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    The dominance of the physicalist-reductionist approach to the study of consciousness and its evolution : the case for a non-physicalist paradigm : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University
    (Massey University, 1992) Jackson, Peter Anthony
    In this thesis it is argued that the dominant physicalist-reductionist view in psychology has hindered the study of consciousness and its evolution. The thesis begins with an overview of the physicalist-reductionist position, from a philosophical viewpoint. The weakness of this position is exposed in that matter can be viewed not as a physical substance, but as the derivative of a non-physical realm. This is argued by using the theory of David Bohm, who postulated the existence of an implicate order (hidden from the senses) and an explicate order (the sensory realm). Bohm's reasoning is explored and justified, where his theory is shown to be the way to reconciling the difficulties faced by quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Using Bohm's implicate-explicate notion as a basis, an implicate-explicate model of the evolution of consciousness is developed. This model is able to deal with biological evolutionary factors, and not simply with the evolution of consciousness. This is because the model assumes that biological forms evolved as a result of the interaction between the implicate and explicate orders. In this model, evolution is seen as the unfolding of what lies implicate, which then becomes explicate. The earliest stages of this unfolding were automatic, and led to increasingly complex physical, chemical, then biological structures. A stage was reached where biological structures gave rise to sufficiently complex neural structures which, in turn, permitted consciousness to appear. In this model, consciousness is a very high order explicate of a special region within the implicate order, which is called Mind. Thus, the evolution of consciousness is the result of the unfolding of Mind. The model shows that consciousness is an active factor in the further evolution of biological forms. The notion of consciousness is explored and a variety of theories of consciousness are reviewed and critiqued, where these are examined in the light of the implicate-explicate model. This model is then used to explore the way consciousness evolves through the infrahuman life forms to the human form. Palaeoanthropological evidence is used to justify the claim that consciousness has evolved, with a special focus on primate evolution, and on the critical phase of transition from proto-human to truly human consciousness. In this, the acquisition of speech is seen as crucial, where the implicate-explicate model offers an explanation for this acquisition. The notion of psychological paradigms is explored, and a set of paradigms delineated, where these are located along a spectrum of the relevance of consciousness to any given paradigm. The relevance spectrum is related to the implicate-explicate model as a metaparadigm. This is used to reveal the strengths and limitations of the various paradigms. The implicate-explicate model shows that present­ day humans have reached an impasse in the evolution of their consciousness. A means to overcoming this is suggested, and the next stage in the evolution of consciousness that might arise is speculated upon.
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    Evolutionary psychologically predicted biases in the manifestation of cognitive dissonance : an exploration : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2009) Clemerson, Peter
    It was hypothesised that over evolutionary time, selection pressures have generated a cerebral modularity which detects survival and reproduction related contradictions preferentially over others. It was also hypothesised that contradiction-detecting mechanisms are rendered less effective if contradictions are implicit rather than explicit, or refer to the future rather than the immediate present. Explicit and implicit contradictions pertaining to the above conditions were embedded in narratives to test these hypotheses. Participants read the narratives via a computer screen, pressing the keyboard space bar to progress through the narratives line by line. A programme recorded reading times (RTs) of each narrative line. An extended RT for a line contradicting an earlier one was interpreted as indicating the generation of cognitive dissonance consequent to detecting the contradiction. A questionnaire was used to ascertain participants' subjective reactions. Analysis of the RTs provided some evidence that the hypothesised modularity exists for reproduction-related contradictions. The results, particularly those relating to survival, suggest that detection of subject matter related modularity is hindered by heterogeneous phrasing and/or the generation of mortality-related emotions. As predicted, implicit contradictions were less frequently noticed. The phrasing employed did not yield any timeframe-related difference in noticeability.
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    On the origin of cognitive dissonance : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2016) Clemerson, Peter
    Since Festinger (1957) published his monograph describing Cognitive Dissonance (CD), a wealth of research has led to a widely accepted understanding of its nature and effect on human behaviour. Holding two conflicting cognitions in mind simultaneously results in an aversive feeling which is alleviated when action is taken to resolve the conflict. In many ways, it acts like an aversive emotion though it is not widely regarded as one. Emotions are accepted as products of humanity’s evolution over many millions of years. Despite its occasional designation as ‘adaptive’ and even rarer comparison to emotions, research establishing CD as a product of Darwinian selection pressures is still lacking. In this research, three main hypotheses based upon Darwinian considerations were developed which predicted differential sensitivity to contradictions according to semantic categories. Further minor predictions were made to test relative sensitivities within categories. Verification of the main hypotheses provides clear evidence for a Darwinian explanation for the existence of CD. Two studies to test the hypotheses were based upon the contradiction paradigm. Over four hundred adults from university premises and shopping mall food courts volunteered to read short stories on a laptop computer screen. Half the stories contained a line contradicting an earlier one. These contradictory stories embraced nine semantic categories of contradiction. As participants successively pressed the space bar to display each story line, their response times were recorded. Predictions specified participants’ relative sensitivities to each category of contradiction, indexed by the differential response times of contradictory lines. Analyses of the response times of all participants combined and male and female participants separately produced confirmations of the main predictions, often with large effect sizes, and a mixture of confirmations and disconfirmations of the minor ones. Some interesting differences between male and female participants emerged for which tentative explanations are offered. The data were further analysed to verify the assumptions upon which the contradiction paradigm is based. In summary, it is claimed that this research establishes CD as a product of Darwinian evolution.
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    Darwin meets Socrates : evolutionary psychology and the innate ideas debate : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Docotr of Philosophy in Psychology at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
    (Massey University, 2004) Stewart-Williams, Steve
    The underlying premise of this thesis is that evolutionary psychology and philosophy can exert a productive mutual influence on one another. To illustrate this, I focus on the innate ideas debate in philosophy. This debate concerns the origin and justification of our concepts and beliefs, and is intimately linked with the empiricist-rationalist debate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The empiricists claimed that all ideas derive ultimately from experience, whereas the rationalists claimed that some ideas are innate. An evolutionary psychological perspective updates this issue in various ways. For instance, it provides a naturalistic explanation for the origin of any innate contributions to our mental representations of the world, and has implications for the subject matter and accuracy of these contributions. Not only does an evolutionary perspective have implications for philosophy, the philosophical literature contributes to an evolutionary psychological perspective on the innate design of the human mind. In particular, various suggestions for innate content can be drawn from the philosophical literature. Among these are the belief in other minds, belief in an objective and mind-independent external world, causal cognition, moral cognition, and elements of our understanding of space and time. Finally, an evolutionary perspective raises an important question: If certain aspects of our worldview are innate, does this provide any reason to think that these aspects accurately depict the world? The simple version of the argument for this conclusion is that if an aspect of mind is innate, it must be useful, and the best explanation for its usefulness is that it accurately depicts the world. Although there are important criticisms of this position, I argue that, in certain circumstances, it is reasonable to assume the approximate accuracy of some innate mental content.