Lessons Learnt from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Peacekeeping Model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries

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Abstract

This thesis studies the lessons learnt from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations focusing on four specific case studies, those being Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor. What this study attempts to do is draw together the lessons learnt that are operation or geographically specific, and those that are common across each of the four case studies. This is done with a view to developing a Peacekeeping Model that can be utilised over a wide range of United Nations operations and interventions, regardless of the geographical location of the conflict.

In order to explore whether or not a peacekeeping model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries can be developed, this thesis draws on the lessons learnt of not only the United Nations, but also the contributing service women and men and coalition partners involved. This thesis is divided into four parts. The Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, are written to provide the reader with an overview of the creation of the United Nations, its Charter and mandate, and to introduce some of the key terminology used throughout the thesis.

Chapters 3 – 6 focus on the four individual case studies chosen for this research and provide an overview of the history, a breakdown of the United Nations operations, and then flows through the key military considerations identified under each case study. The structure of each of the case studies is focused around the United Nations operational mandate, command and control, intelligence and communications, logistics, pre-deployment training and preparations / deployment / post-deployment.

Chapter 7 provides an analytical overview of the lessons learnt that are specific to each of the case studies and discusses in detail the lessons learnt that can be applied across two or more case studies. Chapter 8 discusses the recommended United Nations blueprint or peacekeeping model. It argues that a successful peacekeeping model can be developed and clearly identifies what steps need to be taken for that model to succeed.

Chapter 9 provides a conclusion to the study and comments on the way ahead for United Nations peacekeeping operations based on the recommended blueprint or model. Chapter 9 also discusses the future of the United Nations and whether or not the organisation has a viable role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union (formerly OAU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICP</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Policing</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNGOs</td>
<td>Domestic Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECPS</td>
<td>United Nations Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven States: US, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti.</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>The Western permanent members of the Security Council</td>
</tr>
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<td>P5</td>
<td>Existing five permanent member of the Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peace building Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIWCs</td>
<td>Persons Indicted for War Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council, see also UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (NATO led)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSR</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Security General, see also SG</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly, see also GA</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor (Timor Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM I &amp; II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission for Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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3.1 Map Haiti. (encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/mapcenter/map)  
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5.1 Map East Timor. (encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/mapcenter/map)
Introduction

This thesis studies the lessons learnt from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, with a view to defining and recommending a Peacekeeping Model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries. The aim of this study is to identify a sustainable Peacekeeping Model and way ahead for United Nations operational peacekeeping deployments. It will achieve this through the detailed analysis and comparison of four case studies, those being Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor.

Aim

There are already considerable works on Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East Timor. Those concentrating on the pre-deployment and deployment of the United Nations into these destabilised states have been largely looked to in order to gain valuable information on the lessons learnt from each respective mission and geographical area. Information from studies written with a military perspective are also drawn on to assist in creating the frame work for this study. What this study attempts to do is draw together the lessons learnt and develop a Peacekeeping Model that could be utilised over a wide range of United Nations operations and interventions, regardless of the geographical location of the conflict.

Structure of the Thesis

In order to explore whether or not a peacekeeping model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries can be developed four case studies have been studied. This thesis draws heavily on the lessons learned of not only the United Nations, but also the contributing service women and men and coalition partners involved. The analysis of the case studies has been used to identify a Peacekeeping Model that implemented may provide a stable platform or start state for the United Nations when it deploys into war torn countries, whether they be in Africa, Europe or the Asia Pacific Regions.
The first two chapters of this study delve into some of the key decision making processes surrounding the creation of the United Nations which rose out of the ashes of the failed League of Nations on 26 April 1945. They provide an overview of the United Nations Charter and mandate and discusses the organisational breakdown of the United Nations in order to provide the reader with a basic overview of the United Nations and introduce some of the key terminology used throughout this study. All of which are key pieces of background historical information that if not understood correctly would mean that vital components to the United Nations and the way it is employed today would create confusion. D. A. Wells (2005), and J. S. Sutterlin (2003) provide a detailed breakdown of the establishment of the United Nations and their writings are also referred to in the conclusion of this study because of the emphasis that they place on options for the way forward of the United Nations.

Chapters 3 - 6 focus on the four individual case studies chosen for this research and provide an overview of the history, a breakdown of the United Nations operations that have been or are currently deployed to the conflict or war, and then flows through several key military considerations which are discussed under each case study. The structure of the chapters is focused around the United Nations operational mandate, command and control, intelligence and communications, Logistics, pre-deployment training and preparation / deployment / post-deployment. Each case study outlines the key lessons learnt from United Nations involvement in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations and highlights recommendations on what actions the United Nations can take to avoid the issues confronted on future operations. Each case study concludes with a summary of the current situation on the ground as it sits today, a conclusion on United Nations efforts in the specific theatre and recommendations on what actions the United Nations can take in the future to avoid making the same errors.

Chapter 7 provides an analytical overview of the lessons learnt that are specific to each of the individual case studies, and discusses in detail the lessons learned that can be applied across two or more case studies.
Chapter 7 also aims to highlight the distinct differences or characteristics of each of the case studies through mission specific lessons learned.

Chapter 8 discusses the recommended United Nations blueprint or peacekeeping model. Shows that a successful United Nations peacekeeping model can be developed, and identifies what steps need to be taken for that model to succeed, based on the lessons learned identified across the four case studies. Chapter 8 also outlines some of the key differences faced by United Nations peacekeeping forces when they operate in diverse environmental and geographical locations, such as the difference in operating from conditions in Somalia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the impact that those conditions will have on the selection of lead-nation, troop contributing nations and preparation prior to deployment.

Chapter 9 discusses the future of the United Nations and whether or not the organisation has a viable role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. It outlines some of the key personalities and members within the United Nations system and analyses the impact of regional organisations on the future role of the United Nations. Chapter 9 provides a conclusion to the study and comments on the way ahead for United Nations peacekeeping operations based on the recommended blueprint or model.

Sources

In completing this thesis a wide range of sources have been drawn from to provide as unbiased a view of the United Nations as possible. The authors personal experience working with the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, as well as first hand accounts from New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) officers and soldiers across the Navy, Army and Air force have been used as a base to this study. The experiences of a wide range of military specialists from the Intelligence, Logistics, Infantry, Signals, Engineer, Military Police, Public Relations and Medical Corps have been drawn on to provide analysis of the United Nations employment of these areas during the preparation and conduct of a peacekeeping operation.
The development and distribution of a questionnaire and the conduct of interviews with New Zealand military personnel have been used as primary sources of information for this study. Whilst the feedback the author received on the questionnaire was largely successful not all participants chose to answer the questionnaire directly. As a result this limited the amount of feedback that was available for this study. However, there was a significant amount of military personnel who chose to contribute and answer questions in an informal setting and on an informal basis without wishing to commit their answers to paper. Whilst the experiences and opinions of military personnel have been used to draw some of the conclusions in this study, the opinions expressed throughout this paper are supported by the author and are not intended to reflect current or future NZDF thought or policy.


The firsthand accounts of Cain, Postlewait and Thompson (2004), as well as Zartman (2005) and Fleitz (2002) provide a cutting and harsh reality of civilian employment and perceptions within the United Nations on arguably some of the most difficult peacekeeping missions in its recent history. However, this is not necessarily the reality of all peacekeeping operations as is clearly shown

There exists a significant amount of works on the United Nations. In particular its successes, and/or failures have been commented on in detail. However, it is difficult to find source material on the United Nations that does not provide a biased perspective either for or in most cases against the Organisation. What is also apparent is that there is very little written from a purely military perspective. Scholars such as Wells (2005), Thakur (1998), Azimi (1997), and Rittenberger (2001) - to name a few - have developed an art of writing on the United Nations, however, this thesis is not being written with necessarily the same perspective or vantage point. Due to military influences, training and experience on Operational Deployments as a Peacekeeper and Officer in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) this study will be focused primarily on the United Nations from a military perspective, as opposed to a scholarly, humanitarian or political perspective. The writings of Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004), and Lahneman (2004), have a distinct military flavour and have provided key examples of lessons learnt in a variety of operational theatres.

**Summary**

The creation of a universal Peacekeeping Model that can be employed across a range of geographical theatres and United Nations coalition operations is the intended end state of this study. While it is identified that geographical climates and historical ethnic trends will impact significantly on the nationality of forces deployed into certain areas, this research aims to provide recommendations on the way ahead for the United Nations when it is preparing and training for peacekeeping operations, and for the physical deployment and sustainment of military peacekeeping forces on United Nations operations.
Chapter 1: Background to The United Nations

In order to define and discuss the United Nations today, it is necessary to comprehend why and how it was formed, what the Charter established and why the organisation was structured the way that it was. To understand the United Nations we must look at the major political influences that have affected the Organisation since its founding, but first it is important to look briefly at its predecessor, the League of Nations. The lessons learnt from the failure of the League of Nations largely shaped the way ahead and establishment of the United Nations.

The League of Nations was proposed as part of the Treaty of Paris at the end of World War I. The high casualties of both military and civilian personnel meant that the international community was forced to find some way of preventing such a large scale of death from occurring in the future. In order to achieve this, it was proposed that:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

The Covenant of a League of Nations was adopted at the Paris Conference 28 April 1919 and made part of the larger Treaty of Versailles. On 10 January 1920 the League went into force, less the participation of the United States. The League provided for a General Assembly (GA) where each nation had one vote, it also provided for a Security Council (SC) with five permanent seats (US, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan). The General Assembly met once a year between 1920 an 1940, although the Security Council met 106 times during the same period. In total, over 63 nations would join the League of Nations before its disestablishment. Sutterlin (2003) notes that:

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2 Ibid. p. 8.
3 Ibid. p. 8.
4 Ibid. p. 9.
5 Ibid. p. 8.
Not until the League of Nations was established at the end of the First World War was a structure formed in which the majority of the world were joined in a commonly accepted responsibility for the maintenance of world peace—not peace within a certain region...but peace among all countries.\(^6\)

James Sutterlin (2003) writes that “central to the effectiveness of the League of Nations was the concept of collective security...the principle that all countries will undertake a common action against any country that threatens the security of another state”.\(^7\) However, from the beginning the League of Nations was unlikely to succeed, and arguably the greatest reason for this was the ineffectiveness of the League to enforce action against covenant breaking states.\(^8\) This significant limitation, combined with the failure of important member states to comply with the provisions of the Covenant, and the failure of governments to place the perceived needs of the greater international community over their own national interests, effectively meant that the League of Nations was never going to be able to achieve a common concept of collective security.

**Establishment of the United Nations**

On 14 August 1941,\(^9\) United States President Roosevelt and United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the 8-point Atlantic Charter in which they affirmed the urgent need for “a peace which will afford all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live to their lives in freedom from fear and want”.\(^10\) On 1 January 1942,\(^11\) 26 nations signed a United Nations declaration agreeing to join forces to defeat the Axis force and end World War II. A series of meetings were held throughout 1943 and 1944 in Cairo, Tehran and at Dumbarton Oaks. The final session established the specific structure of the United Nations Organisation with a Secretary General, a

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\(^7\) Ibid. p. 2.
\(^8\) Ibid. p. 3.
\(^9\) Wells, D.A, p. 10.
\(^10\) Ibid. p. 10.
\(^11\) Ibid. p. 10.
General Assembly, a Security Council, and an International Court of Justice. Provision was also made for additional agencies to be created,\textsuperscript{12} such as the World Bank (WB), Commissioner for Refugees (UNHR) and the Children's Fund (UNICEF).

A founding meeting was held in San Francisco on 15 April 1945, and by 26 April 1945 the United Nations Charter in concept was confirmed by acclamation of the fifty nations in attendance, however, the Charter was not officially confirmed until 24 October 1945.\textsuperscript{13} Heinbecker (2005) notes that:

\begin{quote}
The founders put into place an organisation that reflected both the main political concerns and the distribution of power of the 1940's, as well as the lessons derived from the failure of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

It is important to note that from the start the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China and France declared that they would have veto power in the Security Council as the permanent five members of the Council.\textsuperscript{15} These nations also placed numerous major restrictions on the United Nations, which David Wells (2005) argues should be kept in mind in assessing both the perceived successes and failures of subsequent United Nations actions.\textsuperscript{16} The allowance of each of the five nations to have veto power has been suggested as one of the primary reasons for many of the difficulties and restrictions faced by the United Nations since its establishment in 1945. Due to the significance of this veto power it will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.

Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1997) state that "The UN system was born out plural and decentralised and was never intended to approximate a centralised unitary system".\textsuperscript{17} Put simply, The United Nations Organisation that was

\textsuperscript{12} Wells, D.A, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{14} Heinbecker, P & Goff, P, Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Canada, 2005, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{16} Heinbecker, P & Goff, P, p. 12.
created at the end of the Second World War of the twentieth century was established to put to bed any further desire or intention of nations to risk another great war. Unlike the League of Nations before it, the United Nations was not designed solely to ensure collective security, but also to establish a number of international institutions aimed at promoting and fostering the social and economic elements necessary to create and sustain collective security. Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1997) are also quick to note that while the UN system created in 1945 was never intended for the current security environment or to be a centralised unitary system, that “at the same time, the UN system was born from pragmatism and realism and not utopian idealism.”

Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1997) clearly articulate that:

The UN is most fundamentally an intergovernmental organisation in which key decisions are made by governments representing states. The UN Charter may say initially ‘We the peoples’, but the legal members of the UN are states. The UN is a broad and complex system of policymaking and administration in which some decisions are made by individuals who are not instructed by the states...moreover, to the extent that UN decisions involve force or economic resources, or considerable diplomatic pressure, these elements of UN action are, in effect borrowed from member states.

Structure of the United Nations

The United Nations is made up of six major bodies, as well as numerous governing institutions, organisations and agencies, each with their own powers, jurisdictions and responsibilities. For the purposes of this study, the function and duties of the Secretary General and the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council will be looked into in detail. This study will only touch briefly on the Economic and Social Council, The Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice in the following paragraphs, as the two central bodies which safeguard the peace are the Security Council and the General Assembly.

19 Ibid. p. 11.
Chapter XV of the United Nations Charter, Articles 97-101, established the role of the Secretary General (SG) and put in place the caveat of a five year renewable term. The main role of the Secretary General is to chair the meetings of the General Assembly (GA), the Economic and Social Council, and notably the Secretary General may at any time bring before the Security Council (SC) issues which may threaten international peace and security. Article 100 specifies that the Secretary General “shall not seek instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the UN.”

The United Nations Secretariat is designed to represent the international community. Some of the primary tasks of the Secretariat members are to “implement the many economic and social programs that represent much of the UN's tangible contribution to fulfilling the Charter promises.” It is also responsible for gathering statistical data, issuing studies and reports, servicing meetings, preparing documentation, and providing translations of speeches, debates, and documents in the UN’s six official languages.

As at 2006, 192 nations were members of The United Nations and as such, members of the General Assembly, which entitles them to one vote regardless of nation size. In the General Assembly each state may have up to five representatives in order to have representation at each of the major committees. Among the General Assembly’s duties is the responsibility of:

Making recommendations to member states on questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security brought by any state, whether a member of the UN or not, and it may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security (Article II)... decisions on all procedural matters will be by a simple majority of those present and voting.

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22 Ibid. p. 19.
23 Mingst & Karns, p. 36.
24 Ibid. p. 36.
The primary role of the Security Council is the maintenance of peace and security and for this reason the provision was made that members would undertake to make available for use armed force, assistance and facilities, to be used by the council to either maintain or restore international security. The provision of military forces, logistical assistance and facilities meant that the members of the United Nations were committed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. Article 25 states that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council." Wells (2005) notes that:

From the outset the UN would not be a military body like NATO, it would have no standing army, and its peacekeepers are not typical combatant soldiers... unlike typical soldiers, peacekeepers could not be deployed unless invited by both the litigants.

Wells (2005) clearly highlights that the United Nations was never intended to be a military organisation. Mingst and Karns (2007) also comment on the fact that the United Nations was not intended to be established with its own permanent military force and write that "peacekeeping operations have relied on ad hoc military (civilian and police) units, or subcontracting to a coalition of states." Notably, the majority of peacekeeping mission contingents have come from countries outside of the permanent five members of the United Nations with the size of military forces varying widely.

Article 23 of the United Nations Charter states that the Security Council (SC) shall consist of 15 member states. Five of these seats are "permanent" seats (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States); the other 10 are elected for two year terms by the General Assembly... For purposes of geographical representation, the world is divided into the following groups: African States, Asian States, Latin States, Central and

27 Sutterlin, J.S, p. 3.
28 Wells, D.A, p. 22.
29 Ibid. p. 13.
31 Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 94.
Eastern States, and West European and Other States. This latter group includes the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.\(^{32}\) Wells (2005) notes:

No individual UN member state is given authority to make the decision to go to war unilaterally; and, furthermore, no collection of states, such as NATO, has authority to make war in the absence of US approval.\(^{33}\)

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ESC) consists of 53 member states, as well as the Secretary General as Chair, to make the number 54, and is elected for three year renewable terms by the General Assembly.\(^{34}\)

The Trusteeship Council was originally established to oversee the administration of non-self-governing trust territories that carried over from the mandate system of the League of Nations.\(^{35}\) It suspended operations on 1 November 1994, with the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory, on 1 October 1994. By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required,\(^{36}\) by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.

The International Court of Justice (the World Court, or ICJ) was established as a result of Charter XIV, Articles 92-96, and has two primary functions, to settle legal disputes submitted by member states, and to give advisory opinions on legal questions that are referred to it.\(^{37}\) The ICJ consists of 15 member states\(^ {38}\) which always include the permanent Security Council member states. Of note is that the Court cannot deal with a case unless the State involved accepts the jurisdiction of the court. International organisations or private individuals are not entitled to initiate proceedings

\(^{32}\) Wells, D.A, p. 22.
\(^{33}\) Ibid. p. 23.
\(^{34}\) Ibid. p. 25.
\(^{35}\) Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 39.
\(^{36}\) Ibid. p. 39.
\(^{38}\) Ibid. p. 26.
before the Court. However, as Geoffrey Robertson (2006) writes “judicial appointment through a UN system of state nomination does not mean selection on merit or selection of the fittest.”

Since its founding the United Nations has conducted 49 peacekeeping operations, assisting in the process of avoiding war between nations. The Security Council has negotiated 172 peaceful settlements between nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council have worked to control weapons of mass destruction. Wells (2005) notes that in 1980, there were 58 democratic nations worldwide, and that due largely to the actions of the United Nations there are now 115 democratic nations.

In his annual Report on the Work of the Organisation in 2003, former Secretary General Kofi Annan stated:

The United Nations is not an end in itself. Rather, it is an instrument for achieving common ends. The strength and effectiveness of the Organisation depends on the active support of its Member States and their policies. Moreover, achievement of the organisation’s purposes requires a shared consensus about its fundamental goals. That does not mean that Member States need to agree on all issues. However, it does mean that they should be ready to use the Organisation to achieve mutual objectives and to accommodate different national interests.

What is clear is that there is an accepted need for the United Nations and the institutions that it represents. There is no other governing world body that operates with the same level of support and membership in the modern world, nor is there another organisation that is emerging as a likely replacement. However, there is obvious demand and need for reform within the United Nations, including the Charter and the membership within the Security Council. The ongoing requirement for the United Nations is clearly articulated by Mingst and Karns (2007) who note that:

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41 Ibid. p. 30.
There has been a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping and peace-building operations since 2003. This illustrates the continuing vitality of these innovative approaches to conflict management that evolved during and after the Cold War. 43

What is immediately apparent from any study relating to the United Nations is that the Organisation as a whole has been forced to adapt with the political situation that it now faces. The International security environment that exists now differs significantly from that of the post-World War II and the post-Cold War eras. The influences of the permanent five and the power of veto, as well as the national agendas of all member states continues to mean that the United Nations must consider their interests and role within the Security Council and General Assembly when making decisions relating to its primary goal of maintaining peace and security. Mingst and Karns (2007) state that:

As an intergovernmental organisation the UN is the creation of its member states; it is they who decide what it is they will allow this organisation to do and what resources – financial and otherwise – they will provide. In this regard, the UN is very much a political organisation, subject to the winds of world politics and the whims of member governments. 44

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43 Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 93.
44 Ibid. p. 1.

The Role of the United Nations

The United Nations has received more criticism than any other organisation in recent history. If trends since the end of the Cold War and more recently the terrorist threats since the latter end of the 20th Century are anything to go by, the United Nations is likely to receive even more criticism and attention in the years to come. Knight (2005) notes:

After 11 September 2001, many questioned whether the world body was up to the task of dealing with global security problems such as the new wave of terrorism, the threat of biological and chemical weapons, horizontal nuclear proliferation, the exponential spread in small arms, civil conflict, genocide, ethnic cleansing and transnational criminal activity.\(^\text{45}\)

As the United Nations emerged from the end of the Cold War "its involvement in global security issues increased exponentially".\(^\text{46}\) Statistics show that the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council has risen from an average of 15 a year from 1946 to 1989, to more than 60 a year during the 1990s.\(^\text{47}\) Notably, the number of resolutions authorising the use of force has also risen significantly. The strategies of prevention being looked at by the Secretariat and the Security Council in the early 21st Century were focused on addressing the root causes of conflict, not simply the violent flow on or symptoms, and conflict prevention became the primary concern of the United Nations.\(^\text{48}\) As was noted in the 1999 Secretary General's Report on the Work

\(^{47}\) Ibid. p. 60.
\(^{48}\) It was assessed that addressing or stopping the route causes of a conflict was the best method of preventing the violent flow on that would naturally follow if the issue was not addressed. The United Nations also aimed to resolve the route causes of a conflict at the negotiating table before the situation deteriorated and peace operations needed to be conducted.
of the Organisation “prevention is better, and cheaper, than reacting to crises after the fact”.  

Price and Zacher (2004) note:

Conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. An investment in national and international efforts for conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development since the latter can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace.

Knight (2005) provides analysis on a number of issues pertaining to the United Nation’s struggle to balance reactive and proactive functions, as well as drawing some key lesson’s learned from the United Nation’s experience with “adapting its structures, functions and processes to changing global conditions”. Knight achieves this through a selection of chapters written by international law and international relations scholars. Sutterlin (2003) notes that:

As a universal organisation, the United Nations adopted specific institutional rules and norms for the preservation of international peace and security. The rules, found in Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter, embody norms adapted from the League of Nations institution by the Second World War’s victors.

**International Security Defined**

The definition of international security has broadened to “encompass not only peace between states but also the security of populations within states, economic and social progress are increasingly seen again as essential to international security and peace”. It is widely accepted that since the end of the Cold War the definition of international security has expanded to include more issues and actors. International security consists of the measures taken by nations or states and international bodies, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action, and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security are invariably linked.

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50 Ibid. p. 65.
52 Ibid. p. 4.
53 Ibid. p. 4.
The promotion and maintenance of human security lie at the heart of global governance and constitute the United Nations' primary raison d'être...human security; democratisation and sustainable development are inextricably linked.  

International security cannot be looked at in total isolation from human security. The Commission on Human Security (2003) report states that human security broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders. It goes on to say that the changing international and national environments have caused a shift from interstate to internal conflicts as one of the major threats to international peace and security. Human security should be looked at as a compliment to international or state security, as it protects the "vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment".

**Humanitarian Intervention Defined:**

Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, or group of states, or international organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognised human rights.

Murphy (1996) clearly writes that based on the definition given above, if humanitarian intervention takes the form of a threat or use of force, that it "presents a direct conflict with a key norm of the UN Charter". It can be argued that this issue is one of the most pressing being faced by the United Nations in the current international security environment. The question of whether the United Nations has the legal or ethical right to intervene in the affairs of legal sovereign states is raising considerable debate globally. The armed intervention of states into other states has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, and the United Nations Charter was created in a
period of time when this type of intervention was not seen as the common or accepted norm. Knight (2005) notes:

One of the chief purposes of the United Nations has been the prevention of the use of force. As Article 1.1 of the Charter States, "the UN's main role is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace". 60

A commonly accepted definition of humanitarian intervention is that it is "uninvited, armed intervention into another state so as to prevent a humanitarian disaster caused by massive violations of fundamental human rights". 61 So, when we compare this definition and that given by Murphy (2006) against the United Nations Charter, which states in Article 2 (4) that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 62

There are glaring contradictions. Article 2 (7) goes on to state that nothing contained in the Charter "shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". 63 However, Article 42 clearly states in support of interventions that it "may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". 64 Article 51 also clearly outlines that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 65

60 Knight, W.A, p. 52.
63 United Nations Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2, sub-para 7.
64 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42.
So, why is it now accepted amongst the United Nations and the international community that the use of force is an acceptable answer to resolving humanitarian or human rights abuses? The answer may be as simple as modern technology and international focus.

The pervasive effect of the media, especially television, has installed unrealistic but potent expectations about what the UN can achieve...Near instantaneous coverage of atrocities, violence, and deprivation, has evoked demands for immediate and visible action – the 'do something' syndrome.\(^6\)

The impact of the media in getting real time images of the conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor into the living rooms of the average family 24 hours a day, every day, has been significant in raising the awareness of the humanitarian atrocities being committed within sovereign states. It is only logical that this will then place further pressure on international organisations such as the United Nations, and governments around the world to bring an end to the large scale of human suffering and the deliberate violations of fundamental human rights that is occurring. No longer can the abuses carry on unseen and un-talked about, they will not be tolerated. However, the greatest risk from this public pressure is that governments and the United Nations may be forced or pressured into making rash and poorly developed decisions on critical issues without following basic processes and procedures, which are there to ensure that all of the information received is validated and accurate prior to making important decisions.

**Peacekeeping Operations Defined**

To understand the case studies that will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3-6, it is necessary to first comprehend the differences between peacekeeping, peace-building, and peacemaking and the different contexts in which each is used. From 2000 onwards United Nations peace operations formally involved

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three principal activities: "conflict prevention and peacemaking; peace-keeping; and peace-building". Peacekeeping is defined in the Peacekeepers Handbook as:

The prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. Peacekeeping has also been explained as an operation "involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict". The notion of peacekeeping was not mentioned or envisaged when the United Nations Charter was created, and as such it has no clear legal standing as it notionally occupies the middle ground between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. The first United Nations peacekeeping missions in the mid 20th Century were under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and deployed into the Middle East to monitor the Arab-Israeli ceasefire followed by the Suez Crises.

To look at the full spectrum of peacekeeping it is necessary to acknowledge that it is no longer just a simple case of monitoring borders between nations in conflict, such as North and South Korea, or conducting negotiations between countries that are in conflict, such as the Israeli – Lebanon case in the late 1970's. United Nations peacekeeping was "an improvisation, born out of the need to respond to war between states". Peace-building differs from peacekeeping in that it is a post-conflict action aimed at ensuring that violence does not reoccur and to identify and support structures that will strengthen the peace. Similarly, peacemaking is aimed at bringing hostile

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67 Hayward, A, p. 141.
71 Ibid. p. 142.
parties together through a peaceful means, as articulated in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.\(^{73}\)

Differences in ethnic backgrounds, political/state motivation, training, preparation and experience, equipment, and funding between peacekeeping force contributors are all challenges faced by peacekeeping forces today. Simple things such as language training and driver familiarisation training are not being conducted by all force contributing nations and this is ultimately creating a weakness within the deployed force as the United Nations struggles to maintain the required number of peacekeepers on the ground and conduct training to bring unprepared military forces up to the required trained state. As Hayward (1995) articulates:

Complaints about poorly trained units and individuals deployed on peacekeeping operations, lacking required equipment, supplies and communications, and with other impediments limiting their employability are too numerous to recount.\(^{74}\)

The deliberate non-provision or inability of states to provide accurate and timely information and intelligence to the United Nations when it is faced with making key decisions is a major hindrance to the whole decision making process. "National governments often provide the United Nations with only the information they want it to see".\(^{75}\) Whilst intelligence gathering occurs on a large scale within most developed states, there is currently no capacity within the United Nations to pool these resources for its own use. As Price and Zacher (2004) identify, "objections have long prevented the Secretariat from creating any serious intelligence and analytic capacity that could be used for early-warning purposes and to create more effective prevention policies".\(^{76}\) This, combined with a lack of a common database for the collection and processing of information, provides a weakness in the United Nations planning and preparation prior to and during the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The differences in communications equipment

\(^{73}\) United Nations Charter, Chapter VI.

\(^{74}\) Hayward, A, p. 36.

\(^{75}\) Ibid. p. 30.

utilised by military forces around the world also provides a significant challenge, and in many cases a complete block, to providing the timely information that is so vital to force protection.

Interestingly, there has been a significant increase in force contributors in the early 1990s. There are several acknowledged principal reasons for the increase in states contributing to peacekeeping operations. First and foremost is the increased need or demand for peacekeepers, primarily as a result of the increased instability and deteriorating international security environment. The second is the political sway that a state is afforded by involvement with the United Nations. This involvement allows smaller states, such as New Zealand, to be heard in an international forum and creates an air of credibility when they are talking about international security issues. The third reason is the pressure that is placed on governments by its people to support humanitarian relief and the prestige that comes with this. The fourth is arguably the financial benefit achieved by contributing states. The money received by governments is not necessarily put back into the military, but used by the government to fund other outputs, as has been seen by the Fijian government with the employment of Fijian peacekeepers in Lebanon throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

The primary advantage of peacekeeping operations for military forces around the world is the fact that their personnel will receive real time operational experience which can be used as a base to test the training and readiness state of their forces. The contacts and training ties that are established with other military forces are also invaluable in developing and training personnel. The fact that some peacekeeping forces will inevitably receive equipment as a benefit of peacekeeping (as was seen in Somalia and East Timor) is also a powerful motivator for military forces. However, it must be noted from the outset that in the majority of cases the main decision makers of volunteering military forces for peacekeeping operations are the politicians.

