FIGHTING AGAINST ALLIES:
An Examination of “National Caveats” Within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness

2002-2012

VOLUME II: APPENDICES

A Doctoral Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Defence and Strategic Studies

at

Massey University, Manawatū
New Zealand

Regeena Kingsley
2014
VOLUME II
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1

A Case-Study:

Disparate ROE within the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) & the 2004 Kosovo Crisis

In order to illustrate the significant and often negative impact of diverse ROE on a multinational security campaign (discussed in Chapter 4), the following case-study will provide an in-depth account of the way in which contrasting sets of ROE, including national caveat limitations and prohibitions, impacted upon the NATO KFOR operation during the Kosovo Riots of 2004.

Historical Background

In 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a multiethnic entity located in the Balkans of south-eastern Europe, suddenly and dramatically broke apart. The State, comprised of six constituent republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina), had hitherto been held together since the end of the Second World War by a combination of communism and the iron grip and political cunning of Socialist Yugoslav leader, Marshall Josip Broz Tito. However, Tito’s death in 1980 and the subsequent collapse of communism throughout Europe from 1989-1991 sounded the death knell for the Yugoslavian State. Together these two events became the catalyst for a series of violent and bloody inter-ethnic clashes among Yugoslavia’s various ethnic groups, which lasted over a decade.

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

By the end of 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had dissolved with four republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia – declaring independence from Serbia and central rule from the Serbian capital, Belgrade. In reaction, Serbia joined with Montenegro to create a new Yugoslavian Republic – the so-called ‘Greater Serbia’ – which at that time also included the province of Kosovo (the latter stripped of its autonomy).

The political dissolution and reconfiguration of Yugoslavian territory and sovereignty also divided the Yugoslavian people groups within the population. In particular, a stringent divide appeared between two communities scattered throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, namely between Christian Serbs and Muslims of various ethnicities – Croat, Bosnian and Albanian. Generally-speaking, the former wished to become part of ‘Greater Serbia’, while the latter desired independence. The result was catastrophic: whereas Slovenia and Macedonia, with a small minority of Serbs (less than 10 per
cent) were able to secede from the Federation with minimal fighting, violence erupted all over the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Serb population, though still the minority, comprised a higher 12 – 31 per cent respectively of the total population.

In Croatia, brutal fighting between Croats and Serbs led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Muslim Croat refugees. These Croats would later regain most of their territory in 1995 through military raids and the revenge expulsion of 200,000 Serbs. In Bosnia by contrast, where the Serb population was greater, the campaign for a Greater Serbia was supported politically from Belgrade and militarily through the deployment of the large Serbian Yugoslavian Army. Consequently, Muslim Bosnians were concertedly driven out and even massacred through planned military operations – a phenomenon known as ‘ethnic cleansing’. Over the next two years thousands of Muslim Bosnians were killed and more than a million displaced by the fighting.

An international intervention in the form of a NATO air bombing campaign – the first military campaign ever conducted by the organisation – eventually drove the Serbians to the negotiating table however. The result was the 1995 Dayton Accord, which ended the wars and divided the fraught Bosnian territory into two ethnically-dominated administrative regions, each with their own government, parliament and army – the Bosnian Muslim ‘Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and the Serbian Bosnian ‘Republic of Srpska’. Approximately sixty thousand heavily-armed IFOR troops were deployed to Bosnia to enforce the diplomatic treaty, an international contingent drawn from thirty NATO and non-NATO nations, including Russia.

![Map of Yugoslavia prior to and following its fragmentation](image)

*Figure A1.1 – The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Map of Yugoslavia prior to and following its fragmentation.*
Conflict in Kosovo

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo occurred four years later in 1999, when Serbian forces within Greater Serbia again began to carry out ethnic cleansing operations. This time the violence was directed against Muslim Albanians within Kosovo, a province which was widely considered to belong to Serbia but in which Serbs formed the minority population. In its attempt to create a stable Yugoslavian settlement, the Dayton Accord had failed to return to Kosovo its historical right of autonomy, which by 1995 had been abolished for a period of nine years. The lack of redress prompted Albanian militants to react by founding a paramilitary entity called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

Beginning with small-scale attacks on Serb policemen in 1995, the KLA soon attracted so much support from the majority Albanian population of Kosovo (at that time comprising approximately 90 per cent of the total population) that within a few years in 1998, the KLA was embarking on open rebellion on the streets of Kosovo and calling for full independence from Serbia. President Milosovic, then President of Serbia, reacted by sending in the Serbian Army to quell the uprising. This was an order which resulted not only in widespread and continuous military engagements between the Yugoslav Army and the KLA, but also, once again, in widespread ethnic cleaning against the civilian population. As with Croatia and Bosnia, the ‘indiscriminate use of force’ by the Yugoslav Army and Serbian security forces resulted in massacres, atrocities, the displacement of 300,000 people from their homes (50,000 of which fled to the forests and mountains), and the exodus of nearly one million Albanian refugees from Kosovo. The influx of Kosovar refugees seeking refuge from the Serbian rampage in turn destabilised the neighbouring countries of Albania and Macedonia and raised concerns that the inter-ethnic conflict might spread even further within the Balkan region or even reignite tensions in Bosnia. So dire was the situation that British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, described these events as ‘a throwback to the worst memories of the twentieth century’.

Nearly a year after the violence had begun in Kosovo, and with winter approaching, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199 warning of an ‘impending humanitarian catastrophe’ representing ‘a threat to peace and security in the region’, and demanding an immediate end to hostilities. The Security Council could not, however, reach agreement concerning a military intervention, making diplomacy their only means of resolving the crisis. Six months of intense negotiations with Yugoslavia and Kosovo followed, undertaken by the Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Balkans Contact Group and by NATO. However, these endeavours ended repeatedly in failure as the Serbian government repeatedly broke its agreements, refusing to adhere with UNSC resolutions demanding a cease-fire and an end to hostilities – even despite multiple extensions of deadlines (indeed it became clear that even while diplomatic negotiations were taking
place at Rambouillet in France, Serbian forces in Kosovo had received orders from Belgrade to prepare for a large offensive against both the KLA and the Kosovar Albanian community).\textsuperscript{15}

**NATO’s Military Intervention**

On 24 March 1999, NATO officially recognised the failure of diplomacy to resolve the crisis and launched *Operation Allied Force* against Serbian forces in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{16} The operation was only the second military campaign in NATO’s entire history and the first explicitly conducted to protect NATO’s founding values – rather than the territory of its members – in order to both prevent the unfolding of a humanitarian disaster and delegitimise the act of ethnic cleansing, even when occurring outside NATO’s own borders.\textsuperscript{17}

The intervention consisted of a 78-day air bombardment campaign against Serbian military and infrastructural targets both in Kosovo and Yugoslavia itself, namely Serbia and Montenegro.\textsuperscript{18} The air campaign involved over 38,000 sorties and, though criticised, achieved all of its assigned goals, without taking a single casualty.\textsuperscript{19} On the seventy-eighth day, 9 June 1999, Serbian forces finally capitulated, its military authorities signing an agreement with NATO to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo on the condition that no NATO forces enter Serbia proper. As a result of the agreement, NATO suspended all air strikes the following day and authorised *Operation Joint Guardian* – the creation and deployment of the Kosovo Force.

**Kosovo Force (KFOR): Multinational Operation in Kosovo**

KFOR was a NATO-led multinational force tasked to establish and maintain security in Kosovo. It was from the outset a peace-enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, executed ‘to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe’ occurring in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{20} On 12 June 1999, a NATO contingent of some 42,500 KFOR ground troops entered Kosovo, with a further 7,500 in rear support roles.\textsuperscript{21} All Serbian forces correspondingly withdrew from Kosovar territory and by 20 June had completely withdrawn from the province.\textsuperscript{22} Ethnic cleansing halted and was reversed as one million Kosovar refugees began to return to their homes.\textsuperscript{23}

The KFOR mandate drew its authority from UNSC Resolution 1244 in addition to the MTA signed between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Following the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, KFOR’s mission was threefold: first and foremost, to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; second, to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict; and third, to provide assistance to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which performed core
civil functions. The central objective, the maintenance of a secure environment in Kosovo, was to be achieved through: (1) the deterrence of renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; (2) the establishment of a security environment to ensure public safety and order; (3) and the demilitarization of the KLA.

Figure A1.2 – The Province of Kosovo.

The 50,000-strong KFOR contingent was drawn from over thirty different NATO and non-NATO countries. It was organised into four Multinational Brigades (MNB) deployed to four sectors within the Kosovo area of operations (MNB Northeast, MNB Southwest, MNB Centre, MNB East), and one additional Multinational Specialized Unit (MNSU) based in Pristina that consisted of military police specially trained for tackling terrorism and organised crime. Officially, all five units acted under unified C² by taking orders from one overall Operational Commander, the Commander of KFOR (COM-KFOR) based at KFOR Headquarters in the Kosovo capital of Pristina, who held tactical control of the entire operation.

Within each of the four sectors, one Lead Nation was appointed by NATO to oversee operations within the AOR. Consequently, France became the Lead Nation of MNB Northeast with Headquarters at Kosovska Mitrovica (Sector Northeast). Italy became the Lead Nation of MNB Southwest with Headquarters at Pec (Sector Southwest). The United Kingdom, then subsequently Sweden, became the Lead Nation of MNB Center with Headquarters at Pristina, where the KFOR Headquarters was
also situated (Sector Centre). Finally, the United States became the Lead Nation of MNB East with Headquarters at Camp Bondsteel (Sector East). Each of these Lead Nations assumed regional command over a range of smaller supporting national contingents from a variety of different countries, which each had their own national base within the sector they operated in.

![Map of the Kosovo Force Sectors in 2002](image)

*Figure A1.3 – KFOR Command Design: Map of the Kosovo Force Sectors in 2002*

Working in parallel with KFOR, the UNMIK operation acted as an interim civilian administration in Kosovo and sought to promote Kosovar autonomy and self-government through the founding of accountable civilian institutions. During this interim period, UNMIK was also tasked to perform a law enforcement role against the criminal elements within Kosovo, in addition to establishing and training Kosovo’s own police force – the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). In order to support UNMIK in these functions, UNMIK was provided with a UN headquarters from which to work, based in Pristina in MNB Center near KFOR Headquarters, in addition to regional UN buildings in each of the other KFOR operational sectors. Moreover, to assist UNMIK perform its policing role, it was provided with its own UN civilian police force (CIVPOL) drawn from international contributions – chiefly the Italian Carabinieri, but also including units from India, Argentina and Poland.
Disparate ROE & the 2004 Kosovo Riots

At the end of 2003, nearly five years since the onset of these MNOs within Kosovo, UNMIK had 2,422 CIVPOL under its command, in addition to 975 policemen from Special Police Units and 355 Border Police – a total police force of 3,752.\(^{33}\) By early 2004, UNMIK also held command of an additional 5,700 local KPS officers, deployed to police stations throughout Kosovo, who were working in coordination with the UNMIK’s international CIVPOL.\(^{34}\) In contrast, however, whereas UNMIK’s police force had gained in strength and numbers during the first five years of the mission, KFOR had correspondingly declined substantially during the same period as a result of a series of NATO military troop draw-downs. As security had improved in Kosovo, KFOR numbers in Kosovo had been reduced from 42,500 armed forces in 1999, to 39,000 in 2002, then 26,000 in mid-2003, finally reaching a low of 17,500 by the end of that year.\(^ {35}\)

This reduction in numbers produced two effects. Firstly, KFOR’s overall combat capability had shrunk substantially: only one-third of the total number of KFOR troops (approximately 6,000 personnel) were permitted by their governments to be deployed in ‘direct combat-related functions’ in Kosovo, the remaining two-thirds of the total force being constrained to logistical support roles.\(^ {36}\) Secondly, as a result of this, ROE restrictions within KFOR became more visible between the various national contingents than ever before in the course of the mission. This being the case, it is perhaps no surprise that divergent ROE between the participating national forces would soon become a contentious issue within MNO.

Indeed, detrimental differences between diverse sets of national ROE within the KFOR mission came starkly under the international spotlight in 2004 as a result of a sudden new outbreak of violence within Kosovo. At the time of the crisis, later to become known as the ‘Kosovo Riots’, KFOR had consisted of only 18,500 military personnel.\(^ {37}\) Due to the ROE restrictions within this force, only a third of this number had full operational flexibility and freedom of action to respond effectively to events as they occurred. Consequently, despite the fact that the NATO mission’s first priority was ‘to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order’, chiefly through the deterrence of renewed hostility, KFOR was in reality ill-prepared to meet security crises that might occur within the province. In fact, these disparate ROE between KFOR’s main contributors – their effect heightened by low troop levels – subsequently led not only to an underwhelming security response to the Kosovo Riots, but also to its failure to repress the worst outbreak of violence since 1999. As Rachel Denber, acting executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), concluded on the matter:

This was the biggest security test for NATO and the United Nations in Kosovo since 1999, when minorities were forced from their homes as the international community looked on. But they
failed the test. In too many cases, NATO peacekeepers locked the gates to their bases, and watched as Serb homes burned.  

The following will provide an account of the 2004 security crisis in Kosovo, and then present analysis on the practical on-the-ground effects of disparate ROE among KFOR’s Lead Nation contingents, with lead security responsibilities in the four KFOR MNB sectors in Kosovo, in response to this crisis.

The Kosovo Riots

The Kosovo Riots took place over a period of three days between the 17-19 March 2004, nearly five years after the deployment of KFOR to Kosovo. The riots were predominantly an organised uprising of parts of the ethnic Albanian population against both the Serb population and the UN organisation itself. The rioters consisted of ex-KLA insurgent fighters, war veterans, criminals and disenchanted youths, who sought an opportunity to redress the ethnic balance of Kosovo. At the time of the uprising, the question of Kosovar independence had not been addressed by the international community. Kosovar Serbs, who represented ten percent of Kosovo’s two million inhabitants and formed the Kosovar minority, wished Kosovo to remain a province under Serbian rule. The majority population of ethnic Albanians, by contrast, many of whom had suffered tremendous persecution and human atrocities at the hands of Serbian security forces between 1997-1999, demanded full independence.

In the days leading up to the riots, inter-ethnic tension within the province had already reached a peak due to a number of events: (1) the killing of a Serb teenager in Caglavica, south of Pristina, by an unknown Albanian; (2) a resultant Serb road block established on the main Pristina-Skopje road by local villagers in protest of the killing; and (3) a large organised demonstration by groups of veterans and ex-KLA guerrillas to protest the arrest and extradition of many Albanian war criminals to the Hague, including the former Albanian Prime Minister and leaders of the KLA. The inaccurate but sensationalised report that three Albanian boys were drowned after being chased into the Ibar River by Serbs, a story circulated on local Albanian-speaking television channels, became the fourth event and catalyst for the subsequent violence.

Day 1 – Violence in Kosovo

On the morning of 17 March fighting broke out in the partitioned city of Mitrovica in KFOR’s northern sector, MNB North. An angry mob of thousands, supposedly protesting the three boys’ deaths, clashed with both UNMIK riot police and NATO peacekeepers on the bridge dividing the northern Serb-populated part of the city from the Albanian-populated south. Unable to overwhelm
UN and KFOR forces, the crowd turned violently on the only Serb ghetto in South Mitrovica, where 7 were killed and over 200 injured in the fighting. Elsewhere, Albanian snipers took up position in apartments above the bridge and began firing at NATO soldiers, wounding 17, as well as homes in the Serb north of Mitrovica. As the news of this spread, other Albanian riots broke out in cities and villages across Kosovo – in the MNB capitals of Pristina and Pec, as well as the towns of Gnjilane and Kosovo Polje and the villages of Slatina, Bjelo Polje and Binjare. In each place, the criminal mobs targeted areas in which minority Serbs lived or maintained a presence.

Within hours, ordinary Albanian civilians had spontaneously joined the pogrom, motivated as much by frustration over the issue of Kosovar independence as a lust for revenge for the violence and ethnic cleansing conducted by Serbs in the earlier war. Together, as HRW stated in their report: ‘Ethnic Albanian crowds acted with ferocious efficiency to rid many areas in Kosovo of all remaining vestiges of a Serb presence, and also targeted other minority communities, including Roma and Ashkali’. In addition to the Serb population, the violent mobs also targeted the UN. In the city of Pec in MNB West, for instance, an Albanian mob surrounded the UN regional headquarters and forced its officials to leave the premises. Meanwhile in the village of Bjelo Polje, the site of a UN pilot programme enabling the resettlement of Serb refugees, Serb homes were attacked and one set ablaze. By the end of the day, the UN had lost control of a number of Kosovar cities and the provincial capital itself, Pristina, was under siege with Albanian men attacking Serb areas throughout the night.

Figures A1.4-5 – Violence in Kosovo: Maps showing the Serb minority enclaves within the Province of Kosovo and the corresponding areas of attacks during the Kosovo Riots.
Day 2 – Ethnic Cleansing & Destruction

The next day, 18 March, dawned to renewed violence throughout Kosovo. Hundreds of houses were set ablaze and scores killed as the Albanian mobs turned their attention on Serb villages and began to carry out ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’. KFOR troops stationed near these incidents often failed to protect the villages from such attack, many opting to simply evacuate the inhabitants and allow the villages themselves to be destroyed. Ancient Serbian Orthodox churches founded by medieval Byzantine kings between the 12-14th centuries – as sacred to Serbs as the Vatican to Catholics and prized symbols of Serbian national identity throughout Yugoslavia – were also concertedly attacked throughout the second day of the riots (see endnote for more details).

Indeed, by the end of the day 35 Serbian churches had been looted, damaged or destroyed by fire, including nine ancient medieval churches containing invaluable ancient artwork, scriptures, records, literature, icons and other irreplaceable items of religious heritage (bringing the total number of Serbian churches destroyed since the first KFOR deployment to Kosovo in 1999 to a staggering total of 147). Two of these churches – the Church of St. George in Prizren and St. Sava’s in Mitrovica – had been attacked and burned to the ground while KFOR troops that had been tasked to guard the cultural sites stood by (Germans in Prizren and Moroccans in Mitrovica respectively). As one outraged reverend stated to a journalist at that time: ‘There is a pattern emerging. The U.N. evacuates Serbs, and immediately afterwards Albanians come in and burn’.

Serbian leaders throughout Kosovo began to express outrage at the inability of KFOR and UNMIK security forces to protect the Serb minority of the province from attack. While, in response, NATO rushed to deploy an additional 1,000 troops to KFOR, security forces across Kosovo reportedly ‘appeared at a loss as to how to reassert control over the predominantly Albanian province as crowds attacked Serbian neighbourhoods for a second night’. In fact the most effective force of all in countering the violent mobs were ordinary Albanian leaders and businessmen who, in daring acts of courage, stood up to the mobs and were able in some instances to alter their destructive rampage.

While KFOR national contingents grappled to adjust their ROE to better counter the unexpected security crisis, UNMIK police rushed to evacuate Serbs from targeted towns and guard the UN headquarters in the capital. The CIVPOL were ultimately successful at protecting the UN building, though this came at the cost of a number of UN vehicles as well as a Serbian church and several other Serb buildings that, located in the vicinity, became the alternate target of Albanian anger and were set on fire.
Day 3 – Counting the Cost

Finally, on 19th March, the Albanian rampage of violence and destruction in Kosovo petered out. While NATO force contributing nations pledged to send hundreds more troops back to KFOR and KFOR commanders made explanatory statements about the ‘orchestrated’ and ‘well-planned’ nature of the rampage, Serbian families in ethnically-mixed towns began loading their belongings and migrating to larger Serb-concentrated habitations. Small groups of Albanian youths, meanwhile, continued to sporadically set Serbian houses alight. U.N. police and KFOR peacekeepers tried to take stock of the damage done and initiated a clean-up, towing away the charred remains of their vehicles.

In total, 33 separate riots had broken out across Kosovo, involving an estimated 51,000 rioters. The cost to life was significant: 31 people, mostly Serb, had been killed; 900 injured, including 17 KFOR peacekeepers; and approximately 4,100 minorities displaced (2,000 of which were still displaced months afterwards and living in cramped, unhygienic places such as overcrowded apartments, schools, tents and metal trucking containers). In many villages every single Serb, Roma or Ashkali home had been destroyed by the rioters. Indeed, the cost to property was immense: between 550-700 Serb, Roma and Ashkali homes had been destroyed; 37 Orthodox churches and monasteries destroyed or damaged; 10 public buildings damaged beyond repair; and 72 UN vehicles had been burnt to a cinder. KFOR had failed miserably in its primary mission to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order.

Three C² Problems

This raises a very important question. Regardless of the underlying political and social factors motivating the riots, why did KFOR security forces fail so dismally in maintaining security in Kosovo – the very purpose for which thousands of NATO soldiers had been trained and deployed to KFOR? The answer chiefly concerns KFOR’s C² structure and three specific problems within it.

1. One problem was the lack of a centralised command structure to coordinate the responses of all of Kosovo’s security institutions – KFOR, UNMIK police, the KPS and even Kosovo’s infant army ‘the Kosovo Protection Corps’ (KPC). In fact, relations between these security institutions had been fraught with inter-rivalry and distrust for quite some time. This is perhaps best illustrated during the riots by the French KFOR contingent’s refusal to work with the KPS in southern Mitrovica, its barring of passage of members of the KPS, and its reported intention of burning down the local KPS police station in its sector. As the HRW report stated on the situation prior to the riots:

The overlapping security organizations in Kosovo – namely the NATO-led KFOR, the UNMIK international police, the locally-recruited KPS, and the controversial KPC – enjoy an uneasy coexistence and frequently fail to adequately coordinate their activities.
This was especially true in regard to the KPC during the crisis. Though comprised chiefly of
demobilised KLA insurgent fighters with much experience in the use of force, the KPC was for the
most part confined to barracks for the duration of the riots, despite multiple offers of help to KFOR
security units (see endnote).\textsuperscript{70} This occurred largely due to unwillingness by many KFOR
contributing nations to ‘cede any security responsibilities to the KPC’, despite the fact that the KPC
had been specifically authorised by the international community to be ‘a civilian emergency
organization which carries out rapid disaster response tasks for public safety in times of emergency
and humanitarian assistance’ – the very scenario presented by the Kosovo Riots.\textsuperscript{71} Only in the
American-controlled Sector East were members of the KPC allowed to be of some assistance, the
U.S. tasking them to calm crowds and mount joint patrols.\textsuperscript{72}

2. A subsequent problem, specifically related to C\textsuperscript{2} within KFOR and of greatest import in this
study, concerned the disunity of response to the riots by KFOR contingents of various nationalities
due to diverse national mandates. These national mandates represented a ‘rival’ or ‘shadow’ chain of
command to the official KFOR structure among all national contingents operating within KFOR.
This was because the allegiance of National Commanders and their subordinates to their own national
governments, and the inherent duty of national armed forces to obey all government-issued
instructions, was far greater than that owed to KFOR. The practical result of this scenario was that
orders eschewed from national governments to corresponding KFOR contingents through their own
military chain of command, always superseded and took precedence over commands given by COM-
KFOR at KFOR Headquarters, by means of the KFOR chain of command. It was this juxtaposition
that was largely responsible for the wide-ranging reactions among KFOR ground troops.

3. National mandates presented, in themselves, an additional problem within the KFOR C\textsuperscript{2}
structure – and one of utmost, even critical, importance. Not only did these mandates determine troop
numbers and the level of riot training and equipment granted to national contingents (such as riot
shields, protective clothing, tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons and batons), but they imposed
ROE limitations and prohibitions – in other words, national caveats – on national armed forces. It
was these restrictions within the national mandates that were principally to blame for KFOR’s
incongruent response throughout Kosovo as the riots swept violently through the province. For
although, in the aftermath of the riots, National Commanders publicly blamed their various
contingent’s poor responses to the violence on insufficient numbers and inadequate riot training and
equipment, in fact these matters were peripheral and used to mask the real cause of KFOR failure:
inappropriate and restrictive ROE between KFOR national contingents.

Indeed, even given the low force strength of KFOR at the time of the riots – comprising
approximately 18,500, of which only 6,000 were designated to perform combat roles – this number
should have been sufficient to quell the civil violence, if the combat troops had been allowed to react properly and robustly to the rioters. However, a network of government-imposed restrictions and bans had been imposed on many of the existing KFOR combat forces. As the HRW report found:

KFOR’s ability to respond effectively to the violence was...severely hampered by the rules of engagement – often referred to as “caveats” – that various nations put on the deployment of their troops. Almost every nation which deploys troops in Kosovo places specific caveats on their deployment – such as limiting their use of deadly force, limiting their deployment to a certain sector of Kosovo, or requiring their troops to seek approval from national authorities rather than the KFOR command structure for certain activities.31

These national caveats reflected each force contingent’s national mandate, which in turn was indicative of the mindset of each national government towards the KFOR operation, and more importantly, the role the national contingent was expected to play within the operation. It was the existence and prevalence of these national caveats among multinational combat troops within the various sectors that in fact proved to be the real ‘spanner in the works’ in KFOR’s failure to respond quickly and effectively to the violence.

In order to exemplify the critical and detrimental role of diverse ROE restrictions in KFOR’s failure to respond adequately to the 2004 security crisis, these national caveats will be examined in more detail. The following analysis will identify and assess the problems caused by KFOR caveats during the security crisis by examining the reactions of the Lead Nation contingents, holding lead security command of the four KFOR sectors, in contrast with other subordinate national contingents within each AOR in Kosovo. The practical impact of these divergent ROE will be measured by investigating the effect of this diversity on both the Multinational Commander, COM-KFOR, and the effective execution of tactical security operations within each sector – Northeast, Southwest, Centre, and East. The ramifications for the KFOR operation itself as a consequence, in addition to NATO and the individual nations involved, will also be identified.

Assessing the Impact of Diverse ROE: A Critical Study

Caveats: Limitations on the Multinational Commander (COM-KFOR)

It is well known in military circles that diverse national mandates among MNO participants handicap a Multinational Commander’s C² abilities. The KFOR operation well exemplifies this point. Diverse national mandates and correlating ROE among the KFOR participants impacted severely on the Multinational Commander of KFOR, limiting not only his manoeuvrable resources, but also his operational freedom of action in both managing his forces and making important strategic and tactical decisions. The Kosovo Riots provide ample evidence of this hamstringing of the acting COM-KFOR at that time, then Lieutenant General (LTGEN) Holger O.L. Kammerhoff of the German Army.
Firstly, in terms of manoeuvrable resources, the imposition of caveats on the forces at COM-KFOR’s disposal meant that he was constrained at the strategic level in what resources he could appropriate to meet the crisis. The forces under his command consisted of a melange of units each with fixed rules as to where they could be deployed, what tasks they could perform, and whether they could be deployed at all – even in an emergency situation. At the macro-level, these restrictions impinged not only on the flexibility of the KFOR force itself, but more importantly here, that of the COM-KFOR’s decision-making and ability to bring about a rapid and effective KFOR response to the crisis, since coordinating national contingents or reconfiguring the force was rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible. The result was that, as Brophy & Fisera summarise: ‘National caveats prevented the KFOR commander from deploying a large part of his NATO forces to confront the ethnic riots, which ended up causing many casualties’.74

In terms of operational freedom of action, secondly, heavy national caveat imposition meant that most of the national contingents operating under the COM-KFOR could not be deployed without first gaining government consent form the national capital. During the security crisis, the necessity of seeking and receiving national approval for each planned manoeuvre wasted so much of the COM-KFOR’s time and effort, that it actually deterred him from planning troop manoeuvres and taking proactive action at all. Indeed, according to MAJ Steve Challies, a NZDF Liaison Officer stationed at UNMIK Headquarters at the time of the 2004 security crisis, this ROE-instigated permission process ‘wasted hours if not days’ during the crisis.75 A year after the riots in 2005, NATO also acknowledged this caveat-generated reality during a Parliamentary session, stating:

Caveats placed restrictions on the use of national contingents for crowd control without approval from the national capital, and were a significant burden on KFOR commanders who could ill-afford the hours of waiting that it took to get approval from national capitals….KFOR commanders had to request and wait for additional troops to be supplied, wasting precious hours or even days.76

This process, together with the many refusals which resulted, limited COM-KFOR’s ability to either react quickly or shift troops between KFOR sectors to the areas that were most under threat. His freedom of action in the management of his forces was curtailed. As with all core principles for effective command, the correct amount of freedom of action for each commander on operations is relative and a question of degree. However, in this case, it is clear that the KFOR Operational Commander had far too little to respond effectively to the crisis.

Thirdly, national caveats worked to impinge on the COM-KFOR’s decision-making and enforcement capabilities, through creating a significant gap between critical links in the KFOR chain of command, namely, the COM-KFOR at KFOR Headquarters in Pristina and his four subordinate Regional Commanders quartered within the sectors. This gap not only impinged on the KFOR chain of
command, but also unity of command itself since the caveats’ very existence served to negate the
COM-KFOR’s overarching authority and control over the operation (see endnote).  

This was because, representative of State sovereignty within a multinational context as they are, and
acting as guarantors for the national mandate itself, these national caveats rendered multinational
 interoperability difficult. This difficulty meant that Lead Nations in each sector held a much greater
degree of independence than would normally be the case – independence from each other and from
the overall COM-KFOR. The unenviable result was that COM-KFOR could give ‘guidance’ to these
Lead Nation MNB Commanders in the four KFOR sectors during the crisis, but not ‘orders’. Indeed, as one senior UNMIK official reported following the riots:

KFOR lacks command and control structures. Lt-Gen. Kammerhoff is the commander in theory,
but this is ceremonial. Practically speaking, daily decisions are made by the national contingents
that take instructions from their capitals, and Kammerhoff’s instructions are secondary.  

Or as the HRW similarly concluded in their report on the crisis:

The Multinational Brigade Commanders…enjoy a high degree of autonomy over their area of
control, limiting the ability of overall KFOR commander (COM-KFOR) to ensure a consistent
Kosovo-wide response during times of crises…Within KFOR, coordination between the various
multinational brigades and COM-KFOR is not unified. 

In fact, one could argue from this that, in reality, there existed not one but multiple chains of
command within the KFOR operation: the official KFOR chain of command, and then a host of others
– all extending from the individual national contingents within KFOR, via the senior National
Commander back to their own capitals. Effective coordination between the contingents was hence
virtually impossible, making the situation within KFOR rather dismal militarily-speaking. In short,
KFOR had not one, but many ‘Masters’, with competing sets of instructions.

The sum total of these negative constraints on the COM-KFOR, stemming from the imposition of
ROE restrictions, was a slow, uncoordinated, disunified, and widely varying response on the part of
KFOR armed forces to the Kosovo Crisis. What is worse, because these caveats thwarted every
speedy, proactive course of action the COM-KFOR could reasonably take, they forced the COM-
KFOR to try and accommodate the national prohibitions, which led to further poor decisions with
disastrous consequences. Namely, while the riots were ongoing, the COM-KFOR ordered that the
number one priority for KFOR forces be force-protection, thereby diverting what precious resources
there were to defending KFOR military bases, rather than the very civilians and townships they were
tasked to protect and where their deployment might have made a real difference.  

As the COM-KFOR himself reportedly responded, when queried specifically about the effect of the caveats: ‘My
hands are tied’. This meant that:
In community after community, Serbs and other minorities – a disproportionate number of them elderly and infirm – were left for hours at the mercy of hostile ethnic Albanian rioters, waiting for KFOR and UNMIK to rescue them…the international community failed Kosovo’s minorities in its time of greatest need.  

One can see by this just how destructive national caveats can be in impeding the Multinational Commander’s ability to action effective security operations: handicapping the Multinational Commander’s C² capabilities; corrupting key principles of command; wasting time and energy; leading to the uncoordinated use of resources; and resulting in disturbing levels of civilian collateral damage. The practical fall-out of national caveats acting on command within a multinational operation had never before been illustrated so starkly.

**ROE: Impediments to Tactical Security Operations**

Similarly chaotic and ruinous events unfolded at the tactical level too during the Kosovo Riots, as a direct result of various sets of ROE restrictions within the MNO. Not only did these caveats drastically minimise the number of combat troops within KFOR that were available to deploy to the frontline and directly confront the rioters (only a small percentage of the total number of 6,000 combat troops were available), but in numerous areas throughout Kosovo they prevented the majority force of more heavily limited combat troops from taking any effective action during the riots whatsoever.

The most influential caveats, in this respect, concerned prohibitions against involvement in riot control operations. Often the outward symptom that these caveats were in place was the total lack of both riot training and riot equipment within a national contingent. Curiously, despite the fact that maintaining public order including through crowd control was a key priority for KFOR, riot control caveats were nevertheless widely in place amongst KFOR national contingents (some national governments opting to believe that riot-control operations throughout Kosovo was solely the domain of very small units of specially-trained UNMIK riot-police). Throughout Kosovo, these national caveats – among others – stopped high numbers of combat soldiers from performing the very protective tasks they were trained and deployed to perform. One need only consider the four MNBs within the four KFOR sectors, and the friction created between coalition forces as a result of the caveats, to find evidence of this.

**Sector Northeast**

In Sector Northeast, KFOR forces were under the regional command of Lead Nation France and was comprised of a range of national contingents from Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg and Morocco. The brigade – MNB Northeast – was responsible for security in the areas around the
divided city of Mitrovica, as well as Zvecan and Vucitrn. However, the Lead Nation’s national mandate explicitly forbade the French contingent from participating in riot control tasks, and specifically, from firing on rioters. The result of these caveats was that throughout Sector Northeast, French troops were not able to confront the angry mob and so did very little – if not nothing. In practical terms, this meant that in Mitrovica, Albanian crowds were able to sweep aside those that barred their passage across the bridge. Elsewhere in Vucitrn, an area located between two main French KFOR bases, the mob were free to set on fire 69 homes belonging to the minority Ashakli ethnic group, ‘without any reaction by French KFOR’. 

Worse still was the situation in the Serb village of Svinjare, located only 600 yards from a main French KFOR base in the south of Sector Northeast. An Albanian mob filed past the military base to attack the village, killing 20 and setting on fire all 136 Serb homes there. For although approximately 200 French soldiers were stationed at the base at the time, and the village was within viewing distance of the base, French forces were prohibited by their restrictive ROE from taking any action. Consequently the French KFOR troops, ‘whose task is to protect the people living there’, were compelled to decline assistance to the 320 Serb residents of the village. As MAJ Challies stated on the event: ‘The French saw the village burning, but no action was taken – the village was allowed to burn...The French didn’t fire a shot because they were not allowed to fire. So they did nothing’. 

At the village of Svinjare itself, meanwhile, a section of Moroccan soldiers under French regional command tasked to guard the village were parked in a truck at the entrance of the village. As the mob approached and began torching houses, the soldiers were joined by 20 additional Moroccan soldiers and a number of UNMIK police units in UN jeeps, including 50 specially-trained Polish anti-riot police. Responding to shouts by villagers to ‘stop them from burning the houses’, the UNMIK police fired 7-8 warning shots into the crowd and then proactively formed a roadblock through the village in an attempt to protect the remaining houses. The more heavily-armed Moroccan KFOR troops, however, in the words of one Serb survivor, ‘did nothing to stop the mob, but drove parallel to it as the young men threw Molotov cocktails, set more buildings on fire and fired guns’. They then issued the order, communicated from the French base, to abort all attempts to protect the village and instead evacuate all the residents, beginning with women and children, telling the villagers ‘they could not defend the village’. The village was thus razed and ethnically cleansed without a shot being fired by KFOR forces.

According to Colonel (COL) Szezytynski, commander of the Polish UNMIK riot-police unit that had been ordered by Moroccan KFOR troops to leave the village, there had in fact been enough KFOR peacekeepers in the village to defend it. It was consequently the caveats of the French Lead Nation
contingent, amplified by caveats among the Moroccan contingents, that had handicapped the force. As he stated of the Polish unit: ‘There were only five houses burning when they left. When they passed [by] again all [136 of] the houses were on fire’. In the following days the Lead Nation spokesman for Sector Northeast attempted to explain KFOR’s actions in Sector Northeast, explaining that, ‘the [KFOR] decision to evacuate was taken by the French general responsible for Northern Kosovo, General Xavier Michel, because the French forces were needed elsewhere’ – although he did not know where.

Figure A1.6 – Scenes of Destruction: A map indicating where major attacks took place during the 3-day riots.

**Sector Southwest**

In Sector Southwest meanwhile, under the command of Lead Nation Italy, the security situation was far more grave. In addition to the Italian contingent, MNB Southwest was comprised of ground troops from Austria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey, and was responsible for security in the areas around Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Decani, Orahovac, Malisevo, Suva Reka, Klina and Dragas. Outbreaks of violence were widespread in Sector Southwest during the riots, with large-scale attacks mounted in Pec, the nearby village of Belo Polje, Djakovica and Prizren.
Like the French commanding Sector Northeast, the Italian contingent operated under a similarly debilitating mandate and consequently behaved in similar ways during the riots. In Pec, where the main Italian base was located, Albanians surrounded the UN regional headquarters and forced out the UN officials, without any response from local Italian KFOR forces. In the village of Belo Polje, situated on the outskirts of Pec and again located adjacent to another main Italian base, Italian KFOR troops not only failed to prevent the rioters from attacking the village, but also ‘refused to approach the besieged Serbs’ needing rescue.’ As a result of this abdication of responsibility, the Serb residents were forced ‘to run for several hundred meters through a hostile Albanian crowd, before KFOR evacuated them’, many becoming wounded in the process.

Following this evacuation all Serb homes within the village itself – rebuilt by ‘the Return Project’ to house displaced Serb refugees after the earlier Yugoslavian wars in cooperation with the European Agency for Reconstruction – were razed to the ground by the ‘rampaging mob’. Even the village cemetery was desecrated, with Serb tombs opened, graves unearthed and ‘the bones of the deceased scattered around’. Again, despite the official Lead Nation role of Italian KFOR forces as the chief providers of security within the sector, these attacks proceeded without a single shot being fired by KFOR troops (although one U.S. UNMIK policewoman shot and killed one Albanian rioter in order to protect the lives of Serb civilians).

In Djakovica, meanwhile, 24 Italian soldiers had been posted to protect the last remaining Serbian Orthodox church in a town housing five elderly women – the tiniest Serb presence in Kosovo to become targeted by the mob. However, they too were reportedly ‘overwhelmed by the crowds’ and withdrew, evacuating the women, but allowing the nineteenth century church to be destroyed. Four other churches in the area were also destroyed at the same time – St. Lazarus, the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity, the Istok Parish, and the church of St. Elias (the latter also laced with mines), and additional Serb cemeteries desecrated.

The response of the German contingent, one of the largest national force deployments under Italian command and responsible for the area around Prizren, was no better. The German mandate was very restrictive. It authorised German armed forces: (1) to be used only in Sector Southwest to perform low-risk tasks in low-risk areas away from the frontline; (2) to use force only in defence of themselves or other civilian human life, not civilian property; and (3) to ensure sturdy around-the-clock protection of the German compound in Prizren. Furthermore, the German mandate included a specific ROE prohibition or caveat against any participation in riot-control, and to this end, the contingent had been given neither training in riot prevention, nor any anti-riot equipment. With such restrictive ROE as this, German KFOR forces could only perform a ‘stand-aside’ role within the mission, even in the
advent of any security crisis. In view of this mandate, it seems a particularly unwise decision by Lead Nation Italy to task the German contingent to guard civilian property during the riots, in the form of important Serb religious sites, as the March pogroms will attest. In fact, according to the HRW report: ‘The response of the German KFOR in Prizren presents one of the most fundamental security failures during the March 2004 riots’. Indeed in one of the worst incidents during the two days of heavy rioting, a German section of fifteen soldiers had been deployed to a narrow bridge, at the single entrance point, with the task of preventing access by the rioters to a fourteenth century monastery in Prizren, one of the most historic and famous churches in all of Kosovo and consequently on the UNESCO, World Monument Fund and World Heritage list. When the Albanian rioters approached the German soldiers, some wading through the river on both sides of the bridge, the German KFOR soldiers – bound by their ROE restraints – simply allowed them to walk by them and attack the monastery, over which fluttered the German flag. One monk testified that: ‘The Germans didn’t use their truncheons or tear gas, and didn’t even fire in the air’. Or as one Serb website documenting the destruction declared on the incident: ‘German soldiers did not move a finger to protect this holy site’. When the attack was well underway, the Germans ordered the monks into KFOR armoured vehicles and evacuated them, but left the monastery ‘to be burnt down by the ethnic Albanian crowd’. Elsewhere too in the area German forces ‘seemed to melt away’ from the conflict areas, despite having one of the largest German KFOR bases on the outskirts of Prizren. Indeed, it was reported that 400 German soldiers preparing to leave their base in response to the riots ‘never received orders to deploy’. Indeed, according to the HRW report, commanders at the German base steadfastly refused to mobilize and deploy to the town despite repeated requests for assistance made by their German counterparts in the UNMIK police force, as Albanian mobs erased all remnants of a Serb presence in the town. German UNMIK police officers, convinced that a stronger response – a show of force, even in the form of a single tank – would have checked the rampage, would later accuse their compatriot German KFOR commanders of cowardice. Others accused the failure on German ‘commanders who don’t want to make mistakes that could end their careers’. The security vacuum created by this inaction by KFOR security forces gave the rioters free reign in and around the area of Prizren, located to the south of Sector Southwest. In Prizren township itself, German KFOR commanders refused to protect either historic Serb churches or the Serb population itself. The result of the unchecked rampage was immense: 56 Serb houses burnt down; all Prizren Serb residents displaced; a number killed; six medieval churches and monasteries destroyed – considered the ‘worst damage to cultural heritage’ in all of Kosovo; the infliction of millions of
dollars’ worth of damage; and a Serb population traumatized from being ‘abandoned’ to the ‘terror’.

