Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach

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dc.citation.issue7
dc.citation.volume10
dc.contributor.authorLi Y
dc.contributor.authorMoyle B
dc.contributor.authorShakur S
dc.date.accessioned2025-08-12T22:50:57Z
dc.date.available2025-08-12T22:50:57Z
dc.date.issued2025-07-18
dc.description.abstractIn response to the ongoing depletion of fishery resources, many countries now prioritize sustainable fish stock use and ecosystem protection, balancing ecological, economic, and social goals. Fishery subsidies are key in this shift, with their impact depending on design and implementation. In 2020, China introduced marine fishery resource conservation subsidies and simultaneously phased out a 15-year policy of harmful fuel subsidies. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic interactions between government authorities and fishermen across four institutional scenarios, each combining different forms of subsidies and penalties. The findings suggest that a dynamic approach, incorporating both subsidies and penalties, is most effective in promoting legal fishing practices and protecting marine resources. Additionally, the study emphasizes that the effectiveness of subsidies and penalties does not necessarily increase with their scale; instead, both must be carefully calibrated to sustainable and reasonable limits.
dc.description.confidentialfalse
dc.edition.editionJuly 2025
dc.identifier.citationLi Y, Moyle B, Shakur S. (2025). Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach. Fishes. 10. 7.
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/fishes10070356
dc.identifier.eissn2410-3888
dc.identifier.elements-typejournal-article
dc.identifier.number356
dc.identifier.urihttps://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/73338
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherMDPI (Basel, Switzerland)
dc.publisher.urihttp://mdpi.com/2410-3888/10/7/356
dc.relation.isPartOfFishes
dc.rights(c) The author/sen
dc.rights.licenseCC BYen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subjectfishery resource conservation subsidy
dc.subjectthe government
dc.subjectfishers
dc.subjectpenalty
dc.subjectevolutionary game theory
dc.titleFishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.elements-id502588
pubs.organisational-groupOther
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