Chimpanzees in Kant's moral landscape : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand
| dc.contributor.author | Baker, Alyson | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-30T00:47:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-06-30T00:47:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description.abstract | For Kant, human beings are unique in their rationality; non-human animals are not conscious of themselves through time, hence they cannot be agents in his moral landscape. A fresh look at Kant’s concepts relating to pure reason, practical reason, and judgement, will show Kant’s position regarding non-human animals does not follow from his theories of cognition or morality. Using Kant’s own concept of <general rationality>, chimpanzees, as an example of a non-human animal, stand firmly within Kant’s moral landscape as moral agents. We are therefore bound to treat chimpanzees as ends-in-themselves. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10179/17241 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Massey University | en |
| dc.rights | The Author | en |
| dc.subject.anzsrc | 500312 Philosophy of cognition | en |
| dc.subject.anzsrc | 500101 Bioethics | en |
| dc.title | Chimpanzees in Kant's moral landscape : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| massey.contributor.author | Baker, Alyson | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | en |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (MA) | en |