One witness, who saw the Church of St. George being burnt to the ground within 15 minutes, wondered why ‘German troops responsible for the area were nowhere to be seen’ and ‘had made no attempt to stop the group of men who, he said, numbered less than 100’. The answer of course lies in the anti-riot caveat within the German mandate. As MAJ Challies states: ‘The Germans had no mandate to prevent rioting – no equipment, training or authority’.

**Sector Centre**

In Sector Centre, KFOR’s MNB Centre was under Swedish command and was comprised of national contingents from Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Finland and Norway. The brigade was responsible for security in the areas around the Kosovar provincial capital of Pristina, as well as Podujevo, Obilic, Kosovo Polje, Cracanica, and Lipljan. However, as in Sectors Northeast and Southwest, again KFOR armed forces failed to meet the challenge posed by the rioters in their area of responsibility.

In Pristina, for instance, a Serb apartment complex housing former Serb refugees was attacked for hours by the hostile Albanian crowds, who fired on the residents, looted their property and set apartments on fire from both above and below. Residents barricaded in the burning buildings had to wait six hours before KFOR and UNMIK police forces came to their rescue. Elsewhere, pleas by fifteen overwhelmed Italian UNMIK police, attempting to prevent a crowd of hundreds from attacking Serb homes, were rebuffed by Finnish KFOR combat troops parked in three armoured personnel carriers nearby. The Fins later defended their actions, stating that they have ‘had received no orders to back up the police’. In reality, however, the Finnish contingent was bound by national caveats prohibiting the use of lethal force to protect property and the use of riot control weapons (in addition to a ban on the use of lethal force to prevent a detained person from escaping), and for this reason had been provided with no riot control weapons (tear gas, water cannons or rubber bullets). As one Finnish commander, Captain (CAPT) Ari Lehmuslehti, later stated, Finnish ‘troops had no equipment to control the crowds when the violence started’. Subsequently, as one Italian policeman, Angel Filiciano, stated: ‘We felt there was nothing we could do but sit back and watch the destruction’. Indeed, the magnitude of KFOR’s failure in the capital can be measured by one single fact: by the end of the riots, Pristina’s Serb population of 40,000 had been ethnically cleansed from the city.

Nearby in Podujevo, where a 500-strong joint Czech-Slovak battalion was based and in charge of security, Czech and Slovak soldiers guarding a Serb Orthodox church were given orders to retreat as
crowd of 500 Albanians broke though the church’s perimeter wall. One Czech commander, CAPT Jindrich Plescher, later said this decision was based on the fact that they were ‘too many for us’, despite the wide gap in arms and training between the evenly-matched groups. Following the KFOR retreat, the mob: ‘smashed everything inside, including our [KFOR] communications center, made a big pile in front and set it on fire. They then turned their attention to the adjacent Serb cemetery. They knocked over tombstones, dug up the coffins and scattered the bones in them’. Czech and Slovak ROE had succeeded in protecting from injury or death Czech and Slovak soldiers, at the expense of KFOR property and the dignity of the local Serb community. It is clear that force protection, rather than the successful or effective execution of the battalion’s security responsibilities, was the primary area of concern within this battalion. This is perhaps highlighted by CAPT Plescher’s request to a Czech journalist immediately after the riots: ‘Please tell everyone back home that all our boys are alive and well’.

Where there was a weak response in Podujevo, in the large town of Kosovo Polje the situation was even more grim. That is, no KFOR response was mounted against the violence whatsoever. According to the HRW report, ‘UNMIK and KFOR were nowhere to be seen as Albanian crowds methodically burned Serb homes,’ amounting to 100 Serb houses, the Serb post office, Serb school, Serb hospital and a Serb orthodox church. One Serbian civilian was also killed – beaten to death by the frenzied mob.

Other areas in Sector Centre, where national contingents with more robust ROE were based, did see stronger responses by KFOR troops however. Swedish, Norwegian, British and Irish soldiers, for instance, broke the overriding KFOR pattern by mounting a stronger defence of the Serb civilians and property under their protection. In the village of Caglavica for example, south of Pristina and the site of the original Serb protest in the days before the riots, Swedish soldiers opened fire on Albanian gunmen attempted to force their way through their barricade. Norwegian soldiers from the Panser and Second battalions attempted to mount a strong defence of the village of Caglavica against rioters that were in their view ‘willing to use all means available to get into the village’. As the rioters attacking KFOR forces with stones, Molotov cocktails, iron rods and guns (injuring 20 Norwegian personnel) with the reported intent of carrying out lynching of Serbs in Caglavica, Norwegian soldiers fired upon the legs of the rioters (injuring four and killing two) thereby waylaying the crowd on their rampage and saving many Serb lives in the process. It was
consequently as a direct result of their national mandate – and lack of ROE prohibitions – that the Norwegian contingent were much more active than other KFOR contingents in stemming back the violence and in fact ‘bore the brunt of much frontline work with rioting’.  

British and the Irish troops, similarly endowed with robust mandates in view of security tasking, also had the authority and ability to deal with rioters and were subsequently, along with the Norwegians, actively involved in fighting on the frontline and rescuing Serbs for the duration of the riots. Although the village was ultimately attacked and ethnically cleansed, this exchange between KFOR troops and the Albanian mob was one of ‘the fiercest clashes in the area between crowds and the security forces trying to protect Serbian homes’.

**Sector East**

Finally, in Sector East, MNB East was under the command of the United States and supplemented with national contingents from Armenia, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine. The Brigade was responsible for the areas around Kamenica, Gnjilane, Pasjane, Urosevac, Strpce, and Kacanik. Of the four KFOR sectors, Sector East experienced the least violence during the Kosovo Riots. It was also the only sector within the mission to have a Lead Nation unfettered by ROE restrictions and restraints. Consequently, throughout Sector East US troops ‘performed admirably’ during the riots, unfettered as they were by national caveats, also becoming one of the few KFOR units to work in tandem with the nascent – and mostly side-lined – Kosovo Protection Corps.

Problems that did arise during the riots stemmed not from restrictive national mandates and the imposition of caveats *per se*, but rather the disunified KFOR command structure. For instance, when rioters in Gnjilane burnt down the regional UN headquarters and were poised to attack the nearby UN logistical base, U.S. troops – despite being caveat-free – did not take any action to prevent the rioters, despite having a base adjacent to the targeted building. The U.S. spokesman later stated the US contingent feared being too overwhelmed by the number of the rioters there. In truth, however, this poor American response can be accredited to KFOR structures with regard to authority, whereby the contingent needed explicit KFOR authority to protect a UN building under the control of UNMIK. The U.S contingent had no such authority and therefore was prevented from taking any action. Ultimately it was not KFOR but a lone Albanian man, a local civilian restaurant owner, who saved the building – by wielding a single pistol at the rioters.

**Ramifications for KFOR, NATO & Participating Nations**

The generally poor performance by KFOR security forces to the security crisis presented by the March riots had severe ramifications, not only for the MNO itself, but also for the international
organisation supplying the forces, NATO, as well as individual nations whose caveated troops were held responsible for some of KFOR’s worst security failures during the riots.

*The KFOR Mission*

In terms of the mission, first of all, the riots had exposed the weakness of KFOR’s Operation Joint Guardian – the reality that a large majority of KFOR security forces could not be deployed on robust security operations. In addition, the riots had vividly demonstrated that KFOR forces were in fact unable to meet its own mission objective ‘to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order’, including the deterrence of renewed hostility. Worse still, perhaps, was the wave of civilian disillusionment that swept through the province – a loss of faith in KFOR, the UN, and the wider international community which put the entire legitimacy of the NATO operation at risk. As one Serb, forced to flee Svanjare with his family, exclaimed to a reporter at the time: ‘We really believed KFOR would come to protect us, but you see how it turned out’.\(^{156}\) HRW aptly summarised the situation in the aftermath of the riots:

> The international community has lost tremendous ground in Kosovo as a result of the March violence: ethnic Albanian extremists now know that they can effectively challenge the international security structures, having demolished the notion of KFOR and UNMIK invincibility; and ethnic minorities have lost almost all of the remaining trust they had left in the international community.\(^{157}\)

*NATO*

As for the NATO organisation itself, with lead command and responsibility for the KFOR mission, the alliance came under ‘some of the severest criticism’ in the aftermath of the riots (along with the UN organisation in command of UNMIK).\(^{158}\) NATO’s reputation was irreversibly harmed, with the organisation becoming the subject of much negative news coverage broadcast around the world. According to MAJ Challies, NATO was overwhelmingly made to look ‘stupid and ineffective’ – their coalition security forces having failed to provide security in Kosovo at a time of crisis.\(^{159}\) As a Europe Report prepared by the International Crisis Group declared: ‘KFOR and NATO have lost their aura of invulnerability and invincibility. The perception of international weakness and lack of resolve will not be lost on extremists in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans’.\(^{160}\)

NATO’s response to the downpour of international criticism over the events was to clamp down, its military personnel refusing to comment on or discuss the matter publicly, and to deploy the reserve KFOR force of 1,000 American, British and Italian soldiers to Kosovo.\(^{161}\) However, the damage had already been done and the stigma could not be erased. It was afterwards clearly apparent that both NATO and its MNO had been rendered powerless by the national mandates of its key coalition allies.
– once again the unity of the coalition was contingent on, and subservient to, traditional State sovereignty.

**Participating Nations**

Participating nations to the mission were not free from criticism or embarrassment either. In many of the Lead Nation countries, interrogative questions were raised in many national parliaments, and the scandal of national troops’ poor performance publicised nationwide.\(^{162}\) Such negative reviews in turn led to a decline in public support and political will within these countries for national participation in the KFOR operation at all. Internationally too, like the French and Belgians after the Rwandan war or the Dutch after the Bosnian Srebrenica massacre, many nations could not shrug off the stigma of their failures in such a volatile area, now the focus of so much international attention.

The French and German governments’ reaction was to signal their recommitment to the operation by dispatching more troops to the region – amounting to 400 and 600 additional soldiers respectively.\(^{163}\) Likewise the Czech government, that had prior to the riots planned a substantial drawdown of its forces in Kosovo, reversed its stance and postponed the downsizing. As the Czech Prime Minister at the time, Vladimir Spidia, told reporters of the change in government policy: ‘the performance of the Czech soldiers in quelling the riots has made the government change its mind about downsizing the force in the province’.\(^{164}\)

**Inadequate Investigations**

Within the wider international community, meanwhile, numerous international bodies and officials called for independent reviews to determine how KFOR had lost control of the province so quickly, and to explain the undisputed failure – even ‘collapse’ – of Kosovo’s security institutions during the riots.\(^{165}\) However, while a number of reviews took place on the riots by NATO, the UNMIK police, the UN Secretary General and even the German government, each of which raised many concerns, the reviews were either too narrowly-focused or resulted in no major changes.\(^{166}\) Indeed, according to HRW, all of the reviews failed to give a critical analysis of KFOR’s performance, causing the watchdog entity to proclaim that ‘the international community appears to be in absolute denial about its own failures in Kosovo’.\(^{167}\) As it stated explicitly on the matter in its subsequent report:

> Both UNMIK and KFOR officials with whom Human Rights Watch met painted an inaccurately rosy picture of their response to the March 2004 violence, or blamed each other for the failures. Although international officials have been outspoken in their criticism of the Kosovar leadership for its failings during the crisis, they have not shown a similarly critical attitude in evaluating the failures of their own organizations and institutions.\(^{168}\)
Indeed, rather the opposite was the prevailing norm: the British Prime Minister stating that ‘KFOR has saved the peace in Kosovo’; NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer, similarly announcing to KFOR in the weeks afterwards that ‘KFOR has done a magnificent job’ and ‘performed very well in March’; the KFOR chief spokesman, U.S. Lt Col James Moran, asserting ‘our response was exactly as it should have been’; and the UN spokeswoman in Kosovo, Jing Hua, proclaiming that the troops ‘had restored order quickly’. Even the COM-KFOR himself, LTGEN Holger Kammerhoff, praised the performance of KFOR forces, stating in the KFOR Chronicle: ‘We have proved our capability to provide a safe and secure environment by proportional force. The power of KFOR was seen by the rioters…Let’s continue to make KFOR a successful NATO-peacekeeping mission’.

To the contrary, however, the cessation of the rioting was in all probability not due to KFOR’s magnificent performance at all, but rather the dwindling number of targets for the Albanian mob after two days and nights of burning, looting, beating, lynching and widespread ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, in addition to distorting the truth, these comments did nothing to address the core problematic issues underlying KFOR’s failures during the riots: the web of ROE restrictions that had forbidden multiple KFOR units from taking action to protect the Serb populace or their property. Indeed, despite the omission of public references to the critical role of national caveats in the March disaster, private diplomatic cables reveal to the contrary that this fact was acknowledged within NATO itself. As one WikiLeaks cable written in December 2004 discloses: ‘Allied commanders had been very disappointed in the way some nations’ troops had performed in March, and this had led to a focus on national caveats’.

As a consequence of these inadequate investigations into the NATO’s failure in Kosovo, HRW staged its own comprehensive report on the Kosovo Riots in late 2004, thereby offering an independent critique of KFOR’s failure to effectively check the Albanian rampage. As HRW had expressed: ‘Such uncritical, self-congratulatory rhetoric ignores the reality of UNMIK and KFOR’s failures, and the urgency with which these shortcomings need to be addressed in order to prevent a repeat of the March 2004 events. ‘Time is running out for both the international community and minorities in Kosovo,’ it continued, ‘and now is the time for resolute and transparent action to rectify the all-too obvious shortcomings of the international community’s security structures in Kosovo’.

Their investigation produced several conclusions: (1) that the violence in Kosovo had taken Kosovo’s international security institutions by surprise; (2) that KFOR, along with UNMIK, had insufficient capacity, caused by low troop levels, to respond effectively to the widespread attacks; (3) that KFOR and UNMIK troops lacked capacity by being inadequately trained and equipped to deal with riot situations; and (4) that the lack of a coordinated response from KFOR, UNMIK and the KPS stemmed
from a disunified command and control structure which discouraged close coordination between the multinational brigades – hampered further by the prevalence of national contingents taking instructions from their own capitals rather than the Multinational Commander.174

In essence, however, as shown above, at least two – if not three – of these conclusions stem back to one single sticking point: diverse and restrictive national mandates (including disparate ROE), which were indicative not only of ‘widely disparate national doctrines’, but also diverse national interests and agendas among the nations contributing forces to the mission in Kosovo.175 Within these mandates, moreover, it was the diverse sets of ROE – and especially ROE restrictions – that were most instrumental in preventing proactive responses to the riots by most KFOR national contingents. From a broader perspective, these caveats were suggestive of something even more dire: a general apathy and lack of political will and commitment to the KFOR operation by its contributing members, shown not only in the premature termination of donations and delay in determining Kosovo’s status at the political level, but also in the general push for downsizing national troop levels and the ill-preparedness of these troops for riot-control at the military level.176 As one senior UNMIK official lamented to HRW during the investigation:

KFOR is in Kosovo to protect against civil violence, disturbances, and ethnic violence. They don’t need tanks but riot gear and shield, and soldiers trained in dealing with public disorder. If KFOR was not prepared for such civil disorder, then why the heck not? What did they think they were in Kosovo for?177

While scant public acknowledgement has been made of the instrumentality of national caveats in KFOR’s inability to fulfil its mandated security tasks, the evidence of their centrality may be seen in the fact that by 2005 most ROE prohibitions had been removed from the national mandates of KFOR participating nations – the result of behind-the-scenes pleas by the NATO Secretary General.178 A 2005 NATO report on the ongoing KFOR role in Balkan security recorded this development, stating: ‘The issue of national caveats – restrictions placed on the use of forces by national governments – mostly appears to have been resolved…The removal of most caveats since then has helped to make KFOR a more flexible force capable of immediate response’.179 The broader implications and destructive potential of caveats within MNOs, however, have gone largely unheeded. They consequently remain a critical problem hampering coalition operations to the present day, delineating certain forces to bear the brunt of the ‘heavy lifting’ and fighting on the frontlines, while others remain in relative peace and safety, often located to the rear of the heavy action where the worst threats lie. As MAJ Challies well expresses: ‘You can hide behind a national caveat’.180
KFOR – The Catalyst for Change?

In light of this overview, one might ask whether the March disaster in Kosovo and KFOR’s poor conduct as a result of diverse ROE, particularly the imposition of national caveats, had resulted in changes in international thinking and the design of multinational operations C2 structures. Certainly, after the Kosovo Riots, repeated calls were made for ‘genuine reform of the international security structures’ within multinational operations and ‘uniformity of response to security incidents…free of restriction by national contingents on their “rules of engagement”.’\(^{181}\) However, such reforms largely failed to materialize, an occurrence which has not boded well for future multinational operations, led by NATO or any other international organisation. In such operations, therefore, as demonstrated within the KFOR mission, national restrictions continue to severely hamper overall operational effectiveness, especially in interfering with troop manoeuvres.

Indeed, this unhappy reality is being experienced more and more within coalition operations around the world.\(^{182}\) As Brophy & Fisera state:

> The commanders of these multinational missions, such as those in the Balkans, Kosovo and most famously, in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting under NATO auspices in Afghanistan, are learning that many of these caveats, or restrictions, actually prohibit many national forces from engaging in combat operations, or from even deploying to hostile zones.\(^{183}\)

The ISAF operation in Afghanistan in particular – NATO’s second ground operation in its history and the first NATO endeavour after the Kosovo mission – has famously become embroiled in the trappings of caveats, having inherited many of the endemic problems of caveats first seen in KFOR. As a consequence, Multinational Commanders are once again having to learn, as they did in Kosovo, that it is the contributing nations themselves who ultimately control the pace and effectiveness of a peace-support operation – not the organisation that holds command: the former wield the power, the latter only the semblance of it.

It seems that until dramatic changes are implemented on the structural C2 design of multinational security operations, and due attention given to the problem of diverse ROE between coalition partners within such operations, history is doomed to repeat itself with serious and dangerous implications for all involved.
APPENDIX 2

The Evolution of the Caveat Dilemma within the ISAF Mission: Phases I-II

In Chapter 8 it was demonstrated how the issue of national caveats, imposed by national governments on national force contingents contributed to the NATO-led ISAF operation, has posed a continuous and unresolved impediment to the Afghan mission. It also showed how the caveat problem within the ISAF operation has been one of long duration with severely restrictive and inappropriate national caveats being imposed on ISAF forces from the time of ISAF’s infancy, during the first deployment of the ISAF to Kabul Province in 2001-2002, until at least December 2012 (reportedly continuing into 2013). This time period presents over a decade of warfare in which the ISAF military force has been severely constrained in its operations, and its flexibility curtailed, in the interests of political masters at the national level. This appendix will further elaborate on the ISAF’s caveat dilemma, by providing a description of the way in which the mission’s caveat problem developed over this time period, increasing in both scope and severity as the operation progressed through the four phases of NATO’s OPLAN for the Afghan mission.

ROE limitations and prohibitions within ISAF national contingents have been present during all four OPLAN phases to date. These have included the phases of: I) Assessment and Preparation; II) Geographic expansion; III) Stabilisation; and lastly IV) Transition. The following two appendices will provide a concise overview of the diverse difficulties posed by national caveat restrictions on ISAF forces during each of these operational phases, in order to illustrate how the issue of caveat imposition grew larger and more alarming with each progression of the Afghan mission (for a table charting the imposition or lifting of national caveats among the ISAF’s TCNs within each phase, please refer to APPENDIX 4, ‘Table displaying the Complete Record of National Caveat Imposition among the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) in Totality, August 2003 – December 2012’). This chapter will begin by examining the caveat issue within the mission during the first two phases of the OPLAN, which took place between 2002-2006.


The issue of national caveats within the ISAF operation first appeared within only months of the genesis of the ISAF, as 4,000 forces drawn from 17 nations deployed to Kabul Province. Many of these nations were NATO-members, several of which had also assisted the U.S. in the overthrow of
the Taliban during the earlier OEF military operation. From this point of time until November 2003, the mission was in its first operational phase Assessment and Preparation, a period during which the ISAF was to assess the security situation on the ground in Afghanistan and prepare to expand the mission throughout Afghanistan. In 2002 it became clear that caveat imposition was widespread amongst the various national contingents based in Kabul. In November critics began to decry this ‘maze’ of national caveats on the multinational ISAF force contingents, which they claimed were restricting the activities of ISAF members’ forces and were thereby limiting the ISAF coalition’s effectiveness.\(^2\)

To illustrate, some of these caveats forbade any involvement of national forces with the parallel OEF operation taking place alongside the ISAF operation in the eastern parts of the country.\(^4\) Other caveats concerned limitations on any movement of national forces within one kilometre of the Pakistan border or prohibited any ‘cross-border activity’ across the Durrand Line.\(^5\) Most prevalent of all, however, were caveats which forbade national forces from being deployed outside of Kabul Province at all, or even outside certain suburbs or ‘assigned patches’ of Kabul City.\(^6\) NATO officials complained that this refusal reduced the ability of the ISAF ‘to respond to incidents on the ground’ in Kabul Province.\(^7\)

In addition to Area of Operations (AO) caveats, moreover, some governments had imposed restrictions singular to that nation alone. One nation, for instance, banned the participation of national forces in missions where they might be required to operate alongside ‘an historical rival’.\(^8\) A number of countries also prohibited participation in riot-control operations (a caveat also widespread in NATO’s KFOR Operation in Kosovo, which would lead to NATO’s inadequate response during the security crisis one year later), or indeed from using riot control agents such as tear gas.\(^9\)
In addition to these caveat prohibitions, most ISAF force contingents were also bound by their governments to engage in conducting certain tasks only if permission had been sought and obtained from their respective capitals beforehand.\textsuperscript{10} This permission process was not only slow and laborious, a reality that cost precious time and slowed down reaction times for the COMISAF and ISAF HQ, but also the end-result was often a negative response.\textsuperscript{11} The Canadian contingent, in particular, went on record as one of the worst performers during Phase I with regard to this permission process.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{kabul_city}
\caption{Views over Kabul City, the location of ISAF Headquarters.\textsuperscript{12}}
\end{figure}

Firstly, Canadian National Commanders were given ‘very limited discretion’ so that permission had to be obtained for a variety of operations.\textsuperscript{13} In 2002-2003, for instance, Canadian National Commanders had to ‘call home’ to ask permission to conduct any mission ‘that might risk collateral damage’, or had ‘the potential for lethal force’, or wherever significant casualties or strategic failure might be a possibility in the mission (see endnote).\textsuperscript{14} As Auerswald & Saideman state: ‘This essentially meant a phone call home anytime the battle group was to leave the base since collateral damage is always a possibility when hundreds of soldiers move out’.\textsuperscript{15} Secondly, the Canadian contingent held the unenviable status of being among the slowest of all the ISAF force contingents to respond to COMISAF mission requests ‘sometimes taking up to 24 hours or more’.\textsuperscript{16}

Thirdly, all Canadian forces – whether ground, air or Special Operations Forces (SOF) forces – operated under some of the strictest caveats in the ISAF, a status also shared by the French and German contingents.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, according to one Canadian National Commander, COL Pat Stogran deployed to Kabul Province in 2002, Canadian caveats were so strict in these early years that he reportedly:

\begin{quote}
Feared that these conditions would dangerously restrict the ability to act when necessary, [and] that micromanagement from home might create a disaster akin to events in Bosnia and Rwanda where officers had to stand by and watch war crimes take place’…Stogran considered these restrictions to be not only unnecessary but perhaps even dangerous. Indeed, Stogran had prepared himself and his officers for the possibility that he might have to act beyond his authority if it meant stopping mass killings. Luckily, he never had to face that situation.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}
Apart from the widespread imposition of these restrictions, in addition to the range they encompassed, and the time taken by commanders to manoeuvre around them, the caveat issue within the ISAF was exacerbated by the fact that all of these caveats remained secret and classified by national governments, and were neither written nor declared to the COMISAF commanding the mission. This state of affairs continued even after the end of Phase I, into NATO’s successive operational phases. For example, in 2004 national caveats still remained secret and undeclared to the NATO-appointed ISAF Operational Commander, at that time Canadian COMISAF Lt Gen. Rich Hillier, and therefore existed in unknown quantities of numbers on ISAF forces.

As a result of this secrecy, the content of each of the caveats imposed on national contingents in Kabul was discovered only haphazardly, as the COMISAF was denied the use of certain contingents by that contingent’s National Commander vested with the ‘red card’. Even in instances where senior NATO commanders were able to work out contingents’ caveats based on these red-card refusals, in addition to experience working alongside national force contingents in other NATO operations (for instance, KFOR), the reality of having to manage ISAF forces in the light of so many constraints was extremely tiresome. As one deputy COMISAF of this period later commented, working around these caveats was ‘extraordinarily frustrating’. The result was that ISAF COMISAFs began to rank national contingents as belonging to one of three ‘tiers’ of countries based on their caveat restrictions, ranked according to both their level of flexibility and their ability to respond to security events.


The ISAF’s caveat dilemma only deepened over the course of the following years, during which time NATO instituted its second phase of the NATO OPLAN, *Phase II – Geographic Expansion*. This second phase was to take place in four stages, corresponding to geographical thrusts northwards,
westwards, southwards and eastwards from Kabul Province, renamed to RC-Capital. During these geographical expansions the ISAF coalition would take command of the four other large command sectors within Afghanistan, at that time still commanded by American OEF forces. However, while the expansions seemed to consolidate the NATO-led ISAF’s authority and prestige as a multinational military security mission, in terms of national caveats, the four expansions actually served to highlight – even worsen – the ISAF’s caveat plight.

**Expanding Northwards & Westwards**

First of all, in December 2003 NATO had commenced the first stage of ISAF expansion northwards from Kabul Province, to take command of nine new Afghan provinces by the end of October 2004. The new sector was to be known as Regional Command-North (RC-North) and was commanded by Lead Nation Germany with ground forces supplied from Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Hungary. While operationally the expansion was a large step forward for the ISAF, in terms of caveats the northern expansion had resulted in a worsening of the ISAF’s caveat situation as the same restrictions on activities experienced in RC-Capital began to reappear in the ISAF’s new northern sector.

![Figure A2.4 – RC-North: Close crop of ISAF’s RC-North, commanded by Lead Nation Germany.](image)

Indeed, alarm and concern over ISAF national caveats were once again soon raised within the international community. According to U.S. Ambassador Robert L. Barry, for instance, not only had these northern ISAF forces not ‘deployed as fast and strong as we had hoped’, on the one hand, but they had deployed with caveats, on the other hand, which focused them on reconstruction and their own ‘force protection’ at the expense of their other assigned security tasks. Furthermore, the most restrictive caveats of all were imposed by RC-North’s own Lead Nation in command, Germany.
In May 2005, secondly, NATO commenced the second expansion of the ISAF westwards to assume full command of Regional Command-West (RC-West) by September, a sector which was assigned to Italian Lead Nation command with forces fielded from Italy, Spain, Lithuania and the United States. However, as previously, this western expansion gave rise to increased caveat difficulties. Not only was NATO again unable to raise sufficient troops from among the ISAF members to properly deploy to western Afghanistan, but national caveats were also reappearing in the new western sector, imposed again even on the forces of the new sector’s Lead Nation – Italy. This fact led U.S. Ambassador Robert Barry to conclude that ‘without a U.S. lead ISAF has been severely hampered’.
In fact, by this time it was becoming apparent to NATO that the ISAF force as a whole was proving a cumbersome and unwieldy instrument for the security assistance and stabilisation mission in hand, with unknown numbers of national caveats imposed on forces stationed in all three sectors of RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-West. Indeed, despite renewed efforts by a nascent Taliban insurgency to scuttle the ISAF mission and foster instability in Afghanistan, TCNs in all three Regional Commands – Capital, North and West – had imposed caveats on their forces that prohibited participation in ‘offensive’ or ‘combat’ operations, allowing involvement only in defensive operations. At the same time other countries had confined their forces to the provision of humanitarian assistance alone, excluding themselves from all security operations altogether. Caveat limitations also became more prevalent, with permission from national capitals required to be obtained before national forces could be committed to any operation in which national personnel might be exposed ‘to a higher degree of risk’, before every deployment of SOFs, and even before travel by the contingent National Commander.

What is more, the majority of ISAF forces – including combat manoeuvre units – were prohibited from ever being deployed outside the boundaries of their originally assigned locations. While these boundaries usually related to the perimeter of the Regional Command to which contingents had been assigned – a problem for the COMISAF in itself since contingents could not be used throughout Afghanistan as necessity demanded – they sometimes also referred to even the perimeters of a particular province, district, or even city suburb within the RC.

This emphasis by NATO nations on force protection measures was particularly significant during this period, occurring only a short time after unwritten caveats among NATO forces deployed to Kosovo had created an embarrassing security fiasco, when NATO forces were restricted by force protection caveats from acting to protect the Serb population being targeted by violent and widespread Albanian
riots across the Kosovar province (see endnote and APPENDIX 1). In fact, despite the caveat disaster in Kosovo which had impugned NATO’s reputation as a credible security force, most of the 36 TCNs to the ISAF in Afghanistan during 2005 were operating under national caveats limiting how their forces could be used, thereby impacting on what ISAF forces could actually do across the entire mission within the Afghan theatre of war. This was a state of affairs that, according to one U.S. senior defence official, rendered it ‘unnecessarily complicated for commanders’. Indeed, caveats regularly led to serious and frustrating security scenarios and crises for ISAF commanders.

Caveats were not only wreaking havoc on the ground, moreover, but they were also undermining the entire mission to stabilise Afghanistan, which was founded on the premise of first establishing and then maintaining security within the Afghan AO. The ISAF’s first and second expansions in Afghanistan had consequently shown that, while the KFOR disaster may have resulted in a greater awareness and focus on the harmful role of national caveats on NATO forces within NATO Headquarters, it had not led to the elimination or reduction of caveats by NATO nations within NATO’s new mission in Afghanistan.

**Going South**

It was in the context of this increasingly unmanageable situation with ISAF security forces that NATO began planning its final expansionary stages southwards and eastwards, comprising the final two ISAF expansions of *Phase II*. These expansions would not only both take place during the subsequent year, but would expand ISAF command into areas in which the newly resurgent Taliban maintained a stronger presence than elsewhere in Afghanistan. In light of the varied and numerous national caveats among ISAF coalition forces, however, the majority of which were still unstated and therefore learned only as a result of planning problems and security crises, concern began to mount with regard to the effectiveness of ISAF security forces deploying to the south.

This was especially the case amongst American officials who believed the heavily-caveated ISAF allies were ill-prepared for the change in military tempo and the level of threat inherent in ensuring security in these former Taliban strongholds, especially in and around Kandahar, which was not only the birthplace of the Taliban movement, but also an area which had provided strong support for the Taliban regime and its leaders. Indeed, Taliban attacks against American OEF and local Afghan National Army (ANA) forces then stationed in southern and eastern Afghanistan were both more audacious and frequent than anything the ISAF allies had experienced hitherto in the quieter northern and western parts of the country, where ISAF forces saw their mission as primarily and strictly ‘peacekeeping’.
Indeed, as the Taliban insurgency gained strength during the first half of 2006, many of the NATO and non-NATO TCNs to the ISAF seemed reluctant to accept the reality that, in order to secure and stabilise Afghanistan, the mission had to change from a traditional peacekeeping or nation-building operation, into a more fully-fledged COIN mission. This was especially the case in the south, where the Taliban were gaining influence and control over the local populace. In the north, however, where the insurgency had not yet gained a foothold, nation-building activities were still able to continue more or less unheeded by insurgency activity. As one Canadian Colonel summarised the situation at that time: ‘Operating in the north is like doing peace-keeping in Bosnia, while the south is full of insurgents, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers, all making for a very high risk environment’.

Unsurprisingly, given their record of caveats focused on force protection, the governments of many NATO allies – particularly those from continental Europe and beyond such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Turkey – subsequently opted to keep their forces in the north and far away from the fighting required to secure and stabilise the country. Turkey even refused initially to take command of any PRT outside of RC-North, then the quietest ISAF command within the entire mission, rejecting PRTs even in RC-West or RC-Capital. ‘We have no intention to go into Stage 2 or 3 due to logistic and security problems’, Turkish officials claimed (see endnote).

In fact across the ISAF force, reluctance to engage in COIN combat operations against insurgents became a common and recurring theme. This was evident, firstly, in the way that caveats began to increase within the ISAF force, which forbade the participation of contingents in ‘offensive’ operations, ‘war-fighting’ or ‘combat’ operations and – even more explicitly – ‘counter-insurgency operations’. Secondly, moreover, caveats began to emerge which forbade outright the deployment of national forces anywhere ‘south of the Hindu Kush’, thereby halting the COMISAF from deploying their contingents to RC-South where the risk of being in harm’s way in relation to insurgents was greater than elsewhere in the country. This anti-south caveat held sway even in cases of emergency, when the COMISAF might urgently need forces to assist ISAF allies in the south during serious security crises.

In this way caveats were serving to divide ISAF mission into two geographical zones: the ‘north’ (RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-West) and the ‘south’ (RC-South and RC-East). The seriousness of this situation was captured by the Brookings Institute in early 2006, which commented that: ‘While the overall [NATO] rules of engagement are fairly robust, each contributing nation is operating under so-called national caveats that strictly limit what their troops can do…This is not the sort of force or set of rules that will protect and rebuild a country of 25 million people’. Indeed, the article cast doubt on the real political will for the mission among the ISAF’s European participants, concluding:
It is not yet clear that the European governments who are committing to this mission know what they are getting into or have the political will and support to see it through... European leaders who think they have signed on for a casualty-free traditional peacekeeping operation had better think again, especially as the NATO deployment moves in the more dangerous south.  

**The Southern Expansion**

In January 2006 the ISAF commenced its third expansion southwards into RC-South, an area encompassing six provinces in southern Afghanistan. The new sector was to be commanded on the basis of rotation between Lead Nations Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – the three nations that had first volunteered to deploy combat forces to the south. The approximately 7,700 ground forces deployed there were drawn mainly from these three nations, but also included small contingents from Romania, Denmark, Estonia and new ISAF contributor, Australia. The mission’s expansion south thereby more than doubled the total ISAF force, raising the total force level from approximately 7,000 to 15,000 by the end of the expansion on 31 July 2006. Small units of Special Operations Forces (SOFs) attached to the U.S. OEF mission, and harking from Denmark, France and Australia, also remained in RC-South in order to ‘continue combat operations against terrorist elements’.

However, as with the previous two geographical expansions, this diffusion of ISAF forces into southern Afghanistan was again accompanied by difficulties. Indeed, not only did the ISAF force

![Figure A2.8 – RC-South: Close crop of ISAF’s Regional Command South, commanded by Lead Nations the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada.](image-url)
deploy under-strength, since the majority of ISAF’s 37 TCNs refused to send their forces into this more hostile and active sector of the country, but out of the handful of countries that did volunteer to deploy to the new southern sector, most were again imposing national caveats restricting how their forces could be used once deployed there.\textsuperscript{53} This was in spite of not only the 2005 Copenhagen Resolution, drafted in recognition of the ISAF’s growing caveat crisis in order to encourage the reduction of the number of caveats imposed on ISAF forces, but also an earlier informal NATO agreement between all the countries deploying forces south and east, to reduce national caveats and institute more robust ROE on their national contingents.\textsuperscript{54}

In fact, of the seven nations deploying forces to Afghanistan’s more hostile southern regions, only two countries deployed their national contingents free from national caveats – Lead Nations Canada and the United Kingdom. With regard to Canada, in particular, despite its earlier caveat record in Kabul Province, Canada had over time relaxed its ROE to dramatically alter its stance completely by the time of the Canadian contingent’s deployment south. Rather ironically, in regard to other NATO allies, this change of view on the caveat issue within the Canadian government occurred \textit{in spite of} the expected increase in actual risk operating in the Afghan south (in fact Canada’s highest imposition of caveats took place when Canadian forces had operated in Kabul Province, a low-risk environment with few military threats).\textsuperscript{55}

The third Lead Nation, the Netherlands, deployed its forces under national caveats, causing RC-South to be the fourth consecutive sector in which a Lead Nation with lead command responsibility was imposing restrictions curtailing its forces’ activities. Indeed it soon became clear that the Netherlands, Romania, Denmark, Estonia and Australia, while eliminating all ‘major caveats’ from their forces’ ROE, as per the informal agreement, had nevertheless left minor caveats intact.\textsuperscript{56} These so-called ‘minor’ caveats consisted of hefty prohibitions against national forces participating in either counter-terrorist operations or offensive security operations – the latter effectively ruling out involvement in all combat operations.\textsuperscript{57}

This state of affairs was an alarming and pressing cause for concern among NATO military commanders and officials, especially given the high and escalating level of insurgent activity in the ISAF’s southern sector. In fact, by the end of the southern expansion in July 2006, nearly half of all ISAF forces in Afghanistan operated under caveat constraints, an unhappy fact which rendered the caveat issue: ‘A source of great contention as a major cause of interference in terms of troop manoeuvres and overall operational effectiveness’.\textsuperscript{58}
Figure A2.9 – RC-South Badge: The badge of ISAF Forces in Regional Command South.59

To be sure, the imposition of combat caveats on combat forces in the Afghan south was the most troubling development of all in terms of the ISAF mission’s growing caveat problem. Firstly, it indicated that the mission’s caveat difficulty – far from being confined to the north or the west – was spreading from sector to sector, rendering it increasingly difficult for ISAF security forces to prosecute their assigned security tasks. Secondly, because securing the restive Afghan south was a vital lynchpin in the entire campaign to stabilise Afghanistan, non-combat caveats imposed by forces deployed to RC-South were essentially the worst of all the caveats imposed by coalition members, since they made the accomplishment of this crucial southern task virtually impossible.

Consequently, instead of forces capable of the full range of combat operations and full operational and tactical flexibility, the acting COMISAF – then UK General David Richards – was limited in his operational planning by forces bound by severe and intrusive caveats banning combat, counter-terrorist and even counter-insurgent operations. Such a situation in RC-South was nonsensical since, as Richards himself publicly expressed to the ISAF TCNs in May, the whole third expansion south was effectively a ‘combat operation’.60 The issue of national caveats was simultaneously becoming an increasingly troubling and weighty matter of concern to officials within NATO, as well as within the ISAF command headquarters itself. In point of fact, overall, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the caveat imposition within the ISAF was spiralling out of control.

**ISAF Deploys East**

This grim caveat situation within the mission only intensified in subsequent months as the ISAF prepared to deploy eastward. On 5 October 2006 the ISAF commenced its fourth and final expansion stage eastwards into a large swathe of territory that not only encompassed the RC-Capital sector containing the capital city of Kabul, but also ran along a significant length of the long and porous border between Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan.61 The sector was to become known as RC-East and was assigned to the Lead Nation command of the United States, with additional support
provided by Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey and New Zealand. Due to the fact that a large number of American combat forces were already deployed in the east, formerly deployed under the command of OEF but now to become part of the ISAF mission under ISAF command, this final stage of the ISAF mission’s expansion in Afghanistan proceeded far more quickly than the other three stages, being finalised in only three months.\textsuperscript{62}

Nevertheless, despite this NATO success in completing the geographic expansion of the ISAF mission, national caveats were still creating difficulties within the mission – even in the new eastern sector. General lack of political will amongst the ISAF coalition members to have national forces involved in the hardest tasks of enforcing and maintaining security in the country had also extended to the eastern regions of Afghanistan. Even prior to the expansion in July of 2006, it was purported that the overwhelmingly ‘narrow interpretation’ of the ISAF mandate, as shown by the 70 national caveats imposed by a majority of the governments contributing forces to the ISAF, caused numerous Afghan government officials to beg their U.S. OEF counterparts operating in RC-East ‘not to turn over their areas to NATO replacements’.\textsuperscript{63}

\begin{figure}[!h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{FigureA2.10-RC-East}
\caption{Figure A2.10 – RC-East: Close crop of ISAF’s Regional Command East, commanded by Lead Nation the United States.\textsuperscript{64}}
\end{figure}

When, as these officials had feared, forces from NATO countries Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey – as well as non-NATO nation New Zealand – subsequently did take control of their respective assignments, most of these national contingents took command of their posts constrained by national
caveats which, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, restricted their operational and tactical activities in RC-East. Indeed, as was later revealed by NATO SACEUR General John Craddock, the total number of caveats imposed on the ISAF force had risen from 70 in early July to a total of 83 during the subsequent period, as the eastern expansion took place.65

These alarming events led then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to publicly announce at a NATO media conference in November the dire extent of the caveat situation within the mission with ‘scores’ of caveats inhibiting the movement and operation of ISAF forces in Afghanistan.66 Rather than revolving around a north-south Afghanistan divide as promoted in the press, he intimated, the caveat problem was in fact a nationwide matter and about Afghanistan in total, ‘be it north, south, west or east’. 67 While acknowledging in reference to Bosnia and Kosovo that NATO had never had a mission operation without caveats, de Hoop Scheffer emphasized that the current state of affairs was ‘not the ideal situation’ and asserted that the lifting of the caveats was ‘from time to time even more important than bringing in new forces’.68

![Figure A2.11 – RC-East Badge: The badge of ISAF Forces in Regional Command East.](image)

**Concern for Phase III – ‘Stabilisation’**

By the end of December 2006 the ISAF had not only completed its eastward expansion, but also the full geographical expansion of the ISAF AO across the entirety of Afghan sovereign territory, as mandated by both the GiRoA and the UN under Resolution 1510 of October 2003 (see endnote).70 The completion of the fourth ISAF expansion thereby signalled the end of Phase II of NATO’s OPLAN, and the start of Phase III – Stabilisation.71

As the ISAF prepared to secure and stabilise the whole of Afghanistan, however, anxiety and deep misgivings abounded amongst NATO officials and observers alike regarding the ISAF’s ability to actually achieve its mission given its difficult caveat predicament. NATO leadership had only deepened the caveat plight of the mission, with many of its members – even strong, militarily-capable
NATO members, refusing to allow their troops to participate in counter-insurgency security operations or even to deploy their troops to any locality where they might be in harm’s way, or where casualties might potentially be sustained (even temporarily such as in emergency situations). ‘The alliance is on the back foot in combat operations due to the fact that only a handful of countries are actively involved in fighting the insurgency’, claimed senior diplomats and military officials, who contended the credibility of NATO was in jeopardy. Or as former U.S. President, George W. Bush, later recounted in his memoirs:

The multilateral military mission proved a disappointment...Every member of NATO had sent troops to Afghanistan. So had more than a dozen other countries. But many parliaments imposed heavy restrictions – known as national caveats – on what their troops were permitted to do. Some were not allowed to patrol at night. Others could not engage in combat. The result was a disorganized and ineffective force, with troops fighting by different rules and many not fighting at all. Indeed, concern was rising especially within NATO Headquarters in regard to this flood of caveat constraints within the ISAF force. NATO officials and commanders, chief amongst them NATO SACEUR General James Jones who had overseen Phase II of the mission, were worried that with so many operational restraints hindering operations and diminishing the ISAF’s combat ability, the force was not in a good position to begin the next stabilisation phase of the OPLAN. This phase was due to begin in January of the new year, 2007, when ISAF forces would be fully deployed and responsible for all security and stability operations, through which they were to ensure and maintain security against insurgents throughout the entire country of Afghanistan. The question remained, could the ISAF successfully achieve Phase III in the light of so many national caveat constraints on its forces?