UNOSOM 1 is an example of a peace enforcement mandate, instead of a peacekeeping operation. It is important to understand the differences
between the two types of operations and the main differences between both are explained by Fleitz (2002) in the table below:

**Comparison of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Expanded Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Peace Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consent of Parties</strong></td>
<td>Required.</td>
<td>Desired from at least one combatant</td>
<td>Not needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of Force</strong></td>
<td>Only in self-defence.</td>
<td>Discouraged. Troops may engage in limited, military operations, such as to defend aid convoys. Proposals were tabled in 2000, however, to authorise these operations to use force to fight &quot;evil&quot; when disputants are not &quot;moral equals&quot;.</td>
<td>Prepared to use overwhelming military force to compel parties to abide by peace accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Troops</strong></td>
<td>Unarmed or lightly armed.</td>
<td>Unarmed or lightly armed.</td>
<td>Heavily armed combat forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartiality</strong></td>
<td>Required. Are viewed as non-threatening by combatants.</td>
<td>Technically required but tends to side against one party.</td>
<td>Generally ally with one party and identify the other as the aggressor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship with Parties to Dispute</strong></td>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping forces may not interfere in the domestic politics of the host countries.</td>
<td>Also forbidden to interfere in domestic politics of hosts.</td>
<td>Can be short in duration, or long term missions that are essentially occupation forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Command and Control**

In any operation where more than one military chain of command exists there are going to be significant issues, not only with the control of troops on the ground, but also with the perception of Use of Force. Each nation's military has its own enforced Rules of Engagement (ROE) which it must legally operate within. This, coupled with the fact that many commanders will first seek guidance from their own government prior to many perceived 'risky' operations regardless of the approved chain of command in theatre, results in a breakdown of confidence in command in theatre and often the use of the so called "Red Card". A Red Card is what many nations commanders will use to

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get out of completing tasks in theatre that their governments do not approve or want them involved with. 78

The United Nations control over military commanders is tenuous at best. The fact that it does not control or own the forces voluntarily given by troop contributing nations is a severe limiting factor in its operations. A state can withdraw or down size its force at any time of its choosing, regardless of the United Nations need for the force to remain in place. As was experienced with UNITAF and UNOSOM II when the US dictated when their troops would withdraw. During the United Nations operations in Somalia there was no clear evidence of any form of unity of command. This is clearly highlighted by the employment of the Rangers under General Montgomery. 79

The definition of unity of command is having all forces under one responsible commander. “It requires having a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in support of a unified purpose.” 80 The issue of unity of command is one that will be referred to several times throughout this study. Unity of command is one of the principles of war accepted in most established militaries around the world. So the question must be asked, why has the United Nations generally not been afforded the ability to exercise this form of command? The answer is simple, it is because of the intervention of the permanent five and national caveats imposed by troop contributing nations. However, nations will without fail retain full command of their own forces through a national commander in theatre; this is not likely to ever change. In order for the United Nations to deploy on future operations with a clear unity of command considerable negotiation and agreement on the way ahead for implementing unity of command needs to be adopted by all force contributing nations.

78 The use of a Red Card was experienced first hand by the author during operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan.
79 Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P, & Griffith, S, p. 81.
80 Connaughton, R, p. 127.
Intelligence and Communications

There exists a real time significant threat to deployed forces from the lack of proactive intelligence sharing between many coalition forces. The nature of intelligence collection means that the way it is collected, and in some cases the fact that it has been collected at all, has security implications not only for the national intelligence agency that has collected the information, but also for the safety of the sources that may have provided it. Should this information or intelligence get into the wrong hands or a security breach occur through human error, then it is much easier to accept if this error has occurred by your own people, as opposed to the error of someone from another state as it will create significant security and operational ramifications.

On a basic communications level, the fact that many nations' militaries operate with different equipment, with secret codes and encryptions, means that the ability to get a single net for a combined or joint task force to operate within is extremely difficult. For example, the US military will only allow its communications encryption devices to be used by those nations that it believes have adequate security procedures and processes. New Zealand operates in exactly the same manner. This had command and control and information flow ramifications of UNOSOM and UNITAF. It also meant that the flow of information to NGOs needed to be facilitated through daily face to face briefings as NGOs did not have the communications systems utilised by the military.

Logistics

Logistics is arguably one of the most critical elements of getting a force into and out of an area of operations. The use of strategic air and sea lift, as well as the sustainment of forces whilst in theatre in critical to mission success. The United Nations operations in Somalia were faced with the standard initial logistical difficulties, such as lack of power sources, drinkable water, and basic infrastructure to use for hospitals and warehouses, when they deployed on UNOSOM I. However, these issues are standard on most operations and
as a result contingency planning is able to be conducted prior to deployment so that they can be resolved quickly and without difficulty once a force is on the ground.

Inherent in combining a large number of military troops from different nations is the fact that not all of them will be equipped in the same way. Most Western nations carry the same types of weaponry and equipment, so the provision of basic necessities such as batteries for communication equipment and ammunition types for key weapon systems can be planned and prepared for in advance. However, the inclusion of lesser developed or financed military forces will result in the "poor cousin syndrome" whereby these smaller nations attempt to up-scale or better equip themselves. If this occurs, and has not been planned for, then there will be the problem of increased demand for basic critical equipment. This will ultimately result in a shortage of logistic supplies and equipment in theatre.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is no longer solely the jurisdiction or responsibility of military forces. There has been a significant increase in the employment of civilian police and other personnel in peacekeeping operations. Civilians are essential for completing administrative tasks, law and order or policing functions, and assisting with humanitarian issues such as refugee control, repatriation and providing elections monitoring and assistance. These components are integral to running operations and it must be clearly highlighted that the combination of military and civilian personnel on peacekeeping operations brings with it its own complex issues.

Questions surrounding mandate definition, rules of engagement, legal aspects, and the motivations of contributing nations must be addressed...humanitarian reasons for justifying an intervention appear spurious when applied inconsistently. Without resolving these problems, UN credibility and capacity to deal with problems will remain severely impaired.\footnote{Hayward, A, p. 21.}
In looking at the United Nations and its methods and techniques for the employment of modern peacekeeping operations, it is important to understand that this has evolved from a basic form of ‘armed’ or ‘unarmed’ operation in which lightly armed troops or unarmed monitoring observers operated between 1947 and 1985. In fact, during the period between 1947 and 1985 only 13 peacekeeping operations were conducted. Again, it cannot be stressed enough that neither the United Nations, nor its Charter were established with peacekeeping operations in mind. The United Nations has had to develop and adapt, based on the lessons learnt from past peacekeeping operations, in order to keep pace with the current security environment and the steadily increasing requirement for peacekeeping operations.

The requirement for a move from traditional peacekeeping to a more robust or complex peace enforcement or peace-building type of operation has been seen through the case studies on Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations is not equipped to authorise or adequately lead and support operations that extend outside of the definition of peacekeeping operations. The successful use of interim forces, such as UNITAF and INTERFET, which are based on the foundations of a large, well led, trained, equipped, professional and experienced force contributing nation has proven to be the best method of creating a secure and stable environment prior to the deployment of a follow on United Nations peacekeeping force.

Many authors', such as Fleitz (2002) have shied away from the distinction between traditional or so called second generation peacekeeping operations, however, it is terminology that is used by numerous authors', such as Arbuckle (2006), to clearly delineate how peacekeeping operations have evolved from what was envisaged in the mid 1950s to what was actually required in the 1990s. It must again be highlighted that when the United Nations Charter was developed and signed there was no provision made anywhere in the document for the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping

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83 Arbuckle, J.V, p. 109.
operations. So the question must again be asked, why does the United Nations continue to be criticised for its inability to successfully conduct peacekeeping operations when the organisation was never equipped, funded or intended to?

In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the lessons learnt from United Nations peacekeeping operations, the case studies of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor will serve to highlight some of the problems that are inherent with United Nations peace operations.

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84 Arbuckle, J.V, p. 109.
Chapter 3: Case Study One - Somalia

The vicious internecine warfare witnessed in Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s shocked casual observers across the globe, in terms of both excesses of violence and the seeming inability of the international community to bring about a resolution.  

Introduction

Somalia's complex combination of ethnicity and tribes, ranging from the four main clans of the Samale, to the minor ethnic groups like the Arabs, Persians, Bantu and Indo-Pakistani populations; means that there was considerable scope for inter-conflict to exist. Not only are the Somali's divided by ethnicity, they are divided by different dialect (language) and history. Clark and Herbst write:

Composed of six main clan families, Somalia's social structure is subdivided into dozens of sub-clan groups and hundreds of smaller units. There are many mixed cultural zones within regions, especially in larger cities, and most

\[85\] Knight, W.A, p. 77.
\[86\] Ibid. p. 79.
geographical localities have specific clan identifications; the mixed areas tend to be the most heavily contested zones.87

Three distinct peacekeeping operations were conducted in Somalia by the United Nations between 1992 and 1994. In Somalia, the United Nations presence was “linked to the collapse of state authority”.88 The situation in Somalia was markedly different to that experienced on previous United Nations peacekeeping operations. O’Neill and Rees (2005) write that “there were no precedents for deploying UN forces to a humanitarian rather than a peacekeeping mission where there was no government with which to negotiate”.89 Some argued that the deployment of the United Nations into Somalia did not sit within the context of the United Nations Charter. Somalia’s civil war was an internal conflict, and there was no “legitimate sovereign government” requesting United Nations intervention.90

After the initial deployment of UNOSOM I into Somalia, the United Nations Security Council contracted out to the United States so it would lead a United Nations Charter, Chapter VII enforcement operation into the troubled country. Of particular note was the fact that this force would be able to exercise all necessary means in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian and relief operations in Somalia.91 This mandate lead to the establishment of the US led UNITAF operation, and resulted in the expansion of the existing UNOSOM I mandate. The creation of UNITAF was a clear indication that the United Nations had no capacity to lead a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation.

89 Ibid. p. 110.
91 Knight, W.A, p. 87.
Historical Background

A military coup lead by General Siad Barre in 1969\textsuperscript{92} stabilised the fractious region for a short period of time as Barre took over as Somalia's President. However, military actions in the late 1970's meant that an economy of dependence on humanitarian aid, as a result of a refugee problem due to the military defeat from the Somali-Ethiopian struggle for the Ogaden region, would ensue. Barre's defeat in June 1991 by General Farah Aideed meant that a violent battle for Mogadishu between Aideed and his main rival, the new President, Ali Mahdi, would unravel "the last shreds of the Somali fabric".\textsuperscript{93} The country had been ripped apart by brutal military regimes and a civil war that essentially led Somalia into state collapse and internal violence of a horrific scale. "By June 1992, 5,000 were dying each day, 1.5 million were on the brink of death, and 4.5 million were nearing starvation".\textsuperscript{94}

The two Somali militia leaders to emerge after the retreat of Barre in 1991, Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohamed Farah Aideed, had distinctly different intentions for Somalia. Clarke (1997) writes that Aideed's force included "more aggressive, better armed but essentially undisciplined militia".\textsuperscript{95} Whilst Mahdi, a Hawiye/Abgal leader, who had questionably been elected President in mid-1991, surrounded himself with a political faction that also attracted "groups fearing the extension of Aideed's Habr Gedr hegemony over their houses and property in the hinterlands".\textsuperscript{96}

The increasing lawlessness and violence that ravaged Somali from 1991 had the unfortunate effect of creating an environment of anarchy, whereby even Somalia's 15,000\textsuperscript{97} strong National Police Force disintegrated and returned to their traditional clan regions, fearing for their lives should they attempt to retain some form of law and order. There was no working legal or judiciary system in place that was not already corrupt, incompetent or simply not

\textsuperscript{92} O'Neill, J.T., & Rees, N, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. p. 108.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. p. 108.
\textsuperscript{95} Clark, W, & Herbst, J, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. p. 5.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. p. 20.
functioning, and like the police force a judicial system failed to operate after Barre was overthrown in 1991.

Knight and Gebremaria (2005) write that there were several key factors that led to the deteriorating situation and ensuing human tragedy in Somalia. In no particular order of priority they were:

1. Longstanding historical factional divisions between various Somali clans and sub-clans that can be traced to that country’s pre-colonial history.
2. The mistakes attributable to the legacy of colonialism.
3. The radical departure by the postcolonial Somalian Republic from traditional political and socio-economic arrangements with little thought about what might replace them.
4. The corrupt authoritarian rule of President Mohamed Siyaad Barre,
5. The Cold War ideological climate which allowed for the suppression of some longstanding grievances held by one Somali faction against another.
6. The influx of weapons into the country from key arms-producing states.
7. The failure of the governing elite to address the real political, economic and sociological problems that existed in Somalia prior to the outbreak of the conflict.98

The humanitarian crisis that was being faced by Somalia in the early 1990’s was brought about by the inability of any single Somali leader and clan to form a supported and legitimate government. The removal of Barre in 1991 plunged the country into civil war, a war that rival militia leaders were willing to conduct without any regard to the lives, safety and well being of the Somali people. This coupled with a serious drought that began in the southern part of Somalia in late 199099 brought about severe starvation and conversely a health epidemic started to spread throughout the country on a massive scale. As the anarchy continued and warring clans fought for land and diminishing

98 Knight, W.A, p. 78-79.
99 Clarke, W, & Herbst, J, p. 79.
food supplies the death toll again continued to rise. The increased inflation on food costs, combined with Aideed’s and Mahidi’s militia’s looting and confiscation of food stores to influence followers, further impounded the dire humanitarian situation.

The increasing death toll in Somalia from the civil war, starvation and disease, transmitted around the world by international media could not go on unabated. State governments were forced to act in order to relieve the humanitarian situation. Few Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) had been operating in Somalia during this crisis period, however, the unstable security environment, and the requirement to bribe warlords’ for protection of their staff and food resources was ultimately only scratching the surface of the humanitarian relief required. The fact that NGO staff were being threatened, having money and food supplies extorted and in the worst cases kidnapped for ransom, meant that many NGOs were not prepared to operate in Somalia without protection. It was into this environment that UNOSOM I was authorised by the United Nations.

UNOSOM I

UNOSOM I was viewed as a traditional peacekeeping mission. It operated within the context of a ceasefire agreement between the two key stakeholders, Aideed and Mahdi, although this agreed ceasefire covered the Mogadishu area only. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751, 24 April 1992, 50 military observers were deployed to monitor the ceasefire and provide security for a humanitarian operation. Unfortunately the United Nations made the decision to send a further 500 Pakistani soldiers to escort humanitarian aid deliveries, all without the

100 Clark, W, & Herbst, J, p. 85.
consent of Aideed or the Secretary Generals Representative in Somalia, Mahmoud Sahnoun.\(^{104}\)

Resolution 767, signed on 27 July 1992, authorised the establishment of four operational zones: Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo.\(^{105}\) On 28 August 1992 Resolution 775 authorised the increase of military forces to 3,500, then 4,219 troops and 50 observers in September 1992.\(^{106}\) The increased troop presence was required to adequately monitor the four operational zones. UNOSOM would provide a military unit of 750 to each of the areas. In addition to the increase in military personnel, a “100 Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance” was also put into place. The key focus of the programme was to increase the standard of health (measles immunisation) and hygiene; provide basic living infrastructure; provide access to adequate clothing and food; and prevent the continued outflow of refugees by implementing a returnee program. However, implementation of the program proved difficult due to the ongoing security situation and disagreements among Somali factions.

The tenuous ceasefire did not last and the continued fighting further created an environment of fear, starvation and disease. UNOSOM I had proved “incapable of meeting the challenge it faced due to its small size and the limited scope of its mandate”.\(^{107}\) O’Neill and Rees (2005) state that the overall flaw of UNOSOM I was the failure of the United Nations to address the “collapse of state authority”.\(^{108}\) It was into this state of collapse that US President George Bush agreed to increase US support from air and logistical aid and offered US troops to lead a United Nations military operation in Somalia.

\(^{104}\) O’Neill, J.T, & Rees, N, p. 111.
\(^{107}\) O’Neil, J. T, & Rees, N, p. 111.
\(^{108}\) Ibid. p. 112.
UNITAF

On 3 December 1992, Security Council Resolution 794\textsuperscript{109} was adopted and explicitly authorised the Secretary General, the US and other troop contributing nations to “use all means necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”.\textsuperscript{110} The operation was called “Restore Hope”, and during the period December 1992 through to May 1993,\textsuperscript{111} the US contributed 28,000 troops, with the remaining 9,000 troops coming from 20 other troop contributing nations including Pakistan, who had provided 500 soldiers to UNOSOM I, the French Foreign Legion, Belgian, Canadian, Egyptian, Italian, Saudi Arabian and Turkish contingents.\textsuperscript{112} Lahneman notes that:

From an operations point of view, UNITAF was a success. In this operation, 986 airlift missions moved over thirty-three thousand passengers and more than thirty-two thousand short tons of cargo to Somalia. Eleven ships moved 365,000 tons of cargo, a well as 1,192 containers of sustainment supplies.\textsuperscript{113}

While the United Nations pressured the US led Task Force to increase its role to include disarmament, the US did not accept this as it was not included in their original mandate and stressed the limited and short term intention of UNITAF. President Bush also insisted that Restore Hope was to be seen as a humanitarian mission only. The US argued that they achieved a secure environment for humanitarian aid relief by creating protected corridors for humanitarian aid and food delivery, and that creating conditions throughout Somalia for the United Nations to operate freely was outside their missions scope. However, without the effective disarmament of the Somali militias an environment of security and law and order was never going to be realistically achieved.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. p. 113.
\textsuperscript{110} O'Neil, J. T, & Rees, N, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{111} Lahneman, W.J, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. p. 32.
\textsuperscript{113} Lahneman, W.J, p. 36.
From the outset the priority of UNITAF was a humanitarian relief one. In the context of what objectives were laid down by the initial United Nations Resolutions in trying to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia under UNITAF it must be accepted that overall it was a success. Unlike other operations which have a geopolitical or geostrategic objective, the US goal for UNITAF was solely humanitarian.  

The mission had four principal elements to it:

1. Secure Mogadishu port and airfield.
2. Secure lines of communication to the interior.
3. Provide security escorts for relief supply convoys and relief organisation operations.
4. Assist the United Nations nongovernmental organisations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.  

In addition to carrying out its humanitarian relief efforts, UNITAF set about trying to restore law and order by creating the conditions for a Mogadishu Police Force to operate. In January 1993 116 11 former police officers were appointed as district station commanders in Mogadishu and by March 2. 1993 there was a 3,000 117 strong police force established in Mogadishu which was a significant achievement for UNITAF. However, this can ultimately be seen as a short term or short sighted achievement, because although a police force was established, the focus had remained on the security situation in Mogadishu and no thought was given to expanding this fledgling capability throughout the rest of Somalia. UNITAF also held meetings in January 1993 to establish the conditions where the Somali courts could again function, and while only baby steps were taken it provided what appeared to be a decent frame work for UNOSOM II to build on.

114 Clarke, W, & Herbst, J, p. 78.
115 Ibid. p. 100.
117 Ibid. p. 24.
UNOSOM II

Security Council Resolution 816, dated 26 March 1993,\(^{118}\) sanctioned UNOSOM II to replace UNITAF and “mandated the peacekeeping force to protect humanitarian supplies and personnel”.\(^{119}\) From the start the mandate of UNOSOM II was ambitious, not only did it call for the rebuilding of “state institutions”, it was also the first United Nations peacekeeping operation to be given a mandate to use force in order to achieve mission success, instead of merely in self-defence, which turned it into a peace enforcement operation. Predictably, UNOSOM II, unlike UNITAF before it, was mandated to “disarm Somali militias or clans”\(^{120}\) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. UNOSOM II consisted of approximately 28,000\(^{121}\) troops, not the 38,000 of UNITAF, yet it was given a far larger and more dangerous mandate.

Unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II did not have a major military force to use as the backbone to attach its coalition forces to. This coupled with the fact that the United Nations was required to ‘outfit’ some of the troop contributing nations forces meant that there was a delay in those forces being received in theatre and starting operations. The issues over command and control, a centralised chain of command, standard operating procedures and rules of engagement would also surface at the commencement of UNOSOM II. Resolution 814 mandated UNOSOM II to carry out peace enforcement operations and disarm the Somali militias in order to ensure security throughout the country. It also mandates UNOSOM II with carrying out the following tasks:

1. Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
2. Prevent any resumption of violence, and, if necessary take action against violators.
3. Maintain control of heavy weapons pending destruction or transfer to new national army.

4. Seize the small arms of unauthorised armed elements and assist in arms registration and security.
5. Maintain the security of all ports, airfields and lines of communication for delivery of aid relief.
6. Protect UN and NGO personnel and equipment and take action against threats if necessary.
7. Continue mine-clearing programs.
8. Assist in repatriation of refugees.
10. Tasks to be accomplished throughout all of Somalia.\(^{122}\)

The death of 24\(^{123}\) Pakistani soldiers in June 1993, by Aideed's supporters lead to Security Council Resolution 837 under which the United Nations authorised US Rangers to apprehend the militia responsible. The subsequent death of 20\(^{124}\) Somali civilians by Pakistani soldiers cannot be dismissed at this point. The bad blood that existed between the Somali's and Pakistani's, who were arguably only in Somalia for the important and high profile image that it would afford the Pakistani government, was a potential hot spot that was going to result in violence at some point. In fact, Aideed had declared in October 1992 that the Pakistani UNOSOM Battalion operating in Mogadishu was no longer welcome nor would its continued employment be tolerated. It is at this point in time that the United Nations should have given serious consideration to the impact of the ill feeling and 'bad blood' that existed between Somali's and Pakistani's. If this had occurred it is possible that the attacks by Somali militia's on United Nations military forces may not have occurred on such an escalating scale. The blatant dislike for Pakistani forces held by the Somali's must be tempered with their support of Italian forces, who were well regarded.\(^{125}\)

The decision to authorise Task Force Ranger was taken as a result of the attack on Pakistani soldiers in June 1993. It has been argued that the

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\(^{122}\) Hillen, J., Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations, Brassey's, United States, 2000, p. 213.
\(^{123}\) Lahneman, W.J, p. 32.
\(^{124}\) Connaughton, R, p. 116.
\(^{125}\) O'Neill, J.T, & Rees, N, p. 127.
decision to authorise the Task Force ultimately forecasted the end of UNOSOM II. In an operation to detain Aideed, conducted on 3 October 1993, 18 US soldiers were killed and 25 wounded\textsuperscript{126} in a gun battle that raged throughout Mogadishu. The Somali death toll was estimated to have been as high as 500.\textsuperscript{127} As a result of the operation US President Bill Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of US troops from Somalia which was to be completed by March 1994.\textsuperscript{128}

UNOSOM was not a success, "in part the result of a mismatch between goals and resources, the goals of bringing peace to Somalia and nation building were failures".\textsuperscript{129} Some of the key lessons learnt from UNOSOM I and II are covered later in this chapter, and unsurprisingly the issues experienced over mandate, troop size and funding are all discussed. Somalia still remains without a state. The mandate for UNOSOM II was far more ambitious than the resources provided to fulfil it. The total withdrawal of United Nations forces from UNOSOM II was completed in March 1995.

**Mandate**

The mandate that was authorised for UNOSOM I quickly proved to be too large for the small monitoring and peacekeeping force that was deployed to Somalia to protect United Nations personnel and supplies and escort humanitarian relief supplies. The 50 strong monitoring elements was tasked with ensuing that both of the Somali militia factions in Mogadishu adhered to the agreement made under the ceasefire. Although the force rose to just over 4,100 prior to UNOSOM II taking over, the reality is that for UNOSOM I to adequately achieve its task under Resolutions 751 and 775 it would have required a considerable increase in troops.

In a direct contrast to UNOSOM I, UNITAF appeared on paper to have sufficient resources to achieve its mandate. The difficulty that the United

\textsuperscript{126} Fleitz, F.H, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. p. 14.
\textsuperscript{128} Fleitz, F.H, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid. p. 44.
Nations faced with UNITAF was that it wanted UNITAF to expand its mandate to include the disarmament of the Somali militia's, however, as discussed above, the US was not prepared to take on this task. In terms of the mandate it is widely accepted by most scholars, and the United Nations itself, that the US led mission was given a realistic and achievable mandate and as a direct result the operation was a relative success.

UNOSOM II’s mandate was too ambitious and broad from the outset. The United Nations authorised the mission to operate under Charter VII of the Charter, and in effect created a peace enforcement mission. The requirement of UNOSOM II to disarm the Somali militia's, without the adequate funding or troops to complete this task, was never going to be successfully achieved. The mandate of UNOSOM II highlights the dysfunction that existed between the expectations of the Security Council members, especially the permanent 5 members, and what force contributing nations were actually capable, or prepared of providing. The failed US operation on 3 October 1993, and subsequent withdrawal of their forces meant that UNOSOM II was destined to fail and not achieve its mandate.

Command and Control – Force Contributing Nations

As was clearly experienced under UNOSOM II, the divided command structure that comes from having different nations military's, and even the United Nations command involved, each with their own set of procedures and goals, causes major operational problems. Unlike UNITAF which was predominantly under US control, UNOSOM II was under United Nations control. However, as the major force contributing nation was the US with its own parallel command structure, and it was authorised under Security Council Resolution 814 to conduct operations in isolation, when the Task Force Ranger was deployed to capture Aideed it did so within its own chain of command without consultation with either the US or the United Nations commands within Somalia.
The command and control relationship and coordination issues between military and civilian organisations in an area of operations is also potentially a problematic issue. During the period of United Nations involvement in Somalia, up to 30\textsuperscript{130} Non-Government Organisations (NGO's) were providing humanitarian relief. Some of these included, CARE International, Doctors Without Borders (DWB), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxford Famine Relief (OXFAM), and the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO).

In mid-December 1992, the humanitarian community in Mogadishu consisted of 21 international NGOs, six UN agencies, the ICRC and the IFRC...Mogadishu thus represented the nerve centre for relief operations and the principal location for coordination between the military and humanitarian organisations.\textsuperscript{131}

Whilst a common task of military forces is to provide convoy escort protection to these organisations, as was seen with UNISOM I and UNITAF, the reality on the ground is that if the NGO does not cooperate with the military's regulations for controlled movement, or stick to provided timelines, then the level of support can be reduced and the relationship soured. However, during UNITAF it is widely accepted that the relationship between military and humanitarian staff was "remarkably productive and successful".\textsuperscript{132} This can be attributed to the speed with which UNITAF set about creating the conditions for relief convoys to meet their objectives of safely delivering aid and food to their intended destinations, and ultimately by the creation of military and humanitarian coordination centres and daily coordination\textsuperscript{133} meetings.

\textbf{Intelligence and Communications}

There was a major requirement for the careful collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), from Aideed's people, who "were intellectually smart and adept at

\textsuperscript{130} Lahneman, W.J, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{131} Clarke, W, & Hirbst, J, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. p. 104.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid. p. 105.
the art of disinformation" and the processing / analysing and then dissemination of this information to the key stakeholders without bias, closed mindedness or prejudice. The failure of intelligence agencies is always one of the first scapegoats used by commanders when justifying why operations or missions do not succeed. However, what is rarely discussed is the difficulty that intelligence specialists have in getting commanders to listen to accurate and timely intelligence. Unfortunately, in more cases than not, if the intelligence assessment provided does not support what the commander wants to do, then it is dismissed as incorrect or lacking in detail.

The fact that the Task Force Ranger elements were operating under their own communications and intelligence networks meant that their own higher US headquarters, and more importantly the United Nations, had absolutely no visibility of the situation that was unfolding on the ground in Mogadishu on 3 October 1992. Because of this the Pakistani support that would ultimately be provided to the Task Force was not briefed about the operation, and in turn its support to the US was reactive, instead of proactive. The Pakistani and other coalition military commanders were not able to contingency plan or prepare their forces for the likelihood of support to the operation because the US had deemed that it did not need to share information.

The gap between traditional methods of communication within Somalia and the reliance of the United Nations military forces on modern technology was also a disadvantage when dealing with the local people. The difficulty of getting the right message out to the local populace regarding the intention of the United Nations missions and what the Somali people should expect from the deployments also proved a stumbling block that affected the overall mission in Somalia. The different languages and dialects spoken by the Somali's as well as the United Nations military and civilian personnel, and the NGO's also created a block to fast and effective information sharing and communications flow.

134 Connaughton, R, p. 127.
Logistics

The ongoing issue of the small and limited capacity of the Mogadishu airport would provide a challenge for the duration of the United Nations missions in Somalia. The requirement to co-ordinate military as well as humanitarian planes and charters also provided a command and coordination challenge. The limited unloading capacity at the Mogadishu port, in which only one ship could be unloaded at a time, also caused confusion over which sea lift vessels were a priority and resulted in delays and further friction between organisations.

Due to the large scale of military and humanitarian supplies being brought through the airport and port, there needed to be a detailed logistics planning and operational staff in place to coordinate reception of supplies, processing and onward distribution. In Somalia this did not occur in the best manner possible and resulted in a break in the supply chain which caused unnecessary delay, and worst case in some instances the mission critical supplies never made it to their intended destination. Issues of theft were also rampant due to the limited warehousing for storing supplies and equipment once they were unloaded, and prior to being uplifted or dispatched to their intended destination.

At the start of a mission there will always be a 'land grab' mentality amongst military and humanitarian organisations as each agency will attempt to establish itself with the necessary vehicles, engineering and communications equipment. In Somalia this problem was exasperated by the fact that the country had been in a state of civil war that had seriously depleted its commercial infrastructure. The United Nations was unable to purchase much of its logistical supplies and equipment from within Somalia and had to instead source it elsewhere and transport it into the country. In the majority of cases Western contingents in general were well equipped and self sufficient,

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136 Lahneman, W.J, p. 36.
it was the contingents from developing states that required United Nations assistance.

The issue over a lack in equipment and supplies was identified on UNITAF and UNOSOM II with some poorer states using the operation as a revenue building activity as "the peacekeepers earned for their governments 1,000 US dollars per month per soldier". Unfortunately when the United Nations is attempting to get the required manning or troop quota as directed by the mandate, then it cannot turn away a military force if it is unable to provide its own equipment and sustainment, but must instead accept a further financial burden in attempting to equip that force.

Pre-deployment Training and Preparation / Deployment / Post-Deployment

From the outset of planning for operations in Somalia the United Nations committed a significant error. There was no detailed reconnaissance to Somalia conducted by the United Nations or contributing nations military planning staff prior to the deployment of any of the three missions. The failure to conduct a reconnaissance meant that the advice provided to the United Nations Security Council prior to authorising the mandate for UNOSOM I, was fragmented and lacking in detail. Had a qualified United Nations planning staff conducted a reconnaissance, then Resolution 751 authorising UNOSOM I would have been considerably different in nature.

Prior to the deployment of coalition military forces on UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II there was no common training or doctrinal guidance provided to the troop contributing nations. A significant flaw in many United Nations missions has been the inherent lack of doctrine on the use of force, rules of engagement and standard operating procedures for United Nations operations. Connaughton (2001) notes:

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138 Ibid. p. 128.
139 Lahneman, W.J, p. 41.
National forces with different standards of training and doctrine, with variable equipment, cannot simply cohere as equal partners on a military operation. But many were there not for military but for political effect.\textsuperscript{140}

The experience levels between the coalition military forces once deployed on UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II differed significantly. Again, a lack of common training standards, doctrine and operating procedures meant that there were difficulties as a result of the command and control situation, as well as the sharing of information, which would serve to reduce the response times of units significantly. As discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, the different, and in some cases outdated or archaic equipment used by less developed and financed military’s created an additional logistics burden on other military forces and the United Nations.

