to the Crisis Reaction Force. This force would only be staffed with professional soldiers therefore freed from the burden of conscripts. The crisis reaction force should be ready for NATO operations as well as for operation under the umbrella of the WEU or the UN. The rest of the Bundeswehr units would be used for the Main Defence Force. The new structure of two different kinds of forces within the Bundeswehr was similar to developments in other NATO countries. The tendencies for multilateralism in Europe and NATO in the 1990s complied exactly with the Bundeswehr’s preference for international cooperation. Then again, Germany’s neighbours also had an interest in binding Germany’s military potential in transnational co-operation.

The new twofold combat force concept of the Bundeswehr was accompanied by two other revolutionary developments. The first tentative step to improve Germanys’ special operation capabilities was the setup of the 1st Airmobile Brigade for deep operations and the Special Forces Command. Though a timid approach, it was

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88 Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 153; Sebastian Stamm, ‘Zwischen humanitärer Intervention und Neuen Kriegen Neue Herausforderungen für die Bundeswehr,’ (Between humanitarian intervention and new wars, New challenges for the Bundeswehr) University Bonn, 2006, 9 et sq
90 Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, 102
92 Axel Dohmen, *Sicherheitskonzepte im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Voraussetzungen, Funktionen und Folgen der Herausforderung der Konstruktion von militärischen Risiko und Sicherheit* (Security concepts and social change, conditions, functions and results of a changed construction of military risk and security) (Diss Universitaet der Bundeswehr München 2006) 173-4; Berthold Meyer, Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen, Die politische Legitimation weltweiter Militaereinsatze, (Blurring the borders of German national interests, the political legitimation of worldwide deployments), (Frankfurt Hessische Friedens und Konfliktforschung, 2007), 8 et sq
nevertheless an important one. Especially, setting up the Kommando Spezial Kraefte, (KSK, Special Forces Command) caused to be the source of anxiety in certain parts society. A military unit working in secrecy did raise questions about the so valued parliamentary approval. One must remember that the peace movement was still strong in German society and helped to create an antimilitary atmosphere. The memory of the Third Reich was still fresh and after the Cold War, many dreamt about a peace dividend. A new offensive strategic culture with highly trained soldiers did not fit into this peaceful picture.

Another example of how old prejudices and caveats were influencing security and defence related decisions in Germany was the idea of a Joint Armed Forces Operations Command. It should be resourceful enough to command all deployed troops simultaneously. However, memories of the notorious German “Generals Stab” (General Staff) surfaced in connection with this debate. That was the reason why Konrad Adenauer and his government together with the Western Allies decided, there would never be another German “Generals Stab” again. To compensate the lacking capacities, it was necessary to develop different kinds of structures. In time of war, NATO would exercise the operational command of the Bundeswehr except for the territorial forces. The explanation was simple; Germany was lacking a central command institution to exercise operational control over its armed forces. The public distrust in large parts of the population against the military forces resulted in a delicate correlation.

The Defence Minister under the pressure of the public opinion then moved away from the idea of a nevertheless useful concept for an overall military command organisation. Despite the lack of success, the need for a national central organisation remained nevertheless. From the early 1990s onwards, the Bundeswehr tried to work around this issue with the use of mission-orientated installations. Over the course of time, the Bundeswehr established more efficient institutions such as the Force Commands. They were introduced in 1994

95Thomas–Durell Young, Trends in German Defence Policy The Defence Policy Guidelines and the Centralisation of operational control, (Royal Institute of International Affairs: Create Space , 1994),8
and were responsible for the services of the Bundeswehr. In 1995 the Operations Centre of the Bundeswehr followed, which meant Germany was able to conduct various deployments at the same time. It should guarantee the smooth operation of out-of-area operations without interrupting the chain of command in absence of a national command.

On a political level, the German government had failed to launch a debate on the objectives and about a national strategy in regards to out-of-area missions. Nevertheless, the relatively cautious strategy in regards to out-of-area deployments eventually paid off. It provided the opportunity for the military leadership to study carefully the course and challenges of the missions without gaining too much public resistance.


99Klaus Naumann ,‘Der Wandel des Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO Manoeuer zur Anwendung von Waffengewalt und Friedenserzwingung,’ 484; Young-Durrell ,'Post-Unification German Military Organisation,’ 338; Volker Rittberger, German Foreign Policy Since Unification; Theories and Case Studies,Issues on German Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2001),155

100Weisswange ,‘Der Sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsprozess,’ 57
Chapter Three

The Bundeswehr During 1994–1998

Developing a Certain Routine Regarding Out-of-Area Missions

The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994, regarding the participation of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions was an milestone for Germany’s foreign and security policy. The 1994 re-elected German government was now given the chance to develop the Bundeswehr as potential instrument of foreign policy. The intensifying Balkan conflict became the main focus of German foreign policy.

The Berlin NATO summit of 1996 stood for a strengthening of the European position in the Alliance. On 3rd June, the European NATO Foreign Ministers met to discuss the fundamental questions about the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). One result was that the European pillar of NATO should be strengthened in the face of new challenges. These challenges included the issues of military effectiveness, upholding the transatlantic relations and reinforcement of the ESDI. Assessing NATO’s strategic position showed its openness for new members and a shift to the southern region of Europe. The reform efforts ran parallel to the idea of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The idea was, that European nations would be able to conduct own military missions within NATO but without the United States. The new concept was also in the interest of a reunited Germany, which wanted a stronger European influence in the


Alliance. The Treaty of Amsterdam from 2nd October 1997 managed to define a joint foreign and security policy for Europe, captured in the set of agreements of the European Union. In addition, rules were installed to have access to WEU capabilities.

Another important development of the German security culture was the planned NATO expansion to the East. During the debate, the emphasis was put on the need for an intensive dialogue with Russia. Germany especially had taken Russia’s concerns seriously. The three countries in question for possible accession were Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. After the declaration of the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997 with the offer of accession to these countries, one thing became clear; Germany was no longer a buffer state as the eastern border of the Alliance had shifted to the east.

As far as domestic policy was concerned, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court from July 1994 was a watershed decision. The years of political and military cautiousness imposed by alleged constitutional limits seemed to be over. The clearly defined settings opened new horizons and encouraged the politicians to develop a strategy for further Bundeswehr missions. It also offered the chance to use the armed forces as a useful instrument of foreign and security policy to fulfill national interests.

For the German government, the clarifying ruling had the positive effect of regaining its political ability to act. At the same time, the opposition parties lost their argument of a breach of the Basic Law in the context of out-of-area deployments. The focus of the opposition had now shifted away from a legal to a political level, in which the opposition tried to accuse the government of a militarisation of foreign policy.

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6EUV V Art 13,17; Johannes Varwick & Wichard Woyke, ‘Zukunft der NATO,’ 129
However, the judicial decision had not passed unnoticed by Germany’s allies. In notice of the judgement, the allies now demanded a more active role of Germany in the Balkan crisis. Since 1992, the Bundeswehr had taken responsibility in the international effort to pacify the Balkan region as it supported the military implementation of the UN decisions. Taking part in overseeing the Adriatic Sea and the AWACS-flights were seen as a way to avoid further expectations of the international community.\footnote{United Nations Operation UNPROFOR 08.05.1995-20.12.1995 involved medical assistance, and monitoring of the embargo; United Nations ’ Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR,’background \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm} accessed 22/07/2012; Weisswange,’Der Sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungszprozess,’ 96} However, after facing the effects of the court ruling this reluctant policy was suddenly in jeopardy.\footnote{Dietmar Seher,’Die Verbundenen wollen mehr von Bonn,’(The allies want more from Bonn) in Berliner Zeitung 23.11.1994; Hanns W Maull ,’Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”? ’ \textit{Survival} vol. 43 no. 2 Summer 2000,56-80(57)}

On 30\textsuperscript{th} November 1994, the NATO alliance made an informal approach for the Bundeswehr to join the NATO Task Force. Specifically, the Alliance had asked for Tornado aircraft to support UN- Blue Helmets deployed in Bosnia.\footnote{Karl Feldmeyer,’Kinkel schliesst den Einsatz deutscher Flugzeuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus,’(Kinkel is no longer excluding the deployment of German aircraft over Bosnia), in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02/12/1994; Robert Dorff H.,’Germany and Peace Support Operations: Policy After the Karlsruhe Decision,’ \textit{Parameters}, Spring 1996, 73-90(74)} It is understood that this informal question had started yet another internal discussion about out-of–area missions. In contrast to earlier debates, the discussion was engaged on a political level and not just from a legal viewpoint.

Although the re-elected German government wanted to fulfill the raised international expectations and become more involved in the decision making process, it nevertheless refered to the historical linkage to the Balkan. Unfortunately, German politics had to recognise that the international community was strict with demands towards Germany.\footnote{Robert H.Dorff, ’Germany and Peace Support Operations, Parameters, 73-90(74); Robert H. Dorff, ‘Germany and Peace Support Operations,’German Security Policy in the 1990s, \textit{American Diplomacy}, April 1997, \url{http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_4/dorff-Germany.html} accessed 23/12/2012} Yet, the German government stressed that the NATO enquiry, as confirmed by NATO officials, was just a preliminary enquiry. Thus, there was no need to decide, at least for the moment.\footnote{Robert H. Dorff, ’Germany and Peace Support Operations, German Security Policy in the 1990s,’ \textit{American Diplomacy}, April 1997; Von Neubeck ,\textit{Die Transformation der Bundeswehr}, 219} However, it was legitimate to consider that the German government deliberately postponed any participation discussion or decision making procedure for pure domestic reasons. The state election of Hesse on 10\textsuperscript{th} February 1995 was considered as a barometer for the public opinion in Germany. Accepting the importance of a possible Balkan mission, the German government tried to achieve a multi-
partisan support for the possible deployment of the Bundeswehr. Unilateral actions of the government without broad support of the opposition parties would have been politically dangerous.

Finally, on 12th December 1994, the anticipated official question for German soldiers had arrived. At the autumn conference of NATO on 15th December 1994, Germany had felt the increasing international pressure for more binding commitments. After a first evaluation, it was considered to provide support and aircraft to cover a possible withdrawal operation.\textsuperscript{16} The public opinion was unsurprisingly against any engagement in the former Yugoslavian Republic. The German government decided to join a possible mission with limited use of ground forces to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{17} To deploy paramedics and engineers in Croatia, as well as the deployment of Navy and Air Force units, were seen as possible alternatives. The Air Force should also get involved with its airlift capabilities and the Tornado aircraft.\textsuperscript{18} The idea was not to ask for the necessary parliamentary decision before the troops would actually be deployed. On 26th June 1995, it was decided to use Tornado, Brequet-Atlantic maritime patrol and Transall transport aircraft. It was also decided to operate a field hospital in Croatia. For the first time since the Second World War, Germany would send troops to the Balkans, a region that had last seen German troops in World War II.\textsuperscript{19} On 21st November 1995, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel repeated the willingness of Germany to take part in the military operation to secure the UN mission. Approved by the vote of the Bundestag, German soldiers were sent to the Balkans. Nobody could define the extent the Bundeswehr would be involved in, in Balkan over time. The efforts to end the war in Bosnia culminated in the peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, USA. The Dayton Accords were negotiated on 21st November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14th December 1995. At about the same time, a debate had started in Germany about the NATO lead multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia


\textsuperscript{17}Franz-Josef Meiers ,‘Germany’s “Out-of-Area” Dilemma,’ in Thomas-Durell Young , Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices 1996, (6-23),14

\textsuperscript{18}Robert H Dorff,‘Normal actor or reluctant power? The future of German security policy,’ European Security, 6:2,1997, 56-69(58)

and Herzegovina. The mission was code-named “Joint Endeavour” and had a one-year mandate from 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1995 to 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1996 with the goal to oversee the Dayton Accords. Because Germany had already signalled its principal readiness to take part, it was necessary to adapt the German contingent to the specific needs of the mission.\textsuperscript{20}

With the end of the IFOR mission on 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1996, it almost appeared that Germany’s foreign and security policy had finally arrived at normality. The mandate of IFOR was eventually given to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which started from 21\textsuperscript{st} December 1996. What had seemed impossible a short time ago, namely German soldiers in Bosnia, had now become a reality. With the Bundestags decision, Germany abandoned the last remnants of its former special role for military missions.\textsuperscript{21}

In the summer of 1998 when the German cabinet decided the renewal of the SFOR mission, two causes affected the political climate in Germany. First, it was federal election year, and secondly a violent conflict in Kosovo had broken out. Following the success of the SFOR mission and that there was no real alternative to the current approach, the Bundestag decided to extend the SFOR mission.\textsuperscript{22} In stationing own troops, the German government also saw a chance to avert unrealistic financial expectation as it had happened in Desert Storm. The expensive foreign policy strategy of paying its way out should eventually end.\textsuperscript{23}

The security situation in Albania had rapidly declined since March 1997. The financial system of the country had broken down and resulted in almost anarchistic conditions. The authority of the state practically stopped to exist. The security of foreign citizens could no longer be guaranteed and western countries started evacuation operations. From the 13\textsuperscript{th} March 1997 onwards, an evacuation on land was no longer possible. With no conventional means left, the German government decided to use the Bundeswehr to fly the remaining persons in the German embassy out. Chancellor Kohl

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20}Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification," (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 131/132; von Neubeck, "Die Transformation der Bundeswehr," 238
\item \textsuperscript{21}Martin Agüera, "Ambitious Goals, Weak Means? Germany's Project "Future Bundeswehr" is Facing Many Hurdles," Defense Analysis, 17:3, 2001, 289-306(294)
\item \textsuperscript{22}Antrag der Bundesregierung, Drucksache, 13/10977, Deutsche Beteiligung an der von der NATO geplanten Operation zur weiteren militärischen Absicherung des Friedensprozesses im früheren Jugoslawien über den 19. Juni 1998 hinaus (SFOR-Folgeoperation), (Motion of German government to participate SFOR successor mission) 17/06/1998; Lantis, "Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification," 133
\item \textsuperscript{23}Andreas M. Rauch, "Balkan-Konflikt und SFOR-Einsatz", (Balkan conflict and SFOR deployment) Auslandsinfo. 6/2004, 104-130(124)
\end{itemize}
decided there was no time to consult the Bundestag, a necessary condition for any deployment abroad, and employed emergency rules. In the end, only the leader of the parliamentary groups and the defence committee were informed.

The emergency call from Tirana met the Bundeswehr in a time of change. After the “Shock of Ruanda”, the German Bundeswehr set up a new Special Force Unit, KSK, among other things for evacuation operations. In 1994, employees of the broadcaster Deutsche Welle in Ruanda were surrounded by hostile rebels and had to be evacuated by Belgium paratroopers because no Bundeswehr unit was trained for this kind of mission.

The KSK was still in the build-up stage and not operational. Instead, the German government used SFOR soldiers for the evacuation Operation “Dragonfly” that were already stationed in Bosnia. They were flown to Dubrovnik, Croatia and from there to Tirana. At the landing zone in Tirana, the German soldiers were involved in heavy fighting. Altogether 89 military personnel had taken part and 116 people were flown out. The deployment decision was an important one, as it was the first time since World War II that a German government acted autonomously and not in concert with other nations. The necessity that the German parliament had to approve the operation afterwards and the vague approval of Albania made the undertaking interesting on a legal level. Yet, its lawfulness was never questioned.

It was also the first combat operation for German soldiers since the Second World War.

The gradual intensification of out-of-area missions resulted in piecemeal tactics from the government. It did become the strategy for all following governments regardless of its political orientation. The reasons for the cautious but consistent development of out-of-area missions were both political and military. There was still a strong resistance within the population against an intensification of Bundeswehr operations. On a military level the mission revealed shortcomings of the Bundeswehr in training and equipment. It was planned that the Bundeswehr should have organised 10,000 military personnel as

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crisis reaction forces. However, these troops had only been operational from the end of 1997. Therefore, it had been necessary for the SFOR units to be drawn from 14 different Army units. The result of the complicated procedure was that planning and preparation time was significantly prolonged. This mission was also seen as an approach to be better prepared for future and more dangerous missions. The need for more experience was identified as important because the Cold War structures had not been set up for those kinds of missions. Especially the tactical and operational level had to face new challenges in the view of new circumstances.

A further aggravating fact was that with the Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry, three different institutions felt responsible for the planning of the missions. It almost seemed that each of the Ministries and the Chancellor’s Office worked independently and without consulting each other, as each kept its own security and defence working staff. It was more than debatable whether Germany needed three different administrations responsible for out-of-area missions. A result of the uncoordinated organisational leadership was that there were three different conclusions to the same subject on the table. The frictions and conflicts of competence resulted in a planning chaos, which was even further aggravated by the constant budgetary pressure.

Another reason was that a unified Germany was still looking for its place in the international community. Yet, the expectations for a sovereign Germany were contradictory. On one hand, Germany was the biggest economy with one of the largest military forces in Europe. On the other hand, Germany had no intent to prove critics’ right about possible domination plans. The result was a balancing act between inactivity and avoiding the impression of an overly powerful Germany at the centre of Europe. For many, integrating German troops in multilateral forces was seen as a suitable solution to overcome that fear.

The government tried to achieve a broad social consensus about the need for Germany to take more responsibility. Clearly, the burden of history and its impact on society and politics could still be felt. Thus, the government tried a careful and gradual

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28 Weisswange, Der Sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsprozess, 100; Alexander Siedschlag, ‘Die aktive Beteiligung Deutschlands an militärischen Aktionen zur Verwirklichung kollektiver Sicherheit’, (The active participation Germany’s at military actions to realise collective security), Europäische Hochschulzeitschriften Reihe 31 Politikwissenschaften Bd. 275 1995, 75; Klaus Naumann, Wie strategiefähig ist die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik?’ (How durable is the German security policy) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 13/11/2009, Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung 13/11/2009,10-17(12)

approach towards more dangerous missions. Unfortunately, the political elite were unable to communicate the need for a broad public discussion about the new security situation with its implications for Germany to the public. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court was helpful from a legal point of view but could not replace the necessary social debate in Germany.

30 Christian Hacke, ‘Die neue Bedeutung des nationalen Interesses fuer die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,’ (The importance of a national interest for German foreign policy), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 3/01/1997, (3-14), 13
31 Hans Arnold,’Deutschlands Rolle in der UNO,’ (Germany’s role in the UN) In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Nr. 42/ 1995,(27-34),33; Wolfram Wette: ‘Sonderweg oder Normalität? Zur Diskussion um die internationale Position der Bundesrepublik.’(Special path or normality: discussion about Germany’s international position) In: Blätter fuer Deutsche und Internationale Politik 1/1996, (61-70),69
Chapter Four

Transforming the Bundeswehr into a Modern Combat Force

From 1998 – 2002

With the German federal elections of 1998, a fundamental change in governance had taken place. History was written with the first “Red-Green” (SPD and Green party) coalition government.¹ In addition, a new generation of politicians had moved into government, a generation that had never experienced the tragedy of the Second World War first-handed. Many observers had thought that Germany would now head towards a more pacifist foreign and security policy. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer were famous for their involvement in the political far left and the peace movement in Germany.² The Chancellor had always been critical towards the Bundeswehr; he perceived the Bundeswehr mainly as an expensive tool of security policy.³ The new German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was even more radical and rejected the idea of an armed force as a tool of “Realpolitik” at all.⁴ Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping was associated with a more conservative group in the SPD.⁵ It was the hope that he could counterbalance the views of his colleagues.⁶ Yet, international events would dictate otherwise. The extremely serious situation in the Serbian province of Kosovo and the

⁴Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland(Germany’s foreign policy),(Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2003), 449; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military,82
⁵Steinhoff ‘Determinants and Politics of German Military, 81 ; Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security , 72/164
⁶Mary N. Hampton, Christian Soe, Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics Adrift, (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield, 1999), 97; ‘ SPD: Kalter Krieg im Kabinett,’(SPD Cold War in the cabinet), Focus Nr.41 1999
Terror attacks in the US resulted in one of the most difficult phases for German foreign policy.

On 24th March 1999, at 19.00 p.m., NATO had started air strikes, “Operation Allied Force”, against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was a historic moment for the German Luftwaffe, as for the first time Germany assumed almost the same political and military responsibility as its allies. All this happened under the banner of peace-making measures. The German Tornado pilots, who were earlier deployed for surveillance missions over Bosnia and Herzegovina, now started in combat missions. Germany was now directly involved in all Operations of NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). More importantly however was that the participation reflected the grown self-confidence towards out-of-area missions.

The political environment for the undertaking could have not been more difficult. It was the first war for NATO and that without invoking the mutual defence clause or an orderly UN mandate. In Germany, a new parliament had just been elected and the political circumstances had not allowed the new Bundestag to decide over a mission in Kosovo. The outgoing Kohl government, in close consultation with the new leadership, had agreed to use military forces in Kosovo and on 16th October, the Bundestag decided about the first combat mission of the Bundeswehr. It was a difficult and far-reaching decision in particular for the still pacifistic orientated Green party. Yet, the anticipated political settlement of US negotiator Holbrooke had given the new “Red-Green” coalition hope for a still peaceful solution. Nevertheless, the fact remained that a negotiated solution would also need military protection. As a result, on November 13th, the Bundestag decided that German forces would take part in mission “Eagle Eye”. It was an air surveillance mission to oversee the Yugoslav government’s compliance with UN Resolution 1199 and to work in concert with the OSCE observers.