To make matters worse, COMISAF David Richards had announced that both the country and the mission was in fact at a ‘tipping point’, with mission success hinging on progress in the southern sector of Afghanistan. While British and Canadian ISAF forces in RC-South had through the killing of over 500 insurgents in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces been able to ‘broadly stabilize’ the southern regions of the country, Richards explained, insurgents there were still seriously undermining international attempts to stabilise the country. Indeed, if the local Afghan people did not see ‘concrete and visible improvement’ in their daily lives over the next six months, Richards warned, there was a danger that up to 70 percent of Afghans in the south could ‘switch sides’ and begin supporting these insurgents. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair then stated, echoing both the COMISAF and the assessment of ISAF military commanders on the ground, ‘the next few months will be crucial for the Western presence in Afghanistan’.79

This appendix has further explored the ISAF mission’s caveat dilemma, by providing a description of the way in which the mission’s caveat problem developed during the first two phases of the NATO
OPLAN – Assessment and Preparation and Geographic Expansion. The overview has demonstrated how the difficulties posed by the imposition of national caveats by ISAF’s own TCNs increased as the mission progressed and as ISAF forces deployed from Kabul Province into the other four other geographical zones around the country of Afghanistan. Indeed, the national caveat issue had evolved from a minor frustration to a nationwide security dilemma, as the effects of the caveats became more widely felt across the mission. The following appendix will continue this exploration, by examining the way in which caveat imposition developed within the ISAF force during the final three phases of the OPLAN.
APPENDIX 3

The Evolution of the Caveat Dilemma within the ISAF Mission: Phases III-V

In the previous appendix the evolution of the caveat issue within the ISAF was traced through the mission’s two earliest phases, Phase I – Assessment & Preparation and Phase II – Geographic Expansion. This appendix will continue this overview of the development of the caveat problem within the ISAF, by examining the negative caveat progression during the mission’s next three phases undertaken to date: Phase III – Stabilisation; Phase IV – Transition; and most recently Phase V – Redeployment. These three phases have taken place between January 2007 and the present time of writing in 2014. In providing an overview of the continued difficulties posed by national caveat restrictions on ISAF forces during each of these operational phases, the following description will show how the issue of caveat imposition has continued to become larger and more alarming with each progression of the Afghan mission up to the current time.


The deepening of the ISAF’s caveat dilemma during the Geographic Expansion phase of the mission could not but have serious implications for the subsequent third stabilisation phase of the operation. Indeed, Phase III was one of the most vital phases of the mission, the purpose being to tangibly secure and stabilise the whole country of Afghanistan from the insurgent threat, in conjunction with Afghan security forces. As the 2007-2009 ISAF mission statement made clear, the mission objective of the ISAF coalition during this period was to:

Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.¹

Accordingly, Phase III involved not only security operations within each of the five Regional Commands, conducted by combat forces to create and maintain a secure environment in which stability operations could safely take place, but also stability operations carried out by civil-military PRTs in key areas, the purpose of which was – through R&D in addition to governance activities – to build civil function and capacity and restore normality to Afghanistan’s war-torn population. In addition, Stabilisation also involved building up the capacity (quantity and quality) of Afghanistan’s own native security forces under the direct control of the Afghan central Government – the ANA and
the ANP together with Afghan special operations and border patrol forces – by means of ISAF training and mentoring teams.²

Phase III was also the first ISAF phase in which NATO’s new overtly COIN-oriented strategy was to be implemented, encapsulated by the motto ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’. This meant that appropriate combat forces would first be amassed in a given insurgent-controlled area (SHAPE), then combat forces employed to establish initial security within the operational environment by removing insurgents and other anti-Government elements operating within the area, in order to create a space between the insurgents and the Afghan civilian population (CLEAR). This was mostly achieved by the removal of hostile fighters via elimination, detention or expulsion, and was to be conducted by ISAF forces in coordination with ANSF forces, who at that time in early 2007-2008 were assuming a supportive role in these combat operations.³

These ISAF and ANSF forces would subsequently maintain the security that had been initially created (HOLD). This would be achieved by maintaining a strong presence in the area and continuing operations to deny insurgents access or freedom of movement within the AO, and to prevent opportunities for their return. Stability forces would subsequently be deployed to foster reconstruction, development and governance in support of the central Government of Afghanistan, while other ISAF units would also undertake the training and mentoring of both the ANA and ANP in order to build the capacity of Afghanistan’s own indigenous security forces (BUILD). In this way, Stabilisation was to incrementally expand the security bubbles around existing PRTs to create a safe and stable environment in which the native Afghan people might thrive, lead their lives free from fear and terrorization, and take part in the normal functions of a democratically-governed civil society.

Caveats Impede Security & Stability Operations

However, the inefficacy generated by national caveat imposition during the second OPLAN phase of Geographic Expansion, as discussed in APPENDIX 2, continued into Phase III. Indeed, between 2007 and 2011, a range of caveats remained firmly in place in each Regional Command throughout the country, which included not only regional caveats keeping forces within RC boundaries, but also geographical caveats forbidding the deployment of forces to RC-South (including SOFs and the newly-created Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entities designed specifically to respond to emergencies).⁴ Caveat prohibitions against participation in combat, counter-terrorist or counter-insurgent operations also remained heavily in place throughout the force, thereby hamstringing most of the combat manoeuvre units deployed throughout the ISAF’s AOs.
In fact combat forces from several nations were prohibited by national caveats even from using lethal force at all – that is, firing their weapons – unless in self-defence, meaning that the use of lethal force for mission accomplishment was forbidden. This led one defence expert, Max Boot, to proclaim:

This is all well and good in theory but difficult to implement in practice. What do commanders do if they get intelligence on Taliban fighters gathering a few miles away? Wait to be attacked, or strike first? For American officers it would be a no-brainer.

These combat caveats had effectively divided the forces of the ISAF coalition into ‘non-fighting’ and ‘fighting’ groups, while on-going caveats against southern deployments had physically located these groups into the north-west and south-east sectors of the country respectively. Unfair and disproportionate ‘burden-sharing’ quickly became the catchphrase for this caveat-created crisis, especially as the years wore on. Indeed, at the 2008 Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued an unequivocal condemnation of this disproportionate burden-sharing caused by the caveats. ‘In NATO’, Gates emphasized, ‘some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying’.

Other, sometimes peculiar, ROE restrictions also appeared within the various Regional Commands during the Stabilisation phase, for instance forbidding operations at night or ‘under the cover of darkness’, or operations undertaken under snowy weather conditions. One nation seems to have even restricted their national contingents, rather ludicrously, from taking part in any operation – including MEDEVAC emergency operations – at ‘dinner time’. Several nations also began to prohibit even the cooperation of national forces with the forces of nations fighting in the Afghan south or east, for example by banning the transport of ISAF service personnel from other nations on national aircraft.

In addition, some nations also banned their PRT teams from ever leaving their PRT base or from ever taking part in guard duty around the PRT. In other PRTs, patrols could not take place outside the perimeter of the PRT base. Elsewhere where patrols were allowed caveats had been imposed to restrict the manner in which they were conducted. In German PRTs, for instance, foot patrols were forbidden in townships so that patrols could only take place from within armoured vehicles. This was a tactic that was intimidating and not people-friendly for local Afghans, and therefore contrary to the purposes of COIN, the aim being to ‘win hearts and minds’. As Etienne de Durand, director of security studies at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, would later exclaim in 2009: ‘This is not the best way to befriend Afghan locals. You can’t interact with them in an armored personnel carrier’.
The reality of so many caveats on ISAF forces, imposed on both security and stability forces, inevitably had a significant debilitating effect on the ISAF’s COIN campaign, hindering all four stages of the COIN strategy. For instance, with regard to combat forces conducting security operations, many combat units were not authorised to conduct the kinds of operations necessary to CLEAR or HOLD territory from insurgents. Moreover, even in cases where combat operations were permitted by national governments, other caveat restraints would often interfere with these units’ overall combat capability. This meant that in many areas within each of the Regional Commands, combat forces simply could not operate properly either to maintain security in the areas they already held, or to extend the ‘bubbles of security’ into new insurgent-controlled areas to pave the way for stability operations.

As for stability forces, with many civil-military teams constrained to operating solely within the confines of their PRT base or prohibited from conducting security patrols, development projects could not be attempted, and if they were, could not be protected. Due to caveats on patrolling, moreover, in many places ISAF forces could not even provide a basic level of protection within their own PRT areas, so that Afghan locals a short distance away from ISAF bases became the victims of insurgent intimidation, threats (e.g. night letters), and even at times Taliban-style executions. This was especially the case if forces were banned from operating at night, thereby giving insurgents a significant period of time in which they could roam freely and employ terror tactics against the local population without any interruption from ISAF forces. In sum, the result of caveats in Phase III was that, in many provinces throughout Afghanistan, the armed forces of the ISAF were failing to provide security, stability or protection to the Afghan population. In short, they were failing to ‘do COIN’.

This ISAF failure corresponded to negative events in the security climate within the country, especially in the Afghan south. Not only had the insurgency gained in strength, but throughout Afghanistan there had been a serious deterioration in security conditions under the watch of ISAF forces. Indeed, the year 2007 became the bloodiest year on record since the original overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. By the end of the year, while the northern and western sectors of Afghanistan were ‘relatively stable’, the situation in the southern sector was, in de Hoop Scheffer’s words, ‘getting very rough’. Insufficient numbers of combat-capable forces had meant that the areas ‘cleared’ of insurgents during NATO offensives were not able to be ‘held’ in subsequent months, thereby allowing Taliban insurgents to return and re-establish safe-havens in the south.

By 2008 clashes between ISAF and ANSF forces with Taliban insurgents had become a frequent occurrence in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, and while it was reported that ISAF forces had won each major battle and significantly disrupted insurgent command and control in these sectors, these tactical victories had not led to significant strategic gains. The British, whose forces
had been involved in a herculean effort to inflict heavy casualties on insurgents operating in southern Taliban strongholds including through the assassination of key Taliban commanders, blamed such ‘fleeting victories’ on the caveat and burden-sharing stale-mate. ‘If NATO deployed more troops and lifted all restrictions on how they might operate,’ the British Daily Telegraph asserted, ‘the insurgents would be vulnerable to a general offensive. Under present conditions, however, they would simply retreat into Pakistan.’ Indeed, the prevailing atmosphere at the end of 2007 is perhaps best summarised by one Dutch journalist’s exclamation on the matter in the European World Politics Review:

Is it possible that NATO, probably the mightiest, certainly the wealthiest, military alliance the world has ever seen, could leave Afghanistan defeated by the Taliban, a band of religious fanatics with an ideology harking back to the 7th century?  

**Counter-Narcotics Caveats**

In addition to the impact of national caveats, the degenerating security situation was being aided by the illicit narcotics industry in the country, namely the production and smuggling of opium and heroin from Afghan poppy crops. The Afghan drug industry and the Afghan insurgency was inextricably linked, since drug profits played a significant role in funding the various Enemy insurgent groups that were active in destabilising the country and opposing ISAF forces. Narcotics interdiction operations thereby became a new and important area for ISAF forces. As COMISAF Dan McNeill stated in mid-2007: ‘ISAF’s activities in the security sector will count for very little if the drug trade is not curbed.’

Yet even in this sphere of activity, national caveats were again appearing to impede ISAF operations in the form of caveats banning participation in, or support of, Counter-Narcotics (CN) operations. Indeed, according to Karp & Ponzio, 13 of the 37 ISAF TCNs were imposing CN caveats on their national forces in 2007 that ‘preclude ISAF’s commanding general from deploying their forces on certain missions without exemptions’. This figure represented a third (35 percent) of the total ISAF force at that time. Of these 13 CN caveat imposing nations, moreover, five were based in RC-South were the narcotics industry was most rampant and where, correspondingly, CN operations were most urgently needed. In fact, in 2007 Helmand Province alone accounted for 66 percent of Afghanistan’s total opium production, which at that time supplied 93 percent of the world’s opium. This situation led Karp & Ponzio to conclude that:

National caveats must be limited as much as possible, especially with regards to counter-narcotics. While ultimately a political decision by ISAF member nations, there can be no doubt that national caveats undermine the GOA’s security and stability – the very rationale for the international presence in Afghanistan.
However, TCN opposition to CN operations remained strongly intact within the ISAF force over subsequent years, in spite of the fact that it was narcotics which had become one of the main sources of income fuelling the insurgency the ISAF was tasked to quell. So-called ‘sensitivity’ among ISAF TCNs towards involvement in drug interdiction operations led not only to national governments imposing CN caveats, moreover, but also to active lobbying to prevent NATO from officially incorporating CN operations into the ISAF mandate, and subsequently the COIN strategy, of the ISAF.29 This sensitivity was so great that even in playing a passive CN role, consisting of passing drug intelligence along to Afghan authorities and deploying to support the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police Force in their drug interdiction activities, ‘national caveats ensure that ISAF’s support is not as robust as it could be.’30

When finally in 2008 an active narcotics interdiction role was officially authorised in the new ISAF mandate (as a voluntary ‘opt in’ option so as not to inflame the sensitivities of nations not wishing to participate in them), many TCNs opted not to participate and thereby kept their CN caveats in place.31 Germany, for instance, refused to take any ‘lead’ role in such operations throughout 2008, while France and Hungary also maintained CN caveats on their forces until June and October 2009 respectively.32 In mid-2009 ex-SACEUR General Craddock announced that, partly as a result of these on-going CN caveats: ‘The Taliban gets about $400 million a year from its opium poppy crop, which supplies 95 percent of the illicit heroin market in Europe and is still Afghanistan's export mainstay, which represents well over half the country's GDP’.33

**Caveats Limit ISAF Training of the ANSF**

The training of indigenous Afghan security forces was another area fraught with problems within the ISAF, and yet another sphere tarnished by the plethora of caveats within the ISAF operation. During Stabilisation ANSF capacity was, firstly, to be built up with personnel recruited and trained in the basic skills of soldiering, and selected officers provided with officer training. ANSF forces had then, secondly, to be taught how to execute a range of security operations.34 Once trained, moreover, they were to deploy with ISAF combat forces and assume a subordinate, supporting combat role to ISAF command, in order to be given on-the-ground experience in the execution of these combat operations. Finally, they were to be taught how to actively lead the full range of security operations that were necessary to establish and maintain security in Afghanistan.35

In practice, this meant that during Phase III combat operations began to be executed, in which ISAF forces took the supporting combat role during the operation under Afghan lead command.36 Progression from Stabilisation into Transition took place when each of these three conditions had been met, in which ANSF forces were available in sufficient numbers and trained to both execute and
lead combat operations against anti-Government insurgents, and therefore able to take responsibility for security in the local vicinity in which they were based.\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, the success of \textit{Phase III} in regard to ANSF forces depended heavily on the ability of ISAF forces to train Afghan security forces in these three vital areas. In particular, this concerned OMLT teams embedded with both the ANA and ANP, by which approximately 40-60 ISAF personnel, drawn from one or more TCN nations, would train and mentor battalions (‘kandaks’) of around 450-600 Afghan personnel.

By the end of 2007 NATO had already woefully failed to provide sufficient numbers of OMLTs (known as ‘omelets’) to advise newly created and fielded Afghan operational units of the ANA and ANP.\textsuperscript{38} In fact, according to US MAJ General Robert Cone, posted to Kabul to oversee the training of the ANA, while officially 16,000 ANA soldiers could then be deployed around the country, in truth none of these men were ready for combat.\textsuperscript{39} As he himself remarked, when asked how many ANA soldiers were ready for combat: ‘To be perfectly honest – zero’.\textsuperscript{40}

Even when training of the Afghan security forces did begin in earnest in 2008, however, many of the TCN governments were also imposing caveat fetters on this important security domain. This was in spite of the fact that training robust ANSF forces was critical to success in COIN, and also a key factor in the ISAF mission plan enabling ISAF forces to eventually redeploy in \textit{Phase V} (and thus the ISAF TCNs primary ‘exit strategy’ out of Afghanistan).

\textit{Figure A3.1 – ANA Assessment: The operational effectiveness of the ANA as of September 2010.}\textsuperscript{41}
To exemplify, some caveats forbade the transport of any Afghan, whether civilian or military, on national aircraft – even in the case of serious injury.\textsuperscript{42} Other nations imposed caveats which forbade national contingents from operating ‘closely’ with Afghan security forces at all.\textsuperscript{43} In other instances pre-existing national caveats excluded participation in ANSF training. One Swedish caveat, for example, which required that that all decisions regarding the deployment of Swedish forces outside the Swedish PRT area to be made in Stockholm, rather than on the ground by its National Commander, precluded Sweden from contributing an OMLT since it could not be operationally effective.\textsuperscript{44}

As for the conduct of joint operations, in which the ANSF battalions would accompany ISAF forces during their security operations and take a passive role while learning the art of warfare, the governments of many countries – including RC Lead Nations – imposed caveats which denied national forces permission to deploy with the ANA or ANP units outside of their own assigned AO boundaries.\textsuperscript{46} All the ANSF battalions being trained by Italy functioned under this caveat until mid-2009, while Afghan kandaks trained by German OMLTs remained constrained by this caveat into the year 2010 and beyond.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, German forces were forbidden from mentoring ANSF forces ‘outside of RC-North’ in other parts of the country, such as in Kabul.\textsuperscript{48} The Danish government, meanwhile, imposed a caveat that prohibited Danish commanders even from ‘embedding OMLT members with ANA units’.\textsuperscript{49}
Removing these caveats consequently became a top priority in diplomatic circles between 2009-2011. Indeed, following President Obama’s Strategic Review of the Afghan-Pakistan War, U.S. embassy posts around the world were commissioned by the U.S. Secretary of State in April 2009 to request that all caveats inhibiting the performance of ISAF OMLTs be lifted, including not only training caveats but also regional deployment caveats. These messages were delivered to the governments of Belgium, Italy, Spain and Turkey to name a few. As a result of U.S. diplomatic pressure, several nations did subsequently lift their caveats so that by September a number of OMLTs were ‘allowed by many countries to be deployed outside their national area of responsibility’ for the first time.

Nevertheless, despite U.S. entreaties, many OMLT caveats remained in force within the mission including within the contingents of some of the largest TCNs. Consequently, renewed calls continued into 2010. As the U.S. Secretary of Defence related to Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi in 2010, there is an inherent importance in ‘removing caveats that restrict ISAF forces' ability to partner with Afghan forces’ since ‘training Afghans to take responsibility for their own security is the best means to a successful transition’. For this reason, he emphasized, ‘ISAF nations must loosen caveats to allow effective partnering with Afghan forces’.

‘Stabilisation’ in Summary

As may be seen from this overview, unlike the earlier Phase I and Phase II of NATO’s OPLAN, achieving Phase III – Stabilisation across all of ISAF’s Regional Commands proved far more difficult than originally anticipated. On the ground, the accumulation of combat, geographical, regional, AO, counter-narcotic and ANSF caveats within the ISAF force was impeding ISAF progress in the domains of security and stability operations, as well as in activities such as narcotics interdiction and the training and mentoring of ANSF forces.

Indeed, in an official caveat report released by NATO’s SHAPE Headquarters in November 2010, it was reported that 27 of the 47 TCNs (57% of national contingents) were continuing to impose caveats on their forces. Of this number 20 nations were imposing large numbers of caveats including: AO caveats constraining forces to originally assigned locations; regional caveats limiting forces to operations within their own RC; geographical caveats forbidding participation in or assistance to operations in southern Afghanistan; caveats in relation to counter-narcotics operations (especially by nations in RC-South); and a variety of other caveats relating to the use of force and mission accomplishment.

Progress was consequently very slow – even non-existent in some areas of the country – with a resultant tangible lack of security and stability evident in many RCs. This was especially the case in
the southern and eastern sectors of Afghanistan where under-resourced and overwhelmed ISAF forces were tasked with conducting some of the hardest security tasks ‘at the pointy end of the spear’ against the Taliban, without receiving any substantial help from allies based in the north and west – even in emergency situations. It is quite clear, then, that national caveats have contributed to this slow – and some might argue ‘delayed’ – progress of the ISAF mission during the Stabilisation phase of the mission. The very fact that Phase III took over six-and-a-half years to be completed, between January 2007 and June 2013 when the final tranche of Afghan areas progressed to Phase IV, bears witness to this reality.

Moreover, the lack of tangible on-the-ground security and stability after many years of Stabilisation, as a result of so many caveat constraints on ISAF forces, had the unfortunate knock-on effect of also delaying the progression of the mission into the Transition phase. In fact, it seems feasible that this problem of abiding national caveats may have even played a part in the decision by NATO only to introduce areas to the Transition phase of the OPLAN slowly and incrementally, as individual districts reached the set stability requirements, rather than all at once as had been the usual practice with regard to earlier OPLAN phases. This is because progression of Afghan districts into Phase IV depended heavily on both the availability of trained, combat-capable Afghan forces and also the degree to which these forces could lead combat operations and take lead security responsibility in their respective areas. However, in many cases the presence of training, combat and geographical caveats amongst ISAF national contingents obstructed both of these preconditions.


Unsurprisingly, the ISAF’s continuous caveat habit – exhibited throughout all three prior phases of the mission OPLAN, did not bode well for the ISAF’s fourth OPLAN phase: Phase IV - Transition. This phase chiefly concerns the process by which lead security responsibility has been transferred from ISAF security forces to Afghan security forces, with the ISAF assuming a passive support and advisory role. The first of five tranches of Afghan areas initiated Transition in March 2011, and the final tranche is still in the midst of completing this transitional process at the time of writing. Phase IV is expected to be fully complete by the end of this year in December 2014.

During Transition, the focus of ISAF security forces has undergone a great transformation, shifting from the execution of combat operations to the continued and intensive training of ANSF forces, numbering 352,000 ANSF by October 2012, in order to maximize and expand the skill-set and overall capability of local indigenous forces. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen explained on the matter in March 2011: ‘It is vital we gradually transfer our troops from combat roles to training’. 
The ultimate aim of *Phase IV* is twofold: not only are the separate ANSF entities to be transformed in themselves – the ANA to become a ‘fully-fledged army’ with both fighting elements and enabling capabilities and the ANP transitioned into a more traditional ‘civilian policing’ role, but together these ANSF forces are to take leadership command over all ISAF activities across the security, reconstruction and governance spheres within their assigned area.\(^6\)

Indeed, during *Transition* the ANSF takes responsibility for the decision-making, planning and execution of all operations, while ISAF security forces assume a more subordinate, supportive and advisory role in the country.\(^6\)

In practice this means several things for ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Firstly, that ANSF forces henceforth take full leadership of combat operations in their locality, with each ANA and ANP entity fully undertaking the planning and execution of security operations on their own, using their own Afghan officers and ANA/ANP personnel (given the insecure climate of the country the ANP was from the outset trained as a paramilitary rather than merely ‘civilian’ force, capable of ‘countering the insurgency’ within combat operations alongside and in conjunction with ISAF/ANA combat forces).\(^6\)

During these combat operations, Afghan combat forces also make final decisions about present and future actions when engaged with the Taliban or other anti-Government insurgent forces.\(^6\)

Secondly, that ISAF security forces within each RC take on a diminished security role, with authority only to advise, to train, and to support Afghan forces.\(^6\)

Indeed, with ANSF forces taking over the conduct of all combat operations in each RC, former ISAF combat units have been reorganised into numerous ISAF training and mentoring teams, with OMLTs embedded with ANA battalions and POMLTs embedded with ANP units.

**ISAF’s Reduced Role**

This reversal of lead command responsibility for security operations between ISAF and ANSF forces has held important implications for ISAF forces on the ground in the RC sectors. Firstly, while ISAF officers can make suggestions about operational plans, or give advice during combat operations once they are underway, they in fact have no authority at all to over-ride Afghan decisions.\(^6\)

Indeed, if disagreement between ISAF and ANSF personnel occurred in relation to the planning or execution of security missions, Afghan judgment would prevail with decisions made by Afghan commanders outranking the opinion of ISAF commanders.\(^6\)

As MAJ Davie Hillman, commander of a joint British-American OMLT based at Patrol Base Jahan Zeb in Helmand Province stated on the matter to British investigative journalist Ross Kemp in 2011: ‘We’re mentors and advisors. Ultimately, it’s an Afghan decision…I can’t stop Afghan officers in Afghan battlespace doing an Afghan plan’.\(^6\)

Supporting whatever decisions Afghan commanders make – ‘that’s our job’, he concluded.\(^6\)

Or as Kemp neatly summarised the situation: ‘As this is Afghanistan and Afghan lives at risk, it is only fitting that Afghans have the last word’.\(^6\)
Secondly, these new transitional roles alter irrevocably the division of labour on the ground in terms of the actual execution of the combat operations themselves. With ANSF forces taking full lead responsibility for the planning, implementation and execution of all combat operations, ISAF combat forces have an extremely diminished combat role in these operations. Namely, the role of the ISAF OMLTs is restricted to the use of ground and air assets to assist ANA battalions prior to and during operations.

For instance, in terms of ground assets, first of all, ISAF OMLTs regularly follow ANSF forces on their security operations within their own armoured vehicles. However, they do so only under the rubric of a ‘mentor patrol’, primarily to observe the Afghan operation, to report information back to the local ISAF command base as to the progression of this operation, and to relay messages between ISAF OMLT commanders and their Afghan counterparts in the field. In terms of air assets, moreover, ISAF OMLTs regularly utilise unmanned drones to conduct reconnaissance missions prior to planned Afghan operations, in order to gather intelligence of the area in question in relation to insurgent activity, IED-mining and the general ‘atmospherics’ of the area. This information is relayed to Afghan commanders prior to the commencement of security operations. Oftentimes the drone is kept ‘live’ during the execution of the Afghan operation too, so that a constant stream of up-to-the-minute intelligence can be relayed from ISAF to Afghan command.

Thirdly, during Transition ISAF ground and air assets are not authorised to engage with Enemy insurgents themselves during these Afghan operations, except and unless they come under fire or attack themselves, or if the ISAF mentor patrol find that the Afghan security forces they are accompanying are simply ‘not able to deal with the situation’ in hand. In these situations, ISAF ground assets can once again assume a combat support role, and use their armoured vehicles to provide fire support themselves against insurgents in support of the Afghan units on the ground, in accordance with their own national ROE. They can also legitimately call in assistance from ISAF air assets, such as air strikes from attack helicopters or jet fly-over’s as a ‘show of force’ to intimidate the attacking insurgents. It is interesting to note here Kemp’s observation, however, after visiting one ISAF OMLT in Helmand Province in 2011 and accompanying it on several mentor patrols with ANSF units. Kemp remarked that although the Afghan forces tended to consider their security operations successful, in fact in his opinion ANSF forces were in reality still relying too heavily on ISAF ground and air assets, with ISAF forces regularly drawn into the fighting.

**Caveats & ‘Transition’ (2011-2013)**

Due to the apparent decision amongst ISAF NATO nations to ‘go quiet’ and be less public about the ISAF’s caveat issue in 2009, it is more difficult to assess the full impact of national caveats on this
fourth phase of the ISAF OPLAN over the period 2011-2013 than its three antecedents. Nevertheless, while it is true that information on the ISAF’s problematic caveat issue is less profuse from 2010 onwards, some information has been released on the matter from time to time, either within public statements from government or NATO officials, within official government or NATO reports on the ISAF mission, or journalistic media articles. From these sources one can piece together a very broad overview of difficulties posed by national caveats to the mission so far during this Transition phase.

As shown previously, multiple caveat restrictions on ISAF OMLT teams during the Stabilisation phase had severely obstructed the effective training of Afghan security forces since 2007, even to the point of delaying the transition of areas from Phase III into Phase IV. The effects of these caveats were so negative that in 2010 the acting COMISAF, General David McChrystal, emphasized publicly that: ‘Allied forces in Afghanistan need to loosen or remove operational caveats in order to be effective in partnering with Afghan forces’.  

As a consequence, in the years prior to 2011 when the first transitional tranche began, great efforts were made in the international political sphere to reduce the number and the severity of the caveats imposed on the ISAF force, chiefly by persuading TCNs of the coalition to either eliminate completely or reduce substantially the national caveats imposed on their forces within the mission. As a result of this political offensive, many caveats were removed from ISAF national contingents, with some NATO nations finally eliminating all their caveats altogether during 2009. Italy and France for instance, both NATO nations and Lead Nations of RC-West and RC-Capital respectively, not only removed their OMLT caveats in early 2009 but also actually went on to become fully caveat-free TCNs by June the same year.

Nevertheless, as Julian Hale from the U.S. DefenseNews website reported, while caveat restrictions had overall been reduced during these years, in fact the reality was that there had been ‘no seismic shift’ on the caveat issue at large within the ISAF. In mid-2010, for instance, a British House of Commons report cited the vast ‘inconsistency in rules of engagement’ between the ISAF and OEF operations as an area that ‘continued to attract criticism’ on the international stage. Indeed, in September 2010 as preparations were being made for the first Afghan transitional tranche to begin Phase IV the following year, the underlying irritation of national caveats provoked France’s highest military chief, in command over all French armed forces, to publicly denounce national caveats within the ISAF mission. National caveats are ‘a poison for multinational operations’, he asserted emphatically. The very same month the British military chief echoed this assessment, insisting that other allies allow their forces to ‘take a larger role in combat’ within the Afghan mission.
In particular, this criticism by two European NATO allies was directed towards the German government which, despite at least five years of NATO and ISAF appeals on the caveat issue, still remained the ISAF’s heaviest and most restrictive caveat imposer. For instance, in late 2010 as Transition was about to commence, German forces were still constrained from deploying outside of RC-North, even alongside ANSF forces as part of an OMLT unit. The bulk of German forces – including its combat manoeuvre forces (CMUs) – were also prohibited from being sent to the Afghan south or east by the COMISAF without express permission from Berlin, even in times of emergency in spite of the 2006 Riga ‘in extremis’ agreement (see endnote for details on Germany’s few, temporary ‘exceptions’ to this general ban).

In addition, caveat prohibitions against the engagement of German combat forces in the more aggressive offensive, counter-terrorist or counter-narcotic operations against insurgents in RC-North, remained in place, as did the caveat forbidding the use of lethal force for mission accomplishment. German officers themselves reportedly complained that they were also forbidden by caveats from conducting active patrols around their bases. As the UK’s Daily Telegraph concluded in 2010:

> While British forces are committed to the toughest part of the country, the south, and are there to fight, the Germans have stationed their force in the safest part of Afghanistan, the north, and have and surrounded their commitment with numerous caveats restricting when and how their forces might engage in combat...The German army will not actively patrol and tends to hole up in their heavily fortified camps. In short, they will not do the kind of active counterinsurgency operations among the population that the operation requires. This is not because the Bundeswehr is an incompetent force, but because the German commanders sent to Afghanistan are under strict orders to avoid casualties...Germany is proving to be a major weakness in the NATO alliance.

Like the French and British, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, also seemed deeply concerned about national caveats within the ISAF prior to the onset of the mission’s transitional phase. During the course of their diplomatic visits to global capitals throughout 2010, both senior U.S. officials appear to have devoted much effort and energy to ‘consistently emphasize the need for a reduction of caveats to allow for the greatest operational effect’.

**Renewed Caveat Concerns**

Indeed, it seems that throughout 2010 many ISAF TCNs expected national caveats to continue to frustrate ISAF efforts during the Transition phase of the Afghan mission. This expectation of poor performance during Phase IV seems to have been so prevalent in fact that even the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, voiced an opinion on the issue, claiming that the process of handing over security from the ISAF to the ANSF would take much longer than the planned five years, potentially taking up to fifteen years to complete. By this the President seemed to imply that the ISAF combat
mission in the country might not be completed in 2014 as planned, but rather would come to an end a full decade later in 2024.

According to a U.S. Pentagon report on the Afghan mission, released in November 2010, American government officials specifically feared the difficulties two particular issues related to continued caveat imposition might pose to Transition. First, it was feared that on-going imposition of geographical caveats, which constrained national forces from operating outside territorially-defined province and RC borders, would present challenges to the continued training and mentoring of the ANSF across Afghanistan. This was because geographical caveats prevented OMLT teams from participating in or deploying to Afghan operations which took place in forbidden geographical locations, or in the case of regional caveats, beyond or outside set Regional Command borders. In the same way, AO caveats would also inhibit the ability of some national OMLTs to deploy alongside Afghan units when these Afghan operations took place far from national bases or certain district or province locations.

Second, it was thought that national forces still operating under national caveats would simply not be sufficiently robust in their operations to provide the *ad hoc* combat support often required by ANSF forces during *Phase IV*. To exemplify, ISAF OMLT forces restrained from offensive ‘warfighting’ operations would prove counterproductive to Afghan combat units embarked on offensive combat operations. Those national forces bound by counter-narcotics caveats, meanwhile, would be prohibited from accompanying Afghan forces on narcotics interdiction missions. Similarly, national forces restrained by caveats forbidding the conduct of operations at night-time, or ‘under the cover of darkness’ would not be able to mentor ANSF units during operations that began in the early morning – as was usual practice in regard to combat operations with Afghan units frequently deploying from their bases and manoeuvring into position before dawn.

Moreover, in situations where it became necessary for OMLT mentor patrols to intervene on behalf of ANSF forces and provide ground or aerial fire support, national caveats restricting air strikes near villages or even the firing of weapons except in self-defence would scuttle ISAF support. Consequently, despite the presence of Afghan security forces with full lead responsibility for security in their designated areas, and that of ISAF mentoring units, security in each locality might not necessarily be guaranteed.

These concerns in regard to caveats and their impact on *Phase IV – Transition* seem to have been validated by the caveat details relayed in a report by the British House of Commons in July 2012, a few months after the third tranche of Afghan areas progressed into *Phase IV*. Despite the fact that the ISAF mission was by this time in the midst of this most crucial *Transition* phase, over half of the 50
force contributing nations to the ISAF continued to impose caveats on their national forces. To be precise, 30 national contingents continued to operate under national caveats, while 20 national contingents were ‘caveat-free’. These caveats continued to pertain to restrictions across a wide variety of ISAF activities, including CN operations. Nearly 40 percent of the national caveats imposed on the ISAF force, moreover, continued to consist of geographical or regional caveats, which constrained national forces to operations only within specifically defined geographical locations. National forces could not be deployed outside these specific locations without explicit consent from their national capitals.

Due to these disconcerting findings, the British report concluded by stating that the national caveat situation within the ISAF was regarded as presenting a ‘significant challenge for COMISAF as they limit his agility’. Two Pentagon reports, released in April and December 2012, confirmed this dismal and continuously alarming caveat picture. As both reports stated on the matter:

Although some allies and partners have reduced these caveats, national caveats continue to constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country’s forces are authorized to undertake. Senior U.S. leadership consistently emphasizes the need to reduce national caveats in order to allow for the greatest operational effect.

Phase V – ‘Redeployment’ (2015)

Given the way in which caveats seem to have obstructed every phase of the NATO’s OPLAN for the Afghan mission so far, including the most recent and arguably the most critical fourth phase of Transition for the success of the COIN strategy, it is perhaps not surprising that caveats are also expected to impede ISAF operations in the future. The U.S. government, for one, has remained concerned that caveats might not only jeopardize the completion of the transitional phase of the OPLAN at the end of 2014, but will also present significant challenges to the next and final Redeployment phase of the mission – namely, by delaying the removal or redeployment of ISAF forces out of the Afghan theatre. As the 2010 Pentagon report itself stated on the matter: ‘Thinned-out ISAF Forces may be more difficult to redeploy in unstable, insecure areas where handoff of security responsibilities to ANSF may require ad-hoc ISAF engagement’.

Although several nations have already withdrawn their combat forces from the mission, Phase V – Redeployment is officially set to begin in the early months of 2015. If the ISAF’s national caveat problem is not properly addressed and resolved by this time – something which, given the ISAF’s record to date, seems highly improbable and unlikely – one may fully expect that national caveats
imposed by national governments on national forces deployed to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan will continue to wreak operational havoc in the future. Indeed, in light of the precipitous withdrawals of national contingents from early 2012 onwards, caveats constraints may already be having a disadvantageous and damaging impact to security and stability on the ground in Afghanistan at the present time of writing in 2014.

This concludes the examination of the way in which the problem of ISAF national caveats developed within the Afghan mission during its final three OPLAN phases to date – Stabilisation, Transition and Redeployment. Together with the examination undertaken in APPENDIX 2, this investigation of the evolution of the caveat quandary during NATO’s OPLAN phases conclusively demonstrates two things: firstly, that national caveat imposition has been a problem of long duration within the ISAF mission (from 2002 to at least 2012); and secondly, that national caveat imposition is an impediment to the mission that has grown in scope – in terms of not only the range and number of national caveat restrictions in themselves, but also the numbers of coalition TCNs imposing them. In this way, the issue of national caveats within the ISAF mission has become more alarming with each progression of the Afghan mission up to the current time, and remains a significant problem within the NATO-led mission today.
APPENDIX 4:

Table Displaying the Complete Record of National Caveat Imposition among the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) in Totality, August 2003 – December 2012
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### Key

- **X**: Forces deployed to ISAF constrained by caveats.
- **√**: Forces deployed to ISAF free from caveats.
- **---**: Not a member or TCN of the ISAF.
- **0**: An ISAF Member but not a TCN.
- **X**: A TCN, but combat forces withdrawn & caveats imposed.
- **--**: Exit: No longer a Member or TCN of the ISAF.
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APPENDIX 5:

Table Displaying the Caveat-Free & Caveat-Imposing NATO & Partner Nation TCNs within the ISAF Coalition, December 2003-2012

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<tr>
<td>Caveat-Imposing TCN</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Caveat-Free TCN (Through Reimposition of Caveats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Caveat-Imposing TCN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Caveat-Imposing TCN (Through Removal of Caveats or Exit from the ISAF)</td>
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- Austria

**PARTNER(1)**
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28 (49%)</td>
<td>USA, UK, Canada, Poland, Netherlands, Romania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Croatia, Italy, France, Bulgaria, Norway (2x), Denmark (2x), Portugal (2x), Hungary (2x), Partn (12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28 (58%)</td>
<td>Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, USA, Partn (17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39%</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36%</td>
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**NATO(16)**
- UK
- Poland
- Romania
- Estonia
- Czech Rep
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Albania
- Croatia
- Italy
- France
- Bulgaria
- Norway (2x)
- Demark (2x)
- Portugal (2x)
- Hungary (2x)

**NATO(12)**
- Belgium
- Canada
- Germany
- Greece
- Iceland
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Slovenia
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Turkey
- USA

**PARTNER(18)**
- Armenia
- Austria
- Australia
- Azerbaijan
- Bosnia-Herz
- El Salvador
- Finland
- Ireland
- Jordan
- Malaysia
- Montenegro
- Mongolia
- Rep. Korea
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Tonga
- UAE
- Ukraine

**NATO(13)**
- Belgium
- Canada
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
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APPENDIX 6:

List 1:

Compiled List of the Full Range of Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to ISAF in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

(*Please note: Where caveat restrictions belong to two or more categories, the rule has been placed in the category of most significance)

1) Mission caveats (ISAF vs OEF, or other NATO missions)

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

1. The participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.¹ [Spain, Germany, Turkey]

2. The participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.² [Spain, Germany, Turkey]

3. The provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).³ [Germany]

4. Participation of national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.⁴ [France and Germany, prior to June 2009]

5. The deployment of national NATO officers to other NATO missions, including NATO’s training mission in Iraq.⁵ [Spain]
2) Theatre of Operations caveats (Afghanistan vs Pakistan)

LIMITING:

6. Deployment within one kilometre (half a mile) of the Afghan border with Pakistan, unless the national government is consulted and approval granted.  

