Browsing by Author "Watts, Alistair Clive"

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    Options and opportunities for New Zealand and France 1918-1935 : les liaisons dangereuses? : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2019) Watts, Alistair Clive
    The New Zealand histories typically assert that a new national identity evolved after World War I to substitute for the pre-war British-based model. This assumption has resulted in the creation of a British-centric historiography that understates the important role of other non-British influencers – especially the French – in the evolution of post-war New Zealand. Systematic sampling of newspaper articles in the PapersPast database has revealed that within New Zealand’s post-1918 public discourse there was a diverse seam of opinion and news related to France that sat alongside that from Britain. This suggests that events concerning France were more prevalent in shaping the New Zealand story than the earlier histories have indicated. These additional perspectives have been integrated into aspects of the New Zealand post-World War I narrative, supplemented where appropriate with articles from French newspapers and the archive. When the First World War finally ended, New Zealand attempted to disengage from Europe in order to put the collective national trauma in the past. Resuming the traditional dislike of the French was a reflexive rejection of the war years rather than a considered policy. It was a self-imposed rather than an obligatory restraint which manifested as official resistance to repatriating bodies and haste in preparing the local monuments that replicated the grander memorials being constructed in France. Thus, when France attempted to maintain contact with her New Zealand ally through trade and diplomacy, the clear wish of New Zealand to identify as a British-dependent entity led to rejection. Nevertheless, France remained a significant global power owing to the Versailles Treaty and post-war political and economic realities. As a result New Zealand was reluctantly drawn into further interactions with the French. As the other Dominions chose a more independent path it was New Zealand - having spurned the French overtures – that was left by choice diplomatically isolated, while clinging culturally, economically and diplomatically to the remnants of a British Empire that had no need for the former colony.
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    Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France? : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2015) Watts, Alistair Clive
    From the earliest days of colonisation French designs upon British (and later New Zealand) interests in the Pacific were poorly defined and non-specific but they were often cited as a motive for action or reaction as circumstances required. The strategic placement of French Catholic missions was interpreted as an underhand path to sovereignty and as a threat to British colonisation. The French were seized upon as a convenient scapegoat for Governor Fitzroy’s Northern War problem and their colonial gains in the Pacific conflicted with the Seddon-led Liberal policy of a greater New Zealand.2 As a result a prejudicial, anti-French attitude developed, dating from the earliest colonial European contacts. The mainly British colonists and their New Zealand descendants maintained a latent distrust of the French as a nation. As the entente cordiale between France and Britain metamorphosed into an alliance in the early twentieth century, these prejudicial attitudes were suppressed but not forgotten. I have used the term ‘alliance’ in its everyday sense of a loose agreement or understanding. Historical (non-legal) scholarship varies on the status of the Anglo- French entente cordiale. Keiger has argued that the entente was neither an alliance nor a treaty but simply a settlement of various differences over empires and colonies. He concluded that the British acted as if there was an alliance while claiming that there was not; the French ignored British denials and claimed that an alliance existed, using Anglo-French military consultation as evidence.3 As Germany threatened France during the Moroccan crisis of 1905 Britain’s warning in support of France, reinforced by the private assurances various British officials gave, was misread by the French as evidence of an alliance. As a result not one member of the French Cabinet present at its meeting on 6 June 1905 doubted Great Britain’s commitment to the French cause. A later exchange of letters (November 1912) obliged the parties to consult if there was a mutual threat but freedom of action was still reserved. The British Government wanted to be able to tell their parliament there was no binding obligation.4 The British Generals (who despised civilian controls and political interference) militarized the entente and turned it into an alliance.5 As a result New Zealand participated in World War I as part of the British Imperial Alliance. This study investigates and reflects my own curiosity as to how this seemingly unlikely alliance came about. 1 J.A. Salmond, "New Zealand and the New Hebrides," in The Feel of Truth: Essays in New Zealand and Pacific History, ed. Peter Munz (Wellington: A.H. and A.W. Reed, 1969), p.119. 2 "French and German Aggression: Importance of South Sea Possessions," Auckland Star, 10 February 1906, p.9. 3 John Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.3-11. 4 Christopher Andrew and Paul Vallet, "The German Threat," in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.24-25, p.30. 5 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2014). pp.222-223. Robin Neillands, The Old Contemptibles: The British Expeditionary Force, 1914 (London: John Murray 2008). p.44, pp.56-57. Unofficial ‘conversations’ between Brigadier-General Wilson, Director of Military Operations, and the French military allowed the pretence that there was no British commitment. [From the Preface]