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7 Benjamin S. Lambeth , *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment,* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), xiii
8 Oesterreichs Bundesheer, Walter Spindler, ‘Der Beitrag der Bundeswehr zur Bewältigung des Kosovo – Konflikts. Ein Element des internationalen Krisenmanagements im ehemaligen Jugoslawien.’ (Contribution of the Bundeswehr to cope with the Kosovo conflict)  
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb00_36.pdf accessed 8/06/12
9 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force, Still a Civilian Power?’, *Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationale Politik* Nr 2, 17
11 von Neubeck , *Die Transformation der Bundeswehr* ,302; NATO unclassified,’NATO’s Operations 1949-Present,’  
Yet, another challenge was already waiting for the Schroeder government, as it had to
decide about an Extraction Force within the frame of “Operation Joint Guarantor”. When
necessary 2000 OSCE observers should be immediately evacuated. The voting was a great
success as over 90 per cent of the members of the Bundestag voted in favour of the
mission.12

The negotiations for a peaceful solution at Rambouillet in February and March
1999 seemed to have a chance of success. During the negotiations, it was suggested to
form a NATO led Kosovo peacekeeping force to guarantee the security.13 The German
government decided to take part at the Kosovo force with own combat troops.14 With the
disappointing failure of Rambouillet, the hope of a peaceful ending of the Kosovo crisis
had faded.15

It was paradoxical that a “Red-Green” government had to break the taboo that had
been valid since 1949, that except for defence reasons, the Bundeswehr should never again
take part in a war. In particular, the Green Party was confronted with the dilemma of
supporting a NATO intervention, in other words backing an organisation that their
political programme had not long before wished to dissolve. The news magazine “Der
Spiegel” summed up that it had taken a decade from the reunification to transform the
pacifist Germans to a war–ready nation.16 This remark would have triggered a public
outrage in the 1980s but not in the contemporary social climate. Georg Dick, Chief
Planner for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had stated, “That it was not just the irony of
history, it was the history itself”.17 However, the brutal reality was that just four years
after the pioneering ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court over 85 per cent of the

12 Oesterreichs Bundesheer, Spindler, ‘Der Beitrag der Bundeswehr zur Bewaeltigung des Kosovo-Konflikts,’
7: Deutscher Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode Drucksache 14/397 22.02.99 Antrag der
Bundesregierung, ‘Deutsche Beteiligung an der militärischen Umsetzung eines Rambouillet- Abkommens
fuer Kosovo sowie an NATO Operationen im Rahmen der Notfalltruppen (Extraction Force),
(Deutsche Beteiligung in the framework of the Rambouillet agreement and the Extraction Force),
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/003/1400397.pdf accessed 10/01/2013; von Neubeck, Die
Transformation der Bundeswehr, 304
13 US Department of State, ‘Rambouillet Agreement, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
14 von Neubeck , Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 304; Bundestags-Drucksache 14/397 vom 22.02.1999
Deutscher Bundestag 14 Wahlperiode http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/003/1400397.pdf accessed
12/07/2012
15 Bruce R. Nardulli, Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999,(Santa Monica: RAND, 2002),
Issue 1406,16; World: BBC News ‘Americas Richard Holbrooke: The Balkans’ Bulldozer,’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/413122.stm accessed 12/07/2012
accessed 9/06/12
17 Der Spiegel 13/99, ‘Ernstfall fuer Schroeder’ (Emergency for Schroeder)
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-10630138.html accessed 9/06/12
members of parliament voted for the Kosovo Air Operation. The absence of an explicit convention under international law was simply pushed aside by humanitarian issues and the legal requirement as declared in the court decision in 1994, was simply assumed. Even dealing with Germany’s history suddenly no longer appeared as an obstacle. The reunited Germany was on its way to change the traditional balance of power in post-Cold War Europe. For the first time and unselfconsciously, Germany had tried to find its new place in the European framework and more importantly this time it was not driven by its own historical debt.

During the air operations over 79 days, from 24th March to 10th June 1999, over 1,000 aircraft including 16 German Tornados were in operational service. Although the actual number of German aircraft was small, the Germans fiercely tried to assure its importance. Alongside the German Air Force, the German Navy was also involved in various sea-operations with its frigates “Rheinland-Pfalz”, “Bayern” and the Oste class fleet service ship “Oker”. Altogether, NATO aircrafts had flown around 38,000 sorties; the German Luftwaffe had been involved in 636 sorties and had fired 250 HARM missiles. In addition, the Bundeswehr had supported “Operation Allied Force” with its forces in Macedonia and Albania. In particular, the unmanned aerial vehicle unit from Tetovo had aided the mission with aerial photos of the operational area. The Bundeswehr had also set up a refugee camp in Macedonia for 40,000 people and supported the

19 Dieter Dettke, Germany says ‘NO’: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy (Baltimore:The John Hospkins University Press, 2009), 92; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 253
20 Ulrike Esther Franke,’A Tale of Stumbling Blocks and Road Bumps: Germany’s (non-)Revolution in Military Affairs,’ Comparative Strategy, 31:4,2012, 353-375(360)
23 Tom Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century,’ Defence Studies, 11.2,2011, 244-270(247)
24 Hollaender,’Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,73; Oesterreichs Bundesheer,’Der Beitrag der Bundeswehr zur Bewältigung des Kosovo-Konflikts; John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson , Nora Bensahel , Timothy Liston, Traci Williams European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).21
humanitarian efforts with aid flights. Since the Serbian leadership could not withstand the aerial attacks for much longer, it eventually gave in. It was about time as NATO had come under enormous pressure to stop the air strikes as more collateral damages occurred and the immediate military success had failed to materialise. The willingness of Slobodan Milosevic to surrender in June 1999 had spared the Alliance a real test of its mettle. According to unofficial information from the German government, a further bombardment could not have been kept up for longer than two more weeks. The domestic political circumstances would have put too much pressure on the “Red–Green” government.

With the Russian support of the peace process, Milosevic had lost his last Ally and eventually his hope that Russia would intervene on Serbia’s behalf. The Ahtisaarim – Tschernomyrdin – Milosevic’ agreement from 2nd June 1999 opened the door for another agreement between the Alliance and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had been necessary to use extensive troop concentrations to stabilise and guarantee the fragile security situation. Yet, the discussion about ground forces had already started during the air strikes. Germany had not taken an active part in the debate. On the contrary, sweeping generalisations dominated the internal political discussion about ground forces. Some Germans already feared for a literal evocation of a guerrilla war. The fundamental denial of the German government to take part in any military intervention force had come as a surprise for many observers. Especially the timing of the statement was heavily criticised as the air strikes were still in full progress and the success remained elusive. To exclude the choice of a ground force entailed the risk of encouraging

28 Der Spiegel, ‘Der Einsatz deutscher Bodentruppen wäre fatal,’ (The deployment of German ground forces would wrong) 31/03/1999 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,15240,00.html accessed 13/07/2012; Th. A. van Baarda, Desiree Verwij, The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare: Counter-Terrorism, Democratic Value and Military Ethics, Chapter 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 52; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 388
Milosevic to hold on.\textsuperscript{29} NATO officials immediately declared that the Alliance could only be as strong as the NATO countries would allow it to be. Although Germany’s strategic environment and its national interests had significantly changed, its strategic thinking continued to lag behind its ambitions. However, in the end, Chancellor Schroeder could no longer resist the international pressure.\textsuperscript{30} The approval for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in the Bundestag was overwhelming. With the UN Security Council passing Resolution 1244, Germany, France, and Italy each had taken responsibility for one sector in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{31} Due to the takeover of its own sector and more performed self-confidence about its international responsibilities, the Kosovo mission was different to Germany’s previous missions. The Bundeswehr was not restricted in its operational means as it was in the SFOR mission and it finally accepted a leading role.\textsuperscript{32}

Perhaps encouraged by the success of the Kosovo mission an overambitious Foreign Minister Fischer at the UN General Assembly on 22\textsuperscript{nd} September 1999 promised to provide German troops for the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET).\textsuperscript{33} He made promises without prior consultation of the Defence Ministry about the feasibility of such an undertaking. The Minister had eventually tried to limit the political damage at the Bundestag session on 7\textsuperscript{th} October 1999. He tried to explain that Germany should not give in to the impression that its interests would be purely European ones. Fischer had not even tried to show any strategic interests in the region, as it was his own belief that it was important to support the UN, if necessary worldwide. Not a decade ago, Fischer was one of the most devoted opponents of the Bundeswehr, and now he tried to remove every geographical limit for prospective Bundeswehr deployments.\textsuperscript{34} In reality, the Bundeswehr

\textsuperscript{29}Holger H Mey,‘Der Kosovo Konflikt : Eine vorlaufige Analyse,’ (The Kosovo conflict: the preliminary analysis) in \textit{Soldat und Technik}, Nr. 10/1999, 587-591(590)
\textsuperscript{30}Weisswange \textit{Der sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsprozess}, 132; von Neubeck \textit{Die Transformation der Bundeswehr}, 391/392
was not properly equipped for such long–distance missions. The opposition and the Defence Minister correctly highlighted the obvious gap between appropriation of funds and mission capabilities. Although the contribution of the Bundeswehr became unnecessary, Fischer had triggered a discussion about worldwide deployments of the Bundeswehr.35

Yet again, the opposition had addressed the painful subject of funding and rightly stated that a worldwide performing Bundeswehr would need corresponding resources. This in turn would run contrary to the savings program of the Finance Minister.36

The debate of the Bundestag on 8th June 2000 concerning the extension of the Kosovo mandate was conducted passionately and aroused much controversy. The opposition again experienced the need to underline the importance of the parliamentary approval for out-of-area missions. Yet, the government had obviously taken the approval for granted.37 Despite all criticism, the Bundestag voted for an extension and thereby recognising the importance of the mission. The second extension debate of the Kosovo mandate on 1st June 2001 was much more dynamic and of an issue.38 Two proposals for an extension were submitted to the Bundestag, one from the government and a second one from the FDP fraction. The second one separated the extension of the mandate from the expansion of the operative area.39 The explosive nature of the procedure was, that the unwritten consensus of all parties to support any government in out-of-area decisions was broken. Another issue was to what extent the parliament should get involved in

36Fabian Breuer, ’Between Ambitions and Financial Constra
ints: The Reform of the German Armed Forces,’
German Politics, 15,2,2006,(206-220),214/215
operational decisions of the government. The differences in assessing the two bodies over the scope of the mission resulted in a voting of the FDP for an extension but against an expansion of the mission. Nevertheless, the vote for KFOR II on June 1st 2001 got a commanding majority of over 82 per cent. However, to calm its nervous coalition partner, the Greens, Chancellor Schroeder stated that German soldiers would not participate in any fighting. Therefore, even in the year 2001, seven years after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundeswehr, in consideration of internal political sensitivities, only played a limited role.

As expected, the Balkan region did not remain peaceful for long. The crisis in Kosovo spread to Macedonia as fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) surged with the insurgence of refugees into the country. Preventing a civil war was only possible by intense international efforts in order to avoid a second “Kosovo”. It was a lucky coincidence that international forces were already deployed to Macedonia. Given the fact, that the government of President Trajkovski agreed to sign an agreement, was the result of significant pressure and intervention on part of the international community. Eventually, in July 2001, Trajkovski asked NATO for help to disarm KLA fighters in Macedonia. The legal position of the mission was ambiguous as there was no real legal base for a mandate. The NATO alliance simply made the written request of President Trajkowski to the legal basis for the mission.

As expected, Operation “Essential Harvest” had triggered a heated debate in the German parliament. During the debate, the conservative party repeatedly threatened to vote against the mission because of a lack of funds for the Bundeswehr. The opposition party pointed out that the Bundeswehr would not be far away from the verge of collapse. Then again, the ruling coalition and especially the Foreign Minister confirmed that Germany should play a more important role in international foreign policy. A refusal to take part would not only damage Germany’s reputation but would also endanger Europe’s

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40 von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 328; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ‘Bundestag verlängert KFOR Mandat 01/06/2001, Dier Verlaengerung des Kosovo Mandates der Bundeswehr ist beschlossen. Die Entscheidung des Bundestages fiel deutlich aus
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/hintergrund-operation-essential-harvest-1.739164 accessed 13/07/2012;
ability to act. In this respect, the government had not devoted a single word to the accusations of the opposition. The opposition not only had reservations against the Macedonia mission, the government had to face serious in-house critique. The increasing criticism was referred to the growing resistance within the SPD and Green parliamentary groups. Indeed, on 29th August 2001, the day of the voting the “SPD-Green” government had no own majority. Only with the support of the opposition parties, an embarrassing political defeat of Gerhard Schroeder had been avoided.

Not even two weeks after adopting “Essential Harvest”, two commercial airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington D.C.. Terror attacks had not been a new phenomenon in the Western World; however, the dimension of 9/11 had so far been unprecedented. Around 3,000 people died that day, including the 19 terrorists. Shortly after the attacks, the hijackers had been identified and connected to al-Qaeda, a global decentralised Islamic terrorist network. Over time, senior members of al-Qaeda had taken responsibility for the attacks in videos, interviews, and pamphlets. One day after the terror attacks, NATO invoked the mutual defence clause of Art. five and Article 51 UN Charter, which defined the right of self-defence. The UN Security Council unanimously condemned the terror attacks in Resolution 1368. At the same time, the UN had evaluated these attacks as

unlawful under Article 39 and implemented Resolution 1373 as well as the Counterterrorism Committee.\footnote{Daniel Mueller, ‘Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit – Die Transformation der Bundeswehr seit dem 11. September 2001’, (Between aspiration and reality – Transformation of the Bundeswehr since September 11, 2001), (University Chemnitz, Grimm Verlag, 2008), 17}

In a military context, 9/11 stood for the beginning of two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, which was a reaction of the United States to fight international Islamic terrorism. The “War on Terror” which involved more than 70 nations had been a combination of military, political, and legal measurements. The first military Operation, “Enduring Freedom”, against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which was suspected to give shelter to the terrorists, had started on 7\textsuperscript{th} October 2001. The military action was covered by the international law, in particular by Article 51 UN Charter.\footnote{Stefan Talmon, ‘Changing Views on the Use of Force: The German Position,’ Baltic Yearbook of International Law, Volume 5, 2005,41-76 (56)}


Immediately after the terror attacks Chancellor Schroeder assured Germany’s unconfined solidarity and support to President Bush. The invocation of Art. five NATO Treaty also applied to Germany. The terror attacks had decisively changed the classic missions profile and the focus of the Bundeswehr. So far, its focus of attention had been on the Balkan region, which had now changed.

Further deliberations just confirmed what some critical observers had already thought and feared. The German government, in an act of solidarity, had shown the willingness to take part in the war against Afghanistan. The Iraq war was not on
Germany’s agenda and any direct military participation expectations were immediately rejected. The public discussion about possible military actions and the results of the “War on Terror” showed that military operations were just one of the measures on the road to success. What had also changed was the reasoning behind the missions; so far, it had been the defence of the Alliance and the international responsibility. This had now changed into protecting fundamental democratic rights and values. The fact that even the Green party had not excluded military actions immediately after the terror attacks proved the overall significance of 9/11. In hindsight, many party members had tried to relativise the principal readiness for military actions. Yet, Chancellor Schroeder had suddenly seen himself even more supported by the opposition than by its own coalition partner.

Interestingly, a certain degree of indifference of the German public towards out-of-area missions became the normality. What started so cautiously with IFOR and SFOR experienced an increase of intensity with KFOR and was finally at its height with Operation “Enduring Freedom” (OEF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Yet, the real difficulties of these missions had become increasingly obvious, as a clear political strategy was missing and the success of the mission at stake.

Unfortunately, the surprising success of “Essential Harvest” was overshadowed by the 9/11 event. That mandate had ended at the end of September and an extension was on the political agenda. The starting position was now different as the decision for an

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57 Rüdiger Fiebig, Factual Knowledge and Public Support for German Military Operations: The Case of the German ISAF Mission in Afghanistan, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institute der Bundeswehr Strausberg 2011, 79-91(81); von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 394.
extension was no longer controversial. It seemed that the differences had past and voting for out-of-area missions had become a mere formality.\textsuperscript{58}

Chancellor Schroeder went further than any of his predecessors and promised the United States Germany’s unconditional solidarity. The statement would have a serious impact on the internal political landscape.\textsuperscript{59} Schroeder’s statement of unconditional support with possible Bundeswehr operations made clear; the time of Germany’s exceptional status was finally over. For the second time, a “Red–Green” government was responsible for sending German soldiers into war. Only, the exact extent of the deployment was unclear. So far, AWACS aircraft were transferred to the United States and Navy units to the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{60}

The launch of air strikes on 7\textsuperscript{th} October 2001 against targets in Afghanistan marked the beginning of OEF. From the beginning, it was clear that the United States, with its military capabilities, would not need any help to carry out air strike.\textsuperscript{61} However, it was also clear, that in the mid- to long-term outlook, the focus would change from air attacks to ground forces. With the forecast of a likely ground force deployment, a German involvement became more realistic.\textsuperscript{62} All this happened on the legal basis of Article 51 UN Charter and Art.five NATO Treaty\textsuperscript{63}.

At the beginning of the “War on Terror”, the Green Party was ready to make pleas of solidarity avowals, however, that attitude changed. After having surpassed the first shock, the Greens called for a more distinguished approach instead of just relying on military means. Thus, Chancellor Schroeder called the Greens to order, and made clear that only the Chancellor had the right to set the political guidelines. However, during the

\textsuperscript{58}On 27.09.2001 voted the Bundestag eventually in favour of Amber Fox; Marju Korts, \textit{Normalization of foreign policy: The case of Germany, 1990-2005}, August 2007, Thesis M.A. University of Tartu Department of Political Science, 66
\textsuperscript{59}Kilian, \textit{Politik und Militaer in Deutschland: Die Bundespraesidenten und Bundeskanzler und ihre Beziehung zum Soldatentum und Bundeswehr}, 543
\textsuperscript{60}NATO,’Operation Active Endeavour,’ \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm} accessed 14/07/2012; NATO, ‘AWACS: NATO’s Eye in the Sky,’ \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48904.htm} accessed 14/07/2012
\textsuperscript{62}Katja Ridderbusch, Andreas Middel and Jochen Hahn: ‘Phase 2 des Feldzugs gegen den Terror,’ Die Welt
air strikes, more members of the coalition called for an interruption as the air attacks had already exceeded the original plan for selective and temporary operations against terrorists and infrastructures. The longer the air strikes lasted the more obvious became the war-like character of the operations. The Green Party and the peace movement raised their voices in fear of a further escalation. Very soon, it became obvious that Schroeder’s unconditional support statement would have long-term policy implications. Officially, the German government had the responsibility over its armed forces. In reality, the United States was in the position to decide what forces were needed. The domestic debate was overshadowed by the confusion over the exact demands. The inquiry included Special Forces, airlift and logistics capacities, ABC defence forces, and Navy forces, all together around 4,000 soldiers. Given the fact, that no ground troops or air strike capabilities had been requested, made it easier for Schroeder to gain the necessary majority in parliament. To support the cause, Chancellor Schroeder was referring to already known argumentation patterns, which successfully led to the approval of earlier missions. He also mentioned UN Resolution 1368 and made a scathing attack on the Taliban government in Kabul to underline the international dimension of this decision. However, over the course of this debate, it became clear that the ruling coalition would not get its own majority together. The Green coalition partner rejected the motion and Chancellor Schroeder was left without own majority. This had reawakened memories of the Macedonia mission. The Chancellor eventually used its most powerful political instrument; he connected the voting about OEF with a vote of confidence. It was necessary that Chancellor Schroeder would regain a majority in his own ranks to keep the idea of a possible “Red-Green” coalition after 2002 alive.

The opposition had suspected, not unjustifiably, an unsubtle political manoeuvre behind the vote of confidence.68 At the voting on 16th November 2001, the majority eventually was razor thin. All opposition parties and four members of the Green fraction voted against the proposal, but more importantly against Gerhard Schroeder. The following “political theatre” had inevitably damaged Germany’s reputation and influence.69

Despite the dominant issue of the “War on Terror”, the Balkan region was still of high importance for Germany. The imminent extension of the successful “Operation Amber Fox” was next on the political agenda. “Operation Amber Fox” was mandated to protect the international observers in Macedonia, which should oversee the implementation of the peace plan.70 However, some members of parliament started to question the mission. Equipment issues and financial resources were the main key points of criticism. Meanwhile, Defence Minister Scharping as well as Foreign Minister Fischer tried to claim the political success of the mission for the government parties. This was a doubtful performance after the poor voting of “Red-Green” on Operation “Essential Harvest”.71 Nevertheless, on 13th December 2001, a majority voted for an extension of “Amber Fox I”.72

The other important decision of that time was about the ISAF mission for Afghanistan. The US with its ally on the ground, the Northern Alliance, was to some extent victorious over the Taliban. However, the next step was to ensure the security for the new government in Kabul. The interim government under President Karzai needed international troops, as the situation on the ground was still fragile and the projection for the near future only cautiously optimistic. After all the solidarity statements, it was now necessary for the German government to back words with action.

