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    Findings ways to survive : 24 (Auckland) Battalion and the experiential learning curve : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University
    (Massey University, 2006) Connor, Pete
    For many years New Zealand's military historiography has been dogged by the myth New Zealanders were natural soldiers. James Belich believes that this myth had its origins in the Boer War, where Social Darwinism, attempts in New Zealand to forge a national identity, as well the British moral panic about the declining physical attributes of their fighting men, all collided and placed the New Zealand soldier up on a pedestal as an example of the moral fitness of New Zealand, and a validation of the notion that New Zealand was a 'Better Britain'.1 (James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000, Auckland, Allen Lane Penguin Books, 2001, pp.97-98, 104-105. ) Despite the trauma experienced by thousands of New Zealanders who witnessed combat during the First and Second World Wars, the public refutation of this myth by high profile soldiers such as Major-General Howard Kippenberger, and attempts by historians to try and dispel this myth, it continues to be repeated and as recent as 2004 the television documentary programme, The Khaki All Blacks, was expounding this argument, whilst John Thomson's 2004 book Warrior Nation, promotes such a myth in a subtle form.2 (David Crerar and Steven Orsbourn, Khaki All Blacks, Auckland, Oxygen Television, 2004: John Thomson, Warrior Nation: New Zealanders at the Front 1900-2000, Christchurch, Hazard Press, 2000.) This thesis will address this myth by examining 24 (Auckland) Battalion's experiential learning curve: That is, how did 24 Battalion acquire military experience and knowledge, both from internal Battalion sources, as well as from external agencies and then disseminate that knowledge and experience to prepare for military operations? While it is difficult to quantify an intangible value such as 'experience', enough information can be derived from a number of sources that can give an overall picture of the patterns of experience and the changes of experience levels during three periods of 24 Battalion's life. These three case studies are the lead up to the Greek Campaign (February 1940 to February 1941), the Second Battle of El Alamein (September and October 1942) and finally, the Third Battle of Cassino (January and February 1944). These three periods assess how prepared the personnel of 24 Battalion were for upcoming operations and what preparations, both through formal process such as training, and informal processes like a buddy system, were utilised to overcome perceived deficiencies. Finally 24 Battalion's actions in the three subsequent periods of operations are then studied in detail so the question can be asked, what impact did experience and the acquisition of military knowledge have on 24 Battalion's primary infantry role?
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    Discord in the desert : Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in the aftermath of the Arab spring : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2015) Swale, Dan Bradley
    The Sinai Peninsula’s security environment has altered significantly since President Mubarak’s overthrow in January 2011. Though Sinai has a history of militant Islamism, prior to 2011 violence was uncommon and limited in scope. Today, conflict is widespread and described by commentators as an insurgency. Violence has increased in frequency and is qualitatively different. Violence has also spilt beyond Sinai, affecting not just Egypt, but Israel and the wider region. This thesis maps how the Arab Spring has affected Sinai’s security environment. This is important as continued security deterioration demonstrates that Egypt’s actions there have failed. To explain why, this thesis provides a framework for understanding the security environment’s principal actors: Egypt, Israel, Gaza, militant Islamists and the Bedouin. Mapping Sinai’s security environment explains the nature of post-Mubarak changes and how these actors influenced these changes. The thesis demonstrates that regardless of the government in Cairo, Egypt’s military has controlled Sinai’s security and has viewed it through a solely security-based lens. To map the causes of these changes this thesis considers three themes. First, it demonstrates how Mubarak-era marginalisation of Sinai’s Bedouin politically, economically and socially has continued following the Arab Spring. Such marginalisation distances the Bedouin from the Egyptian state, and creates an environment susceptible to militant Islamism. Second, the thesis shows that Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation in Sinai has reached its zenith post-Arab Spring, with Israel allowing Egyptian re-militarisation of Sinai to combat militant Islamists. This thesis also argues that any approach that ignores the economic needs of the Bedouin and Gaza’s population will fail, with Bedouin’s reliance on the Egypt-Gaza tunnel trade distancing them economically from the Egyptian authorities. Last, whilst explaining the varied backgrounds of Sinai’s militant Islamists, this thesis demonstrates that the iii post-Morsi intensification of violence results from a coalescence of goals between militants and the Bedouin. Egypt’s current security-centric ‘separate, silence and neutralise’ strategy will not succeed. Whilst requiring military force tailored for counter-insurgency, Egypt’s strategy must include Bedouin economic development that integrates rather than isolates Gaza. Commencing at the governorate level, this must be combined with Bedouin political and social integration within the Egyptian state.
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    Guardians of the state or the regime? : examining the behaviour of the Egyptian military during the 2011 uprising : a thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Politics at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2012) Yousef, Nadia
    The Arab military has long been a key player within the institutions of the state, particularly in Egypt. It was no surprise then that when the Arab Spring took hold in Cairo in January 2011 and President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, that the military stepped in to fill the power vacuum. This thesis investigates the role of the Egyptian military in the 2011 uprising. To understand how this situation eventuated, it provides an in depth analysis of the role of the military in the Egyptian state since 1952 when Egypt first became a republic. It explores the deep roots that the military has set throughout the institutions of the state under the guidance of three authoritarian Presidents. By examining the modern institutional history of the Egyptian military, it provides tools for understanding why it is now behaving in the way it is. Primarily this is based on its attempts to either remain in power, or entrench itself further in Egyptian politics so that it is able to maintain its position of privilege once a democratically elected President comes to power.