PROHIBITING:

7. The participation of national forces in operations occurring outside of Afghanistan (beyond the Afghan area of operations).
8. The deployment of national forces within one kilometre of the border with Pakistan, unless national government approval is sought and given.
9. The participation of national air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan. [Germany]

3) Geographical caveats

LIMITING:

10. Any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted. [Germany, Italy, Spain]
11. Caveat limiting any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered ‘absolutely necessary’ for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted. [Germany]

PROHIBITING:

12. The deployment of national forces to the ‘hostile south’ of Afghanistan.
13. The deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South. [Finland, Norway, Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey]
14. The deployment of national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains. [Germany]
15. The deployment of national forces to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East. [Finland]
16. The deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations [Sweden, Norway, Spain]
17. The deployment of national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency. [Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria]
4) Regional caveats

LIMITING:

18. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.\[18\] [Italy]

19. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.\[19\] [Italy]

20. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, ‘necessary for the success of the ISAF’, and approved by the government Minister of Defence.\[20\] [Germany]

PROHIBITING:

21. The deployment of national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-Capital, RC-North, RC-West, RC-South or RC-East), even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\[21\] [Greece, and most of the other 25 NATO nations between 2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

22. The deployment of national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector (RC-Capital, RC-North, RC-West, RC-South or RC-East), except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis agreement (made November 2006 at the NATO Riga Summit).\[22\] [Imposed by many of the 26 NATO nations]

23. The deployment of national forces outside RC-Capital sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga in extremis agreement).\[23\] [France, Italy, Austria, Greece. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009, especially France]

24. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga in extremis agreement).\[24\] [Germany, Sweden, Belgium. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009, especially by Germany]

25. The deployment of national forces outside of RC-West sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga in extremis agreement).\[25\] [Italy, Spain. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009 by both Italy and Spain]
5) Area of Operations (AO) caveats within Regional Commands

LIMITING:

26. The deployment of Danish national forces outside a defined AO in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations, without government approval first being sought and given.26 [Denmark]

PROHIBITING:

27. The deployment of national forces outside Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province.27 [Canada]
28. The deployment of national forces outside a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City.28 [Greece]
29. The deployment of force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport compound.29 [Greece, France, Luxembourg, Belgium]
30. The deployment of national forces outside originally assigned suburbs or districts of Kabul City.30 [France]
31. The deployment of national forces outside of the specific Province within the Regional Command in which contingent was originally based.31 [Caveat imposed by 17 TCNs in April 2010]
32. The deployment of national forces outside Kabul Province in RC-Capital.32 [Austria, Italy]
33. The deployment of national forces outside Hirat Province in RC-West.33 [Italy]
34. The deployment of national forces outside Badghis Province in RC-West.34 [Spain]
35. The deployment of national forces outside Ghor Province in RC-West.35 [Lithuania]
36. The deployment of national forces outside Baghlan Province in RC-North.36 [Hungary]
37. The deployment of national forces outside Uruzgan Province in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.37 [The Netherlands, 2006]
38. The deployment of national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.38 [Germany, 2009]
39. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres).39 [Italy]
40. The deployment of national forces outside protective military bases.40 [Greece]
41. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national personnel at Kandahar airbase to hostile areas outside the ‘secure environment’ of the base.41 [Slovakia]
42. The deployment of national forces beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province (RC-North).42 [Hungary]
43. The deployment of national forces outside of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province.43 [Sweden]
44. The deployment of national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities. 44 [Germany]

45. The deployment of national forces to ‘hostile’ or ‘high-risk’ zones within provinces or districts. 45

(6) Force Numbers caveats concerning the size of ISAF force contingents

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

46. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 365 troops. 46 [Sweden]

47. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 375 troops. 47 [Sweden]

48. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 475 troops. 48 [Sweden]

49. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 600 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency). 49 [Sweden]

50. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency). 50 [Sweden]

51. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 690 troops. 51 [Spain]

52. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops. 52 [Spain]

53. The deployment of national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops. 53 [The Netherlands]

54. The deployment of national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1200 troops. 54 [The Netherlands]

55. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,500 troops. 55 [Spain]

56. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,000 troops. 56 [Spain]

57. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops. 57 [Italy]

58. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops. 58 [Germany]
59. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops [Germany]

60. Force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations. [Germany, prior to October 2008]

61. The deployment of any further troops to existing ISAF national contingent. [Greece, Spain]

(7) Command caveats concerning command arrangements and National Commanders

LIMITING:

62. The National Commander of force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the capital. [Canada]

63. The National Commander of force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander’s own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle). [Canada]

64. The requisition of national aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.

65. The COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of national contingents without direct communication with the national government in the capital. [Canada, during occasions 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

PROHIBITING:

66. The deployment of National Commanders outside Kabul City.

67. The transfer of national forces to ISAF operational control (from national command and control directed from national capitals).

68. The transfer of national QRF forces to Lead Nation operational control within the Regional Commands. [Norwegian QRF personnel in reference to Lead Nation Germany in RC-North from 2009 onwards, American forces with regard to Lead Nation Britain in RC-Southwest 2010 –present]

69. The deployment of national forces under U.S. command. [Spain]

70. Any decision to deploy national forces outside of an assigned PRT area made by ISAF commanders in the field, acting under the authority of the COMISAF (each deployment outside the PRT area must instead be ordered by commanders in the capital city of the home country outside the Afghan theatre of war). [Sweden]
71. Personal travel by ‘peacekeeping’ military commanders and personnel individuals into danger zones.\textsuperscript{71} [Iceland]

\textbf{(8) Weaponry and Lethal Force caveats relating to the use of certain weapons and other military equipment, in addition to the use of force}

\textbf{LIMITING:}

72. National forces from carrying any weapon at all, without express authorisation (only police officers and explosive ordnance disposal unit personnel authorised to carry weapons).\textsuperscript{72} [Iceland]

\textbf{PROHIBITING:}

73. The use of heavy weapons against adversaries.\textsuperscript{73} [Germany, 2001-2009]

74. The use of riot control agents, such as tear gas.\textsuperscript{74}

75. National forces from carrying or using automatic weapons.\textsuperscript{75} [Iceland]

76. National forces from carrying arms at all (only unarmed personnel permitted).\textsuperscript{76} [Iceland]

77. National forces from wearing, ‘battle dress’ or helmets (appearing like a ‘warrior’ rather than a ‘peacekeeper’).\textsuperscript{77} [Iceland]

78. National forces from wearing military uniforms (only civilian peacekeeping specialists permitted to deploy to the ISAF mission).\textsuperscript{78} [Iceland]

79. The use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).\textsuperscript{79} [Germany, Finland, Norway]

80. Firing weapons at adversaries except in self-defence.\textsuperscript{80} [Hungary, Iceland, Germany]

81. Firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position.\textsuperscript{81} [Germany]

82. Inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only ‘exclusive’ applications of force permitted).\textsuperscript{82} [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

\textbf{9) General Operations caveats relating to unauthorised force contingent activities within the ISAF mission (excluding Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics activities)
LIMITING:

83. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

84. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

85. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

86. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

87. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that national personnel ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2004]

88. The engagement of national forces in any activity that went ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [Canada, 2005-2006]

PROHIBITING:

89. The engagement of national personnel in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province. [Austria]

90. The engagement of national personnel in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province (RC-North) and Afghan election support. [Austria]

91. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than humanitarian assistance tasks (giving forces a strictly ‘stand-aside’ role in the mission). [Spain, with regard to personnel at Qal’eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West]

92. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work at PRTs (giving forces a strictly ‘stand-aside’ role in the ISAF mission). [Spain, with regard to personnel at Qal’eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West]

93. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work and counter-narcotics projects at PRTs. [Spain, with regard to personnel at Qal’eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West]

94. The participation or engagement of personnel in any activity apart from PRT tasks and force protection duties. [Singapore]

95. National forces (including combat forces) from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities within the ISAF mission. [Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland]
96. The engagement of national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role, only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted). [Spain, Slovakia, Hungary, Turkey]

97. The participation of national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted). [Iceland, Germany (2001-2009), Italy]

98. The participation of national forces in the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rapid response entity or its operations. [Iceland]

99. The participation or engagement of national forces in PRTs. [France]

100. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing. [Italy, Hungary, 2009-2012]

101. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation [Canada, 2002-2004]

102. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

103. Any specific deployment of Special Forces outside RC-North, even upon request of the COMISAF, without explicit case-by-case approval and consent by the national Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate. [Germany, post-Riga]

104. The deployment of the national Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the national Chief of Defence. [Portugal]

105. The engagement of Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation. [Slovakia]

106. The participation of Special Forces in any operation, other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces). [Slovakia]

107. The participation of Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces. [Germany]
108. Operations by Special Forces outside RC-North, even under the authority of the COMISAF. [Germany]

109. The deployment of the Regional Command Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement). [Norway, Germany, Portugal]

110. The participation or engagement of national combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), the Netherlands (prior to Riga Summit), Romania (prior to Riga Summit)]

111. Engagement of national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Special Forces only allowed to conduct kinetic combat operations). [Australia]

112. National infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or ‘fire-fight’ with the Enemy. [Australia]

113. Participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents. [Italy]

114. National infantry from leading offensive operations (units may only act in support of ANA, where ANSF take the lead). [Italy]

115. National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support). [Germany]

116. National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support), except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations. [Italy]

117. The conduct of joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

(11) Ground Security Operations caveats conducted by ground combat forces (apart from combat and combat support operations), such as protection and reconnaissance patrols

LIMITING:

118. The conduct of patrols by national combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital. [Italy]
PROHIBITING:

119. Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted). 119 [Iceland]

120. National combat ground forces from conducting ‘guard duty’ at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan. 120 [Iceland]

121. Participation in crowd/riot control operations. 121 [France, Canada between 2002-2004]

122. The execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships). 122 [Germany]

123. The conduct of security patrols without armoured vehicle support. 123 [Germany]

124. The conduct of foot patrols outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum. 124 [Romania]

125. The deployment of national force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West in the course of their security operations, except in cases of extreme emergency. 125 [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]

126. The deployment or placement of force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from ever being placed ‘in harm’s way’ in the course of their security operations. 126 [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]

(12) Air Combat Operations caveats relating to combat and combat support operations against insurgents, conducted by air forces (fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and personnel)

LIMITING:

127. The deployment of bomber pilots and aircraft on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. 127 [Canada, 2002-2004]

PROHIBITING:

128. The participation or engagement of national air forces in any ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation (defensive combat operations permitted). 128 [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), the Netherlands (prior to Riga Summit), Romania (prior to Riga Summit)]
129. National air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.\textsuperscript{129} [Germany]

130. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.\textsuperscript{130} [Italy]

131. The conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.\textsuperscript{131} [Italy, 2001-2009]

132. Providing air cover (conducting close air support) if ISAF ground forces are close to Afghan villages.\textsuperscript{132}

133. The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.\textsuperscript{133} [Italy, 2001-2009]

134. National reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.\textsuperscript{134} [Germany]

135. Joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).\textsuperscript{135} [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

(13) Other Air Operations caveats relating to other air operations within Afghanistan (apart from combat and combat support operations), including transport and MEDEVAC operations

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

136. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).\textsuperscript{136} [Germany]

137. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).\textsuperscript{137}

138. The transport of Afghan civilians aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury. \textsuperscript{138}
(14) Time caveats relating to a specific time of day or date in the year

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

139. Participation of national security ground forces in any security operation or patrol undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.139 [Germany]

140. Any deployment of national security ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).140 [Germany]

141. The participation of national security aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.141 [Germany]

142. The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.142 [Germany]

143. The conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.143 [Germany]

144. PRT security personnel from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.144 [Germany, Hungary]

145. PRT security personnel from deploying outside the PRT at night after nightfall (units must also return to base before nightfall).145 [Germany]

146. The conduct of any activity or task by PRT military and civilian development personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.146 [Germany]

147. National military and civilian development personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.147 [Germany]

148. The deployment of national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as national statutory holidays.148 [Italy in RC-West]

(15) Weather caveats relating to atmospheric conditions

LIMITING:

(None)
PROHIBITING:

149. Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ¹⁴⁹ ['South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

150. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ¹⁵⁰ ['South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

(16) Counter-Terrorism caveats relating to ISAF Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

151. The participation or engagement of national ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.¹⁵¹ [Turkey, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

152. The participation or engagement of national air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ¹⁵² [Turkey, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

153. The support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ¹⁵³ [Turkey]

154. The support of ISAF aircraft or personnel in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ¹⁵⁴ [Turkey]

155. The distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.¹⁵⁵ [Germany]

(17) Counter-Narcotics caveats relating to Counter-Narcotics (CN) operations

LIMITING:

(None)
PROHIBITING:

156. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations.\[156\] [Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Turkey and others, imposed by a total of 17 TCNs in 2007 including 5 TCNs operating in RC-South ]

157. Participation or engagement of ground infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.\[157\] [France]

158. Participation or engagement of Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.\[158\] [France]

159. Participation or engagement of any PRT military personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.\[159\] [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

160. Participation or engagement of any PRT civilian personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.\[160\] [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

161. Any lead role of national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).\[161\] [Germany]

162. Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).\[162\] [Germany]

(18) ISAF Cooperation Caveats relating to the cooperation of national ground and air forces with ISAF personnel deployed by other ISAF force contributing nations

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

163. The participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival.\[163\] [Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]

164. Caveat prohibiting national forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North).\[164\] [Bulgaria]

165. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft.\[165\] [Germany]

166. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.\[166\] [Germany]
The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).[^167] [Germany]

The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).[^166] [Germany]

The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).[^169] [Germany]

The communication of information through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces).[^170] [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

Shared, inclusive reporting of information (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel).[^171] [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

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**ANSF Cooperation Caveats relating to cooperation of national forces with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (in particular constraining OMLT and POMLT teams in their task of training and mentoring Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units)**

**LIMITING:**

The deployment of OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.[^172] [France]

The deployment of OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding PRTs, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital.[^173] [Sweden]

Participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour’s drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.[^174] [Germany]

**PROHIBITING:**

Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.[^175]

The transport of Afghan military personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.[^176]
177. Donations of lethal equipment to ANSF forces (for example, Kalashnikov AK-47’s).  
[Finland, 2006-2007]

178. Contributing national forces to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces.  
[Finland]

179. The engagement of Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations).  
[Slovakia]

180. Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF forces.  
[Sweden]

181. The deployment of OMLTs nationwide outside Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).  
[Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Sweden, France]

182. The deployment of OMLTs outside originally assigned AO locations (districts or provinces within Regional Commands), when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.  
[Sweden, Germany, Hungary]

183. The deployment of national OMLTs outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.  
[Greece]

184. The embedding of national OMLT personnel within ANA ‘kandaks’ (battalions).  
[Denmark]

185. The participation of OMLTs from participating or engaging in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.  
[Finland]

186. The participation or engagement of national OMLT personnel in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations.  
[Hungary]

187. National OMLTs and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces.  
[Turkey]

188. National POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is ‘purely civilian government activity’ (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).  
[Germany]

189. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Regional Command sector boundaries.  
[Germany with regard to RC-North]

190. National POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.  
[Germany]

191. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of assigned military base within Regional Command.  
[Germany with regard to Kunduz base in RC-North]

192. National POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.  
[Germany]

193. National POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.  
[Germany]

194. National POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.  
[Germany]

195. National POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.  
[Germany]

196. National POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.  
[Germany]
(20) PRT Security Operations Caveats relating to security operations conducted by PRT Security Units in and around Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) locations

LIMITING:

197. National personnel from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence. [Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

198. National personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital. [Italy with regard to the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]

199. National personnel from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital. [Spain with regard to districts within Badghis Province, RC-West]

PROHIBITING:

200. National personnel from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs). [Germany, prior to October 2008]

201. National personnel from conducting security operations outside of PRTs. [Germany]

202. National personnel from patrolling beyond a defined distance from the PRT (for example, between 10-80 kilometres, often preventing joint international patrols from PRTs). [Turkey, Singapore]

203. National personnel from deploying beyond a specified distance from the PRT within Baghlan Province. [Hungary]

204. National personnel from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT. [Hungary]

205. National personnel from executing foot patrols within PRT townships (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted). [Germany]

206. National personnel from conducting patrols within PRT townships without armoured vehicle support. [Germany]

207. Military personnel at PRTs from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations. [Spain]

(21) PRT Stability Operations Caveats relating to stability operations conducted by military-civilian humanitarian and development aid personnel at Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) locations
LIMITING:

208. National personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital. [Italy with regard to PRT personnel based at the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]

209. National personnel from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital. [Spain with regard to PRT personnel based at the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]

PROHIBITING:

210. Civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working with national military forces in Afghanistan. [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]

211. Civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where national military forces operate or are based. [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]

212. The deployment of civilian personnel outside of a PRT’s immediate surrounding area. [Sweden with regard to Mazar-e-Sharif PRT in Balkh Province]

213. National military and civilian personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases. [Germany]

214. National military and civilian development personnel from staying outside the PRT base AO overnight. [Hungary]

215. Military and civilian development personnel from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations. [Spain with regard to the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]
List 2:
Compiled List of the Full Range of Known National Caveats Imposed by OEF Force Contributors on National Armed Forces Deployed to OEF in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

‘Limitation’ Rules of Engagement, restricting:

1. Any deployment of OEF Special Forces outside RC-North, even under the authority of the COMISAF, unless consent is given by the Defence Minister on a case-by-case basis.¹ [Germany]
2. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.² [Canada, 2002-2004]

‘Prohibition’ Rules of Engagement, forbidding:

3. The participation of any national forces in the OEF mission.³ [Spain]
4. Any deployment of OEF forces into Pakistan.⁴ [Germany]
5. Any involvement of OEF forces in counter-terrorism operations.⁵ [Turkey]
6. The deployment of forces to the OEF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1400 troops.⁶ [Germany, 2005-2008]
7. The deployment of forces to the OEF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops.⁷ [Germany, 2008-2009]
8. The deployment of Special Forces to the OEF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 100 personnel.⁸ [Germany, 2005-2008]
9. Any further deployments of Special Forces to operate as part of the OEF mission to conduct combat and counter-terrorism operations.⁹ [Germany, 2007-2009]
10. Any involvement of OEF Special Forces in counter-terrorism operations.¹⁰ [Germany]
11. Any deployment of OEF Special Forces outside of RC-North, to conduct operations nationwide within Afghanistan, even under the authority of the COMISAF.¹¹ [Germany]
12. Any involvement of OEF Special Forces in cross-border operations between Afghanistan-Pakistan.¹² [Germany]
APPENDIX 7

(a) Table Displaying Known Caveat Categories Imposed by Each ISAF TCN, 2001-2012
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**KEY:**
- **X** = Known Caveats
- **--** = No Caveats
- ○ = Unknown
CAVEAT CATEGORIES:

1. Mission caveats (ISAF vs OEF, or other NATO missions)
2. Theatre of Operations caveats (Afghanistan vs Pakistan)
3. Geographic caveats
4. Regional caveats
5. Area of Operations (AO) caveats within Regional Commands
6. Force Numbers caveats concerning the size of ISAF force contingents
7. Command caveats concerning command arrangements and National Commanders
8. Weaponry and Lethal Force Caveats relating to the use of certain weapons and other military equipment, in addition to the use of force
9. General Operations caveats relating to unauthorised force contingent activities within the ISAF mission (excluding CT and CN activities)
10. Ground Combat Operations caveats relating to combat and combat support operations against insurgents, conducted by ground forces (infantry combat manoeuvre units, QRFs, SOFs)
11. Ground Security Operations caveats relating to other security operations - apart from combat and combat support operations – conducted by ground forces, such as protection and reconnaissance patrols
12. Air Combat Operations caveats relating to combat and combat support operations against insurgents, conducted by air forces (fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and personnel)
13. Other Air Operations caveats relating to other air operations – apart from combat and combat support operations - within Afghanistan (including transport and MEDEVAC operations)
14. Time caveats relating to a specific time of day, or date in the year
15. Weather caveats relating to atmospheric conditions
16. Counter-Terrorism caveats relating to ISAF Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations
17. Counter-Narcotics caveats relating to Counter-Narcotics (CN) operations
18. ISAF Cooperation caveats relating to the cooperation of national ground and air forces with ISAF personnel deployed by other ISAF force contributing nations
19. ANSF Cooperation caveats relating to cooperation of national forces with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (in particular constraining OMLT and POMLT teams in their task of training and mentoring Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units)
20. PRT Security Operations caveats relating to Military Security Units based at Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) locations
21. PRT Stability Operations caveats relating to Military-Civilian humanitarian and development aid Personnel at Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) location
7(b) Compiled List of Known National Caveats by Category
Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces,
December 2001- December 2012

(*Please note: Some caveats apply only to specific force units within the national contingent, whereas others apply to all forces generally including a range of different force units. In the latter case, these nations’ caveats may consequently appear in several different categories listed below)

Albania

- **ISAF TCN from August 2003 – December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - October 2007**
- **Caveat-Free Nation from October 2007 – December 2012**

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Armenia

- **ISAF TCN from October 2009 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2009 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Armenia’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)**

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Australia

- **ISAF TCN from July 2006 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from July 2006 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Australia’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)**

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

**COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Australian national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Special Forces only allowed to conduct kinetic combat operations).¹

2. Caveat prohibiting Australian national infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or ‘firefight’ with the Enemy (personnel must also sign documentation attesting that they have not provoked firefights during their deployment in Afghanistan).² [Australia]
COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Australian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction. [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Austria

- *ISAF TCN from April 2004 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from April 2004 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Austria’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**AREA OF OPERATIONS:**

1. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of the 10 Austrian personnel working in ISAF Headquarters outside of Kabul Province. [2001-2006]

**GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:**

2. ‘Mission employment’ caveats prohibiting the engagement of the 10 Austrian personnel deployed to ISAF Headquarters in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province (RC-Capital).  
3. ‘Mission employment’ caveats prohibiting the engagement of 70 Austrian military personnel deployed to Kunduz Province in RC-North in any activity apart from election support during their temporary three-month deployment prior to and following the 18 September 2005 Afghan elections.

Azerbaijan

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Azerbaijan’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Bahrain

- *ISAF TCN from January 2012 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2012 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Bahrain’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.
Belgium

- ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Belgium’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-Capital), even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^7\) [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside RC-Capital, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).\(^8\)
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (2009).\(^9\)

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 24 Belgian force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport grounds (2003-2012).\(^10\)

ANSF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines (RC-North) alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\(^11\)

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- ISAF TCN from March 2009 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2009 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Bulgaria

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – June 2009
- Caveat –Free Nation from June 2009 – December 2012
Bulgaria is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.\textsuperscript{12}

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Bulgarian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\textsuperscript{13} [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Bulgarian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the \textit{in extremis} Riga agreement (Post-November 2006).\textsuperscript{14}

ISAF COOPERATION:

3. Caveat prohibiting Bulgarian forces from sharing equipment with ISAF ally Hungary in their joint area of operations at the Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province (RC-North).\textsuperscript{15} [2003-2009]

Canada (ISAF Lead Nation)

- \textit{ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012}
- \textit{Caveat-Free Nation from January 2006 – July 2011}

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\textsuperscript{16} [2001-2005]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside of Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province.\textsuperscript{17} [2002-2004]
COMMAND:

3. Caveat limiting the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the Canadian capital of Ottawa.  

4. Caveat limiting the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander’s own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle).  

5. Caveat limiting the requisition of Canadian aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.  

6. Caveat limiting the COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of the Canadian national contingents without direct communication with the national government in the capital. [Between 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES CAVEATS:

7. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]  

8. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]  

9. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]  

10. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]  

11. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]  

12. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2004]

13. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without
government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. \textsuperscript{28} [2005-2006]
\textbf{14.} Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations \textsuperscript{29} [2002-2004].

\textbf{COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:}

\textbf{15.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{30} [2002-2004]
\textbf{16.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{31} [2002-2004]
\textbf{17.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{32} [2002-2004]
\textbf{18.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{33} [2002-2004]
\textbf{19.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{34} [2002-2004]
\textbf{20.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{35} [2004]
\textbf{21.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. \textsuperscript{36} [2005-2006]
\textbf{22.} Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations \textsuperscript{37} [2002-2004].

\textbf{SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:}

\textbf{23.} Caveat \textit{limiting} the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{38} [2002-2004]
24. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁹ [2002-2004]

25. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁰ [2002-2004]

26. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴¹ [2002-2004]

27. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴² [2002-2004]

28. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴³ [2004]

29. **Caveat limiting** the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. ⁴⁴ [2005-2006]

30. **Caveat prohibiting** the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004]. ⁴⁵

**COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:**

31. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁶ [2002-2004]

32. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁷ [2002-2004]

33. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁸ [2002-2004]

34. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. ⁴⁹ [2002-2004]

35. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than
in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

36. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.  

OTHER AIR OPS:

37. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

38. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

39. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

40. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

41. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

42. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.  

Croatia

- **ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – October 2007**
- **Caveat-Free Nation from October 2007 – December 2012**

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.
**Czech Republic**

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**REGIONAL:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Czech national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^{58}\) [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

**Denmark**

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006/June 2007 –December 2009*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**REGIONAL:**

1. The deployment of Danish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^{59}\) [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

**AREA OF OPERATIONS:**

2. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Danish national forces outside a defined AO in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations, without government approval first being sought and given [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit].\(^{60}\)
COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. The participation or engagement of Danish combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\footnote{[2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]}

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. The participation or engagement of Danish combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\footnote{[2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]}

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

5. The participation or engagement of Danish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\footnote{[2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]}

6. The participation or engagement of Danish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\footnote{[2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]}

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Danish national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.\footnote{[2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]}

ANSF COOPERATION:

8. The embedding of Danish national OMLT personnel within ANA ‘kandaks’ (battalions).\footnote{ }

**El Salvador**

- *ISAF TCN from October 2011 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2011 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of El Salvador’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

**Estonia**

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003- December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*
Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

1. The participation or engagement of Estonian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.67 [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

2. The participation or engagement of Estonian combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.68 [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

3. The participation or engagement of Estonian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.69 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

4. The participation or engagement of Estonian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.70 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Estonian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.71 [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Finland

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – April 2008

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.72

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East.73
FORCE/WEAPONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence). 74 [2008-2012]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

4. Caveat prohibiting Finnish national forces (including combat forces) from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities. 75

ANSF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the donation of lethal equipment to ANA or ANP forces (for example, excess Kalashnikov AK-47’s). 76 [2006-2007]
6. Caveat prohibiting Finnish forces from contributing to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces. 77 [2010]
7. Caveat prohibiting Finnish OMLTs from participating or engaging in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. 78

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

8. Caveat prohibiting Finnish PRT security forces from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations. 79 [In reference to Finnish forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

9. Caveat prohibiting Finnish PRT security forces from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations. 80 [In reference to Finnish forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].

France (ISAF Lead Nation)

- ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – June 2009
- Caveat-Free Nation from June 2009 – December 2012

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.\(^81\)

GEOGRAPHIC:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the south of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the \textit{in extremis} agreement).\(^82\) [With the exception of French fighter planes which were transferred to Kandahar Airfield in 2008 to shorten flight times]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the east of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the \textit{in extremis} agreement).\(^83\) [At least between 2001 and July 2008, after which one French combat battalion was authorised to deploy to Kapisa Province in RC-East, subsequently followed in 2009 by all French combat ground and air forces].

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations (2001-2006, pre Riga Summit agreement).\(^84\)

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga \textit{in extremis} agreement).\(^85\) [Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to ongoing arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French force personnel outside Kabul International Airport.\(^86\)

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of originally assigned suburb/district of Kabul City.\(^87\)

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in crowd/riot control.\(^88\)

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in PRTs.\(^89\)

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:
10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the French RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan, regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests (enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).\textsuperscript{90}

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\textsuperscript{91}

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French forces in riot control operations.\textsuperscript{92}

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\textsuperscript{93}

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

14. Participation or engagement of French infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.\textsuperscript{94}

15. Participation or engagement of French Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.\textsuperscript{95}

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat limiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.\textsuperscript{96} [France]

17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\textsuperscript{97}

\textbf{Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia}

- \textit{ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012}
- \textit{Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – January 2007}
- \textit{Caveat-Free Nation from January 2007 – December 2012}

Specific types of national caveats imposed are still unknown. However, during 2006 Macedonia was reported to have seven caveats imposed continuously on eight separate rotations of approximately 151 Macedonian forces.
deployed to the ISAF mission. The caveats were cited by U.S. Embassy officials as being ‘significant’. Five of these were lifted by December 2006, and the remaining two caveats were eliminated in January 2007.  

**Georgia**

- *ISAF TCN from November 2007 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation for the duration, November 2007 - December 2012*

No caveats imposed on Georgian forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

**Germany (ISAF Lead Nation)**

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Germany’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**MISSION:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.  

2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel OEF mission in Afghanistan.  

3. Caveat prohibiting the provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).  

4. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.  

   [Prior to June 2009]

**THEATRE:**

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.
GEOGRAPHIC:

6. Caveat limiting any deployment of German forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered ‘absolutely necessary’ for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.\(^{104}\) [2003-2009]

7. Caveat limiting any deployment of German national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions in which national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.\(^{105}\) [2003-2009]

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into the hostile RC-South.\(^{106}\) [2003-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.\(^{107}\)

REGIONAL:

10. Caveat limiting any deployment of national forces out of RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, ‘necessary for the success of the ISAF’, and approved by the government Minister of Defence.\(^{108}\)

11. Caveat limiting any specific deployment of Special Forces outside the originally assigned Regional Command, without explicit consent of the government Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.\(^{109}\)

12. Caveat limiting any deployment of Special Forces units outside of own assigned ISAF Regional Command, even upon request of the COMISAF, without specific case-by-case approval from the Minister of Defence (post-Riga).\(^{110}\)

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside RC-North boundary lines for any reason, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^{111}\) [2001-2006]

14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (following the November 2006 Riga in extremis agreement).\(^{112}\) [2006-2012]

15. Caveat prohibiting operations by German KSK Special Forces outside RC-North command sector, even under the authority of the COMISAF.\(^{113}\) [2008]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

16. The deployment of German national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\(^{114}\) [2009]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities.\textsuperscript{115}

FORCE CEILING:

18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops.\textsuperscript{116}
19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops\textsuperscript{117}
20. Caveat prohibiting the force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations.\textsuperscript{118} [Prior to October 2008]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

21. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).\textsuperscript{119} [2001-2009]
22. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries, except in self-defence.\textsuperscript{120} [2001-2009]
23. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position.\textsuperscript{121} [2001-2009]
24. Caveat prohibiting the use of heavy weapons against adversaries.\textsuperscript{122} [2001-2009]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

25. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).\textsuperscript{123} [2001-2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

26. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the German Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside RC-North boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).\textsuperscript{124} [2008]
27. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\textsuperscript{125}
28. Caveat prohibiting German ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support).\textsuperscript{126}
29. Caveat prohibiting German combat ground forces from deploying into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\textsuperscript{127} [2009]
30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German KSK Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces. [2008]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

31. Caveat prohibiting the execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships). [2008]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

32. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.

33. Caveat prohibiting German national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.

34. Caveat prohibiting the national reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role. [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

35. Caveat prohibiting the solo flight of any German armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).

TIME:

36. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.

37. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of German combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).

38. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of patrols by security ground forces at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.

39. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national combat aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.

40. Caveat prohibiting the transport of German military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.

41. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.

42. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.
43. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRTs after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).141

44. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of any activity or task by German PRT civil-military personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.142

45. Caveat prohibiting German civil-military personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.143

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

46. The participation or engagement of German national ground or air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.144

47. Caveat prohibiting the distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by German reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.145

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

48. Caveat prohibiting any lead role of German national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).146

49. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role). 147

ISAF COOPERATION:

50. Caveat prohibiting the transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on German national aircraft.148

51. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.149 [2008-2009]

52. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).150

53. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).151

54. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).152
ANSF COOPERATION:

55. Caveat *limiting* the participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour’s drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.\(^p\)

56. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside specific missions within certain districts or provinces within RC-North, when conducting ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces.\(^p\)

57. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\(^p\)

58. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\(^p\) [2009]

59. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is ‘purely civilian government activity’ (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).\(^p\)

60. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of RC-North sector boundaries.\(^p\)

61. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.\(^p\)

62. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Kunduz military base within RC-North.\(^p\)

63. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.\(^p\)

64. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.\(^p\)

65. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.\(^p\)

66. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.\(^p\)

67. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.\(^p\)

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

68. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).\(^p\) [Prior to October 2008]

69. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting any security operation outside the borders of the German PRTs.\(^p\)

70. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).\(^p\)

71. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.\(^p\)
72. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any German PRT security personnel based at Meymaneh PRT into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\textsuperscript{170} [2009]

**MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:**

73. Caveat prohibiting German Civil-military personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.\textsuperscript{171}

74. Caveat prohibiting the any German PRT stability personnel based at Meymaneh PRT from travelling into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\textsuperscript{172} [2009]

**Greece**

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006/April 2007 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – April 2007*
- Greece is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.\textsuperscript{173}

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**GEOGRAPHIC:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.\textsuperscript{174} [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

**REGIONAL:**

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\textsuperscript{175} [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside RC-Capital, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).\textsuperscript{176}

**AREA OF OPERATIONS:**

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City.\textsuperscript{177} [2003-2007/2007-2009]

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside of protective military bases.179

FORCE CEILING:

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any further Greek troops to existing ISAF national contingent.180

WEATHER:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Greek ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.181 [2006-2007/2007-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Greek air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.182 [2006-2007/2007-2009]

ISAF COOPERATION:

10. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which Greek national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival.183 [In reference to troops from both Turkey and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia]

ANSF COOPERATION:

11. Caveat prohibiting Greek OMLTs from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-Capital alongside their ANSF units, when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).184

12. Caveat prohibiting Greek OMLTs from deploying outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.185

Hungary

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside RC-North or RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 186 [2003-2006]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). 187

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside Baghlan Province of RC-North. 188

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province (RC-North). 189

FORCE/WEAPONS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the firing of weapons except in self-defence. 190

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Hungarian forces in offensive operations against insurgents. 191

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Hungarian forces in mine clearing. 192 [2009-2012]

TIME:

8. Hungarian PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness. 193

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any Hungarian PRT civilian personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel. 194 [With reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any PRT military personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel. \[195\] [With reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any kind by Hungarian national forces in counter-narcotics operations. \[196\]

ANSF COOPERATION:

12. Caveat prohibiting the Hungarian OMLT from deploying outside Baghlan Province of RC-North alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations. \[197\]

13. Caveat prohibiting the Hungarian OMLT in Baghlan Province from participating in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations. \[198\]

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

14. Caveat prohibiting PRT Security Units from deploying beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province. \[199\]

15. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT. \[200\]


17. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian PRT Security Units from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence. \[202\] [In reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

18. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian civil-military personnel from staying outside the PRT base AO overnight. \[203\] [In reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

Iceland

- ISAF TCN from August 2003- December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Iceland’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Icelandic national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.204 [2003-2006]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Icelandic national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006).205

COMMAND:

3. Caveat prohibiting personal travel by ‘peacekeeping’ military individuals in danger zones.206

FORCE/WEAPONS:

4. Caveat limiting Icelandic national forces from carrying any weapon at all, without express authorisation (only police officers and explosive ordnance disposal unit personnel permitted to carry weapons).207

5. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic personnel from firing weapons except in self-defence.208 [2006-2012]

6. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from carrying or using automatic weapons.209 [2006-2008]

7. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from carrying arms at all (only unarmed personnel permitted).210 [2008-2012]

8. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from wearing, ‘battle dress’ or helmets (appearing like a ‘warrior’ rather than a ‘peacekeeper’).211 [2006-2008]

9. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from wearing military uniforms (only civilian peacekeeping specialists permitted to deploy to the ISAF mission).212 [2008-2012]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

10. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities.213

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Icelandic national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).214

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national forces in the QRF rapid response entity or its operations.215

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted).216
14. Caveat prohibiting National combat ground forces from conducting ‘guard duty’ at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{217}

Ireland

- \textit{ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012}
- \textit{Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Ireland’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)}

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Italy (ISAF Lead Nation)

- \textit{ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012}
- \textit{Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – May 2009}
- \textit{Caveat-Free Nation from May 2009 – December 2012}
- Italy is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.\textsuperscript{218}

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat \textit{limiting} any deployment of Italian national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.\textsuperscript{219} [2009]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.\textsuperscript{220} [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency.\textsuperscript{221} [2006-2009]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat \textit{limiting} any deployment of Italian national forces outside of RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.\textsuperscript{222}

5. Caveat \textit{limiting} any deployment of Italian national forces outside of RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.\textsuperscript{223}
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 224 [2003-2006]

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 225 [2003-2006]

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). 226 [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-West sector (including into RC-North), except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). 227 [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Kabul Province in RC-Capital. 228

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Hirat Province in RC-West. 229

12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres). 230

FORCE CEILING:

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops. 231

FORCE/WEAPONS:

14. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing. 232 [2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Italian RC-West Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre
of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement). [2006-2009]

16. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. [2001-2009]

17. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).

18. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any operation occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West or RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South). [2005-2009]

19. Caveat prohibiting the participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents.

20. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of combat operations by Italian infantry on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.

21. Caveat prohibiting Italian ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support), except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

22. Caveat limiting the conduct of patrols by Italian combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital in Rome. [Only 270 of 1,800 Italian soldiers were permitted to patrol in October 2007]

23. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian security forces in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

24. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian national air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. [2001-2009]

25. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.

26. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West and RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South). [2005-2009]

27. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations. [2001-2009]

28. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations. [2001-2009]
TIME:

29. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.\(^{247}\)

WEATHER:

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\(^{248}\)
31. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\(^{249}\)

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

32. The participation or engagement of Italian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\(^{250}\) [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
33. The participation or engagement of Italian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\(^{251}\) [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

ISAF COOPERATION

34. The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.\(^{252}\) [Italy, 2001-2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

35. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of OMLTs outside of RC-West and RC-Capital boundary lines (into RC-North, RC-South or RC-East) alongside their ANSF units, when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\(^{253}\)

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

36. Caveat \textit{limiting} Italian PRT Security Units from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome.\(^{254}\)
MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

37. Caveat limiting Italian military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome. 255

Jordan

- ISAF TCN from November 2007 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from November 2007 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Jordan’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Latvia

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006
- Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. The deployment of national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 256 [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Lithuania

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006
- Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 257 [2003-2006]
AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian personnel outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West. [Classed as a capacity-based caveat, rather than a ‘political’ caveat]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any PRT military personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel. [2005-2006, with regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province of RC-West]

4. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any Lithuanian civilian PRT personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel. [2005-2006, with regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province of RC-West]

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian PRT Security Units outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West. [2005-2006]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian military-civilian personnel outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West. [2005-2006]

Luxembourg

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Luxembourg’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Luxembourgish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2003-2006]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Luxembourgish national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006).
AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 10 Luxembourgish force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport compound. [2003-2012]

**Malaysia**

- *ISAF TCN from November 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from November 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Malaysia’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

**Mongolia**

- *ISAF TCN from March 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Mongolia’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

**Montenegro**

- *ISAF TCN from February 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from February 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Montenegro’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

**Netherlands (ISAF Lead Nation)**

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – November 2006/August 2010 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 –August 2010*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**
REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside RC-South boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [266, 2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside Uruzgan Province of RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [267]

FORCE CEILING:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops. [268]

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1200 troops. [269]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. [270, 2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. [271, 2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [272, 2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [273, 2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction anywhere within the Afghan AOR. [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch personnel in narcotics eradication operations in Uruzgan Province. [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

New Zealand

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation for the duration of participation in the ISAF mission, from December 2001 - December 2012*

No caveats imposed on New Zealand forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

Norway

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 - May 2006/July 2006-December 2009*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from May 2006-July 2006/December 2009-December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-North/RC-Capital) to the south or east of Afghanistan. [276]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South. [277]

REGIONAL:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside RC-North boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [278 [2003-2006]

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside own RC-North sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). [279]
COMMAND:

5. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of Norwegian QRF forces to German Lead Nation operational control within RC-North.\(^{280}\) [In regard to the Norwegian-Latvian QRF battalion deployed in early 2009 to operate from Norway’s Maimana PRT]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

6. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, except in self-defence when an attack against Norwegian personnel is taking place or is imminent (the ‘right of imminent self-defence’).\(^{281}\) [2006]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Norwegian RC-North Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).\(^{282}\) [2006-2009]

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

8. Caveat prohibiting PRT Security Units from using lethal force, except in self-defence when an attack against PRT personnel is taking place or is imminent (the ‘right of imminent self-defence’).\(^{283}\) [2006]

Poland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – October 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from October 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Polish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^{284}\) [2003-2006]
Portugal

- **ISAF TCN from February 2002 - December 2012**
- Portugal is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.\(^{285}\)

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**REGIONAL:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Portuguese national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.\(^{286}\) [2003-2006]

**COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:**

2. Caveat limiting the deployment of the Portuguese RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the Portuguese Chief of Defence.\(^{287}\) [*Listed by SHAPE as one of its seven priorities in terms of attaining caveat removal within the ISAF between November 2007 – April 2008]*

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Portuguese RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-West boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).\(^{288}\) [2005-2006]

**Republic of Korea (South Korea)**

- **ISAF TCN from April 2010 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from April 2010 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of South Korea’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)**

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed by South Korea are still unknown. However, in 2009 South Korea was reported by U.S. State Department officials at the American Embassy in Kabul as imposing national caveats on the use of their military forces deployed to conduct operations at the Parwan PRT in RC-East. Nevertheless, the South Korean PRT security unit, or so-called ‘protective forces’ seem not to have been restrained by these same operational limitations however, since the United States expected the unit to be robust.
enough to: ‘secure its own compound; provide security for its personnel conducting operations outside the PRT; perform patrols in the vicinity of the PRT to gain situational awareness; control coalition assets as required; coordinate its activities with coalition forces; and perform reporting as required by RC-East HQ and Task Force Cyclone’.289

**Romania**

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**REGIONAL:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Romanian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.290 [2003-2006]

**COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:**

2. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.291 [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

**SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:**

3. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of foot patrols by Romanian personnel outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum.292 [2006]

**COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:**

4. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.293 [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

**COUNTER-TERRORISM:**

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.294 [2003-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{295} [2003-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction. \textsuperscript{296} [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

**Singapore**

- ISAF TCN from January 2008 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2008 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Singapore’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Singaporean PRT personnel at Bamyan PRT in RC-East in any activity apart from PRT tasks and force protection duties. \textsuperscript{297}

**PRT SECURITY UNITS:**

2. Caveat prohibiting Singaporean PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond 10 kilometres from the Bamyan PRT in RC-East (preventing wider joint security patrols with New Zealand PRT military personnel within Bamyan Province). \textsuperscript{298} [2008-2012]

**Slovakia**

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Slovakia’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)
- In 2009 the 262 Slovakian troops operating within the ISAF mission were described by U.S. Embassy personnel in Bratislava as being ‘subject to strict caveats’, imposed by the ‘insistence’ of the Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico in order to keep the likelihood of casualties ‘minimal’. \textsuperscript{299}

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**
REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovakian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2003-2006]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovakian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006).

