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    A battle to win : an analysis of combat effectiveness through the Second World War experience of the 21st (Auckland) Battalion : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, New Zealand.
    (Massey University, 2012) Wood, Peter William
    This study analyses the Second World War experience of the 21st (Auckland) Battalion to create a combat effectiveness model of unit-level ground combat for modern application. Most of the literature concerning combat effectiveness of land forces, and why combatants win or lose, has analysed very large military organisations, often of American, British or German origin. Little analysis has been set at battalion level or lower, and none on New Zealand troops. Much of the most important research has emphasised formulae, factors and coefficients to construct a mathematical model of combat to either account for victory in past battles, or to predict it for those in the future. This approach provides realism to computerbased simulations and games and is of assistance to Operations researchers, but it does not help historians or the general reader account for victory, nor does it help soldiers prepare for combat in the future. This research uses combat analysis methodology to examine eight battles fought by the 21st (Auckland) Battalion in Egypt, North Africa and Italy between April 1941 and December 1943. It found that the 21st (Auckland) Battalion was raised specifically for war service, and was prepared for combat largely by its own men, some of whom had a modicum of inter-war Territorial army service, and a very few had First World War combat experience. It found that the battalion was ineffective in its earlier battles, but as it gained in experience, its combat effectiveness improved, despite changes in personnel due to casualties and furlough drafts. The research shows that novice Italian and German infantry units exhibited the same lack of combat effectiveness as the 21st (Auckland) Battalion did in its initial battles. The study found that no battle examined was alike. Each was a battle to win, despite the odds. Superior strength was found to be a reasonable determinant of victory, but leadership and will to fight, along with the tactics employed and the terrain over which the battle was fought, all impacted significantly on the outcome of the battles analysed. The study found that the 21st (Auckland) Battalion, as a microcosm of all of the 2nd New Zealand Divisions infantry units, evolved towards a preference for night operations as a means of reducing vulnerability to enemy small arms fire, and as a way of achieving surprise over the enemy. It discovered that the willingness of New Zealand infantrymen to take over, rather than take cover, once their leaders had become casualties, was also a significant contributor to combat effectiveness.
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    A view from Chechnya : an assessment of Russian counterinsurgency during the two Chechen wars and future implications : a thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2010) Renaud, Sean
    Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the myriad of smaller engagements taking place around the world in conjunction with the global war on terrorism, military academia has increasingly focused study on historical counter-insurgencies. The study of historical counter-insurgency has been very beneficial to the conduct of contemporary counter-insurgency operations. Although lessons can be learned from historical study, any conclusions tend to be subjective and are time, space and country specific. Notwithstanding this, historical case studies of counter-insurgency operations reveal a number of consistent themes. These themes include: the recommended approaches towards the conduct of information, security, hearts and minds, and reconstruction operations, the use of allied indigenous forces, the importance of unity of effort between the various counter-insurgent forces, the correct use of air power, the manipulation of the media, the proper training of counter-insurgent forces, logistics operations, and the importance of morale during counter-insurgencies. In the last two decades Russia has fought two counter-insurgency conflicts in Chechnya. The First Chechen War (1994-1996) was conducted by an underprepared, poorly coordinated Russian military. The First Chechen War was a disaster for the Russians because they simply had no road map for their ultimate objective of returning Chechnya to the Russian Federation. As a result, the Russians were severely mauled by the committed Chechen ‘warrior patriots’ and were forced to withdraw in 1996. Following this war, the Russian military began examining lessons from the first war and other counter-insurgencies with an eye to re-invading Chechnya. When that invasion commenced in 1999, the Russian forces were better prepared and more successful. They saturated the tiny republic with enormous firepower and manpower which made it difficult for the Chechen insurgents to manoeuvre. Although the war lingers on today, the Russians had control over the majority of the country within a year. Despite this victory, the Russian campaign was flawed; and its conduct has major implications for the future of Russian counter-insurgency operations. While heavy quantities of firepower and manpower were able to put down the insurgency in Chechnya, it is questionable whether Russian firepower and manpower would be successful in putting down an insurgency in a larger country with a larger population.