• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Massey Documents by Type
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Massey Documents by Type
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Between barons and wolves : British and German tactical command in the first air war, 1914-1918 : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

    Icon
    View/Open Full Text
    02_whole.pdf (1.700Mb)
    01_front.pdf (141.9Kb)
    Export to EndNote
    Abstract
    This thesis outlines the experience of tactical command in the British and German fighter aviation branches in the First World War. It is based on primary and secondary accounts, as well as modern leadership scholarship to guide the study of command. The study considers the assessment of an official historian of the American Expeditionary Force, William Sherman, that ‘patrol leading became the most important factor in determining air supremacy’ and that tactical command was the decisive factor in British dominance in fighter aviation in late 1918. It considers the qualities of success and the systems of command between the German and British air forces, and determines that they were orientated towards very different goals. It argues that the German system elevated expert pilots into command as part of a defensive aerial effort that created a specialised, elitist organisation, while the British undertook an offensive strategy that necessitated the growth of a large conventional force. While the systems of command were very different, some traits were shared amongst the successful commanders regardless of nationality. Neither system can be determined superior as they served different purposes in pursuit of different ends. The British prioritised strategy at the expense of tactics, while the Germans prioritised tactics at the expense of strategy. While the air war developed and expanded through 1915, 1916 and 1917, the Germans were able to use their more agile and efficient organisation to retain a level of competitive parity against the Allies, even as their forces were increasingly outnumbered. By 1918 the tides had dramatically shifted and the British had managed to improve the quality of their fighter force without compromising on their over-arching policy of expansion. It is concluded that while the standards of patrol leadership differed between the British and German air forces, neither was clearly superior and that tactical command was only one of many essential elements that determined the final balance of British superiority in the air.
    Date
    2012
    Author
    Shaw, Christopher James Michael
    Rights
    The Author
    Publisher
    Massey University
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10179/3845
    Collections
    • Theses and Dissertations
    Metadata
    Show full item record

    Copyright © Massey University
    | Contact Us | Feedback | Copyright Take Down Request | Massey University Privacy Statement
    DSpace software copyright © Duraspace
    v5.7-2020.1-beta1
     

     

    Tweets by @Massey_Research
    Information PagesContent PolicyDepositing content to MROCopyright and Access InformationDeposit LicenseDeposit License SummaryTheses FAQFile FormatsDoctoral Thesis Deposit

    Browse

    All of MROCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    Copyright © Massey University
    | Contact Us | Feedback | Copyright Take Down Request | Massey University Privacy Statement
    DSpace software copyright © Duraspace
    v5.7-2020.1-beta1