69Martin Wagener, ‘Normalisation in Security Policy,’ in Germany’s Uncertain Power Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. Hanns W. Maull 2006
70NATO, Operation Amber Fox (Task Force Fox)
In the knowledge of the difficulties lying ahead, the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister had chosen to employ the longstanding and proven strategy to appeal to the international responsibility of Germany. He also referred to the Petersberg Conference, which had taken place with the ambitions to find a sustainable and feasible solution for the Afghanistan conflict. The opposition responded in the same way as before, namely to refer to problems of funding, equipment and training. Some politicians started to question the mission and connected a deployment to a special national interest Germany’s in the region. It was recommended to develop a systematic for out-of-area missions, one that was defined by Germany’s strategic interests. A discussion about a national strategy had been carelessly neglected since Germany regained its full sovereignty. Yet, the government did not provide a clear and convincing answer. The complex security situation in Afghanistan however had raised questions towards an engagement of German soldiers. The pure land area of Afghanistan in relation to the troop numbers with limited service time made the ISAF mission questionable to some observers. Further points of interests were the limited operational resources of the German Armed Forces and the interaction with the local allies. There were concerns about the trustworthiness of the local coalition partners as the warlords had played a vital part by the takeover of the Taliban.

Yet, none of these issues had been discussed in parliament. Considering the complexity of the issue surprised the lack of a national strategy. Then again, a short while ago nobody would have thought that German soldiers would be doing service in Afghanistan. It almost appeared that the German government was taken by surprise by this development. This conclusion was insofar justified, that the official German agenda was still talking about humanitarian interests and verbal support statements instead of troop deployments. The reasoning for such a path-breaking decision seemed almost too thin and shallow. Nevertheless, following the unconditional solidarity statement of the government, the Bundestag voted with a convincing majority for the ISAF mission.

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Moreover, since the Petersberg conference in Germany, the German government felt a very special responsibility to safeguard peace and support the Afghan government. It was a surprising move considering its active and demanding role in the Balkan region. In regards to the ambitious political guidelines and the lack of resources, it was due to the Bundeswehr officers who made the execution of the mission even possible. The transfer of the advance force for Afghanistan became almost a debacle and a symbol for the striking shortfalls of the Bundeswehr. Because the new Airbus A 400 M transport aircraft had not been delivered in time, the Bundeswehr had to resort to the outdated Transall transport aircraft. That was not the only issues about missing capacities of the Bundeswehr. It was still lacking sea transport capabilities, modern reconnaissance, and communication equipment. Despite the great difficulties, the transfer of German troops was successful and the supply situation was eventually resolved.

In mid-December, a squad of forty Special Forces soldiers and sixty support personnel under the command of an American Special Force Colonel arrived at Camp “Rhino” south of the city of Kandahar. Under the guidelines of the ISAF mandate, it was necessary to integrate Germany’s special commando forces into a coalition force under American leadership. The Task Force K-Bar was the first Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–South, which at first operated from Oman and later from South Afghanistan. From October 2001 to April 2002, this Task Force had conducted 42 reconnaissance and surveillance missions and an unknown number of combat missions. The KSK helped to identify Taliban networks, to detain relevant people and to find and...
destroy arms depots. The missions were notably less vigorous than for other nation’s Special Forces. This could be explained by the early distrust of the American, British, and French militaries about the abilities of the German forces. There were suggestions that the deployment of the KSK had not only happened for military reasons but also for political ones. Despite these suggestions, the KSK soon earned the acceptance of the other Special Forces.

With the worldwide deployments of the Bundeswehr, the lack of a national defence strategy became ever clearer. With a changed reasoning for out-of-area missions, the lack of a national strategy also became obstructive. Since OEF and ISAF, German history was no longer a valid argument against a military involvement. Yet, the danger was that in this kind of atmosphere military considerations would take the place of a non-existent national security strategy. In that case, the guesswork of military officers would replace the primacy of politics.

In the face of an increasing threat potential of asymmetrical non-governmental threats like Islamic terrorism, it became necessary to reinforce the international cooperation. However, it also became necessary to aim for an own strategy of national security interests. The international terrorism threat could have provided the platform for imposing national interests rather than reasoning with morale purposes as in the Kosovo conflict. Yet, the German government was cautious to draft its strategic framework, as it still had to consider certain sensitivities. Even before 9/11, the classic task of the Bundeswehr of national defence was already driven away by more demanding challenges. Since the ambitions of NATO for an expansion to the East, the defence term was clearly defined in a more extensive way. The threat of a direct attack by armed forces had become

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more and more unlikely. The modern defence term therefore had to be redefined, away from a pure national defence concept, as the defence of national interests was no longer bound to a territorial threat. On the contrary, Germany’s national security interests were now represented on a global scale. Naturally, such a radical change of security interests’ had a far-reaching importance for the defence strategy in general.

The Kosovo mission had clearly taught that a necessary internal debate about identifying national interests was still missing. Although still not clearly defined, Germany had slowly started to exercise a more determined foreign policy, backed by a military muscle. The deployment of German Navy ships to the Horn of Africa within the “War on Terror” framework just underlined this development.\(^6\) Secured trade routes especially on sea had always been of highest priority for Germany’s export orientated economy. However, it was one thing to use armed forces to secure Germanys’ economic interest; it was another to provide it with necessary resources to fulfil the expectations.\(^7\) In addition, the legal–political situation for the Navy was so difficult that it was almost impossible to enforce actions as the legal possibilities had been limited by national guidelines. Germany had shown no immediate interest to change its position. The result of this political immobility was embarrassing. The transfer of five speedboats to the Horn of Africa to support OEF in January 2002 and the return in May 2002 was an obvious example of Germany’s aimlessness. It showed how political activism and not the military need was the driving force behind certain deployments, which was of course disputed by official levels.\(^8\)

Yet, the focus for Germanys’ newly discovered military commitment was still Afghanistan. Defence Minister Struck’s famous statement that the Hindu Kush will be just one of the regions where Germany’s security will be defended, nevertheless suffered from an anxious political behaviour.\(^9\) For centuries, Afghanistan was the plaything of foreign

\(^{6}\)US Central Command Centcom ,’German Navy involved in Operation Enduring Freedom,’ \[http://www.centcom.mil/Germany/\] accessed 15/07/2012; Bernhard Chiari & Magnus Pahl Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr von der Escort Navy zur Expeditionary Navy, 103

\(^{7}\)Tomas Kucera,’Can ‘Citizen in Uniform’ Survive? German Civil–Military Culture Responding to War,’ German Politics, 21:1,2012, 53-72(66)


\(^{9}\)Simon Koschut ,Der Spiegel 01/15/2010 ,’Last Exit Kabul How To Get Out Without Forsaking Afghanistan’s Stability.’ \[http://www.spiegel.de/international/Germany/last-exit-kabul-how-to-get-out-\]
powers strategic interests. Its geo-political location between Middle Asia and the Middle East was seen as crucial. A politically stable Afghanistan would therefore have a positive effect on the region as well as incidentally provided a secure environment for the western natural resource supply.\(^9\) The interest of the international community in Afghanistan can be summarised in three headings: the war against terrorism, the fight against drugs and the political stabilisation. The support for the Afghan government was implemented in several stages. The goal was to back Afghanistan effectively in dealing with the challenges imposed by the beginning democratic process and the rule of law. Further initiatives included the foundation of reliable security forces as well as the financial and technical support for rebuilding measures.\(^9\)

The Bundeswehr was actively involved in the “War on Terror” as well as in the efforts to stabilise the country. Officially, the humanitarian character of the mission was the main reason for Germany’s involvement. Stabilising the country to secure the raw material supply would have been a politically wrong statement and might have found enormous objections.\(^9\) An initial assessment of the Afghanistan mission revealed to be instructive as other countries were much more experienced in using its armed forces as a tool for its national interests. Then again, Germany was still missing the necessary experience to organise its military accordingly.

The year 2002 had marked a more or less quiet period as the federal elections had dominated the domestic political scene. Mission extensions were almost automatically approved in sequence. Operation “Amber Fox” was extended for the second time without greater debate as did the next extension of KFOR on June 7th and shortly after the third extension of “Amber Fox”. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was discussed on the same day with the issue to increase the Bundeswehr contingent. It was originally planned to run a maximum of 1,200 military personnel, with the hope that it still would not be fully used.

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Yet, the debate on the extension proposal also involved an increase of 200 soldiers.\textsuperscript{93} On 7\textsuperscript{th} June and 14\textsuperscript{th} June a large majority in parliament adopted the extensions of KFOR III and “Amber Fox” and ISAF.\textsuperscript{94}

The decisions about “Amber Fox” and ISAF were the last decisions of the 14\textsuperscript{th} German Bundestag. Four years before, the 14\textsuperscript{th} Bundestag had started its meetings with the debate about the Kosovo War in 1998. Meanwhile it had moved on with the Macedonia mission and OEF in 2001 and closed its meetings in 2002 with the ISAF mission. It was the irony of history that it was a SPD Chancellor with a Green Foreign Minister, which led Germany away from the last constraints of the Cold War.

Contrary to the pre-election party programmes, the “Red-Green” coalition started to reorganise and customise the Bundeswehr for potential future missions. The necessary restructuring was closely coordinated with the equally necessary reorientation of NATO and EU.\textsuperscript{95}

The new maxim for the Bundeswehr was to act jointly with its allies and to to cover the whole spectrum of the Alliance tasks. Yet, the Green Party although in governmental responsibility had kept its reluctance towards the need and usage of armed forces. The general opinion in the party still was that Germany would not need a standing Army. Nevertheless, the time between 1998 and 2002 was dominated by the fundamental changes of the Bundeswehr and its various deployments. The debate about the reform efforts was accompanied by disputes over the funding and the implementation of new structures.

When Gerhard Schroeder was elected to office, his first task was to assure the continuity of foreign and security policy by demonstrating perseverance and reliability. Foreign and security policy had so far been considered CDU / CSU and FDP areas of competence. Those who had expected a radical and fast change of the armed forces had

\textsuperscript{93}Der Deutsche Bundestag, “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auswärtigen Ausschusses (3. Ausschuss),Tagesordnungspunkt 19. Fortsetzung Beteiligung Kosovo,”(recommendation to continue Kosovo missions) \url{http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/094/1409437.pdf} accessed 16/07/2012;


seen their hopes dashed. In fact, the government called for an expert panel to discuss the further development. Some had even hoped for a wide-ranging public discussion about security strategies in general and in particular the upcoming concept for the Bundeswehr. This however was not crowned with success.

The appointed expert Commission had to work under time pressure with a deadline set for mid-2000. This meant the results should be presented in the middle of the parliamentary four years term. In practical terms, it was almost impossible to set up large changes in the remaining two years. Besides, without the final report, no reasonable fiscal decisions could be decided. The doubts had almost reached dramatic proportions as nearly all decisions were put on hold. The direct effects for the procurement were dramatic with a worsening effect on planning procedures. At the end of 1998, Defence Minister Scharping ordered the Inspector General Bagger to write a report on the existing capabilities. This report would give the expert Commission the necessary background information about the weakness and strength of the Bundeswehr. The final report of the Inspector General was handed over the same day the Weizsaecker Commission was appointed.

The report was unambiguous and pictured the Bundeswehr mostly as a Cold War force. The changes that happened so far were rooted in outdated conceptual and planning guidelines from the early 1990s. Yet, the need to adapt the Bundeswehr and to evaluate the impact of new challenges had made rapid actions necessary. Adjusting the Bundeswehr for UN missions and to the expanding task spectrum of NATO and EU became a central feature of the German Transformation process. The missing adaptation combined with the burden of simultaneously conducted missions resulted in an overexertion of the Bundeswehr. Without significant changes, it was just a matter of time until the Bundeswehr would be thrown off balance. It soon became obvious, that any redirection was not the result of an extensive military reform but only a reaction to

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external causes. The Inspector General pointed out that the financial means were not enough to fulfil the raised expectations. Germany’s percentage of its gross domestic product devoted to military expenses had fallen from around 3 per cent in 1990 to 1.5 per cent in 1998.\textsuperscript{99} At the same time, the average percentage of defence expenditure in the NATO alliance was 2.29 per cent.\textsuperscript{100} The Army, as the largest service, had to bear most under the extra burden of more missions. Even with the crisis reaction forces in full strength, it was still necessary to fall back on the whole Army to get the necessary reserves. In particular, the medical and logistical forces were exposed to a particular high workload.\textsuperscript{101} The report highlighted that the planning until 1994 was determined under different circumstances.

Judging the condition of the Air Force revealed a similar situation. Out–of–area missions in general and the war against Serbia in particular underlined a new understanding about the capacities of the German Air Force. The Phantom fighter aircraft was out of date and even its most modern aircraft the Tornado had no precision and distance capability and therefore was not being able to use precision munitions.\textsuperscript{102} As a result, the electronic combat/reconnaissance (ECR) and reconnaissance (RECCE) Tornado versions were the only ones deployed.\textsuperscript{103} The Bundeswehr used the outdated Transall transport aircraft as a means of transport.

Out of the three services the Navy appeared to be the best prepared. Even so, the situation was only slightly better to the ones of the other services as the equipment and training was still aimed at national defence tasks. The overall result of the assessment was surprisingly plain. It stated that the Bundeswehr in its current state would not able to cover the possible range of operations. The study recommended that a complete reorganisation would be the best solution instead of just another reform.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101}Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 14/2900 14. Wahlperiode 14. 03. 2000 Sachgebiet 50 ,‘Unterrichtung durch die Wehrbeauftragte,’(Instructions by the Parliamentary Commissioner) http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/029/1402900.pdf accessed 16/07/2012
\textsuperscript{102}Sorin Lungu, 'Military modernization and political choice: Germany and the US promoted military technological revolution during the 1990s,' \textit{Defense & Security Analysis}, 20:3,2004, 261-272(262)
\textsuperscript{103}Franke Ulrike Esther, ‘A Tale of Stumbling Blocks and Road Bumps: Germany's (non-)Revolution,’ in \textit{Military Affairs, Comparative Strategy}, 31:4,2012, 353-375 (360)
The purpose of the reform Commission was to discuss and assess possibilities of the Bundeswehr. Recommendations of the Commission should also include and build on the findings of the former report. Yet, the work was ill fated from the beginning. The initial plan for the Commission was to evaluate the situation and make suitable recommendations based on a guaranteed defence budget for the year 2000. However, the economic situation in Germany of 2000/2001 was dominated by a recession.

Reflecting the economic situation, the Defence Minister announced a cut of the defence budget by DM 1.5 Billion. That was the complete opposite of what Chancellor Schroeder had previously assured, namely not to touch the defence budget. In the end, the new financial circumstances implied that the basic draft of the Commission with 340,000 soldiers was already obsolete and compromised. Budget drops were not an invention of the current “Red–Green” government. However, this government had used the Bundeswehr much more as a tool of “Realpolitik” than any other government before. Yet, the capability gap between the new challenges and the shortages in funding and equipment had resulted in a permanent state of excessive demands. Scharping tried to exercise some kind of damage control and commissioned the Inspector General to revise the structure as reality had already overtaken the number of 340,000. The initial plan was to present the results in autumn but because of the budget cut, it was necessary to bring the announcement date forward to May 2000. The recommendations should be incorporated into the parliamentary budget discussion. The main themes of the debate of the reform plan were the financial funding and the necessary personnel cuts. This was particularly the case after information from the “Weizsaecker Commission” leaked about an anticipated strength of 240,000.

108 Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001), 34; Tom Dyson The Politics of German Defence and Security Bundeswehr Reform during the First Schroeder Chancellorship 2007, 101, Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military,95
The result of the “Weizsaecker Commission” was proclaimed as a fundamental reform with a concept range of up to 15 years. It was called “Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr”.\(^{110}\) In detail, the numbers of soldiers compatible with other NATO forces should be increased from 60,000 to 140,000.\(^{111}\) These units should be comprised of professional, combat-ready and well equipped soldiers.\(^{112}\) Other specifications were to provide enough capacities to use its forces in two different missions in a minimum of time.\(^{113}\) As the new focus of the Bundeswehr would be peacekeeping and crisis prevention missions, a large decrease of the force strength became necessary. The conclusion was that a force strength of around 340,000 service personnel could not be maintained. A smaller military force with 240,000 soldiers would however be adequate considering the defence budget.\(^{114}\)

The Commission was also concerned with the sensitive issue of the compulsory military service. The opinions on how to proceed were greatly divided. It is important to recognise that the introduction of the compulsory military service happened when the distrust in uniformed personnel was widespread. Conscription was introduced as a confidence building measure to improve the relationship between the public and the armed forces. Yet, almost 50 years later the political positions could not have been further apart. It had gone from complete abolishment to change nothing at all. The Commission recommended a compromise with the compulsory service being kept but with reduced numbers. Around 30,000 draftees should be integrated into the new structure, which would get an increased service pay.\(^{115}\) There was much common ground to use the

\(^{110}\)Ernst Lutz Brigadier General,’ Germany's strategic choices,’ The RUSI Journal, 145:2, 2000, 79-80(79)
\(^{112}\)Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics of German Military, 96; Lutz Unterseher, PDA Project on Defence Alternatives, German Defence Planning: In a Crucial Phase,’ http://www.comw.org/pda/0110gerdef.html#5.2 accessed 16/07/2012
\(^{113}\)Jackson Janes, Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform, German Issue 25,32 et sq; von Neubeck ,Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 367
compulsory service as a useful tool for recruitment. However, the question of the fairness of the draft was not taken up. Other key measures for an optimal outcome were:

- To decide and perform the final move of the Defence Ministry to Berlin. Since the move of the German Bundestag and the Federal Government from Bonn to Berlin, government roles were divided and had been executed both in Berlin and in Bonn.

- Another controversial issue raised by the Commission was the garrison question. The recommendation was to reduce bases in Germany from 600 to 300.

- The investment of the Ministry of Defence should be raised from DM 9 to 12 billion at the same time in order not to fall further behind to its allies.

- An efficient and lean staff structure was also on the Commissions’ agenda.

- The position of the Inspector General so far was an advisory one. It was intended to strengthen and integrate the position in the chain of command.

- The report also disclosed the abrupt shift in operational and technical needs. Because of the current commitments abroad, fast solutions were needed. Approaches were necessary that would redefine the command and control architecture and enable joint operations.

- An Operations Command; a Joint Forces Command that would coordinate out-of-area missions more effectively was put on the table.

Overall, the report was negative and had some critical remarks for the former government. The Bundeswehr was too big, its composition wrong and it was not up-to-date with its training, equipment and material. The prediction was that the gap between demands and means would widen further. It was said that it would just be a matter of time before the Bundeswehr could no longer fulfil its tasks in a professional way. The Commission report also made headlines on the military draft and the future as a conscription force. However, the unbalanced debate about the compulsory military

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117'Jackson Janes, ‘Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform,’ German Issues, 33; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 96
118'Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Joint Force Command Bundeswehr, [http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/?ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8x1LM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKU1P7UzZixJdqtBfEStfNZU7JB3ly89Ly44fTM0tS9QyvHRUBRo68RQf/ accessed 17/07/2012 accessed 17/07/2012 ; von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr, 367
service overlapped the much more interesting and important development of transforming the Bundeswehr into an operational force.

The Inspector General von Kirchbach, successor of General Bagger, was ordered by the Minister to develop the cornerstones for a reorganised Bundeswehr from a military perspective. On 23rd May 2000, von Kirchbach announced his concept with personnel strength of 290,300. The differences in the numbers were mainly attributable to the diverging interpretations of the different conscript ideas. However, the Defence Minister was not satisfied with von Kirchbach’s report and replaced him with General Kujat. General von Kirchbach, who was initially appointed by Volker Ruehe, was not the right man in Scharping’s vision for a modern Bundeswehr.

Officially, the upcoming reform efforts were based on two existing reports, the “Weizsäcker Commission” report and the von Kirchbach analysis. Concurrently, Scharping had given the order to develop his cornerstones of a reform by the Head of Policy Planning Staff, at that time, General Kujat. Interestingly, Kujat’s report was published a week after the other ones. There had been some suggestions that he had started his study at around the same time. He stated that the armed forces should be reduced to 277,000 and the number of Intervention Forces should be augmented to 150,000 soldiers. Further cornerstones of this evaluation were the end of the classification between Main Defence Forces and Intervention Forces. The Inspector General should get more power and with the creation of airmobile forces and the reduction of heavy equipment should be pressed ahead. The Air Force should receive more attention to the disadvantage of the Army and the compulsory service should be kept but shorter than before. The important approaches of the reform had not gone as far as the

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122 Unterseher German , ‘Defence Planning: In a Crucial Phase,’ Berlin 2001; Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, Bundeswehr Reform during the First Schroeder Chancellorship, 99; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 97
124 Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, Bundeswehr Reform during the First Schroeder Chancellorship, 104
126 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Christoph Schwennicke: ‘Scharping plant Bundeswehr mit 277 000 Soldaten,’ (Scharpings’s plan for Bundeswehr with 277,000 soldiers) 02.06.2000; Franz-Josef Meiers, ‘The Security and Defence Policy of the Grand Coalition,’ 55 et sq Foreign Policy in Dialogue Volume 7 - Issue 18 Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations University Trier; The Federal Minister of Defence
“Weizsaecker Commission’s” recommendations; however, the far-reaching significance could not be overlooked.127

The Bundeswehr was used to many structural changes in its history, yet the speed of the developments had never been higher.128 Nevertheless all concepts and reform efforts contained a material error in at least one aspect. The budget reductions had not allowed the needed injection of funds to get either one of the concepts kick-started. It was Scharping’s weakness not to use the result of the well-respected “Weizsaecker Commission” to his own advantage. A renowned expert panel like this Commission could have given him an important impetus and a possible advantage in the negotiations with the Finance Minister.