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 57-man Slovakian military engineering unit at Kandahar airbase to hostile areas outside the ‘secure environment’ of the base. [2008]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

4. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation at all (only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted).

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation.

6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations).

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Slovakian Special Forces in any operation other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces).

ANSF COOPERATION:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of the 15 Slovakian OMLT personnel in Kandahar Province in any offensive or kinetic combat operation. [2008-2012]

Slovenia

- ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 –November 2006/August 2007 –December 2012
- Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – August 2007
Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovenian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. 308 [2003-2006]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovenian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). 309 [2007-2012]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting the two platoons of some 69 Slovenian soldiers conducting force-protection at an Italian base in Hirat Province in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West, except in cases of extreme emergency. 310

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment or placement of the Slovenian force protection platoons in Herat ‘in harm’s way’. 311 [Unit is described by U.S. Embassy personnel in February 2010 as ‘a tightly-caveated force protection mission’]

Spain

- **ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Spain’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)**
- **Spain is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.** 312

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Spanish ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan. 313

2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Spanish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan. 314

139
3. Caveat prohibiting the redeployment of Spanish NATO officers to other NATO missions, including NATO’s training mission in Iraq.  
4. Caveat prohibiting the redeployment of Spanish NATO forces to participate in NATO operations in Iraq.

GEOGRAPHIC:

5. Caveat limiting any deployment of Spanish forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South. [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.

REGIONAL:

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2003-2006]
9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish national forces outside RC-West sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006). [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces outside Badghis Province in RC-West. [2005-2007]

FORCE CEILING:

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 690 troops.
12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,000 troops.
13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops.
14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,500 troops.\textsuperscript{326}

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any further troops to the existing Spanish ISAF national contingent, including to staff the ISAF XI HQ in Kabul.\textsuperscript{327}

COMMAND:

16. The deployment of Spanish national forces under U.S. command.\textsuperscript{328}

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

17. The engagement of Spanish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation at all (only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted).\textsuperscript{329} [2005-2010]

18. The participation or engagement of Spanish national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work at Qal’eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West (giving forces a strictly ‘stand-aside’ role in the ISAF mission).\textsuperscript{330}

19. The participation or engagement of Spanish national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work and counter-narcotics projects at Qal’eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West.\textsuperscript{331}

WEATHER:

20. Participation of Spanish ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\textsuperscript{332}

21. Participation of Spanish air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\textsuperscript{333}

ANSF COOPERATION:

22. The deployment of Spanish OMLTs outside RC-West boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\textsuperscript{334}

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

23. Caveat limiting excursions by Spanish PRT Security Units based at Qal’ey-ye Now PRT into ‘insecure districts’ of Badghis Province (RC-West) without prior approval from the Spanish government in Madrid.\textsuperscript{335}
24. Caveat prohibiting Spanish PRT Security Units in Badghis Province (RC-West) from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations. PRT’s effectiveness is reportedly limited by ‘strict national caveats’ in addition to short 4-month rotations.

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

25. Caveat limiting excursions by Spanish PRT military-civilian personnel based at Qal’ey-ye Now PRT into ‘insecure districts’ of Badghis Province (RC-West) without prior approval from the Spanish government in Madrid.

26. Caveat prohibiting Spanish PRT military-civilian personnel at Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province (RC-West) from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations. PRT’s effectiveness is reportedly limited by ‘strict national caveats’ in addition to short 4-month rotations.

Sweden

- ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Sweden’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.

REGIONAL:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish national forces outside RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga in extremis agreement).

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish national forces outside of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North). Despite the PRT being responsible for development and reconstruction projects in Jawzjan, Sari Pul and Samangan Province in addition to Balkh Province.
FORCE CEILING:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 365 troops.\footnote{343}

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 375 troops.\footnote{344}

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 475 troops.\footnote{345}

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 600 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency to better respond to ‘unforeseen difficulties’).\footnote{346}

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency to better respond to ‘unforeseen difficulties’).\footnote{347}

COMMAND:

9. Caveat prohibiting any decision to deploy Swedish national forces outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area made by ISAF commanders in the field acting under the authority of the COMISAF (each deployment outside the PRT area must instead be ordered by Swedish military commanders in the capital Stockholm rather than inside the Afghan theatre of war).\footnote{348}

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

10. Caveat prohibiting Swedish national forces (including combat forces) from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities.\footnote{349}

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Swedish rifle brigade nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.\footnote{350} [2007-2009]

12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of additional Swedish manoeuvrer elements into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.\footnote{351} [2008-2009]

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Swedish rifle brigade outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North).\footnote{352} [2007-2009]

14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of additional Swedish manoeuvrer elements outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North).\footnote{353} [2008-2009]
OTHER AIR OPS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish MEDEVAC helicopters and personnel into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations within RC-North.  

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat limiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding Mazar-e-Sharif PRT, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital Stockholm.  

17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.  

18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside RC-North boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).  

19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside originally assigned locations (certain districts or provinces within RC-North), when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.  

20. Caveat prohibiting Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF units.  

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

21. Caveat prohibiting Swedish civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working together with Swedish military forces in Afghanistan [Caveat imposed on the personnel of Sweden’s developmental aid government department, SIDA]  

22. Caveat prohibiting Swedish civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where Swedish military forces operate or are based in RC-North.  

23. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish civilian personnel outside the immediate surrounding area of Mazar-e-Sharif PRT.  

Switzerland

- **ISAF TCN from August 2003 - March 2008 (full exit and troop withdrawal from ISAF mission).**  
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – March 2008 (representing the entire duration of Switzerland’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)**  

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

1. Caveat prohibiting Swiss national forces from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities within the ISAF mission.\textsuperscript{363}
2. Caveat prohibiting Swiss national forces from participating in counter-insurgent operations.\textsuperscript{364}

**Tonga**

- ISAF TCN from October 2010 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Tonga’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

**Turkey (ISAF Lead Nation)**

- ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Turkey’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)
- Turkey is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.\textsuperscript{365}
- Turkey was also specifically requested by the U.S. Obama Administration to ‘remove operationally restrictive caveats to enhance operational effectiveness’ during April 2009 via diplomatic channels, but was subsequently described as still having ‘significant restrictions’ imposed on its national ISAF force contingent in September 2009.\textsuperscript{366}

**Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**

**MISSION:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish ground forces deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{367}
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{368}
GEOGRAPHIC:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.³⁰⁹ [2003-2007, still in place after opening its first PRT in Wardak Province, RC-East, and in force at the time of the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.³⁷⁰ [2003-2006]

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the in extremis Riga agreement (Post November 2006).³⁷¹

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).³⁷²

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).³⁷³

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).³⁷⁴

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

9. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).³⁷⁵
OTHER AIR OPS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). 376

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. 377 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. 378 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
13. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. 379
14. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. 380

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the engagement or participation of any kind by Turkish national forces in counter-narcotics operations (although C-N training of ANSF forces is permitted). 381 [2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat prohibiting Turkish OMLT s and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces in RC-Capital from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces. 382

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

17. Caveat prohibiting Turkish PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond approximately 10 kilometres from Kowt-i-Ashrow PRT in Wardak Province of RC-East (preventing planned joint security patrols between the Wardak and Bamyan PRTs). 383
Ukraine

- **ISAF TCN from March 2008 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2008 - December 2012** (representing the entire duration of the Ukraine’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

United Arab Emirates

- **ISAF TCN from September 2008 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from September 2008 - December 2012** (representing the entire duration of the UAE’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

United Kingdom (ISAF Lead Nation)

- **ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Free Nation** for the duration of participation in the ISAF mission, from December 2001 - December 2012

No caveats have ever been imposed on British forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

United States (ISAF Lead Nation)

- **ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012**
- **Caveat-Free Nation** from December 2001 - January 2010
- **Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2010 – December 2012** (Relating to U.S. forces in Helmand Province, RC-Southwest)

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMMAND:

1. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of American national forces to British Lead Nation operational control within RC-Southwest [2010-2012, both the U.S. and the U.K. are designated Lead Nations of RC-Southwest]
FORCE/WEAPONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only ‘exclusive’ applications of force permitted by U.S. personnel). 385 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). 386 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. Caveat prohibiting joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). 387 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

ISAF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the communication of information by American national forces through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces). 388 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

6. Caveat prohibiting shared, inclusive reporting of information by American national forces (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel). 389 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
APPENDIX 8

(a) Table Displaying Known Major Force Units within the ISAF Mission Constrained by National Caveats (2001-2012)\textsuperscript{1}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAVEAT CATEGORY</th>
<th>1 Ground Combat Units</th>
<th>2 QRF(s)</th>
<th>3 SOF(s)</th>
<th>4 Ground Security Units</th>
<th>5 Air Combat Units</th>
<th>6 Air MEDEVAC Units</th>
<th>7 Air Transport Units</th>
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Ground Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), comprised of Major Combat Units (>700) and Minor Combat Units (<700 troops)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The conduct of patrols by national combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital. ¹ [Italy]
2. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.² [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴ [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵ [Canada, 2002-2004]
6. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁶ [Canada, 2004]
7. The engagement of national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. ⁷ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

8. The participation or engagement of national combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. ⁸ [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), and Romania (prior to Riga Summit 2006)]
9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of national ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.⁹ [The Netherlands, prior to the Riga Summit]
10. Engagement of national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Only Special Forces permitted to conduct kinetic combat operations). [Australia]

11. National infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or ‘fire-fight’ with the Enemy. [Australia]

12. Participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents. [Italy]

13. National infantry from leading offensive operations (units may only act in support of ANA, where ANSF take the lead). [Italy]

14. Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ['South European' nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

15. The conduct of combat operations by infantry on days of national significance, such as national statutory holidays. [Italy]

16. Participation of combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness. [Germany]

17. Any deployment of national combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall). [Germany]

18. The transport of military combat personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness. [Germany]

19. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [Germany]

20. The participation or engagement of national ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

21. The support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [Turkey]

22. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

23. Participation or engagement of ground infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations. [France]

24. Any lead role of national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted). [Germany]

25. Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role). [Germany]

26. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces. [Germany]

27. Caveat prohibiting national forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North). [Bulgaria]

28. National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations, e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations. [Italy, Germany]
29. The conduct of joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).  

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of the national Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the national Chief of Defence.  

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

2. The participation of national forces in the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rapid response entity or its operations.  

3. The participation of any QRFs deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.  

4. The deployment of the Regional Command Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).  

5. The transfer of national QRF forces to Lead Nation operational control within the Regional Commands.  

6. Participation of QRF forces in combat operations outside Regional Command sector boundaries.  

7. Participation of QRFs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.  

8. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.  

Special Forces (SOF) Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.  

[Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

3. Any specific deployment of Special Forces outside RC-North, even upon request of the COMISAF, without explicit case-by-case approval and consent by the national Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate. [Germany, including post-Riga]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

4. The participation of any national Special Forces units, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan. [Spain, Germany]

5. Operations by Special Forces outside RC-North, even under the authority of the COMISAF. [Germany]

6. The participation of Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces. [Germany]

7. The engagement of Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation. [Slovakia]

8. The engagement of Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations). [Slovakia]

9. The participation of Special Forces in any operation, other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces). [Slovakia]

10. The participation or engagement of Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations. [France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and many other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

11. Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF units. [Sweden]

Ground Security Units (Protection, patrol and guard duty units etc.)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

2. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

3. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

4. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. 53 [Canada, 2004]

6. The engagement of national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. 54 [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted). 55 [Iceland]

8. National combat ground forces from conducting ‘guard duty’ at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan. 56 [Iceland]

9. Participation in crowd control or riot control operations. 57 [France, Canada between 2002-2004]

10. The conduct of foot patrols outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum. 58 [Romania]

11. The execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships). 59 [Germany]

12. The conduct of security patrols without armoured vehicle support. 60 [Germany]

13. Participation of national security ground forces in any security operation or patrol undertaken at night, under cover of darkness. 61 [Germany]

14. Any deployment of national security ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall). 62 [Germany]

15. Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. 63 [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

16. The deployment or placement of force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from ever being placed ‘in harm’s way’. 64 [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]

17. The deployment of national force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West, except in cases of extreme emergency. 65 [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]

18. Caveat prohibiting ground security forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North). 66 [Bulgaria]

19. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces. 67

20. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. 68 [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

21. The participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival. 69 [Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]
22. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of security forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all.\textsuperscript{70}

**Air Combat Units (Fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and personnel)**

**CAVEATS LIMITING:**

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{71} [Canada, 2002-2004]

2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{72} [Canada, 2002-2004]

3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{73} [Canada, 2002-2004]

4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{74} [Canada, 2002-2004]

5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. \textsuperscript{75} [Canada, 2004]

6. The engagement of air forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. \textsuperscript{76} [Canada, 2005-2006]

**CAVEATS PROHIBITING:**

7. Participation of national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of originally assigned Regional Command.\textsuperscript{77} [Italy]

8. The participation of national air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.\textsuperscript{78} [Germany]

9. The requisition of national aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.\textsuperscript{79}

10. The participation or engagement of national air forces in any ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation (defensive combat operations permitted). \textsuperscript{80} [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), Romania]
11. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of national air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. [The Netherlands, prior to the Riga Summit]

13. National air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations. [Germany]

14. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces. [Italy]

15. Participation of national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of originally assigned Regional Command. [Italy]

16. The conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations. [Italy, 2001-2009]

17. Providing air cover (conducting close air support) if ISAF ground forces are close to Afghan villages. [Italy]

18. The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations. [Italy, 2001-2009]

19. The participation of national aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness. [Germany]

20. National reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role. [Germany]

21. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces. [Germany]

22. Joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

23. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft). [Germany]

24. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft). [Italy]

25. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ['South European' nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

26. The participation or engagement of national air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

27. The support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [Turkey]

28. The distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts. [Germany]

29. The participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan. [Spain, Germany, Turkey]
30. The provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission). [Germany]

31. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

32. Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role). [Germany]

33. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft. [Germany]

34. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations. [Germany]

35. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces). [Germany]

36. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF). [Germany]

37. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements). [Germany]

38. The communication of information through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces). [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

39. Shared, inclusive reporting of information (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel). [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

40. Participation of national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan. [France and Germany, prior to June 2009]

**Air MEDEVAC Units**

**CAVEATS LIMITING:**

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]

5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2004]

6. The engagement of air forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. The conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness. [Germany]

8. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft). [Germany]

9. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft). [Germany]

10. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces. [Germany]

11. The transport of Afghan military personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of serious injury. [Germany]

12. The transport of Afghan civilians aboard national helicopters, even in case of serious injury. [Germany]

13. The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness. [Germany]

14. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. [South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

15. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft. [Germany]

Air Transport Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.\(^{127}\) [Canada, 2002-2004]

3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.\(^{128}\) [Canada, 2002-2004]

4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.\(^{129}\) [Canada, 2002-2004]

5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.\(^{130}\) [Canada, 2004]

6. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.\(^{131}\) [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).\(^{132}\) [Germany]

8. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).\(^{133}\)

9. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.\(^{134}\)

10. The transport of Afghan military personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.\(^{135}\)

11. The transport of Afghan civilians aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.\(^{136}\)

12. The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.\(^{137}\) [Germany]

13. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\(^{138}\) [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

14. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft.\(^{139}\) [Germany]

15. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.\(^{140}\) [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
Afghan National Army (ANA) Operational Training and Mentor Teams (OMLTs)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital. [France]
2. The deployment of OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding PRTs, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital. [Sweden]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. Contributing national forces to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces. [Finland]
4. The participation or engagement of national OMLT forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. [Finland]
5. The deployment of OMLTs into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South. [Finland]
6. The deployment of OMLTs to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East. [Finland]
7. The deployment of OMLTs nationwide outside Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide). [Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Sweden, France]
8. The deployment of OMLTs outside originally assigned AO locations (districts or provinces within Regional Commands), when conducting ‘partnering’ operations. [Sweden, Germany, Hungary]
9. The deployment of national OMLTs outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations. [Greece]
10. The participation of OMLTs in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival. [Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]
11. The embedding of national OMLT personnel within ANA ‘kandaks’ (battalions). [Denmark]
12. The participation or engagement of national OMLT personnel in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations. [Hungary]
13. National OMLTs and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces. [Turkey]
14. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
15. Participation of OMLTs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ['South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]
Afghan National Police (ANP) Operational Training and Mentor Teams (POMLTs)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. Participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour’s drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.156 [Germany]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

2. National POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is ‘purely civilian government activity’ (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).157 [Germany]

3. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Regional Command sector boundaries.158 [Germany with regard to RC-North]

4. National POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.159 [Germany]

5. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of assigned military base within Regional Command.160 [Germany with regard to Kunduz base in RC-North]

6. National POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.161 [Germany]

7. National POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.162 [Germany]

8. National POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.163 [Germany]

9. National POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.164 [Germany]

10. National POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.165 [Germany]

11. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.166 [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

12. Participation of POMLTs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.167 [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

PRT Security Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. PRT Security Units from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital.168 [Italy with regard to the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
2. PRT Security Units from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital.\(^{169}\) [Spain with regard to districts within Badghis Province, RC-West]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. PRT Security Units from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations.\(^{170}\) [Finland, with regard to its forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].

4. PRT Security Units from participating in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).\(^{171}\) [Italy, with regard to its forces at the Italian-led Herat PRT]

5. PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).\(^{172}\) [Germany, prior to October 2008]

6. PRT Security Units from conducting other security operations outside of PRTs.\(^{173}\) [Germany]

7. PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond a defined distance from the PRT (for example, between 10-80 kilometres, often preventing joint international patrols from PRTs).\(^{174}\) [Turkey, Singapore]

8. PRT Security Units from deploying beyond a specified distance from the PRT within Baghlan Province.\(^{175}\) [Hungary]

9. PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT.\(^{176}\) [Hungary]

10. PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).\(^{177}\) [Germany]

11. PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.\(^{178}\) [Germany]

12. PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.\(^{179}\) [Germany, Hungary]

13. PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRT after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).\(^{180}\) [Germany]

14. PRT Security Units from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence.\(^{181}\) [Hungary with regard to Poł-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

15. PRT Security Units from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.\(^{182}\) [Spain]

16. Participation of PRT Security Units in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.\(^{183}\) [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

17. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.\(^{184}\)

18. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.\(^{185}\) [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
PRT Military-Civilian Personnel

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. Military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital. \[186\] [Italy with regard to PRT personnel based at the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
2. Military-civilian personnel from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital. \[187\] [Spain with regard to PRT personnel based at the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. Civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working with national armed forces in Afghanistan. \[188\] [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
4. Civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where national armed forces operate or are based. \[189\] [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
5. PRT civil-military personnel from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations. \[190\] [Finland, with regard to its forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].
6. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces. \[191\]
7. Military-civilian personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases. \[192\] [Germany]
8. The deployment of civilian personnel outside of a PRT’s immediate surrounding area. \[193\] [Sweden with regard to Mazar-e-Sharif PRT in Balkh Province]
9. The conduct of any activity or task by PRT military-civilian personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall. \[194\] [Germany]
10. Military-civilian personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall. \[195\] [Germany]
11. Military-civilian personnel from staying outside the PRT base overnight. \[196\] [Hungary]
12. Military-civilian personnel from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations. \[197\] [Spain with regard to the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]
13. Participation of military-civilian personnel in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. \[198\] ['South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]
14. Participation or engagement of any PRT civilian personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel. \[199\] [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
15. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. \[200\] [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
APPENDIX 9:

Table Displaying Caveat Imposition among Major and Minor Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs) within the ISAF Mission, June 2006 – December 2012) \(^1\)
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<th>Forces Deployed</th>
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<td>0-399 Forces</td>
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<td>Large Force Deployment</td>
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<td>Minor Combat Unit(s)</td>
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<td>700+ Forces</td>
<td>Major Combat Unit(s)</td>
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APPENDIX 10:

(a) Table Displaying the Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 ISAF Lead Nations,
January 2007 – December 2012¹
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<th>Temporary Caveat-Free Exceptions</th>
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10(b) List of Known National Caveats Imposed by Lead Nations of ISAF Regional Commands on National Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2002-2012

(*Please note: Some caveats apply only to specific force units within the national contingent, whereas others apply to all forces generally including a range of different force units. In the latter case, these nations’ caveats may consequently appear in several different categories listed below)

FRANCE

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital

- Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003– June 2009 (5 ½ years)
- Caveat-Free Lead Nation from June 2009 – December 2012 (3 ½ years)
- Total number of known caveats by category: 17

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.¹

GEOGRAPHIC:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the south of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the in extremis agreement).² [With the exception of French fighter planes which were transferred to Kandahar Airfield in 2008 to shorten flight times]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the east of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the in extremis agreement).³ [At least between 2001 and July 2008, after which one French combat battalion was authorised to deploy to Kapisa Province in RC-East, subsequently followed in 2009 by all French combat ground and air forces].
REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations (2001-2006, pre Riga Summit agreement).4

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga in extremis agreement).5 [Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French force personnel outside Kabul International Airport.6

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of originally assigned suburb/district of Kabul City.7

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in crowd/riot control.8

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in PRTs.9

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the French RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan, regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests (enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).10

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.11

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French forces in riot control operations.12

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.13
COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

14. Participation or engagement of French infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁴
15. Participation or engagement of French Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁵

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat limiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.¹⁶ [France]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹⁷

TURKEY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital

- Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – December 2012 (9 years)
- Caveat-Free Lead Nation: Never (0 years)
- Total number of known caveats by category: 17

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish ground forces deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.¹⁸
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.¹⁹

GEOGRAPHIC:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.²⁰ [2003-2007, still in place after opening its first PRT in Wardak Province, RC-East, and in force at the time of the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]
REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2003-2006]

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006). [22]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [23]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [24]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [25]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

9. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [26]

OTHER AIR OPS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role). [27]
COUNTER-TERRORISM:

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

13. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.

14. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the engagement or participation of any kind by Turkish national forces in counter-narcotics operations (although C-N training of ANSF forces is permitted). [2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat prohibiting Turkish OMLTs and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces in RC-Capital from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces.

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

17. Caveat prohibiting Turkish PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond approximately 10 kilometres from Kowt-i-Ashrow PRT in Wardak Province of RC-East (preventing planned joint security patrols between the Wardak and Bamyan PRTs).

ITALY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital & RC-West

- Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – May 2009 (5 ½ years)
- Caveat-Free Lead Nation from May 2009 – December 2012 (3 ½ years)
- Total number of known caveats by category: 37

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
**GEOGRAPHIC:**

1. Caveat *limiting* any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.35 [2009]

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.36 [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency.37 [2006-2009]

**REGIONAL:**

4. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces outside of RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.38

5. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces outside of RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.39

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.40 [2003-2006]

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.41 [2003-2006]

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).42 [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-West sector (including into RC-North), except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).43 [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

**AREA OF OPERATIONS:**

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Kabul Province in RC-Capital.44

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Hirat Province in RC-West.45

12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres).46
FORCE CEILING:

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops.\(^47\)

FORCE/WEAPONS:

14. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing.\(^48\) [2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Italian RC-West Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).\(^49\) [2006-2009]

16. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.\(^50\) [2001-2009]

17. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).\(^51\)

18. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any operation occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West or RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).\(^52\) [2005-2009]

19. Caveat prohibiting the participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents.\(^53\)

20. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of combat operations by Italian infantry on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.\(^54\)

21. Caveat prohibiting Italian ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations, e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.\(^55\)

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

22. Caveat limiting the conduct of patrols by Italian ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital in Rome.\(^56\) [Only 270 of 1,800 Italian soldiers were permitted to patrol in October 2007]

23. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian security forces in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).\(^57\)
COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

24. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian national air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.58 [2001-2009]

25. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.59

26. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West and RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).60 [2005-2009]

27. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.61 [2001-2009]

28. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.62 [2001-2009]

TIME:

29. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.63

WEATHER:

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.64

31. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.65

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

32. The participation or engagement of Italian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.66 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

33. The participation or engagement of Italian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.67 [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

ISAF COOPERATION

34. The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.68 [Italy, 2001-2009]
ANSF COOPERATION:

35. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of OMLTs outside of RC-West and RC-Capital boundary lines (into RC-North, RC-South or RC-East) alongside their ANSF units, when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide). 69

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

36. Caveat limiting Italian PRT Security Units from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome. 70

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

37. Caveat limiting Italian military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome. 71

GERMANY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-North

• Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – December 2012 (9 years)
• Caveat-Free Lead Nation: Never (0 years)
• Total number of known caveats by category: 74

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.72

2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.73

3. Caveat prohibiting the provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).74
4. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan. [Prior to June 2009]

THEATRE:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.

GEOGRAPHIC:

6. Caveat limiting any deployment of German forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered ‘absolutely necessary’ for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted. [2003-2009]

7. Caveat limiting any deployment of German national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions in which national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted. [2003-2009]

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into the hostile RC-South. [2003-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.

REGIONAL:

10. Caveat limiting any deployment of national forces out of RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, ‘necessary for the success of the ISAF’, and approved by the government Minister of Defence.

11. Caveat limiting any specific deployment of Special Forces outside the originally assigned Regional Command, without explicit consent of the government Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.

12. Caveat limiting any deployment of Special Forces units outside of own assigned ISAF Regional Command, even upon request of the COMISAF, without specific case-by-case approval from the Minister of Defence (post-Riga).

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside RC-North boundary lines for any reason, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2001-2006]

14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (following the November 2006 Riga in extremis agreement). [2006-2012]
15. Caveat prohibiting operations by German KSK Special Forces outside RC-North command sector, even under the authority of the COMISAF. [2008]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

16. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North. [2009]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities. [88]

FORCE CEILING:

18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops. [89]
19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops. [90]
20. Caveat prohibiting the force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations. [91] [Prior to October 2008]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

21. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence). [2001-2009]
22. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries, except in self-defence. [93] [2001-2009]
23. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position. [94] [2001-2009]
24. Caveat prohibiting the use of heavy weapons against adversaries. [95] [2001-2009]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

25. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted). [96] [2001-2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

26. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the German Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-North boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan
(regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).97

27. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.98

28. Caveat prohibiting German ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combat operations).99

29. Caveat prohibiting German combat ground forces from deploying into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.100 [2009]

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German KSK Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.101 [2008]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

31. Caveat prohibiting the execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).102

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

32. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.103

33. Caveat prohibiting German national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.104

34. Caveat prohibiting the national reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.105 [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

35. Caveat prohibiting the solo flight of any German armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).106

TIME:

36. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.107

37. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of German combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).108

38. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of patrols by security ground forces at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.109
39. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national combat aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{110}

40. Caveat prohibiting the transport of German military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{111}

41. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{112}

42. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{113}

43. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRTs after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).\textsuperscript{114}

44. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of any activity or task by German PRT civil-military personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.\textsuperscript{115}

45. Caveat prohibiting German civil-military personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.\textsuperscript{116}

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

46. The participation or engagement of German national ground or air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{117}

47. Caveat prohibiting the distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by German reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{118}

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

48. Caveat prohibiting any lead role of German national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).\textsuperscript{119}

49. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).\textsuperscript{120}

ISAF COOPERATION:

50. Caveat prohibiting the transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on German national aircraft.\textsuperscript{121}

51. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.\textsuperscript{122} [2008-2009]
52. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).\textsuperscript{123}

53. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).\textsuperscript{124}

54. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).\textsuperscript{125}

ANSF COOPERATION:

55. Caveat \textit{limiting} the participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour’s drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.\textsuperscript{126}

56. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside specific missions within certain districts or Provinces within RC-North, when conducting ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces.\textsuperscript{127}

57. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).\textsuperscript{128}

58. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.\textsuperscript{129} [2009]

59. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is ‘purely civilian government activity’ (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).\textsuperscript{130}

60. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of RC-North sector boundaries.\textsuperscript{131}

61. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.\textsuperscript{132}

62. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Kunduz military base within RC-North.\textsuperscript{133}

63. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.\textsuperscript{134}

64. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.\textsuperscript{135}

65. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.\textsuperscript{136}

66. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.\textsuperscript{137}
67. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.138

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

68. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).139 [Prior to October 2008]
69. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting any security operation outside the borders of the German PRTs.140
70. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).141
71. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.142
72. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any German PRT security personnel based at Meymaneh PRT into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.143 [2009]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

73. Caveat prohibiting German Civil-military personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.144
74. Caveat prohibiting the any German PRT stability personnel based at Meymaneh PRT from travelling into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.145 [2009]

CANADA

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South

- **Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation** from December 2003 – December 2005 (2 years) and from July 2011 – December 2012 (1 ½ years, making a total of 3 ½ years)
- **Caveat-Free Lead Nation** from January 2006 – July 2011 (5 years)
- **Total number of known caveats by category:** 42

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2001-2005]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside of Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province. [2002-2004]

COMMAND:

3. Caveat limiting the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the Canadian capital of Ottawa. [2002-2004]

4. Caveat limiting the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander’s own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle). [2002-2004]

5. Caveat limiting the requisition of Canadian aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval. [Between 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

6. Caveat limiting the COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of the Canadian national contingents without direct communication with the national government in the capital. [Between 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES CAVEATS:

7. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

8. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

9. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]
10. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

11. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

12. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2004]

13. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [2005-2006]


COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

16. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

17. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

18. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

19. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

20. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2004]

21. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without
government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [2005-2006]

22. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

23. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

24. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

25. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

26. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

27. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]

28. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2004]

29. Caveat limiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [2005-2006]

30. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

31. Caveat limiting the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [2002-2004]
32. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [177] [2002-2004]

33. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [178] [2002-2004]

34. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [179] [2002-2004]

35. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [180] [2004]

36. **Caveat limiting** the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [181] [2005-2006]

**OTHER AIR OPS:**

37. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [182] [2002-2004]

38. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [183] [2002-2004]

39. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [184] [2002-2004]

40. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [185] [2002-2004]

41. **Caveat limiting** the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation. [186] [2004]

42. **Caveat limiting** the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. [187] [2005-2006]
THE NETHERLANDS

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South

- **Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation** from December 2003 – November 2006 (3 years) and from August 2010 – December 2012 (2 years, 4 months)
- **Caveat-Free Lead Nation** from November 2006 – August 2010 (3 years, 9 months)
- **Total number of known caveats:** 10

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside RC-South boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations. [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside Uruzgan Province of RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.

FORCE CEILING:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops.
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,200 troops.

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
COUNTER-TERRORISM:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{194} [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{195} [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction anywhere within the Afghan AOR.\textsuperscript{196} [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch personnel in narcotics eradication operations in Uruzgan Province.\textsuperscript{197} [2006]

UNITED KINGDOM

**ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South & RC-Southwest**

- Caveat-Free Lead Nation from December 2003- December 2012 (9 years)
- Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation: Never - No caveats have ever been imposed on British forces deployed to the ISAF mission (0 years)
- Total number of known caveats: 0

UNITED STATES

**ISAF Lead Nation, RC-East & RC-Southwest**

- Caveat-Free Lead Nation from December 2003- January 2010 (6 years)
- Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from January 2010 – December 2012, relating only to U.S. forces operating in Helmand Province, RC-Southwest (3 years)
- Total number of known caveats: 6

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:
COMMAND:

1. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of American national forces to British Lead Nation operational control within RC-Southwest. 198 [2010-2012, both the U.S. and the U.K. are designated Lead Nations of RC-Southwest]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only ‘exclusive’ applications of force permitted by U.S. personnel). 199 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). 200 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. Caveat prohibiting joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted). 201 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

ISAF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the communication of information by American national forces through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces). 202 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

6. Caveat prohibiting shared, inclusive reporting of information by American national forces (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel). 203 [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
APPENDIX 11

Burden-Sharing Analysis:
Key Factors Contributing to the Severity of the ISAF Mission’s Burden-Sharing Dilemma

In Chapter 13, an examination was provided of the serious issue of inequitable burden-sharing amongst the coalition members of the ISAF mission. The following two appendices seek to provide deeper and more precise analysis of this caveat-generated issue, by analysing three principal factors which have contributed to the severity of this burden-sharing inequality within the mission, in addition to the political and military outrage the issue has engendered. These three factors relate to: (1) the consistently high numbers of ISAF TCNs imposing caveats within the coalition, amongst both the NATO and Partner nation groupings; (2) the disproportionality represented by the way that many TCNs with large, capable militaries have remained caveat-imposers throughout the mission, while TCNs with smaller, less capable militaries have become caveat-free; and (3) the high number of NATO Lead Nations within the list of the caveated ISAF TCNs, and over significant periods of time.

This appendix begins this deeper investigation by examining the first two factors named above, both of which have played a significant part in amplifying the burden-sharing dispute and its on-the-ground effects within the ISAF mission.

Factor 1: The High Numbers of Caveat-Imposing NATO & Partner Nation TCNs within the ISAF

The first contributing factor to the severity of the ISAF’s burden-sharing malady concerns the continually high numbers of ISAF TCNs which have imposed caveats on their forces deployed to the Afghan theatre of war over the period of the present research, 2002-2012.

**Total Caveat-Imposing & Caveat-Free TCN Numbers & Percentages**

Indeed, despite the way in which the coalition has grown between August 2003 and December 2012, with total TCNs augmenting from 35 to 50 over the course of the mission, caveat-imposing TCNs have almost continually formed the majority within the ISAF coalition. Table A11.1 illustrates this trend within the ISAF, by comparing the caveat-free and caveat-imposing numbers of TCNs over the period 2003-2012. As the table shows, caveat-free numbers of ISAF TCNs began at only three in 2003, slowly increased to peak at 22 TCNs in 2009, then regressed again to only 18 out of 50 total TCNs by the end of 2012. To the contrary, caveat-imposing numbers began at a staggering 32 of 35
total TCNs, diminished slowly to 21 by 2007, vacillated between 21 and 25 in the subsequent two years, then climbed again to 32 out of 50 TCNs by December 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR (December)</th>
<th>TOTAL # ISAF TCNs</th>
<th># CAVEAT-FREE TCNs</th>
<th>% CAVEAT-FREE TCN CONTINGENTS</th>
<th># CAVEAT-IMPOSING TCNs</th>
<th>% CAVEAT-IMPOSING TCN CONTINGENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9% (Lowest)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8% (Highest)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51% (Highest)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49% (Lowest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A11.1 – Overall TCN Numbers & Percentages: The numbers and percentage of caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF TCNs out of total ISAF TCN numbers, 2003-2012.

From this table one may see that high numbers of caveat-imposing TCNs have been the prevailing norm within the ISAF coalition. Indeed, this fact is made more evident, when the figures are displayed in the form of a column graph, as depicted below in Graph A11.2, with caveat-free and caveat-imposing numbers shown in contrast to overall total ISAF TCNs between 2003-2012.

Graph A11.2 – Caveat-Imposing and Caveat-Free TCNs: The number of caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF TCNs out of total ISAF TCN numbers, 2003-2012.
When these numbers are translated into percentages, moreover, the caveat picture within the ISAF coalition during the course of the mission becomes even clearer, as displayed below in *Graph A11.3.*

![Graph A11.3. – Overall Caveat-Imposing & Caveat-Free TCN Percentages: The percentage of caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF TCNs out of total ISAF TCN numbers, 2003-2012.](image)

The percentage of caveat-free TCNs within the ISAF, for instance, began at a very low 9 percent, fell further to 8 percent as the ISAF expanded, then rose to 51 percent at its peak during several months in 2009. Following 2009, the percentage slowly declined again from 51 to 42 percent and finally fell to 36 percent by the end of 2012. Conversely, the percentage of caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF force began at a very high 91 percent, climbed higher to 92 percent between 2004-2005, declined to 49 percent at its lowest in 2009, and then increased again to 64 percent by December 2012.

**Comparative Analysis: NATO Nations vs Partner Nations**

These numbers can be analysed even further when all the TCNs contributing forces to the ISAF are divided into their two respective groups or types of TCN within the ISAF: NATO alliance member ‘NATO nations’ and non-NATO member ‘Partner nations’.

As previously discussed in Chapter 6, when NATO took leadership command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the 35 TCNs contributing forces to the mission were comprised of all 19 NATO members at that time and 16 non-NATO Partner nations. These numbers would alter over the years as the ISAF grew in TCN numbers, and as several Partner nations gained full membership within NATO. Consequently, by December 2012, 28 of the 50 total ISAF TCNs were NATO members and
22 were Partner nations (see Graph A11.4 and A11.5 below). Perhaps not surprisingly, given the leading role of NATO in the mission, it is clear that the NATO nation grouping has formed a continual majority of TCNs in the coalition over this time period, as alluded to previously in Chapter 6 of Volume I.

*Graph A11.4 & A11.5 – The NATO Nation Majority: The composition of the ISAF coalition TCNs in 2003 and 2012, based on classification as a NATO or Partner nation.*

When the record of caveat imposition amongst the ISAF TCNs is applied to these two main groupings of force contributors within the coalition, a number of interesting findings arise.

Firstly, caveat-free NATO nations have continually outnumbered caveat-free Partner nations during the course of the mission (see *Graph A11.6*).
Graph A11.6. – Caveat-Free TCN Numbers: The fluctuating numbers of caveat-free NATO nations in comparison with caveat-free Partner nations within the ISAF coalition between 2003-2012.

Secondly, during the first five years of NATO leadership of the mission (2003-2008), caveat-imposing NATO nations outnumbered caveat-imposing Partner nations (2003: NATO 17/Partner 15 – 2008:NATO 15/Partner 10). In 2009, however, this equilibrium reversed with caveat-imposing Partner nations heavily outweighing NATO nations for the remainder of the mission (2009: NATO 9/Partner 12 – 2012: NATO 13/Partner 19). This reversal is best demonstrated in Graph A11.7 below.

Graph A11.7. – Caveat-Imposing TCN Numbers: The fluctuating numbers of caveat-imposing NATO nations in comparison with caveat-imposing Partner nations within the ISAF coalition between 2003-2012.
The Caveat Record: NATO Nations

Thirdly, in regard solely to the NATO nation grouping, caveat-imposition was the prevailing norm between 2003-3005, with between 17-24 (89-92 percent) NATO nations imposing a variety of constraints on their security and stability forces in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, during the subsequent years 2006-2012 the opposite became true with the majority of NATO nations, with between 14-19 nations (54-68 percent) becoming caveat-free (refer to Table A11.8 below).

Table A11.8 – NATO Nation Table: The numbers and percentages of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO nations within the ISAF between 2003-2012, out of total NATO nation and ISAF TCN figures.

Indeed, in 2006 the percentage of caveat-free NATO nations in this category jumped dramatically from a scant 8 percent to 54 percent. This percentage would increase further to reach a peak at 68 percent of NATO nations caveat-free in 2009. However, this figure would decrease again to sit at only 54 percent by the end of 2012, as several NATO nations once again reverted to the status of a caveat-imposing nation as the mission progressed (also depicted in Graph A11.9).
Fourthly, with regard solely to the Partner nation grouping, Partner nations imposing caveat restrictions on their forces have always formed the vast majority, with only a scant 1-6 Partner nations enjoying caveat-free status at any one time. Indeed, within this Partner grouping which expanded in number from a total of 16 to 22 over the period 2003-2012, a maximum of only 7 Partner nations became caveat-free during these nine years of the Afghan mission (with a high of 6 caveat-free Partner nations at any one time, recorded in 2007).

Moreover, due to fluctuations in these numbers as these Partner nations either joined NATO to become NATO nations, or alternately re-imposed caveats then removed them again in subsequent years, a maximum of only six of these nations were caveat-free at any one time (see Table A11.10).

**The Caveat Record: Partner Nations**

(Graph A11.9. – NATO Nation Percentages: Caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO nations out of total NATO numbers within the ISAF, 2003-2012.)
PARTNER NATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR (December)</th>
<th>TOTAL # ISAF TCNs</th>
<th>#PARTNER NATION TCNS</th>
<th>% CAVEAT-FREE PARTNER TCNs</th>
<th>% CAVEAT-FREE PARTNER NATIONS</th>
<th># CAVEAT-IMPOSING PARTNER TCNs</th>
<th>% CAVEAT-IMPOSING PARTNER NATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6% (lowest)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>94% (highest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46% (highest)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54% (lowest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80%</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A11.10 – Partner Nation Table: The numbers and percentages of caveat-free and caveat-imposing Partner nations within the ISAF between 2003-2012, out of total Partner nation and ISAF TCN figures.