Once deployed the different nations’ perceptions and understanding of the United Nations mandate was a cause of contention. The German, Italian, Indian and Korean forces did not view their role in UNOSOM II as a strict Chapter VII operation and preferred an escalation of force that was graduated. The French, Belgian, Canadian and Pakistani forces were seen to be particularly aggressive with some Belgian troops being charged with ‘colonial barbarism’ after they had returned from Somalia.\textsuperscript{141} The difference in mandate interpretation by troop contributing nations also resulted in some forces refusing to go into certain parts of Somalia as they were concerned for their own safety and not equipped with the armoured protection that was necessary for operating in Mogadishu for example. The differences between United Nations intentions, and the realities of troop contributing nations governmental priorities and end states hampered operations in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{140} Connaughton, R, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{141} O’Neill, J.T, & Rees, N, p. 127.
Key Lessons Learnt

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) was issued in May 1994\(^{142}\) in response to the perceived United Nations failure in Somalia. PDD 25 identified 25 key failings within the United Nations, and outlined 17 conditions that would need to be met before the US would work with the United Nations on another peacekeeping operation. A result of the US report was the creation of a United Nations special commission to investigate what had gone wrong in Somalia during UNOSOM II, more importantly, a "Lessons Learned Unit"\(^{143}\) was created within the United Nations.

A key finding made on Somalia was that the mission had failed principally because its "different military components had no means of communicating with each other directly."\(^{144}\) The second key finding was that there was "very little coordination at the UN headquarters level".\(^{145}\) The fact that the US effectively operated under its own Rules of Engagement, and within US Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) meant that it was operating in isolation from the United Nations. The US did not share vital information with its higher headquarters, subordinate units, coalition partners, and most importantly the United Nations. The Commission concluded that:

The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflict of states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake enforcement operations, the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.\(^{146}\)

The key lessons learned from Somalia are a lot more far reaching than the primary two listed by the Commission above. Whilst they are both vital failures and oversights that needed to be addressed in future operations, in no way does the United Nations hold sole responsibility for the mistakes

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\(^{143}\) Ibid. p. 166.
\(^{144}\) Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 167.
\(^{145}\) Ibid. p. 167.
\(^{146}\) Ibid. p. 167.
made in Somalia. If anything, the creation of ambitious and unrealistic resolutions was supported by the permanent five members – including the US. However, the established mandates were always going to be extremely difficult to achieve with the low level of funding which was given in support of operations in Somalia, something that has in the past been endemic for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and an issue that is not likely to be resolved in the future. The United Nations did not receive the funding that it needed to achieve the mandates laid down by the Security Council.

United Nations operations in Somalia clearly highlighted that the mandate must be achievable with the resources that the mission is allocated. As identified earlier in this chapter, there was a glaring difference with the manning and equipping of UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Yet, UNOSOM II was given the task of disarming the Somali militia’s as UNITAF would not extend its mandate to include this objective. The question has to be asked, why was UNOSOM II not more closely aligned with the capabilities of UNITAF? Especially when it was going to be faced with not only disarming the militia’s, but also with creating a secure environment throughout the whole of Somalia, not just the localised Mogadishu area.

The lack of experience within the United Nations as an Organisation must also be addressed as a key lesson learned. The simple fact is that the United Nations did not have the capacity, or experience base within its personnel to adequately support the complex military operations and humanitarian effort in Somalia. There was little to no coordination between the key organisational departments, and as a result the planning, what little was conducted, was often completed in isolation. The considerable lack of United Nations doctrine and procedures for training, equipping, authorising rules of engagement and the use of force policies of troop contributing nations was also a major flaw during this period.

The failed operations in Somalia again identified the impact that the media can have on public perception and public support for military operations.

147 Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 81.
The images showing the corpse of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu had "an immediate impact on the American public and undermined the US's resolve to stay in Somalia and confirmed the failure of the UNOSOM II mission".\textsuperscript{148}

The lack of a workable command and control system between the United Nations and the US could be seen as the ultimate reason for the failure of UNOSOM II in Somalia. "The bungled action in Mogadishu in October 1993 was conducted by the US, not the UN".\textsuperscript{149} It must be remembered that this was the final act that led to the withdrawal of US troops and some would argue the ultimate failure of UNOSOM II. So, while the US is very quick to lay the failure in Somalia at the United Nations feet, its deliberate failure to provide intelligence and allow coalition forces (even their own US QRF) time to read into the operation and prepare adequate contingency plans are largely responsible for the cost of many lives and the failure of this operation.

Again and again key decisions over United Nations operations were made without Somali buy-in. This was compounded by the lack of a legitimate Somali government and the fact that the United Nations missions did not take into account the full strength, influence and popularity of Aideed. Had more effort gone into getting Aideed and Mahdi on side prior to and during UNOSOM I and then UNITAF it is likely that the situations would not have deteriorated to the point that it did under UNOSOM II. Whilst Somalia did not have a functioning government Connaughton (2001) convincingly argues that the sovereignty of the clans operating within their own territory should not have been overlooked.\textsuperscript{150}

**Recommendations**

Knight and Gebremariam provide some recommendations on what actions the United Nations can take to avoid the issues confronted in Somalia in future operations. They are:

\textsuperscript{148} Connaughton, R, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{149} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{150} Connaughton, R, p. 119.
1. Delineate between peacekeeping and enforcement actions.
2. Develop a UN rapid response capability.
3. Put greater emphasis on prevention.
4. Look to possible UN funding alternatives.
5. Make priorities.

While this list is certainly not exhaustive, it does cover some of the key lessons learned that can be gained from United Nations operations in Somalia under UNOSOM I, UNITAF and finally UNOSOM II. In no particular order, additional recommendations that can be drawn from the United Nations experience in Somalia surround the following key issues:

1. Mandate. The requirement for a clear, concise and realistic mandate is all prevailing.
2. Command and control. Not only within the United Nations Headquarters, but also within the troop contributing nations and peacekeeping force.
3. Intelligence and Information sharing between the United Nations and all troop contingents is required to provide vital force protection and situational awareness.
4. Communications systems that can be employed across a range of situations by all troop contributing nations and the local populace would be a significant asset in information sharing.
5. Logistics. Equipping and sustaining peacekeeping operations, whether it is through own nation responsibility or the United Nations logistic system, is essential for sustaining operations.
6. There is the requirement for United Nations approved, directed and publicized Standard Operating Procedures and Rules of Engagement.
7. An approved common training standard for all United Nations peacekeepers needs to be directed by the United Nations.
8. The training and Education of staff within the United Nations needs to occur.
9. In conducting nation building operations, the creation of stable secure environment through disarmament and the establishment of robust law and order agencies must be sought.

Conclusion

So what could have potentially stopped the developing crisis in Somalia that lead to the requirement for United Nations military intervention? Lahneman (2004) is quick to point out that decisive and early decision making and intervention, backed by realistic military and financial threats or sanctions, could have prevented the failed outcome in Somalia.\textsuperscript{151} There is a large list of lessons learnt that has been developed as a result of the failed United Nations operations in Somalia. Scholars debate what the key reasons for failure were, with some arguing that it was a case of “doctrinal confusion impeded – and ultimately defeated – the UN’s Somalia Mission”.\textsuperscript{152} While others state that it was the breakdown in command and control, or the ambitious and unrealistic mandate created by the United Nations Security Council. Knight (2005) notes:

Admission of the UN’s failure in Somalia can be found in UN Security Council Resolution 865, adopted on 22 September 1995, which set the end of March 1995 as the date for ending the UN peacekeeping effort in Somalia.\textsuperscript{153}

Any one of the key lessons learnt from UNISOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II could be seen as the reason for United Nations failure in Somalia. The expectation that an inherently peacekeeping organisation can change to a peace enforcement one with no training, doctrine or standard operating procedures is seriously flawed. The belief that military forces from numerous nations can operate together at the same standard, without having the same training, processes, procedures, equipment and experiences, without a unified command and control system in place, is incredibly naive.

\textsuperscript{151} Lahneman, W.J, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{153} Knight, W.A, p. 77.
The inability or reluctance of the United Nations and its troop contributing members to intervene in the conflict early or fully comprehend the situation in Somalia from the start clearly highlight a lack of understanding of the scale of conflict prior to the operations even deploying into Somalia. The inability or refusal of the United Nations and troop contributing members to put into place effective measures under which disarmament and stability could occur clearly highlights that there was a lack of absolute commitment to resolving the conflict in Somalia. The unwillingness of member states to provide the United Nations with the necessary funding, resourcing and military contribution required to successfully intervene in Somalia clearly highlights how reliant the United Nations is on the major powers within the Security Council. "What the Somali case has taught us is that understanding the nature of a conflict is essential for devising means to end it".  

While the United Nations operations in Somalia can be seen as admirable, they are non-the-less a failure. The numerous and wide encompassing reasons for the failure in Somalia are debated and analysed in this chapter. While the lessons learnt from Somalia could have gone a long way to assisting the United Nations with the employment of its forces in future peacekeeping operations, history tragically shows that throughout the 1990's United Nations peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq and the Balkans continued to experience systemic failings due to many of the key lessons learnt identified under UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

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154 Ibid. p. 78.
Chapter 4: Case Study Two - Haiti

The six peacekeeping efforts deployed to Haiti since 1993 were a comedy of tragic errors because of a conceptual vacuum and an especially incoherent policy that included restoring a veritable madman to power and trying to build democracy and free market economy in a Fourth World country.\(^\text{155}\)

Introduction

Between 1990 and 1997, the United Nations was "involved in a broad range of activities in support of democracy in Haiti".\(^\text{156}\) This included electoral monitoring and support, three United Nations peacekeeping operations, the imposition of various sanctions and the authorisation of Chapter VII powers to the US-led multinational force (MNF).

Following a military coup on 30 September 1991,\(^\text{157}\) elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide was removed from office and a period of unrest and military violence ensued. On 30 July 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 940 which authorised member states to form a multinational force (MNF) to end the military

\(^{156}\) Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 159.
\(^{157}\) Ibid. p. 159.
dictatorship, facilitate the return of the legitimately elected president and establish and maintain a secure and stable environment.\textsuperscript{158} In the case of Haiti the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolved that the illegal removal of a democratically elected government “constituted a threat to regional peace and security”.\textsuperscript{159}

Resolution 940 provided that a United Nations peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), would take over from MNF after a secure and stable environment had been established. When UNMIH drew to a close the United Nations Secretary General approved the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), followed by the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), a United Nations police force to assist the Haiti national police. In November 1997 the UNSC decided by Resolution 1141 to establish the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in order to continue support to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police.\textsuperscript{160} MIPONUH operated in Haiti until March 2000 when the United Nations formally withdrew all peacekeeping forces out of Haiti and handed over to the MICAH.

Unfortunately the United Nations break from peacekeeping operations in Haiti would prove to be short lived with a return to violence and political corruption in the country. This resulted in a further political upheaval and the retirement of President Aristide in February 2004, amongst calls for major political and governmental reforms. Due to this the United Nations approved the deployment of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to stabilise Haiti. This mission remains ongoing today with 8,825 total uniformed personnel, including 7,065 troops and 1,760 police, supported by 462 international civilian personnel, 876 local civilian staff and 157 United Nations Volunteers.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{158} Knight, W.A, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{159} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{160} Knight, W.A, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{161} United Nations, Peace and Security Section, MINUSTAH Home Page, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, correct as at 30 June 2007.
Historical Background

Haiti, largely regarded as the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere,\footnote{Ehrhart, H, & Schnabel, A, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, United Nations University Press, New York, 2005, p. 264.} gained its independence from France in 1804, thus becoming the first black republic in the world and the second oldest independent state in the Americas. However, it was not until 1825 that France granted Haiti conditional recognition as an independent state. New bases for the legal, social, and economic institutions were established during the early decades of Haiti's independence,\footnote{United Nations, Report of the United Nations Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti, United Nations, New York, 1949, p. 26.} nonetheless, the established systems were basic to say the least and did not include the necessary means for the country's economic development to keep pace with the population increase. As Knight (2005) notes:

Following independence, the country was plagued by political instability, economic exploitation, social inequality and environmental degradation.\footnote{Knight, W.A, p. 150.}

Historically Haiti has been ruled by self-serving elitists, such as Henry Christophe, Alexandre Petion, Guillaume Sam and François Duvalier, the latter of which used a tough regime of regressive taxation to skim the income off rural production in an ever-growing bid to maintain their lifestyles. The US invaded Haiti in 1915 and occupied it for the next 19 years. Kumar (2005) states that the primary reason for US intervention was to protect its financial interests. The US withdrew in 1934, and by 1957\footnote{Ibid. p. 151.} the Duvalier dictatorships began and the troubled country degraded even further. François Duvalier became the President in 1957 and it is widely agreed that under his vicious rule Duvalier created an "oppressive and dysfunctional" political and legal system within Haiti.\footnote{Lahneman, W.J, p. 111.}
Francois Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude. Unlike his father, it was initially believed that Jean-Claude had the ability to inject new life into the Haitian economy and work industry, and that under his rule the country would begin to move forward. However, there were no forward thinking plans or processes in place for Haiti to develop economically, or how it would start to be self-sufficient. Whilst the promise of a better future was there, its potential was not realised or fulfilled. State collapse in Haiti occurred under Jean-Claude Duvalier and he was forced to flee into exile in 1986. Duvalier was replaced by General Namphy who took control of the government.\textsuperscript{167} A period of military brutality and violence had begun. The massacre of peasants and voters between July and the aborted elections in November 1987\textsuperscript{168} further destabilised the country and increased the heavy-handed military rule over Haiti.

President Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected in December 1990, with a 67 percent majority in the United Nations sponsored elections. This was arguably the country's first free and fair election according to Zartman (2005).\textsuperscript{169} The military and police-led coup in September 1991, in which Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras and Lieutenant Colonel Michel Francois overthrew Aristide, was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Although calls were made for Aristide to be reinstated, China and India blocked Security Council attempts to pass a resolution and imposed OAS sanctions failed to get Aristide reinstated. In light of these events the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo against Haiti under Resolution 841, dated 16 June 1993.\textsuperscript{170} Resolution 867 followed on 23 September 1993 and authorised a peacekeeping force, UNMIH, to "modernise the Haitian armed forces and establish a new peace force".\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{167} Lahneman, W.J, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{170} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. p. 160.
The relationship of the OAS with the United Nations warrants some discussion. Article 52 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the role of “regional arrangements”.\textsuperscript{172} This provision includes formally constituted organisations that are designed to operate within their own geographical areas of influence. Haiti is a classic case of how a regional organisation operated in conjunction with the United Nations to attempt to resolve the deteriorating situation in the region. Instead of neglecting its responsibilities the OAS was heavily involved during the crisis and with the eventual outcome in Haiti from 1991 to 1996.

Malone (1998) wrote that the United Nations Security Council decisions on Haiti were linked to the United Nations efforts to address the issues of:

The advancement of democratic rule, in part through electoral assistance and monitoring; promotion and monitoring of human rights; concern over the humanitarian plight of a civilian population affected by political turmoil; a strong desire on the part of some to bring to justice those responsible for gross human rights violations.\textsuperscript{173}

Cheaten Kumar, in Sustaining Peace in War Torn Societies: Lessons from the Haitian Experience, writes that despite numerous criticisms, “both the initial response to Haiti’s immediate crisis and subsequent peacekeeping operations accomplished their key goals”.\textsuperscript{174} He argues that the deficiencies that developed in the international response to the situation in Haiti were not related to the peacekeeping operation, but to the overall strategy for dealing with Haiti’s political situation.

On 3 July 1993,\textsuperscript{175} an agreement was signed on Governors Island in New York by the two main political stakeholders, Aristide and Cedras. Talks had been convened in New York by the United Nations representative Dante

\textsuperscript{174} Laheman, W.J, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{175} Murphy, S.D, p. 262.
Caputo. The talks were conducted over the period 28 June to 3 July 1993\textsuperscript{176} and at the conclusion the general consensus was that Aristide would return to Haiti and resume his presidency. The Governors Island Agreement, as it became known, contained a ten point plan for resolving the crisis in Haiti. Key to the agreement was the return of Aristide to Haiti as its president and the installation of a prime minister by Aristide. Lieutenant General Cedras and his principal associates were allowed to step down without facing any political fallout and were given political amnesty for the crime of undertaking the coup.\textsuperscript{177}

As a result of the initial compliance with the agreement the United Nations lifted its economic sanctions on Haiti. Unfortunately this spelled the early end of the agreement as “a campaign of murder and intimidation took place in the form of armed gangs terrorising the population and attacking Aristide’s allies”.\textsuperscript{178} Under the Governors Island Agreement there had been no requirement for the Haiti militant groups to disarm or be forcefully disarmed. It was in this environment that plans were made for the deployment of UNMIH.

**UNMIH**

From the outset the initial UNMIH deployment was set to fail when faced with armed resistance. United Nations Security Council Resolution 867, signed on 23 September 1993,\textsuperscript{179} mandated a United Nations peacekeeping force to assist in modernising the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force. However, on arrival at Port-au-Prince in October 1993 the “peacekeeping force onboard the USS Harlan County did not disembark when confronted by a crowd of armed thugs gathered at the harbour”.\textsuperscript{180} Notably, the Canadian peacekeepers already ashore were left to their own


\textsuperscript{177} Murphy, S.D, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. p. 263.


\textsuperscript{180} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, 160.
devices as the 200 peacekeepers on board the USS Harlan County sailed home without even notifying the United Nations.\textsuperscript{181} Zartman (2005) notes that:

Confronted with gangs of armed men and a bevy of television cameras, the Harlan County withdrew and the peacekeeping mission was cancelled.\textsuperscript{182}

It is at this juncture that a critical error was made. Instead of deploying UNMIH and reinforcing it with a credible military force to show the Haitian junta that they meant business, the United Nations instead put the deployment on hold and reimposed its oil and arms embargo and in May 1994 adopted a comprehensive set of sanctions against Haiti. The assassination of Guy Malary, Aristide’s Minister of Justice on 14 October 1993,\textsuperscript{183} further compounded the deteriorating situation in Haiti as a result of the failed Governors Island Agreement.

\textbf{MNF}

In January 1994 the exiled President Astride approved the use of external military force in Haiti. The US agreed to lead a military force to tackle the problems of increasing Haitian refugees and a breakdown in negotiations with the military junta. Resolution 940 was authorised on 31 July 1994\textsuperscript{184} as a result of the "Carter Mission" MNF was able to deploy into Haiti unopposed.

\textbf{The Carter Mission}

Whilst preparations were well underway for the US-led MNF, then US President, Bill Clinton, authorised a three man US delegation to travel to Haiti with a mandate "to negotiate the manner in which the military authorities would leave power".\textsuperscript{185} Former US President Jimmy Carter led the mission

\begin{footnotes}
\item[181] Zartman, I.W, p. 192.
\item[183] Murphy, S.D, p. 264.
\item[185] Murphy, S.D, p. 271.
\end{footnotes}
and the Carter delegation met with Haitian military authorities on 17-18 September 1993.

The success of the Carter delegation led to the de facto government stepping down and the resignation of de facto President Jonassaint. The acceptance of the reinstatement of Aristide, as well as the United Nations lifting all measures imposed against Haiti, was a requirement of the agreement reached during the meetings. It must be noted that this three man US mission was conducted without United Nations awareness. It is another blatant example of the US’s lack of respect or submission to the United Nations when it comes to international security. It undermined the United Nations in the eyes of not only the Haitian’s, but also meant that Aristide was deprived of the opportunity to defeat his military rivals with United Nations support.

At its peak MNF totalled 21,000 troops\(^{186}\) with 19 states contributing military and civilian personnel to the mission. Resolution 940 authorised:

> Member States to form a national force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement, on the undertaking that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by participating Member States.\(^{187}\)

In Haiti, like Somalia before it, it was necessary to disarm the local junta or militia to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment. The MNF that deployed into Haiti was authorised, established and equipped to successfully implement its mandate. “This enabling mandate, together with the deliberate initial show of force, and the robust rules of engagements all contributed to a successful implementation of the disarmament mandate.”\(^{188}\)

\(^{186}\) Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 161.
\(^{188}\) Pugh, M, p. 135.
Importantly, the resolution also stated that the MNF would be replaced by an expanded and strengthened UNMIH. US forces headed the mission into Haiti in September 1994 and it is largely agreed that the deployment in Haiti was relatively smooth and incident free.\textsuperscript{189} After the successful restoration of the Haitian Constitutional Government in October 1994, UNMIH’s mandate was revised by Security Council Resolutions 940\textsuperscript{190} in 1994 and further in 1995 by Resolution 975.\textsuperscript{191}

**UNMIH**

UNMIH formally took over from MNF on 31 March 1995\textsuperscript{192} to resume its expanded mandate of supporting the legitimate Haitian government fulfil its democratic responsibilities. The revised mandate included the requirement of assisting the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organisation of free and fair legislative elections. The election of Rene Preval as president in December 1995, was fundamental in the overall progress of Haiti at this time as it demonstrated that the country was again a democracy and moving forward with a peaceful resolution after four years of brutal military rule. The augmented UNMIH consisted of approximately 6,000 troops under United Nations command, 2,400 of which were from the US, plus an additional 570 civilian police, and 450 civilian staff.\textsuperscript{193} UNMIH’s mandate ended on 30 June 1996.

**UNSMIH**

UNSMIH was initially established for a period of six months only under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1063, of 28 June 1996.\textsuperscript{194} The mandate of UNSMIH was limited compared to that of MNF and UNMIH before it. The force was authorised to assist the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; maintain a secure and stable environment in

\textsuperscript{189} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{192} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{193} Murphy, S.D, p. 274.
order to establish and train an effective national police force; and the coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti. Initially comprising 1,500 civilian and military personnel, this amount was reduced to 250 when the mandate ended on 31 July 1997 and it handed over to UNTMIH in August 1997.\(^{195}\)

**UNTMIH**

UNTMIH was authorised under Security Council Resolution 1123 on 30 July 1997\(^{196}\) and established to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Key tasks included the training of HNP specialised units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security. UNTMIH was made up of 250 civilian police and 50 military personnel. The mission ended in November 1997 when it was assessed that the Haitian National Police had been provided with enough long term support to develop its new police force.

**MIPONUH / MICAH**

The Security Council, by its resolution 1141 authorised on 28 November 1997,\(^{197}\) established the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) with the mandate to continue work to support the Haitian National Police. This mission was conducted over a period of three years and a full handover to the MICAH (International Civilian Support Mission) occurred in March 2000 and the United Nations formally withdrew all operations from Haiti. MICAH was established by the UN General Assembly in its resolution A/54/193 of 17 December 1999.\(^{198}\) MICAH was mandated to consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions. MICAH was also tasked with further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with

\(^{195}\) Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 84.
coordinating and facilitating the international community’s dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.

**MIF**

Acting in response to the deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in Haiti, the Security Council authorised the immediate deployment of Multinational Interim Force (MIF) on 29 February 2004, for a period of three months to help to secure and stabilize the capital, Port-au-Prince, and elsewhere in the country. The Security Council also voted to unanimously adopt resolution 1529, 29 February 2004, and under Chapter VII of the Charter authorized the Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate. The mandate included, among others, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and the access of international humanitarian workers, and facilitating the provision of international assistance to the Haitian police and Coast Guard to establish and maintain public safety and law and order and to promote and protect human rights. MIF was replaced by MINUSTAH on 01 June 2004.

**MINUSTAH**

Resolution 1542, 30 April 2004, again authorised United Nations forces to intervene in Haitian affairs to help the transitional government to stabilise the situation. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter the Security Council decided that the deteriorating situation in Haiti again constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region. MINUSTAH was mandated to support the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti could take place; as well as to continue efforts to restructure and reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) and to protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment.

Operations in Haiti under MINUSTAH are ongoing today, with no indication that the stated objectives of a safe and secure environment or a fair and free political system have been met and are likely to advance into the future without United Nations oversight. A crackdown on gang activity in the capital in February 2007 highlights the continuing security risk and unstable environment faced by United Nations peacekeeping forces deployed in Haiti today.

**Mandate**

The four United Nations led and commanded missions into Haiti had distinctly different mandates, varying from police training and promoting institution building, to the mandates authorised for MINUSTAH and the US-led MNF and MIF, which authorised the use of force to disarm the local military junta and militia. The mandate provided to the initial 1993 UNMIH deployment did not provide the force with the required armed readiness or troop numbers to deal with the hostile situation that they met when they tried to disembark in Port-au-Prince. The peacekeepers were not armed or prepared for peace enforcement operations, but peacekeeping operations, and did not have the required weapons or equipment to deal with the security situation in Haiti. Knight (2005) writes that:

> It is axiomatic that one of the conditions of success in peacekeeping is the clarity and feasibility of an operation’s mandate. Ambiguous, unrealistic and impractical mandates are recipes for failure and risk compounding the very problems they are intended to resolve.\(^{203}\)

The mandates authorised for MNF, UNMIH and the 2004 deployments of MIF and MINUSTAH were realistic and accompanied by an allocation of military, police and civilian personnel that meant that the tasks could be completed with little to no difficulty. The mandates authorised for UNSMIH and the smaller police focused UNTMIH was significantly limited compared to that of the larger forces. It can be argued that the tasks laid out in all of the

\(^{203}\) Knight, W.A, p. 155.
mandates were achieved; however, one criticism that must be drawn is the lack of forward thinking under UNSMIH when attempting to put into place the necessary long term measures for institution-building and economic rehabilitation. That said, the purpose of the United Nations force was peacekeeping, not nation building, so this does not detract from what the United Nations missions were there to achieve.

The current deployment of MINUSTAH has no end state in sight. Its mandate to provide a secure and stable environment, provide assistance to and support the political process, and monitor and report on the human rights situation, as well as the requirement to meet all of the tasks that fall out of each of those three specific headings is proving a significant challenge. Whilst progress in certain areas is being made, this is slow going at best and will likely take a considerable period of time for the full mandate to be completed.

Sanctions

Bellamy writes that since 1994 all United Nations sanctions have been targeted. They comprise of "various packages of financial sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes and commodity boycotts, rather than general trade sanctions". In Haiti the Security Council not only targeted government assets, but also targeted the accounts of designated individuals and groups such as the Haitian military junta. The early lifting of the imposed sanctions in 1993 was a serious mistake. This meant that the junta could carry on unopposed with no threat or likelihood of punishment. Murphy (1996) writes that:

Ironically, the sanctions themselves, over several months, imposed considerable hardship on the people of Haiti, resulting in malnutrition, deteriorating health care, and hunger that in some areas approached starvation.

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204 Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. & Griffin, S., p. 151.
206 Murphy, S.D, p. 265.
In an effort to target the military and ruling elite, the sanctions were expanded in May 1994, to include a travel ban on all military and police officers, and their civilian supporters, from travelling outside of Haiti. Mingst and Karns (2005) note that the United Nations sanctioned intervention in Haiti marked the first time the United Nations took action to restore a democratically elected government.207

**Command and Control – Force Contributing Nations**

The command and control aspects of the MNF and MIF deployments into Haiti in 1993 and 2004 respectively will not be discussed in detail in this chapter. As identified in Chapter 3, in Case Study One Somalia, the command and control issues that arise for the deployment of a hybrid multinational force under the command of a major military command chain pale in comparison to those experienced under United Nations led and commanded missions. The US-led operations were widely believed to be a success from a command and control vantage point. The fact that both missions were able to successfully set the conditions for the deployments of follow on forces, UNMIH in 1994 and then MINUSTAH in 2004 is a credit to not only the commanders and leaders at all levels, but also to the planning staff that organised and facilitated the phased transition between forces.

The Canadian led operations into Haiti were strikingly similar to that of the US-led and commanded operations. This is likely due to the similar training and doctrine methodologies between both forces, as well as the fact that the Canadian forces were experienced, disciplined, well equipped and kept well informed of the ongoing situation. As identified in operations in Somalia, interoperability is considered critical for well functioning multinational force.208

The Canadian, US and French forces as well as minor troop contributing

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states, were able to operate effectively due to a common belief in standards of doctrine, training, equipment and professionalism. Hillen (2000) notes that:

Any degree of common doctrine; common training; common command, control and communication procedures; common equipment; and common standards of professionalism can make it infinitely easier for thirty six state ad hoc force to operate with a sense of cohesion.\textsuperscript{209}

The command and control aspect of the United Nations led operations in Haiti proved to be relatively successful in nature. This was largely due to the intelligence and information processes that were put in place under MNF and further developed by the Canadian led UNSMIH and UNTMIH missions.

\textbf{Intelligence and Communications}

Intelligence gathering and analysis are needed at all levels, from the strategic planning stages of a mission before its mandate is even authorised, right through to the tactical implementation of the mission on the ground. Whilst it is widely acknowledged that intelligence gathering is crucial for determining mission capabilities, this requirement was largely paid lip service to during the initial deployment of UNMIH in 1993. Intelligence is only useful to the commander in his or her decision making process if it is timely, value adding and most importantly, accurate.

UNMIH lacked a capable information or intelligence gathering force on the ground in Haiti before it deployed in October 1993. If UNMIH had possessed this capability it would have been forewarned and prepared for the scene that awaited it in Port-au-Prince. The mandate that the United Nations Security Council approved for the initial deployment of UNMIH would also have differed if the United Nations had an accurate assessment of the situation on the ground in Haiti. Deploying lightly armed military engineers and trainers into the unstable and potentially violent security environment in Haiti would not have seemed like such a good idea.

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid. p. 157.
The deployment of the US-led MNF and subsequent Canadian deployments resulted in a change in the way that intelligence and information gathering operations were carried out in Haiti:

A developed and well fleshed out intelligence program that employed its conventional military forces, air assets, psychological warfare, and other elements into a comprehensive intelligence effort. Helicopters provided surveillance and manoeuvre. A reconnaissance platoon provided detailed observation and patrols. Indeed a complete intelligence net was constructed during the operation.210

The use of intelligence in Haiti clearly indicates how successful an intelligence gathering operation can be if it is not only layered throughout all areas of society, but also within the military and civilian agencies. Carment and Rudner (2006) also discuss the fact that the Canadian led UNMIH had French speaking troops, an advantage when dealing with the local population in civil affairs (CA) operations, and in gathering first hand human intelligence (HUMINT) from the streets. "Language skills, cultural empathy, and a willingness to use and cultivate HUMINT proved essential".211

Whilst intelligence operations were carried out efficiently and effectively at the operations and tactical level, numerous criticisms have been directed at the strategic level decision making. Zartman (2005) writes that there was an enormous failure of intelligence among the US policymakers.212 Most of this criticism can be directed at the short term planning for the way ahead in Haiti, and the inability or lack of forethought of planners when they were attempting to promote institution-building and economic rehabilitation.

