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Browsing by Author "Baker, Alyson"

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    Chimpanzees in Kant's moral landscape : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2021) Baker, Alyson
    For Kant, human beings are unique in their rationality; non-human animals are not conscious of themselves through time, hence they cannot be agents in his moral landscape. A fresh look at Kant’s concepts relating to pure reason, practical reason, and judgement, will show Kant’s position regarding non-human animals does not follow from his theories of cognition or morality. Using Kant’s own concept of , chimpanzees, as an example of a non-human animal, stand firmly within Kant’s moral landscape as moral agents. We are therefore bound to treat chimpanzees as ends-in-themselves.

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