Eventually, on 14th June 2000, the Bundestag should decide about the upcoming Bundeswehr reform.129 The plan was to start the reorganising procedures in April 2001 and to be finished within five years.130 However, the important question of financing remained unanswered. The Defence Minister had roughly calculated with costs of over DM 20 billion over the coming ten years. These costs should be covered by earnings from sales of assets and further measures of rationalisation and co-operation. Many critics seriously doubted that the expected numbers could be reached.131

On 11th October 2000, Scharping presented his concept of a Bundeswehr reform, “Grobausplanung zur Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr”, (Planning for the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr), to the Federal Cabinet. It was no surprise that the reform concept was the subject of a vigorous political discussion in the Bundestag.132 The purpose of the

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reform was clear from the beginning, namely to attune the Bundeswehr to the new needs of a changed security environment. The necessary debate about identifying national interests and thus the decision for which purposes the Bundeswehr should eventually be used had still not taken place.

In comparison to Scharping’s report, the “Weizsaecker Commission” already anticipated multinational crisis operations as the most probable option for the future. By contrast, the government was still hanging onto the national and alliance defence concept. After all, the idea of crisis operation was given at least an important place in the new concept.\(^{133}\) The Defence Ministers’ concept underlined the need to increase the number of crisis forces by the factor three to 150,000.\(^{134}\) It was stated, that this was a necessary measure to fulfil the capacity profile under the demands of NATO and EU.\(^{135}\) The distinction between Main Defence Force and Intervention Force was abandoned. The Army as the largest branch of the Bundeswehr was most affected and most at risk from these changes. Although the overall number of military formations would have stayed the same, the tendency towards light and mobile formations was inexorable. Thus, it was necessary to reduce heavy equipment in particular tank formations. The Air Force also had to cope with cuts as its fighter-bomber squadrons and fighter squadrons were affected.\(^{136}\) The Navy had to reduce the number of smaller ships specialised on Baltic Sea warfare. Yet, the changes had less impact on them compared to the other services.

Another central element of the new concept was the changing role of the Inspector General. So far, he had performed the role of an adviser for the Minister but that was about to change. He should become the chairperson of the council responsible for the deployment of the Bundeswehr.

In spring 2001, the Inspector General presented the material and equipment concept with disillusioning results. It was stressed that the armed forces suffered from chronic...
underfunding. General Kujat summarised the Bundeswehr would need an overhaul to be able to fulfil the increased national and international expectations. Critics correctly remarked the continuing pressure on the defence budget resulted from a deteriorating economic situation and was not caused by an improved security environment. Yet, regardless of external causes, the Bundeswehr was burdened with high personnel costs. Cuts in the human resource sector would thus create more flexibility in the defence budget. However, neither von Kirchbach’s report nor Scharping’s cornerstones had followed this school of thought. The fear that further cuts would have awoken a new cost-cutting round at the expense of the Bundeswehr was too great. It was difficult to convince the critics of a smaller Bundeswehr that the performance of an armed force should be measured in the capabilities available and not in pure numbers.

When General Kujat was asked to comment on the availability of funds to finance the reform, he was just cautiously optimistic, although he expressed his doubts about the performance of the armed forces. It was not the first time that concerns had been raised about the capabilities of the Bundeswehr. Although capable to conduct particular missions, the Bundeswehr was struggling to cover the whole spectrum of tasks.

Even the Chancellor, who had previously assured that the defence budget would be safe from budgetary savings had to back down. In the face of a glooming economy, the government failed to respect the commitments made earlier. The obvious contradiction in the governmental statements was an opportunity for the opposition. The necessary discussion about the reorientation of the armed forces was proverbially crushed between the political parties.

However, who was responsible for the failure of the Bundeswehr reform? The intentions of Kujat as well as from the “Weizsaecker Commission” were...
ambitious considering the financial situation. Although proper funding was not available, the workload of the Bundeswehr had grown. One reason for the permanent condition of underfunding was Germany’s economic situation; another reason was the professionalism of the soldiers, which supported the wrong faith by many politicians that everything was fine. However, a closer inspection would have proved to be sobering, as deployed units had been privileged with new equipment and free of any budgetary limits. The Bundeswehr units at home were confronted with large budget cuts to contribute to the federal budget consolidation process. In the end, the reform discussion was reduced to three aspects, the compulsory service, the size of a reformed Bundeswehr and the financial support. Other issues like the strategic range of the Bundeswehr and the definition of a national strategic interest were carelessly neglected.

There was a growing knowledge that the 1995 installed Operations Centres of the Bundeswehr could no longer keep up with the growing demands of out-of-area missions. The increasing number of international operations had eventually worked towards a new debate of a Joint Operations Command. After all, the continuing reform efforts not only had the goal to adapt material aspects but also the command structures. The reinvigorated discussion about a national operational command just displayed the advancements the Bundeswehr has made since 1995. The new Joint Forces Command was operational from July 2001 and replaced the operations centres in the respective services. The Joint Forces Command, which would coordinate all foreign deployments, provided a vivid glimpse into the future. However, reorganising the command structures had not taken place without incidents and difficulties. The Inspectors of the armed services objected any limitation of their powers towards a central administration. The old way of thinking and keeping the status quo was still widespread through all command levels. However, clear

143Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘The content of Bundeswehr reform,’ The Adelphi Papers, 41:340, 33-52 (42)
144Michael Fröhlingdorf, Hammerstein, Konstantin von; Koelbl, Susanne; Szandar, Alexander; Thielke, Thilo 11.03.2002 SWP Studie, Sascha Lange: ‘neue Bundeswehr auf altem Sockel, Wege aus dem Dilemma,’ SWP Studie 2005, 6
allocation of responsibilities for risk identification, analysis and assessments for the deployed soldiers outperformed the perceived disadvantages of the loss of power by far.

The new role of the Joint Forces Command comprised the role as counterpart to the Minister of Defence, Inspector General and its high command. In reality, its focus was concentrated on administrative tasks and as superior authority for the deployed contingents.147 Because of the integration in NATO structures, the Alliance was mainly responsible for the operational leadership. The political leadership always wanted a full integration of the Bundeswehr in multinational missions, which would therefore lead to a limited scope for national manoeuvres.148 As multinational operations within the EU had become an important factor, the National Operations Command was just one aspect of the new Joint Forces Command. Germany, like so many other European nations, had agreed to provide national headquarters, which could also be used for transnational operations.149 It provided an example of the gradual but continuous adaptation of German defence and security policy to the facets of “Realpolitik”, which included an active part of the Bundeswehr.

Despite all the restructuring efforts, the Army was still the largest of all three services. Compromised of 134,000 military personnel, it had lost notable portions of its personnel and heavy equipment nevertheless. The revised concept for the Army named “Army of the Future”, involved five mechanised divisions and two specialised divisions.150 The idea envisaged a Bundeswehr that should be able to perform with an augmented mechanised division in one out-of-area mission or with two brigades in two missions at the same time.151 This had been a substantial difference to the former personnel strength of the Army. However, in the new scenario, heavy equipment would

147 J.P.F. Lepine, ‘From Cold Warriors to Expeditionary Forces The Current Challenges Facing the German Armed Forces,’ in Canadian Military Journal 2006,44
150 Matthias Goedecke, ‘Modernisation of the Bundeswehr , New Trend in Germany's Security Policy,’ Air Command and Staff College 2003, 18; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Neuaustrichung der Bundeswehr; Grobausplanung, Ergebnisse und Entscheidungen, (Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, planning, results and decisions), (Berlin: September 2000)
151 Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 102; Matthias Goedecke Modernisation of the Bundeswehr, New Trend in Germany’s Security Policy, (Air Command and Staff College 2003), 18; Bundeswehr Heer der Zukunft, (Army of the Future) http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/?ut/p/c4/HcrLDYAwCADQWVwA7t7cQr3VFI2pwaaAJk7vJ_6cMaXhJO3YHx2HHEKXX_XIJCJGrBohY00Zo7ZCNSaF_NGkkj_QfrHR0324r1a1j0D9pnJBs/ accessed 18/11/2012
have more likely been an obstacle than an advantage. The set-up of the two specialised divisions, the Special Operations Division and the Air Mobile Division was the logical extension of these new developments and requirements. These two divisions would provide the necessary mobility and flexibility needed to perform against irregular forces.

Another important step towards a more mobile and flexible force was the installation of the Joint Support Group. The new service would support the armed forces at home and abroad. The duties of the Joint Support Group had gone well beyond simple logistical support; it had also compromised communication, reconnaissance, and military police functions. In the end, the Joint Support group consisted of 50,000 soldiers and had incidentally become the second largest service in the armed forces. It formed a fourth branch of service with an own Chief of Staff and its supporting staff.

A further development had taken place in the Medical Service, which had raised its importance and was now recognised as the fifth service of the Bundeswehr. Updated training and adjusted equipment accompanied all these changes. In particular, the Cold War orientated armament of the Bundeswehr had become a disadvantage for the new mission profile. Shortfalls were especially recognised in missing C4I capacities, strategic airlift capacities, let alone missing ISTAR capacities.

Yet, introducing new military systems is an expensive long-term investment for every defence budget, as the research and testing phase is significant. This would have run contrary to the latest budget cuts and the clouded perspective of the defence sector.

153 Joint Support Service, http://www.streitkraeftebasis.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NjgzNjdhMzM2YTMsNjc5MDIwMjAyMDIw/07407_Information_SKB_engl_2007_09_24.pdf accessed 17/07/2012; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military 102; Wolfram Kuehn, ’Tasks of the Joint Support Service within the Scope of Bundeswehr Missions Abroad,’ European Security and Defence 3-4/2011
To make the situation worse, the Bundeswehr was bound by major procurement decisions planned and decided in the 80s.\textsuperscript{157} It was important to note that not only military needs but also broader political purposes had played an important role in these decisions. The Eurofighter, Eurocopter Tiger and the Airbus A400M were classic examples of political orientated military projects.\textsuperscript{158} The political goal was to promote a strong European arms industry and to secure thousands of jobs on the European continent. The alternative would have been to buy existing and often cheaper models on the global arms market and thereby weakening the domestic arms industry. This was no alternative for the German or any other European government, especially in times of economic stress.\textsuperscript{159} In December 2001, the Schroeder government signed the final contract for Germany’s first military used reconnaissance satellite system. Considering the dependency on other countries for satellite images, the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Lupe satellite system was the hoped for independence of Germany’s outer space reconnaissance ambitions.\textsuperscript{160} The German government also decided to replace the ageing Transall C-160 transport aircraft with the new Airbus A-400M. The new aircraft would not only improve Germany’s strategic airlift capacities but also simultaneously decrease its dependency on other armed forces or civil contractors.\textsuperscript{161} All these projects were important measures to upgrade the Bundeswehr, as more German soldiers than ever before were deployed in international missions.

The changing profile of the Bundeswehr, due to its global theatres of operations, had just highlighted the Transformation that had taken place so far. The Schroeder government used the Bundeswehr albeit reluctantly but nevertheless more often as an instrument of “Realpolitik”. Although the Bundeswehr was now an international operating military force, the Transformation process itself had just started and was not without difficulties. The inconsistence between the political ambition and willingness to participate in military operations and the actual capacities had widened. The reluctance of


\textsuperscript{161}Agüera Martin,’ Ambitious Goals, Weak Means? Germany's Project "Future Bundeswehr" is Facing Many Hurdles,’ \textit{Defense Analysis}, 17.3, 2001, 289-306 (297)
the political elite to spend more money on its armed forces ran counterproductive to its willingness to use them. Yet, the ambitious reform efforts of the German government had shown miscellaneous achievements at most. One of the most important key drivers of every military reform is to provide enough financial funds, especially for the start-up funding. Nevertheless, the Schroeder government headed in the right direction with setting up a Joint Support Service, a Joint Operations Command and the positive decisions on some important arms projects. Yet, the disentanglement of old thinking was difficult as the main objective of the Bundeswehr was still the defence of national and alliance territory. There was no shortage of reform proposals but the path taken by the government remained incomplete. Although external causes like the NATO Alliance or the EU had put pressure on the German government, the results were so far unimpressive.162

Chapter Five

Pushing Ahead with the Transformation Efforts of the Bundeswehr During 2002-2005

At the federal elections in October 2002, Gerhard Schroeder was re-elected for a second term, which can only be described as a time of radical change. Not only the security environment, but also the political landscape had been re-drawn by the military campaigns following 9/11. At the same time, NATO and the EU, two for Germany important institutions, had tried to overcome the difficulties of readjusting its own security strategies to the new circumstances of the security environment. Yet, even the correlation between NATO and the EU itself was not without problems. At the same time, Germany had to face its most demanding out-of-area deployment in Afghanistan.

In 2003, the controversies over the Operation “Iraqi Freedom” between France and Germany on one side and the US on the other side made the existing problems in the transatlantic relation more apparent.\(^1\) Observers questioned how the EU could offer political leadership when its members were undecided how to proceed. This played into the hands of Euro-sceptics and the United States, which had seen this discord as proof that there was no coherent and comprehensive European security policy. US Defence Minister Rumsfeld referred especially to France and Germany as the “Old Europe” and stated that the center of gravity of NATO-Europe had shifted to the East.\(^2\) The resoluteness of the US to intervene in crisis regions whenever they considered it necessary, at the same time underlined the weakness and helplessness of these countries towards the US position. However, the overall importance of the transatlantic Alliance revealed itself in several tries to restore the old strength. Besides the political efforts, it was crucial to revive the military importance of NATO. One key goal was to close or narrow the existing capability gap between the European NATO members and the US. In reality most European NATO members had to admit their inability to conduct own operations.

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interoperability between the US and its allies was at serious risk as the technological gap widened. Thus, the European NATO members were trying to optimise their capacities to close the capability gap.³ Germany as one of the major European NATO members should play a distinctive part in these approaches.⁴

The international context between 2002 and 2005 was also shaped by the expansion plans of NATO and the EU. The expanding influence of NATO and EU accounted for a significantly improved strategic environment in Europe. Germany was a direct beneficiary of these tendencies. One of Germany’s most important foreign and security policy issues was to include Eastern Europe into the western community.⁵ However, this period was also characterised by the constant crisis management efforts of the EU and NATO. As a result, Germany was challenged by uprising threats of a changed security environment and by the increasing expectations of its allies. Yet, the plain fact that the US had trusted a “coalition of the willing” to fight in Afghanistan instead of relying on the Alliance was seen as sign of weakness and caused irritation among some European members. Especially when considering that NATO had invoked its Art. five to declare its unconditional solidarity.⁶ Given the decreasing role of NATO as centre of US - European security relations, some even feared the near end of the transatlantic era. The strategy of using pre-emptive strikes against Saddam Hussein increased the frictions within the Alliance.⁷ In late 2002, the NATO summit in Prague constituted a breakthrough in many respects. Among other topics the Transformation summit, as it was called, involved the east expansion of NATO. Seven countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,

⁴Meiers (2005): ‘Germany's defence choices,’ 157; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 107
⁵Michael Staack,. ‘Normative Grundlagen, Werte und Interessen deutscher Sicherheitspolitik,’ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik; Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse,(normative bases, values interests of German security policy) eds. Stephan Böckenförde and Sven Bernhard Gareis (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2009), 62
Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks. A new command organisation was also discussed.\(^8\) Two strategic commands, one operational and one functional, should guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency of NATO’s command structures. Further on the agenda was to improve the capabilities of individual NATO states. It was also decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF), and to review NATO’s role in general.

Especially for the European members, the decisions proved to be a decisive test. To achieve the needed results they had to step up their Transformation efforts. The idea was to develop sustainable military forces that would be deployable and inter-operational. This should be achieved by improving the abilities and increasing the commitment towards a joint funding.\(^9\) The new challenges like the rise of fundamentalism and terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) made an overhaul of NATO structures and strategies necessary. It was an interesting fact that NATO moved away from its previous geographical limits to a policy where it would be able to use its forces wherever and whenever necessary.\(^10\) NATO was going to evolve from a regional defence alliance into an international security network.\(^11\) Yet, the ambition of a global approach, as well as the technological prominence of the US, needed a notable budget increase from most of its members. As early as 1999, NATO started the Defence Capabilities Initiatives Program (DCIP) to address these issues.\(^12\) The problem was to prove the continuing progress of these efforts, because the participants had no duty to report their efforts and without superior authority, the progress was delayed.\(^13\)

The Iraq conflict acted interestingly enough as a booster for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).\(^14\) What started with OEF had continued two years later with military actions against Iraq. The US decided to form a “coalition of the willing” including

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\(^14\)Nicole Gnesotto, ‘EU Security and Defence Policy The first five years (1999-2004),’ EU Institute for European Studies, 2004, 11-33(20); Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 111
countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland in the Invasion phase of 2003. In the “Post-Invasion phase”, a coalition of over 40 nations contributed to the Multi-National Force - Iraq. However, two European heavyweights, France and Germany had opposed the Iraq war from the beginning and tried to press ahead with a European Security and Defence Policy. That alone was not easy as the “cherry picking” of the US to gather its “Coalition of the willing” created tensions in the European part of NATO. Nevertheless, the European NATO members tried to redirect their focus on the EU and the ESDP experienced a political re-evaluation in 2003. Despite the disagreements between the institutions the “Berlin Plus” draft of 2003 provided the platform for a new cooperation between the Alliance and the EU. The plan was to make the capacities and assets of NATO available to the EU. Soon after, the European Council set up a framework for independent EU operations and the EU proclaimed its first European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. Given the fundamental differences in regards to the strategy of the US led “War on Terror” and the differences about the use of pre-emptive strikes, the ESS emphasised the European point of view. The ESS concept was not as different from NATO concepts as it also underlined the possible threat of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. It provided the base to support the Helsinki Headlines Goal (HHG). The HHG 2010 stressed the need to build-up capacities to carry out several military operations of different intensity at the same time. The EU agreed to turn over the HHG 2010 shortly after. At the centre of this idea stood the suggestion to develop 13 Battle Groups (BG)

16Stephanie C. Hofmann, ‘Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP, Perspectives on Politics, Volume 7 Issue 01 March 45-52; Steinhoff Determinants and Politics of German Military, 111
17Meiers (2005): ‘Germany's defence choices’, 154
consisting of 1,500 service personnel. These battle groups should be on higher alert and able to be operational within 15 days for a period of 30 days.\textsuperscript{22}

The effects on the Bundeswehr should not be underestimated. The Transformation efforts in the Alliance as well as in the EU had become impossible without the largest European member, Germany. Its willingness to contribute to the Transformation was essential for the success. Thus, Germany agreed to contribute up to 5,000 service personnel to the NRF. The NRF rested on a semi-annual change with a needed period for training from six to twelve months before a stand-by period of half a year.\textsuperscript{23} Because of this half-yearly change, the Bundeswehr needed 15,000 service personnel for its participation. Providing the necessary training, equipment, and logistical service for these troops was a demanding task for the Bundeswehr. The NRF and BG only consisted of professional soldiers and no conscripts. The Army as the service with the most conscripts had to face the challenging task to provide the necessary numbers. The ambitious plan of the EU to carry out ESDP operations independently compromised a further challenge to attending states. Nevertheless, the limit of the German troop contingent at the HHG was going to be 18,000.\textsuperscript{24}

Yet, autonomous military operations of the EU would need more effort from its members as the lack of support capabilities of important NATO members had to be balanced. The plan was to formulate a joint approach of the European countries to counterbalance the existing shortfalls. Germanys’ participation in the NRF underlined its increased responsibility to take part in multilateral initiatives. Yet, it also highlighted questions about national sovereignty and the parliamentary reservations over the Bundeswehr in the face of new missions. Besides these influences, it had been the out-of-area missions, which shaped Germany’s security policy substantially. The international deployments emerged as catalyst for the Transformation process. Under its edited post

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23]NATO,’ Response Force,’ http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/jfcbrunssum/nato_response_force.aspx accessed 28/11/2012; Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics of German Military ,113
\end{footnotes}
Cold War strategy, Germany continued its participation in international operations and tried to fulfil the raised expectations now as a security provider.\(^\text{25}\)

Despite the raised expectations, Germany rejected any direct military participation in Iraq from the beginning. However, to ease the situation the German government offered to increase its troop numbers in Afghanistan. In August 2003, NATO accepted responsibility for ISAF and solved the burdensome issue of deciding over a lead nation every six months.\(^\text{26}\) Yet, this assumption of responsibility also made clear that Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan would not be short-term. It was obvious, that the increased involvement would put even more pressure on the Bundeswehr resources.\(^\text{27}\) The fact that the Defence Ministry had to pay the costs of international operations from its own defence budget made it even more difficult. As a negative by-product, financial means were less available for the Transformation process.\(^\text{28}\)

Yet, the Bundeswehr not only suffered financial hardship but also had to face a sustainable learning process triggered by its military undertakings. Especially the ISAF mission proved to be a watershed. The experience gained from the insurgency attacks in Afghanistan resulted in a review of the available equipment. For example, in order to protect soldiers against Improvised Explosives Devices (IED), suicide bombers as well as mines armoured personnel carriers were required. The overall result of the review was more than sobering as the Bundeswehr in its current state was lacking such equipment.