Logistics

The logistical burden placed on the US logistical supply chain under MNF was considerable. MNF was initially required to rely heavily on sea lift to get military as well as humanitarian supplies and equipment into Haiti at Port-au-
Princ. The lack of infrastructure in Haiti due to years of neglect and decline in the economy, as well as the ongoing humanitarian crisis which was bordering on starvation in some areas, meant that supplies, food and medical provisions had to be brought into Haiti quickly in order to stabilise the security situation.

The United Nations missions in Haiti did not experience the issues over a lack of equipment and supplies within troop contributing nations that was experienced in Somalia during UNOSOM I and II. This is largely due to the majority of contributing nation states having well trained and equipped military forces. The military forces that deployed into Haiti in 2004 already had in place detailed knowledge of the country and the lessons learnt from previous missions to Haiti meant that a sustainable logistical supply system could be established quickly and efficiently.

Pre-deployment Training and Preparation / Deployment / Post-Deployment

The transition from multinational forces to United Nations peacekeeping forces after MNF and MFI were largely successful. When discussing the transition from MNF to UNMIH, Zartman and Rasmussen (1997) wrote that “the transition was planned months in advance; the rotation of troops was phased to ensure continuity at all times; and the US, which had led the multinational force, stayed on as the largest troop contributor.”\(^{213}\)

The withdrawal of United Nations forces from Haiti in 2000 was a well planned and staggered handover with the local police force. The key focus of the withdrawal was ensuring that the newly created Haiti National Police (HNP) force could operate effectively on its own without United Nations assistance. This was achieved through a six month extension of the MIPONUH mandate in order for the HNP to have enough time to establish themselves within the Haitian community as a credible policing element.

\(^{213}\) Zartman, I.W, & Rasmussen, J.L, p. 328.
Key Lessons Learnt

Interplay between the US, OAS and United Nations was a very important factor in the intervention in Haiti. It was the first time that the OAS had taken centre stage and played a key role in facilitating the support and eventual intervention of the United Nations and a major military power, the US. The successful relationship that was developed between the two organisations and the US was an example of the successful interplay that can be had between regional and world bodies.

The postponement of UNMIH in October 1993, and the departure of the USS Harlan County from Haiti without any of the peacekeepers on board stepping foot on Haitian soil, was not only an embarrassment for the US and United Nations, but also a critical error on the part of the decision makers. This withdrawal clearly highlight to the Haitian junta that they had little to fear from the United Nations and that a mild show of force was enough to get the United Nations to effectively put their mission on hold. The return to imposed oil and financial sanctions did not have the desired effect in getting the rogue military elite to step aside, but instead further exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation amongst the Haitian people.

The existence of a robust intelligence and informant network in Port-au-Prince prior to the deployment of UNMIH, would have meant that the peacekeeping force would have been prepared for the rioting thugs that greeted them. More importantly, if access to this information had been available, then the United Nations Security Council may not have authorised a resolution and mandate that wanted to put lightly armed and ill-prepared troops into Haiti as peacekeepers when there was no peace to keep.

The initial lifting of sanctions after the Governor's Island Agreement in 1993, prior to the full implementation of the agreement from the ruling military and political authorities in Haiti was an error made on the part of the United Nations and US. Once the sanctions were lifted there was no reason for Lieutenant General Cedras to stick to the agreement as he had achieved the
victory of ceasing United Nations and US sanctions against Haiti without even stepping aside as promised.

Again the lessons of ambitious and over-reaching mandates were learned during the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers to Haiti. Why does the United Nations Security Council insist on sending lightly armed peacekeepers into situations where there is no peace to keep? The mandate authorised for UNMIH in 1993 was unrealistic and impossible to achieve. This was clearly highlighted when the peacekeepers did not even make it onto Haitian soil and instead departed for the US after being confronted by armed thugs in Port-au-Prince. UNMIH was not equipped, manned or prepared to take on peace enforcement operations.

The actions of the US at times undermined the authority of the United Nations, and identified one of its major stumbling blocks, the lack of a dedicated United Nations military force. The requirement of the United Nations to rely on major military powers to command and lead its operations means that it has to accept that states will want to influence and direct the decision making process of their military forces. The Carter Mission to Haiti in September 1993, whilst arguably paving the way for a violent free entry into Haiti, was conducted by the US without any consultation with the United Nations. Not only does this show a lack of respect for the organisation, it also indicates that the US was going to do things its own way regardless of what the United Nations wanted or attempted to enforce.

The model of a MNF intervention being led by a major power, then followed by a United Nations commanded peacekeeping force, was a success. The handovers between MNF to UNMIH in 1994, and MIF to MINUSTAH in 2004, were both fluid and well phased operations. Kumar articulates that the plans for any international peace operation and for its exit strategy should be drawn up to focus on supporting the building of political consensus and the restoration of Rule of Law.\textsuperscript{214} The opportunity for the United Nations missions to follow on from multinational forces designed to stabilise and secure the

\textsuperscript{214} Lahneman, W.J, p. 127.
situation in a short period of time, proved to be a success. The ability of the MIF to respond rapidly and deploy to Haiti on 29 February 2004, also clearly showed the Haitian military and police that the United Nations and the US clearly meant business.

Recommendations

Mingst and Karns (2007) clearly articulate that "although international military action should be authorised by the UN, the actual work of applying force has to be subcontracted to what has become known as a coalition of the willing led by one or more major powers with sufficient military capabilities".\(^\text{215}\) This was demonstrated well in Haiti under both the MNF and MIF missions. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, where possible it is reinforced that the United Nations missions into insecure and unstable environments where peace does not exist, should be preceded by a multinational force led by one of the major military powers in order to create a more peace like environment for United Nations peacekeepers to deploy into.

The command and control and intelligence systems in place in Haiti from MNF to present have largely been conducted without incident. The ability of multinational forces to carry out their mandate is considerably enhanced or increased when the forces employed operate within similar doctrine, training and equipment philosophies and capabilities. Carment and Rudner (2006) clearly show that the intelligence and information network established in Haiti under UNMIH and UNSMIH was not only comprehensive but also successful. The ability to share information between the force contributing nations military and policing forces, as well as with NGOs was a significant advantage during operations in Haiti.

United Nations missions are going to be hard pressed to restore and develop democratic and economic institutions in a country where the local parties have no interest or inclination in either cooperating with the United Nations, or with furthering their own nations. In order for "nation-building" or the

restoration of democracy to be successful there must be total buy-in and commitment from a country's leaders and people. Aristide and his key political staff were more interested in lining their own pockets than promoting democracy in Haiti. In order to achieve the necessary buy-in and support required a well executed education and information process needs to be developed and distributed so that the local people have an understanding of what is trying to be achieved, and can see a way ahead for the development of their country. Through an education process the required buy-in might be achieved.

In order to support a fair and equitable political and judicial system the involvement of the United Nations, and in this case the US, needed to be impartial and fair. The US's constant backing and support of Aristide, in light of all of the evidence against him which indicated that he was corrupt and not interested in furthering democracy within Haiti, was a mockery of the pledges to restore a democratic government to Haiti. Whilst elections were conducted under United Nations supervision, the already inherent corruption and strong financial support for Aristide in 2000 meant that none of the eligible contenders would run against Aristide insisting that the elections were a sham. Aristide was elected and claims were made that it was a fair and legal election regardless.

Conclusion

United Nations peacekeepers are given great credit for restoring democratic rule in Haiti.\textsuperscript{216} However, the democratic rule restored in the mid 1990s was short lived and the eventual slide back into political corruption and violence in 2004 was not a surprise to many. Zartman (2005) states that there were several missed opportunities in Haiti. Foremost amongst these was be the failure to assist in the appointment of an honest and moral president who was going to establish and follow a legal and fair political and justice system.\textsuperscript{217} The US and the United Nations chose to reinstate and support Aristide not

\textsuperscript{217} Zartman, I.W, p. 182.
once, but twice, even though many questioned his fitness for office and his support for democracy and a free market economy. The question over the relentless insistence of the US to keep Aristide in power is one that has been delved into by several scholars, such as Fleitz, and the consensus is that it was not done for the betterment of the Haitian people. Fleitz (2002) notes:

Economic deterioration, drug trafficking, and political assassinations have defined Aristide's Haiti.

Like the situation in Somalia, the United Nations faced extreme difficulties with the permanent members of the Security Council when it was attempting to influence the situation in Haiti. Thakur (1998) writes that the provision of the power of veto to the Permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council has resulted in a "severely curtailed" decision making process due to the "extensive decision-blocking competence of the permanent members". Thakur further goes on to argue that the veto clause effectively negates the collective security aspect of the United Nations, which he defines as "the maintenance of international peace and security" regardless of whether it is achieved through preventative diplomacy or peacekeeping.

Malone (1998) is quick to note that the United Nations Security Council's decisions on Haiti were "linked to and very much influenced by developments elsewhere in the world...and they in turn influenced developments elsewhere". Malone (1998) notes that:

While international intervention restored a civilian government and replaced the repressive army with a civilian police force, it did not address Haiti's long term political impasse. When Aristide was restored, so was the deadlock that had characterise his previous government.

218 Fleitz, J.H, p. 136.
221 Thakur, R, p. 181.
222 Malone, D, p. 2.
The current situation in Haiti, even with MINUSTAH in place, remains tenuous at best. Demonstrations, protest marches and strikes may occur at any time in the capital, throughout the country and on main highways. It was noted that large crowds, particularly in downtown Port-au-Prince, can quickly turn into violent demonstrations with gunfire and burning barricades. Criminal activity remains endemic throughout Haiti where armed and extremely dangerous gangs continue to operate. The risk of kidnapping, carjacking and armed robbery also remains.

The key issue in Haiti now, remains the same issue that existed in the late 1980s, and throughout the 1990s. The lack of a fair and legal political and judicial system means that the country cannot move forward as a democracy. Until a president and government are elected that accept the offer of international aid and funding for the use in bettering Haiti, the country will not progress. Whilst the efforts of the United Nations, the US and NGOs throughout the 1990s to the present day have greatly alleviated the suffering of the local people, they have not addressed or rectified the issues of institution-building, national reconciliation or economic rehabilitation in Haiti.
Chapter 5: Case Study Three – Bosnia-Herzegovina

The saga of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia is surely one that will go down in history as an example not to be followed. You do not attempt to appease an aggressor by giving him humanitarian aid, replenishing his fuel supplies and turning a blind eye when he raids weapons depots. Do not attempt to avoid offending the aggressor by letting him attack the people most in need of protection. Do not prevent these people from fighting back. Do not put non-combat-ready peacekeeping forces in places where they cannot defend themselves. Do not be surprised when the troops you have made hostage to your non-policy become real hostages. 224

Introduction

The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred in the aftermath of the death of the federation’s leader Josip Tito in 1980, the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, and because of the political and economic crisis that had been facing Yugoslavia since the early 1970s. Crime and corruption became a prominent feature of the country’s political environment with the decline in the economy. The country’s decent into war, including the establishment of paramilitary groups within the Bosnian Serb faction, resulted in smuggling and

black market activities being conducted on a large scale. This also ultimately led to the unique situation of criminal elements working for all three sides.

The United Nations officially became involved in the situation on 25 September 1992 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 expressing its concern at the fighting and calling on all States to implement a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.” The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted as part of the larger set of conflicts surrounding the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federal state, of which Bosnia-Herzegovina was a federal republic. Bosnia-Herzegovina received recognition of its independence from the international community in April 1992 and this was the trigger for the conflict that ensued. On April 6, 1992, the Bosnian Serbs began their siege of Sarajevo. Muslim, Croat, and Serb residents opposed to a Greater Serbia were cut off from food, utilities, and communication. Seven peacekeeping missions were deployed to Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia between 1992 and 2000.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established to operate in Croatia in February 1992, and then expanded to also encompass Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1992. The deployment into Bosnia-Herzegovina was initially mandated in order for the Sarajevo airport to be re-opened for humanitarian supply efforts. However, this mandate would be expanded on many occasions over the three years of UNPROFOR involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the time the conflict ended in 1995 more than 20,000 Bosnians had lost their lives, and nearly half of the country’s remaining population had been displaced.

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226 Center for Balkan Development, History of the War in Bosnia, Cambridge, May 1996.
227 Fleitz, p. 137.
228 Lahneman, W.J, p. 53.
As the conflict evolved the UNPROFOR mission experienced the same problems of mission creep, divided command and control, lack of civil-military cooperation, and a weak and over ambitious mandate that characterised UNOSOM I and II. However, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was able to successfully complete its policing mission. As this chapter discusses, the lessons learnt from Bosnia-Herzegovina are similar to those already discussed in case study one (Somalia) and are not all specifically unique to the Balkans crisis.

**Historical Background**

The origins of the conflict in Yugoslavia can be traced back several centuries. Diehl (1993) writes that the present troubles stem from the decisions of “Croatia and Slovenia to declare their independence in 1991 from the Yugoslav federation”.\(^{230}\) This, coupled with the political and economic crisis that faced the country throughout the 1980s, meant that Yugoslavia collapsed largely because it “no longer had the institutional means to save itself”.\(^{231}\)

The multiethnic nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its varied settlement dispersion contributed to the disintegration of the country. Prior to the conflict the tension between individual and group ethnicities within Bosnia-Herzegovina was a major source of concern. Even after the Dayton Agreement this issue remains one of the main areas of contention. The creation of ethnically defined territories was meant to help facilitate the safe and quick return of refugees to their homes; however, the reality is that even four years later the areas under Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat control have actively resisted the return of minorities. Donias (2005) notes that rather than resolving the partition debate the Dayton Agreement institutionalised it:

> Those who have returned to minority situations are faced with widespread discrimination, both illegal and legal. Not only are returnees regularly subject to threats, harassment, and intimidation

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\(^{230}\) Diehl, P.F, p. 190.

\(^{231}\) Donias, T, p. 7.
by members of the majority group, they also face institutionalised political discrimination.232

The authorisation of UNPROFOR in 1992 to enter Croatia and protect the people through the establishment of demilitarised zones was later expanded to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A referendum of independence was held and approved by an overwhelming majority, the result of which was the outbreak of fighting between Bosnia Serbs and Muslims. In May 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted as a member of the United Nations, Croatia and Slovenia, also former Yugoslavia states, were also admitted.233

The disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina following the referendum was quick and on an immense scale. Murphy (1996) writes that:

The fighting that followed was brutal, involving indiscriminate, vicious attacks on and torture of civilians, sieges of cities sheltering starving civilians, rape as an instrument of warfare, and inhumane treatment of prisoners. The term “ethnic cleansing” came to mean the elimination by an ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups either by forced expulsion or death.234

It must be noted that while all of the warring factions are guilty of committing serious breaches of human rights, that the vast majority of the atrocities were committed by the Serbs. The human rights abuses were so severe that they resulted in the Security Council establishing an international criminal tribunal in The Hague to prosecute those responsible. The paramilitary forces under Bosnian Serb command were largely responsible for the worst atrocities committed during the conflict. The Secretary General noted in his report to the NATO foreign ministers in 1992 that:

Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with the present leadership of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. They have

232 Murphy, S.D, p. 51.
233 Ibid. p. 201.
234 Ibid. p. 200.
sought territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous practice of "ethnic cleansing." It was in this setting that the United Nations Security Council imposed a general embargo on the import and export from Serbia-Montenegro of all commodities. In addition it ordered states to freeze assets abroad, prohibited services related to its aircraft and weapons as well as flights to and from Serbia-Montenegro. However, these measures did little to stem the violence or victimisation of the Muslim minority. The ban of military flights in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina caused tension within the Security Council with concerns that it would create difficulties for UNPROFOR relations.

**UNPROFOR**

Resolution 743 approved the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an initial period of 12 months on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR was initially established to ensure demilitarisation of designated areas in Croatia and was created as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the "negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia." The mandate was later extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor "no fly zones" and safe areas, and then further extended to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for preventative monitoring in border areas. Throughout the period February 1992 to February 1993 the mandate of UNPROFOR extended across five of the seven former republics of the former Yugoslavia, with a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia.

Due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 30 April 1992, 40 military observers were sent into the troubled area by the United

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Nations Secretary General. Due to the inability to establish a solid ceasefire between the two warring sides of the Bosnia Serbs and the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims the observers were withdrawn in May 1992. The decision to deploy UNPROFOR was made without a stable ceasefire in place. Another key issue was also the fact that the Bosnian Serb military had "access to the most sophisticated weaponry in the former Yugoslavia." The United Nations forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not facing an unorganised, poorly equipped or trained militia element. They were facing a disciplined, experienced and heavily armed military that had no hesitation in conducting rape, murder and ethnic cleansing operations against their fellow Bosnia's.

Mockaitis (1999) writes that "besides lacking an enforcement mandate and the appropriate hardware for the combat environment for Bosnia, UNPROFOR faced additional problems that limited its effectiveness." The fact that UNPROFOR was only lightly armed was a serious distinguishing feature when the tasks given to the mission started to evolve into enforcement ones. Peacekeepers are traditionally meant to use their arms in self defence only; they do not have an offensive mission and lack the capability to carry one out.

The use of 370 United Nations peacekeepers as human shields by the Serb military was a direct example of the distain that the Bosnian Serbs held for the United Nations. It also indicated very clearly that they understood how to manipulate the organisation, as the United Nations would not conduct air strikes against Serb equipment if there was any risk of injuring its own peacekeepers. This action resulted in the withdrawal of United Nations peacekeepers under UNPROFOR from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR was followed by a six week air campaign by NATO, which ultimately forced the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a ceasefire and a peace treaty. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on 14 December 1995 and Donias (2005) notes that:

From the moment the deal was struck it was clear that as difficult as it had been to reach the agreement at Dayton, it would be tougher still to implement it...Dayton’s initial timelines were hugely ambitious and, ultimately, deeply unrealistic.241

The Dayton Accords were initialled in Dayton, Ohio, on the 21 November and formally signed and implemented on 14 December 1995.242 Donias (2005) writes that “with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international community embarked on one of the most ambitious state-building projects it has ever undertaken.”243 While there remained some ambiguity or difference in interpretation between the signatories regarding the peace agreement, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) notably stopped the killing and laid down a rough blueprint for transforming Bosnia into a “peaceful market democracy”.244 Most notably the Dayton Accords were responsible for partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina into three national states.

The return of refugees and displaced persons, consolidation of democratic values, institutions and practices as well as the creation of a viable market economy and climate of tolerant multi-ethnicity were all “pillars” of the agreement according to Donias (2005).245 Bose (2002) notes that:

There are often calls for a revision of the peace agreement, either to break up Bosnia further or to pave the way for a more unitary state. Neither is realistic, and both are irresponsible in view of the fears that would be unleashed by any attempt to remake the peace, in effect opening up all the questions of the war.246

This is clearly a logical argument. However, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina would not survive going back to the drawing board and finding an alternative or revised peace agreement. The fact that the requirement for international involvement in the country still exists is a clear indication that

241 Donias, T., p. 9.
243 Ibid., p. 1.
244 Ibid., p. 1.
245 Ibid., p. 2.
246 Bose, S., p. 1.
there is a significant way to go before the state-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina is even close to completion. The DPA heralded the deployment of the Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR), a 60,000\(^{247}\) strong NATO-led peace-enforcement mission, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

**UNMIBH**

Resolution 1035\(^{248}\) authorised by the United Nations Security Council on 21 December 1995, established the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), an operation that came to be known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). UNMIBH was mandated to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia-Herzegovina by assisting in forming and restructuring the local police, assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system and monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order.\(^{249}\) An increase in its mandate tasks also led to UNMIBHs involvement in “investigating or assisting with investigations into human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel”.\(^{250}\) A further five resolutions were authorised by the United Nations Security Council throughout the tenure of UNMIBH, an indication that the Security Council was prepared to increase the mandate tasks to best facilitate the changes required in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNMIBH was predominantly a civilian police operation. With an original strength of 1,721 police officers and 5 military liaison officers,\(^{251}\) the number of civilian police was eventually increased to 2,057 to meet additional imposed tasks.\(^{252}\) Notably, unlike most peacekeeping operations, UNMIBH did not contain a military component and worked closely with IFOR then SFOR to achieve its mission. The significant level of crime and corruption evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina before, during and after the war meant that

\(^{247}\) Mockaitis, T.R, p. 115.
there was corruption at most levels within the law and justice agencies active in the country. The significant contribution of civilian police officers from many nations to try and retrain, up-skill and reintegrate a degree of trust and professionalism back into Bosnia-Herzegovina's policing and legal processes has been successful to date. That said, the process is going to continue to be long term in nature.

Following the completion of its mandate UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH on 1 January 2003. UNMIBH successfully achieved the tasks required under its various mandates, and, unlike the military operations under UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not receive a stigma attached to it due to failed operations.

**IFOR / SFOR**

IFOR replaced the failed UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995\(^{253}\) and was tasked with developing a safe and secure civilian environment. IFOR was intended to enforce the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^ {254}\) It was predominantly a United States led operation with NATO forces involved from the outset in securing and maintaining air superiority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR was succeeded by a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in January 1997\(^ {255}\) which was tasked with stabilising the country and focusing on nation building. Under SFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina was split into three major geographical areas with France, the United States and Britain essentially responsible for their own sectors. SFOR remains in place to this day.

\(^{253}\) Carmet, D, & Rudner, M, p. 36.


\(^{255}\) Ibid. p. 36.
Mandate

Jett (1999) writes that “a mandate can suffer from being unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak”. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the mandate was unrealistic and unsupportive because some of the Security Council members were acting in accordance with their own interests and on faulty assessments. The provision of inadequate resources is one of the major contributions to the mission’s failure. Jett goes on to write that it was not merely political influences that weakened the mandate, but also a “lack of material and human resources” that made the mandate virtually unachievable. One military commander working in Bosnia stated:

There is a fantastic gap between the resolution of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions and the means available to commanders in the field.

The international community sought to mediate an end to the crisis and conduct humanitarian operations only in Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with traditional peacekeeping principles, including the consent of all warring factions. The fact that the Serb military had a well armed force operating within Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was potentially willing to retaliate or attack an armed ground intervention, was one of the factors that deterred intervention in the first three years of the conflict. The United Nations had no desire to put peacekeepers into a position where they would be vulnerable to retaliation or offensive operations from a heavily armed professional military force. It was argued from the outset that any enforcement orientated mission would be at risk and that the main force contributing nations were not prepared to volunteer their soldiers for anything other than a traditional peacekeeping operation.

At the root of the failure of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia was an unworkable and contradictory mandate. UNPROFOR troops in

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257 Ibid. p. 40.
258 Ibid. p. 40.
259 Murphy, p. 216.
Bosnia were given a so-called "chapter VII" mandate but were equipped as traditional peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{260}

The establishment of a "no fly zone" under Resolution 781,\textsuperscript{261} dated 9 October 1992, meant that all non UNPROFOR military flights, or flights in support of United Nations operations, were banned in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another increase in UNPROFORs strength was approved in order to place observers at key airfields to monitor compliance with the resolution.

Operations in Croatia and Bosnia were seriously undermined by conceptual, mandate, and administrative problems, and may have done the most cumulative damage to the reputations of the UN and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{262}

The adoption of a 'no fly zone' was fully supported by the United Nations Secretary General as a means of controlling the delivery or weapons and ammunition into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The support that Bosnia Serbs received from neighbouring Serbia meant that the flow of arms was a major concern to the United Nations forces operating within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this was one way of controlling or stemming the flow of weapons into theatre. The trafficking of weapons across the land border also led to an increase in UNPROFOR's mandate to place border control points along Bosnia-Herzegovina's external northern and eastern borders to again attempt to control or cease the large amounts of weapons and ammunition supplies making it into the Bosnian Serbs hands.

Command and Control - Force Contributing Nations

The French and British contingents, numbering just over 10,000, formed the backbone of UNPROFOR. The mission faced systemic issues from diverse methods of command, rules of engagement and understanding of the weak and ambitious mandate. The command and control arrangements within

\textsuperscript{260} Fletz Jr, F.H, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{262} Fletz, F.H, p. 137.
Bosnia-Herzegovina were dysfunctional and involved too many layers of command. Cooperation with civilian aid agencies was also stilted with a lack of effective liaison and a "fundamental differences in approach" and "lack of common goals."\(^{263}\)

Diehl (1993) notes that, "UNPROFOR had command and control problems that seriously hindered the mission."\(^{264}\) The combination of troops remaining under inherent national control, combined with the United Nations influence and then the additional layer of NATO meant that two different chains of command needed to be consulted before even a basic decision could be made. This dual command structure caused significant delay in the decision making process, and led to conflict between the United Nations and NATO when hidden agendas stopped support to certain actions, such as the bombing of Serb forces by NATO aircraft. Diehl summarises that:

> The UNPROFOR operation exemplified a peacekeeping force placed in the nearly impossible situation of a brutal civil war with the expectation of performing its mission without the cooperation of the warring parties, sub-national actors, and key third party states. It is thus not surprising that the mission encountered so much difficulty.\(^{265}\)

The example of the Dutch peacekeeping battalion tasked with protecting the Muslim 'safe area' established in Srebrenica is perhaps the most potent reminder of how a United Nations peacekeeping force that is under strength, poorly prepared, weakly mandated, and incorrectly armed can so blatantly fail. Security Council Resolution 819, passed in April 1993, provided for the creation of six Muslim 'safe areas' within Bosnia-Herzegovina and virtually guaranteed that it would protect the people within them. The United Nations assessed that 34,000 troops would be needed to adequately secure the safe areas, but only mustered a force of 7,400 to complete the task.\(^{266}\) Robbertson (2006) notes that the Dutch soldiers "simply cowered when the

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\(^{263}\) Mockaitis, T.R, p. 93.
\(^{264}\) Diehl, P.F, p. 195.
\(^{265}\) Ibid, p. 196.
Serb attack came, and watched apologetically during the subsequent preparations for 'ethnic cleansing' by evacuation and massacre."

This incident highlights that the United Nations will not take action if it is fearful that its own peacekeepers will be in direct danger as a result of that action. The failure of the United Nations to order NATO air strikes meant that the Serb advance was unhindered by the 'promised' United Nations guaranteed protection of the safe area. Robbertson (2006) writes that what made the Srebrenica incident different from the many other cases of ethnic cleansing that have been conducted was that the international community, in particular the Dutch peacekeepers, simply stood back and watched as the Serb military massacred Muslim men of weapon bearing age.

The fear that Dutch soldiers would become hostages and that the battalion might suffer casualties caused the Dutch government (and the UN representative on the ground) to veto the essential air strikes.267

This exact scenario was also faced by Belgium peacekeepers in Rwanda when they were forced to watch the massacre of innocent Tutsis by the Hutus.268 Again a weak and limited mandate meant that peacekeepers were in a situation where they were few in number and severely under-armed. If the situation in the western Sudan province of Darfur is looked at honestly and without bias, the same conclusion that ethnic cleansing and genocide are occurring must be reached. Robbertson (2006) notes that:

Until mandates to keep the peace are interpreted by the UN as mandates to fight aggressor factions, if this is the only way the peace can be kept and genocide prevented, there will be many more Srebrenica's and (much worse) more Rwanda's.269

In creating safe areas and vowing to protect them the United Nations effectively adopted a Chapter VII enforcement policy, however, only a Chapter VI mandate was ever authorised and the peacekeeping force was

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267 Robbertson, G, p. 85.
268 Ibid. p. 86.
269 Ibid. p. 87.
not equipped to implement Chapter VII tasks. The mandate authorised for UNPROFOR placed the Dutch peacekeepers in the unfavourable situation of being in a position where enforcement action was required to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims, but they had neither the weaponry nor political will to take action.

Major General Lewis Mackenzie, a Canadian and former head of United Nations forces in Sarajevo made this comment about the United Nations managerial capacity: “A UN commander in the field should not get into trouble after 5 p.m. in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone”.\(^{270}\) This situation is widely systematic across the majority of United Nations missions.

**Intelligence and Communications**

Intelligence sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina under UNPROFOR was disjointed and guarded at the best of times. The flow of intelligence and information within UNPROFOR was not a systematic process that was designed to get the best possible intelligence to the lowest end user in a timely and efficient manner. The diverse range of troop contributing nations meant that the British, Canadian and US forces were hesitant to share their ‘intelligence’ with their United Nations allies, such as the French and Bangladesh contingents. The fact that the United Nations considered itself neutral, and that the term “intelligence” was seen as a dirty word throughout the organisation the early 1990s did not assist in the information gathering efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Carment and Rudner (2006) note that:

For most UN missions conducted during the 1990s, the operational consequences of this aversion to intelligence has proven problematic...The United Nations Protection Force’s (UNPROFOR’s) tasks began to multiply in response to a rapidly deteriorating situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its

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\(^{270}\) Lahneman, W.J, p. 41.
intelligence resources lagged behind its needs as the political process upon which intelligence-sharing relied for direction proved insufficient.\textsuperscript{271}

The rate with which mandates were changed and updated indicated that the comprehensive analysis and intelligence processes had not been conducted prior to critical operational decisions being made both within UNPROFOR and the United Nations organisation as a whole. Within most intelligence organisations there exists several tiers of classified information, both internal within their own national organisation, and externally with other intelligence agencies or organisations. The handling and caveats for the release of information within each tier differs greatly, with strict national guidelines and rules on what information can be released. A clear example of this is the standard NATO ‘five eyes only’ caveat, which essentially means that intelligence will only be released to the appropriately cleared personnel from Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

Smaller intelligence cooperation or sharing relationships also existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as that between Britain and the United States. Whilst these caveats are created ultimately to ensure the safety of intelligence or information for the organisation that has gained it, unfortunately, the lack of information sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that at times peacekeeping troops from other nations, that did not have a developed intelligence system in place to provide essential early warning, were to be put in situations where they could have been better forewarned had they been trusted.

The use of HUMINT within UNPROFOR proved crucial to the mission. The deployment of peacekeepers into certain areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as those with a predominantly Bosnian Serb or Muslim majorities, was not welcomed by many of the local people. The requirement for getting early warning on planned attacks or operations against the United Nations or the local population was vital. Had access to this valuable source of information existed, then the incidents surrounding the hostage taking of peacekeepers

\textsuperscript{271} Carment, D & Rudner, M, p. 2.
for political gain might not have been successful. HUMINT is also essentially in order for a commander to understand the tactical situation in his or her area of operations (AO). The reliance on HUMINT clearly highlighted the issues which arose due to a lack of enough interpreters, and re-raised a key intelligence lesson learned that language skills are essential.