In percentages this means that only between 6-46 percent of Partner nations were caveat-free during the ISAF mission, the vast majority – some 54-94 percent – being caveat-imposing nations (depicted below in Graph A11.11).

Graph A11.11 – Partner Nation Percentages: Caveat-free and caveat-imposing Partner nations out of total NATO numbers within the ISAF, 2003-2012.

In sum, one can see by this that whether analysing TCN caveat-free and caveat-imposing numbers in totality within the ISAF force, or separately with regard to the two distinct groupings of NATO or
Partner TCN nations, high numbers of ISAF force contributing nations have imposed national caveats on their national forces in Afghanistan for the duration of the mission. Indeed, this continuous reality within the two ISAF groups of NATO and Partner TCNs, over a decade of operations between 2003-2012, is depicted below in Graph A11.12. It is this unceasing high record of TCN caveat imposition within the ISAF mission, which is one of the principal exacerbating factors contributing to the severity of the mission’s caveat affliction, and its resulting burden-sharing inequalities among ISAF forces.

![Caveat-Free & Caveat-Imposing TCN Numbers within NATO & Partner Nation Groupings](Graph A11.12)

**Graph A11.12 – ISAF TCNs – The Total Caveat Picture: Comparative column graph displaying the number of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO and Partner nation TCNs out of total NATO & Partner TCN numbers respectively, 2003-2012.**

**Factor 2: The Disparity of Military Capabilities between Caveat-Free and Caveat-Imposing ISAF TCNs**

A second key factor contributing greatly to the burden-sharing stale-mate, in addition to the gravity of the ISAF’s national caveat problem overall, relates to the puzzling disparity between the caveat status of ISAF force contributors in comparison with the size and capabilities of their national militaries. That is to say, a major group of ISAF TCNs with large, capable military forces, including principal NATO nations, have remained caveat-imposers for most – or all – of the duration of the Afghan mission. In stark contrast, another minor group within the ISAF, comprised of several countries with small militaries and quite limited force capabilities – many of them non-NATO Partner members, have over the same period removed all their force restrictions in Afghanistan to become caveat-free.
**Militarily-Capable, Caveat-Imposing NATO Nations**

For instance, caveat-imposing nations with well-established, capable militaries have included France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey in addition to Belgium, Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal – all NATO nations which must *ipso facto* maintain significant defence expenditure and preparedness as part of their membership conditions in the NATO collective security organisation (involving an obligation to invest between one-two percent of their national GDP on their national defence sectors – see endnote for more information).\(^1\) Bulgaria and Slovakia too, both of which gained membership in NATO during 2004 and were hence considered to meet NATO’s military standards as part of this membership process, have likewise been caveat-imposing ISAF nations during much – if not all – of the NATO-led Afghan mission. Bulgaria only removed its caveat restrictions from its forces in June 2009, while Slovakia has been a caveat-imposing nation throughout the ISAF operation (see endnote for details, including an American assessment on the reduced value of Slovakia’s caveat-ed force contribution).\(^2\)

Sally McNamara of the U.S. *Heritage Foundation* commented on this puzzling state of affairs at the end of 2009, stating:

> With a few honorable exceptions, NATO’s European members—especially France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—have underresourced the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from the start. They have provided too few troops with too many national caveats on their deployments. Furthermore, their support for the civilian component of the comprehensive strategy approved at NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008 has been woeful, despite a stated eagerness to forgo combat missions in favor of aid and development projects.\(^3\)

Steven Erlanger of *The New York Times*, likewise made a similar observation, writing in December 2009 that:

> American generals regard the European contributions as helpful, but not overwhelmingly so — too many nations, too many small contingents, too many special rules and conditions on how each nation’s soldiers are able to fight the war.\(^4\)

**‘Less-than-Adequate’ Force Contributions**

The most obvious caveat transgressors represented in this group comprise Lead Nations France, Italy, Turkey and Germany. Indeed, as indicated in Chapter 9, NATO nations Italy and Turkey, together with Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, have all been indicted by NATO in November 2007 for their heavy caveat imposition and less-than-adequate force contributions to the ISAF mission, all six featuring in NATO’s supreme headquarters short ‘prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility’.\(^5\) In fact even as late as December 2009, when both France and Italy had at last lifted their caveat restrictions, only seven of the 28 NATO members (Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Poland, Romania and the Netherlands) were considered to be contributing: ‘sizable forces that are not handicapped by restrictive “combat caveats,” which prevent forces from participating in the full range of counterinsurgency operations’.\(^6\)
This state of affairs caused French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, to remark the same month, when asked if NATO was not working well in Afghanistan: ‘It’s not working at all’. 7

Within SHAPE’s prioritised group of recalcitrant, caveat-imposing NATO nations, Greece and Spain have come under particular criticism for their failure to contribute adequately to the ISAF’s combat capability. This has been true even in terms of combat support capabilities, such as the provision of combat aircraft to the mission. As McNamara argued with regard to Greece:

Several European nations, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, could contribute enhanced airlift capability that, absent national caveats, would markedly increase the security and efficacy of combat operations in Afghanistan. Greece also has capacity at its disposal, including 15 Chinooks. Greece has been a reluctant contributor to the mission in Afghanistan, deploying fewer troops than Macedonia, even after Greece unilaterally blocked Macedonian membership in NATO in 2008.8

Spain, even more than Greece, has come under heavy criticism for its intransigence in refusing to play a combat role within the mission over a period of seven years since NATO assumed command of the Afghan mission, from 2003-2010. Besides combat and combat support prohibitions, Spain’s caveats have over many successive years also included regional and geographical (anti-south deployment) caveats and troop-ceiling caveats, in addition to bans in leading or supporting counter-narcotics operations.9 Indeed, Spain’s preference for staying in the ‘quiet’ areas of Afghanistan – far away from the combative southern and eastern sectors – is illustrated by the way in which it would only agree to lead a PRT ‘if it was in the right location’ in 2005, continued to quibble along with France and Italy over definitions of an ‘emergency’ situation long after the 2006 Riga in extremis agreement had been forged (Spain would also debate the meaning of the 2008 Budapest agreement on active counter-narcotics operations).10

Spain’s caveats have been so stringent that the Spanish government was specifically targeted by the Obama Administration during the diplomatic round of April 2009 (outlined in Chapter 8). Spain was then requested to not only ‘remove operationally restrictive caveats to permit nationwide operations (at a minimum in RC-North)’, but also to partner with Columbia in leading a Special Operations Task Group to conduct military training and mentoring’ for ANSF units, as well as to ‘support counter-narcotics initiatives including the GPI [Good Performers Initiative], training the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and funding Counter-Narcotics Advisory Teams’.11 In response, Spain reduced some of its caveats at this time, not only providing ‘discretionary authority’ to its respective National Commanders on the use of national forces in emergency situations, but also pledging contributions to police mentoring teams to assist the training of the Afghan National Police.12
Nevertheless, by September 2009 Spain was still reported as one of four nations (beside Italy, Turkey and Belgium) to have ‘significant restrictions placed upon their contingents’.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, in November 2009, U.S. Embassy officials in Madrid underscored the ineffectiveness of Spanish national forces in RC-West, reporting that:

The Spanish have a cautious approach to their PRT role [in RC-West]. Although they operate effectively in the secure areas of the province, they rarely venture into insecure districts. The Spanish military element rotates every four months, further limiting its effectiveness... The Spanish remain committed to the province, albeit limited by their short rotations and strict national caveats. PRT Badghis will continue to work for a more active, COIN-focused Spanish role.\textsuperscript{14}

When at last Spain did eliminate its combat caveats from its forces – seven years after NATO’s assumption of command over the ISAF mission in February 2010 – also boosting force levels in RC-West from 800 to 1500 personnel to undertake ‘additional combat duties’ (see endnote for more details), this alteration came ‘too little, too late’ for the ISAF campaign as a whole.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, other Spanish caveats remained fixedly in place into 2012 and beyond – including its anti-south and anti-east restrictions, thereby still limiting the effectiveness of the Spanish military contingent in RC-West.\textsuperscript{16}

**Militarily-Capable, Caveat-Imposing Partner Nations**

Partner nations Australia, Sweden and Switzerland, meanwhile – all wealthy, Western nations with capable forces and therefore the capacity to ‘do more’ in Afghanistan – have similarly refused to eliminate their caveat restrictions from their forces for the duration of the mission.

As alluded to in Chapter 9, Switzerland actually withdrew completely from the mission in 2008 when it became apparent that counter-insurgency combat operations were a necessity within the mission. As for Sweden, another so-called ‘neutral’ country, this Scandinavian nation has obstinately continued to impose national caveats on its forces in Afghanistan for the duration of its participation in the ISAF– thereby remaining a caveat-imposing TCN over a period of time numbering at least 10 years (possibly even 12 years from the beginning of the ISAF mission). Sweden has, furthermore, never participated in combat operations at all. Finally, despite being a country noted not only for having deployed its combat forces to the controversial southern sector of Afghanistan in 2007, but also for permitting Australian units to engage in combating the Taliban from 2008 onwards, Australia has nevertheless been a caveat-imposing TCN since joining the mission in 2006. In evidence of this, Australian infantry have been reported as being prohibited from engaging in kinetic operations (a task apparently assigned only to Australian SOFs in Afghanistan), and are also required to sign formal documents declaring that ‘they have not provoked combat operations’ or ‘fire fights’ with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{17}
Table A11.13 – Puzzling Military Disparities: The larger but caveat-fettered national force contributions of the wealthier, and more militarily-capable, caveat-imposing ISAF TCNs, comprised of both NATO and Partner nations, based on official ISAF force figures provided between January 2007 – July 2010.18
The entire picture created by this puzzling disparity, of military-capable nations paradoxically imposing national caveats on their forces deployed to the ISAF, is represented in Table A11.13.

**Militarily-Limited, Caveat-Free NATO Nations**

By contrast, nations with smaller militaries and less trained and equipped forces have proved more willing to conduct their operations in Afghanistan free from restraint. These ISAF TCNs have included: NATO nations Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Albania and Croatia; and Partner nations New Zealand, Finland, Macedonia and Georgia.

Amongst the NATO nations represented in this list, one of the most surprising developments has been the way in which many of the former Communist countries from the Eastern bloc – once ‘satellite’ puppet-States ruled and controlled by the Soviet Union – have featured largely amongst the group of caveat-free TCNs. While many of the governments of larger European NATO nations have imposed combat and anti-south caveats on their contingents, thereby conferring the largest share of the war-fighting burden in the Afghan south on non-caveated U.S., British, Canadian, Dutch and Polish forces, the governments of these smaller NATO nations have – despite the limited size of their nations and military resources – proved more willing and committed allies by providing practical help in shouldering this heavy combat burden. This fact has led forces, from at least one of the larger caveat-free NATO nations (Britain), to refer to their Eastern European counterparts as ‘real allies’, especially in contrast to notoriously heavily-caveats German forces. As Corum of the British Telegraph wrote in January 2010:

> Unlike the Germans, the Poles and Baltic forces deploy their troops to combat without restrictions or conditions. They are currently serving and taking casualties under US and UK command in the tough parts of Afghanistan… The strong commitment of these countries to the Western system is revitalising the alliance.  

**More Valuable Force Contributions**

Indeed, in many cases the small caveat-free force contributions made by this group of nations have been considered by NATO to be more valuable contributions than the larger, but caveated contributions made by their larger, stronger and more prosperous allies. The caveat-free Slovenian contribution is one good example of this (caveat-free between November 2006 – August 2007, and one caveat-free OMLT ‘exception’ in October 2010). U.S. Embassy officials in Ljubljana considered the TCN’s contributions to ‘represent quality even if the quantity in absolute terms is not large’, a fact that led to the Slovenian contribution being repeatedly praised by U.S. and Multinational Commanders in Afghanistan.
A Croatian Mobile Liaison Observation Team (MLOT), moreover, was considered by the U.S. in 2007 (at a time when Croatia was still a Partner nation) to be preferable to their NATO Icelandic counterparts for patrolling and traversing the icy and dangerous mountainous terrain of Ghor Province in RC-West. This was because Croatian personnel operated without caveats and were subsequently free from the Icelandic restrictions that ‘sometimes meant that those capabilities could not be put to their fullest use’. Likewise, in 2009 Lithuania’s national contingent in Afghanistan was not only one of the largest force contributors in RC-West, after Lead Nation Italy, but more highly valued than Italy’s given the caveat-free combat-capable status of these forces (operating without caveat restraints as of November 2006).

Four other countries which, despite being members of NATO have comparatively small militaries, have also at certain times made valued caveat-free contributions to the ISAF mission, namely: Norway (between May-July 2006 and December 2009-December 2012); Denmark (between November 2006-June 2007 and December 2009-December 2010); Bulgaria (between December 2009-December 2012); and even Hungary (during a four-and-a-half year period between November 2006–September 2008 and December 2009-December 2012). Of these nations Denmark has been particularly cited as one of the small nations playing ‘a major role’ in Afghanistan, especially during its caveat-free years cited above. In contrast to ‘other Western nations which have not pulled their weight at all, with Germany now acting as the problem child of the Western alliance’, by 2010 Denmark had in the course of its operations in RC-South taken more casualties per capita, as a percentage of its total population, than any other continental European nation contributing forces to the ISAF (as previously discussed in Chapter 13 of Volume I). In fact, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia, in addition to Canada and Britain – all TCNs operating in the ISAF’s hostile southern sector – have each suffered more casualties per capita in Afghanistan than even the United States.

**Greater Political Commitment to the ISAF**

Aside from actual force contributions, moreover, this group of small nations has also been both conspicuous and remarkable in the high levels of political commitment and will expressed towards the Afghan campaign and its success than their larger, and more capable allies. For whatever reason – whether a desire to enhance bilateral relationships with the United States, to demonstrate strong commitment to NATO (especially by the new, Baltic member-States of the alliance), or via solidarity with NATO to deter renewed Russian aggression across their borders (especially following the Russian invasion and annexation of territory in Georgia in 2008) - this small group of caveat-free NATO nations have, on the whole, proved more committed allies to NATO’s endeavours than their larger more militarily-capable counterparts within NATO.
Despite having a population of only two million, Slovenia has shown itself to be a willing force contributor to NATO and UN PSO missions and has been reported by U.S. Embassy officials as being ‘eager to contribute to the collective security of the NATO Alliance’. In 2010, for instance, Slovenia had more than 500 members of its military forces (representing seven percent of its military) deployed abroad on international peace and security missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Lebanon and Syria – and, of course, Afghanistan (75 largely caveat-free personnel). Furthermore, quite aside from its willingness to contribute forces to NATO security operations, Slovenia had also shown itself committed to enhancing the quality of its NATO contributions by modernising its military forces in terms of training and equipment. As U.S. officials stated: ‘Slovenia’s military has taken great strides in a short time to become an all-volunteer force that is professional, equipped and ready to contribute to the collective security of the NATO Alliance’.

This willingness among this group of nations to involve themselves politically and militarily in the ISAF mission has often been expressed by a desire to deploy additional resources to the mission, beyond even their actual capabilities. A 2008 U.S. State Department cable reveals that Estonia, for instance, whose military at that time had forces deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon and the EU Battle Group and had already sustained ‘multiple casualties’ with four killed and 45 wounded:

Frequently offer to increase their deployments, particularly with U.S. forces, but they simply lack experienced, sustainable cadres of forces. The will to deploy is certainly present, but the means are unfortunately lacking.

Estonia’s eagerness to pull its weight and ‘do its bit’ in Afghanistan led American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Ljubljana to conclude that: ‘Regardless of these difficulties, the Estonian Defense Forces continue to place a high value on serving side by side with US forces and will look to maintain this relationship in Iraq and/or elsewhere.’

Like Estonia, other Baltic nations Latvia, Lithuania and even Bulgaria (once the latter had become caveat-free) indicated willingness to make greater caveat-free contributions to the ISAF mission, if additional training or equipment could be provided by their larger (and less fully committed) NATO allies to enable the deployment. These contributions included not only combat ground forces and Close Air Support personnel, but also OMLTs to train and mentor local ANSF units – teams that many other NATO allies had consistently been reluctant to deploy to Afghanistan (presumably out of fear that ANSF-ISAF ‘green-on-blue’ friendly-fire incidents may result, thereby producing casualties).

Aside from ISAF combat forces, some of these nations also expressed the wish to deploy medical personnel and facilities to the NATO-led mission, given sufficient support. In December 2009, for
instance, Bulgaria possessed the personnel and equipment necessary to deploy a Role Two Military Medical facility to the ISAF, but lacked adequate financial means to enable the transport and sustainment of this unit ‘in the field’ (leading to its request that the unit be supported by the U.S. and embedded with a U.S. contingent). Willingness to contribute more to the mission, on the part of these small caveat-free NATO nations, was so widespread in fact that in late 2009 a call was made by Bulgaria for the NATO Alliance to ‘find better ways to match up wealthy countries that are unwilling to fight with poorer countries with greater political will but fewer resources’ at its force generation meetings. The U.K. and France subsequently seized on this willingness and responded by providing helicopters to several of these nations to enable these additional force deployments, simultaneously calling on other NATO members to ‘find out creative approaches’ to assist their combat-ready allies.

**Militarily-Limited, Caveat-Free Partner Nations**

In terms of non-NATO nations within this caveat-free group, furthermore, four of the smaller, less militarily-capable nations in this second group of ISAF TCNs have been Partner nations with no membership in NATO – namely, New Zealand, Finland, Macedonia and Georgia.

Like their small NATO nation compatriots, three of these nations (with the exception of Finland) have contributed forces that, despite being small, have been considered of greater worth than the personnel contributed by the larger but caveated NATO allies. Indeed, New Zealand, Macedonia and Georgia have each been praised by NATO and the United States for their caveat-free contributions. In fact recognition of valued force contributions to the ISAF mission has even been extended to these countries in the form of American military decorations. To illustrate, the highest U.S. military decoration for foreign officers – the ‘Defense Meritorious Service’ medal has been awarded to 25 NZ military personnel since 2003. In 2011, when a New Zealand SOF commander was distinguished with the award, acting COMISAF General David Petraeus himself lauded ‘the exceptional quality of [NZ] military forces’, and spoke of how highly the U.S. regarded the NZ SAS Task Force, in particular, as a Partner force in the mission.

Macedonia, too, has been highly praised for its caveat-free contributions in the ISAF, and as a result of this contribution (as well as its caveat-free deployment to Iraq) the recipient of 163 U.S. military decorations including eight Bronze stars. Successive U.S. State Department cables during 2007 describe the small unit of Macedonian forces (approximately 163 personnel) as ‘performing well’ and a source of pride in Afghanistan, causing Macedonia to be considered ‘a small but effective contributor to global peace operations’. This message was also reiterated two years later in a cable dispatched in December 2009 which stated: ‘Macedonia’s soldiers have served with distinction in ISAF (and with no caveats), and have received numerous medals from NATO allies’. This cable
also included the text of a personal letter sent by U.S. President Obama to Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov in recognition of the nation’s contribution to the ISAF, which read as follows:

Thank you for your letter expressing Macedonia’s continuing support for our joint effort to stabilize Afghanistan. On behalf of the American people, I want to express my gratitude for your efforts thus far and for your increased commitment in this critical period. Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, we have been able to count on the people of Macedonia to stand by us and defend the cause of freedom. I salute the willingness of your people to stand with us, our Allies, and the Afghan people.45

As the only new TCN to the mission to contribute its forces free from caveats from the outset – rendering it the sole exception to the ISAF rule – Partner nation Georgia has also been the recipient of much praise from NATO allies.46 At the time of its joining, Georgia received much commendation at the Noordwijk meeting in 2007 from many of the other caveat-free NATO nations for the way in which it had not only offered its forces entirely free from caveat restraints in their ROE, but also volunteered to send them to one of the most troublesome and most combative southern sectors of the mission, RC-South, where they were offered to work alongside the Dutch in Uruzgan Province.47 A U.S. State department cable at that time reveals that these forces, comprised of both the Georgian 1st and 3rd Brigades, were considered by the U.S. to have been not only ‘trained to U.S. standards regarding counter IED and maneuver tactics, and willing to “do the job” with no caveats’, but available for deployment to Uruzgan Province in the combative Afghan south (see endnote however).48

Two years later in December 2009, non-NATO nation Georgia was again applauded by the caveat-free TCNs within the NATO alliance for its promise to deploy 750 combat forces (two light companies and a heavy battalion) to Helmand Province – again free from caveat restraints (including notably combat caveats). These forces comprised Georgia’s best forces specifically trained by the U.S. for engaging in full-spectrum operations, including the conduct of asymmetric counter-insurgent warfare in Iraq and elsewhere.49 According to one American Colonel, once fully deployed this caveat-free Georgian contribution would amount to approximately 20 percent of the ‘combat power’ in Helmand Province and were thus ‘vital to the effort in Afghanistan’.50 Indeed, other cables document that ‘most speakers praised Georgia for its pledge’ at the 2009 NATO meeting, for its contribution of ‘a fighting unit with no caveats’.51 Even outside NATO, many regarded this offer as a ‘hefty contribution’ by a non-NATO country, the U.S. Secretary of State commenting that the Georgian force ‘might qualify as the largest contribution of any country, on a per capita basis’.52

Interestingly, Georgia continues to be active in RC-South into 2013 with some 1,570 forces – the largest non-NATO member contribution – patrolling Helmand Province alongside British and American Marines.53 In fact when, as per his December 2009 announcement, Obama withdrew two-
### Table A11.14 – Puzzling Military Disparities: The smaller, but caveat-free national force contributions of the less-wealthy, less military-capable caveat-free ISAF TCNs, comprised of small NATO and Partner nations, based on official ISAF force figures provided between January 2007 – July 2010.54

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<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
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</table>

**TOTAL ISAF FORCE**

| TOTAL # ISAF TCNs | 35,460 | 39,000 | 43,250 | 52,900 | 56,420 | 61,130 | 85,795 | 119,500 | 132,457 | 102,011 |
thirds of the 20,000 Marine surge from Afghanistan including from the troublesome Nimroz and Helmand Provinces of the RC-Southwest sector, the Georgian contingent became the forces of choice to replace them and ‘fill the gap’.\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, four years later in 2013, NATO SACEUR Admiral Stravridis testified before the U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the American ‘Georgia Deployment Program’ were supporting the ‘simultaneous deployment of two Georgian battalions every six months’ to work with the remaining U.S. Marines in RC-Southwest.\textsuperscript{56}

The consequent picture of small but valued caveat-free contributions, made by this second group of ISAF TCNs with smaller militaries and financial resources, is depicted in Table A11.14.

The disproportionate commitment to the ISAF mission, among these two groups of TCNs to the mission, is starkly illustrated by these official numbers of caveat and caveat-free forces deployed by each group of nations respectively during the mission between January 2007 – December 2012 (provided in Tables A11.13 and A11.14 respectively). By these figures it is abundantly clear that caveat-imposition – especially by many of the larger TCN nations within the ISAF (whether NATO or Partner nations) – has had a significant impact on the prosecution and success of the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan.

This disparity between the large, caveated contingents and the smaller, caveat-free contributions by these ISAF TCNs within the mission is rather an enigma, but nevertheless one which has contributed to the overall severity of the long-standing burden-sharing crisis within the operation. On the one hand, the smaller caveat-free TCNs simply have not been able to provide anything like the quantity of numbers required to fill the caveat-fostered breach within the mission’s security forces. On the other hand, the larger more capable TCNs vested with large numbers of forces at their disposal – numbers urgently required to fill the force gap within the mission – have stubbornly remained caveat-imposers with severely restrictive ROE fetters on their force contingents in Afghanistan.

**In Summary**

In sum, this appendix has examined two key factors which have played a significant role in rendering the ISAF mission’s burden-sharing dispute and its effects so severe within the Afghan operation. It has shown, firstly, how very high numbers of ISAF force contributors have been caveat-imposing nations for the duration of the ISAF mission. This has meant that force restrictions have been imposed by a large majority of the TCNs to the ISAF – a fact that remained static for the duration of the campaign from 2001 -2012, regardless of changes in overall TCN numbers. When the ISAF
TCNs were divided into their two contributor groupings of NATO and Partner nations, furthermore, this trend of high caveat-imposition amongst the two camps of TCN has also continually been present within both groups.

Secondly, this examination has demonstrated that a puzzling disproportionality has existed between the caveat-free and caveat-imposing TCNs with the mission. That is, many of the wealthiest countries with significant defence expenditure and capable militaries, in addition to membership within the NATO military collective security organisation, have been vacillating or permanent caveat-imposing force contributors to the mission. By contrast, a group of small nations with less capable, trained, equipped and funded militaries – some even Partner nations without NATO membership – have to the contrary eliminated all of their national caveat exemptions to render their ISAF forces robust, flexible and caveat-free within the mission. This imbalance in political and military commitments to the mission between the two groups of nations has resulted in disproportionality on the ground in Afghanistan too. Numerous, large ISAF contingents have remained constrained by heavy caveat restraints in their operations in Afghanistan, despite being capable combat forces from large, developed and wealthy countries with NATO membership. By contrast, very small ISAF contingents from poorer nations with less developed militaries have been permitted by their respective government to operate in the full range of operations – including combat – free from restraint.

APPENDIX 12 will analyse further this latter aspect revealed by the caveat data, to present a third factor which has materially impacted on the severity of not only the caveat quandary within the ISAF mission, but also the sharp burden-sharing divide between principal force contributing nations. Namely, this third factor concerns the way in which many of the largest, wealthiest and most militarily-capable caveat-imposing TCNs to the mission, referred to above, have in fact been principal NATO allies and the mission’s own designated Lead Nations, vested with lead command responsibility within the Afghan security and stabilisation mission. In short, the following appendix will examine further the caveat record of the heaviest caveat-imposing Lead Nations within this small but influential group within the mission – namely, Italy, France, Turkey and Germany.
APPENDIX 12

Burden-Sharing Analysis:

The Third Contributing Factor – Caveat Imposition among the ISAF Mission’s ‘Lead Nations’

In the previous appendix two factors within the caveat data which have exacerbated the ISAF mission’s struggles with caveat imposition and inequitable burden-sharing within the mission were analysed. These concerned: (1) the continually high numbers of TCNs imposing restrictions on the operations of their forces; and (2) the quizzical disproportionality in military size and capabilities between many of the ISAF caveat-imposing and caveat-free TCNs. This appendix will examine a third factor which has contributed to the severity of the operation’s burden-sharing problem: (3) the unhappy fact that several of the large, capable NATO nations operating under caveat restrictions within the mission have in fact been the mission’s own appointed ‘Lead Nations’, with lead security responsibility for one or more of the Regional Commands around Afghanistan (see Figure A12.1).

Figure A12.1 – Lead Nations: The eight Lead Nations within the 5 Regional Commands (prior to the creation of RC-Southwest in June 2010).

Indeed, a significant proportion of these eight NATO Lead Nations – expected to show leadership of command in their respective Regional Commands over the other NATO and Partner TCNs within each respective sector – have not been free from the complication of national caveats. Four Lead
Nations, in particular, have persistently resisted calls to eliminate their caveats from their ISAF contingents: Italy, France, Turkey and Germany. These nations have thereby become simultaneously not only four of the heaviest TCN caveat-imposers within the mission, but also four of the most culpable nations in propagating the burden-sharing divide within the ISAF coalition.

The following analysis aims, firstly, to provide further detail with regard to the caveat record of these four Lead Nations, in order to demonstrate the extent to which national caveats on these Lead Nations have helped to propagate unfair and disproportionate burden-sharing within the mission. Secondly, it will show that this influential group of Lead Nations within the ISAF, along with their forces and the sectors over which they have held lead security command, have become as divided by national caveats as the wider ISAF coalition itself.

For a table charting the record of caveat imposition and removal within solely this group of Lead Nations between August 2003-December 2012, refer back to APPENDIX 10(a), ‘Table Displaying the Caveat-free or Caveat-fettered Forces of the 8 ISAF Lead Nations, January 2007 – December 2010’. A list of all of the national caveats that have been imposed on ISAF force contingents by each of these respective Lead Nations, compiled in the course of this research, can also be found within Volume II at APPENDIX 10(b), ‘List of Known National Caveats Imposed by Lead Nations of ISAF Regional Commands on National Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012’.

**ISAF Lead Nations & the Caveat Rift**

As previously explained in Chapter 6, when NATO took command of the ISAF mission in August 2003, it also undertook to expand the operation geographically across Afghanistan. NATO nations volunteered and were appointed as Lead Nations with lead security command for one or more of the five Regional Command sectors. However, two years later, it had become clear that only two of these designated Lead Nations – the United Kingdom in RC-South and the United States in RC-East – were contributing forces to the mission free from national caveat restraints and thereby permitted to participate in robust operations. By contrast, the remaining six Lead Nations (representing a large 75 percent of this ‘leadership group’) were caveat-imposing TCNs, as depicted in Table A12.2.

During these early years several of these Lead Nations – notably, France, Turkey, Germany, and Canada – had gained a reputation not only for having caveat-restrained forces, but furthermore for having imposed some of the heaviest and most strict and severe caveats within the mission. This was a situation which did not bode well for caveat-imposition amongst the other TCNs contributing forces to the mission, as Chapters 8-13 have shown. To be sure, the alarming fact of a majority of Lead
Nations imposing caveat restrictions seems to have actually encouraged other TCNs to do likewise, meaning that the caveat problem within the ISAF was being generated and promoted by the very nations invested with leadership responsibility within the NATO-led mission.

At last in January 2006, Canada eliminated all of its caveats prior to the deployment of its Canadian contingent to RC-South. The Netherlands – with national forces likewise deployed to the southern sector – followed suit nine months later at the NATO Riga Summit of November 2006. However, the remaining four caveat-imposing Lead Nations, despite reaffirming rhetorically the importance of the Afghanistan mission and their commitment to its success at the Riga ‘caveat summit’, refused to respond to NATO, ISAF and allied requests to eliminate national caveats from their large ISAF contingents. Consequently, although one of the aims of the Riga Summit had been to address the ‘sharp disparity’ within NATO between European NATO allies that ‘sought to minimise their casualties and concentrate on reconstruction’, and allies like Britain, Canada and the United States who collectively ‘are committed to defeating the Taliban’, this burden-sharing disparity had not been resolved at all.

In having continued to resist pressure from many quarters over a period of more than three years from 2003-2006, to reduce or eliminate their force restrictions in the best interests of the mission – specifically its effective prosecution and completion, these nations had shown that national interests were of more import than the interests of the security mission in Afghanistan, or indeed of the NATO organisation leading the mission. Indeed, France, Italy, Turkey and Germany all departed from Riga seemingly determined to exercise their sovereign right of national prohibitions on national forces, thereby ‘effectively restricting their Forces from certain aspects of operations’. These nations subsequently earned the unenviable reputation of being the four ‘worst offenders’ within the ISAF on the matter of national caveat imposition.
Divided Leadership & a Divided Mission

As a result, in December 2006 when Phase III – Geographic Expansion had drawn to an end with the forces of these Lead Nations fully deployed and operational within their respective sectors, only four NATO Lead Nations – the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands in RC-South and the United States in RC-East – were not imposing caveats on their forces. This meant that from the beginning of the Stabilisation phase, four of the mission’s Lead Nations – France, Turkey, Germany and Italy – continued to fetter their national forces with politically-based operational restraints, thereby severely compromising NATO leadership within the Regional Commands (see Table A12.3).

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<th>SECTOR</th>
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<th>RC-WEST</th>
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Table A12.3 – Caveats & the ISAF Lead Nations: The caveat-free and caveat-imposing status of the ISAF’s Lead Nations within each of the five Regional Commands, November 2006 – April 2009.

In short, only half of the Lead Nation forces operating within the mission had deployed forces that were flexible and caveat-free – and therefore capable of robustly leading security operations within the Regional Commands, while the remaining 50 percent of this ‘leadership group’ had deployed forces that, due to caveat constraints, simply were not capable of properly conducting this role (see Graph A12.4 and A12.5).
This significant political divide between the mission’s leading nations on the caveat issue was reflected on-the-ground within the Afghan operation too. That is, the operation was geographically divided with caveat-free Lead Nation forces in RC-South and RC-East, while large numbers of Lead Nation forces remained heavily caveated within RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-West.

Moreover, strict regional caveats kept the Lead Nation forces in the North, West and Capital province exactly where they were – forbidden from being deployed to aid the other Lead Nations in the southern or eastern regions of Afghanistan, where kinetic, high-tempo combat operations against insurgent forces were frequently required. Prior to Riga, this caveat held fast even in cases when allied forces in RC-South or RC-East found themselves in emergency security situations and required urgent reinforcement or assistance (and adherence to the in extremis agreement following Riga has not been certain). The negative security effects of this refusal on the part of half of the mission’s NATO Lead Nations to deploy southwards or eastwards, operationally and in terms of the impact of this stalemate on both ISAF under-resourcing and the longevity of the Dutch and Canadian deployment in RC-South, have already been discussed in greater detail in Chapters 12 and 13 of Volume I.
In the years that followed, France, Italy, Germany and Turkey all remained hardened to a series of caveat calls – appeals for the elimination of national caveats in the mission which had begun in 2002, and had continued year-by-year as the mission progressed. NATO officials and the representatives of the caveat-free Lead Nations (the U.S., U.K., Canada and the Netherlands) desired, at a minimum, that the four remaining caveat-imposing Lead Nations: (1) lift their combat caveats from their combat forces deployed to the mission; and (2) remove their geographical and regional caveats to allow the COMISAF freedom to deploy forces from their large Lead Nation contingents beyond the boundaries of their own sectors, to operate nationwide around the country. However, Italy, France, Turkey and German remained immovable on their caveat positions.

Indeed, unlike many of their Eastern European neighbours, it seems that these larger and wealthier NATO allies, with key leadership responsibilities within the mission, were determined to ignore Afghanistan’s worsening insurgent realities. All four Lead Nations remained fixated on the ‘postwar reconstruction’ stabilisation aspect of the original ISAF mission of 2001, at the expense of the security elements of the mandate which had become more and more urgent with the passing years. In fact none of these caveated Lead Nations would alter their official stance on the issue for another two-and-a-half years until 2009. This signifies that the four Lead Nations were stubbornly impervious to their allies’ urgent and increasingly desperate calls for caveat elimination – even by the leaders of NATO and the ISAF, the NATO SACEUR and the COMISAF – for a period of seven-and-a-half
years from early 2002 – mid-2009. Nevertheless, in 2008 some small headway was made on the issue by both Italy and France.

Caveat-Imposing, Lead Nation Italy

In June 2008 newly-elected Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi of the center-right *The People of Freedom* party, promised the United States that it would work to eliminate the geographic Italian caveats that had been imposed on its 2,350-strong ISAF force by the succeeding government under Romani Prodi’s center-left *Democratic Party* (May 2006-May 2008). As U.S. Embassy officials explained to their State Department counterparts in Washington D.C., the new Italian government wished ‘to regain its position as our best ally in continental Europe’ (see endnote).

Caveat-Free Carabinieri

As evidence of this new commitment, Berlusconi promised to deploy to the ISAF 60 personnel of the Carabinieri Police to the ISAF (formerly involved in training the Iraqi National Police under NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq), to be embedded with U.S. Marines, where they would work with the Marines as POMLTs of Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) units. Italy’s geographical caveats forbidding Italian forces from being deployed to RC-South would be lifted from these Carabinieri forces, in order to enable them to function effectively with the caveat-free U.S. Marines. As a direct result of this Italian caveat ‘exception’, 26 of the caveat-free Carabinieri personnel were subsequently ‘diverted from police training’ to engaging in combat operations with the Taliban. U.S. CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus, would later dubb the Carabinieri ‘the Michael Jordan of police trainers’ in order to encourage an increase in numbers for this unit.

However, in terms of Italy’s other combat forces in Afghanistan, the Italian government did not lift any of Italy’s operational caveat restraints on these forces that year, and also consistently declined to significantly boost its national contingent’s numbers. Instead, although Carabinieri numbers were increased from 60 to 100, the additional 40 personnel were specifically assigned to work only with the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan in Kabul (RC-Capital). As one American Embassy official would remark in February 2009: ‘Sending the Carabinieri has by now become a convenient and cheap way to respond to the international community’s call for more resources, while diverting attention from the fact that Italy is unwilling to make major new troop commitments’ (see endnote).

In 2008-2009 the Italian government repeatedly expressed the wish to ‘forge a strong relationship’ and ‘more closely calibrate GOI [Government of Italy] policies and actions’ with the new U.S. Obama
Administration.  

It also showed a strong desire ‘for regaining a lead role on Afghanistan’ within the international community, for instance, by vying against France to host donor and support conferences for Afghanistan in 2008 and unveiling plans for an Afghanistan-Pakistan conference within the G8 during its 2009 Presidency. However, the reality was that despite these public political measures, Italy had by this time both severely under-resourced and handicapped with caveats its 2,350-strong national contingent within the Afghan mission – the most important security enterprise to American national interests and to world security. Not only allied commanders, but even Italian military commanders themselves chaffed under Italy’s politically-based constraints. As one U.S. official reported in 2009: ‘Italian commanders tell us they would do more if the GOI provided the resources and the political support needed for robust operations.’ Indeed, the American assessment of Italy’s commitment to the Afghan mission was then as follows: ‘They do not have sufficient troops in their command sector (RC-West) to control the territory and therefore confine their troops to limited operations so as not to endanger them’.

**Italy Makes Excuses**

Despite having ‘one of NATO’s strongest militaries’ within the alliance, Italy had continuously explained this negative trend in its commitment to the ISAF mission, as owing to its military being ‘stretched to the limit’ combined with ‘tight budgetary constraints’. However, in truth, these were duplicitous and misleading explanations, and a convenient means by which Italy has evaded its responsibilities in the ISAF.

For instance, Italian military commanders claimed in March 2009 that while only three infantry companies had been deployed to Afghanistan (reportedly comprising fewer soldiers in number than the number of police needed to ensure security at an Italian Roma-Lazio soccer game), 13 companies of Italian infantry had been dispatched to Kosovo, where they were kept ‘doing little more than guard duty’. An additional 3,000 army personnel were kept on ‘police duty in Italian cities’, moreover, as part of Berlusconi’s campaign pledge to crack down on crime in Italy. Indeed, the Italian Chief of Defence reportedly told General Petraeus in 2009 that if Italy deployed equally low force commitments to the security mission in Lebanon, with the same ‘troop-to-territory’ ratio as then existed in RC-West in Afghanistan, ‘Italy would have 22 troops in UNIFIL, not 2,200’.

As for the budgetary constraints, the Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Rome illuminated the realities of this excuse, stating:

GOI officials routinely cite Italy's "tight budget situation" when responding to Embassy demarches requesting Italian contributions for Afghanistan...The “tight budget” excuse for not doing more in Afghanistan should be seen as disingenuous, circular logic. In its budget process, year after year the GOI decides to spend relatively little on defense [calculated to be approximately 0.96 per cent of GDP]. Then, when asked by us to do more in Afghanistan, the
GOI points to now sacrosanct budget numbers and claims to be unable to do more. In response, USG interlocutors should remind the Italians that expanded operations in Afghanistan will require real sacrifices from all involved, and this may require Italy to shift budget resources from other areas.  

Indeed, the real motivation behind Italy’s caveat imposition in Afghanistan, together with keeping its contingent under-strength in RC-West, seems to have been – quite simply – a fear of casualties. For while, on the one hand, Berlusconi’s government had not been confronted with the level of domestic opposition to the Afghan war as that seen in other NATO Lead Nation countries (for example, in Canada, the Netherlands, France and Germany), it had nevertheless been, as U.S. officials quipped, ‘as reluctant to put troops in harm’s way as was the notoriously weak-kneed center-left Prodi coalition’.  

In fact, according to the Italian Army Chief of Staff, the Italian government ‘has made clear that the [Italian] military should take as few risks as possible’ in Afghanistan.

All of this points to the indisputable and ugly truth that Italy, while wanting to regain the image of a good force contributor in the ISAF and a world leader on Afghanistan on the one hand, has had no intention of actually being one, by delivering properly and fully on its commitments to the NATO-led mission (see endnote). As the American staff at the Rome Embassy likewise concluded:

> Italy can and should do more in Afghanistan...Italy suffers from a credibility gap among ISAF partners...They do not have sufficient troops in their command sector (RC-West) to control the territory and therefore confine their troops to limited operations so as not to endanger them. The Government of PM Berlusconi is vocal in its support for ISAF but fearful of casualties...The USG should press the GOI to make the same tough choices their ISAF partners have made and commit enough troops and resources to do the job.

**Caveat-Imposing, Lead Nation France**

France, too, altered its position somewhat on caveat-free force contributions during 2008. One year earlier in May 2007 American Embassy officials in Paris had reported that there existed a ‘widespread impression’ within the French government, reportedly shared even by President Chirac, that ‘Afghanistan may be a losing cause’. Opposition leader, Nicholas Sarkozy, likewise claimed that the French role in Afghanistan ‘was no longer decisive’ and that consequently French forces ‘would not stay there permanently’.

As a result of this pessimistic view, France had held fast to its caveat-imposer status within the ISAF and continued to focus its efforts on force-protection rather than combat in Afghanistan, seemingly in an effort to avoid casualties before the so-called inevitable withdrawal. This held true even for French forces participating in the parallel OEF mission. In fact when France’s one SOF unit in the south, a
small force that had been operating with OEF since 2003 along the Afghan-Pakistan border near the town of Spin Boldak in RC-South, sustained heavy casualties in the course of its operations in early 2007, the French government had actually withdrawn the French contingent completely, thereby increasing the security burden of its Lead Nation allies in RC-South.  