Another mission, which proved to be instructive for the Bundeswehr, was Operation “Iraqi Freedom”. Although not actively involved, it provided valuable lessons for the Bundeswehr nevertheless. By the virtue of its technological prominence, the US military highlighted the potential of the most up to date warfare capabilities. The US military served as model for applied network-enabled operations.\(^\text{29}\) As a direct result, the


\(^{26}\) NATO, ‘ISAF history,’ official website, [http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html](http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html) accessed 28/11/2012

\(^{27}\) Michael F. A Harsch, ‘Reluctant Warrior The German Engagement in Afghanistan,’ *Peace Research Institute Oslo*, 1 et seq, October 2011


\(^{29}\) Timothy M. Binds, John E. Peters, *Army Network-Enabled Operations, Expectations, Performance and Opportunities for future Improvements*, (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, February 2012)
Bundeswehr introduced network-enabled operations as guiding principle for its own Transformation.30

However, not only the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq provided valuable lessons. In March 2004, reality caught up with the Bundeswehr in Kosovo. So far, this mission was characterised mainly as a humanitarian one, which changed with a riot of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.31 The Bundeswehr was lacking the necessary equipment and training to face the situation properly.32 The highlighted shortages of the Bundeswehr not only lay in the missing equipment and training for such a low-intensity conflict, but also in the lack of political guidance. Germany had painfully experienced that every mission needed clear rules, a strong mandate, and a decisive political framework.

Defence Minister Peter Struck tried to solve the existing problems. In 2002, he took up what can only be described as a difficult legacy. Thus, the leitmotif of the Bundeswehr reform of 2000 quickly became outdated.33 Summarised, the Bundeswehr needed a reform of the 2000 reform, imposed under Defence Minister Scharping to solve the problem of funding and the extensive international commitments made.34 In early 2003, Struck presented the Defence Policy Guidelines 2003 (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, VPR). It was announced as the new conceptual framework for the Bundeswehr. The guidelines should define the mandate of the Bundeswehr and provide information about requirements for equipment and material. Just ten months in office, Struck tried to leave his mark by setting up his Bundeswehr reform.35

The text of the guidelines explained the circumstances of its development. The strategic environment had fundamentally changed; therefore, the abilities of the

30Tom Dyson ,‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,’ German Politics, 20:4,2011, 545-567; Tom Dyson , ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century,’ Defence Studies, 11:2,2011, 244-270(245); Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics on German Military, 117
31Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, The Bundeswehr willing and able? in Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 109/110
33Peter Struck, ‘Die Bundeswehr – Neue Aufgaben, neuer Kurs ’,(The Bundeswehr, New tasks and a new course), Europaeische Sicherheit Nr.1 54 Jg (Hamburg, 2005),12-17(13)
Bundeswehr had to change as well. The well-grounded difference between this and previous papers was that the 2003 VPR not only described possible scenarios but also covered real cases. Some observers called the VPR a fundamental change, which would adjust the Bundeswehr to the challenges of the new millennium. Struck’s statement of, “Germany’s security interests would also be defended at the Hindu Kush”, highlighted the fundamental change.

The VPR recognised the transatlantic Alliance as key for Germany and Europe’s security. NATO had an important place in the guidelines and the European security idea was seen more complementary. The guidelines stated that military missions in the future would only be possible within multinational organisations. The only exception for a national leadership role would be for evacuation and rescue missions. The 2003 VPR underlined for the first time that the national security was no longer under threat. The VPR in parts referred to the results of the “Weizsaecker Committee” of 2000, which again underlined its importance. The main findings were that national defence would become less important and new tasks like conflict management and crisis prevention more important. The threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD moved more and more to the forefront. The shift of priorities can be attributed to the experiences from the Balkan missions and the 9/11 terror attacks. The VPR stated, referring to Strucks statement, that the defence of German interest would no longer be limited to its immediate neighbourhood. Rather, an increased number of out-of-area missions would become the most likely scenario for the Bundeswehr. It was also suggested not to endanger the difficult reform period by more commitments abroad. The idea was to promote the

38 Jahn Egbert, ‘Politische Streitfragen in zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Die Verteidigung Deutschlands am Hindukush. Die deutsche Rolle in Afghanistan, University Mannheim 2008
42 Peter Struck, ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und die Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen,’ (German security policy and the Bundeswehr facing new challenges) Europäische Sicherheit Online, January 2003
development of joint military capabilities in the Bundeswehr. The previous idea of an individualised approach had to be changed into a more interlinking one. It was planned that the scope of the Bundeswehr should eventually include an interlocking set of command, intelligence and reconnaissance abilities, mobility as well as combat effectiveness, combat support and sustainability. The survivability and force protection were also identified.43

The absence of any determination towards NATO or the EU resulted from the idea to avoid internal unrest in the government.44 It was no secret that Schroeder and Fischer were confident Europeans, while the Ministry of Defence had a traditionally more US friendly attitude.45 Experts repeatedly stated that a fundamental change combined with a new launched investment programme would need the support of the whole government. One-sided reform ambitions by the Defence Ministry would be condemned to fail. Planned to be a comprehensive project the VPR lacked the needed support of the German government.

After presenting the VPR, it was necessary to implement the needed changes. The “Directive for the further development of the Bundeswehr” was the logical continuation of the VPR. In the “Directive”, the Ministry was asked to process a conception to realise the VPR. In addition, a description of the future role of the Inspector General and an outline for a new basing concept were presented.

It is interesting to note that the term “Transformation” appeared in German government circles for the first time in 2002. Interestingly enough it was used just like the term “Reform”, namely about restructuring the Bundeswehr.46 Defence Minister Struck defined the “German Transformation” as the permanent adjustment of the capabilities to the changed strategic environment and military needs. The idea was to achieve Transformation with the use of new technologies and connecting equipment with material and technologies.47 Yet, the Transformation needed enough funding to be successful. Article 87a Basic Law guaranteed the financial means for an armed force without going into details. Yet, Germany’s continuous cut of the defence budget made an effective Transformation process difficult. In the year 2004, the defence budget amounted to Euro

43Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics on German, Military 125
44Dyson, ‘The Politics of German Defence and Security,’ 134-141
45Meiers (2005): ‘Germany's defence choices,’ 155
24 billion. The running costs made up for the largest part of the total costs with over 2/3 of it. The defence investments only amounted to a small part of the overall budget. The planning showed no major signs of improvement. The idea was to cut the running costs to provide the defence investment budget with more funds. Compared to 2002 when the running cost amounted to Euro 18.5 billion it was reduced to Euro 17.4 billion in 2005. Simultaneously, the defence investment increased slightly. At an early stage, Minister Struck recognised that a defence budget was dominated by running costs and would not allow the necessary structural reorientation. However, a capped defence budget prevented the Defence Minister from major steps forward. Shifting means from the running costs to the investment area appeared to be a reasonable solution. In the wake of the Transformation, it was also necessary to reorganise the personnel structure of the Bundeswehr. That happened with the “Berlin Decree” in 2005. In particular, the reorganisation involved the shifting of tasks within the command structure. The previous advising position of the Inspector General was especially effected by the redirection. The new responsibilities included a more active role in regards to the Transformation efforts and the implementation of the new Bundeswehr. The inspectors of Navy, Army, and Air Force as well as of the Medical Service and Joint Support Service headed its respective areas as troop superiors. However, they are now all accountable to the Inspector General and mainly responsible for the smooth functioning of their respective service.

The “Weizsaecker Commission” already stated in 2000, when examining and analysing the conditions of the Bundeswehr that it was too large.

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51successor of the Blankeneser decree of 1970; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung,’ Grundsatze fuer Aufgabenzuordnung, Organisation und Verfahren im Bereich der militaerischen Spitzengliederung,’(Principles of responsibilities, organisation and procedures in the area of military top –level structure) January 2005
52Bundesministerium der Verteidigung , Betina Berg, Berliner Erlass( Berlin Decree) Paragraph 2 Point 2.1.1; Marcus Septimus ,Die Bundeswehr zu Beginn des 21 Jahrhunderts Transformationsprozesse der Bundeswehr 2000-2005, 75-77
53Berliner Erlass paragraph 2 Point 2.2
54Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr,(Joint Security and future of the Bundeswehr), 13
personnel strength was around 310,000. The future human resource plan 2012, based on the Bundeswehr structure 2004, included a decrease from 256,000 to 252,500 in 2010.\textsuperscript{55} It was tried to reach the anticipated numbers mainly through restructuring measurements. The number of conscripts should be reduced by over 10 per cent while the number of professional and regular soldiers should be increased by 4,000.\textsuperscript{56} The Defence Minister considered the restructuring measures as necessary to fulfil the raised expectations. The aim was to shift funds internally to make more money available for the investment sector. Yet, any try to restructure the personnel sector successfully had to involve the conscription question. However, the compulsory military service in the Bundeswehr was an inherent part of its history. From the beginning, it had played a central role in the civil-military relationship within Germany. The re-emergence of militarism and possible tendencies of a “State within the State”, as already experienced, should be prevented. Defence Minister Struck called it the secret of success on the 50th anniversary of the Bundeswehr. The German government seemed to be dedicated to praise the conscription as a high achievement and a proven basis for the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{57} The same applied for Struck, as he did not make any critical remarks on the subject. On the contrary, he made a gloomy prediction in case of abandonment.\textsuperscript{58}

In reality, and despite all the public statements of solidarity, the conscription had been under consideration for years. After the Cold War, a domestic discussion about the need of the armed forces in general and conscription in particular had started. The upcoming challenges called for a more professional force instead of a large conscription force. The supporters argued that a Bundeswehr without conscripts would get recruiting problems and that a professional force would be more expensive. An end of the conscription would also increase the fear of a separation of Bundeswehr and society. All these arguments were not proven and therefore missed the necessary truth. That conscripts


\textsuperscript{56}Detlef Bald,\textit{Die Bundeswehr },(The Bundeswehr), (Munich:Beck Verlag, 2005), 173; Arthur Hoffmann & Longhurst Kerry ,‘German strategic culture in action,’ \textit{Contemporary Security Policy}, 20:2,1999, 31-49(42)


\textsuperscript{58}Longhurst Kerry, ‘The reform of the German Armed Forces: Coming of age?,’ \textit{European Security}, 9:4,2000, 31-44(41)
would only cover less than 20 per cent of the Bundeswehr personnel raised even more questions about its future.\(^{59}\) Over time, the conscription time had been significantly reduced. What started in 1962 with 18 months, had dropped back to 9 months in 2002.\(^{60}\) The training objective for the conscripts had also changed during the Transformation process. The new objectives included support measures domestically as well as in foreign missions.\(^{61}\) In particular previous knowledge, abilities, and professional experience of conscripts should find more consideration. The future concept included 25,000 positions for draftees who could serve on a voluntary basis for up to 23 months.\(^{62}\) These soldiers would be available for out-of-area operations. In this respect, the VPR supported the compulsory military service against its critics.\(^{63}\)

Initially, the 1994 created classification between Intervention Forces and Main Defence Forces should have been the answer to the need of crisis response capabilities in the Bundeswehr.\(^{64}\) The anticipated personnel strength of the crisis reaction forces had been 50,000 service personnel.\(^{65}\) Yet, the reality of growing responsibilities and increased mission demands needed new answers and the two-part structure was unable to provide the right ones.

In the year 2000, a new idea was introduced to provide the armed forces with the necessary means. The idea involved that the whole Army should now be responsible for crisis reactions missions. However, logistical and support tasks were outsourced to the new founded Joint Support Service. Shortly after, the 2000 concept was discarded. In 2004, the Defence Minister Struck introduced a restructuring concept with three different categories of forces. The idea was developed in cooperation with the Inspector General and would distinguish the Bundeswehr into Intervention Forces, Stabilisation Forces and Support Forces. These three forces should receive different equipment and training.

\(^{59}\)Steinhoff, *Determinants and Politics of German Military*, 134


\(^{63}\)Dyson, ‘The Politics of German Defense,’ 134.


\(^{65}\)Stephan Boeckenfoerde, Sven Bernhard Gareis *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Herausforderungen, Akteure und Strategien,(Ulm: Barbara Budrich, 2009),113
The Intervention Force was created to join multinational operations of high intensity. It was not planned that these forces would stay for longer in the operation area than necessary. This force should rather pave the way for the Stabilisation Forces with a fast and effective operation. They should be a first class combat force with the capacity of peace enforcement operations. It appeared that the Intervention Force with its profile for expeditionary warfare was a step forward to deviate from the antimilitaristic culture in Germany. In detail, the number comprised of 35,000 service personnel from adding the 15,000 NRF troops, the 18,000 Headline Goals troops and 1,000 troops for UN-Stand by Arrangements-System (UNSAS), and 1,000 troops for national evacuation operations.

Summarised, nearly all German forces on high alert were now either available to NATO or the EU. In the end, the Bundeswehr was a long way from setting up own strategic capacities. On the contrary, the Intervention Force constituted an obligation to the “never alone again” maxim.

The Stabilisation Force should be able to execute low to middle intensive operations over longer periods. The goal was to stabilise the peace efforts especially in crisis areas, which could include overseeing of ceasefire agreements, separating conflict parties and removing negative influences in general. Therefore, a certain degree of combat ability was required. The Stabilisation Force would work in correlation with the Reaction Force.

The Support Forces should be used to support the Intervention and Stabilisation Forces and to guarantee the basic operations. It was planned to carry out support actions from Germany and from advanced base camps. The basic operations were described as administration, training, and management duties. Combat actions should not be involved.

The goal was to create an armed force that could join multinational and network-centric operations. It was also intended to overcome the traditional rivalry of the services in the armed forces. The focus of all three services should be to provide troops for the new force structure. With intact units send into missions the efficiency should be increased as

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67International Herald Tribune, Judy Dempsey,‘ Germany to double peacekeeping troops,’ 24 April 2006; Gustav Lindstrom ,’The Headline Goal,’ Institute for Security Studies , 4; Breuer ,Reform of the German Armed Forces , 213
68Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics of German Military , 128
70Sven Bernhard Gareis, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Herausforderungen, Akteure und Strategien( German security policy, challenges actors and strategies), ( Stuttgart:UTB,2008),118
71Fabian Breuer, Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints , The Reform of the German Armed Forces, 2006,213
The new force categories should also be coordinated on an operational level instead on a strategic level.

The new range of tasks as well as the new ability profile defined in the Defence Guidelines 2003 needed a reorientation of the procurement process. The technical demands had to be customised to the new direction. The experiences from the earliest to the latest out-of-area missions inexorably showed the weaknesses of the Bundeswehr in action. New priorities were identified, which was irreplaceable for future challenges. Information, communication, command and control were leading the list of priorities. It also meant that the procurement for only national tasks had almost become obsolete.

Defence Minister Struck and the Inspector General, explained on a press conference “New Tasks – New Direction” on 30th March 2004, the now prioritised abilities. These included command and control capabilities, intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic mobility, operational effectiveness, support and sustainability and survivability and protection.

The new ordering concept for the anticipated capabilities on relevant projects was also introduced. The Fennek vehicle with its observation and reconnaissance equipment BAA and the OHB developed SAR-Lupe satellite would improve the Bundeswehr’s reconnaissance abilities substantially.

In principle, the new challenges of conflict prevention and conflict management needed an adjustment of all equipment and material. Interestingly, the operational need of 180 Eurofighters was not questioned at all. The issue of support and sustainability should be resolved by ordering 3800 armoured vehicles, of

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types MUNGO, GTK, DURO, Dingo 2 and Wiesel 2, for various tasks to respond adequately to new emerging threats. For survivability and protection was planned to introduce new systems for the personal equipment of the soldiers, for example friend and foes identification equipment.

The Joint Support Service was not a new institution of the Transformation; it was already set up in 2000 during Scharping’s reform endeavours. The reason the Joint Support Service survived Struck’s reform effort was simply because it reflected the new approach of his Transformation. The service combined different apartments of Navy, Air Force, and Army. It was composed of two pillars, the “Streitkraeftunterstuetzungskommando” (Joint Support Command) and the “Streitkraefteamt” (Office of the armed forces). The initial sceptical approach of the services towards the Joint Support Service was drained away by its obvious success. It eventually was fully recognised as a service provider and as one driver of the Transformation. The Centre for Transformation had also become included into the Joint Support Service. The main task of the centre was to develop long-term analysis and forward studies as well as parameters for managing the Transformation. As a think tank of the Bundeswehr, it was responsible to examine relevant tendencies in society, economy and to analyse the technological progress.

Within its 50 years of existence, the Army had experienced many structural reforms. More than seven were planned and carried out since its foundation in 1955. The reforms efforts can be seen as a mirror of the strategic environment. The first four structural reforms happened all before the end of the Cold War. These structures reproduced the threat western societies were facing. The national defence capacity was of highest priority and the Bundeswehr was primarily equipped with tank divisions and

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81 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung,’ Zentrum fuer Transformation, (Center for Transformation) www.bmvg.de
antitank weapons. Yet, with the fifth Army structure in 1992, a new era had started for
the Bundeswehr. The keywords now were troop decreases, defence budget cuts and a
changed security environment. The review in 1998 revealed the long farewell of the
standardised units of division strength and instead favoured light and mobile units. The
“Weizsaecker Commission” in 2000 underlined that the Bundeswehr in general and the
Army in particular was too large and not modern enough. The missing Intervention
Force of the Army were especially subject to criticism, as it should be capable to uphold
and support two missions simultaneously in brigade strength.

In 2001, under the impression of 9/11, the leadership of the Bundeswehr presented
the “Army Structure of the Future”. In detail, the Army should be composed of five
mechanised divisions, together with the divisions for airmobile operations and special
operations.

Yet, the concept “Army of the Future” had already become obsolete. The new
concept was called “New Army” and was introduced in the 2004 reorganising efforts. The
respective services should lose its importance for the benefit of the introduced force
categories, in particular the Intervention, Stabilisation, and Support Forces. In reality,
fierce opposition from within the services met the concept. General Gudera, then Inspector
of the Army, was one of the most prominent critics. This was also related to the fact that
the Army was affected most by the Transformation process. Because of its focus on
national defence, the reorganising had a stronger effect on it than the other services.
Despite the fact that the Army lost parts of its logistical and medical services to the Joint
Service Group, the Army was still the heart of the force category system.

In 2005, the Army consisted of 134,000 soldiers in 22 brigades. The heavy-duty
machinery involved 854 main battle tanks, 1152 armoured personnel carriers and 488
artillery systems. According to the future concept, the Army should be reduced to 104,000
soldiers, and the heavy-duty machinery should be reduced by half. It was intended to only
keep 350 main battle tanks, 410 armoured personnel carriers and 119 artillery systems.

83Leo J. Daugherty III , ‘‘The Tip of the Spear’—The Bundeswehr, Soviet Force Restructuring &
Development of West Germany’s Armored Forces, 1951–1986,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies,
84Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Hrsg.): Bestandsaufnahme. Die Bundeswehr an der Schwelle
85Bericht der Kommission an die Regierung, ‘Gemeinsame Zukunft und Sicherheit der Bundeswehr,’ 51-53
86Tom Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century,’
Defence Studies, 11.2,2011, 244-270(253),
87Hans-Jörg Voll, ‘Das Neue Heer. Chancen und Zukunftsfähigkeit im Rahmen des
Transformationsprozesses,’(The new Army, chances and sustainability in the framework of the
Transformation process), Strategie und Technik. 03/2005. 20-24(21)
The divisions should be reduced to five altogether.\(^{88}\) The five divisions would consist of an armoured infantry division as the heart of the Intervention Force. The division airmobile operations revolutionary included an airmobile infantry regiment. The Special Operations Division with the Special Force KSK and the Airborne Brigade for evacuation operations were also included with two further divisions.

From the beginning of the Transformation, the Air Force was much more integrated in multinational operations and in NATO structures compared to the Army.\(^{89}\) The interaction with the other services in the Bundeswehr as well as with other nations was not new to the Air Force. Since its foundation in 1956, the Air Force as well as the Army had undergone five different reforms. These reforms reflected the respective threat scenario and tasks at the time to some extent. The year 1998 represented a turning point for the Air Force. Within a short time, Reform Structure five and six followed. Structure five from 2001 represented the internationalisation of the Bundeswehr and had the emerging conflicts in Europe considered. Air Force Structure six from 2005 represented a further step forward, with the focus on the War on Terror. Altogether, the Air Force should have been reduced from 110,000 airmen and over 1,000 aircraft to under 50,000 airmen and less than 400 aircraft. The year 2004 marked another turning point and started a new era. Jagdgeschwader 73 (Fighter Wing 73) was the first fighter wing to receive the new Eurofighter Typhoons, which should replace the remaining MIG-29s and later parts of the Tornado fleet as fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of the Bundeswehr. The weapons system F-4 Phantom, with the introduction of the Eurofighter, should eventually no longer be operated. In 2015, the new fleet of aircraft should only comprise of 262 aircraft, in detail 180 Eurofighter and 82 Tornado aircraft. The result of the Transformation became obvious as previous priorities were revised and for example the antiaircraft missile unit was massively reduced. Simultaneously, it was decided that the international defence project MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defence System) would become its successor system.\(^{90}\) Like the Army, the Air Force had just started with the Transformation process.