The diverse nature of contributing countries to UNPROFOR meant that the communications systems throughout the organisation were largely dysfunctional as the technology used by countries differed so greatly. The limited nature of police communications was also problematic under UNMIBH because the equipment used was not compatible with their military counterparts in UNPROFOR or IFOR. The requirement to provide communications to sub-units, higher headquarters elements, flanking units or organisations, within a force's own command structure and then back to national command elements and out to the United Nations placed a heavy communications bill on UNPROFOR. The inability to provide the accurate and timely intelligence essential to commanders at all levels during their decision making process was further impeded not only by language barriers, but also through the issues created over the geographical layout of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to the rough and step terrain throughout the country certain areas were unable to receive reliable signals and the reliable access to communications.

It must be noted that the intelligence capability within IFOR and its successor SFOR was greatly enhanced from than that used by UNPROFOR or UNMIBH. A heavy emphasis was placed on HUMINT and SIGINT collection from the outset of IFOR. However, the same issues over information sharing and a reluctance to plan intelligence led operations as a collective group also existed. During SFOR issues over intelligence sharing between the five eyes community were experienced and this resulted in a breakdown in communications, information flow and the creation of a suspicious or untrustworthy perception towards intelligence gatherers and organisations, military and civilian.
Logistics

United Nations operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were initially hindered by the fact that the major airport in the capital Sarajevo was controlled by the Bosnian Serb military. United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 called on:

All States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{272}\)

After further discussions the decision was made that the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and onward throughout other parts of the country would be entrusted to UNPROFOR. Resolution 776\(^{273}\) authorised a change in mandate to meet this new requirement and approved an increase in the size of UNPROFOR to meet this additional task. UNPROFOR succeeded in keeping the Sarajevo airport open and in the period from July 1992 to January 1993 "the humanitarian airlift organised by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods".\(^{274}\)

Mockaitis (1999) notes that "inadequate equipment, a hybrid force composed of units of varying quality, and a lack of political will reduced UNPROFOR’s actions to the least common denominator."\(^{275}\) Again the issues faced in Haiti and Somalia were compounded in Bosnia-Herzegovina when troop contributing nations sent were under equipped, poorly trained and unprepared soldiers to contribute to UNPROFOR. This is an endemic issue within United Nations peacekeeping missions. Whilst the United Nations insists on accepting poorly trained and poorly equipped troops, instead of turning them away, it is going to continue to have issues with supplying the basic logistic


\(^{275}\) Mockaitis, T.R, p. 91.
provisions to these nations. It is unlikely that this scenario will change in the short term, with the United Nations having to accept any force contributing nation that steps forward and offers troops in order to meet the large demand worldwide for peacekeepers.

The provision of vital humanitarian aid to the allocated 'safe areas' was difficult via road, even with UNPROFOR providing convoy escorts. New Zealand soldiers commented that the Bosnian Serbs showed little or no respect for the presence of United Nations peacekeepers escorting convoys and that at times road blocks were put in place to deliberately hold up the delivery of humanitarian aid to certain areas. This difficulty lead to the United States conducting air drop operations into declared safe areas in order for essential food and supplies to reach the cut-off Muslim populations. However, the 3,286\textsuperscript{276} tons of supplies delivered via air drops was not nearly enough to meet the needs of the starving people. UNHCR reported that 30-40\textsuperscript{277} people were dying per day from starvation.

**Pre-deployment Training and Preparation / Deployment / Post-Deployment**

"Contingents from outside Europe often arrived ill trained and poorly equipped, and were in the words of one UNPROFOR deputy commander, "a waste of rations."\textsuperscript{278} The different standards in training and equipment are a problem that is endemic within United Nations deployments. While there is a clear guide for the required standard of United Nations peacekeepers, the example of UNMIBH clearly indicates that this is not always met, and that the United Nations does little to nothing to rectify the issue of poorly trained peacekeepers.

While the issue of poorly equipped forces can be readily fixed by providing funding and supplies, the time and effort required to train peacekeepers is not always available. In theatre familiarisation training does go some way to

\textsuperscript{276}Mockaitis, T.R., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{277}Ibid. p. 95.
\textsuperscript{278}Ibid. p. 91.
assessing the trained readystate of a force, but it would be unrealistic to
expect the United Nations to train or re-train a force that has agreed to
commit to operations and guaranteed that its troops meet the required
standard. While the initial deployment of peacekeepers to Bosnia-
Herzegovina suffered from a consistently low standard of personnel, this was
largely overcome by the time that UNPROFOR was replaced with IFOR. The
deployment of IFOR, which consisted of several large NATO contributing
nations, was a timely arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it clearly indicated to
the Bosnian Serb military that they could no longer attack indiscriminately
without repercussions.

Key Lessons Learnt

The mandate authorised for UNPROFOR in Croatia was a success, however,
the increase to operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina without a change from a
peacekeeping to peace enforcement mandate proved to be a fatal error. As
the United Nations kept expanding the tasks of UNPROFOR it needed to
adapt the mandate to not only allow the force to complete the enforcement
tasks, but provide the force with the heavy weaponry required to deter the
Bosnian Serbs and also provide the force with an increase in military
personnel to effectively monitor and patrol the protected areas.
A key lesson learnt in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that intervention in a civil
conflict “invariably leads to enforcement”.279 It is the same lesson that the
United Nations learnt in Somalia under UNOSOM I and II. As the nature of
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed the mandate authorised for
UNPROFOR also needed to change to keep pace with the deteriorating
security situation on the ground. UNPROFOR was not equipped with the
necessary combat capability required to conduct enforcement operations, nor
did it posses the capability to adjust quickly to changing situations.

This case study offers unique insight into the impact and scope of influence
that Security Council members can have on the United Nations. Several
members’ own hidden agendas, combined with a lack of political will and lack

of human and material resources can seriously impact on when the United Nations intervenes, and what mandate it intervenes under. This arguably can be seen as the reason that the international community was prepared to let the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina carry on for three years prior to the Dayton Agreement and approval for IFOR to deploy. Steven Burg in his chapter Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Bosnia,\textsuperscript{280} notes that:

The coordinated military-political intervention or strategy of coercive diplomacy carried out in 1995 can be considered successful because it achieved the primary goals of Western policymakers: it put an end to the fighting, averted a catastrophic withdrawal of allied forces under sire, and established a Bosnian state within existing borders.

Burg then goes on to state that the intervention did not settle the overriding issue of the conflict, but instead “transformed the struggle among Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims from a military to a political conflict.”\textsuperscript{281} This is largely due to the fact that the Dayton Agreement left power divided among the three groups.

The United Nations has been heavily criticised for not remaining impartial or neutral when dealing with the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mockatis notes that: “the belligerents in a civil war recognize no neutrals. They measure every action and inaction as benefiting or hurting their cause.”\textsuperscript{282} The perception that the United Nations was assisting the Bosnian-Serbs was wide spread; however, this was through their inaction to stop Serb military actions, rather than through physical assistance. A perception that the United Nations was supporting the Muslim minority was also rightly assumed as a result of extensive humanitarian operations to get food and supplies to the cut off Muslim population. Again the fact that the mission was given 'enforcement' tasks without a Chapter VII mandate meant that if could not take offensive action which might be construed as enforcement in nature. On this subject Diehl (1993) notes that:

\textsuperscript{280} Lahneman, W.J, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid. p. 64.
\textsuperscript{282} Mockaitis, T.R, p. 95.
Neutral behaviour (both perceived and objective) of peacekeeping troops must reinforce their neutral composition. Neutrality means that the actions of the peacekeeping troops are not intended to favour one side or the other in the dispute.\textsuperscript{283}

The geographical layout of Bosnia-Herzegovina “complicated the ability of peacekeepers to complete their missions”.\textsuperscript{284} The requirement to maintain law and order in large cities, as well as provide protection to humanitarian aid and supplies that needed to transit significant distances overstretched UNPROFOR. The fact that the Bosnian Serbs also implemented the tactic of blockades around cities to shell people by effectively caging them also disrupted United Nations efforts to protect the Muslims and Croats. The diverse geographical layout of Bosnia-Herzegovina also presented a problem for communications within UNPROFOR and later IFOR.

The support that the Bosnian Serbs received from Serbia was also a unique and difficult factor for United Nations troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina to deal with. It effectively meant that there was a pro-Bosnian Serb element providing aid in the form of weapons and ammunition from outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The porous border and the fact that weapons and ammunition were smuggled in under the guise of humanitarian aid did little to develop or enhance a level of understanding and trust between United Nations peacekeepers and Bosnian Serbs. However, it must be noted that it was not only the Bosnian Serb forces that used humanitarian aid as a means of smuggling during the war.

**Recommendations**

It is imperative that the United Nations remains impartial and neutral in the eyes of all stakeholders involved in a peacekeeping or peace-building intervention. This was not fully achieved during the deployment of UNPROFOR and to a lesser extent UNMIBH. UNPROFOR has been widely criticised for its anti Bosnian Serb stance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it can be

\textsuperscript{283} Diehl, P.F, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid. p. 193.
said that the United Nations learnt an invaluable lesson from operating within this fractious environment. The provision of a Chapter VII enforcement mandate would have gone a long way to alleviating some of the difficulties faced by peacekeepers when they were forced to stand aside and watch in the face of aggressive military factions committing atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Whilst it is vital that the United Nations be seen to exhaust all possible options of negotiation prior to intervention, there must be an acceptable point where enforcement action occurs. It must be argued that the large scale of rape, murder, ethnic cleansing and displacement caused during the three years of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been the point where a decision was made to intervene. Although the media brought regular reports on the atrocities being committed to the international stage the United Nations still chose to negotiate an end to the conflict.

Donias (2005) writes that partition was the only solution to solve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the country was split along ethnic lines and the “ancient ethnic grievances combined with the more recent wartime atrocities meant that Bosnia’s ethnic communities could not live together”. The breakdown of civil and political order and the disintegration of a stable and effective government are touted as the main reasons for the conflict according to Woodward (1995). Whilst the Dayton Peace Agreement was ultimately the reason for the end of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in this it was successful, it must be noted that there is a considerable way to go with the state-building process before the country is ready to move forward on its own without international assistance.

The reconstruction effort required to start re-building the shattered country was immense. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred during a period where the United Nations was heavily committed with operations in Somalia and Haiti and already overstretched in terms of manpower and resources.

Millions of people were deported or forced to flee their homes. Sixty percent of all houses in Bosnia, half of the schools, and a third of the hospitals were damaged or destroyed. Power plants, roads, water systems, bridges, and railways were ruined.\textsuperscript{287}

The humanitarian and re-building effort directed towards Bosnia-Herzegovina received criticism from some fronts, particularly from members of the Security Council (that represented small third world African nations, as a result of this war being seen as "a rich man's war."\textsuperscript{288} However, the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis suffered from a lack of will by troop contributing nations just as much as any other conflict during the early 1990s. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the fact that this was a well developed nation, which had a trained, well equipped and professional military force, unlike Somalia or Haiti, was actually a disadvantage for the United Nations when it was attempting to get troops contributing nations involved. This case study highlights that there is a direct requirement for an enforcement mandate for all peacekeeping or peace-building missions in any situation where there is the potential threat from a professional military force.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This case study highlights that the United Nations attempted to seek a negotiated outcome to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The diplomatic efforts at the highest level were not always coordinated with either the military activities or those of the humanitarian agencies. The distinct lack of coordination and cooperation was ultimately a result of there being no central planning organisation involved at the start of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When discussing the future effort required in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lahneman notes that:

\begin{quote}
Under the best of reconstruction programs, it was argued that it would take about thirty years to produce a functioning, stable state out of Bosnia’s current conditions. This observation should serve as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{287} Center for Balkan Development, \textit{History of the War in Bosnia}, May 1996. www.friendsofbosnia.org

\textsuperscript{288} Chesterman, S, p. 191.
a sobering reminder that the scars of systematic human rights violations run deep and that reconstruction is a complex, long-term, and probably expensive undertaking.\textsuperscript{289}

In his February 1993 report on UNPROFOR activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Secretary General also noted the following:

Efforts were characterised by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host government to blame it for a variety of short comings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFORs performance in the Republic had largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force had not been mandated, authorised, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil.\textsuperscript{290}

UNMIBH achieved its mandate and the civilian policing mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely seen as a success. The same cannot be said for the failed UNPROFOR mission. The fact that the mission had a weak, unrealistic, unsupported and constantly evolving mandate that developed into too broad a commitment and task list for UNPROFOR to ever hope to achieve, is one of the primary reasons for the mission's failure. Another key reason is the blatant targeting of the United Nations weaknesses by the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The fact that the United Nations shied away from conducting operations against the Bosnian Serbs because they were not prepared to risk injuring their own peacekeepers was a significant limitation that was used to the Bosnian Serbs advantage on numerous occasions.

However, failings aside, UNPROFOR did provide some valuable assistance in the protection of civilian humanitarian agencies and it must be remembered that this was originally one of its main mandate tasks. While the relationship between UNPROFOR and the humanitarian community was largely strained and dysfunctional without a common set of goals or mission, UNPROFOR succeeded in providing protection to aid agencies and in that regard

\textsuperscript{289} Lahneman, W.J, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{290} S/25264 Secretary General's Report, UNPROFOR, 10 February 1993.
completed a key task in its mandate. 12 years after the Dayton Agreement was signed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains fragile and the international community shows no signs of a short term withdrawal. Whether or not the country would survive on its journey towards a fully independent and secure nation without international efforts is debatable. Time will tell if the efforts to rebuild the economy, politics and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been successful.
Chapter 6: Case Study Four – East Timor / Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste became the first new country of the new millennium following its declaration of independence on 20 May 2002. The authorisation of UN Security Council Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999, which established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was the official trigger of this independence process.  

Introduction

United Nations involvement in East Timor began in 1960 when the United Nations General Assembly declared that the country was a non-self governing territory. The 1975 Indonesian seizure of the territory after the collapse of the Portuguese administration led to further United Nations involvement, with the action being condemned by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. Following almost 15 years of Indonesian rule the promise of independence sent the East Timorese people to the polls and the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was authorised and deployed in 1999 to organise and support the referendum. UNAMET was quickly followed by the multinational Interim Force in East Timor (INTERFET)

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which transitioned to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and then the United Nations Mission in Support in East Timor (UNMISET) on when the country gained independence in May 2002.

The withdrawal of United Nations peacekeepers from the newly independent Timor Leste in 2005 has widely been seen as a significant success for the United Nations. Both the UNTAET and UNMISET missions successfully achieved their mandates and the handover of Timor-Leste to the Timorese people was accomplished. Unfortunately the newly created and stabilised independent country would not prosper for long under its own legal authority and on 25 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council authorised Resolution 1704 which established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and heralded the return of United Nations peacekeepers.\(^\text{294}\)

**Historical Background**

East Timor was colonized by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. A change in government in Portugal in April 1974\(^\text{295}\) meant that Portugal re-evaluated the status of its former colonies or overseas provinces and decided that they had the right to self-determination and independence. In July 1975 the Portuguese government passed a law which provided for the formation of a transitional government in East Timor. This declaration was accepted enthusiastically by the East Timorese people and political organisations within the country prepared for independence. The most notable being the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) which later changed its name to Fretilin – the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti).\(^\text{296}\)

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\(^{296}\) Ibid. p. 15.
UDT and Fretilin formed a collation in January 1975 with the common goal of independence as the main theme, however, increasing tensions between the two parties, one of which wanted to develop close ties with Indonesia, resulted in a collapse in May 1975. Martin (2001) writes that “the situation rapidly escalated to open hostilities and civil war”. In August 1975 the Portuguese administration formally withdrew, and on 28 November 1975 Fretilin declared Independence and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. On 30 November 1975 a coalition of pro-Indonesia parties, mainly UDT and Apodeti, also proclaimed independence and the country’s integration with Indonesia.

On 7 December 1975 Indonesia launched a naval, air and land assault on East Timor, with the pro-Indonesian parties declaring the establishment of the Provincial Government of East Timor. Notably on 17 July 1976 Indonesia promulgated Law 7/76 which made East Timor Indonesia’s 27th province. “The Indonesian military brutally suppressed a local insurgency, and then initiated a reign of terror that led to more than 180,000 deaths – out of a population of fewer than 1 million.” Throughout 1975 and 1976 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 384 and 389 calling on Indonesia to respect the “territorial integrity” of East Timor. The General Assembly also passed annual resolutions reaffirming the right of the East Timorese people to independence. Interaction between the Secretary General, Indonesia and Portugal did little to change the situation in East Timor throughout the 1980s and early part of the 1990s with Indonesia continuing to rule East Timor through a campaign of terror and military occupation.

297 Martin, I, p. 16.
298 Ibid. p. 16.
299 Ibid. p. 16.
304 Martin, I, p. 18.
In 1998 President B.J. Habibie replaced President Suharto as the leader of Indonesia. In the wake of the failed Suharto regime and the collapsed Indonesian economy, Habibie demonstrated Indonesia's "new found democratic instincts" by announcing in January 1999 that the Timorese would be permitted to choose between autonomy with Indonesia or independence. Smillie and Minear (2004) write that Habibie made this decision based on the fact that he thought that the East Timorese people would want to unite with Indonesia, however, as highlighted by the majority vote in the referendum, this perception was largely misguided.

The 5 May Agreement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal and witnessed by the Secretary General, resulted in the full acceptance of a constitutional framework for a special autonomy for East Timor. What it lacked was the approval and planning for what should have been seen as the required security arrangements to accompany the decision. The decision to forgo an international peacekeeping force to oversee the security during the ballot, in light of the Indonesian insistence that it stay responsible for security during the proceedings, proved to be a fatal mistake which would ultimately be paid for by the East Timorese people. The date agreed to for the ballot was 8 August 1999 and the Secretary General was requested to establish "an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation". The fact that a secure environment did not exist in East Timor prior to the 30 August ballot did not bode well for the establishment of a peaceful and secure East Timor post ballot. Smith (2003) clearly articulates that in East Timor, "the establishment and maintenance of security was central to everything".

305 Traub, J, p. 103.
307 Smillie, I, & Minear, L, p. 58.
308 Martin, I, p. 33.
309 Ibid. p. 33.
310 Ibid. p. 34.
UNAMET

UNAMET was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999,\textsuperscript{312} as a result of the 5 May 1999 agreement between Indonesia and Portugal. UNAMET was mandated to organise and conduct a popular consultation, or referendum, in East Timor. UNAMET was also tasked with overseeing a transition period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people. On 30 August 1999, 98 percent of eligible voters went to the polls to vote in East Timor, and on 4 September 1999 it was announced that an overwhelming 80 percent of those voters had voted for independence.\textsuperscript{313} Unfortunately this was all it took for organised militia violence to begin on a massive scale. Traub (2006) notes that:

Gangs of young men moved from village to village, killing with machetes and burning with jerricans of gasoline. Political figures were hunted down and murdered; virtually the entire population was forced to flee into the hills. And the Indonesian army, plainly in league with the militias, was abetting the violence rather than trying to control it.\textsuperscript{314}

The Indonesian military forces remaining in East Timor did little to stem the violence, and in some cases openly supported militia fighters in their campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. This breakdown in law and order resulted in the evacuation of the majority of international and local UNAMET staff to Australia, with a small cadre remaining at the United Nations Headquarters in Dili to ensure the safety of non-United Nations staff. The concerted efforts of the Secretary General and Security Council to halt the violence and convince the Indonesian government to control its military and maintain security were largely effective. This pressure resulted in Indonesia's acceptance of a multinational force, Australian-led, on 12 September 1999 to restore peace and security to East Timor.\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{313} Utley, R.E, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{314} Traub, J, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{315} Smith, M.G, p. 19.
The campaign of violence that began as a result of the referendum should not detract from the fact that the United Nations supervision during the lead up to and conduct of the referendum was a success. The referendum was “carried out efficiently, effectively, and without serious complaint in less than three months”. The acknowledged efforts of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, along with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, are well documented. Traub (2006) writes that “from the outset Kofi Annan played a central role in a delicate, complex, and fast-moving situation”. Traub also clearly identifies the impact that events in Kosovo and Rwanda had had on the employment of United Nations peacekeepers and observers, and on the fact that the United Nations was possibly hesitant or reluctant to commit to another state building mission in the wake of severe criticisms over its handling of earlier interventions.

INTERFET

On 15 September 1999 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1264 authorising a multinational force which was to be known as INTERFET. Five days later the Australian-led force of 2500 soldiers arrived in East Timor. The establishment, preparation, deployment and subsequent handover of INTERFET has been widely seen as a great success for the United Nations and Australia. Pressure on the United Nations to intervene, as well as the fact that Australia had a mobilised and trained military force ready to go from 8 September 1999, meant that the deployment of INTERFET was handled with tactical precision. The only stumbling block that occurred during the planning for the Australian-led force had been the Indonesian government’s uncertainty or wariness at having Australia lead INTERFET. However, through careful negotiations between the Secretary General, Australia and Indonesia this issue was resolved.

316 Smillie, I, & Minear, L, p. 65.
317 Traub, J, p. 104.
319 Smith, M.G, p. 46.
320 Smillie, I, & Minear, L, p. 65.
INTERFET was mandated to restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. In conjunction with the military operations ongoing within East Timor the humanitarian relief effort was significantly bolstered and a large scale relief effort ensued. The withdrawal of Indonesian military and police forces, and the improved security situation meant that UNAMET was able to reopen its office in Dili on 28 September 1999 and start redeploying UNAMET personnel throughout East Timor.

The situation on the ground in East Timor was one of destruction and despair, with nearly a quarter of the people in East Timor displaced and living in makeshift camps in West Timor, and the country’s infrastructure in ruins. The stabilisation of the immediate law and order security situation throughout East Timor was achieved relatively quickly, the most pressing problem facing peacekeepers and aid agencies was reconstruction and humanitarian relief efforts to support the terrorised and displaced East Timorese population. However, putting together the country’s judicial and policing procedures would prove to be a lengthy and ongoing process. Statistics show that prior to the referendum in 1999 East Timor already had a very low standard of health, severe unemployment, low literacy levels, archaic infrastructure and low development levels. The reconstruction efforts directed at East Timor focused on the provision of basic infrastructure such as power, potable water and health facilities.

UNTAET

On 25 October 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1272 which authorised the establishment of UNTAET. UNTAET was mandated to provide security and maintain law and order throughout East Timor; establish an effective administration; assist in the development of civil and social service; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian

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322 Smillie, I, & Minear, L, p. 65.
323 Ibid. p. 66.
assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; support capacity building for self government; and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.\textsuperscript{324}

Command of military operations was handed from INTERFET to UNTAET in February 2000. The handover of missions was conducted successfully, largely due to the continued command and influence of the Australian military. Unlike INTERFET before it, UNTAET was tasked with assisting with a series of urgent regulations that were required to establish an effective administration of East Timor. These included: setting up a legal system, re-establishing a judiciary, setting an official currency, creating border controls, taxation, and creating a first consolidated budget for East Timor.\textsuperscript{326} Venugopal (2006) writes that the scale and scope of the tasks given to UNTAET were an “unprecedented expansion of the traditional UN peacekeeping role, beyond even peacemaking and into state-building”.\textsuperscript{326}

During its task of rebuilding East Timor UNTAET acted with an almost totalitarianism attitude, possibly due to the mandate that it was afforded under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272. The job facing UNTAET was by no means a strictly narrowly focused peacekeeping one. As Venugopal (2006) clearly articulates above, UNTAET was not faced with the single requirement to ensure security and law and order throughout East Timor, it was mandated to support capacity building for self government in a country that had not had effective self government for nearly two centuries.

\begin{quote}

UNTAE\textsuperscript{T} was criticized for its failure to adequately involve the East Timorese in the transitional government, and for its heavily expatriate-staffed operation.\textsuperscript{327}
\end{quote}

This exclusive policy led to the resignation of four East Timorese cabinet members in December 2000, stating that they had “no power, no duties, no

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid. p. 112.
resources to function adequately". However, it must be strongly argued that heavy handedness or exclusive policy aside, that the UNTAET mission was a success for the United Nations. On 20 May 2002 the country gained its independence with Xanana Gusmao elected as president.

**UNMISET**

UNMISET was a peacekeeping mission mandated to provide assistance to the newly independent Timor-Leste until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the Timor-Leste authorities, and to permit the newly independent nation to attain self sufficiency. It was also mandated to provide interim law enforcement, assist in the development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) and to contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of Timor-Leste. Established under United Nations Resolution 1410, dated 17 May 2002, UNMISET was initially established for a period of 12 months, however this would be extended three times until 20 May 2005 when UNMISET successfully concluded its mandate in Timor-Leste.

The withdrawal of UNMISET effectively ended the United Nations peacekeeping involvement in Timor-Leste. The close of mission was seen as a success as the country moved forward on its journey for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. On 20 May 2005 UNMISET was succeeded by a small follow on political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). UNOTIL’s main task was to ensure that the procedures and policies put in place for the Timor-Leste administration were upheld and the mission was predominantly political and advisory in nature.

**UNMIT**

UNMIT was authorised under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704 on 25 August 2006. Its mandate was focused on support not only to

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328 FitzGerald, V, Stewart, F & Venugopal, R, p. 113.
the presidential and parliamentary process, but also the restoration and maintenance of public security, the facilitation of relief and recovery assistance and to assist in further strengthening the national institutional and to assist in further building the capacity of state and government institutions.\footnote{United Nations, UNMIT Home Page, United Nations Organisation, www.un.org.} The tasks for UNMIT encompassed everything from security to rehabilitation and relief efforts to election support and the protection of human rights and promotion of justice and reconciliation. Unlike UNTAET, UNMIT was operating within a recognised nation state, and whilst many of the tasks outlined by the mandate were identical, UNMIT was required to complete them with the full buy-in and visibility of the Timor-Leste government.

In his report to the Security Council on 8 August 2006, Kofi Annan stated that the tasks of nation-building and peace-building were long term in nature, and in order for the gains which had been made to be capitalised on, that the government of Timor-Leste required further United Nations support.\footnote{Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006), S/2006/628, 8 August 2006.} UNMIT was established as a primarily police focused mission, with military liaison and staff officers as well as a civilian component contributing to the mission. The operations of UNMIT remain ongoing within Timor-Leste and for this reason the lessons learnt, which are still being collated and assessed as the mission progresses, will not be discussed under this chapter.

**Mandate**

The UNAMET mandate has been criticised for not providing the mission with enough military and police personnel to deal with the potential threat of violence expected after the ballot had been conducted.\footnote{Caballero-Anthony, M, & Acharya, A, p. 110.} The mandate of UNAMET was a strictly advisory one and as such the police and military liaison officers (MLO’s) were unarmed. INTERFET was deployed as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and
equipped with the right to take “all necessary measures” required to achieve its mandate.

UNTAET’s mandate has also faced criticism over the lack of guidance provided in regard to the involvement and consultation of the Timorese people during the process leading to self-government, and the how the administration was going to be handed over to them. Although UNTAET achieved its mandate this issue is a sore point for many of the local Timorese people and arguably soured some military and civil relationships during the early tenure of UNTAET. However, that said, once UNTAET was fully operational and established, concerted efforts were made to get Timorese buy-in and valuable input to the decision and administration processes in East Timor.

In contrast to UNTAET, planning for UNMISET began well in advance of the deployment and “resulted in the development of a detailed and comprehensive mandate implementation plan, which was endorsed by the Security Council without significant changes”\textsuperscript{336} The use of mandates in the four missions to East Timor clearly identifies that a mission’s mandate plays a decisive role in whether or not a peacekeeping operation is going to be successful. The mandate authorised for UNMISET is a classic example of a mandate that is well thought through and developed, the mandates authorised for United Nations missions in Somalia are in stark contrast to this. Whilst the United Nations mission in Somalia was tasked under a Chapter VII mandate, the force was not equipped or adequately manned to achieve a Chapter VII mission.

**Command and Control - Force Contributing Nations**

On 5 September 1999, Prime Minister John Howard informed the United Nations Secretary General that Australia would lead the multinational force to

\textsuperscript{335} Utley, R.E, p. 123.

\textsuperscript{336} Caballero-Anthony, M & Acharya, A, p. 117.
deploy on INTERFET and later UNTAET.\textsuperscript{337} Key to the successful transition from INTERFET to UNTAET was the willingness of Australian, and in particular its military leadership, to "continue to play a decisive role in transitioning the force".\textsuperscript{338} The INTERFET / UNTAET transition was planned well in advance by the Australian military and the plan for a phased tradition was in place shortly after the authorisation of the INTERFET mandate. Lahneman (2004) notes:

\begin{quote}
The stability provided by both the INTERFET and UNTAET military forces provided the space necessary for post conflict peace building, while the international community developed not an exit strategy but a strategy for the transfer of power to the people of East Timor.\textsuperscript{339}
\end{quote}

Australasian countries have made up the bulk of the military and civilian personnel deployed to East Timor. During the UNAMET deployment military and civilian were contributed by Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{340} The deployments of INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMIS and most recently UNMIT have had significant Australian and New Zealand troop contributions with troops and staff officers sent to Timor-Leste. Feedback from New Zealand forces on the command and control aspects of military operations in East Timor has been largely positive towards both the New Zealand Battalion hierarchy and that of the Australian Brigade Headquarters based out of Suai. The common training and standard operating procedures used between both militaries' is largely responsible for this.

Funding for United Nations operations in East Timor has continued to be considerable. Fitzgerald, Stewart and Venugopal (2006) write that the UNTAET mission was by design "tightly enmeshed with other elements of the international aid community, particularly the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank".\textsuperscript{341} One of the major issues facing the international military and humanitarian communities was the need to resettle up to 70% of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[337]{Traub, J, p. 105.}
\footnotetext[338]{Lahneman, W.J, p. 160.}
\footnotetext[339]{Ibid, p. 162.}
\footnotetext[340]{Caballero-Anthony, M, & Acharya, A, p. 108.}
\footnotetext[341]{FitzGerald, V, Stewart, F & Venugopal, R, p. 113.}
\end{footnotes}
the population which had been displaced during the violence prior to and as a result of the referendum. The requirement for well planned and phased resettlement was identified quickly and both INTERFET, and later UNTAET, and UNHCR have been credited with a largely successful reconciliation and rehabilitation process. Smith (2003) notes that:

> Despite the major difficulties presented by the total devastation of East Timor and its rudimentary infrastructure, overall the resettlement of people was handled very professionally by a variety of agencies. The successful outcome of their efforts was aided by and largely due to the discipline and cooperation of the East Timorese people.³⁴²

Unlike the military and civilian humanitarian agencies in East Timor, the civilian police component faced many problems due primarily to the required speed of deployment, different nationalities, backgrounds, languages, training and equipment, and policing techniques.³⁴³ The initial problems faced by the international police elements can be attributed to the restricted mandate under UNAMET whereby they were not permitted to be armed and were in a strictly advisory and monitoring role. Problems that arose after the 30 August ballot and the deployment of INTERFET and UNTAET are a result of poor cooperation and planning with military elements and humanitarian agencies. Smith (2003) writes that “insufficient planning had occurred prior to deployment and that in contrast to the PKF, civilian police operations lacked focus and commitment”.³⁴⁴

Criticisms over United Nations civilian workers have been consistent in throughout this case study. A glaring perception amongst New Zealand soldiers is that the “self-serving” attitude of some civilian staff detracted from the overall mission and created an unnecessary breakdown in cooperation. Another common theme which has also been highlighted was a blatant civilian disregard for the security situation throughout East Timor, particularly in the capital Dili. While the United Nations military component was constrained and limited in its movement and out of hours activities, the civilian

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³⁴² Smith, M.G, p. 51.
³⁴³ Utley, R.E, p. 125.
³⁴⁴ Smith, M.G, p. 74.
United Nations staff were essentially allowed to go wherever they chose with no thought for their own safety or that of others. This in turn created an ‘us versus them’ attitude which did not further relationship and trust building between some military and civilian organisations.

