Browsing by Author "Mackenzie, Anne Jennifer"

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    Brain damage and personhood: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University
    (Massey University, 1991) Mackenzie, Anne Jennifer
    In certain cases of specific brain-damage, neurologists are often puzzled about the patient's status as a person. They suggest that the person is changed, diminished, or even absent, but it is not clear why. Can a philosophical account of personhood help answer their questions? My aim is to show that a philosophical understanding of personhood can be improved by taking account of actual cases of brain-damage. At the same time, a philosophical analysis enriched in this way can help to dispel uncertainty and perplexity concerning those cases. I outline a necessary condition of personhood and show reasonable justification for it. The condition combines the notions of consciousness, being a continuing subject of experience, and awareness of being such a subject. Assuming the condition is justified, I go on to consider its application. I suggest that cases of very specific brain-damage may provide clues to capacities which are essential if the condition is to be satisfied. A closer examination of what must be the case if an individual satisfies each of the parts of the condition shows that this is difficult to determine. The main part of my project has two sections. Firstly, I focus on the condition itself. I show that memory for experiences is essential for having a sense of oneself as a continuing subject of experience and I answer possible objections to this claim. Memory alone is insufficient, for the memories need to be processed into something like a narrative. This processing calls for a basic linguistic capacity and so this capacity is also necessary if the condition is to be satisfied. In the second part of my project, I select accounts of brain-damage described in the literature. I choose seven cases where experiential memory is impaired, one case where linguistic capacity is lost, and one case of profound deafness where linguistic capacity did not develop until quite late. A final case is an example of very severe brain-damage where minimal memory and linguistic capacity were recovered while much else remained lost. Considering these two parts together, I point out how the philosophical analysis can help us to understand just what it is that the patients have lost. At the same time, the case studies show that the sense of self is diminished when there are specific memory and linguistic deficits. The patients, despite being mobile, articulate and intelligent, cannot function as persons in many respects. Their difficulties support my claims about the necessity of memory and linguistic capacity. Further support comes from the case where memory and linguistic capacity are recovered to some extent in the face of devastating losses. Overall I try to show that a philosophical analysis of the concept of a person will be enhanced if we take note of cases of specific brain damage. We can gain insights from sympathetic accounts of the lives of these patients and an enhanced philosophical account can contribute to our understanding of the plight of the brain-damaged.
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    From languageless interaction to enlanguaged interaction : a philosophical study of Ildefonso :a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 1999) Mackenzie, Anne Jennifer; Mackenzie, Anne Jennifer
    This investigation centres on a man, Ildefonso, learning his first language (American Sign Language) at twenty-seven. The prime source of material is Susan Schaller's account of teaching Ildefonso, A Man Without Words. Certain claims about language and education from the Deaf community, and writings of the Deaf are a second important source of material. The deaf individual, not the theory of language as such, is the focus of the issue of languagelessness in these materials and in this dissertation. Schaller's account throws doubt on some conventional notions of language, and an alternative view of language emerges. Her early lessons are based on conventional ideas: that language is fundamentally a symbol system; that language is a tool for transferring information; that vocabulary and grammar are of prime importance. Lessons based on these ideas fail with Ildefonso. Progress occurs when Schaller stops trying to show Ildefonso ASL signs and begins trying to confer with him. Her description of his progress suggests languaging is fundamentally a particular kind of interaction. I characterise this as reciprocal back and forth interaction, and trace its development in three dialogues between Schaller and Ildefonso. One of the most surprising features of this development is the secondary nature of sign/words and grammar to becoming enlanguaged. Some years later, Schaller asks Ildefonso about his thinking before he acquired ASL. He gives none of the conventional answers we might expect. After two failed attempts to answer he takes Schaller to meet some of his languageless friends so that she can see for herself. Clearly he wants her to see interaction. I have characterised this interaction as performer-audience interaction. Humberto Maturana's theory of language, based on the interaction of living systems, provides a framework which accommodates both performer-audience interaction and reciprocal back and forth interaction. The transition to becoming enlanguaged has more to do with coming to interact in a particular way than with acquiring a vocabulary or learning grammar. Language is fundamentally a particular way of interacting. This view of language helps us understand why bilingual education (incorporating a signed language) is important for profoundly deaf children. We see why sign systems devised and imposed by the hearing do not work, but home sign systems generated by deaf children do.