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dc.contributor.authorHarrison, Gen_US
dc.date.available2019-01-22en_US
dc.date.issued2019-01-22en_US
dc.identifierhttps://www.pdcnet.org/eip/content/eip_2019_0020_0001_0066_0088en_US
dc.identifier5en_US
dc.identifier.citationEssays in Philosophy, 2019, January 2019, 20 (1), pp. 66 - 88en_US
dc.description.abstractI believe most acts of human procreation are immoral, and I believe this despite also believing in the truth of moral particularism. In this paper I explain why. I argue that procreative acts possess numerous features that, in other contexts, seem typically to operate with negative moral valences. Other things being equal this gives us reason to believe they will operate negatively in the context of procreative acts as well. However, most people’s intuitions represent procreative acts to be morally permissible in most circumstances. Given moral particularism, this would normally be good evidence that procreative acts are indeed morally permissible and that the features that operate negatively elsewhere, simply do not do so in the context of procreative acts in particular. But I argue that we have no good reason to think our intuitions about the ethics of human procreation are accurate. Our most reliable source of insight into the ethics human procreative acts are not our intuitions those acts themselves, but our intuitions about the typical moral valences of the features such acts possess. If that is correct, then acts of human procreation are most likely wrong.en_US
dc.format.extent66 - 88en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherPacific University Librariesen_US
dc.rights© 2019 Harrison. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)en_US
dc.titleAntinatalism and Moral Particularismen_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.citation.volume20en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.7710/1526-0569.1629en_US
dc.description.confidentialfalseen_US
dc.identifier.elements-id422013
dc.relation.isPartOfEssays in Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1526-0569en_US
pubs.organisational-group/Massey University
pubs.organisational-group/Massey University/College of Humanities and Social Sciences
pubs.organisational-group/Massey University/College of Humanities and Social Sciences/School of Humanities, Media & Creative Communication
dc.edition.editionJanuary 2019en_US
dc.identifier.harvestedMassey_Dark
pubs.notesNot knownen_US
dc.publisher.urihttps://www.pdcnet.org/eip/content/eip_2019_0020_0001_0066_0088en_US
dc.subject.anzsrc2203 Philosophyen_US


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