Feedback on the role of the NGOs in East Timor is in stark contrast to that of other United Nations civilian staff. In general New Zealand military personnel commented that they saw the NGOs as a motivated and professional group of individuals. Two key points raised however, were the fact that some NGOs were often misinformed, due to little or no contact with the military forces operating in their area, and the issue of rivalries between NGOs and military forces was also raised.\textsuperscript{345} A key outcome of this is that while the military is heavily mandated and controlled in its tasks, NGOs are able to pick and choose where they will work and what tasks they will complete. At times this can lead to competitiveness over certain jobs, such as re-building hospitals and schools. The creation of a mandate or job description for NGOs operating parallel to United Nations military forces might alleviate this problem somewhat.

**Intelligence and Communications**

Intelligence and communications operations in East Timor between the major troop contributing nations were largely successful. The New Zealand Battalion (NZBATT) operating out of Suai was in close contact with the Australian Battalion (AUSBATT) based out of Metinaro, and the Portuguese forces operating in Dili. Operating within the New Zealand Battalion Area of Operations (AO) was a company of soldiers from Fiji and Nepal, and a platoon provided by Ireland and Singapore respectively. The role of intelligence in East Timor was essential in providing early warning in order to avoid surprise militia attacks and sporadic outbreaks of violence. Responsible to the higher Australian-led Brigade Headquarters based out of Suai, NZBATT was required to provide daily intelligence reports and assessments on activities occurring within the AO, as well as trend analysis.

\textsuperscript{345} Information received during feedback from Thesis Questionnaire.
and threat assessments on an as required basis. This intelligence network did not flow solely upwards. For example, the intelligence section working at HQNZBATT was also responsible for providing reports to its subordinate units, and achieved this through the provision of an intelligence operator in each subordinate AO, as well as conducting information sharing with its Australian and Portuguese counterparts. This was largely conducted successfully, with clearly identified chains of command and intelligence flow identified and enforced.

The nature of patrolling and operations in East Timor naturally created an environment where the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) operators was pivotal in the information collection process. By providing its HUMINT operators with language and cultural awareness training NZBATT was able to cultivate a collection capability that could develop a quick and easy rapport with the local Timorese people and this proved useful for intelligence gathering. Information collected from the local people was not solely the responsibility of trained HUMINT operators. The ability of the average Kiwi or Fijian soldier to gain valuable and timely information by conducting his or herself in a professional and friendly manner proved itself time and time again. Carment and Rudner (2006) note that:

Field intelligence teams were active throughout the territory. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare (EW) also found vital roles...Australian forces were able to employ a substantial, but conventional, military intelligence organisation and employ their pre-existing doctrine to good effect.346

The communications detachment operating within HQNZBATT was responsible for the provision of communications equipment and services throughout the entire AO. This also encompassed the requirement to provide compatible communications equipment to subordinate units from Fiji, Nepal, Ireland and Singapore. The doctrine and basic organisation and operational procedures utilised by the New Zealand and Australian contingents provided a solid base for operations. The language barrier between military forces

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346 Carment, D, & Rudner, M, p. 38.
operating in East Timor and the local people was overcome by the employment of interpreters and language training for military personnel conducted during pre-deployment training. However, the level of training provided was basic, focusing heavily on common phrases and those related to security. A lesson learnt from East Timor was the requirement to provide personnel with as much language training as possible prior to deployment in order for them to communicate effectively with the local people.

Logistics

Caballero-Anthony and Acharya (2005) wrote that the speed of the logistical deployment in support of UNAMET was “made possible by the use of a trust fund that received immediate voluntary contributions”.347 This effectively meant that the drawn out and often complicated process of gaining permission to make financial decisions was not a factor as there was essentially a money pot that could be dipped into as required. The fact that the United Nations logistics base in Italy was also well stocked and held a substantial portion of the required equipment and supplies is also attributed to the success of the logistical supply chain.348

Major General Mike Smith, Deputy Force Commander of UNTAET from January 2000 to March 2001 stated that the “capable air and maritime assets, which deployed quickly in East Timor, were the main reasons behind INTERFET’s successful tactical operations.”349 However, once INTERFET was replaced by UNTAET, and the Australian helicopters replaced by those from other contributing nations, problems arose. Not only did the replacement air frames take longer than expected, but some did not even meet the required safety standards once they arrived in theatre.350 This meant that there was a lack of mobility and a constraint imposed on military operations because some helicopters could not operate at night. This

348 Ibid. p. 108.
349 Utley, R.E, p. 123.
350 Smith, M.G. p. 143.
limitation also provided a significant medical evacuation dilemma for military commanders at all levels.

The United Nations current practice of troop contributing nations being self-sustaining also proved to be ineffective. A number of nations could not provide their own sustainable logistics supply system and had to rely on the United Nations providing them alternative arrangements. Smith (2003) argues that an important aspect in the selection of a force should be an assessment of that nation’s ability to adequately supply, equip and sustain its forces.

Pre-deployment Training and Preparation / Deployment / Post-Deployment

Several key differences were identified as a result of the deployments of INTERFET and UNTAET. From a planning and pre-deployment perspective the main differences between the two forces were capability, trained readiness states and the ability to deploy as a functioning headquarters and unit at short notice. The ability of INTERFET to deploy at such short notice was primarily due to the fact that the majority of the force was contributed by the Australian Defence Force, which had such a force on short notice in case an emergency situation arose in the South Pacific. The duration of INTERFET was also a factor in its success. INTERFET was only ever deployed for a short period of time in order to restore law and order, whereas UNTAET and UNMISSET had to maintain a secure and stable environment for a period of years, rather than months.

The pre-deployment training for New Zealand personnel deploying to East Timor on UNTAET and UNMISSET was well planned, lengthy and detailed. It covered all aspects from small arms weapon skills training, medical training, driver training, to language training. It included detailed country familiarisation and health briefs, weekly intelligence situation briefs and operations updates. The communications between elements already deployed and those preparing for deployment was frequent and successful.
Feedback from New Zealand military personnel is that the amount of time dedicated to pre-deployment training was adequate and that they felt well prepared for their deployment to East Timor.

The preparation of the civilian policing component of the United Nations missions in East Timor was not as robust as that of its military counterparts. Smith (2003) clearly articulates that although United Nations procedures for civilian police "required compulsory redeployment training and testing, that it was obvious that some were inadequately prepared and that the calibre of some police was below standard". The mandate, deployment and employment of civilian police officers in East Timor in support of United Nations operations was badly handled from the beginning, and compounded by an apparent hesitation to take policing to the people. This was further exacerbated by an unwillingness to establish police stations at sub-district level, although the justification for this is easily understood considering the police were unarmed and would have been isolated and vulnerable.

Key Lessons Learnt

Kofi Annan's role in the East Timorese conflict was motivated and proactive in the face of a drawn out and maddeningly slow political process with the Indonesian government. Not only did he have to negotiate with Indonesia to allow a United Nations security force into East Timor, he also had to organise an Australian led multinational force and get Xanana Gusmao on side. His attention to detail and patience in dealing with not only President Habibie, but also with the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly are laudable and noteworthy. The change in Secretary General in the 1990s clearly highlighted the impact that a motivated, articulate and forward thinking individual can have in that appointment.

Arbuckle (2006) writes that what the military can offer, if correctly structured and deployed, “is protection, communications, logistic support, and robust command and control capacities – all of which will often be critical in a

351 Smith, G, p. 75.
complex emergency response, especially in the earliest stages." This was clearly seen by the deployments of INTERFET, UNTAET and then UNMISET in East Timor. The command, control and logistic capabilities were well developed and established, which ultimately led to the success of the United Nations missions in East Timor. The comparative capabilities and organisational structures of the major military force contributing countries meant that not only had these forces trained together in peacetime, but they also had a standard set of operating procedures, comparative weaponry, logistics and communications systems.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the mandates for the respective United Nations mission in East Timor differed significantly. They will not be discussed here in detail, except to note the following. Had the mandate authorised for UNAMET, which restricted the military and police component to a purely unarmed monitoring role only, been more security focused, then the situation of lawlessness which developed in September 1999 might not have occurred on such a massive scale. Whereas the mandate established for UNAMET was restrictive, the mandate authorised for UNTAET provided the mission with complete authority to establish an effective administration and maintain law and order, an unprecedented act for the United Nations. Both are a clear example of how the United Nations Security Council can authorise significantly different mandates for missions in the same country.

It has been clearly documented that during its first 12 months of operating there was a failure on the part of UNTAET to get the local Timorese people more involved. This perceived lack of 'buy-in' from the local community, in particular political figures, in the restoration planning and process for the East Timorese administration has been commented on by Fitzgerald, Stewart and Venugopal (2006) and discussed earlier in this chapter. The importance of relationship building with the local people cannot be stressed enough and is a key lesson learnt in United Nations operations in East Timor. The

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352 Arbuckle, J.V, p. 100.
development of a public relations plan, and its implementation throughout the territory by UNTAET and then UNMISET, can be seen as a success.

Although the military hierarchy in theatre received criticism at the political and governmental level, it was not alone as many of the civilian police had difficulty in "establishing rapport with and in winning the trust and confidence of the East Timorese people." The military did not suffer from this lack of rapport and the relationships built between New Zealand soldiers and East Timorese people were exceptional in terms of the respect, openness and friendliness shared between the two groups.

The role of public relations and information sharing has again been identified as pivotal to the success of any intervention mission. A lesson learnt by UNTAET was that it needed to establish and maintain an effective public information program, and that once this was established, it needed to be handed over to successive missions and ultimately the transitional administration. As with Somalia and Bosnia before it, the impact of the media in getting international attention and aid focused on East Timor was significant. The daily reports and images of violence, arson and looting were enough to get the Australian and New Zealand governments to quickly agree to the provision of military forces to INTERFET and then UNTAET. The media proved to be an effective tool in getting the international community to place additional pressure on the United Nations to intervene. It also created an environment of generosity for the Timorese people within and outside of the South Pacific, which resulted in large donations and offers of aid being made to the collapsed country.

Unlike many of the United Nations intervention missions conducted in the early 1990s, East Timor was notably different because of the large amount of financial and humanitarian aid that it received. This is arguably one of the largest impacts on the success of United Nations missions in East Timor. Smillie and Minear (2004) note that:

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354 Smith, M.G., p. 75.
Donors were generous: East Timor received more humanitarian assistance per capita than any other major emergency up to that time, belying the charge that Bosnia and Kosovo had been well funded simply because the victims were white Europeans.\footnote{Smillie, I., & Minear, L., p. 51.}

However, Smillie and Minear (2004) are also quick to point out that East Timor also exemplified many of the worst failings of donor agencies and their governments. This criticism is largely directed at the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide aid and humanitarian assistance to East Timor during the period post Portuguese rule during the Indonesian occupation. It is argued that the relative strength of Indonesia prior to the 1997 Asian economic meltdown\footnote{Ibid. p. 51.} was the primary reason that international organisations did little to assist East Timor prior to 1999. Despite the scale of crime committed by occupying Indonesian forces, the major international governments did little to stem the flow of violence and instead supported the Suharto government with “military and economic aid.”\footnote{Ibid. p. 57.}

**Recommendations**

Gunn (1997) wrote that intervention in East Timor would require a clear definition of direction and coordination, preparation during the negotiation phase, an allocation of responsibility for support functions, and the information, electoral, repatriation, human rights, civilian police and military components.\footnote{Gunn, G.C, p. 102.} His assessment was accurate. As identified in the lessons learnt above, the need for local people buy in and the earliest possible involvement of Timorese officials is essential in creating an administration that can be successfully handed over.

The successful command and control of INTERFET, UNTAET and UNMISET was achieved through the Australian military leading the United Nations force contributing nations from the outset. The smooth transition between missions was largely achieved through the bulk of INTERFET personnel transferring to
UNTAET, and then the well developed, planned and phased transition from UNTAET to UNMISET. This case study again highlights that an intervention force preceding a United Nations mission is a successful way of creating a secure and stable environment in which to deploy United Nations led peacekeepers.

The provision of a sustainable logistics system in East Timor was achieved through the well planned and organised efforts of both the United Nations and the major force contributing nation Australia. However, issues with air medical evacuation arose when the Australian air assets in theatre used under INTERFET were replaced with helicopters from other force contributing nations which either did not meet the required United Nations safety standards or were incapable of flying night missions. This proved to be a significant weakness during the conduct of night operations and limited the ability of the military forces deployed in East Timor. Had a detailed user requirement been conducted by planning staff then the right helicopters could have been sourced and provided in theatre prior to the withdrawal of INTERFET.

Clearly defined military and civilian humanitarian organisation roles and tasks would go a long way to avoiding potential rivalries between both organisations. It is blatantly obvious that the efforts of military and civilian organisations need to support and complement each other if the desired outcome for a rebuilt and rehabilitated country is going to be achieved. Close liaison and attendance at daily or weekly briefings could enable civilian organisations to develop a better understanding of both the security situation and events that are developing in the area which they operate within.

**Conclusion**

While each of the United Nations missions in East Timor achieved their mandate and greatly assisted the country in becoming an independent state, Smith (2003) writes that East Timor does not provide a template for future United Nations interventions.
The circumstances prevailing in East Timor were specific...in particular, the security situation was more benign and the degree of host-country support was greater than in many other UN interventions.359

The United Nations interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina were conducted under their own unique set of circumstances also, which has been identified under each case study. However, as Smith articulates above, the security situation in East Timor, once INTERFET was deployed and the Indonesian military forced to refrain from acts of violence and intimidation, was largely stable and benign. The Timor-Leste case study highlights many key lessons learnt that can be applied across a broad spectrum of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Perhaps the most notable being the need for the United Nations deployed force to get local buy in during the planning and decision making processes, and the positive impact that using a major troop contributing nation, such as Australia, to provide the command and control of the initial multinational force and subsequent follow on missions.

The stability provided by both the INTERFT and UNTAET military forces provided the space necessary for post conflict peace building, while the international community developed not an exit strategy but a strategy for the transfer of power to the people of East Timor.360

The United Nations intervention in East Timor is generally regarded as a success, but as the lessons learnt and recommendations provided in this chapter identify, it was not without its share of mistakes which hindered operations. Not all of the lessons learnt in this case study are solely unique to the East Timorese environment, and many can be carried throughout a variety of theatres both in the Asia Pacific and across the rest of the world. The successful endeavour by the United Nations missions to nation-build in Timor-Leste is a positive sign that with the right conditions, support, finance and people that an intervention operation can succeed.

359 Smith, M.G, p. 119.
360 Lahneman, W.J, p. 162.
UNMIT remains in Timor-Leste tasked with providing a secure and stable environment during the lead up to and conduct of the parliamentary and presidential election process. The situation remains relatively calm, however, the risk from small outbreaks of sporadic violence and rioting continues. Timor-Leste is slowly making forward progress, but as articulated by former Secretary General Kofi Annan “the tasks of nation-building and peace-building are long term in nature”\textsuperscript{361} and in order for the gains already achieved to be capitalised on, the government of Timor-Leste requires further United Nations support.

\textsuperscript{361} Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council resolution 1690 (2006), S/2006/628, 8 August 2006.
Chapter 7: Analysis of Case Studies – Lessons Learned

The case studies discussed in this research study have provided a variety of lessons learned that are either mission or geographically specific and, in some instances, lessons learned that are common across each of the case studies. This chapter will identify and discuss the lessons learned for each specific case study and then summarise those that were common across two or more missions as pivotal lessons learned for the United Nations. This chapter will also clearly identify that the lessons learnt which scan across several missions can be attributed to systemic management, funding, education and command and control issues within the United Nations. The overarching influence of the permanent five members of the Security Council also has a significant role to play in how support to a peacekeeping mission is planned, funded, equipped and most importantly manned.

Case Study 1: Somalia

There were three separate peacekeeping operations conducted in Somalia by the United Nations between 1992 and 1994. The situation faced by the United Nations in Somalia was markedly different to that experienced on any precious mission as there was no “precedent for deploying UN forces to a humanitarian rather than a peacekeeping mission” and there was no legitimate sovereign government to negotiate with. A basic mandated caveat or requirement for the United Nations prior to any intervention or peacekeeping operation is that it the mission is conducted at the request of the state authority. This was not the case in Somalia as there was no sanctioned state authority in place. Case study 1 showed that the requirements of a humanitarian mission differ to those of a traditional peacekeeping one and that at all levels within the United Nations, including the military and civilian components, that there little to no understanding of what was required to plan and conduct a humanitarian mission. This became glaringly obvious throughout the course of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II’s missions in Somalia.

363 Ibid. p. 110.
The situation that greeted the United Nations in Somalia was one of a country racked by civil war, starvation and disease. The initial deployment of UNOSOM I proved inadequate in creating the secure environment in which humanitarian operations could be conducted unhindered within militia interference. This resulted in the authorisation of the US-led UNITAF which was viewed as a purely humanitarian mission. With this argument in the forefront the US was never going to allow an increase in UNITAF's mandate so that it could address the issues over disarmament and pave the way for the creation of a secure environment throughout Somalia. UNITAF achieved its humanitarian mission. The situation in Somalia's capital also improved under UNITAF as the force was considered a well armed, trained and professional military organisation.

The United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian workers in Somalia were faced with militia warring factions that were well equipped with small arms, but did not poses the large weapon systems, the training, the discipline nor the experience to work as well trained units and pose a considerable threat to the deployed military forces. That said, the incidents surrounding the ambush on Pakistani soldiers and the bungled operation by US Ranger Forces under UNOSOM II, which resulted in many deaths and causalities, clearly highlighted that the Somali militia were still a threat, albeit an unorganised one, that could not be taken lightly. UNITAF was a well armed and equipped US-led organisation that could have realistically been successful in disarming the local militias. Its predecessor, UNOSOM I, and successor UNOSOM II, did not poses either the manning, weapons systems, or the ability to successfully disarm the militia, however, UNOSOM II was still given this unrealistic and ambitious task in its mandate.364

United Nations operations in Somalia are a classic example of why the careful selection of troop contributing nations is so important. The level of bad or ill-feeling that existed between the Pakistani troops and the Somali people ultimately resulted in several attacks against Pakistani troops, most notably in

364 www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Mission/UNOSOM2
June 1993, and retaliatory attacks back against the Somali community. The United Nations will attempt where possible to employ troops in a peacekeeping mission that will have some affinity with the local people, such is the case in Sudan, with the United Nations supporting the African Union backed mission. The geographical location of each particular crisis or conflict is important to the selection of force contributing nations and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.

Operations in Somalia highlighted the requirement for troop contributing nations to arrive fully trained, equipped and supplied to conduct self-sustaining operations for the duration of the mission. Unfortunately, as the Somalia case study shows, the United Nations did not have the luxury of picking and choosing troops due to a large influx of nation’s volunteering their personnel for peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Some have even argued that the smaller and poorer states saw United Nations operations as a revenue building activity. Unlike UNITAF which was structured around a US military hierarchy, UNOSOM I and II did not have a major troop contributing nation to use as a force backbone, and the United Nations was required to ‘outfit’ some of the troop contributing nations even though they were contracted to arrive in theatre fully fit and operational. This logistical burden also placed an unnecessary strain on the chain of command as not all military forces were capable of completing all tasks.

A significant breakdown in command and control within the United Nations processes was the decision to authorise a US Ranger based force to conduct a cordon and detain operation in October 1993. The US Special Forces element planned, conducted an operation in complete isolation and then had to rely on the United Nations forces in theatre to bail it out once the operation had failed. Had a common intelligence, communications and command network been in place the situation on the ground would have differed considerably. The divided command experienced under UNOSOM II, whereby the US had a stand by quick reaction force (QRF) allocated in

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365 Lahneman, W.J, p. 32.
366 Fleitz, F.H, p. 32.
support, but not under the command of the UNOSOM II hierarchy, meant that operations were authorised to be conducted in isolation. This was a flaw in the mandate as it created an environment that was reactionary, as opposed to pre-emptive and meant that the United Nations was not aware of what was happening within its own area of operations (AO).

As a result of the failed UNOSOM II operation in Somalia the United Nations was heavily criticised for a lack of experience within the organisation. The US went so far as to state that “17 conditions”, under Presidential Decision Directive 25,\textsuperscript{367} would need to be met before the US would work with the United Nations on another peacekeeping mission. While the United Nations was the scapegoat for the failure in Somalia, when it can be argued that it was US interference which actually brought about the end of UNOSOM II, its overall responsibility must not be overlooked or diminished casually. Notably the United Nations failure in Somalia did result in the establishment of a “Lessons Learned Unit”\textsuperscript{368} within the organisation.

Case Study 2: Haiti

Six peacekeeping missions have been deployed to Haiti since 1993, four of which were United Nations led. While the country required a secure and stable environment for the political and judicial processes to succeed, little effort was actually dedicated towards nation or state building. As discussed in case study 2, Kumar (2004) writes that the peacekeeping actions taken were largely successful and that “it was the overall strategy for dealing with Haiti’s political situation that was lacking”.\textsuperscript{369} It must be noted from the beginning that the violence and unrest in Haiti was not necessarily aimed at targeting United Nations peacekeeping forces. Instead it focused on the elimination of political and military figures and relied on the use of violence against the local population as a measure for ensuring subservience through terror and intimidation.

\textsuperscript{367} Bellamy, A.J, Williams, P & Griffin, S, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid. p. 166.
\textsuperscript{369} Lahneman, W.J, p. 116.
The Haiti case study is unique in that it clearly shows the successful interplay between the US, OAS and the United Nations and that this was a significant factor in the intervention in Haiti. Notably it was the first time that the OAS had taken a pivotal role in any conflict and the successful relationship that developed heralded important things for the future of regional arrangements within geographical areas of influence. Again, this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.

The United Nations imposed numerous sanctions against Haiti prior to the deployment of an intervention and then peacekeeping force. However, as Murphy (1996) states that “the sanctions themselves, over several months imposed considerable hardship on the people of Haiti”. It was not until May 1994 that the sanctions were widened to target the military and ruling elite in Haiti. However, the imposition of sanctions alone proved ineffective and it was not until exiled President Aristide approved the deployment of MNF that the ruling junta agreed to negotiate.

The Carter Mission, whilst successful in achieving its aim, was conducted without the approval or awareness of the United Nations. It was a blatant example of the US’s lack of respect for the United Nations and confidence in its ability to bring about a successful negotiation and completely undermined the organisation. This mission identified one of the major stumbling blocks faced by the United Nations. The United Nations relies solely on the willingness of nations to provide its military capability for peacekeeping operations. One of the major flaws during the creation of the United Nations Charter was that it did not provide a dedicated military force. This means that the organisation is required to rely on the good will of member nations for peacekeepers.

Haiti highlights the importance of a well planned and developed intelligence capability, and the need for the collection of information on the situation on the ground prior to the deployment of a force. The initial United Nations

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370 Murphy, S.D, p. 265.
372 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 43.
deployment into Haiti was turned off at the last minute due to the peacekeepers being met by an armed crowd on arrival in Port-au-Prince. Had the United Nations had a clear understanding of the situation on as it was unfolding in Haiti then they would not have been unprepared. MNF had a more advanced intelligence and communications capability than UNMIH, largely due to the efforts of the Canadian and US military intelligence staff. The ability of the Canadian troops to speak the local language was also a major advantage in Haiti and assisted in relationship building and information gathering, which was not the case in Somalia where the language barrier proved problematic.\textsuperscript{373}

**Case Study 3: Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The deteriorating situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was predicted long before the actual collapse and outbreak of war in the country occurred. The death of Josip Tito and the subsequent independence of Croatia and Serbia seriously fractured the former Yugoslavia and created an environment of crime and corruption. The United Nations formally became involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1992 when the mandate for UNPROFOR was expanded from Croatia to also include Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the next three years; however, its mandate was unrealistic and unable to be achieved. It must be noted that the deployment of UNMIBH, a civilian police based mission, was seen as a success with its mandate being completed, due to this the case study on Bosnia-Herzegovina focused on UNPROFOR rather than UNMIBH.

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was unique because the United Nations peacekeeping force was faced with a serious threat from a well trained, equipped, armed and professional military force. This led to reluctance on the part of troop contributing nations to support attempts to increase UNPROFOR's mandate so that it could deal effectively with the requirement to conduct enforcement operations. This combined with the fact that Serbia was providing external support to the Bosnian Serb military through the provision

\textsuperscript{373} Carment, D, & Rudner, M, p. 35.
of arms and ammunition, meant that it the Bosnian Serbs had a military that was superior to that of the United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they knew it. This imbalance of military power put UNPROFOR on the defensive from the outset.

The creation of ‘safe areas’ within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the allocation of ill-equipped troops to protect them was a considerable failure for UNPROFOR. The United Nations created the perception that its forces would protect the people within the safe areas, when in reality it was not mandated or equipped with the adequate weaponry to achieve this. This flows on to the issues over the reluctance of troop contributing nations to support missions where they will have to put their soldiers in harm’s way. The Dutch incident in Srebenica is a clear example of this, and it also highlights the influence that politics and the power of the vote have when a nation makes a commitment to support the United Nations in a peacekeeping operation. The use of 370 peacekeepers as human shields by the Bosnian Serb military was also a clear indication that they knew the weaknesses of the United Nations and how to manipulate the organisation. Rather than risk the death of its peacekeepers the United Nations and troop contributing nations were willing to withdrawal and handover to IFOR.374

The establishment of a “no fly zone” under Resolution 781375 was a unique step for the United Nations. The influx of arms and ammunition from the supporting neighbouring state Serbia meant that the Bosnian Serb military was able to receive unlimited access to weapons and ammunition. The no fly zone effectively banned all non UNPROFOR or flights which were in support of the United Nations from operating in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, on its own this measure would not have been effective in stemming the flow of weapons and ammunition into Bosnia-Herzegovina. A change in the UNPROFOR mandate to increase the numbers of troops on the ground meant that the border could also be controlled more effectively.

374 www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/UNPROFOR
The scale of human rights abuses, including the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Muslims and the use of rape as a political means to either create submission or breed a race of people out of existence, was so unprecedented that it resulted in the Security Council establishing an international criminal tribunal in The Hague to prosecute those responsible.

It must be noted that it was the aerial bombing campaign by NATO that led to the Bosnia Serbs signing the Dayton Peace Agreement and heralded an end for UNPROFOR and the deployment of IFOR. The deployment of IFOR was a successful negotiating medium because the warring factions within Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised it as a force that was well trained, professional and equipped to deal with a capable military threat. IFOR was able to quickly achieve what UNPROFOR had been unable to as it was a peace enforcement force, not a peacekeeping force. Arguably the earlier deployment of a capability such as IFOR would have led to a cessation in hostilities much sooner and potentially averted the scale of death, rape and displacement that occurred during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Case Study 4: East Timor/Timor-Leste

The deployment of INTERFET and then UNTAET to East Timor was as a direct result of the campaign of violence that gripped the country after the people voted overwhelmingly for independence for Indonesia on 30 August 1999. UNAMET deployed to East Timor to organise and conduct a popular consultation, or referendum, concerning whether or not the East Timorese people wanted independence. The announcement on 4 September 1999 that the population had voted 80 percent in favour of independence heralded an unprecedented outbreak in militia violence and intimidation that sparked a major refugee crisis.

The role of the Secretary General was central to the negotiation process that led to the deployment of INTERFET to East Timor in 1999. Kofi Annan's role

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376 Utley, R.E, p. 122.
377 Ibid. p. 122.
in bringing an end to the conflict and negotiating an Australian-led intervention force is noteworthy and clearly indicates the impact that a motivated, articulate and forward thinking individual can have in the Secretary General's appointment. Annan has not received many of the criticisms of his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who was criticised heavily over the wider Yugoslav crisis, which coupled with the failure in Rwanda in 1994 was perhaps the reason that he was not re-elected for a second term. Whilst not free from criticism himself, Annan has been involved in several of the wide sweeping changes that have worked towards making the United Nations a more effective organisation.

During its first year of operations UNTAET was heavily criticised for its failure to get the local community and political leaders more involved in charting the country's future. Fitzgerald, Stewart and Venugopal (2006)\(^{378}\) comment on the perceived lack of 'buy-in' during the restoration and planning process for the East Timorese administration. The reason for this is arguably the mandate which was approved for UNTAET which gave its commanders the complete authority to establish an effective administration and maintain law and order,\(^{379}\) a feat that was previously unheard of in the United Nations. However, the environment of distrust and disrespect that developed in some quarters as a result of initial UNTAET procedures was able to be effectively overcome through extensive efforts to rebuild relationships between the military and local political players. The examples of East Timor and Somalia highlight the need for relationship building with the local people and this is a key lesson learnt for future United Nations operations. The development of an effective public relations plan in the later stages of UNTAET and UNMISET can be seen as a success.

The funding effort directed at East Timor and subsequently the newly formed country of Timor-Leste has been considerable. Unlike Somalia and Rwanda before it, East Timor did not suffer from a lack of organisations and countries willing to contribute financially or from donor fatigue as the peacekeeping in

\(^{378}\) Fitzgerald, V, Stewart, F, & Venugopal, R, p. 112.

East Timor missions transitioned. Smillie and Minear (2004) write that “donors were generous...East Timor received more humanitarian assistance per capita than any other major emergency up to that time.” The significant amount of financial and humanitarian aid and effort is one of the key reasons that efforts to nation-build in East Timor were successful.

