Neural dependence and sensory–external incongruence under naïve realism : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy, Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand

Abstract

Naïve realism, the view that sensory appearances are extracorporeal or ‘out in the world’ and so not supervenient upon neural activity, is confronted with apparent incongruences between sensory appearances and correlated extracorporeal data (Pautz, 2018). Consequently, Pautz (2018) argues that naïve realism is starkly disconnected from results of contemporary science. However, in the present thesis, I demonstrate that sensory–external incongruence need only indicate further investigation is required to identify hidden sensory–external congruence. Centrally, through reanalysis of, and expansion upon, the spectral reflectance dataset to which Pautz (2018) appeals, I predict physical correlates of colours through quantitative modelling of the unique–binary hue distinction between colours. Therefore, there is extensive colour sensory–external congruence underlying the wider dataset cited in part by Pautz (2018) – demonstrating that sensory–external incongruence can be rendered congruent through further investigation. More generally, I argue that basic tenets of naïve realism permit sensory appearances to be counterfactually dependent upon specific neural activity yet, simultaneously, not upon any determinable physical pattern impinging upon the sensory system. In other words, given basic tenets of naïve realism, neural data can be more illuminating of the ‘qualitative character’ of sensory experience than associated extracorporeal data. Therefore, I conclude that identifications of sensory–external incongruence most reasonably stand as elicitations for further empirical and theoretical investigation into structures of correlations between sensory consciousness and both neural and extracorporeal data.