Then again, the Transformation of the Navy was the one that made the most progress. However, this was accomplished by a fortunate coincidence. In the fourth reform


of the Navy in 1986, the primacy of deterrence was still of highest priority. Financial constraints however forced the Navy to undergo necessary restructuring measures to achieve the predetermined guidelines. This forced reorganisation anticipated the developments of the coming Transformation. An early review in 1987 had already assessed that the Navy could only complete its anticipated tasks in a smaller and more modern form. The fifth concept of the Navy of 1991, “Fleet 2005”, intended to reduce the Navy by half, which was surprising considering the time it was decided, namely before the Cold War was officially declared to be over. In the end, the actual fleet of 2005 showed remarkable likenesses with the concept “Fleet 2005”.91 Yet, like all the other services, the Navy had to adjust to the general characteristics of the Transformation. The previous five type flotillas would become two flotillas. Out of these two flotillas, the Navy would assemble the units for task force and stabilisation operations.92 The capability of naval warfare from the air was acceded by the Air Forces from January 1st 2005 onwards.93 Existing material and equipment of the Navy were also questioned and should be restructured in the Transformation process. Defence Minister Struck called commissioning the submarine class 212A and introducing the Berlin class replenishment ships a milestone in the modernisation of the Navy.94 The new generation of submarine with its new developed hybrid propulsion would provide valuable services in the areas of intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.95 The Berlin class replenishment ships are the largest ships in the German Navy and are intended to support German naval units far away from their homeports. This was a clear indication of a Transformation towards an “Expeditionary Navy”.96 The personnel strength of 24,000 soldiers had a lasting effect under the personnel plan 2010. In contrast to Army and Air Force, the Navy could be positioned at the coast of potential conflict areas to show presence and thereby execute a kind of force projection, as

92Deutsche Marine ( German Navy)
www.marine.de/01DB070000000001/CurrentBaseLink/W26L89T7341INFODE Stand 01.01.2006 accessed 24/11/2012
94Dagmar G. Woehrl, Marine und Marineschiffbau in Deutschland vor neuen Herausforderungen,’ BASIS See das Zukunftskonzept der Deutschen Marine 2007, 8-10(8)
the upcoming new type of frigate of the type 125, will have much enhanced land–attack capabilities. The frigates will also be more suitable for possible peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions than any other German Navy vessel before.

The Medical Service was forced to change in a more fundamental way. The cornerstone concept of Defence Minister Scharping in 2000 had already announced that modification for the medical service would be required. Scharping wanted to encompass all resources under one medical service command.

Summarised, the Transformation resulted in personnel cuts for all services. As a result, these cuts had an impact on the basing concept. Base closures seemed to be a suitable solution to increase the financial room for the necessary reforms. In 2004, Struck announced a new military basing concept, which was pushed by the force cuts and led to a further decrease of military facilities. The Defence Minister stated that the current basing concept was relying on a Cold War scenario and that a modern force would need an adjusted basing concept. Some experts claimed that Struck tried to speed up these base closures in order to avoid its discussion in the political election campaign of 2006.

Bundeswehr bases in over a hundred locations were shut down with 392 bases and installations remaining in 2010. The Defence Ministry took an economic orientated course of action and wanted to establish its future basing concept on relevant military aspects as well as on efficiency. As a result, the Bundeswehr increasingly vanished as an important factor and supporter of rural and disadvantaged regions. With the further

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101 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Grundlagen der Stationierungsentscheidung,’ (principles of the basing concept), Berlin, 26.10.2011, BMVg, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/?ut/p/c4/HYfDoAgDATf4gfo3Zu_UG9FV9KA1UDRxNeLZi8z/mS2N1KZ8SWCTQznRSNmibv-dy1e4Yh1MTM2g1PUGKcrGpo78I8md11L7CnEZ1x6F5ALeGJ/ accessed 3/12/2012; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 134
decrease of personnel and less conscripts in service, the Bundeswehr ceased from playing a role in the daily life in German cities.

At the end of October 2005, the Inspector General was drawing up an interim balance about the progress of the Transformation. In his opinion, the Transformation of the armed forces was formed both by external causes and by internal influences. He explicitly included the German strategic culture as internal reason. The chronically underfinanced Bundeswehr should be given more financial room for manoeuvre to allow it to focus on the Transformation process. By giving up no longer used structures, barracks, and material it was intended to gain more financial scope for modernisation measurements. The Inspector General made quite clear that the Bundeswehr could not compete with the French or British military in almost any aspect. The baggage of the Cold War and the desired restrictions implemented on the Bundeswehr by the Allies and the Bundestag were still evident. Although its threefold classification and the importance of capacities as a whole, instead on highlighting single services or even equipment, supported the confidence of a promising start.

In the meantime, the orientation on network-enabled capabilities opened the gate to process new schemes that would support interoperability. The new force categories would also ensure that Germany could fulfill its duties for NATO, the EU and international missions. Considering the difficulties at the beginning to set up a national command and control authority in the 1990s, it was a real success to establish headquarters for multinational operations in late 2005.

Nevertheless, the general lack of capacities resulted in a concept that was waiting for troop requirements instead of showing own dynamism and future orientated planning. Germany had slowly changed its role from a security beneficiary to a security exporter and trusted partner in international operations, but it was still far away from being a pillar of the international security community.

102Welt am Sonntag General Schneiderhahn "Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft". Transformation der Bundeswehr: Eine erste Bilanz auf dem Weg zur Verbesserung der Einsatzfähigkeit". (Bundeswehr and society, a first balance on the path of improvement), Berlin, 25. Oktober 2005
104Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 124; Manfred Engelhardt, Transforming the German Bundeswehr- The Way Ahead in Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st century ed. Daniel S. Hamilton 2004, 91-114(111); Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 136;
105Breuer, Between Ambitions and Financial Restraints, 213
The decision of Struck to radically change the quality of the armed forces from national defence tasks to conflict prevention and crisis management triggered the most extensive alteration of the Bundeswehr. Despite the Transformation efforts of the Bundeswehr, Struck and Chancellor Schroeder, supported the military draft and wanted to retain the current system. At the same time, Struck had to defend the Transformation against members of the political elite and public. These groups feared that the Transformation would be used to change the Bundeswehr into offensive expeditionary force as instrument of an aggressive foreign policy. However, it was not possible to reach an agreement as they stayed away from any clearing discussion. Therefore, the undertaking remained responsibility of the Defence Ministry alone. In fact, Struck actually was not looking for a broad political agreement why German soldiers were doing service in Afghanistan and defending German security interests so far away from Germany. In the end, the Transformation of the Bundeswehr remained largely unperceived by the public, which had contributed to a more critical discussion about the future of the armed forces with a Transformation process that had just started.

Chapter Six

Further Refinement of the Transformation

2005-2009/10

The year 2005 marked the first grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany since 1969. A coalition between the two biggest parliamentary fractions offered the unique opportunity to push the Transformation efforts ahead with the needed political support. The beginning of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first term in office was characterised by attempts to propitiate the relations to the United States. The transnational relation between Germany and the US came under pressure during the Iraq conflict. However, Chancellor Merkel not only had to pay attention to the US but also to France and Russia. After the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, she was trying to promote the European integration with other key nations. In contrast to Schroeder, Merkel wanted to revert to the classic role of a mediator between France and the US. It was important for Germany to be seen as a responsible ally. An intensifying ISAF mission underlined the German intention to be a trustworthy partner.

Franz Josef Jung became the new Minister of Defence in the grand coalition cabinet of Angela Merkel on November 22nd 2005. Jung was well known for being a conservative and reliable politician. In contrast to his predecessor Struck, he was not a political pioneer. Thus, his time in office was characterised by continuing the started Transformation. Nevertheless, experiences from Germany’s out-of-area missions provided new impulses for the armed forces. The ISAF mission that became more dangerous, as well as missions under authority of the UN and EU resulted in gaining the valuable experiences. Yet, the Transformation efforts were also shaped by the financial crisis of 2008/09, which should create a lasting impact on defence budgets around the world.

2Franz –Josef Meiers,’ Germany's defence choices,’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47:1,2005, 153-165(155); Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics on German Military, 139
3Carlo Masala,‘Möglichkeiten einer Neuorientierung deutscher Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,’(Possibilities of a new orientation of German foreign and security policy), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43 (2008), 25
4Stephen J. Flanagan ,’A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense and Foreign Assistance Capabilities,’Center for Strategic and International Studies May 2011, 9
From the mid-2000s on, the situation for the EU and NATO deteriorated and became more difficult to manage. On one hand, the Afghanistan engagement of NATO was becoming more intensive and a source of tension between the members. On the other hand, the EU was confronted with the ill success of its constitutional treaty. The success of ESDP and the European defence integration were seriously jeopardised. Another area of concern was the different perspectives of NATO and the EU about the applied procedure in conflicts. In contrast to most European partners, the US was often favouring military approaches over diplomatic ones. In particular, forming special purpose coalitions instead of using longstanding alliances caused unrest among its old allies.5 This could be largely explained by the different tendencies within these institutions. The NATO alliance experienced an existential crisis between 2002 and 2005. In 2003, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described the French and German attitude to the Iraq crisis as a problem.6 He criticised their attitude towards the US strategy and described those countries as the old Europe. Rumsfeld also declared a shift of the centre of gravity in NATO Europe to the East. These statements coincided with celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty between Germany and France. The seriousness of the crisis was only comparable to the 1956 crisis over Suez.7

However, the time after 2005 was characterised by an atmosphere of reconciliation between the US and the Europeans. A further decline of the relations could have resulted in NATO’s breakdown with unforeseeable results. The seemingly rediscovering of the NATO alliance could have also been a result of the engagement of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second term of President George W. Bush in office was characterised by strengthening NATO as forum for cooperation and support. The Alliance was seen as possibility of burden sharing to avoid an overexertion of the US forces.8 While Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer’s time in office was characterised by a close

8Michael Rühle, ‘Entwicklungslinien des Atlantischen Bündnisses,’( Development trajectories of the Atlantic Alliance), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43 (2006), 5; Philip H. Gordon & Jeremy Shapiro, Allies At War, America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, 191; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 141
relationship to France and Russia, Merkel tried to revive the friendship between Germany and the US. However, it was all done on the expense of the French and Russian relations. Nevertheless, the east expansion plans as well as NATO’s role in Afghanistan were still a source of tensions. Especially the ISAF mission proved to be an issue of conflict. During the conflict, the increasing gap between verbal solidarity statements and military engagement of some countries became more and more obvious. The Alliance was further troubled by capacity shortages and the lack of public support. In addition, NATO members could not agree on a common strategy to pacify the country, as national reservations limited the operational possibilities of NATO.

The increasing violent atmosphere that called for more troops was also affecting the status of the NRF. The NRF was declared operational in November 2006 on the NATO summit in Riga. The force once was seen as figurehead of the Transformation did not take part in the ISAF or KFOR missions and increasingly became a burden for the attending nations. A readjustment of the NRF to the circumstances became necessary. The idea was to set up a special troop of high readiness ready for use at all times and support troops with a lower state of alert. However, the unity of NATO was threatened by individual states who would favour national interests more strongly than joint positions. The different positions about the right strategy as well as different national interests made it essential to review NATO’s role.

As a direct result, the new Strategic Concept of 2010 superseded the outdated paper of 1999. The paper was the product of different groups and summarised the need for a collective defence as well as conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities. The 2010 strategy was also based on an edited threat evaluation. NATO member states additionally determined the need to complement its traditional conventional and nuclear

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9 Timo Noetzel & Schreer Benjamin, 'Counter–what? Germany and Counter–Insurgency in Afghanistan,' The RUSI Journal, 153:1, 2008, 42-46(44); Steinhoff , Determinants and Politics on German Military, 141
10 Maren Tomforde, ‘How Much Culture is Needed? The Intercultural Dilemma of the Bundeswehr in ISAF,’ International Peacekeeping, 17:4,2010, 526-538(532); Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics on German Military, 141; Vicent Morelli, Paul Belkin , 'National Caveats, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,' Congressional Research Service 2009
arsenal with new capabilities. These new capabilities included ballistic missile defence as well as cyber defence abilities. NATO also decided to become more involved in areas like energy supply and civilian crisis management. However, the EU already had such capacities in place, which raised questions about the future relations between these two institutions.

In this regard, Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea played an inglorious role. In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus was accepted into the EU without achieving a political answer to the Turkish-Greek conflict over the split island. Due to the continuing problem of a divided Cyprus, a close collaboration between NATO and EU was difficult to achieve. The situation was even aggravated by the fact that Turkey and Greece were both NATO members but only Greece was a member of the EU. Any deepening of NATO–EU relations depended on the cooperation between Turkey and Greece in the Cyprus question to break the stalemate. Therefore, the “Berlin Plus” framework that would have allowed the EU to address NATO capacities was jeopardised. Without recourse to NATO resources, became it necessary for the EU to conduct its mission independently from 2004 onwards. Therefore, it was necessary for the individual EU states to increase their efforts to meet the expectations. As a result, more planning was necessary, which caused delays in the process.

Following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the Lisbon Treaty was labelled as a fresh beginning for the integration efforts. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) previously known, as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), should eventually become a part of the systematic establishment of a common EU policy. This would provide the member states with a stage to intensify their collaboration in security and defence issues. Germany’s refusal to contribute more than a basic support encountered a lack of understanding in France and the United Kingdom. Therefore, France and the United Kingdom decided to enter a defence alliance with each other and hence outside the CSDP. Observers agreed that without France, the United

15Sven Biscop and Nicole Gnesotto et al,’ What do Europeans want from NATO? The EU and NATO: beyond appearances,’ Nicole Gnesotto in European Union Institute for Security Studies, Report No. 8 November 2010
16Mary Elise Sarotte,’The consequences of German military reform for ESDP and NATO,’ The Adelphi Papers, 41:340, 2001, 53-63(58)
17Clara Marina O’Donnel,’ Britain and France should not give up on EU defence co-operation,’ Centre for European Reform, October 2011; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 143
Kingdom, and Germany, the CSDP would not be more than an empty shell. The active participation of these countries was essential for the success of the CSDP.\textsuperscript{19} This development put Germany’s Transformation efforts in serious jeopardy since the decision for the ESDP/CSDP in 1999 was a stimulating cause for the review of the military capabilities of its participants.\textsuperscript{20} Because of the absence of France and the United Kingdom out of their frustration over the progress, it became more than doubtful whether Germany could bridge the gap.\textsuperscript{21} Despite this irritation over the European defence initiative, ESDP operations had a real influence on Germany’s defence and security policy.\textsuperscript{22} The ESDP mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo revealed several drawbacks. The UN asked the EU for armed forces to be used in an assistance operation. When the EU approved the mission in March 2006, Germany was taking over the Operation Commander position and the Operations Command in Potsdam was acting as EU Headquarter for the operation. Germany was also strongly involved with 780 service personnel.\textsuperscript{23} Yet, the mission relentlessly displayed the shortages of the Bundeswehr in strategic airlift capacities.\textsuperscript{24} The mission further underlined the need to increase the capabilities of the Operation Command, as it could not provide enough capacities for the Congo operation and all German out-of-area missions concurrently.

Whereas these kinds of EU missions were clearly defined in length and size, the situation was different for the ISAF mission. The engagement in Afghanistan was the most demanding operation of the Bundeswehr so far. What had started as a peace-building mission with almost no violence had changed over time into a full combat mission in the middle of nation building efforts. The changed security environment was also reflected by an adjusted approach of the Bundeswehr. What started as a mission of around 2,000

\textsuperscript{19} Ronja Kempin and von Ondarza Nicolai, ‘Die GSVP vor der Erosion?’ (CSDP before erosion), SWP-Aktuell 25 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011), 3; Conclusion: German military reform and European security, The Adelphi Papers, 41:340, 2001, 65-70(70); Steinhoff ,Determinants and Politics of German Military, 143
\textsuperscript{21} Mary Elise Sarotte ,’Conclusion: German military reform and European security, The Adelphi Papers, 41:340, 2001, 65-70(70)
\textsuperscript{22} Martina Kolanoski ,’Die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland, Zur Funktion der Parlamentsvorbehalse im Kontext Buendnispolitischer Verpflichtungen,’(Out – of –area missionsof the Bundeswehr , the role of parliamentary approval) (Potsdam: Universitaetsverlag, 2010), 24
\textsuperscript{24} Stefan Mair, ’Auslandeinsaetze der Bundeswehr, Leitfragen. Entscheidungsspielraeume und Lehren,’ SWP Studie,11-20(18); Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military ,144
service personnel carrying out patrols with light equipment in 2003 had completely changed. On 26th February 2010, the Bundestag decided to raise the manning level to a maximum of 5,350 German personnel including a reserve of 350 soldiers. Equipped with armoured vehicles and heavy combat material, the German contingent should fight insurgents in northern Afghanistan. Because of the ISAF mission, several challenges of proceedings, equipment, and command became obvious. Of particular importance were the problems to re-supply the Bundeswehr in its operational area and the unfavourable regional climate. Over time, the Bundeswehr needed to reconsider its engagement as an intensifying conflict called for a growing military presence with more armoured vehicles to protect its personnel against mines and IEDs. In this respect, the ISAF mission provided the perfect stage to gain experience about operational and technical demands for a mission in that kind of environment. In it, some even saw the testing ground for new weapon systems. Yet, the large number of soldiers needed in Afghanistan highlighted the need for light and mobile forces. It also underlined a general opinion namely that the Bundeswehr was lacking infantry units since the end of the Cold War.

In addition, the experience from the ISAF mission seriously questioned the Bundeswehr force categories. The Afghanistan mission mercilessly pointed out the drawbacks as the Stabilisation Force proved itself as inadequate to continue the needed operations. On the contrary, it was necessary to use the Intervention Force for Afghanistan, which was not assigned for that kind of stabilisation operation.

Another issue raised by the ISAF mission, was the likelihood of casualties. The German contingent in Afghanistan was confronted with battle-hardened insurgents and for the first time experienced continuous fighting. German soldiers were now involved in counterinsurgency operations and experienced death and injuries. The lasting effects of fighting on soldiers had not been evaluated in the German Armed Forces. Terms such as combat related deaths, post-traumatic stress disorder or disabilities of home coming

25Guido Steinberg and Wörner Nils, ‘Eskalation im Raum Kunduz - Wer sind die Aufständischen in Nordafghanistan?’ (Escalation in the areas of Kunduz – Who are the insurgents in northern Afghanistan), SWP-Aktuell 84 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010), 4-6
soldiers had so far been more of a theoretical value for Germany. Yet, the ISAF mission changed Germany’s mind-set towards the severe consequences for German soldiers.29 It triggered an intensive debate in German society about the fundamental need of a German engagement in Afghanistan. In the involvement, many saw a provocation against Germany’s peace movement history.

It became clear during the course of the mission that the pacifist belief of many Germans still existed and was not easily overcome. Germany’s willingness to join the Americans in Afghanistan was initially based on Schroeders’ solidarity announcements after 9/11. The supporting German elite faced the dilemma to promote the Afghanistan mission to the German public and then again not to appear as an unconditional supporter of military actions. There was a broad political consensus to highlight the humanitarian and rebuilding efforts of the Bundeswehr. The impression was that the force would rather consist of armed aid workers than soldiers.30 Yet, from 2006 on, the security situation in Afghanistan became more dangerous and insurgency spread especially in the southern and eastern part of the country. Considering the rising violence against foreign troops, it became difficult to maintain the impression of a peacekeeping and stabilisation operation.

To the surprise of its allies, especially those engaged in the southern and eastern part of Afghanistan, the German media coverage appeared to be one-sided. The media described the execution of the operations of Germany’s allies in the south and east as causing increasingly collateral damage. However, the German undertakings in the north were described as peaceful and sensible.31 In the view of intensive fighting, the German government dismissed support requests of the US and NATO to deploy troops to the troubled areas. The German government bearing in mind that a deployment into these areas would face strong internal opposition tried to ignore the requests.32 In 2007, the German government offered as a substitute to deploy Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts to

Afghanistan, which also marked the start of increased combat capabilities. Again, Germany was caught between the international expectations and internal considerations. This had reached its preliminary peak when Defence Minister Jung fiercely tried to avoid the term “armed conflict” or even “war” and it was not until 2008 before Jung used the term “killed in action”.

On the 4th September 2009, reality had caught up with Germany’s ambiguous policy. An air strike southwest of Kunduz City, Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan became the most serious incident in Germany’s post war history. A German colonel ordered air strikes against two fuel tankers stolen by the Taliban. An American F-15E fighter jet attacked the tankers and killed over 90 civilians. Due to the high civilian death toll, the attack had an enormous international and domestic impact. The air strike happened when the concept about the right strategy between Europe and the US came apart. General Stanley McChrystal, then US commander of ISAF, wanted to keep a low profile to avoid unnecessary casualties. The air strike was therefore criticised by the US and Afghan officials and lead to a review of Germany’s participation in Afghanistan in general. The political damage was huge although the government tried to limit the damage as quickly as possible. The result for Defence Minister Jung and Inspector General Schneiderhahn was sobering, as they had to resign. In 2009, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg became the new Defence Minister. zu Guttenberg, a young and ambitious politician, seemed capable to handle the situation. However, the inquiry into the incident continued to widen. In the end, even Chancellor Merkel was summoned before the parliamentary Kunduz committee of inquiry. Some observers stated the Kunduz incident would have

33Timo Noetzel & Thomas Rid, ‘Germany's Options in Afghanistan,’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 51:5, 2009,71-90(84); Merz, ‘Still on the way to Afghanistan,’ 11; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 131
35Anja Seiffert, et al, Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan; Sozial- und politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektiven,(Bundeswehr in Afghanistan) (VS Verlag,2012),56; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 150;
37Stephen Flanagan, Afghanistan: ‘A Stress Test For Transatlantic Security Cooperation, Senior Vice President and Henry A. Kissinger Chair, CSIS; T.J. Cipoletti, Research Associate, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, CSIS; and Amanda Tuninetti, Former Intern, Henry A. Kissinger Chair,CSIS,195, 2011; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics of German Military, 150

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long lasting effects on German defence and security policy. Besides, it would lead to strengthening the “never again war” attitude.  