A breakdown in relationships and roles between military and civilian agencies occurred in East Timor from the outset of United Nations involvement. A lack of understanding between both organisations on what the others role was, and what they could provide, was a common reason for this failure to communicate and coordinate activities properly. Also, a military perception of idle security practices or laziness by some civilian aid organisations resulted in rivalries and the creation of an “us versus them” mentality. Closer liaison, a greater understanding and respect for the security situation, and cooperation could alleviate potential difficulties on future deployments.

Whilst the lessons learned from East Timor may seem minor compared to those of the failed Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina peacekeeping operations, and the missions are regarded as a success, they are nevertheless valuable lessons that should be applied in future operations. The success of the United Nations in East Timor was a positive injection to the organisation which confirmed that with the right conditions, support, finance and people an intervention operation can succeed. The requirement for the United Nations to re-deploy peacekeepers to Timor-Leste in 2005 does not detract from the success of its previous operations, but is an indication that the process of nation building is a prolonged and drawn out one.

**Lessons Learned Relevant to all Case Studies**

Peacekeeping operations from Somalia to East Timor clearly highlighted that from the outset a major force contributing nation should be used as the backbone for other coalition forces to attach to. The US-led force in Somalia

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380 Smillie, I, & Minear, L, p. 51.
(UNITAF), US-led force deployed to Haiti (MNF) and Australian-led force in East Timor (INTERFET) are classic example of using a well equipped, trained and experienced military headquarters and force as an initial intervention force. Each case study has discussed the advantages of the United Nations contracting out to a major military force for its command and control, intelligence and communications and logistics frameworks. Mingst and Karns (2007) clearly articulate that "although military action should be authorised by the UN, the actual work of applying force has to be subcontracted to what has become known as a coalition of the willing led by one or more major powers with sufficient military capabilities".381

The handover and phasing from an intervention force, such as MNF in Haiti or INTERFET in East Timor, to a follow on United Nations led peacekeeping force has proven to be a successful method of transitioning command and control. The use of a credible military force to create a secure and stable environment within which peacekeeping operations can be conducted is a successful method of getting United Nations peacekeepers into an operational theatre. The creation of an intervention force which can be deployed at short notice for a small period of time also allows time for planning a large scale peacekeeping operation.

The mandates authorised across all four case studies experienced some elements of being either too ambitious, under resourced, under manned, ambiguous, vague and too unrealistic. Notably in the cases of Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina they did not provide for the required level of force to successfully deal with the security environment. In Haiti, the mandates authorised for MNF, UNMIH and the 2004 deployments of MIF and MINUSTAH were realistic and accompanied by an adequate allocation of personnel and resources so that tasks could be completed with little or no difficulty. The mandates authorised for UNTAET and UNMISET were also realistic and provided the peacekeeping force with adequate resources and personnel to complete their mission.

At times the different mandates led to confusion and differences in interpretation on certain missions. Once authorised and deployed on peacekeeping missions different nations viewed mandates with a different focus or perception which led to different rules of engagement and force being applied. In Somalia, the Belgian, Canadian and Pakistani troops were seen as particularly aggressive compared to other nations. The requirement for a clear, concise and realistic mandate is the basic start point or beginning for a successful peacekeeping operation. The impact that the Security Council, and most importantly the permanent five members on the council, have on the authorisation of a missions mandate is critical to understanding why the mandates for some peacekeeping operations have been a success, and why others have been weak and doomed to fail from the start. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a classic example of how the influence of Security Council members can stop a peacekeeping force from having a workable and achievable mandate.

The case studies on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti show that to be effective the United Nations must remain impartial at all costs. The United Nations was heavily criticised for not remaining impartial towards the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Through the creation of safe areas or zones the United Nations was all but admitting that it was the Muslims who were being victimised, by the Serbs. In Haiti the US and consequently the United Nations were criticised for their unending support for Aristide, even though he ultimately proved to be one of the main reasons for the country's failings and inability to move forward as a nation state. It is imperative that the United Nations be seen to be impartial and neutral at all costs if it is going to succeed in carrying out peacekeeping operations.

The provision of poorly trained and equipped troops to peacekeeping operations is a problem that is endemic within the United Nations. This was an issue experienced in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East Timor. There is no short term solution or fix for this problem as the United Nations cannot afford to 'pick and chose' where peacekeepers come from. However, measures to try and raise the level of training or experience of those nations
that require it are being addressed to some degree through the conduct of pre-deployment training, and in-theatre training being sponsored by the United Nations. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the troop contributing nation to ensure that military forces are trained and equipped to operate at the required standard on peacekeeping operations.

Each of the case studies has highlighted the specific logistical lessons learnt for operating in each of the mission areas. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor are all examples of the importance of security airfields and ports as soon as possible in order the facilitate the movement of the vital supplies and equipment in and out of the country where they are required to support United Nations missions. The requirement for logistics support to countries that are generally devastated through years of conflict or war, and that have little to no useable infrastructure means that logistics operations need to be planned well in advance so that the necessary provisions and supplies arrive in theatre as soon as possible to support operations. The provision of logistic supplies, whilst ultimately the responsibility of the troop contributing nations, is an endemic issue which has to be address by the United Nations as smaller, poorer nations often provide troops that are ill-equipped.

The impact of the media on peacekeeping operations has been an effective tool for getting the United Nations and troop contributing nations to step in and authorise peacekeeping missions. Conversely, the media has also played a significant role determining whether or not the United Nations and troop contributing nations will remain on a peacekeeping operation. A clear example of this was in Somalia when the international media showed the body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, which resulted in the withdrawal of US forces and heralded the failure of UNOSOM II. The impact that the media had on the international community’s support to UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also considerable. The footage of 370 peacekeepers chained or tied to Bosnian Serb heavy weapons embarrassed and humiliated the organisation and was a contributing factor that led to the decision to withdraw and hand over to IFOR.
The dilemma faced by the United Nations and force contributing nations over the chain of command and control procedures is endemic across United Nations peacekeeping operations. Not only does a military force work to its higher United Nations headquarters, it also has a direct responsibility and link back to its national command and government. This diversity in command that exists between nations, coupled with the fact that more than one chain of command exists, is always going to be a problem with not only how the troops on the ground operate, but also with the different application of rules of engagement (ROE) enforced. The United Nations command over military commanders remains tenuous and will continue to do so while the United Nations does not have its own organic military capability. The fact that there is no common unity of command is a weakness in the employment of United Nations peacekeepers.
Chapter 8: Peacekeeping Model Blueprint.

The lessons learned from the case studies on Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor plainly indicate that while each specific operation had its own unique set of circumstances, that there were common lessons that could be applied across each theatre of operations. The fact that common lessons apply across each operational area provides the framework for the development of a peacekeeping model that can be utilised by the United Nations as a blue print for future peacekeeping operations. Issues that do not have a direct impact on the military component of employment within the United Nations will not be discussed in detail in this chapter, funding being a classic example, as they have been commented on in each specific case study and the military has little to no say in financial matters within the United Nations.

This chapter discusses the key areas where lessons learned from each operating theatre can be applied in generic situations where the United Nations is required to authorise, plan and conduct peace operations. Whilst the experiences and opinions of military personnel have been used to draw some of the conclusions in this chapter, the opinions expressed throughout this paper are supported by the author and are not intended to reflect current or future NZDF thought or policy. The blue print for a successful peacekeeping model has been structured in a logical sequence from beginning to end. While some discussion on post deployment procedures is added, it is not discussed in great detail as this is ultimately the responsibility of the relevant troop contributing nation and the United Nations has little to no say in what processes and procedures occur.

The United Nations without a Military Force

Key to many of the command and control, intelligence and communications, logistics, training and experience and policy and procedures issues that the United Nations experienced on peace operations is the fact that it does not have its own military force. This imposes a severe limitation and constraint on the organisation. Unable to deploy its own force, the United Nations is forced
to rely on the generosity and willingness of member states to contribute peacekeepers and equipment in order for it to conduct operations. As shown through operations in Haiti and East Timor, the initial deployment of a non-United Nations led intervention force provides a very good framework for a United Nations peace operation to follow on from. According to Wells (2005) perhaps one of the greatest shortfalls of the United Nations is that it was:

Created without an army, without the "power of the purse", and with an International Court from which nations could, at their pleasure, claim immunity.\(^\text{382}\)

**Factors that will Impact on the Success or Failure of a Peace Operation**

Smith (2003) notes that depending on the circumstances of each mission, that some of the following factors will be more important than others, but that they are "all likely to impact on success or failure in multidimensional peacekeeping operations."\(^\text{383}\)

1. Legitimate intervention.
2. Sustained international commitment.
3. Achievable political objectives and exit strategy.
4. Host-country support.
5. Feasible and achievable mandate.
6. Thorough and timely preparation and planning.
7. Restoration and maintenance of a secure environment.
8. Effective governance.
9. Capable leadership and effective partnership.
10. Sustainable economic and social development.
11. Implementing human rights and addressing the past.
12. Managing displaced people.
13. Effective emergency relief.\(^\text{384}\)

\(^{382}\) Wells, D.A, p. 1.  
\(^{383}\) Martin, p. 97.  
\(^{384}\) Martin, p. 97.
Of the factors listed above, the ones that can be influenced and implemented by the military component of any United Nations peace operation are the thorough and timely preparation and planning of a force, restoration and maintenance of a secure environment, capable leadership and effective partnership, and managing displaced people through assisting humanitarian organisations. The other factors commented on by Smith are issues that can only be addressed at the strategic and political levels internally within the United Nations and externally with its major troop contributing nations. Due to this they will not be commented on further in this chapter. This chapter will focus on the issues surrounding reconnaissance, staff planning, standard operating procedures (SOPs), Security Council Resolution and Mandate, the selection of troop contributing Nations, pre-deployment training, command and control, intelligence and communications, logistics, post-deployment, and the civil-military relationship.

Reconnaissance

Key to successful staff planning is the ability to get staff from across the command, intelligence, communications and logistics functions into the theatre of operations to conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the proposed operational area. The ability to provide first hand information and intelligence on the situation on the ground is critical to the commander’s decision making process. This needs to occur as quickly as possible, and early within the planning process. This will also enable the commander’s staff to identify key lacking information requirements that will then need to be answered to better assist the commander’s situational awareness. The intelligence specialist is also required to organise the selection, security vetting and interviewing of potential interpreters and local staff, which is a task that can impinge on operational security if it is not carried out correctly.

From the outset a communications specialist needs to be involved in the staff planning process and on the reconnaissance. Without effective communications the command of forces, and the information flow is ceased which can have severe consequences on the operational battlefield. A communications specialist is required to work with coalition partners to ensure
that information can be passed between different communications equipment, and to design a network plan for moving information within the operational area down to subordinate units, across to coalition headquarters staff, back to the host nation military joint headquarters and up to government level if required. Communications also plays a significant role in establishing and maintaining morale within a deployed force. The ability to call home weekly, or use the internet to complete basic necessary everyday tasks such as internet banking keeps the deployed personnel in touch with the 'outset world' and assists in the maintenance of morale of the soldier deployed, and their families at home.

A logistics specialist is essential on a reconnaissance. They are able to decide whether basic necessities such as food, water and shelter can be sourced from within the operational area, or whether it will need to be provided from elsewhere and transported. Logistics staff arrange all of the contracts with the local people for the provision and hiring of vehicles, shipping containers for storing equipment and supplies, and the provision of accommodation or the overseeing of building the required accommodation and offices. They are also responsible for the movement of all personnel in and out of the operational area, including out of theatre leave arrangements, as well as for the movement of all vehicles, equipment, personnel and stores pre and post deployment.

Importantly the reconnaissance allows specialist staff to liaise with possible counterparts in the conflict area, and start developing the critical relationship between coalition and host nation partners. There is a severely misconceived perception that any military staff officer is able to adequately provide the correct advice and gain the necessary information on a specialist area. This is an outdated, ignorant and cheap misconception of what the reconnaissance is actually designed to achieve. Whilst officers are trained in a broad variety of skills, they are given a snap-shot into specialties other than their own. That is why the military pays substantial amounts of money to have officers and soldiers trained in specific specialties, whilst at the same time maintaining a high level of infantry all arms skills. A classic example of this is
when an infantry or artillery officer is sent on a reconnaissance to gain information on intelligence systems and processes, logistical sustainment and infrastructure, engineering requirements and communications systems. Not only do they lack the training and experience within specialist fields necessary to collect the required information, they also lack the credibility required to speak with authority on specific subject matter.

Without a detailed reconnaissance with the necessary staff specialists the planning and decision making processes required for an operational mission would be flawed from the outset. In order to make the best assessments and decisions within a limited and constrained timeframe a detailed situational awareness is necessary for all relevant staff planners. The mission reconnaissance is a vital component of the overall staff planning process.

Staff Planning

The military staff planning process followed by most developed militaries around the world essentially adheres to the same basic tenets and procedures. It is this familiarity that proves an advantage time and again when nations such as New Zealand, Australia, Britain, the United States and Canada operate together in a coalition environment. The ability of a coalition headquarters to operate with a degree of understanding means that decisions, and support to the decision making process, are able to be made quickly and efficiently with military personnel familiar with the requirements of their staff role.

As highlighted above, following the staff planning process is essential for the successful deployment and subsequent phased handover of forces and reaching the ultimate end state of a peace operation. Without representatives from across the staff functions providing specialist advice the commander would not be able to make decisions with the best information available. Issues between coalition military staff develop over a lack of communication and experience, whether it is due to a language barrier, or because of significantly different planning processes and command and control
procedures. Where standard operating procedures differ between troop contributing nations the United Nations needs to enforce a common set of processes and procedures that follows the staff planning processes that is accepted worldwide by developed militaries, and provide some form of training or guidance for poorer or less developed militaries to bring them to the required trained state prior to deployment on United Nations led peace operations.

**Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) provide a common level of procedures and processes for military staff planning and operations. One set of common and United Nations approved and enforced standard operating procedures needs to be developed for all United Nations led peace operations. The development of a common set of SOPs would remove confusion, the ability for different nations to impose different and contradicting sets of procedures, and create an environment where troop contributing nations could work closely together with a clear understanding of the United Nations operating procedures.

**Security Council Resolution and Mandate**

Flowing on from a detailed reconnaissance and staff planning effort is the requirement for the authorised Security Council resolution and accompanying mandate to be created based on the best possible information and assessment available. The mandates authorised across all four case studies were either too ambitious, under resourced, inappropriately manned and armed, ambitious, vague and often unrealistic. An appropriate mandate that addresses all considerations from the required manpower level, the type of weapons systems required (ie: heavy weapons, which would have been a benefit in Bosnia-Herzegovina or small arms weapons carried for personal protection only), the command relationship between force contributing nations and the United Nations, a clear and defined mission, task list and end state strategy for the deployment to be planned from start to finish, and
contingency plan for a quick reaction force (QRF) should the situation deteriorate and not be able to be contained by the deployed force. The resolution should also provide guidance on the relationship and roles of NGOs and other non-United Nations humanitarian organisations, such as police forces and the in place military and police force.

A clear and defined mandate, which leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation, would provide military commanders with a clearly defined mission which they could then plan for and execute. All troop contributing nations must have a clear understanding of the mandate and know the limitations or restrictions and freedoms that it imposes on how they operate. A commonly accepted lesson learned from Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the authorised mandate must be achievable with the resources that the mission is allocated. The force that is deployed must be trained, equipped and experienced in dealing with peace operations if it is expected to successful achieve its mandate.

Selection of Troop Contributing Nations

Dependent on the location of the peace operation the major force contributing nations should be selected from countries that can associate with the conflict area. A classic example of this at work is the Australian-led operations in East Timor, where major contributors came from the neighbouring nations such as New Zealand and Fiji. The deployment of African Union (AU) military personnel to Darfur, Sudan, is another example of the United Nations supporting the employment of military troops in an area that they have an affinity or familiarity with.

The geographical location of a conflict should dictate the regional organisation that reacts to the conflict and offers support to any United Nations peace operation. Inherent within the employment of regional organisations is a perception that they will have a current situational awareness of what is happening within their area of interest and be best placed to react to a quickly deteriorating situation. This leads on to the issue of regional organisations
keeping the United Nations abreast of any developing situations within their area of responsibility and providing options for contingency planning should conflict occur.

The selection of troop contributing nations extends further than geographical boundaries and interests. Nations that offer troops for United Nations peace operations are well aware that there is the requirement to provide a force that is logistically self-sufficient, trained, equipped and experienced in peace operations. As highlighted many times throughout peace operations in the 1990s, many poorer developing nations see a deployment on a United Nations peace operation as a way of equipping their force with modern equipment and technology, earning money, and getting political kudos for doing “their bit” to restore peace and security. This is a mentality that is endemic. Due to the large demand for peacekeepers the United Nations can ill afford to turn a willing troop contributing nation aside, even though it may not reach the basic trained state to operate safely in an operational theatre. The provision of standard operating procedures, strict enforcement of the basic training and experience level required and some form of pre-deployment training would address many of the issues created through poorly trained and disciplined soldiers being sent on peace operations.

Pre-deployment Training

While the United Nations has made efforts to provide standards, packages, documents and advice\(^{385}\) Arbuckle (2006) clearly articulates:

> The United Nations is not in a position directly to conduct training for most of those allocated to a peace mission, as the military and police components are provided by member states; civilians come from the Secretariat, for other UN missions or may be hired directly for the mission.

The establishment of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Training and Evaluation Service (TES)\(^{386}\) has been seen

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\(^{385}\) Arbuckle, J.V, p 142.

\(^{386}\) www.un.org.
as a necessary step in developing a common training standard across all force contributing nations. However, the inability of the United Nations to effectively monitor the compliance of the recommended standards, due mainly to the fact that the standards are not mandatory,\textsuperscript{387} means that the organisation has no way of enforcing training standards. Whilst troop contributing nations are aware of the required training and experience levels prior to their military personnel deploying on peace operations there are certain nations that continually put ill-trained and ill-equipped personnel on missions. Examples of this are usually based around poorer nations who have shown time and again that they will deploy their personnel as a way of garnering money, and getting their military equipped with modern equipment and communications systems. Conversely, other nations offer military personnel for purely political gain, such as the case of Pakistan in Somalia.\textsuperscript{388}

By enforcing a standardised training level the United Nations would be able to ensure that it is providing peacekeepers that are at an appropriately trained level across all peace operations. This would avoid the potentially dangerous scenario of peacekeepers getting into dangerous situations when they lack the training to protect themselves or those that they are responsible for. It would provide the United Nations military command element of a mission to employ all of its military personnel across a wide range of tasks, instead of relying solely on the military personnel from well trained and equipped troop contributing nations. The issue of training again flows on to the requirement to develop a universally accepted set of standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Command and Control – Lead Nation

The need for a well developed and experienced military command and control system to be employed on peace operations as the backbone for a force is essential. Intervention operations in Somalia, Haiti and East Timor were a clear example of how the deployment of a large, well trained and equipped

\textsuperscript{387} Arbuckle, J.V, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{388} O'Neill, J.T, & Rees, N, p. 127.
military force, used as the headquarters and command element can provide a very successful way of creating a secure and stable environment for the subsequent deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Whilst a major troop contributing nation such as the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia or even New Zealand may agree to take the lead-nation role and provide the majority of a military force to a peace operation, what they will not agree to is having another country’s military in full 'control' or 'command' of their own force. This creates another command chain within any peace operation as a force is required to go back to their own joint military headquarters, or even government, to get permission prior to completing some tasks. This reach forward of this national command then creates unnecessary and often dangerous time delays between when a mission or task should be completed, and when the approval to do so is actually received. Arbuckle (2006) notes that:

There is nothing doctrinally or necessarily inherent in the command and control of peacekeeping operations that has not for long been charismatic of the operations of military coalitions. Gradations of command and control, and parallel structures, both authorise and limit combined operations.389

The use of the so called ‘national card’ is something that is employed on operations when a senior national commander is uncomfortable with carrying out the tasks that he/she is allocated. While this is an issue that is certainly not going to be resolved in the short or medium term, it is an issue that creates a breakdown in the command and control of a coalition force and must be addressed as a matter of importance. The United States military unit will never let itself be commanded or controlled by a Pakistani or Iraqi one, nor would a New Zealand force ever be commanded or controlled by a Timorese or Singaporean one. That said, the close relationship and similar adherence to staff planning and training between Australia, Britain, Canada New Zealand and the United States does mean that these nations will work

389 Arbuckle, J.V, p. 123.
closely together on peace operations, and that at times a level of operational command and operational control is approved by governments.

**Intelligence and Communications**

As discussed throughout the case studies, the ability to get a clear picture of the situation on the ground as it is unfolding is essential in informing the commander during the staff planning process. Without this decisions will be made without an accurate assessment which could potentially lead to a force being deployed into an entirely different situation than one it has prepared for. Whilst every soldier or humanitarian aid worker is capable of gaining valuable raw information this must in turn be processed and analysed by a trained intelligence operator in order to get timely and accurate intelligence.

The fact that the term intelligence has been shied away from within the United Nations for many years has put the organisation on the back-foot when it comes to having well established intelligence processes and procedures. Troop contributing nations deploy on peace operations with their own organic intelligence and communications capabilities and rely largely on their own ability to get the intelligence that they require to operate, not on that provided by the United Nations. This is a process that works within developed militaries, however, for ill-trained and equipped nations the inability of the United Nations to provide them with access to intelligence is a severe limitation. The provision of timely and accurate intelligence is vital in providing early warning and the information essential for force protection, without it a military force is left vulnerable to attack.

Intelligence and information sharing is also handled badly within the United Nations. There is a level of mistrust between many troop contributing nations with those that they view as a potential security risk, and for this reason they will not provide intelligence to forces that they have to operate with closely. The failed operation in Somalia with the Ranger Force is a classic example of this. The active collection on coalition members by certain other members, such as Singapore, also places a strain on the intelligence sharing
relationship. Nations will not disclose their intelligence and information when there is a risk that the means by which they obtained it can be discovered. That said, the intelligence relationship between the majority of developed military forces is largely a positive one, with most agreeing to pass on information to their allies which will have an impact on their force protection.

The ability to communicate between all levels is essential for effective command and control. Barriers created by the use of different equipment and technology, coupled with the operational security requirements for encoding messages has meant that there is a lack of a common communications system within the United Nations that can be employed across a range of situations by all troop contributing nations. If this common technology existed it would significantly enhance information sharing between troop contributing nations, and also importantly with the local population.

The communications issues that arise from language barriers, not only between the local population and military forces, but also within coalition troop environments are a considerable barrier to effective communications. The employment of interpreters, as well as the provision of language training during the pre-deployment training period prior to deployment can assist with providing some basic understanding of the local language. Commonly used phrases and greetings are taught so that soldiers can speak to the local people, even if it is in a limited capacity, and develop some familiarity and rapport with them. From a security perspective basic military and medical phrases are also taught. Whilst the initial language training provided is basic, there is ongoing training available to those that are willing to learn and for those who demonstrate the aptitude and potential for formal courses and training.

**Logistics - Sustainment**

The United Nations logistics system relies on troop contributing nations being able to provide forces that are self-sufficient. This essentially means that they are able to provide enough essential supplies for the sustainment of their
force when deployed for an agreed period of time. This in turn gives the United Nations the time required to set up its own logistic structure within the operational area. The sustainment of a force once it is in theatre is the main military logistic support effort. Where possible civilian agencies and organisations should be utilised to provide whatever support is available. This support may be in the form of catering support, mechanical and vehicle support, the provision and maintenance of hygiene products and services and electrical and engineering services. By phasing support from the military to civilian contracted logistic providers it allows scarce military assets to be deployed elsewhere.

Familiarity with the road, rail, air and sea/river systems in any operational environment is the key to the successful movement of equipment and supplies. The ability to charter civilian air assets to move personnel and equipment in and out of an operational area also provides the military and the United Nations with the capability to move additional supplies and equipment. As the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated, the ability to move equipment and supplies by road was severely restricted, however, this was overcome to a certain degree by the ability to provide air-drops of basic supplies into those areas most in need. Civilian air transport is relied on heavily by the United Nations as a form of strategic airlift in order to move the smaller nations’ military forces and equipment into operational areas. The use of civilian air carriers is a commonly accepted way of moving forces that do not possess the organic strategic level air lift capability to move themselves. It is an efficient way of freeing up military air assets so that they can be utilised more effectively in moving personnel and supplies around the area of conflict.

Dependant on the levels of damage that have occurred in the area of conflict it is likely that considerable logistic effort will need to be directed towards getting a basic level of infrastructure in place in order to support operations. A priority will generally be directed towards the facilities located at sea ports and air fields, and towards electrical, water and medical services and facilities. Capable and efficient logistic operators and services are an
essential requirement for any peace operation as they provide tactical operations with the flexibility to operate and react at short notice.

Post-deployment

Post deployment considerations focus on the downsizing of stock and personnel in theatre, the phased handover to another military or civilian force or organisation, the return of all personnel and equipment to their home location, and the subsequent requirement to reconstitute the entire force. From a personnel perspective, personnel will require medical and psychological checks, and their personal equipment will need to be checked for damage or loss and replaced as quickly as possible in order for them to be ready to deploy again as required. An extended period of leave is embarked upon once the post-deployment requirements have been met. The post-deployment requirements for equipment, weapons and vehicles are considerably lengthier and take a considerable period of time before the equipment is checked and declared ready for future use on operations.

Once the equipment has been reconstituted the United Nations pays a predetermined or arranged amount so that damaged equipment can be either repaired or replaced. Once this has occurred the involvement of the United Nations is complete.

Civil – Military Relationship

In any peace operation a close relationship between the military and NGO or humanitarian organisations is a chief requirement for the conduct of successful tasks and missions. This is primarily due to the commonly expanded role of the military in protecting civilian aid convoys and relief efforts. However, there is often a breakdown in communications and cooperation due to a lack of understanding over the goals, tasks or responsibilities of the different organisations. When discussing many of the misunderstandings that can evolve between military and civilian organisations, Arbuckle (2006) notes that:
There are professions which are victim-orientated, such as the humanitarian organisations and the NGOs. Other professions, like the military..., tend to be more mission-orientated. The two approaches are not always compatible and cause counter-productive agendas and inefficiencies of operations.390

There is often an 'us versus them' attitude between military and civilian agencies and organisations. Whilst both sides are arguably as much to blame for issues that can stem from this prejudice, cooperation and the development of a close working relationship are necessary for the achievement of shared tasks, such as refugee control and the re-homing of displaced people. By allowing civilian agencies to attend daily or weekly operations and situation briefings they will develop a greater understanding of the security environment and movement restrictions required. Through information sharing and working together the relationship can prove mutual for both sides as the civilian workers will garner information on the situation on the ground from the local people that they are helping. The nature of modern peace operations means that the military and their civilian counterparts must work together and draw on the strengths of each other to achieve the mission's objectives.

Summary

The power of veto from the permanent five members, combined with the political ambitions and agendas of many of the members that belong to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, continue to shape and steer decisions made within the United Nations concerning peace operations. The rise of regional organisations within the peace operations arena continues to place pressure and create debate on the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is a clear definition of this role, and whether it remains as it currently stands, or whether it evolves so that the United Nations is left purely with approving peace operations, rather than planning and leading them, that will determine not only the future of the United Nations within peace operations, but also whether it

390 Arbuckle, J.V, p. 57.
will be required to follow a peacekeeping model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries. Arbuckle notes that:

What the military can offer, if properly structured and deployed, is protection, communications, logistic support, and robust command and control capacities – all of which will often be critical in a complex emergency response, especially in the earliest stages.\(^{391}\)

Whilst the examples highlighted throughout this chapter focus more closely on the direct provision of military personnel and assets to achieve a successful United Nations operation there are additional ways in which the military can assist in peace operations. At all levels of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) the requirement for military liaison officers or advisors exists. The provision of specialist military operational, intelligence and security advice is essential if the decision makers are going to be best advised and the planning process influenced so that it better meets military demands. The development of a close working relationship between military advisors and other United Nations staff would prove beneficial for both communities as it would ultimately result in well planned, executed and most importantly fully supported and understood peace operations.

The creation of an effective and sustainable peacekeeping model or blueprint for employment by the United Nations is achievable by applying the recommendations and basic principles discussed in this chapter. By carrying out the fundamental planning considerations above and gaining specialist advice for greater situational awareness the United Nations would be better placed to make key decisions throughout the entire process. However, the successful employment of this peacekeeping model has numerous external non-military factors that will ultimately impede its progress. The current wording of the United Nations Charter and the ongoing issues over where peace operations actually sit within the United Nations remit, coupled with the significant limitation of no standing permanent military force, are two examples of critical weaknesses in the United Nations as it currently stands.

\(^{391}\) Arbuckle, J.V, p. 100.
Chapter 9: Likely future of the United Nations and Roles that it will have to play in International Security in the future.

The future role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security is in a permanent state of flux. That the United Nations, or a similar organisation, needs to exist is not the focus of this study. Rather, whether or not the United Nations is currently achieving what it was created to do and whether this could be done more effectively and efficiently is the issue at hand. There are those for and against the continued existence of the United Nations and there is considerable evidence that the organisation continues to be a scapegoat for the mistakes of several major contributing nations. This chapter will look into the documents and reports that have heralded the United Nations move into the 21st Century and discuss the impact that they are likely to have on the future role of the United Nations. It will discuss the roles of key figures and regional organisations both internal and external to the organisation with a view to determining the way ahead for the United Nations.

The Brahimi Report

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, addressed many of the limitations or failings that were inherent in United Nations peacekeeping operations during the 1990s. Commissioned by the Secretary General, it was an inward looking assessment intended to provide straight up and specific recommendations on ways that the United Nations could improve its peacekeeping operations. The United Nations executive summary of the report noted that:

The Secretary-General asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations
focus not only on politics and strategy but also and perhaps even more so on operational and organizational areas of need.\textsuperscript{392}

The Brahimi Report made numerous recommendations on the way ahead for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Issues over command and control, intelligence and information processes, planning and logistical support, doctrine and clear, credible and achievable mandates were addressed in the report and recommendations made. Notably the report provided recommendations on the way that the United Nations could address issues over a lack of global information collection, processing and analysis.\textsuperscript{393} Importantly the panel also re-affirmed the following:

The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.\textsuperscript{394}

The Brahimi report looked into the numerous lessons learnt, the impact of which were positive or negative towards the United Nations and peacekeeping operations, that were gleamed from operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia throughout the early 1990s. The commission of the Brahimi Report was a timely move made by proactive Secretary General who was well aware that without a full review to address serious issues that arose as a direct result of the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the United Nations would not be able to regain its credibility as a peacekeeping organisation. Kofi Annan's acceptance of

and support for the Brahimi Report and subsequent request to the international community to actively support the recommendations and take "prompt action" to implement the broad changes, heralded wide sweeping changes for the United Nations.