U.S. officials pointed out that France had taken a paradoxically different approach to the ISAF and OEF Afghan missions than toward NATO’s other missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the French government reportedly emphasized a collective, unified, ‘in together and out together’ approach by NATO nations.  This collectiveness ‘also applies to national caveats on the use of forces’, the officials stated.  

**Slight Force Adjustments – But Caveats Remain**  
The Dutch ultimatum delivered to NATO nations at the end of 2007, at the NATO Noordwijk meeting in Holland, however, seemed to bring about a slight adjustment in force commitments within the newly-elected Sarkozy government.  

As outlined in Chapter 13, of the three Lead Nations operating in the south, it was the Netherlands the seemed the most incensed at the lack of movement by its NATO allies on the caveat issue. Having itself eliminated its caveats adopted a more robust stance on the Afghan battlefield in response to earlier NATO calls at the 2006 Riga Summit – and despite public opposition towards greater involvement – the Dutch government was adamant that other NATO nations must do more.  

Reprimanding Alliance nations only contributing armed forces to ‘safe zones’ in the more peaceful north and west of Afghanistan, among them Germany, France, Italy and Spain, Van Middelkoop argued that ‘fair risk and burden sharing has to be a leading principle for NATO’ and threatened that unless NATO members stepped up their help to the Dutch working in the Afghan south, the Netherlands would be compelled to bring its commitment there to an end by August 2008 the following year.  

In response to a specific request by the Dutch government that France send forces to work with Dutch forces in Uruzgan Province in RC-South (equating to NATO assistance that would enable the Dutch government to secure parliamentary approval for keeping its forces in Afghanistan beyond August 2008), President Sarkozy agreed to deploy one French OMLT training team to Uruzgan in RC-South and to transfer six of its Mirage fighter jets from Dushanbe in Tajikistan to Kandahar Air Field to conduct ‘intelligence and close air support missions’, including in support of Canadian ground forces.  This was despite and against the council of Sarkozy’s ‘cautious advisors’ and, as one official commented, a French ‘bureaucracy that prefers slow adaption to bold moves’.  In addition, during a
State visit to Washington D.C., President Sarkozy subsequently announced in a speech to the U.S. Congress that: ‘France will remain engaged in Afghanistan as long as it takes, because what’s at stake in that country is the future of our values and that of the Atlantic Alliance’.39

However, despite this slight alteration in force commitments to the mission, both the OMLT and the French air personnel remained constrained in their activities by restrictive French ROE. Moreover, France did not in fact alter its position on the wider ISAF caveat issue, and continued to remain a caveat-imposing Lead Nation within the mission along with Italy, Germany and Turkey – all of which were imposing a range of geographical, operational, combat, tactical, time and weather-related restrictions on their security forces, in spite of the growing insurgency and the increasing instability within Afghanistan. Indeed, of this group of four Lead Nations, France and Germany were both singled out by the COMISAF in March 2008 as the heaviest and most severe imposers of national caveats on its forces deployed to the ISAF mission.40

This meant that the bulk of approximately 1,515 French forces in Afghanistan were still being kept out of combat and out of harm’s way in the northern sector of RC-Capital – also importantly, the location of the Afghan Parliament in addition to the ISAF’s own Command Headquarters – where it held lead security command on the basis of rotation with fellow caveat-imposing Lead Nations Italy and Turkey (see Table A12 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LN ROTATIONS &amp; TOTAL FORCE NUMBERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC-CAPITAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN07  JULY07  FEB08  JUNE08  FEB09  JUNE09  FEB10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA (+RC-W) ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUR ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC-SOUTH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN07  JULY07  FEB08  JUNE08  FEB09  JUNE09  FEB10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETH ↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK ↓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A12.7 – Lead Nation Rotations (RC-Capital & RC-South): Rotational chart showing the rotation of lead command and security responsibility between the six Lead Nations in RC-Capital & RC-South between early 2007-2010, in addition to total ISAF force numbers for each of these respective Lead Nations41.
France makes a Caveat-Free ‘Exception’

Possibly as a result of this criticism together with a wish to improve its now poor standing within NATO and the mission, especially following a July 2008 report by the European Union that called for additional troops ‘unrestricted by national caveats’ in Afghanistan (see endnote), the French government subsequently made the significant decision to send 600 more combat forces to Afghanistan and to render them caveat-free.\(^{42}\) This was France’s first caveat exception in the history of its participation in the ISAF. It is likely that France’s view of itself as a principal player and even self-appointed leader within the EU may have factored heavily in this decision.

Consequently in July 2008 one caveat-free ‘joint-service battle group’ battalion was deployed to eastern Afghanistan for the first time, to assist U.S. forces in combating insurgents in Kapisa and Surobi Provinces in RC-East.\(^{43}\) As the spokesman for the French Chief of Staff, CAPT Christophe Prazuck, highlighted afterwards, French soldiers were now ‘involved in exchanges with insurgents every day’.\(^{44}\) Beyond this specific caveat-free ‘exception’, however, the French government, like fellow NATO ally Italy, was reluctant to eliminate caveat constraints from the rest of its security forces in RC-Capital or to commit additional resources to the mission, a position which remained static for the rest of 2008 and into 2009. The French government explained this stance in February 2009 stating that additional French forces could not be sent to the mission because:

1. Afghanistan deployments are unpopular domestically;
2. the operational tempo in the lead up to Afghan elections conflicts with French timing on NATO reintegration and other issues; and
3. questions are being raised about their added value, due to the recent large increase in U.S. troops.\(^{45}\)

ISAF Sea-Change: Italy and France Eliminate Caveats

Having ‘tested the waters’ with caveat-free ‘exceptional’ deployments in Afghanistan in 2008, both Italy and France did, however, subsequently and in quick succession eliminate all of their caveat restraints from their ISAF forces in Afghanistan. In May 2009 Italy made the grand gesture of eliminating all of the caveats that had for over seven years been constraining Italian security forces in the country, then standing at approximately 2,350 personnel (see endnote).\(^{46}\) France quickly followed suit the next month in June, eliminating all of the caveat restrictions imposed on the remaining 2,180 French personnel of its 2,780-strong ISAF contingent.\(^{47}\)

This was a significant and important sea-change in the record of caveat-imposition amongst the NATO mission’s Lead Nations. Journalists could well triumphantly declare, as they did in October 2009 that: ‘Over the last few months, several European nations that publicly emphasize their
peacekeeping role have shifted with little fanfare to more aggressive patrolling and have engaged in sharp firefight with insurgents.” Indeed, in addition to greater engagement with the Enemy, these formerly unyielding caveat-imposing Lead Nations had also, for the first time, allowed all of their police and army OMLTs to deploy outside of their originally-assigned national areas of responsibility.

According to one high-ranking Italian general, the Italian change in posture came as a result of having becoming better accustomed to the Afghan conflict zone, the purpose of the mission, their own capabilities, and the requirements and expectations of the Operational Commander (the COMISAF).

As he explained:

When the Italians deployed to Afghanistan, caveats were a protective device. The Italian military was not knowledgeable about what ISAF was going to ask them to do. So the political side protected our presence… But after a while you get to know the political and security landscape, so you can ease the caveats. With time, you adapt.

In the French case, the alteration of the government’s view on caveat imposition seems to have come about as a result of positive military and domestic political developments stemming from its caveat-free battalion operating under U.S. command in RC-East (see endnote for a detailed description of these positive developments within the French military).

Indeed, by mid-2009 France was even willing to transfer most of its troops from the safer RC-Capital sector to the more conflictive Kapisa and Surobi Provinces of RC-East, areas in which its non-caveated battalion had been operating since July 2008. In this way, France directly answered the Obama administrations April 2009 request for the Lead Nation not only to more fully staff its existing combat battalion in RC-East, but also to ‘provide additional maneuver battalions’ to the mission (refer to endnote).

As a result of these decisions, the caveat-imposing to caveat-free Lead Nation ratio altered in 2009 for the first time in three years. The majority of Lead Nation armed forces – six of the eight contingents – were now free from caveat restraints and enjoying full mobility and flexibility in their operations, including combat operations. Only two Lead Nations continued to keep their ISAF forces restrained in their operations by national exemptions – Turkey and Germany.

This change signified that one whole ISAF sector – RC-West – was now under the leadership of Lead Nation forces no longer fettered by political restraints. Indeed from December 2009, only two of the ISAF mission’s five sectors – RC-Capital when under the rotational leadership of Lead Nation Turkey (Italian forces in RC-Capital were from this point free from caveats and thereby combat-capable when Italy rotated to lead command position) and RC-North under the command of Lead Nation Germany – continued to hold this unhappy distinction with caveats crippling the combat capability of national forces (see Table A12.8). The division of Lead Nations had thereby altered too, with a majority of
Lead Nation armed forces in Afghanistan now enjoying full mobility and flexibility in their operations, including combat operations.

![Table A12.8 – Caveats & the ISAF Lead Nations: The caveat-free and caveat-imposing status of the ISAF’s Lead Nations within each of the five Regional Commands, May 2009 – December 2009.]

**Turkey & Germany: Continued Recalcitrance**

However, the record of caveat elimination among the ISAF Lead Nations stops here. Neither Turkey nor Germany ever eliminated fully their national caveat restraints from their ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan. Indeed, the forces of both countries continue to operate under caveats at the present time of writing in early 2014 (refer to *Graph A12.9*).

Furthermore, caveat elimination ceased to be the progressive trend among this group of Lead Nations, with several Lead Nations reverting to caveat-imposing status in subsequent years, namely the United Stated in January 2010 in regard to its Helmand Marines in RC-Southwest, the Netherlands in August 2010, and Canada as of July 2011 (depicted in *Graph A12.10*). As discussed previously, in the case of the Netherlands and Canada, this reimposition of national caveats on national forces deployed to the mission came as a result of government decisions to end their respective combat roles in the country, after many successive years of bearing a disproportionate share of the war-fighting burden within the mission. As a result of these decisions, high numbers of Lead Nation forces again became restrained in their activities within the mission in RC-South and the new Regional Command of RC-Southwest.

It is clear from this examination that among the eight Lead Nations within the ISAF, only Germany and Turkey have been caveat-imposing Lead Nations for the full duration of the ISAF mission – from the very genesis of the mission in fact in December 2001 to the end of this research period in December 2012 (and indeed, even further beyond into 2014). This has meant that, despite being principal members of a strong and capable military collective security organisation, these nations have...
contributed forces severely restrained in their security and reconstruction activities by these political fetters for over 12 years (during at least 9 of which, NATO has held command leadership and responsibility). As Lead Nations for sectors within Afghanistan, moreover, this unyielding caveat stance has had consequent effects on security and stability operations in RC-North, RC-Capital and even RC-East where Turkey has operated a PRT manned by caveat-fettered Turkish forces (effects discussed in more detail in Chapters 11-13 of Volume I).

In truth, these two principal NATO and ISAF nations have proved to be the most obstinate on the caveat issue among not only the Lead Nations, but also all the TCNs contributing forces to the ISAF. Year after year, at all of the NATO meetings during this period – the 2006 Riga Summit in Latvia, the 2007 Brussels and Noordwijk Defence Ministerial meetings, the 2008 Bucharest Summit in Romania and the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit (the latter celebrating the 60th anniversary of NATO solidarity) – Germany and Turkey have unwaveringly refused to eliminate their caveat constraints from their security forces deployed to Afghanistan. This continuous record of stubborn caveat-imposition by these two nations, representing a full quarter (25 percent) of the mission’s NATO leadership group of eight, is depicted in Graphs A12.11-14.

Graph A12.9 & A12.10 – Proportion of Caveat-Imposing NATO Lead Nations: The proportion of Lead Nations, and their corresponding forces, that were caveat-free between December 2009 – December 2012.
Caveat-Imposing, Lead Nation Turkey

Despite being a NATO nation, and a Lead Nation with security responsibilities, Turkey has made a limited and heavily-caveated contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan from the outset, with at least 17 known restrictions imposed on its Turkish contingent (refer to APPENDIX 10(b) in this volume).

Aversion to Security Operations

In particular, Turkey has been firmly opposed to engaging its forces in combat operations in Afghanistan. This rejection of war-fighting as a role for Turkey appeared as operational caveats forbidding not only participation in, but also the support of, combat operations within the ISAF mission. President Abdullah Gül explained his government’s position in 2009 by claiming that: ‘If we fight, we will lose the respect of all sides, including the Taliban’. 

This aversion to combat with the Taliban can also be seen in the way that Turkey initially refused to operate anywhere in Afghanistan apart from ‘the North’ – that is, RC-Capital (where Turkey holds Lead Nation status on the basis of rotation) and RC-North. This preference for the safe areas of the country was so strong in the early years of the ISAF mission that in 2005 Turkey declined the
invitation to take up leadership of the PRT in Badghis in RC-West, although it was willing to lead the Meymaneh PRT in RC-North (a position already taken by Norway). Only in mid-2006 did Turkey at last agree to lead a PRT for the first time, outside of the North, a PRT located in Wardak Province of RC-East immediately neighbouring RC-Capital. Turkey has also remained opposed to its forces engaging in active counter-narcotics operations within the mission, which target the Taliban’s prime source of funding in the country, consistently arguing that ‘ISAF should not be engaged in the counter-narcotics fight’ (refer to endnote).

In the same vein, and despite being classed by the United States as ‘a strong ally in the Global War on Terrorism’, Turkey banned any participation of its national ISAF contingent in the more overtly counter-terrorist OEF mission. Moreover, while allowing U.S. forces to use its Incirlik air base and to transport non-lethal goods for Afghanistan across Turkish territory (see endnote), the Turkish government has stopped short of allowing the transport of any ‘lethal’ goods, such as weaponry, for use in the mission. These restrictions have resulted in thousands of Turkish personnel being kept away from the hard fighting work of the missions in Afghanistan against anti-Government insurgents and terrorists – what is known as a ‘stand aside’ role. As one U.S. official wrote in September 2009:

> Turkey will not support any CT [Counter-Terrorist] operations in Afghanistan. They do not believe there is a NATO/ISAF mandate to engage in these operations, and they additionally have national caveats preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT operations.

As noted above, Turkey has remained firm in its caveat-imposing position over many successive years, and despite urgent pleas and appeals from NATO, the COMISAF and other allies – even as security deteriorated dangerously within the mission. Even following the specific request by the Obama administration to ‘remove operationally restrictive caveats to enhance operational effectiveness’ in the diplomatic round of April 2009, Turkey has remained a caveat-imposing TCN and Lead Nation within the mission. Indeed, in response Turkish Defence Minister, Vecdi Gönül, reportedly argued that ‘remaining caveats were a consensus government decision, and that it would be very difficult to remove them’.

**A Contribution of Value?**

Instead of a robust contribution to security operations within the mission, Turkey has consistently preferred to take a ‘soft-power’ approach within the ISAF campaign, focusing its efforts on the softer aspects of COIN, such as ANSF training, and opting to ‘make contributions on issues where other countries were unable to contribute’.
Nevertheless, even with regard to the training of ANSF forces, Turkish combat, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism caveats have had a negative effect. In terms of OMLTs, for instance, Turkish training teams were for many years not permitted to deploy alongside Afghan trainee units outside of RC-Capital boundaries. After COMISAF McChrystal argued emphatically that ‘Allied forces in Afghanistan need to loosen or remove operational caveats in order to be effective in partnering with Afghan forces’, Turkey did however respond to this call and relax its regional caveat on its OMLT teams in 2009. Unfortunately, despite this new freedom, the caveats prohibiting Turkish forces from engaging in offensive combat operations with the ANSF units remained in force and have continued to frustrate ISAF training efforts. Consequently, although Turkey has declared itself to be ‘committed to training Afghan military and police’, having trained 8,000 members of the ANSF (three Afghan companies) including 450 inside Turkey proper by December 2009, the quality of the training received by these forces and their subsequent capability – especially in terms of the full scale of combat operations – is unclear.

Instead of eliminating its contingent caveats, Turkey has also tried to remove the negative stigma of continued caveat-imposition within the mission by increasing its force contribution in Afghanistan. For instance, following the 2009 NATO summit and with Turkey due to assume leadership of RC-Capital, Turkey doubled the size of its ISAF contingent, deploying around 1,000 additional personnel to the mission, augmenting the contingent to 1,755 by February 2010. Yet these additional forces were deployed under the same caveat restrictions as their counterparts in theatre, with Turkish security forces prohibited from conducting combat operations, even as part of the ANSF training process. These additional force numbers have therefore not significantly extended the ISAF’s presence or capability in Afghanistan.

Likewise, in December 2009, after being urged by the United States to ‘dig deep’ and ‘show leadership’ in the mission, Turkey agreed to consider deploying an additional 500 Turkish personnel to the mission – ‘but not in a combat role’ (Turkey also agreed to consider leading a second Turkish PRT in Jawzjan in early 2010 (U.S. Embassy Ankara)). President Gül subsequently declared that Turkey ‘would continue to abstain from involvement in clashes in Afghanistan’, adding emphatically that ‘Turkey's activities in Afghanistan will increase, but we will decide on how to do it’. These on-going restrictions have seriously undermined the value of the Turkish ISAF contingent to the mission, limiting the ability of Turkish Lead Nation security forces to make a substantial contribution to the security mission, especially in recent years with ever-increasing insurgent attacks and violence. Consequently, as with Turkish contributions to ANSF training, given the inability of Turkish forces to assist with critical security and stability tasks outlined above, the value of these added personnel numbers is also uncertain and must be called into question.
Caveat-Imposing, Lead Nation Germany

Germany, finally, has been one of the most notorious and ill-reputed TCNs and NATO Lead Nations within the mission in regard to national caveat imposition. The nation is internationally regarded as not only the heaviest imposer of national caveats of all the TCNs contributing forces to the ISAF mission, but also the heaviest imposer of caveats among all of the mission’s Lead Nations. This track record is not limited to the ISAF mission either: over the past decade Germany has also attracted criticism for imposing restrictive caveat fetters on its forces deployed to KFOR, OEF and more recently to the UNMIS mission in the Sudan.74

Indeed, with no less than 74 known caveat restraints imposed on approximately 3,000-5,000 ISAF forces that have operated in Afghanistan over the past decade, German forces represent one of the most severely constrained contingents within the entire ISAF operational force.75 In spite of this reality, Germany does not use the word ‘caveat’ in any of its official government and ISAF discourse. Indeed, official German government documents are conspicuous for their avoidance of any use of this term, with German restrictions referred to instead as ‘national exceptions’.76 Nevertheless, NATO officials have described Germany’s secret communique, listing all of its limitations and prohibitions for German forces operating in the ISAF mission, as containing ‘far-reaching instructions and clarification notes’, with lengthy dissertations on the German view of ‘the use of force’ and ‘the principle of proportionality’.77

German prohibitions govern the activities of all the different types of security forces Germany has deployed to the mission, including combat forces, combat support forces, PRT forces, OMLT and POMLT training teams, and even Special Forces (refer to APPENDIX 10(b) within this volume). This is despite having been the designated Lead Nation with lead command and security responsibility in RC-North since 2004, a sector encompassing a huge swathe of territory spanning across nine different Afghan provinces (see Figure A12.15).

It is for this reason that Germany has been the target of an avalanche of criticism and derision over the past 10 years, to the point of being described as ‘the problem child’ of the Alliance and ‘a major weakness’ in NATO.78 Indeed, time and again the charge has been levelled against this Lead TCN that it has been failing miserably to ‘pull its weight’ and take up its fair share of the security and war-fighting burden in Afghanistan.
German Security Forces: Tangled in a Web of Constraints

Of all of the bans imposed on German forces, the prohibitions against leading, engaging in or supporting combat operations has been the most denounced. Indeed, in a rather non-sensical way Germany has for over a decade (2001-2011) continually opted to confine its combat soldiers to a strictly ‘non-combat’ role in its sector of RC-North, thereby rendering its combat forces ‘toothless’. The German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, has argued for this German position, articulating that ‘the reconstruction work carried out by 3,000 German troops in northern Afghanistan is just as important as fighting insurgents’. This ban against offensive, combat operations has applied even to its Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) Special Forces, giving rise to the notion that even Germany’s most elite combat forces are ‘not licensed to kill’, as discussed in Chapter 12.

In keeping with this stance, Germany has also persistently imposed geographical and regional bans, which keep German combat forces firmly entrenched in the Afghan north within RC-North boundary lines, far away from the combative southern or eastern regions of Afghanistan. These bans on its combat forces have remained intact despite many, fervent pleas from its southern allies for ‘more troops’ in RC-South to help conduct combat operations against the Taliban. Even its combined German-Afghan OMLT combat battalions and Special Forces units have been bound by this restriction and kept from reinforcing or rendering combat assistance to allies in the south or east. Indeed, until the in extremis agreement was made at Riga in November 2006 (and – it is rumoured –
even afterwards too), Germany even denied the COMISAF permission to redeploy German units to RC-South in cases of emergency.  

Moreover, on the very rare occasions during 2007-2009 that the German government has allowed exceptional ‘temporary’ deployments to RC-West or RC-South – approved on a ‘case-by-case’ basis and on the proviso that the deployment was deemed ‘absolutely indispensable to the success of the ISAF mission’ – these forces have remained constrained to a non-combat role and have comprised MEDEVAC helicopters and personnel, radio operations and electronic specialists dispatched only ‘to provide medical and intelligence support’ for other allies conducting combat operations against insurgents. As U.S. Embassy officials in Berlin stated in October 2008: ‘None of the German soldiers, however, were directly involved in combat operations’. Indeed, aside from the personnel described above, no combat or elite KSK forces have been sent to assist allies in the south, American officials stating that ‘the German government has been very reluctant to exercise this authority in regard to combat forces’ (see endnote). This caveat has never been eliminated and has consequently remained in force over many successive years, so that even as late as October 2009, approximately 4,400 German forces continued to be confined to RC-North, and banned from deploying south.

In addition to banning offensive combat operations and the deployment of combat forces out of RC-North to the south or east of the country, Germany has also taken a puzzling and somewhat strange stance with regard to the use of force within the mission. Between 2001-2009, the German government maintained that lethal force could not be lawfully utilised by any of its forces in Afghanistan in any offensive capacity, even against known Taliban insurgents or Al-Qaeda operatives, but only and strictly for force protection – that is, ‘self-defence’. To be precise, German instructions on the matter, given to all its forces deployed to Afghanistan, are that ‘the use of lethal force is prohibited unless an attack is taking place or is imminent’ (refer to endnote). In fact, this emphasis on self-defence is so pervasive that Bundeswehr soldiers that have fired their weapons in self-defence are not even permitted in their engagement reports to use the word ‘attack’ but must instead describe their actions as the ‘use of appropriate force’.

This caveat has been imposed in spite of – and in contradiction to – a wealth of German government documentation, which declares that: (1) the German ISAF deployment is in Afghanistan specifically to protect the country from international Islamist terrorism of the kind exported from the country under the pre-existing Taliban regime, and (2) describe the terrorism-employing insurgents fighting against ISAF and ANSF personnel as ‘forces bent on imposing permanent bondage under the guise of religious observance’, which ‘seek to intimidate the population and restrict the government’s capacity to act’ (see endnote). Indeed, according to the German Foreign Office:
Afghanistan must not revert to its former role as a refuge for international terrorists. This is why Germany and the international community are helping Afghanistan to become a stable country whose people can live in safety and determine their own future. In addition, this German ban prohibiting offensive operations against insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan has been taken in spite of the reality that the German nation has itself been threatened by the prospect of Islamist terror attacks at the hands of Al-Qaeda operatives. Four of the 9/11 hijackers – Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah – had prior to the attacks been students living in Hamburg, where they had formed a ‘close-knit’ terrorist cell. A planned Al-Qaeda attack on a German Christmas market was also successfully foiled in the early 2000s. In 2005, two more terror plots intended to take place within the German homeland were either thwarted or failed. Even more recently, in September 2010, Al-Qaeda planned to execute a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack within Germany, using jihadist ‘commandos’. The plot was intercepted and foiled by the United States, which executed drone attacks on the militants in question in Pakistan. In November 2010, furthermore, the German government issued a high alert, dispatching hundreds of police officers into railway stations, airports and other public places throughout Germany, in response to specific intelligence tip-offs and terror threats issued from Islamist extremists. The same year two ‘mail bombs’ sent to the United States from Yemen were found to have transited through German airports. Indeed, even Germany’s own intelligence agents have gathered ‘concrete intelligence’ that have pointed to “sustained efforts” by Islamic extremist groups to plan attacks in Germany. In sum, Germany is and remains a target of Al-Qaeda-sponsored terror, a fact that ought to have heightened the stakes of Germany’s involvement in the Afghan theatre of war and underscore the importance to Germany of mission success there.

In short, Germany has demonstrated a strong aversion to performing the ‘sharp’ or ‘hard’ work of the COIN strategy – that is, taking the fight to the Taliban and other anti-Government insurgent forces in accordance with the security line of operation (required to protect the population and in order to establish security so that stabilisation activities across the other lines of operations can proceed). The German government has also prohibited its ISAF forces from ever participating in the parallel OEF mission, and even from sharing insurgent-related intelligence (gleaned from its six Tornado reconnaissance aircraft from 2007 on) with numerous ISAF TCNs that are permitted to participate with OEF forces and to conduct offensive combat operations.
This aversion to offensive operations has been so strong, in fact, that the country strongly opposed the proposed merging of the OEF and ISAF missions (a proposition made to tidy up the mess caused by the existence of two complex command structures and overlapping tasks between the two missions, that were occurring within the same country at the same time). The German government protested that ‘merging the two missions might push for a more offensive focus and draw their forces into ground combat operations not then being undertaken’.\textsuperscript{101} In explanation of this stance, Germany has claimed that its forces are trained only for stabilisation, and consequently that it does ‘not have forces available for the counter-insurgency and counter-terror tasks’.\textsuperscript{102} The consequences of an ISAF Lead Nation for security taking such a counter-productive position on combat within its sector have been dire. As Corum states:

NATO officers in Afghanistan complain that the German army will not actively patrol and tends to hole up in their heavily fortified camps. In short, they will not do the kind of active counterinsurgency operations among the population that the operation requires. This is not because the Bundeswehr is an incompetent force, but because the German commanders sent to Afghanistan are under strict orders to avoid casualties.\textsuperscript{103}

Furthermore, in addition to its restrictions on offensive, combat operations, southern deployments, and the use of lethal force, Germany has been equally condemned by its caveat-free allies and Lead Nation counterparts for the scores of other caveat restrictions placed on its forces operating in the country. For instance, some of these other caveats have included prohibitions against: foot patrols in cities; leaving military compounds or conducting ground or air operations at night or any time ‘under the cover or darkness’ (a ban that extends to MEDEVAC helicopters and personnel); travel by its forces more than two hours away from emergency surgery facilities; conducting counter-narcotics interdiction activities; the deployment of OMLT teams beyond RC-North boundaries with their corresponding trainee units; and even the deployment of its police training teams to ‘conflict areas’ in the north (in fact the latter are confined to their bases for the duration of their deployment).\textsuperscript{104} The German force contingent has also been banned by the German Parliament – the Bundestag – from exceeding its troop-ceiling limit, even temporarily duration force rotations when units are deploying in or redeploying out of the German zone of activity in RC-North.\textsuperscript{105}

For these caveats – and many others besides – Germany has become ‘the poster child of caveats’ in the mission.\textsuperscript{106} Indeed, these caveats have led to a rash of security incidents and crises in RC-North over the past decade – especially during the year 2008 (Germany’s ‘annus horribilis’) – some of which have put Germany’s caveats and its record of heavy caveat imposition firmly under the spotlight of international media and the criticism and censure of the Western world. As one political commentator from the Atlantic Council concluded in September 2009: ‘Germany is ISAF’s weakest link’.\textsuperscript{107}
This criticism of Germany’s Afghan contribution has been even more severe given the way in which Germany has simultaneously been viewed as failing to provide appropriate force levels to the mission overall. Even at its peak of 4,920 personnel in February 2011, Germany has deployed to the ISAF mission half the number of forces deployed to the mission by Britain, despite being one of the wealthiest countries in NATO and the ISAF, with the fourth largest economy in the world and a population of 81 million (compared to 63 million in the United Kingdom, 34.5 million in Canada, and 16.8 million in the Netherlands). Corum underscores this disproportionality in an article published in January 2010, and entitled ‘Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan’, stating:

Germany rejected the recent call for reinforcements to Afghanistan, the Poles are increasing their force to over 3,000 men. Poland, with half of Germany’s population, will soon have troop strength equal to Germany’s. The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have a combined population of about 10 per cent of Germany’s. But in late 2009 these three countries had a military and civilian deployment to Afghanistan of over 700 military and civilian personnel – a much larger commitment in terms of their populations and economies than Germany’s.

German Explanations Fall Short

Various German officials have attempted to explain away these multiple and long-standing ROE ‘exemptions’ for German forces operating within the ISAF mission.

The first explanation relates to the German legacy of the Second World War, namely that it is ‘haunted by history’. As one Bavarian Government Minister, Edmund Stoiber, argued to the American Ambassador in 2009: ‘German engagement in and responsibility for two world wars had “left marks of deep trauma on the German people”’ (see endnote). As a result German society is largely pacifist and rejects military power ‘for anything except self-defense’ and humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, a military general from Italy – another belligerent country of World War II which, like Germany, has become engaged in the heaviest fighting for the first time in six decades in Afghanistan – has refuted this explanation. ‘Germany and Italy are not different from each other’, he asserted. ‘Both countries were in World War II. There is no real difference’.

Other German officials have, secondly, pointed to the German constitution as the source of the caveats, which strictly prescribes how German forces may be used on ‘out-of-area’ deployments abroad. However, Germany was able to relatively easily and quickly remove its combat, regional and geographical caveats from its SOF forces after being compelled to take command of the sector’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in 2008 – without any changes to the German constitution. Furthermore, the German government also was able to remove combat and lethal force caveats from its entire ISAF contingent during 2009, when attacks by insurgents in RC-North became endemic (in part due to the lack of a robust German presence in the sector, despite being Lead Nation for security). These examples (discussed further below) clearly indicate that it is a lack of political will and
commitment towards the mission within German political circles – rather than the constitution per se – that is most at fault for such a heavy record of caveat imposition for the duration of the mission.

**A ‘Peace-Keeping’ Mission?**

A third explanation relates to the way in which Germany has consistently chosen to view the ISAF mission more as a reconstruction and stability mission, than an ‘active combat mission’ as NATO SACEUR Rasmussen recently described the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Indeed, on the whole, the German government has for the majority of the mission behaved as if it was participating in a traditional peace-keeping or reconstruction assistance mission, rather than a security and stability mission in which reconstruction plays a significant constituent part. In evidence of this, a government document from 2012 reveals that from the very outset the ISAF Afghan operation has been seen by Germany to be similar in nature to the earlier ‘peace-keeping and security operations’ conducted in the Balkans, specifically the UN and NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in which German forces took part. From this perspective German forces have been in Afghanistan to ‘keep the peace’ and to ‘ensure the rebuilding of the country’s armed forces’.

Likewise, the German Ministry of Defence has stated that Germany’s function as Lead Nation in RC-North is primarily ‘to coordinate reconstruction in all of the Afghan north’. In fact German government documentation between 2001-2009 is circumspect for its avoidance of the term ‘war’ or even ‘counter-insurgency’ in relation to the mission in Afghanistan (see endnote for more information on Germany’s view of the ISAF mission). In more recent years too, between 2009-2012, the German Minister of Defence – and many other German leaders – reportedly ‘still refuses to use the word “war” to describe Germany’s actions in Afghanistan’. In 2010, the ISAF operation continued to be viewed by the German government ‘above all as a peaceful stabilization operation’, or as ‘crisis prevention under difficult circumstances’ as applied by the government to Germany’s PRTs, rather than a fully-fledged COIN operation (refer to endnote for a specific example of this outlook).

In keeping with this perspective, the German government seems to have also consistently held the view that ISAF forces are not deployed to Afghanistan to hold back insurgents or foreign terrorists from destabilising or taking back control of the country (even though this is one of the stated aims of the mission). To the contrary, in its own government documentation Germany has overwhelmingly interpreted its security responsibilities within the ISAF mission, as defensive force protection for German PRT and NGO civilian reconstruction personnel in RC-North, achieved by its presence and its patrols within the German PRTs. This is because, from the German point of view, the protection of ‘civilian helpers’ in Afghanistan is the main task of its combat forces. As U.S. officials have
argued, up until Germany’s command of the QRF in 2008, the German Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan ‘have been focused almost solely on stabilization and force protection missions’.\textsuperscript{123}

Indeed, four main priorities are consistently emphasized for German forces in government documentation: (1) the protection of PRT personnel and R&D staff; (2) the training of ANSF personnel; (3) participation in R&D projects at German PRTs and ‘PATs’ (Provincial Advisory Teams – a German creation in RC-North); and most recently (4) the training of Afghan police units.\textsuperscript{124}

As the German Foreign Office has stated:

\begin{quote}
The [German] military operation [in Afghanistan] serves to foster the reconstruction process. The troops are stabilizing the situation and protecting civilian aid workers. We shall, of course, continue our constant review of the situation to ensure that we have the right mix of civil projects and the essential military cover.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

From this overview it may be seen that the inundation of national caveats on German forces deployed to the ISAF have been German government’s means of keeping German forces strictly tied into this R&D and ANSF training role. Preservation of this role for German force within the ISAF has been sacrosanct, and doggedly maintained regardless of heated – even bitter – international criticism by NATO allies.

However, it is important to note that even within this severely limited role that the German government has unilaterally prescribed for itself within the ISAF mission (and despite being a Lead Nation for security in RC-North) both German PRT personnel conducting R&D operations and its OMLT and POMLT units training the ANSF have also been hindered in their activities by caveat restrictions, as also shown in APPENDIX 6, 7, 8(b) and 10(b). Consequently, this ‘peace-keeping ISAF’ explanation also falls short to adequately explain Germany’s obstinacy in maintaining strict operational restrictions on its forces in Afghanistan.

**Germany: Not a ‘Real’ NATO Ally**

These combined factors have led many to conclude that Germany is not a ‘real’ ally within NATO, but rather a weak and unreliable partner in military operations with a poor commitment to the success of the ISAF mission and to the NATO alliance itself.\textsuperscript{126} As Corum has emphasized: ‘German troops are stationed in Afghanistan as a symbolic act of NATO solidarity than as a true military ally’.\textsuperscript{127}

To abate some of this criticism, Germany has from time to time increased the size of its ISAF force contingent in RC-North. In 2009, for instance, after a year of negative reports on German forces in Afghanistan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed to deploy an additional 1,000 German soldiers to the ISAF campaign raising the overall German contribution to 4,500 personnel.\textsuperscript{128}
However, as NATO SACEUR General Craddock pointed out in 2008, additional German forces have not added much materially to the fight in Afghanistan since, like many of their other caveat-imposing counterparts in the country, they have been deployed to the Afghan theatre under Germany’s special caveat which requires that they remain in RC-North for the duration of their deployment. In brief, what the ISAF mission has really needed from Germany, is not more caveated forces, but rather the elimination of its caveats which would then free up its approximately 4,000 personnel already stationed in the county to conduct robust, kinetic security operations against Enemy insurgent forces in Afghanistan (and also enable them to deploy in support of allies during emergency security situations in the Afghan south and east).

Following the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit of 2009 and the findings of the Obama strategic review, moreover, Germany also agreed to focus its 4,500 personnel on capability-building of the ANSF, by dramatically boosting the number of its OMLT teams from seven to twelve by early 2010, in order to train and partner with the ANA and ANP. However, Germany’s combat caveats remained in force to frustrate the partnering process, stopping German OMLTs from deploying to fight insurgents outside RC-North with their Afghan kandaks, and even reportedly restricting certain missions with Afghan battalions within RC-North itself. Germany has, nevertheless, been willing simultaneously to invest 50 million Euros to finance the education of ANA officers to lead the ANA Engineering School and ANA Combat Support School (a project that would include the training of Afghan officers in Germany itself). This seems to indicate that even in recent years, and despite being a Lead Nation for security, Germany has been more willing to fund combat – to be conducted by others – than to perform these operations themselves. Or in other words, to expend cash rather than blood.

This is not to say, however, that Germany has not from time to time agreed to relax or remove some of its caveats from specific force units over the last decade. Besides the ‘temporary’ and ‘exceptional’ deployment of small numbers of non-combat forces to the south (requiring the removal of its regional ‘RC-North only’ and geographical anti-south restrictions), Germany did lift its combat and regional caveats from its QRF entity in RC-North from July 2008 onwards (see endnote). This was a significant event in the record of Germany’s caveat imposition and its ISAF contributions since, as U.S. officials then stated, it was ‘the first time Germany has had a force (consisting of about 200 troops) that can be quickly deployed around the country on short notice and that is authorized to conduct combat missions’.

In April 2009, moreover, at a time when insecurity had risen dramatically in RC-North as a result of insurgent and criminal activity (and just one week after the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit), Germany changed its notorious ROE relating to both the use of lethal force and combat operations, thereby ‘allowing its forces to take a more offensive approach’ (though this change was made very quietly and
even ‘secretly’ – refer to endnote).\textsuperscript{135} As Der Spiegel reported in July 2009: ‘Recent events suggest that the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan is, surreptitiously, becoming more aggressive’.\textsuperscript{136} In fact, according to Shea of the American Stars and Stripes journal, this relaxation meant that ‘Germans were finally able to borrow a phrase American soldiers had been using for years and “go looking for a fight”’.\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, between 2009-2012 German combat forces have not only been ‘knocking insurgents back near the cities of Kunduz and Marzar-e-Sharif’ to expand the security bubble around these areas, but also ‘fighting more and larger battles, and killing and dying in larger numbers than at any time since 1945’ (see endnote for more information on the German population’s reaction to these increased casualties in Afghanistan).\textsuperscript{138} As the commander of a German infantry company, CAPT Marcel Boehnert, remarked in early 2012: ‘What happens here is totally new for the army…This is a new generation of soldiers’.\textsuperscript{139}

Finally, in January 2010 following the London Conference, the caveat against German forces conducting foot patrols in cities was lifted, allowing German soldiers to patrol outside of armoured vehicles and tanks for the first time.\textsuperscript{140} This seems to be Germany’s first re-alignment of its policies towards the ‘more comprehensive approach’ of the ISAF COIN strategy (an approach which actually began in January 2007), what the German Defence Minister, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, has described as ‘winning an Afghan face’.\textsuperscript{141}

Nevertheless, despite these specific relaxations, Germany has not removed its other multiple caveats imposed on its forces operating in the ISAF mission. German suggestions that its forces might redeploy to the west or south of the country, following the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR) to ANSF forces in RC-North, have likewise not eventuated (see endnote).\textsuperscript{142} Indeed, it has remained a caveat-imposing TCN – and Lead Nation – from 2001 to the end of 2012 a decade later, and even to the present day. This period includes at least nine years in which it held lead command responsibility for creating and maintaining security within the entire sector of RC-North.

Germany has thus remained impervious to the calls for caveat elimination, and resistant to pressure to become caveat-free applied by NATO, ISAF and other allied government officials for the entirety of the ISAF mission. As Guttenberg remarked to German media correspondents prior to the London Conference, when asked if Germany would change its approach to the Afghan mission and also deploy a further 2,500 troops to the ISAF:

\begin{quote}
Germany has not changed its stance: a stable future for Afghanistan is not something that can be achieved by military means alone. We will focus our concentration on civilian reconstruction efforts so that Afghanistan can begin to establish security on its own and determine its own future…Again and again, we are hearing calls to send an additional 2,500 soldiers, but that number is unrealistic. I am not somebody who is susceptible to peer-pressure, and I don’t need help from the United States to make my decisions.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}
As equally unsettling as Germany’s recalcitrance on the caveat issue is the reality that, despite steady criticism by ISAF allies of Germany’s caveated Lead Nation forces and repeated calls for the country to ‘do more’, Germany sees itself today as a country that has in fact made a ‘significant contribution’ to the ISAF mission. Indeed, according to U.S. Department of State officials, the German government led by Chancellor Merkel continues to believe that with 4,500 troops in Afghanistan Germany ‘is already doing its fair share in Afghanistan’ and ‘feels no compunction to significantly expand its effort in the near term’ – including through the elimination of its national ‘exemptions’. In fact, American officials in Berlin have reported that, according to the German government, the problem is ‘not that they need to do more, but that they need to do a better job of publicizing what they are already doing’.

It seems highly likely, then, that German caveats will remain in force within the German ISAF contingent for the foreseeable future, until the contingent is redeployed from the Afghan theatre in early 2015. It is also to be expected that caveats will again become a feature of any post-ISAF German force contributed to the post-2014 ‘Resolute Support’ mission to be led by NATO in future years. Further, it is to be expected that national caveats on German forces contributed to future PSOs will likewise – as in Kosovo and Afghanistan – be handicapped by these political constraints.

**In Summary**

In conclusion, this appendix has examined the third factor contributing to the severity of the ISAF mission’s caveat quandary, namely the caveat record of the ISAF mission’s most notorious caveat-imposing Lead Nations – Italy, France, Turkey and Germany. It has demonstrated how, during the course of the Afghan mission, these principal and powerful NATO members charged with the task of leadership in their respective Regional Commands have set poor examples within the mission on this problematic issue of caveat imposition within the mission. It has also shown that these countries’ positions on the caveat problem has not only caused division within the small group of ISAF Lead Nations, but has furthermore led to tangible geographical divisions on the ground in Afghanistan between the various Regional Commands and the Lead Nation forces stationed within these sectors. This friction and dissension on the subject of national caveats amongst the Lead Nations has consequently exacerbated the severity of the caveat affliction within the mission.