Another UN operation of that time, which had caused a political discussion, was a mission in Lebanon. Right from the start, it became clear that Germany would support the Lebanon with humanitarian aid after the Israeli military operation in 2006. However, the idea to participate at the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) created some internal resistance. It was believed that it posed too much of a risk to use the Bundeswehr as part of an UN force. The risk of a direct military confrontation with the Israel Defence Force (IDF) was perceived as too high. With Germany’s history, this scenario had to be prevented no matter what. Then again, many saw a special debt to Israel in Germany’s history, which would have called for participation. At the end, the German Bundestag did approve the mission with a large majority. Germany remained prepared to assume greater international responsibility to a stabilisation of the region. In the face of a confrontation between Bundeswehr and IDF, it was decided that only the German Navy would be deployed. 

From a Transformation point of view, the first term in office of Chancellor Merkel could be characterised as the stabilisation and adjustment of the Transformation process. The focus was directed at the continuation and promotion of the Force Structure 2010 and by it continuing the process started by the previous government. The cuts in force strength to 252,500 service personnel severely tested the Bundeswehr in the face of international commitments. A recognisable proof of the stabilisation process was the presentation of the Defence White Paper 2006, the first one since 1994. It was referring to the Defence Policy Guidelines 2003 and the Concept of the Bundeswehr 2004. The White Paper 2006 was

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42 Ernst-Christoph Meier, ‘Vom Verteidigungsauftrag des Grundgesetzes zum Begriff Vernetzter Sicherheit, Zur Politischen Einordnung des Weissbuches 2006– (From the defence task in the Basic Law to the concept of networked security, political classification of the 2006 White Paper) Schriftenreihe des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Institutes der Bundeswehr Bd 8 VS Verlag 53-69(55); Dr. Klaus Brummer, Stefani Weiss Bertelsmann, *Gut, aber nicht gut genug, das neue sicherheitspolitische Weissbuch der Bundesrepublik*
consequently following the chosen path and highlighted crisis management and conflict prevention as the most probable missions. It also now included the war against international terrorism as an important task. Because of the disunity of NATO about the further strategy in Afghanistan and the obvious disagreement within the Alliance over a common Iraq strategy, the White Paper tried to reconcile the opposing positions. It clearly stated the importance of NATO for Europe and especially for Germany as key element of its defence and security policy. However, it also considered the latest development and highlighted the UN and EU important institutions. The White Paper developed the idea of a nexus of security factors. This nexus involved traditional and known tools as well as new economic, educational, and environmental strategies. These were pooled together in a multilateral scheme. Interestingly, the 2006 Defence White Paper also presented the image of Germany as a civilian power, a power that practices preventative conflict resolution with the focus on multinational missions and the use of soft power. Military force should only be the last resort and consequently keeping open the option to use force in legitimate circumstances. The idea of “never again alone” expressed itself in the multilateralism and commitment of Germany in NATO (NRF) and the EU (Battle Groups). The idea of “never again” war resulted in a preference for non-military means. Thus, the incentive for a development of force projection capabilities was less pronounced than in other European countries.

A short time after publishing the Defence White Paper, the Defence Ministry set up an expert panel to review existing procedures for out-of-area missions. The results were presented in July 2007. The findings included recommendations to increase the efficiency in and the coordination between the services such as the standardisation of the training courses for crisis management operations. Given the particular characteristics of planning and conducting missions from peacekeeping to possible combat mission, the Response Forces Operation Command (RFOC) in Ulm, was ideally suited for this purpose. In compliance with the terms of the EU, the RFOC should be able to set up a Force Headquarter (FHQ) operating on site and an Operations Headquarters (OHQ) operating

Deutschland,(Good but not good enough, the security policy White Paper Germany’s), (Guetersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Oktober 2006), 5; Steinhoff, Determinants and Politics on German Military, 151;


from Germany.\textsuperscript{45} As the EU was lacking adequate command structures and despite the constraints of the “Berlin Plus” agreement, it could be evaluated as a clear sign towards the CSDP to use the Ulm command structures. It displayed Germany’s commitment and ambition to remain a valuable partner in Europe. For the command structure, the change of the Operations Branch of the Armed Forces Staff into Joint Operation Staff in 2008 was noteworthy.\textsuperscript{46} The Inspector General was now directly responsible for the Joint Operations Command. It was another step in the restructuring process, to concentrate all responsibilities in the Ministry. In addition, a joint forum of experts was set up to make ministerial expertise at short notice available.\textsuperscript{47} The panel would comprise representatives of the military services as well as members from the civilian departments. This was widely interpreted as signal for the forthcoming end of the separation between militaries and civilians in the Bundeswehr. Instead, an operational approach would be favoured in the future. Then again, it took 16 years to get there.

Although the Merkel government made public statements to push ahead with the Transformation, domestic constraints slowed the progress down. Through the tightening up of the Cold War structures, the government tried to create the needed additional financial room for the Transformation. At the same time, the ISAF mission intensified and the public support was diminishing. Yet, the government had done nothing to promote the necessary social and political debate about the future concept of the German Armed Forces. A clarifying domestic discussion was overshadowed by the ambitions to reconcile with the US and at the same time strengthening the European structures. The consequences of the missing debate were that the Transformation process so far remained

\textsuperscript{45}Bundesministerium der Verteidigung,' Joint Support Service,' http://www.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/streitkraeftebasis?lat/p/c/4/DckxDoAgDADA\_i\_BdnfF-\_p\_ii\_i\_g0DRRNf\_l\_7nx\_MdB6QFMe\_i\_p044rby\_XN4cZVw\_GH8OOU1\_zMK1eb1Bi\_ap29ZOK9JBqF6B-jctoZ\_14c\_EA1'/ accessed 22/09/2012; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, OTL Herald Kammerbauer Streitkraeftebasis, Strategische planung in einer vernetzten Welt 07/2009 http://www.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/streitkraeftebasis?lat/p/c/4/NY\_BC0Mw\_EET\_a\_B\_O\_1\_N\_6\_U3x2ip\_Li\_Sa1S2\_IS1\_VC6cc3\_FJo\_Dc5\_HT9x\_Eqlcb\_Tooxe\_O\_X\_Vi\_Q\_m\_Y\_X\_L\_H\_a\_4\_R3vDRu\_MXhi\_ISSEY\_Y\_HU188Ea\_Y\_FZX\_01z6Qp\_F4x\_O\_X\_M\_p\_S\_H\_a\_N\_j\_A\_G\_h\_N\_P\_x\_7\_USKA\_\_1\_Ubicr\_UK\_AW\_V\_Q\_v\_09f1P\_JPe6b\_PK\_K\_I\_q\_2\_x\_o\_R5\_n\_6\_Avd\_ZnE'/ accessed 30/11/2012; Steinhoff , Determinants and Politics of German Military, 135

\textsuperscript{46}Timo Noetzel & Schreer Benjamin, 'Counter—what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan,' The RUSI Journal, 153:1, 2008, 42-46(45),

more of an internal governmental matter than becoming the necessary national discussion topic.
Chapter Seven

The Process From Conscription to an All Volunteer Force
From 2010-2012

During the Transformation efforts in mid 2009, almost no one could have predicted such a far-reaching restructuring of the armed forces. After a quieter phase between 2005 and 2009, the recent Transformation efforts can only be seen as the result of a complex of matters and events. This nexus of factors had created an exceptional promising sphere. Decisive points of the following Transformation period between 2010 and 2012/13 were a new leadership, a regained meaning of priorities, and the reality of budget savings. In foreign affairs, the aggravated security situation, the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan and deteriorating conditions for the military personnel determined the German foreign policy.

The change of leadership in the Ministry of Defence was closely associated to the Kunduz incident in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz in September 2009.\(^1\) Due to the great political cost, it can be said that this incident had a longstanding impact on Germany’s security thinking. The internal effects were however undisputed. The lack of leadership about the Kunduz incident had led to a replacement of the Minister of Defence.\(^2\) Defence Minister Franz-Josef Jung was ousted and superseded by the new star of the conservative movement Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. With his 38 years, zu Guttenberg personified a new generation of politicians with a new style of leadership. While trying to overcome the Kunduz incident, the Inspector General Schneiderhahn and State Secretary Peter Wichert had to resign.\(^3\) The newly formed leadership team around zu


Guttenberg was complemented with General Wieker as the new Inspector General and Walter Otremba as new State Secretary.\(^4\) The personnel shuffle had caused larger reactions in the armed forces; however, it was a necessary step to set up a more Transformation-orientated leadership. Since the beginning of the new millennium, reform efforts were restrained by contentment and missing seriousness to approach the existing drawbacks. There was a feeling in German politics that as long as it works nothing had to be changed. Yet, in time, the atmosphere in the Bundeswehr had altered drastically. Because of long-lasting engagements in out-of-area missions from the Balkans to Afghanistan, a new awareness of the existing drawbacks had arisen.

The internal strain between outdated Cold War structures and the new spectrum of tasks was growing and aggravating. However, efforts to approach the needs were undertaken without much success.\(^5\) The performance of the Bundeswehr was sobering, the armed forces continued to be bulky and misaligned. The result was a Bundeswehr with too many service personnel and not enough mobility. The Kunduz incident acted as a catalyst for a discussion about change and raised the curtains for a new approach about long-outstanding issues. Shortly after the incident, a newly formed conservative–liberal coalition government had introduced the “Weise Commission”, which had to analyse the command and administrative structures of the Bundeswehr.

The third aspect was the risk of large defence budget cuts. In early 2010, in the middle of the debt and financial crisis, Finance Minister Schaeuble declared that there was a need for austerity programmes to consolidate the federal budget.\(^6\) Considering the necessary consolidation process zu Guttenberg demanded a fundamental change of the overall approach. In the view of financial doubts, he called for an end of the muddling through approach.\(^7\) Shortly afterwards, the German government adopted a cost cutting package worth Euro 80 billion over four years.\(^8\) The austerity measures obligated the

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\(^4\) Periskope ,‘Walther Dr Otremba: new Undersecretary of State in MoD,’ European Security and Defence 1/2010


\(^7\) Jackson Janes, ‘Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform,’ German Issue 25, American Institute for Contemporary Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 2001, viii

defence sector to contribute around Euro 9 billion between 2011 and 2014.\textsuperscript{9} However, the catch was that the given number disguised the real savings of over Euro 14 billion.

Savings like that needed more than just cuts in the procurement sector. It became clear that another round of significant personnel cuts could not be avoided. The Federal Cabinet decided to decrease the Bundeswehr personnel by 40,000.\textsuperscript{10} A turning back was no longer possible and the stage for the Transformation was prepared. In addition, the drawbacks could no longer be masked from the public and aggravated the need for a reorganisation. The new Defence Minister, carried by a wave of public interest and support, was ready to approach the key issues. Yet, the exact extent and correct execution of the necessary changes was still obscure and could not be predicted. However, in accepting that a Transformation was inevitable, it was important to prepare a road map for the future. It was unanimously agreed that as in previous reform efforts, internal and external assessments would play an important role. These reports should help to identify the shortfalls and would make useful recommendations. This came in the form of three assessments. The first assessment was a Bundeswehr internal shortage analysis to discover and term the existing shortfalls. The report was followed by a force-structure assessment conducted by the Inspector General Wieker\textsuperscript{11} and an independent expert panel, the “Weise Commission”, would carry out the third review.\textsuperscript{12} The “Weise Commission” was appointed after the Kunduz incident and should complement the other two reviews. Altogether, they created the sound base for the on-going Transformation process of the German Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet, almost unnoticed by the public the preparations for this comprehensive Transformation had already started much earlier than in the publicised headlines in mid 2010. The respective services were already ordered to conduct internal analysis to support

\textsuperscript{12}Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism, ‘German Politics, 20:4, 2011, 545-567(556)
\textsuperscript{13}Bjorn H Seibert, 'A Quiet Revolution,' The RUSI Journal, 157:1, 2012, 60-69(61)
Within four months between January and April 2010, the services reviewed their capabilities and shortfalls. Eventually in April 2010, the Inspectors of the services declared their findings to the Minister. They made clear that the previous reform efforts had not met the high expectations and that the ambiguous goal to uphold operational readiness with changing personnel strength was difficult to achieve. The anticipated number of deployable troops of the Bundeswehr was too low in contrast to the number of service personnel. The pace of developing a new range of capabilities was also slow. Yet, the result was no surprise as it revealed the lessons already learned from many continuous out-of-area missions. These missions disclosed a lack of deployable troops and the serious shortfalls in the fields of material and equipment. The procurement process was also labelled as too slow and inefficient. The Ministry of Defence itself was also the object of criticism, as it was spared by the reform efforts so far. The assessment urged to reorganise decision–making procedures as well as reorganising the organisational structures. In contrast to the lack of public awareness, the analyses played an important part for the future recommendations of the “Weise Commission”.

In mid 2010, the Federal Cabinet approved the austerity package to stabilise the public finances before the “Weise Commission” had finished its report. The cabinet ordered the MoD to review the impact of a possible 40,000 decrease in personnel on Germany’s defence capabilities. The Defence Minister instructed the Inspector General to assess and present different solutions for Germany’s future defence and security policy. The report was published in August 2010 and included five models. The models differed in the force strength from 150,000 to 210,000 service personnel. The favoured model comprised of a reduced force strength of 163,500 and an end to conscription.

14German Armed Forces face big changes, Strategic Comments, 16:10,2010, 1-3 (1); Verband der Beamten der Bundeswehr,’ Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010 Vom Einsatz her denken, Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz,’ (Structural Commission report) http://www.vbb.dbb.de/pdf/bericht_strukturkommission.pdf accessed 04/06/2012
15Bundesministerium der Verteidigung,’ Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr,’(Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr), Berlin 12 April 2010
18Christian Schmidt ,’ Ausgestaltung einer neuen Bundeswehr – Schritte in eine modern Zukunft,’ Politik und Sicherheit September 2010,3; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ’Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfungsauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur,’( Statement Inspector General, examination of the Bundeswehr on governmental order) vom 7 Juni 2010, 31
Although there was an internal discussion about the future of the compulsory military service, the report of the Inspector General represented a revolution. The highest-ranking soldier of the Bundeswehr suggested an end to the conscription. The political strategist zu Guttenberg used the chance to start a discussion about an end of the compulsory military service in Germany.\textsuperscript{19}

Eventually, the “Weise Commission” presented its review in October 2010. It also recommended an end to the compulsory military service, and an overall force strength of 180,000.\textsuperscript{20} Unfortunately, the Commissions’ review offered little information about the realisation of the proposed changes. The report concentrated more on reorganising the Ministry and the administration. In particular, the barriers within the Ministry were criticised and the numbers of authorisation needed in the decision-making process. The review also criticised the complicated procurement process of military equipment. In particular, the lengthy period between draft and operation of a new system was noticed. On this basis, the “Weise Commission” made several suggestions for improvements. The MoD should reduce its personnel by 50 per cent to 1,500. The long-standing geographical division of the MoD should finally be ended and all departments should be transferred

\textsuperscript{19}Tom Dyson,’Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century,’ \textit{Defence Studies}, 11:2,2011, 244–270(250),
\textsuperscript{20}Verband der Beamten der Bundeswehr,’Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010, Vom Einsatz her denken, Konzentration, flexibilitaet , Effizienz,’ Oktober 2010,10  
from Bonn to Berlin. Other cost-saving measures were the decrease of the number of the services to four, with fusing Joint Medical Service and Joint Support Service together. In addition, the number of civilian employees should be reduced by 25,000 to 50,000. The procurement process stood out among all the measurements. It should be made more efficient and adjusted to the specific needs of the Bundeswehr. This was a tantamount to a reorganisation of the MoD including its command and control structures. As part of the reorganisation idea, the Commission recommended that certain service parts should be outsourced to civilian contractors and organisations. The Commission highlighted the restructuring measure that aimed for an improvement of efficiency, with clearly defined responsibilities and a reduced number of command levels.

The reaction to the proposed changes was intense and mixed. In particular, the demand to abolish the compulsory military service touched the raw nerves of many politicians. Conscription has always been seen as a special bond and safeguard between military and society. Yet, after the Cold War, the need of a compulsory military service was suddenly questioned. German politicians were divided over the question of the compulsory military service. The supporters of the military service were worried, not at least out of economic reasons. An abolishment of the conscription would afterwards lead to economic loss due to troop cuts and base closures. Another issue intensively discussed was the prospect of budget cuts and a reduced Bundeswehr. Concerns were raised whether the anticipated budget would put Germany on a back seat of military powers in Europe. In particular, the danger that Germany would no longer be able to fulfill international expectations in the European Union and NATO lead to that conclusion. To reunite the different sides and weaken the critics, zu Guttenberg introduced a new idea of a voluntary military service from 12 to 24 months. Carried by zu Guttenberg energetic appearance and his strive for change the so far largest Transformation of the Bundeswehr had started.

The first step was the decision of the German government to stop conscription and decide over the new size of the Bundeswehr of 185,000 service personnel. Yet, a change

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21 Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being”? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,’ German Politics, 20:4,2011, 545-567(557)
23 Bertold Meyer,‘Vom Ende her denken. Bundeswehrreform und Parteiendemokratie,’(to think about the consequences, Bundeswehr reform and party democracy), Das Parlament, 48/2011,16-23
of leadership happened at a critical point while imposing the Transformation. zu Guttenberg resigned from office in March 2011 and Thomas de Maiziere followed him as new Minister of Defence.\(^{25}\) Despite the changed political atmosphere, the implementation of the Transformation had just started.

Reaffirming the continuation of the Transformation efforts, de Maiziere presented his key issues in May 2011. Thomas de Maiziere underlined the importance of precise data to be able to go on with the Transformation. He also tried to bring in his own notes by preparing an updated edition of Defence Policy Guidelines 2011.\(^{26}\) The new guidelines assumed the Bundeswehr would be challenged by the whole spectrum of scale and intensity. The guidelines concurrently underlined the most probable tasks for the Bundeswehr as conflict prevention and crisis management. This resulted in a much more convincing picture of the 2011 guidelines than for the 2003 ones.

Simultaneously, de Maiziere ordered the appointment of task forces to prepare details of the reorientation process. In early 2011, the first conclusions had been declared, with the project teams to prepare further details. At the end of May 2011, the Defence Minister presented the cornerstones of the “Reorientation of the Bundeswehr” as further continuation of the Transformation process.\(^{27}\) Key features had been reorganising the Ministry of Defence as well as the civilian Federal Defence Administration. It partially referred to the “Weise Commission” as the Transformation process should include all levels of responsibility of the MoD.\(^{28}\) It was planned to downsize the Ministry by over 30 per cent. It was anticipated to achieve the reductions mainly by outsourcing measurements. The position of the Inspector General would finally be included in the chain of command. Strengthening the Inspector General however, happened at the expenses of the respective service inspectors. The chain of command would run from the Minister of Defence to the Inspector General and finally to the services chiefs. As a result, for the first time in Bundeswehr history, the Inspector General would exercise command over all Bundeswehr

\(^{27}\)German Federal Ministry of Defence, The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, (Berlin: May 18, 2011)
\(^{28}\)Tom, Dyson, ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,‘ German Politics, 20:4:2011, 545-567(557)
Besides, he would also be responsible for out-of-area missions and the readiness for use and capacities. The support services will be uncoupled from the Ministry and assigned to delegated authorities.

The importance of these changes should not be underestimated. They constituted to a comprehensive restructuring of a long-standing command organisation. The proposed changes were not the result of a rushed decision-making process but they were imposed after decade long reviews. A much less recognised change but similar important was the end of the separation between civilians and militaries in the MoD. The divide was the result of public mistrust in the military establishment after the Second World War. The new organisational structure will be a mixed staff of service personnel. Yet, the downsizing process had not just been exclusive to the military branch. The civilian Federal Defence Administration (FDA), as a stand-alone service but under MoD authority also had to cope with personnel cuts. The FDA was responsible for human resource management and material demands had to stand personnel cuts for the past decade. The numbers were reduced from 124,000 in the year 2000 to 76,200 in 2010. Yet, further cuts were introduced to reduce the personnel to 55,000.

Defence Minister de Maiziere proclaimed that the reform process would not effect the classification into Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the Joint Support Service and the Joint Medical Service. In this respect, de Maiziere did not follow the recommendations of the “Weise Commission”, which suggested a merging of Joint Medical Service and Joint Support Service. The previous differentiation between the Intervention Forces and Stabilisation Forces had not been continued. This followed a recommendation of the Inspector General’s report to move away from a classification in categories. At this point, the report noted that a dual system with a clear-cut distinction between Intervention and Stabilisation Forces in the present strategic environment would no longer be able. This was in contrast to the operational environment of the 2003 defence reform.

