Browsing by Author "Codd, John Albert"

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    Cognitive structure and development in the education of poetic appreciation : a theoretical and clinical investigation : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education at Massey University
    (Massey University, 1980) Codd, John Albert
    The development of poetic appreciation is investigated by combining philosophical analysis with Piagetian-type interviews in order to argue a general case for the fundamental importance of knowledge and the emergence of cognitive abilities in the education of artistic appreciation. Coleridge's poem, "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" is used as the object of appreciation for a series of clinical interviews involving 30 subjects, 10 at each of three different age-levels: 9 1/2 - 10 year olds; 11 1/2 - 12 year olds; 13 1/2 - 14 1/2 year olds. Illuminative protocols are drawn from these interviews to illustrate various aspects of the educational theory that is advanced. This theory draws upon recent research and writings in the philosophy of art, literary criticism and developmental psychology as these relate to curriculum problems in the appreciation of art and literature. The educational implications of the argument are then synthesized into a tentative theoretical framework for the teaching of poetic appreciation. The rejection of positivism and recent moves towards epistemological pluralism are used to support the claim that artistic appreciation, no less than science, is a domain of public knowledge characterized by critical enquiry, objective canons, and concepts shared within a socio-cultural tradition. It is contended that because appreciation presupposes an interpretation which entails "seeing" works of art and literature under an appropriate aspect and in correct relationship to their context, artistic appreciation is not the result of merely subjective or idiosyncratic responses to artistic experience but requires an initiation into the understanding of relevant concepts, the knowledge of publicly identifiable criteria, and a gradual induction into the interpretive mode of reasoning. It is argued, moreover, that emotional responses to art are not "inner" subjective states but are themselves structured by cognitive appraisals of the aesthetic object. Hence, there is an important distinction between an affective response to the experience of art and an appreciation in which emotion is controlled by valid interpretation. Because this control presupposes public norms and the knowledge necessary to apply them, the education of the emotions through the appreciation of art and literature is necessarily cognitive. Thus, it is argued that the education of poetic appreciation, as with other forms of art, requires the development of interpretive reasoning ability and specific cognitive capacities such as metaphoric competence and perceptual discrimination. The development of these capacities involves the progressive equilibration of cognitive structures exhibiting features of wholeness, transformation and self-regulation. The task of the teacher in the education of poetic appreciation, therefore, is to provide the experiences of poetry necessary to the understanding of poetic meaning, and to make available the knowledge necessary to an educated and mature appreciation. The key to such appreciation, it is claimed, lies in developing the ability to construct valid, comprehensive and consistent interpretations on the basis of relevant contextual knowledge. Only when this ability has been developed can evaluation, or the critical appreciation of poetry become a central focus for education.
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    Some philosophical problems in the cognitive-developmental approach to morality : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education
    (Massey University, 1974) Codd, John Albert
    This thesis examines some of the philosophical problems which underlie the cognitive-developmental approach to morality as it has been presented in the Piaget-Kohlberg theory. This theory of moralization is reviewed, synthesized and evaluated in order to demonstrate the substantial body of empirical research on which it is founded and to focus on some of the unresolved theoretical issues and methodological problems such as stage generality, motivation, decalage and cross-cultural validity. The problem of explanation is discussed in relation to the appropriateness of alternative modes and it is concluded that, as cognitive-developmentalism is a theory of human action, it requires an explanatory paradigm which takes cognizance of (i) the agent's viewpoint and reasons for acting, (ii) a molar level of behavioural analysis, (iii) enabling conditions for choice, and (iv) cognitive processes of appraisal and judgment. The assumptions underlying the cognitive-developmental explanation of moral judgment are examined in relation to the proposed paradigm. It is contended that the concept of judgment, which is central to the theory, is not adequately defined and its logical status within the practical reasoning process is not explicated within the cognitive-developmental theory. The prescriptivism which is assumed by the theory does not explain the logical connection between reasons for action and the universalizable imperative; nor does it adequately account for discrepancies between judgment and action. Kohlberg's approach to morality lies within the Kantian tradition but even within this context his theory entails a number of metaethical problems. In the present thesis, it is argued that the theory provides no adequate criteria for defining the moral domain and that its claim for formal universality of moral principles cannot be supported. Kohlberg's moral position is inconsistent and shifts between formal prescriptivism and a naturalistic claim for the place of justice as the supreme moral principle. The problem of justification for moral principles is evaded. By emphasizing the cognitive aspects of moral judgment and the place of prescriptive principles at the highest stage, the theory neglects the effective and motivational features of morality and the influence of beliefs, habits and personal ideals on moral conduct. It is argued that Kohlberg's claim for the isomorphism of psychological and normative structure cannot be supported and his argument for the solution of the is/ought problem remains untenable. Finally, Kohlberg's developmentalist ideology is discussed with special reference to educational implications. It is argued that there is a sufficiency fallacy in cognitive-developmentalism and that the theory is equivocal in its employment of the concepts of rationality and autonomy. An attempt is made to define these concepts in relation to development and education in order to illustrate the limitations of Kohlberg's concept of 'cognitive stimulation' and his advocacy of 'development' as an aim for education. The importance of Kohlberg's theory is not disputed in this thesis but it is argued that he claims too much for it in relation to the philosophical problems which it entails and the relevance to moral education which it implies.