In Chapters 14 and 15, this research turns to investigating the aim of the present caveat research: How have national caveats impacted on the overall operational effectiveness of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan? The final two chapters of *Volume I* will show how national caveats within the ISAF
mission have continuously undermined – even crippled – the fundamental principle of unity of effort within the mission. It will show, furthermore, that ISAF national caveats have in fact worked to guarantee disunity of effort within the mission. In short, national caveats have been the harbingers of operational ineffectiveness and diminished chances of success within the Afghan mission.
ENDNOTES

APPENDIX 1


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.


12 Solana, ibid., p. 115.

13 Ibid., p. 117.

14 Ibid., p. 116.


17 ‘Kosovo Force (KFOR) – How did it evolve?’, op. cit.; Solana, op. cit., pp. 114, 117.


22 Ibid.

23 Solana, op. cit. p. 118.


25 ‘NATO’s role in Kosovo’, op. cit.


Among them, four medieval buildings in Prizren, the jewel of the Byzantine empire; the 14th century Church of Bogorodica Ljeviška, the best example of Byzantine architecture and artwork in Kosovo; the monastery of the Holy Archangels which housed the tomb of Kind Dusan; the Church of the Savior with 14th century frescoes; the Church of St. George; Runovic’s Church; and the 15th century Devic monastery, carefully repaired and restored over decades since the end of World War II (Wood and Binder, ‘Treasured Churches in a Cycle of Revenge’, op. cit.)
plies that Kosovo policy should be uniform, not only to avoid confusion but also to prevent uncoordinated action in pursuit of competing aims.


Ibid.


Ibid.

For instance, repeated offers were made by the KPC in Sector Centre, led by Sweden, to assist in defending Caglavica. However, they were ‘steadfastly refused’ by the Scandinavian KFOR contingents (‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, op. cit., p. 11).

Ibid., p. 11; Standards for Kosovo, Number VIII, cited in ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, ibid., p. 10.

Ibid., p. 13.


MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.


The chain of command implies that each commander is responsible to a senior commander directly above in an unbroken hierarchical command chain, so that there is never any doubt about responsibility. Unity of command, meanwhile, refers to the fact of there being only one designated overall commander of an operation, not only to avoid confusion but also to prevent uncoordinated action in pursuit of competing aims.

Ibid., note 60, p. 25;

Cited in ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, ibid., p. 25.

Ibid., pp. 13, 25.

Illustration taken from News from Kosovo: March Pogrom, op. cit.


Ibid.


MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

Ibid.


‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo’, op. cit., p. 57.

Ibid., pp. 54-55.

Ibid., p. 55.

Ibid., p. 21; ‘Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities’, op. cit.


Ibid., p. 55.


MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.


Ibid., p. 21.


Ibid.

News from Kosovo: March Pogrom, op. cit.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 21.


MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

Ibid.


Ibid.

MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

Ibid.

Ibid.

‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo’, op. cit.

MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

Ibid.


MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 22-23.

APPENDIX 2


7 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.

8 Auerswald & Saideman, Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War, op. cit. p. 8; D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for...


MAJ General Andrew Leslie, the Canadian National Commander and deputy COMISAF in 2003, was required to call home ‘whenever Canadian special operations forces engaged in any significant activities, even when operating outside of ISAF as part of OEF’ (Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, ibid., p. 15).


23 Adapted from ‘Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations’, NATO Headquarters, op. cit.


The ISAF was under-resourced when it deployed to the north, suffering short falls in utility helicopters, transport aircraft, quick reaction forces and even a medical facility. Indeed, the Finnish government found difficulty even in finding helicopters to deploy Finnish troops to the PRT in Meymaneh (M. Gordon,
In June 2006, however, Turkey would eventually accept leadership of a PRT in Wardak Province in RC-East, a province that neighboured RC-Capital where Turkey was a Lead Nation on the basis of rotation (U.S. Embassy Ankara (released by Wikileaks), Cable 06ANKARA332, We Look Forward to Your Visit, Turkey Is A Strong


47 Ibid.


52 Adapted from ‘Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations’, NATO Headquarters, op. cit.

53 Boot, Proactive Self-Defense, op. cit.; ISAF, ISAF Chronology Table, op. cit.


55 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 27.


63 Boot, Proactive Self-Defense, op. cit.

64 Adapted from ‘Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations’, NATO Headquarters, op. cit.


68 Ibid.


70 As UNSCR 1510 states, the UN Security Council ‘authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its
successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement’ (United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1510 (2003) – Adopted by the Security Council on its 4840th meeting, on 13 October 2003, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf, (accessed 12 March 2009)).

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.

APPENDIX 3

afghanistan, (accessed 26 July 2010).

10 J. Starkey, ‘They came, they saw, then left the Afghan war without a single mission’, The Scotsman (U.K.), 9

11 J. Brophy & M. Fisera, ‘National Caveats’ and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, Univerzita
(accessed November 18, 2009); ‘Makeshift “Rorke’s Drift” unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, This

12 U.S. Embassy Stockholm (released by Wikileaks), Cable 08STOCKHOLM51, Swedish Parliament’s Foreign

13 U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), Cable 06KABUL2342, PRT/Qalat Q Romanina Interest in


15 Ibid.


17 ‘You Don’t Negotiate with Murderers - Spiegel Interview with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer’, Spiegel Online, 9 October 2007, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,518druck-505152.00.html,,
(accessed 24 February 2009).


20 Cited in D. Blair, ‘Nato faces toughest test since Cold War as Afghanistan troubles deepen’, ibid.


Organisations and Security Sector Reform, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), 2007, p. 226.

23 Cited in Karp & Ponzio, ibid., p. 227.

24 U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Pentagon, Progress toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan - Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defence Authorization Act
Ankara (released by Wikileaks), Cable 06ANKARA3352, We Look Forward to Your Visit, Turkey Is A Strong


26 Cited in D. Blair, ‘Nato faces toughest test since Cold War as Afghanistan troubles deepen’, ibid.

27 U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Pentagon, Progress toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan - Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defence Authorization Act (Section

for Civilian Leaders International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselet/.../408.pdf


polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf

presented at the 42

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf

1230, Public Law 110

Afghanistan

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Cheap’, www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck


http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BERLIN1387.html


35. Ibid.


43. Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


46 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


51 Ibid.

52 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


56 Ibid.


60 NATO, ‘NATO and Afghanistan’, op. cit.

61 NATO, Backgrounder – Phase 4: Transition to Afghan ownership and leadership in security, op. cit.


63 ‘Episode 4’, ‘Ross Kemp - Back on the Frontline’, 2011 [DVD], ibid.;

64 ‘Episode 4’, ibid.; NATO, ‘NATO and Afghanistan’, op. cit.


66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


Alliances had, however, been made in 2007-2008 ‘for temporary, limited, deployments’ of German soldiers to other parts of the country, including the south, on a case-by-case basis if deemed ‘absolutely necessary’ to the overall ISAF mission. These exceptional deployments had to be reckoned ‘absolutely indispensable to the success of the ISAF mission, however, and be explicitly agreed to by the German Minister of Defence. This change occurred following a situation in late 2007 in which the German Defence Minister had approved a ‘time-limited’ temporary deployment of German soldiers to RC-West to provide medical and intelligence support to combat manoeuvre units involved in combat operations there. Following the minor technical change to the caveat, this temporary deployment to RC-West was again repeated in late 2008 and the same year 30 German radio operators were also permitted to deploy temporarily to Kandahar in RC-South to provide communication support to other ISAF allies. By October 2008, exceptional time-limited deployments of German Bundeswehr forces outside the north were also being permitted for psychological operations (PSYOPS) personnel, Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, C-160 aircraft providing intra-theatre airlift, and MEDEVAC helicopters. However for the most part and as a general rule, with the exception of these agreed-upon temporary deployments described above — ‘limited in time and scope, outside the north on an exceptional basis’ — all other German forces committed to the ISAF are prohibited from operating outside of the northern AOR. This was especially true in regard to Germany’s combat manoeuvre forces since, while provision has been made by the German government for occasional temporary deployments of support personnel, the same government has been ‘very reluctant to exercise this authority in regard to combat forces’ (U.S. Embassy Berlin, 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09BERLIN431, New U.S. AF/PAK Strategy Generates Good Will, But Not Many New German Contributions, 10 April 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BERLIN431.html, (accessed 11 July 2011)).

88 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
APPENDIX 4

1 This table is based on the caveat data gathered and generated during the course of this research, especially data specifically relating to caveat-free and caveat-imposing TCN countries within the mission over the period from August 2003 to December 2012.

APPENDIX 5

1 This table is based on the caveat data gathered and generated during the course of this research, especially data specifically relating to caveat-free and caveat-imposing TCN countries within the mission over the period from August 2003 to December 2012.

APPENDIX 6 (LIST 1)


11 U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108*, op. cit.


18 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


26 Brophy & Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, op. cit.; ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, op. cit.


84 Ibid., p. 15.
86 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Boot, Proactive self-defense, op. cit.
94 LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 September 2010, New Zealand High Commission, London, United Kingdom.
123 U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.; U.S. State Department, Cable 08STATE63686, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.; ‘German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not Licensed to Kill’, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 8; U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.

124 U.S Embassy Reykjavik, Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.


126 U.S Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy, Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.


129 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


131 U.S. Embassy Bratislava, Cable 09BRATISLAVA497, op. cit.

132 Ibid.

133 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.

134 Ibid


138 Ibid.


142 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


144 Beste, von Hammerstein & Szandar, ‘The Discount War: ISAF is Failing in Effort to Secure Afghanistan on the Cheap’, op. cit.

145 U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.

146 Ibid.


148 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


130. U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.


132. U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


146 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, ibid.
147 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.
148 Member of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS), [Identity Protected], Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 12 June 2009, Wellington New Zealand.
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154 U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, op. cit.
160 U.S. Embassy Vilnius, Cable 05VILNIUS837, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST749, op. cit.
161 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1255, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.
162 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1255, ibid.


164 U.S. Embassy Sofia (released by Wikileaks), Cable 07SOFIA218, Bulgaria Seeks Guidance On Hosting Next V-10 Meeting, 16 February 2007,


166 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 7.


169 Ibid.


171 Ibid.


173 U.S. Embassy Stockholm, Cable 08STOCKHOLM272, op. cit.


179 U.S. Embassy Bratislava, Cable 09BRATISLAVA497, op. cit.

180 U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.


182 U.S. Embassy Stockholm, Cable 08STOCKHOLM752, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN882, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST771, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST855, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.

183 U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 08ATHENS469, op. cit.

185 U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 08HELSINKI155, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 09HELSINKI360, op. cit.
186 U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST855, op. cit.
190 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 10BERLIN138, op. cit.
192 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN382, op. cit.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST771, op. cit.
198 U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.

201 Thruelsen, ibid., p. 21.
203 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.
204 Ibid.
205 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.
206 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
207 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.
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11 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.

12 Kaim, ‘Expanding ISAF-Ending OEF: The Debate on the Mandates Sending German Troops to Afghanistan’, op. cit.

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1 This table is based on the caveat data gathered during the course of this research, and relates to the period between 2001-2012.

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4 U.S. Embassy Vienna (released by Wikileaks), Cable 05VIENNA1152, Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Kunduz For Election; Will Review Caveats, 8 April 2005, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf, (accessed 31 July 2013);

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13 de Hoop Sheffer, Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, op. cit.
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16 de Hoop Sheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’, op. cit.
18 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
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24 Ibid.
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29 Auerswald & Saideman. ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 28.
31 Ibid., p. 15.
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109 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.

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113 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


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118 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


124 de Hoop Sheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1604, op. cit.


127 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op. cit.

128 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.
129 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
131 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 7
132 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.
140 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
142 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, ibid.
143 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.
144 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 7.
145 Ibid., p. 7.
147 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1255, op. cit.
152 Ibid.
153 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN382, op. cit.
154 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN882, op. cit.
155 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1542, op. cit.; ‘You Don’t Negotiate with Murderers - Spiegel Interview with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop
156 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op. cit.
159 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 10BERLIN382, op. cit.
160 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 10BERLIN38, op. cit.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
165 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
166 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, ibid.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, ibid.
167 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op. cit.
169 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op. cit.
170 U.S. Mission NATO HQ, Cable 07USNATO610, op. cit.
172 U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 06ATHENS1058, op. cit.; de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General’, op. cit.
173 ‘NATO signals new Afghan approach’, op. cit.; ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.
177 Ibid.
180 Shared by a LTGEN Andrew Leslie of the Canadian Army, a deputy COMISAF now serving as both the Chief of Canada’s Land Staff and the Commander of the Canadian Army (cited in Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 8; and in Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit. p. 9).
Greece’s problematic relations with Turkey (Boot, “‘Proactive Self-Defense’”, op. cit.).
Brophy & Fisera, “‘National Caveats’ and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic”, op. cit.; Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in House of Commons (HoC), Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006, op. cit.


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314 U.S. Embassy Madrid, *Cable 05MADRID395, op. cit.*
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327 Ibid.
331 U.S. Embassy Madrid, *Cable 05MADRID395, op. cit.*
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336 Ibid.
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U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, op. cit.

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APPENDIX 8 (a)

1 This table is based on the caveat data gathered and generated during the course of this research, and relates to the period between 2001-2012.

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54 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
55 U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.
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59 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
60 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
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76 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, ibid., pp. 16-17.
77 U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.
79 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
82 Brophy & Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, op. cit.; Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in House of Commons (HoC), Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006, op. cit.
84 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
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94 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
97 Ibid.
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110 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1255, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.
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119 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
120 Etienne de Durand, cited in Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
122 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 8; Brophy & Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, op. cit.
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, February 6, 2010, 12 February 2010,


149 U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 08ATHENS469, op. cit.

150 Shared by a LTGEN Andrew Leslie of the Canadian Army, a deputy COMISAF now serving as both the Chief of Canada’s Land Staff and the Commander of the Canadian Army, in Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, op. cit., p. 8.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 9.

Greece with relation to Turkey & Macedonia: Boot, “’Proactive Self-Defense’”, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 08ATHENS313, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 08ATHENS469, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Athens, Cable 08ATHENS896, op. cit.


152 U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST855, op. cit.


168 U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.
170 U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 06HELSINKI1158, op. cit.
173 Thruelsen, ibid., p. 21.
175 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.
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177 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
178 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
181 U.S. Embassy Budapest, Cable 09BUDAPEST771, op. cit.
182 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.
184 Etienne de Durand, cited in Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
186 U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.
187 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.
188 U.S. Embassy Stockholm, Cable 08STOCKHOLM752, op. cit.
189 Ibid.
190 U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 06HELSINKI1158, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 09HELSINKI360, op. cit.
194 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
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197 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.


APPENDIX 9

This table is based predominantly on the caveat data gathered and generated during the course of this research and relates to the period between 2001-2012. Information on force numbers (indicative of major and minor combat units) has also been drawn, however, from multiple official ISAF force ‘Placemat’ releases from ISAF Headquarters, dating from January 2007 to December 2012 (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 2 January 2007 – 3 December 2012, Official Website of the International Security Assistance Force, http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html, (accessed 20 February 2013)).

APPENDIX 10 (a)


Caveat status based on information gathered in the course of this research, including data specifically relating to caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF TCN countries, in addition to numerical figures of caveat-free and caveat-fettered forces within the mission, relating to the period between August 2003 and December 2012.

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40 de Hoop Sheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretay General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’, op. cit.

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54 Member of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS), [Identity Protected], Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 12 June 2009, Wellington New Zealand.

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59 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, ibid.

60 U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 08ROME454, op. cit.; U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.

61 U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.

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63 Member of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS), [Identity Protected], Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.


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113 October 2008,
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Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’,
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Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’,
NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan’,
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109

108 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of
Caveats in Afghanistan’, p. 22.

107 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War’, ibid.

106


104 Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of
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101 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.

100 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.; ‘German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not
Licensed to Kill’, Insurgency Research Group, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the

99 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, ibid.; Auerswald & Saideman,
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97 de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop
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95 Ibid., p. 7.


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83 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.; ‘German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not Licensed
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82 de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop
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http://www.cfr.org/publication/10985/proactive_selfdefense.html, (accessed 4 February 2010); Hale,
‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman,

80 Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, ibid.; Auerswald & Saideman,
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77 ISAF, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces
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76 Garamone, ‘U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Boot, ‘“Proactive Self-
Defense”’, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, ibid.;

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74 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


72 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely
on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; McNamara, ‘Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe
Must Do More in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; L. Michel & R. Hunter, ‘Keeping our allies on our side in Afghanistan’, Los

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70 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; McNamara, ‘Backgrounder #2347:
NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Michel & Hunter, ‘Keeping our allies on our

69 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, ibid.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on
Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; McNamara, ‘Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must
Do More in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Michel & Hunter, ‘Keeping our allies on our side in Afghanistan’, op. cit.;

68 ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on
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67 J. Starkey, ‘They came, they saw, then left the Afghan war without a single mission’, The Scotsman (U.K.), 9


Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*, p. 28.


*ibid.*, p. 15

*ibid.*

*ibid.*

*ibid.*

*ibid.*


Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*, p. 28.


*ibid.*, p. 15.

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*ibid.*


Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*, p. 28.


*ibid.*, p. 15.

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*ibid.*, p. 15.

*ibid.*

*ibid.*

*ibid.*


*ibid.*, p. 15.

*ibid.*

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de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’, *op. cit.*


Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), *Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006*, *ibid*.

NATO members are required to invest between one-two percent of their national GDP on their defence sectors (NATO has set a 2% benchmark with a minimum 1% threshold). Admittedly, however, since the early 2000s many NATO members have reneged on their defence spending obligations and invested below this threshold (Canada, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands being particularly of note amongst these reneging members). Moreover, according to the U.S. State Department, 11 of the 26 NATO members in 2004 spent ‘more than 60 percent of their defense budgets on personnel costs alone’. At the same time the U.S. spent ‘more than twice that of the other Allies put together’, however, a fact which has caused the capability gap between the U.S. and its other NATO-member allies to widen even further (U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), Cable 04HELSINKI1571, NATO Ambassador Burns’ visit to Helsinki, 16 December 2004, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04HELSINKI1571.html, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 08ROME1406, SceneSetter For Your December 3 Visit To Rome, 19 November 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ROME1406.html, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09ROME358, Italy: SceneSetter For Codel McConnell, (27 March 2009), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ROME358.html, (accessed 11 July 2011).

This neglect by NATO members towards their defence sectors quickly became apparent when NATO took over the leadership of the ISAF campaign, with many NATO nations encountering difficulties even in deploying their forces to the Afghan theatre. The Finns, for example, after committing its forces to the Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh, could not in fact find helicopters to deploy the Finnish PRT troops. Nevertheless, engagement in the ISAF mission over the past decade has reversed this negative spending trend within some

APPENDIX 11


NATO members are required to invest between one-two percent of their national GDP on their defence sectors (NATO has set a 2% benchmark with a minimum 1% threshold). Admittedly, however, since the early 2000s many NATO members have reneged on their defence spending obligations and invested below this threshold (Canada, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands being particularly of note amongst these reneging members). Moreover, according to the U.S. State Department, 11 of the 26 NATO members in 2004 spent ‘more than 60 percent of their defense budgets on personnel costs alone’. At the same time the U.S. spent ‘more than twice that of the other Allies put together’, however, a fact which has caused the capability gap between the U.S. and its other NATO-member allies to widen even further (U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), Cable 04HELSINKI1571, NATO Ambassador Burns’ visit to Helsinki, 16 December 2004, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04HELSINKI1571.html, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 08ROME1406, SceneSetter For Your December 3 Visit To Rome, 19 November 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ROME1406.html, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09ROME358, Italy: SceneSetter For Codel McConnell, (27 March 2009), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ROME358.html, (accessed 11 July 2011).

This neglect by NATO members towards their defence sectors quickly became apparent when NATO took over the leadership of the ISAF campaign, with many NATO nations encountering difficulties even in deploying their forces to the Afghan theatre. The Finns, for example, after committing its forces to the Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh, could not in fact find helicopters to deploy the Finnish PRT troops. Nevertheless, engagement in the ISAF mission over the past decade has reversed this negative spending trend within some
NATO nations. Canadian defence spending, for instance, has increased dramatically so that by 2009 it was considered to be ‘at its highest level since World War II’, becoming ranked as the sixth greatest investor in defence within NATO and the thirteenth in the world. U.S. State Department officials calculated in fact that in 2008 France was investing 2.3 percent of its GDP on its defence sector, the United Kingdom 2.5 percent, and the United States 4.2 percent of GDP. Others, however, continued not to meet their commitments and to under-invest in their defence sectors, with consequent effects in Afghanistan. Italy, for example, was considered to be spending 0.96 percent of its GDP on its defence sector – a figure that fell well short of even the NATO threshold of one percent. As one commentator remarked in 2009: ‘The problem is that while NATO and the United States already have 61,900 troops on the ground in Afghanistan, the European contingents still lack essential equipment such as helicopters, field hospitals, F-16 fighters and aircraft to transport tanks and troops across the country’ (U.S. Embassy Helsinki, Cable 04HELINKI1571, op. cit.; B. Smith-Windsor, ‘Reinvigorating the Trans-Atlantic Relationship – Don’t Underestimate Ottawa’s Role’, DefenseNews, 5 January 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?id=3885992, (23 September 2009); J. Dempsey, ‘Letter from Europe; U.S. Ready to Exile NATO From Afghan Decisions’, The New York Times, 19 March 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2D6173FF93AA25750C0A96F9C8B63, (accessed 22 July 2009); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09ROME177, Getting Italy To Do More In Afghanistan, 13 February 2009, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ROME177&q=caveat%20france%20isaf, (accessed 26 July 2013).

In fact disproportionate defence spending is one of the many issues considered to be dividing the NATO Alliance at this point of time. As ex-SACEUR General Craddock himself publicly remarked in 2009: ‘[We lack] political will, commitment in resources…and commitment to communicate the need…to our citizens. Defense spending is on the decline (while) security demands are on the rise’ (Dempsey, ‘Letter from Europe; U.S. Ready to Exile NATO From Afghan Decisions’, op. cit.; General Craddock, cited in A. de Borchgrave, ‘Commentary: NATO Caveats’, United Press International (UPI), 10 July 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2009/07/10/Commentary-NATO-caveats/UPI-47311247244125/, (accessed 7 October 2009).

2 In fact a U.S. attempt in March 2008 to encourage Slovakia to lift its caveats in 2008 illicited the joint and explicit response from the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence that ‘prospects for lifting restrictive national caveats are slim’. It’s OMLT caveats, in particular, were highly ‘unlikely to be lifted anytime soon’. This reply led American Embassy officials in Bratislava to conclude that: ‘Slovakia is moving – incrementally – in the right direction on Afghanistan, but the value of Slovakia’s contribution is lessened by the Prime Minister’s insistence on strict caveats…the invocation of caveats by numerous NATO Allies gives him the cover he needs to continue on a path that shortchanges both the Alliance and Slovakia (particularly its own military)’. A subsequent cable in November 2009 further reveal that Slovakian special forces were be used ‘primarily for force protection’ in Afghanistan, and forbidden from engaging in the training of ANSF forces since this ‘might also involve offensive operations’. Indeed, following the Obama diplomatic round in December 2009, the Slovakian government deferred addressing its caveat issue in Afghanistan until after the June 2010 Slovak elections (U.S. Embassy Bratislava (released by Wikileaks), Cable 08BRATISLAVA115, Afghanistan and the Bucharest Summit, 13 March 2008, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08BRATISLAVA115&q=2008%20afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf, (accessed 26 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Bratislava (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09BRATISLAVA497, Das Quafrud in Slovakia, 27 November 2009, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BRATISLAVA497&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20slovakia, (accessed 18 July 2013)).


11 U.S. State Department 09STATE31102, op. cit.

15 Burke, ‘Spain’s War in Afghanistan’, op. cit.

It was only in 2010 – nearly nine years after the mission began – that Spain finally relaxed its restrictions, removing its combat caveat and revising its 800-personnel troop ceiling limit to allow 1,500 Spanish forces to be deployed to the ISAF where they would ‘undertake additional combat duties’. The Spanish government even created a new combat-capable OMLT to mentor and operate jointly with an Afghan National Army battalion (even committing itself to the construction of a new permanent military base in Badghis for this new Afghan ‘kandak’). Nevertheless, Spain still seems intent on exiting the Afghan theatre of war exactly as planned in 2014, if not before. As the Spanish government argued in early 2010, it is ‘reasonable to expect Afghanistan to provide its own security in five years so that foreign forces can be withdrawn’ (E. Burke, ‘Spain’s War in Afghanistan’, Atlantic-Community.Org, 24 February 2010, http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Spains_War_in_Afghanistan, (accessed 14 January 2013); United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), C. Taylor, ‘SN/1A/5227 Military Campaign in Afghanistan’,


21. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


26. Corum, ‘Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.


It is however important to point out that despite its caveat-free status from its date of joining the mission, Georgia subsequently did not deliver on its offer to send two brigades to work with the Dutch in Uruzgan Province in RC-South. This seems to have transpired due to Dutch hesitance in accepting the offer. It is highly likely, however, that Russia’s invasion of Georgian sovereign territory during 2008 also played a significant role.
in this delayed deployment of forces. No matter the reason, the ISAF’s own force placemats clearly show that only one solitary Georgian officer was deployed to the ISAF during the next two years between December 2007 and December 2009. Consequently, although Georgia is ranked as a caveat-free TCN from October 2007, one can see that in fact Georgian forces per se made a negligible difference to security operations within the ISAF mission during the following two year period (U.S. Embassy The Hague (released by Wikileaks), Cable 07THEHAGUE2061, Netherlands/Afghanistan: DASD Cagan’s Dec. 12 Visit To The Hague, 14 December 2007, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07THEHAGUE2061&q=2008%20afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf. (accessed 26 July 2013); ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 5 December 2007, 3 June 2008, 1 December 2009, 15 June 2009, 1 October 2009, 1 February 2010, op. cit.).


50 COL Cottrell, Commander of U.S. Marines Training and Advisory Group. According to Cottrell, the Georgia’s soldiers ‘had positive attitudes and were proving to be the best partner he had worked with thus far’ (U.S. Embassy Tbilisi (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09TBILISI2291, Georgia: DSD Wallander Leads Bilateral Defence Consultations, 29 December 2009, http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09TBILISI2291&q=2011%20afghanistan%20caveat, (accessed 14 June 2013).

51 Ibid.


55 Ibid.


APPENDIX 12


6 Created using ‘ISAF Placemat’ maps combined with the caveat data gathered during the course of this research (ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 13 February 2009, 1 October 2009, op. cit.).


Apart from force generation, mover, Italy was by 2009, regarded as an ‘anemic contributor’ in terms of monetary development aid for Afghanistan and Pakistan, having cut its overall foreign assistance donations by 60 percent. As one U.S. official wrote on the matter: ‘Italy's average annual aid contribution to Afghanistan (Euro 50 million), while respectable, should be higher given its leadership of the Herat PRT and its traditional role as lead nation in Justice Sector reform’ (U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME649, op. cit.).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.

U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME649, op. cit.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Evidence of this hypocritical pretense may also be seen in an incident which occurred in late 2008. When Pakistani journalist and specialist on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, attributed the deteriorating security situation in RC-West to the reality of Italy’s caveated forces in the sector which ‘rarely left the compound’, the Italian government protested, angrily and publicly refuting this almost self-evident conclusion (U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.).

U.S. Embassy Rome, Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.


Ibid.


U.S. Embassy Paris, Cable 07PARIS1844, op. cit.

Ibid.


U.S. Embassy Paris, Cable 07PARIS4357, op. cit.


The European Parliament had both debated on, and then voted to accept, an EU report on Afghanistan, one of the key findings of which was ‘that a major strengthening of political will and commitment is necessary, and that this should be followed up not only by a willingness to provide additional combat troops in the most difficult areas, unrestricted by national caveats’ (United States Library of Congress, Morelli & Belkin, op. cit., p. 11).


Italian force contributions suddenly and significantly increased after becoming a caveat-free TCN within the mission, rising from 2,350 in June 2009 to 2,795 by October. After pledging an additional 1,000 personnel to the ISAF mission in early 2010, the Italian ISAF contingent again climbed to 3,150 by February 2010, and 3,770 a year later in February 2011, augmenting further to 3,880 by June that same year. In fact by December 2012, Italy had 4,000 troops deployed to the NATO-led Afghan mission. As one U.S. State Department official wrote from the Embassy in Rome in March 2009: ‘We are encouraging Italy to take its rightful place as one of NATO’s strongest militaries with a significant contribution to the effort in Afghanistan. Italy is currently the sixth-largest force contributor to ISAF with 2,600 troops, a PRT in Herat and Command of RC-West. But the Italian military’s ability is limited by a lack of resources...In the near future...we will need robust effort from Italy, coordinated with the U.S. and other allies, to make sustained progress in Afghanistan’. (ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 15 June 2009, 1 October 2009, 1 February 2010, 16 April 2010, 3 February 2011, 6 June 2011, 3 December 2012, op. cit.); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09ROMES38, Italy: SceneSetter For Codel McConnell, 27 March 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ROMES38.html, (accessed 11 July 2011).


Michel & Hunter, ‘Keeping our allies on our side in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


Ibid.

Interestingly Generale Giuseppe Valotto, formerly an Italian KFOR Commander between September 2005-August 2006, rose to become Italy’s Chief of Staff of the Italian Army in September 2009. Valotto became the designated Operational Commander shortly after the 2004 ‘Kosovo Riots’ crisis in which national caveats had played such an instrumental role, and would hence had had certain knowledge of the negative effects of national caveats on the successful execution of multinational peace support operations (Senior Italian Military Official, [Identity Protected], Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, ibid.)

Firstly, morale within the French army units in Afghanistan, which was reportedly ‘as low as its socks’ prior to the deployment in July 2008, had soared to very high levels just one year later. Secondly, moreover, military relations had noticeably improved between French President Nicholas Sarkozy and his general staff, accompanied by a stronger resolve and commitment to the ISAF mission. Thirdly, political debates about equipment quality waned and equipment procurement accelerated to meet the needs of French soldiers in the Afghan theatre. Finally, despite a major security incident in Uzbin valley within the Surobi region during August 2008, during which a full squad of 10 French soldiers on patrol were killed after being caught in an ambush and firefight with insurgents, public support for French forces involved in the mission had not plunged in response to these casualties. According to one scholar, all of these positive effects were the direct result of the French armed forces adopting ‘a re-warriorization of what had to that point largely been viewed as a peacekeeping mission’ (J. Grustein, ‘Afghanistan, Europe and the Return of War’, World Politics Review (WPR), 13 July 2009, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/4064, (accessed 14 May 2010)).
As a consequence of these positive developments, France began a process of slowly relaxing its caveat fetters on French forces serving in other areas of the country. Firstly, the regional caveat on French forces in Kabul Province was lifted to allow the COMISAF to deploy French soldiers outside of RC-Capital for the first time. Secondly, the in extremis emergency-related caveats were loosened to allow French forces to offer emergency assistance to the forces of other NATO nation contingents within the ISAF. Thirdly, French OMLT teams were released from their caveat restriction. Then finally, in addition to ‘boosting the combat punch’ of the French combat battalion in RC-East by reinforcing the 600-man battalion with addition French units redeployed from Kabul, the French government maximized the combat capability of all its forces in Afghanistan by eliminating combat caveats from all French forces across the board. As Auerswald & Saideman argued in 2009, although French National Commanders deployed as part of the ISAF force had originally been given ‘very limited discretion’ in the use of their forces by their government, France – like Canada before it – had in latter years ‘made remarkable changes in how much discretion the troops have on the ground, providing us with variation over time’ (Sloan, S., ‘NATO in Afghanistan’, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Redalyc, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espana/University of Madrid, no.22, (Enero-sin mes/Janv-March) 2010, pp. 34-5; Michel & Hunter, ‘Keeping our allies on our side in Afghanistan’, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., pp. 13-14, www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf), (accessed 18 March 2013).

In fact, between June 2009 and February 2010 French forces also increased by almost one thousand personnel from 2,780 to 3,750 troops. With security responsibility for RC-Capital due to be handed over to Afghan control in November 2009, a large proportion of the French contingent were assigned to the new function of training and mentoring local Afghan security forces. Approximately 600 personnel joined another joint-service battle group to conduct combat operations in partnership with the ANA in Kapisa Province. Another 280 French personnel were committed to train Afghan Army and Special Forces units, something which subsequently became a niche and priority area for France. Hundreds of French gendarmes were also pledged to serve in POMLT teams too, thereby ‘reinforcing’ the critical security line of operation’ (ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 16 June 2009, 1 February 2010, op. cit.; Dempsey & Austen, ‘Many Allies of U.S. Share Pain of Afghan War’s Toll’, op. cit. 35


56 Ibid.


Although prior to 2008, when counter-narcotics was not a mandated activity within the ISAF, it did permit Turkish forces to train ANSF personnel (U.S. Embassy Ankara, 09ANKARA1472, op. cit.).
Turkey played a key role in facilitating the transport and distribution of critical supplies and a quarter of all fuel for the coalition of the willing during the Iraq War too, especially during 2005-2006, even allowing U.S. forces to use its territory as a logistical hub (U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 06ANKARA3352, op. cit.).


U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, op. cit.
U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.
U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1713, op. cit.

U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1713, op. cit.; U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 10ANKARA251, op. cit.
U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1713, op. cit.
U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1713, op. cit.


Ibid.
Ibid.

Created using maps from ISAF Placemats combined with the caveat data gathered during the course of this research (ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 13 February 2009, 1 October 2009, op. cit.).

However, as Auerswald & Saideman have argued, even if this geographical restriction on German combat forces had been lifted, German forces ‘would not significantly add to the flexibility of the NATO commanders’ in RC-South given its combat caveats (Auerswald & Saideman. ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., pp. 7-8).

This caveat has applied not only to German infantry and air forces, moreover, but also to its KSK Special Forces, which in the years after 2006 were tasked with participating in ISAF’s ‘catch or kill’ targeting operations, undertaken to eliminate the hardline insurgent commanders within the insurgency. In the years since 2006, as the insurgency continued to flourish across Afghanistan, ISAF HQ had adopted this strategy of ‘buying’ Taliban sympathisers while ‘eliminating’ the hardline insurgent commanders through targeted assassinations, the latter carried out by teams of Special Forces of various nationalities deployed to ISAF. The targeting strategy was lauded by HQ ISAF for having eliminated at least 150 Taliban commanders nation-wide. Indeed, the restriction subsequently led to an infamous incident in early 2008 whereby Germany’s elite KSK forces had a known Taliban commander and bomb-maker in their sights but were compelled to allow him to escape unharmed, due to the ban against lethal force except in cases of self-defence (for more information on this incident see Chapter 15 in Volume I) (‘German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not Licensed to Kill’, op. cit.).

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Indeed, Max Boot asserts that the caveats have been imposed, not out of fear of casualties, but rather because: ‘They are more afraid of what their troops might do. They realize that counterinsurgency is a nasty type of warfare and that troops of any nationality are liable to commit some excesses’. He describes modern German soldiers as overwhelmingly more afraid of killing than of being killed, and ‘deathly afraid’ of committing combat atrocities for fear that it ‘might revive old stereotypes about German militarism’ (M. Boot, ‘Contentions – the German View’, Commentary Magazine, 19 March 2007, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2007/03/19/the-german-view/, (accessed 24 February 2009); ‘Germans said to be more afraid to kill than to get killed’, Atlantic Review, 20 March 2007, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/6633-Germans-said-to-be-more.afraid-to-kill-than-to-get.killed.htm, (accessed 24 February 2009)).


103 Corum, ‘Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


105 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.


107 Foust, ‘German is ISAF’s ‘Weakest Link’, op. cit.


109 Corum, ‘Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan’, op. cit.


This German perspective on the Afghan mission has become even clearer in recent years in the way in which debate has arisen within Germany as to whether the operation was truly a stabilisation effort, or rather a ‘war’, given the increasing numbers of German casualties as a result of terrorist and insurgent attacks. As Henning Riecke of the German Council of Foreign Relations has stated: ‘What we have in Afghanistan is a war being conducted according to a new design. It is a mission that serves nation-building, but at the same time military operations are needed to fight insurgents that want to obstruct and destroy this very nation-building. This is not a declared war between states, but a war between armed forces and insurgents, which in Afghanistan is fought as a war. To get involved in splitting hairs won’t help anybody – neither the advocates of the mission, nor its detractors. What we need is a little bit more honesty. And it is honest to say that we are stuck in a kind of war’. (cited in ‘In Germany’s Afghan Commitment, ‘Splitting Hairs Won’t Help: We Are At War’, 26 June 2009, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1763626.html, (accessed 7 July 2009); Government of Germany, Rippl. ‘Einblick: Ein Einsatz verändert die Bundeswehr’, op. cit.).

This view is perhaps best represented by the remarks of a military doctor, Heike Groos, who deployed to RC-Capital with the German Army in 2009. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Groos gave the impression of having been a tourist-in-uniform in the country, and seemed shocked to have been confronted by the realities of war and death in Afghanistan. As she stated: ‘The first death destroyed the atmosphere for me. It happened during my second deployment to Kabul. I’d been expecting everything to be like it had been the first time – lots of sun, beautiful landscapes, nice colleagues and a friendly local population. Then one of our all-terrain vehicles ran over a mine and was blown up, killing a young soldier instantly…We underwent a significant change after the first terrorist attack aimed directly at us. A suicide bomber blew up one of our all-terrain vehicles, killing four of our soldiers and seriously wounding many more. After that, we were more careful, more nervous, more wary’ (‘SPIEGEL Interview with Former Army Doctor in Afghanistan: “I didn’t want to be part of this insane mission”’, 9 August 2009, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-interview-with-former-army-doctor-in-afghanistan-i-didnt-t-want-to-be-part-of-this-insane-mission-a-647751.html, (accessed 16 September 2009).

‘Auch in der Bevölkerung wurde das Engagement am Hindukusch zunächst vor allem als friedlicher Stabilisierungseinsatz wahrgenommen’ (Rippl, ‘Einblick: Ein Einsatz verändert die Bundeswehr’, op. cit.).
In RC-North the QRF had since its naissance in 2006 been commanded and staffed by Norway. In early 2008, however, Norway signalled its intention to quit its leadership of the QRF in the sector by the end of June. In view of the new shortfall opening up in such a critical capacity within the sector, Lead Nation Germany was compelled to assume combat command of the QRF from 1 July 2008. Approximately 200 Bundeswehr personnel were assigned to conduct these operations as part of RC-North’s QRF, to be centrally based in the sector at Mazar-i-Sharif. However, despite this freedom from Germany’s strictest caveats and its authorisation for use in emergency situations outside RC-North, the reality has been that this QRF unit has been kept by Germany chiefly in the northern sector. German officials have defended this state of affairs to its American allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North’. In fact, when the QRF was subsequently expanded from 200 to 600 personnel in order to meet the ISAF requirements, all NATO allies, arguing that ‘the primary mission of the QRF is to respond to emergencies in RC-North'.

This alteration of these lethal force and offensive operation prohibitions was achieved very quietly, however, reportedly ‘for fear of public outcry’. Indeed, when the phrase ‘the use of lethal force is prohibited unless an attack is taking place or is imminent’ was removed from Germany’s prescriptions on the lawful use of force, the government did not make an announcement of this key shift, nor even inform the German parliament’s defense committee, leading to accusations regarding their ‘secret handling of the case’ (Joyner, ‘Afghanistan Caveats Coming to End?’).

Correspondingly, however, as Germany’s involvement in kinetic security operations against insurgents has increased and as German casualty numbers have risen as a direct result, the German populace has increasingly wanted German forces to be withdrawn immediately from the mission. Polls conducted between 2009-2012, for instance, have continually shown that between 69-70 percent of the population want German forces to be
withdrawn quickly and completely from Afghanistan, indicating that German society has little stomach for
German engagement in ‘war’ — no matter how vital that war is to their own national interests and security from
terrorism (Shea, ‘Ready to fight: German soldiers Afghan mission shifts from reconstruction and training to
engaging enemy’, op. cit. (U.S. Embassy Munich (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09MUNICH328,
‘Germany/Afghanistan: Is The CSU The Weakest Link In The Germany Government’s Afghanistan Policy?’, 22

139 Shea, ‘Ready to fight: German soldiers Afghan mission shifts from reconstruction and training to engaging
enemy’, op. cit.
141 Ibid.
142 U.S. Embassy Berlin, (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09BERLIN431, New U.S. AF/PAK Strategy Generates
Good Will, But Not Many New German Contributions, 10 April 2009,

In 2009, the German Special Envoy to Afghanistan proposed that following TLSR,
and the 2009 German
elections, German forces could be shifted to the west of the country. Other German officials suggested that
the government was also considering sending its forces to team up with the Netherlands in Uruzgan Province ‘since
the two countries share the same philosophical approach’ – despite their caveat differences. As the Chancellery
Chief of Military Affairs stated to U.S. Embassy personnel in Berlin in April 2009: ‘Germany and the
Netherlands already have a close military relationship, reflected in the joint German-Dutch Corps in Muenster,
and share the same military-civilian approach in Afghanistan’(U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op.
cit.)

143 Cited in ‘Germany to release new Afghanistan strategy at London conference’, Deutsche Welle, 6 January
144 ‘Background: the mandates for the military operations in Afghanistan’, Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign
Office), www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afghanistan.html,
(accessed 30 June 2009)
145 U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 09BERLIN431, op. cit.
146 Ibid.