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29Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being”? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,” German Politics, 20:4, 2011, 545-567(556)
30Bjoern H Seibert,‘A Quiet Revolution,” The RUSI Journal, 157:1, 2012, 60-69(64)
Simultaneously, the MoD announced large force cuts of 67,500 military personnel by 2015. Eventually the armed forces would encompass 185,000 service personnel. Out of this number, 10,000 service personnel should be operational. The personnel cuts will be exercised fittingly through all services of the Bundeswehr. It however was not the intention of the reorganisation to shift the internal weight of the individual services.

Supposing the smallest number of short-term volunteers the personnel strength of the three services would be as follows. The Army will be manned with 57,570, Air Force 22,550 and Navy with 13,050 service personnel. The Joint Medical Service with 14,620 and Joint Support Service with 36,750 service personnel as well as 30,460 personnel in training and administrative positions complete the picture.

The restructuring effort of de Maiziere resulted in a Bundeswehr with a small armoured centrepiece and by it, the complete opposite of the Cold War orientated Bundeswehr. It was anticipated to reduce the number of Army brigades from eleven to eight. Under the reform concept, six multi-role brigades had been assigned to them. Each of these brigades consisted of infantry, armoured reconnaissance, logistic and engineer forces in battalion strength. All of these brigades should be under control of two division headquarters. In addition, an artillery battalion was planned to be under direct divisional control. The divisions for special operations and for airborne operations would eventually merge into a single command. This command included an air-assault force in brigade strength as well as special operation forces. The light–infantry brigade as part of the Franco-German Brigade would complete the picture. Consequently, the German Army had changed from an armoured heavyweight into a lighter medium force. The Army’s armoured components will be cut back for light infantry battalions. These light battalions would be increased from six to eight. Because of the changing focal points within the Army, equipment adjustments became necessary. The numbers of main battle tanks, Leopard 2, had to be reduced by 35 per cent and the heavy artillery, Panzerhaubitze 2000 by 45 per cent. Concurrently the number of armoured personnel carriers like Fuchs and Boxer would remain unchanged at 765 and 272. The same applies for the light armoured reconnaissance system Fennek with 212 vehicles. In addition, the Army aviation units will be transferred to the Air Force, though the new NH-90 helicopters should stay in the

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33Formuszewicz, Willing and (un)able, New Defence policy Guyidelines and Reorientation, 7
35German Armed Forces face big changes, Strategic Comments, 16:10,2010, 1-3 (3)
36Alexander Neu , ’Bundwehr –sparen oder ruesten,’ (Bundwehr to save or to prepare), in Wissenschaft &Frieden 2011-3 Soldaten im Einsatz 12-14(12)
Army. Instead of the planned two units with 80 Tiger attack helicopters, the Army will only use one unit with 40 helicopters.

The Air Force had to face similar reorganisation tasks. It had to give up its divisional organisation and was restructured into two commands. These commands consist of operation and support command. Thus, all aviation and air defence units had been combined into the operational command. In addition, it had to absorb a massive fleet cutback as the number of Tornado aircrafts will be reduced by over 50 per cent and will be earlier decommissioned. The replacement aircraft Typhoon Eurofighter will now be ordered in smaller numbers, three wings with 140 aircraft. That means one wing less than originally planned and a reduced stock of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. In particular, the outdated Transall transport aircraft will be reduced by 25 per cent and the not less outdated transport helicopter Ch-53G by 22 per cent.

The Navy reorganised its fleet into two flotillas and one air branch. It provides that the flotillas will consist of 11 frigates. The new class of frigates F-125 are to replace the outdated Bremen-class ones. The Bremen class frigates can therefore be phased out earlier than planned. However, the number of the new Corvette class will stay the same with five units as well as the number of the new Submarines 212A with six units planned. Yet, the naval patrol capacities with eight P-3C Orions aircraft will be maintained within the Navy. The ageing Sea King and Sea Lynxes helicopters are to be replaced with 30 new NH90 helicopters. The number of multi-role combat ships is planned to be reduced by two to six.

The discussion about the possible procurement of “Killing Drones” is a further indication of Germany’s rapidly maturing attitude towards European and international defence and security. In this regard, financial cooperation and industrial policy will play an important role. At the moment, no European country is willing or able to finance and develop a national medium-altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle. Nevertheless, the European defence industry has already started to research development

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38German Armed Forces face big changes, Strategic Comments, 16:10,(2010), 1-3 (2); Bjoern H Seibert, ‘A Quiet Revolution,’ The RUSI Journal, 157:1, 2012, 60-69 (66)
40German Armed Forces face big changes, 16:10,(2010),1-3 (2); Dyson Tom (2011): ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,’ German Politics, 20:4, 545-567(558); Bjoern H Seibert,’ A Quiet Revolution,’ The RUSI Journal, 157:1, 2012, 60-69(66); Sebastian Schulte , ‘Germany’s Bundeswehr Prepares for Reform,’ Jane’s Weekly 12 October 2011
projects. However, the ethical consequences of killings by armed drones operated on-screen from a safe distance, have not been full researched.\textsuperscript{42} It can be assumed, the lesson learned from the past, is going to enforce that the debate about the use of armed drones and will therefore be the subject of brisk discussions.

It soon became obvious that such radical changes in size and structure would have another impact on the existing basing structure. In October 2011, de Maiziere declared a new basing concept based on these changes. The goal was to keep the regional distribution as well as to consider military needs. Nevertheless, the announced number of base closures had been significant and at the end, only 264 out of 394 bases should stay. The restructuring base concept will be completed between 2015 and 2017. Even the operational command centres of the three services had not been spared and will be relocated into the new federal states.\textsuperscript{43}

Eventually, the tight public budget left a big question mark hanging over the financing of the Transformation. Yet, without the guaranteed financial means, no Transformation model would be successful. Since 2005, the German defence budget had been almost constant with 1.4 per cent of GDP. The noted raise of the budget in 2006 was owed to a mere accountant measure.\textsuperscript{44} Among others the pension claims of past service personnel, had now been included into the defence budget.

Right from the start, concerns existed about the practicability of the announced budget cuts. Yet, not one of the five presented models came close to the proposed savings. The chosen model four would allow roughly Euro 4 billion savings within a time frame of four years to 2014. This number has been deceptive, as the savings were opposed by increased costs of the new all-volunteer force.\textsuperscript{45} To keep and enlist qualified personnel would become an expensive venture. Other countries, which had already done the transition to an all-volunteer force, had to make more funds available to cover the costs of

\textsuperscript{42}Marcel Dickow\&Hilmar Linnenkamp, ‘Kampfdrohnen- Killing Drones,’ \textit{SWP Aktuell 75} December 2012; Jorge Benitez \textit{NATO Source Alliance News Blog Germany Plans to deploy Armed Drones January 25, 2013}
\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Stationierungskonzept 2011 der Bundeswehr,} \url{http://www.bundeswehr.de/bwde/Stationierungsbroschuere2011.pdf} accessed 28/11/2012
\textsuperscript{45}Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,’ \textit{German Politics}, 20:4,2011, 545-567(558); Formuszewicz, ‘Willing and (un)able, New Defence Policy Guidelines and Reorientation,’ 10
recruitment and retention.46 As a result, the MoD made a proclamation to make more money available until 2015 in support of recruitment and retention measures.47

The other cornerstone of the cost savings notion was the procurement sector. Because of long-term commitments and legally binding agreements with the defence industry and international partners, it had been necessary to renegotiate existing agreements to achieve notable savings. Unquestionably, the reconsideration of expensive procurement projects would result in long and medium term savings. However, renegotiations with the defence industry or international partners are going to be extensive and possible result in high short-term expenses. Since fiscal consolidation relies crucially on spending retrenchment, the defence budget could not avoid its share. The most probable recommendation would be an arrangement to split up the proposed cuts over a certain period.

Over the last couple of years, the Bundeswehr had experienced one of the most extensive restructuring undertakings since its foundation. This process had continued to advance where the previous ones had failed. The shift from a conscription-armed force to an all-volunteer one and the opening up of the armed forces to females should not be underestimated. Without the burden of conscripts, Germany will have the chance to configure its armed forces for future challenges. The idea of a smaller, but at the same time more flexible Bundeswehr with the means to cover a wide range of tasks will reflect much more the new strategic environment. However, force Transformation was just one cornerstone of the reform efforts. Transforming the MoD was equally important. All these changes display a much more advanced attitude of German defence and security policy, even though the necessary debate about a national strategy had still been carelessly neglected.48

46Daniel Moeckli,’ Wehrpflicht im Europäischen Vergleich,’ (European conscription in comparison), CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 75 Juni 2010 (1-3)
47Bundeswehr benötigt jährlich bis zu 27.000 neue Soldaten und Soldatinnen,’ (Bundeswehr needs up to 27,000 new soldiers annually), 16.03.2011, http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2011_03/2011_112/03.html accessed 28/11/2012
Conclusion

This thesis had the objective to picture the development of the Bundeswehr from a Cold War force to a modern military force. It also examines the social, economic, and governmental influences on Germany’s security and defence policy in general and on the armed forces in particular. To understand Germany’s relation to its armed forces, a broad approach was needed, which included internal and external factors.¹

In this regard, two organisations, NATO and the EU, played an important role in Germany’s history. They provided West Germany with the necessary security guarantees and economic possibilities, needed to mark a new beginning after the Second World War. The integration into the Western community of states enabled West Germany to regain part of its sovereignty in 1954. The Cold War and the constant threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact for which NATO was designed, became a fundamental part of West Germany’s security and defence doctrine. Thus, the German Bundeswehr became an essential element of the NATO’s forward defence strategy. Its static structure in combination with the NATO strategy determined the role of the Bundeswehr as a pure defence force. As many other NATO armies, the German Bundeswehr had to deal with major reorganisation efforts after the Warsaw Pact was disbanded at the end of the Cold War. Because of its structure and organisation, the Bundeswehr was more affected by the changes than many other armed forces. Yet, the end of the Cold War created the chance to redefine and reinvent itself for Germany. Simultaneously to the anticipated normalisation, an increased expectation of the international community towards a reunited Germany had approached to accept its new role in the community of states. Consequently, Germany had to assume more political and military responsibility. The resulting adjustments in the spectrum of tasks and structure of the German Armed Forces called for a thorough renewal process, which can be identified as the Transformation of the Bundeswehr.

The period in the early 1990s was characterised by the enormous challenges of the reunification process. In addition, the Bundeswehr had to cope with the integration and dissolution of the NVA and to fulfill the obligation of the “Two plus Four” treaty to massively reduce personnel and material. Following the Cold War, in the light of new challenges and uncertainties, the necessity for a fresh era of interrelation between NATO

¹Gerhard Kümmel,’The winds of change: the transition from armed forces for peace to new missions for the Bundeswehr and its impact on civil–military relations’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 26:2,2003, 7-28 (8)
and the EU had become apparent. Germany, as member of both organisations, supported ambitious reforms of the EU and promoted a stronger European pillar of NATO. The Bundeswehr took first tentative steps under UN patronage to get involved in out-of-area missions, although Cold War structures and equipment turned the first missions into a challenge.

The German ambitions, as aspiring middle power in 1990s, were soon brought back to reality as the wished for permanent seat at the UN Security Council was denied for Germany. It became also apparent that Germany’s political and military power was deeply integrated in the European and NATO structures and therefore only of limited use for national interest. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 regarding the accordance of out-of-area missions with the Basic Law prepared the ground for future missions. Although operating in a legally secure context, the Bundeswehr was still in the process of adjusting itself to the new challenges of out-of-area missions.

The first term in office for Chancellor Schroeder between 1998 and 2002 was marked by the Kosovo conflict and the 9/11 terror attacks against the US. The Kosovo war was a watershed for Germany as the Bundeswehr had taken part in its first combat mission since the Second World War. Yet, the gap between the political ambitions and the reality of military shortcomings was more than sobering. Although the participation of Bundeswehr was a major step forward, it was still missing modern equipment and material to operate on the same level as its allies. Ambitious reforms embracing various aspects from national command structures for out-of–area missions to the foundation of the Joint Support Service had been started and implemented. Following the terror attacks of 9/11, Chancellor Schroeder said the US could be sure of Germany’s unrestricted solidarity. In the aftermath of the terror attacks, Germany became involved in its so far most demanding out-of-area operation, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

The period from 2002 onwards was shaped by demanding out-of-area missions and the ever-decreasing funds of the defence budget. The “Weizsaecker Commission” already stated in its status report of the Bundeswehr in 2000, that it was oversized, wrongly organised and outdated. Defence Minister Struck, who assumed office in July 2002, at a time of upheaval due to the terror attacks in the US, ordered a revision of the previous reform efforts. International crisis management missions and contributions in the war

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against international terrorism should not be included in the expanded spectrum of tasks. The results of the revision were reflected in the Defence Policy Guidelines 2003. In 2004, Struck announced the three ways split of the Bundeswehr force into a highly professional Intervention Force for high intensity missions, a larger Stabilisation Force for medium and low intensity operations and a Support Force. The new classification should guarantee the Bundeswehr the sustainability, as the forces were now mission orientated, equipped and trained. Yet, the Afghanistan mission questioned the 2004 introduced force categories. As the Stabilisation Force was not adequate to face the situation, the Intervention Force had to be deployed. However, the Intervention Force was not designed for such stabilisation operations.

Between 2005 and 2009, Germany experienced the first coalition government between CDU/CSU and SPD since 1969. The grand coalition tried to continue the started Transformation process, backed by its large majority in the Bundestag. The foreign policy was still marked by the German commitment in Afghanistan and the endeavours to reconcile the relations to the US, which had come under stress because of the Iraq war in 2003. This period was also marked by the efforts of the EU to become an independent actor on the international stage of foreign policy. In 2009, the Bundeswehr caused the Kunduz incident with over 90 civilians killed and attracted criticism both domestically and abroad. As a result, politicians and parts of the public questioned the participation of the German Armed Forces in the ISAF mission. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg succeeded Franz-Josef Jung as Defence Minister, who resigned after the Kunduz airstrike. Defence Minister zu Guttenberg tried to provide new impulses for the Transformation, by addressing the compulsory military service.

The high point of the reform endeavours was reached when the new Defence Minister de Maiziere proclaimed "The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr" in May 2011. In this context, relevant keywords had been safeguarding Germany’s national interests, assuming international responsibility and creating security cooperations. The undertaking had been ambitious and drastic in its scope and size, considering the obsolete structures of the Cold War, yet absolute necessary. The centrepiece of the Reorientation had been the suspension of the compulsory military service and the creation of a smaller expeditionary force. The reform should also be orientated to the needed capabilities. It had been

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necessary for the Bundeswehr, to perform in line with the challenges of a changed strategic environment and to adjust its structures and organisation accordingly. However, this adjustment was just another mosaic stone of a bigger picture.⁴ The approach also involved the capabilities, abilities, and procedures of the Bundeswehr. What followed was an unprecedented Reorientation process of all five services in the Bundeswehr. It was intended that the Army, Air Force and Navy as well as the Joint Support Service and Joint Medical Service would have to fundamentally change its command structure. Even the Defence Ministry had to contribute, as it had to cut its staff by half. The total number of service personnel would be reduced from 220,000 down to 185,000. This figure comprises of 170,000 of professional and temporary soldiers and includes reserve personnel. 5,000 to 10,000 of the service personnel should be constituted from voluntary-service conscripts.⁵ Out of the 185,000 soldiers, 10,000 should be available at all times. By reducing the armed forces, it was simultaneously planned to concentrate and improve decision-making processes to achieve more room for manoeuvre in the human resource and equipment sector. New security challenges, a demographic shift, and financial sustainability will eventually result in different requirements for the personnel and reduced numbers with shorter regeneration periods. During the Reorientation, the flexible and requirement-orientated adjustment of personnel structures has been derived from the needed capacities and tasks. The numerical adjustment of non-commissioned officers and enlisted ranks was owed to the Transformation from a conscription-armed force to a volunteer one. The personnel structural model PSM 185 should provide a solid basis to face the demographic changes and guarantee sustainable personnel recruitment. It ensured operational readiness as well as a high level of endurance in sustained operations.⁶ This was a formidable challenge considering that the Bundeswehr consisted of up to 500,000 military personnel at the end of the 1980s. As part of the Reorientation, all arms projects were reviewed. The most important objective was to adjust the equipment to the requirements of possible missions and at the same time to create financial scope for future projects. In 2012, around 20 per cent of the defence budget was available for defence investments such as equipment, procurement, research and development. Even though the pure number

⁴Thiele, ‘On the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr,’ 1
⁵Prof. Dr. J. Schnell Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (New orientation of the Bundeswehr) Universität der Bundeswehr 2012, 14
⁶Bundeswehr, Informationen zum Personalstrukturmodell (PSM) 185, (Information about structure model PSM 185)03/07/2012, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/ut/p/c4/HcvBDYAgDAXQWVyyvXizC_VW9EaSCVQZH2NeefHO39MHo3ieptkXnk7dA6DwjhBzSvU UXVcDjLoOiOaSvVukgr-UtIyvT10JgJ/? accessed 20/11/2012
appears to be sufficient, 95 per cent of the investment budget was already bound by long-term contracts.\(^7\) The next step was to confront the arms industry with the reality of reduced financial means. The progress of the Transformation of the Bundeswehr had so far gone according to plan. Even though the ideas for a new Bundeswehr were slowly beginning to take shape, the Transformation/Reorientation of the Bundeswehr was still in its early stages. Besides, the further development of a national strategy incorporated in Germany’s security and defence policy was still needed.

Therefore, the Defence Policy Guidelines 2011 recommended that the European nations should share and pool its capabilities to become more capable. These strategies have been seen as effective means to share the burden of cost intensive military forces. However, it remains to be seen, how the intensifying European debt crisis and a US economy still faltering, will affect Germany security and defence policy. We can predict neither how serious the global economic and debt crisis will be nor how long it will last. So far, the upswing in Germany proved to be relatively sturdy. A deterioration of the financial situation, however, might have serious effects for the Transformation process of the Bundeswehr. The defence budget would be likely to come under more pressure to take its share to achieve and maintain a sound federal budget.\(^8\) It is also still unclear whether and to what extent the NATO alliance will be a catalyst for the coming changes in the Bundeswehr. The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 stayed uncertain over the next steps despite some initiative approaches on the fields of cyber or missile defence.\(^9\)

Within a few years, the Bundeswehr has evolved from a purely defence orientated armed force into an interventionist and multi-purpose instrument of German security and foreign policy. Such a fundamental change cannot be ordered, in reality the cooperation and participation of all actors involved, was necessary. With a reasonable likelihood, the Transformation/Reorientation will allow the Bundeswehr to meet the growing expectations and new challenges with an upgraded arsenal of military capabilities. Because of this development, the armed forces will be able to conduct a wide range of military activities including combat missions and successful counterinsurgency strategies.

\(^7\) BundesverteidigungsMinisterium, Rede VerteidigungsMinister: Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr – Eine Antwort auf die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit, Berlin 14/06/2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDehINahpQhePaj11nmzhiUmKeu2Xvx4k0N n4MHwGHxaXlbB6eck5vxicPExp_ELY9wCRE78URJe13iS975ByFPCR717gikn0kqlpFwYxGkWWLLoX M0qUgyw8HYvjPW7LG.47291temMz21u-ES4_kFK0EpHg!!/ accessed 10/12/2012

\(^8\) Europe Parliament, ‘The impact of the financial crisis on European defence,’ Directorate-General for external policies of the union, April 2011, 15

However, the further development of Bundeswehr capacities is just one of the challenges lying ahead. The ongoing societal adjustment of Germany’s anti-military attitude to the new strategic climate and the use of military force are still not completed. After the Cold War, Germany experienced an unprecedented phase of peace. Over 40 years of Cold War and more than 20 years without existential danger had its impact on Germany’s society. The determination and willingness to undergo sacrifices involving life-threatening missions for its soldiers was at a low level.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, this attitude will continue to restrict the deployment possibilities of the armed forces for an indefinite period. In regards to future missions of the Bundeswehr, it will be doubtful if the German government will give up its reluctance for more responsibility. The absence of Germany from NATO actions against the Gaddafi regime in Libya underlined the predominant culture of reticence towards an intensification of international missions.\textsuperscript{11} However, this decision was further aggravated by the fact of internal state elections, which had been important for the federal government.\textsuperscript{12} Summarised, is it likely to assume that the German government will be selective in its choice of international missions and mainly be based on national reflections.\textsuperscript{13}

Considering the incurious public and political elite unable to start a national debate, it is one of the biggest problems of the new professional force to find capable volunteers.\textsuperscript{14} Yet, it would be short sighted today, to watch out for the changes in the armed forces alone. Those supporting such a position are overlooking another central aspect of change: nowadays the military is only one tool amongst many of security and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{10}Gerhard Kuemmel & Leonhard Nina, ’Death, the Military and Society Casualties and Civil-Military Relations in Germany,’ Straussberg SOWI 10 et seq, 2005
\textsuperscript{12}Justyna Gotkowaska, ’Germany’s stance on the Libyan crisis as a function of German internal policy,’ Center for Eastern Studies 2011.
\textsuperscript{13}Dalvi Sameera ,‘The Post-Cold War Role of the Bundeswehr: A Product of Normative Influences,’ European Security, 7:1,(1998) 97-116(107)
\textsuperscript{15}Rolf Clement ,’Die neue Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik,’Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B11/2004,40-46 (46)
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