Regional Organisations

Hume, in his chapter *A Diplomat's View*, notes that the exploration and development of "a select group of countries to conduct or, at times, support an effort at conflict resolution" is one diplomatic approach that has been taken in resolving international conflicts. An example of this is the involvement of the OAS in the conflict resolution in Haiti, which is a clear illustration of the success that can be had from getting regional organisations to "act directly or in support of a negotiating process conducted by the UN Secretary General". Article 52 of the United Nations Charter caters for the provision of regional arrangements and states in part:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Articles 53 and 54 go on to state that whilst regional arrangements or agencies operate, that they are required to keep the United Nations Security Council fully informed at all times of any activities undertaken or planned for the maintenance of internal peace and security. The Charter recognises the role of the formally constituted organisations such as NATO, OAS, OAU, and OSCE. NATO has been the most active regional organisation conducting operations throughout the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sudan to name a few. NATO's involvement in the bombing campaign that

397 Ibid. p. 326.
brought about the ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one example of the impact that the well equipped and trained military force can have.\textsuperscript{400}

Brian Job in his chapter \textit{The UN, Regional Organisations and Regional Conflict: Is there a Viable Role for the UN?}, notes that in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 "Agenda for Peace" statement, the former Secretary General turned to regional organisations for support, "advocating regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation, and cooperation with the United Nations".\textsuperscript{401} While this was seen as a successful way to lighten the burden of the Security Council and develop a "deeper sense of participation, consensus, and democratisation in international affairs",\textsuperscript{402} limited steps were taken during the early 1990s to put this into practice. The involvement of the OAS in Haiti was perhaps the clearest example of how this relationship can work successfully. In his 1997 "Supplement to An Agenda to Peace", Boutros-Ghali went a step further pushing for regional organisations to back up\textsuperscript{403} United Nations operations. The perceived failure of United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda had a significant flow on effect in terms of which nations were willing to contribute peacekeeping troops to future United Nations peacekeeping operations. Commenting on the disillusionment with United Nations peacekeeping and the change in contributing nations, Job notes that:

By 2002, with the exception of Australia and the Ukraine, no Northern state was among the top ten. UN peacekeeping missions over the course of the 1990s, with the exception of those in the Balkans, became and have remained Southern state operations. Note, however, that there was not a general withdrawal from international peace operations by the United States, Canada and the Europeans. There was instead a shunning of the UN and a turning to regional organisations and ad hoc "coalitions of the willing".\textsuperscript{404}

The decline in large scale United Nations peacekeeping operations in the latter part of the 1990s was largely brought about by the increase in regional

\textsuperscript{400}\url{www.nato.int/official home page.}
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid. p. 230.
\textsuperscript{403} A/RES/51/242, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, United Nations Secretary General, 15 September 1997.
or ad hoc operations. Job observes that the United Nations may find itself stymied by the change in circumstances brought about by the involvement of regional organisations. "The vision of the Charter to support the roles and responsibilities of regional organisations and simultaneously sustain the hierarchical position of the UN vis-a-vis regional organisations is in danger of unravelling".  

In his chapter Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors, J. Rasmussen notes that:

Guiding peaceful social and political change requires concerted and creative approaches toward developing and maintaining crucial relationships among bodies politic across the official/unofficial divide within and between countries, including representatives from governments, regional organisations, NGOs, business communities, religious orders, academia, and private citizens. Successful peacemaking can best be accomplished through coordinated efforts that work vertically in a top-down, bottom-up, and middle-out strategy, as well as horizontally within each level.

Smith (2006) notes that "Regional and sub-regional common interest organisations active at the UN are drawn from all continents of the world". Smith then goes on to highlight that the African Union (AU), the Latin America (OAS), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU), to name a few, are regional or sub-regional organisations that "advance common positions in UN debates on certain issues". The importance that regional or sub-regional organisations play within the United Nations cannot be overlooked as they play an important role in advancing a common position on as many United Nations issues as possible, as stated by Smith above. However, whilst these organisations work towards a common position or goal, it must be noted that they operate under their own "charters, staffs, and decision making procedures that can be use to reach agreement and support negotiating efforts".

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405 Price, R.M, & Zacher, M.W, p. 239.
408 Ibid. p. 71.
409 Ibid. p. 72.
The Role of the Secretary General in the Future of the United Nations

The future of the United Nations cannot be discussed without bringing to the forefront the role of the Secretary General which has closely affected the key decisions and support given to peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s. Article 99 of the United Nations Charter states that "The Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". In his chapter The Secretary-General's political space, James Traub states that the relationship between the Secretary General and the Security Council is not merely one of subordination, based on the writing of Article 99, but is in reality "much more complicated, and much more fluid". Traub then goes on to note that the amount of political space available to the Secretary General:

Varies according to his or her own ambitions and diplomatic gifts, as well as the willingness of the five permanent members of the Council – and above all the United States – to grant him or her a role.

Whilst some of the former Secretary General's have been renowned for their "diplomatic finesse", such as Javier Perez de Cuellar, Traub is quick to note that the political space for others, such as Kurt Waldheim "contracted close to absolute zero". Other examples of this political freedom or restriction can be clearly shown by the different approaches of former Secretary General's Kofi Anna, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Whilst Annan enjoyed a close diplomatic relationship with the United States, Boutros-Ghali did not. However, as identified in chapter five, this was largely as a result of the failed United Nations operations in Somalia and Rwanda which occurred under Boutros-Ghali's tenure. The impact of the perceived failings within the United Nations at the time led to the United States vetoing Boutros-Ghali's

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411 Chesterman, S, Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 185.
412 Ibid. p. 186.
413 Ibid. p. 189.
414 Ibid. p. 189.
attempt at a second term as Secretary General. When discussing former Secretary General Annan, Traub notes that:

Annan became the emblem, almost the mascot, of the institution, replacing the received image of a building full of dark-suited diplomats speaking strange tongues with that of one very unthreatening, optimistic, morally driven, and pro-American man.\textsuperscript{415}

Indeed the ability of Annan to not only bring about sweeping changes within the United Nations, but also to get the organisation on the international stage with great regularity were both key steps in moving the organisation into the twenty-first century. However, not even Annan could avoid the political fall-out with the United States over the Iraq War. Traub is quick to note that the United Nations was "marginalised when the Bush administration and its allies went to war in Iraq without Security Council approval".\textsuperscript{416} Again the complete lack of respect for office that the United States and its coalition partners held towards the United Nations was blatantly highlighted to the international community, much as it had been during the conflicts in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s. Mingst and Karns (2007) note that "the war in Iraq raised a host of questions of principle and practice concerning the UN’s role in enforcement, including the fundamental question of the UN’s relevance".\textsuperscript{417} Dyer (2004) goes so far as to say that when the United States and Britain invaded Iraq in the face of overwhelming opposition that "they attacked the foundations of the entire post-Second World War international order".

The Role of Member States and the Charter in the Future of the United Nations

Dyer (2004) clearly articulates that the founders of the United Nations were "not trying to create an organisation that would impose democracy, justice, and brotherly love on the world. They were just trying to build an institution that would prevent a Third World War, and as many other wars as possible".\textsuperscript{418} Dyer then goes on to discuss the overwhelming impact of the

\textsuperscript{415} Chesterman, S, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid. p. 199.
\textsuperscript{417} Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{418} Dyer, G, Future p. 211.
five permanent members veto within the Security Council when the United Nations is making decisions on whether or not to intervene in the annexation or occupation of a state by another.\textsuperscript{419} However, for all of its perceived failings, Dyer is quick to note that:

The UN is a central and indispensable part of the modern world. It is the institution through which a politically conscious global society first came into existence, and its specialised organs are still the arena in which most of the world’s large scale deals are made...It is the organiser and command centre of many of the peacekeeping missions that hold old enemies apart and try to minimise the level of violence in failed states, and the source of legal authority for most of those peacekeeping missions that it does not directly control.\textsuperscript{420}

Peoples (2007) in his book \textit{A Constitution for the United Nations: Before It Is Too Late!!}, revisits the current wording and processes within the Charter and provides his views on a proposed constitution for the United Nations. Unlike Mingst and Karns, Dyer, and Traub, Peoples does not focus on what the United Nations has been able to achieve within its current limitations, but instead focuses on the actual wording and meaning of the Charter and that the United Nations has already failed. While he is not critical of the people within the organisation Peoples comments that:

The failure is not due to limitations in human nature or the incompetence of the United Nations personnel, but rather, it is due to fundamental flaws in the organisational concept. These flaws have rendered the UN a “paper tiger” that has been a debating society in “gridlock” for over half a century.\textsuperscript{421}

When discussing the United Nations Charter Peoples goes on to remark that the “most serious flaw is the undemocratic stranglehold the five permanent members of the Security Council have on all major aspects of the organisation”.\textsuperscript{422} Peoples argues that five fundamental changes need to occur within the current United Nations Charter in order for the organisation to achieve its purpose. By disbanding the Security Council, upgrading the Charter based on democratic principles, giving the General Assembly the

\textsuperscript{419} Ibid. p. 212.  
\textsuperscript{420} Dyer, G. p. 214.  
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid. p. 33.
power to legislate, enact and publish international laws, expanding the International Court meet the demand for justice, and establishing an International Police and Inspection (IPI) Force to enforce international laws. Peoples states that international cooperation can be achieved. "The key to obtaining international cooperation is to upgrade the United Nations Charter to a democratically-inspired Constitution that will encourage willing and active support from all nations".

This issue brings to the front the age old argument over the power of the permanent five members of the Security Council and whether or not it is there to actually serve the best interests of the United Nations, or singular national interest. The latter of the two is more likely. What is clear is that the United Nations will have its hands tied on certain issues when the political will of any of the five permanent members raise objections towards the advance of common positions within the United Nations. That the Secretary General must be afforded the political freedom to further causes as she or he sees fit is not an issue which is contested. How much scope or political room the Secretary General will be afforded remains an issue that is on the forefront of many of the United Nations Member’s agendas, the permanent five being the forerunners in this debate.

Mingst and Karns (2007) go on to state that "other individuals within the UN system can exercise significant influence". The role of the special representatives of the Secretary General, appointed by the Secretary General, on all peacekeeping operations has been a significant one in the "mediation and negotiation" process in efforts to bring an end to conflicts. The ability, or inability of the special representatives, as seen in Somalia, has a considerable impact during the initial stages of an evolving conflict as they are relied on to provide first hand information and opinions of the situation as it is unfolding. Importantly, they are also relied on to provide an initial assessment on the likely outcome of a conflict.

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423 Peoples, P.L, p. 129.
424 Ibid. p. 128.
425 Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 75.
426 Ibid. p. 75.
The Role of NGOs in the Future of the United Nations

The relationship between NGOs and the United Nations is well documented and has largely shown the importance of both organisations working closely together towards a common cause. The nature of field work carried out by NGOs in the majority of conflict or war ravaged zones throughout the world means that NGOs will often be present in a specific operational area before the United Nations authorises a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. Utilised correctly NGOs are a reliable source of raw information\textsuperscript{427} that can be drawn on by either military or United Nations reconnaissance and planning staff during the initial planning and decision making processes. The relationship between United Nations civilian and military personnel with field NGOs can develop into a successful information sharing partnership if a close liaison and common goal is developed. If this does not occur then an element of distrust and an “us versus them” attitude may develop, as was highlighted under chapter 6. In discussing the future of NGOs with the United Nations Martens (2005) notes that:

NGOs today have manifold possibilities for interaction with the UN. They assist UN institutions and provide them with information on issues of concern to them, they regularly advise UN commissions and committees, they collaborate with the UN and UN agencies, and implement joint projects.\textsuperscript{428}

Martens then goes on to articulate that while NGOs have been carrying out many of these activities since the founding of the UN, that over the last decade “the range and intensity of these activities has broadened”.\textsuperscript{429} The increased requirement for peacekeeping and intervention operations since the early 1990s has mirrored the increased need for humanitarian and aid organisations. The inability of conflict and war ravaged nations to provide the necessary basic levels of food, water, medical and hygiene support to their people has cause unprecedented levels of starvation and disease. Unable to deal with the levels of death and starvation, governments corrupt and

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid. p. 45.
\textsuperscript{429} Ibid. p. 45.
legitimate; have been forced to allow NGOs within their borders to facilitate the provision of basic humanitarian aid and relief efforts. Impartiality within NGOs is as critical to their employment in certain operational areas as it is for the United Nations, as without it they would likely have their access or guarantee of safety revoked. Martens notes that:

NGOs have not only been recognised as participants in global affairs, but have been integrated into the UN framework. In response, NGOs have adapted to these increased opportunities by altering their patterns of activity over the course of the last decade.⁴³⁰

Accredited NGOs already enjoy a relationship with the United Nations from a field operational level to being involved in the policy initiating and developing process.⁴³¹ NGOs without formal status still only maintain relations with "single operational UN bodies".⁴³² The inclusion of accredited NGOs within the framework of United Nations policy and developing processes is a positive relationship for the United Nations to draw on. NGOs are often able to provide personnel that are subject experts on the inner workings of a country or state, including vital information on key personalities and the real time situation on the ground. While the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations has evolved considerably since the 1990s, it is envisaged that this is an ongoing process that will continue to adapt and evolve with the changing international security and humanitarian environment.

Is there still an accepted requirement for the United Nations?

Smith (2006) articulates that one of the common arguments used to justify the importance of the United Nations in world politics relates to "the issue of demand: do states want to be in the organisation, and do they bring their problems to it for resolution?"⁴³³ Statistics and membership demand clearly show that the majority of eligible nations belong to the United Nations and continue to support the organisation. Moskowitz (1980) comments that:

⁴³⁰ Martens, K. p. 162.
⁴³¹ Ibid. p. 163.
⁴³² Ibid. p. 163.
⁴³³ Smith, C.B., p. 278.
There is no nation in the world today, regardless of size, population, wealth or power that is not in one way or another affected by, and in turn does not affect, the United Nations. Price notes that despite its dramatic failures, “developments on the ground over the past decade have continued to create numerous and indeed seemingly limitless functional opportunities for the UN as a niche organisation”. Hirst (2001) also argues that the only real role of the United Nations “is to provide legitimacy for the action of other powers”. However, he takes this argument a step further than Price and instead on focusing on the other functional opportunities that the United Nations can fill, goes on to write that “institutions like the UN are not merely ineffective, they are also only weakly legitimate”. Hirst’s is not alone in his view of the United Nations and the future that it will play in the maintenance of international peace and security, Muravchik (2005) also notes that the United Nations “is a failure”.

It is hard to have a conversation about the United Nations without someone having a derogatory comment to direct at the organisations perceived failings or inability to quickly negotiate or resolve an end to a conflict. Perhaps the most common themes from a military perspective are directed at the organisations reluctance to conduct peace enforcement operations or create its own cohesive military force.

Behind most basic criticisms directed at the United Nations is a misconceived view on what the organisation was created for, what the Charter authorises the United Nations to do, and what the United Nations can realistically achieve within its organisational constraints. Mingst and Karns (2007) clearly articulate that:

For many, the future of the United Nations is closely linked to the fate of efforts to reform the institution and, thereby, enhance its legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness.

434 Moskowitz, M, p. vii.
436 Hirst, P, p. 81.
437 Hirst, P, p. 142.
439 Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 239.
There is a well supported and documented requirement for the continued existence of the United Nations. While the organisation may take a more supervisory role within peace operations in the future relying on regional organisations or "coalition of the willing" to man, equip and command peace operations, as Price notes, there are still "limitless functional opportunities for the UN as a niche organisation". Key reform issues facing the United Nations remain centred around the issue of representation, or participation within the organisation, especially within the Security Council, and the issue of institutional capacity and effectiveness. Steps are being taken to address the issues of institutional capacity and effectiveness, and the findings of the Brahimi Report have been largely effective in ensuring that this process has advanced. However, the issues surrounding reform within the Security Council and amending the United Nations Charter, as noted by Mingst and Karns, are "not procedural but political", which in turn means that this reform is going to be a much debated and drawn out process.

Throughout the course of this study several common themes across each of the four case studies have appeared. First, is the issue over the involvement or controlling impact of the permanent five members of the Security Council, the United States in particular, and other Members within the United Nations. Second, there is the ongoing debate over the lack of a permanent, or at least capable, military force with which to conduct peacekeeping operations and achieve peace operation mandates. Third, is the issue over the need for the creation of realistic mandates with the allocation of an appropriately equipped, trained and funded force to implement them. The fourth issue flows on from the third in that the United Nations is not afforded the luxury of choosing troop contributing nations that are at the appropriate trained state and experience level, but instead is forced to accept what it is offered. These ad-hoc military units lack the basic military command and control structure that is a basic force multiplier and is required to achieve mission success. Fifth, is the issue over the impact of regional organisations and the "coalitions of the willing" on

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442 Ibid. p. 242.
443 Mingst, K.A, & Karns, M.P, p. 258.
how the United Nations is perceived as a legitimate organisation. The sixth major theme focuses on the relationship between military and civilian organisations with the United Nations, including the role of NGOs. Finally, the seventh major theme is the ongoing debate about the role that the United Nations ought to play in the leadership of peace operations, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

This study has focused on the military aspects of United Nations peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations with a view to providing a successful peacekeeping model for employment in future United Nations operations. Along those lines the themes discussed have resolved around the military issues from command and control, intelligence and communications, logistics, and pre-deployment and deployment training. The failures of the large ill-equipped and multinational peacekeeping operations in the 1990s heralded a significant change in attitude both internal and external to the United Nations as an organisation. This change in attitude resulted in the Brahimi Report and the United Nations taking numerous steps forward towards achieving a more cohesive, experienced and structured military approach to peace operations.

It can be argued that no other international security or humanitarian organisation has gained, or gains as much international attention as the United Nations. Wells (2005) argues that “the United Nations functions the way it does because American leaders planned it that way.” The study has clearly highlighted through the case studies on Somalia and Haiti the detrimental effect that the United States has had on the United Nations and in particular the considerable impact that it has had on how the organisation is viewed. The decision to wage war in Iraq is perhaps one of the clearest examples of the United States and Britain’s willingness to by-pass the United Nations if it does not get the support either documented or physical that it wants. The power of veto within the Security Council of the permanent five members has also had a noticeable impact in permanently delaying or drawing out decisions that require immediate attention, the case study on

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Bosnia-Herzegovina being a classic example. Yet for his criticism of the United Nations Wells obviously believes in the principle of the United Nations and notes that:

In spite of all its warts and wrinkles the UN has accomplished wonders in being justice to the needy and helping to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.\textsuperscript{445}

Heinbecker and Goff (2005) argue that "the United Nations remains indispensable to the preservation of peace and security, to the attainment of prosperity, and to the advancement of human rights".\textsuperscript{446} However, they also clearly articulate that the employment of "its mandate, and the tools at its disposal to fulfil it, must be adapted to the changing times".\textsuperscript{447} Whilst steps are being taken within the United Nations to address these key issues, they are not being taken with the speed that they require and this lack of action is placing the United Nations on back-burner while regional organisations take the lead in the actual planning and conduct of peace operations. The role of the United Nations in legitimising these operations remains extant for the time being; however, it is highly possibly that even this authorising function may be superseded by other organisations or coalitions of the willing in the future. The United Nations needs to take immediate action towards clearly defining and then cementing its role and position within peace operations in order to avoid being completely sidelined.

The rapidly changing world order and the increased threat to global security from deliberate or random acts of terrorism and military invasion or intervention have created an environment where the United Nations is going to be relied on more and more to intervene and resolve conflict resolution. The United Nations will play a significant role in the maintenance of peace and security in the years to come, however, the exact role that the United

\textsuperscript{445} Wells, D.A, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{446} Heinbecker, P & Goff, P, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{447} Ibid. p. 2.
Nations will take in peace operations over the next decade is yet to be clearly defined.
APPENDIX 1

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Preamble

We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And for these Ends

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I - Purposes and Principles

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, an to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventative or enforcement action.

6. The Organisation shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II – Membership

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
CHAPTER III – Organs

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV - The General Assembly

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a
state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

   a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

   b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

**Article 15**

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

**CHAPTER V**

**The Security Council**

**Article 23**

The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

**Functions and Powers**

**Article 24**

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI - Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII - Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 an 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall dully take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed force, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-fore contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII - Regional arrangements

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER XI - Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

1. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

2. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

3. to further international peace and security;

4. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the
practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

5. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapter XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XIV - The International Court of Justice

Article 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV - The Secretariat

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI - Miscellaneous provisions

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.
APPENDIX 2

Somalia – UNOSOM I & II - Mandate

UNOSOM I was established by Security Council resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia; and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs.

On 28 August 1992, UNOSOM I’s mandate and strength were expanded by Security Council resolution 775 (1992), to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia.

On 3 December 1992, after the situation in Somalia had further deteriorated, the Security Council, by its resolution 794 (1992), authorized Member States to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNITAF worked in coordination with UNOSOM I to secure major population centres and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed.

UNOSOM II was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). [UNITAF was a multinational force, organized and led by the United States, which, in December 1992, had been authorized by the Security Council to use “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.]

The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included:

- monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented;
- preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action;
- maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control;
- seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
- securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs;

• continuing mine-clearing, and;
• assisting in repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

In resolution 814 (1993), the Council also requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from all United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. The assistance included repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, and mine-clearance.

On 6 June 1993, gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by Somali militiamen against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 837 (1993), reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for such attacks, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.

On 4 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 897 (1994) revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. The revised mandate included:

• assisting the Somali parties in implementing the “Addis Ababa Agreements”, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and ceasefire efforts; protecting major ports, airports and essential infrastructure;
• providing humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country;
• assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system;
• helping repatriate and resettle refugees and displaced people;
• assisting the political process in Somalia; and
• protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia in early March 1995.
Haiti - UNMIH, UNSMIH, & UNTMIH - Mandate

UNMIH was originally established by Security Council resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, to help implement certain provisions of the Governors Island Agreement signed by the Haitian parties on 3 July 1993. Its mandate was to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force. However, due to non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be fully deployed at that time and carry out that mandate.

After the restoration, in October 1994, of the Haitian Constitutional Government with the help of a multinational force led by the United States and authorized by the Security Council, UNMIH's mandate was revised by the Security Council [resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995)] to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: sustaining a secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. UNMIH was also to assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities.

UNMIH assumed its functions in full on 31 March 1995. Democratic legislative elections were held in summer 1995. The Presidential elections were held successfully on 17 December 1995 and the transfer of power to the new President took place on 7 February 1996. Upon the receipt of the request of the President of Haiti, UNMIH's mandate was extended by Security Council resolution 1048 (1996) for the final period until 30 June 1996.

UNSMIH was established, initially for a period of six months, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996 with a mandate limited to the following tasks:

- Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police;
- Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force;
- Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.

After two extensions UNMIH's mandate expired on 31 July 1997.

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UNTMIH was established to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP), by Security Council resolution 1123 (1997) of 30 July 1997 for a single four-month period ending on 30 November 1997. Tasks of UNTMIH's police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security, areas considered to be of distinct importance. Once reinforced, these units would considerably improve HNP's effectiveness while it pursued its own development. UNTMIH and the United Nations Development Programme continued preparation of an assistance programme to provide HNP with law enforcement expertise. Tasks of UNTMIH's military security element included ensuring, under the authority of the Force Commander, the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel implementing the mandate. The Special Representative continued to coordinate the activities of the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina – UNMIBH – Mandate

On 21 December 1995, the Security Council, by its resolution 1035 (1995) established, for an initial period of one year, the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was done in accordance with the Peace Agreement signed by the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 14 December 1995. The operation came to be known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The Security Council renewed the mandate of UNMIBH on several occasions. Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1423 (2002) of 12 July 2002.

In accordance with the Peace Agreement, IPTF main tasks included:

- monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organisations, structures and proceedings;
- advising law enforcement personnel and forces;
- training law enforcement personnel;
- facilitating, with the IPTF mission of assistance, the parties’ law enforcement activities;
- assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats;
- advising government authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organisation of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;
- assisting by accompanying the parties’ law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the Task Force deems appropriate.

In addition, the Task Force was to consider requests from the parties or law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for assistance, with priority being given to ensuring the existence of conditions for free and fair elections.

UNMIBH was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who exercised authority over the IPTF Police Commissioner and coordinated other United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to:

- Humanitarian relief and refugees;
- Demining;
- Human rights;
- Elections;
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction.

UNMIBH also worked closely with the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) authorised by the Security Council to help ensure compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement, and continued such cooperation with the successor to IFOR – the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

Throughout its existence UNMIBH was mandated to perform a number of additional tasks, which included:

- Resolution 1088 (1996) which gave responsibilities relating to the investigation of allegations of human rights abuses by police officers or other law enforcement officials of the various authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Resolution 1103 (1997) which meant an increase in UNMIBH’s civilian police strength, by 186 personnel, to monitor, restructure and retrain the police in the Brcko area.
- Resolution 1107 (1997) which meant a further increase in UNMIBH’s civilian police, by 120 personnel, to carry out additional and exiting tasks relating to human rights investigation, monitoring of the local police, strengthening of police training police restructuring and the development of guidelines for democratic principles, IPTF would have to move from a police force with primarily generalist functions to one with a substantial number of police experts in specialised fields.
- Resolution 1144 (1997) the following additional tasks were entrusted: (a) the creation of specialised IPTF training units to address key public security issues, such as refugee returns; organised crime, drugs, corruption and terrorism, and public security crisis management; as well as training in the detection of financial crime and smuggling; and (b) cooperation with the Council of Europe and OSCE, under the coordination of the High Representative, in a programme of judicial and legal reforms, including assessment and monitoring of the court system, development and training of legal professionals and restructuring of institutions within the judicial system.
- Resolution 1168 (1998) which authorised a further increase in the strength of UNMIBH by 30 civilian police personnel to carry out new intensive programmes for the local police in a number of specialised fields.
- Resolution 1184 (1998) which approved the establishment of a programme to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of an overall programme of legal reform under the overall coordination of the High Representative. This programme became known as the Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP).
East Timor - UNAMET, UNTAET & UNMISET - Mandate

**UNAMET** was established by Security Council resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999 for a period up to 31 August 1999. To organize and conduct a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia, in accordance with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement. By Security Council resolution 1257 of 3 August UNAMET was extended to 30 September 1999.

**UNTAET** had overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. According to Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, UNTAET's mandate consisted of the following elements:

- To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
- To establish an effective administration;
- To assist in the development of civil and social services;
- To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
- To support capacity-building for self-government;
- To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

**UNMISET** was established by Security Council resolution 1410 (2002) of 17 May for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 20 May 2002, with the following mandate:

To provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor;

To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS); and

To contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor.

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The Council also requested UNMISET to give full effect to the following three Programmes of the Mandate Implementation Plan as set out in section III A 3 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2002/432) of 17 April 2002:

Stability, Democracy and Justice;

Public Security and Law Enforcement; and

External Security and Border Control.

On 19 May 2003, that mandate was extended for another year, until 20 May 2004, by Security Council resolution 1480 (2003). On 14 May 2004, the Security Council, in its resolution 1543, again extended the mandate of UNMISET for a period of six months, with a view to subsequently extending the mandate for a further and final period of six months, until 20 May 2005. It also decided to reduce the size of the mission and revise its tasks, in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary-General as outlined in his report of 29 April 2004 to include the following elements:

(i) support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes;

(ii) support to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste;

(iii) support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste.

On 16 November 2004, the Security Council, by its resolution 1573 (2004), extended the mandate of UNMISET for a final six months until 20 May 2005. The Council also decided to maintain UNMISET's tasks, configuration and size, in order to allow the Mission to complete its mandate and consolidate gains made in that country thus far.

On 20 May 2005, UNMISET successfully concluded its mandate in Timor-Leste. It was succeeded by a small follow-on political mission - the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which was established by the Security Council to ensure that the underpinnings of a viable State are firmly in place in that country.
THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE: V.R. HOUGHTON

This questionnaire has been developed to support a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master of Philosophy in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University.

In order to support the development of the thesis the specialist views of a variety of military personnel is required to provide quantitative research into the subject. The thesis title is:

Lessons Learnt from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Peacekeeping Model for creating and sustaining peace in war torn countries

Security/Privacy Obligations:

In order to keep confidentiality please do not provide personal details such as your name, regimental number, or current appointment.

Please do not include any information that is sensitive in nature to the NZDF or which holds a security classification marking. Your answers will be held in the strictest confidence and the information that you provide will in no way be linked to you, nor will it be provided to the NZDF in any other form than that of the completed thesis.

Once the data required from this questionnaire has been collected the questionnaire will be destroyed.

Background Information:

Please list how long you have been in the NZDF, what rank you currently hold, your specialist/trade area, and how many overseas deployments you have been deployed on.

Mission Information:

1. Have you been deployed on a United Nations (UN) mission(s)? If yes, then list the mission(s) and deployment date(s) below:
2. What role/specialist appointment(s) did you hold?


3. What were the major contributing nations that you worked with? Which country had lead nation?


Detailed Information:

4. What was your general impression of working with the UN military staff?


5. What was your general impression of working with the UN civilian staff or agencies?


6. Did you have a working relationship with any non-UN civilian agencies or aid organisations? If yes, which ones and what was your impression of working with them?


7. In your own words, how effective did you find the UN's employment of your specialist/trade area?
8. Did you encounter any issues with the differences in UN contributing countries views/procedures on the employment of your specialist/trade area? If yes, how did they impact on the day to day running of the mission?

9. What measures could be taken to improve the UN's employment of your specialist/trade area?

10. How effective was the command and control (C2) relationship between the lead nation and the headquarters or unit that you were employed in?

11. What changes could have been made to make this more logical - successful?

12. In your own words, prior to the commencement of a UN Peacekeeping operation what are the vital military elements/procedures that need to be met?
13. Was pre-deployment training for the UN mission conducted? How long was it? Do you feel that it was sufficient?

14. Was any in theatre training conducted by the UN? If yes, did this duplicate or enhance what training was given prior to deployment?

15. Did you have any exposure to information/intelligence sharing prior to deployment, and once in theatre? Were there any significant sharing restrictions that impeded your employment?

16. Did you encounter any religious, cultural or gender difficulties on any of your UN operation(s)? If yes, did this affect how and where you could be employed?

17. Did you encounter any technical or equipment barriers working with other nations and their communications and military equipment? If yes, what were they, and how were the barriers overcome?
Conclusion:

18. List the five key advantages of working within the UN as you see it.

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19. List the five key disadvantages of working within the UN as you see it.

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20. If you could recommend two changes to how the UN mission(s) that you were deployed on were run, what would they be?

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21. Has your experience working with the UN coloured your view or perception of the organisation? If yes, in what way?

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chesterman, S, Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.


**Journals/Reports:**


