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    To cognize X is to be X : predication, surrogacy, & the adoption of a truly sufficient ontic stance : a study in the metaphysics of various empiricist accounts of cognition, a tradition which includes Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke and (among others) Charles Dunbar Broad : a thesis ... presented to partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy at Massey University
    (Massey University, 2003) Hall, Mark Webster
    When I cognize a substance do I thereby enter into a special relationship with this substance? It is tempting to say that I do. When I stone-cognize, for example, I seem to be related to the stone in a special way. But how do I best characterize this relationship? Do I cognize the stone directly? Is it given to me as it exists in the paddock? Can I be mistaken about this stone? Many philosophers are reluctant to say that the stone is available to me directly. They find that paddock-stones (and the like) are not the sort of things which comfortably (reliably) accrue to souls or minds. They bruit some third thing. This third thing stands between the cognizer and the mediate cognizeable. Aristotle, for example, suggests that when I stone-cognize it is not the stone itself in my soul, but rather the form of the stone. He proposes a sufficient condition for cognition which exploits immaterial form (thus): to cognize X is to have the form of X (devoid of its matter component) accrue to the soul. This model purports to uniquely characterize a cognitive episode. We vet the model. And, reaching aporia – given the rather blunt metaphysical resources endorsed by the Stagirite – ask for refinement. Thomas Aquinas superadds to the model. His cognitive sentences invoke esse intentionale forms. For Aquinas world items come in two flavours: natural and intentional. A natural stone is answered by the lapidary object sitting in the paddock. An intentional stone, however, is the stone which accrues to my soul whenever I cognize the lapidary object. Are the two stones stones? Yes, but clearly one of the stones is a stone in some nonstandard way. Does this not undermine the special connection? We next discuss early-modern empiricism. John Locke's surrogates are mental ideas. STONE* flags a Lockean idea. But it is not a simple. It should properly reduce to the likes of, say, ROUND* and WHITE*. Ontological problems however, linger. Is ROUND* round (WHITE* white)? Yes (and no). But how can a mental item be round? We ask the idea to reveal something of its simple cause. And move forward to a reasonably contemporary strain of empiricism, viz., sense-datum theory. This theory identifies immediate cognitive objects with appearances. I never cognize substances directly. I only cognize sense-data. I cannot be mistaken about these items. They are single-propertied logical objects. Theory, under close analysis, terminates in monism. Which result, we proffer, illuminates the paradoxical nature of cognitive surrogacy. Cognizeables must be their mother objects in a way which undermines standard reality. Cognition seems inextricably linked with predication.
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    Reflective thinking in nursing practice : a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Nursing, Massey University
    (Massey University, 1997) Teekman, Bert
    While it is claimed in the nursing literature that reflective thinking is the approach par excellence for learning and advancing the art and practice of nursing, few empirical studies have been undertaken in this area to date. This thesis presents a study of reflective thinking. Sense-Making, a qualitative research method, was utilised to obtain and analyse data from interviews from ten Registered Nurses. After exploring the seminal works of Dewey and Schön, the concept of reflective thinking was clarified in order to arrive at an operational definition. Ten non-routine nursing situations were analysed for the presence of reflective thinking Time-Line interviews of the ten events resulted in a total of 59 Micro-Moments, each of which was explored in terms of how nurses engaged in reflective thinking, and furthermore, what the focus of this reflective thought was. Reflective thinking was extensively manifest, especially in moments of doubt and perplexity. 'Pre-perceptions' played an important part in how the participants perceived their situation. Reflective thinking, an active cognitive process to create meaning and understanding, consisted of such activities as comparing and contrasting phenomena, recognising patterns, categorising perceptions, framing, and self-questioning. The latter activity was identified as a significant process within reflective thinking. By exploring and analysing the type of questions participants were asking themselves, the study uncovered three hierarchical levels of reflective thinking. Participants most often engaged in reflective thinking-for-action which centred on the here and now in order to act. Reflective thinking-for-evaluation focused on creating wholeness and contributed to the realisation of multiple perceptions and multiple responses. Reflective thinking-for-critical-inquiry is the highest level of the 'Reflective Thinking Pyramid' even though its occurrence could not be demonstrated in the study sample. The findings of this study resulted in the development of a 'Dynamic Process Model of Reflective Thinking', and are discussed in terms of the implications for nursing practice and nursing education. Finally, the Sense-Making Method is recommended as a framework to encourage and guide reflective thinking in nursing practice.
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    Fluency and flexibility of thinking : a study of open-ended thinking with pupils of high ability in science : a dissertation presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education at Massey University
    (Massey University, 1971) McAlpine, Donald M.
    This study explored some aspects of fluency and flexibility of thinking with a sample of 13 to 15 year old pupils of high ability in science drawn from England, U.S.A. and New Zealand. Stimulus material within the general field of science was presented for response in the open-ended idiom. This procedure established a closer alignment between the nature of the task and the interests and abilities of the subjects than hitherto obtained for such pupils. Tests included three measures of open-ended thinking employing science stimuli, an intelligence test, an attitude scale, a personal preference questionnaire, and teacher and peer rating scales. Scoring procedures and interscorer reliabilities for the open-ended measures were determined, and scores from all tests converted to normalized T-scores. Then a series of correlational studies was undertaken which examined relationships between measures of fluency, flexibility, intelligence and personality. Two centroid factor analyses - one in the cognitive, the other in the personality domain - were carried out in an effort to seek further evidence of the internal structure of matrices. Results from total sample data (by country) were employed for the majority of statistical analyses, although selected samples incorporating high-low scorers (±1SD) and other selected groups based on sex, age, and classroom differences were utilised on other occasions. Within the limits of sample selection some inter- and intra- cultural differences in cognitive and personality behaviours were observed, although the major result was one of variation on a theme rather than of striking contrasts. Scores on either fluency or flexibility of thinking were seen to be less correlated across tests (e.g. generally between .30 to .45 for fluency, and between .25 to .35 for flexibility) than with each other within tests (e.g. generally between .65 to .75). This tendency was supported by factor analysis which suggested a composite fluency-flexibility factor anchored to each test. Although some measure of stable cognitive style was seen to be operating, it was overshadowed in the present study by a tendency for pupils to be task-specific even within the science domain. Correlations between intelligence and fluency and flexibility of thinking were generally low and positive. Differences on some attitude factors suggested that within this sample of pupils of superior ability in science high scorers in flexibility (and to some extent in fluency) of thinking tended to approve more of such traits as running risks, doing dangerous experiments, teasing people and investigating the unusual, and approve less of being obedient, accepting expert advice, and getting everything correct. While the study was not primarily concerned with the wider issues of divergent or creative thinking, nor with the academic bias of science/arts students, they were briefly discussed when the educational implications of the study were considered.