Browsing by Author "Alam A"
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- ItemClimate change and geopolitical conflicts: The role of ESG readiness(Elsevier Ltd, 2024-02-27) Alam A; Banna H; Alam AW; Bhuiyan MBU; Mokhtar NB; Evans JMThis study examines the relationship between climate change vulnerability and geopolitical risk using data on 42 countries from 1995 to 2021. Utilising two distinct indices, the climate vulnerability index (CVI) and the country-specific geopolitical risk (CGPR) indices, we find that countries with high vulnerability to climate change are more likely to experience geopolitical conflicts. Further analysis reveals that country-level overall economic, social, and governance (ESG) readiness significantly mitigates this detrimental effect. This moderation is mainly attributed to the social and governance readiness measures. Additional tests indicate that the mitigating role of ESG is more pronounced for countries with high institutional governance. These results remain resilient through a set of endogeneity tests using matched samples of countries generated through propensity score matching (PSM) estimation. Our findings suggest that addressing climate vulnerability is crucial to promoting global peace and geopolitical stability.
- ItemProblem Directors and Corporate Risk-Taking(John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy of Management, 2023-10-20) Bhuiyan MBU; Liu J; Alam A; Johan SThis study investigates the impact of a ‘problem director’ on the risk-taking propensity of a firm and its consequences for firm value. Analysing a sample of US companies, we find that corporate risk-taking propensity increases when a firm appoints a problem director. Our results are of economic significance, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in problem director's score leads to a 2.33% to 4.17% increase in corporate risk-taking. Mediation analysis reveals that a problem director increases firm risk-taking through reducing financial reporting quality. Further, a firm's risk-taking increases when a new problem director joins the board, and the damaging effect persists even after the problem director has left. Moreover, if a chief executive officer (CEO) is a problem director, s/he displays a greater predisposition for risk-taking. Moreover, when a problem director also sits on a board led by a problem CEO, we determine that the former will have an even greater propensity to take risks. Further analysis determines that the presence of problem directors damages long-term firm value in the aftermath of risk-taking behaviour. Overall, this study provides fresh evidence revealing a web of connections between a problem director, ineffective corporate governance and a decline in firm value.