Journal Articles
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/7915
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Item Extremism at the center: Uncovering political diversity among midpoint responders on the left–right self-placement item(Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of International Society of Political Psychology, 2025-10-22) Clarke EJR; Eckerle F; Kerr JR; Hill SR; Ling M; Marques MD; Williams MNThe midpoint of the left-right self-placement item is hiding important political diversity, and may be conflating moderate responders with populists and other political sub-groups. Survey researchers should consider this problem when examining relationships between political orientation and political attitudes. We suggest testing for non-linearity in these relationships, and measuring anti-establishment and populist beliefs separately. Researchers interested in building theories explaining the psychological underpinnings of ideological extremism should also consider the possibility that a qualitatively different type of ideological extremist self-places on the midpoint.Item Communicating natural hazards science advice: Understanding scientists', decision-makers’, and the public's perceptions of the scientific process(Elsevier B.V., 2025-10-01) Doyle EEH; Thompson J; Hill SR; Williams M; Paton D; Harrison SE; Bostrom A; Becker JSHow individuals perceive scientific processes impacts their interpretation of, trust in, and use of, science advice particularly when managing uncertain natural hazard risk. We explored a) how diverse stakeholders understand how science of natural hazards is produced, and b) how this relates to their ontological, epistemological, and philosophical views of science. Using inductive analysis of semi-structured interviews with 31 participants involved in the management of natural hazards in Aotearoa New Zealand (including non-scientists), we produced three leading themes describing their views: 1) ‘Science is a way of seeing the world’; 2) ‘Science has limitations’; and 3) ‘Knowledge evolves’. Across Scientist, non-Scientist, and Lay public groups, there was broad agreement on the fundamental steps of the scientific process, aligning mostly with a hypothetico-deductive process. However, many discussed how others may have different perspectives of scientific approaches, truth, and reality. These are informed by training, disciplinary biases, cultural practices, and personal experience of hazards and associated science. We propose that individuals who recognise different worldviews and philosophies of science will experience higher levels of communication and cognitive uncertainty, which encourages information seeking behaviour and can improve communication efficacy, particularly during high pressure events. We conclude with three communication lessons: 1) be transparent about the processes and causes of change in natural hazards science advice; 2) communicate as both trusted individuals as well as through collective Science Advisory Group (SAG) systems; and 3) provide accessible structures and language to help lay people articulate scientific processes they often intuitively understand, rather than just simplifying information.Item Does Developing a Belief in One Conspiracy Theory Lead a Person to be More Likely to Believe in Others?(John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2025-02-17) Williams MN; Marques MD; Kerr JR; Hill SR; Ling M; Clarke EJRThe monological belief system model suggests that—for at least a subset of people—developing a belief in one conspiracy theory will cause them to be more likely to believe in others. This model has been influential in the literature, but its core causal hypothesis has never been credibly tested. We therefore tested it in two longitudinal studies. Study 1 used a sample from New Zealand and Australia (N = 498), with 7 monthly waves. Study 2 (preregistered) used a sample from New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom (N = 978), with 13 monthly waves. We applied random intercept cross-lagged panel models, permitting a credible causal identification strategy, albeit we cannot rule out time-varying confounds. We find that increased belief in a conspiracy theory at one wave did (on average) predict increased belief in other conspiracies at the next wave, although the estimated coefficients were small.Item Democracy and belief in conspiracy theories in New Zealand(Australian Political Studies Association, 2022) Marques MD; Hill SR; Clarke EJR; Williams M; Ling M; Kerr J; Douglas K; Cichocka A; Sibley CThe COVID-19 pandemic supercharged the spread of fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories worldwide. Using a national probability sample of adults from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study during 2020 (17–99 years old; M = 48.59, SD = 13.86; 63% women, 37% men; N = 41,487), we examined the associations between agreement with general conspiracy beliefs and political indicators of intention to vote and satisfaction with government, alongside political factors including trust in politicians, political efficacy, identity centrality, and political ideology. Left-wing political ideology, trust in politicians, and political efficacy accounted for most of the explained variance in satisfaction with the government. General conspiracy belief was also a unique contributor to lower satisfaction with the government. We also found a curvilinear relationship between political ideology with heightened belief in conspiracies at both ideological extremes and the centre. Findings are discussed in terms of the consequences of conspiracy belief on democratic engagement.
Item Differences in perceived sources of uncertainty in natural hazards science advice: lessons for cross-disciplinary communication(Frontiers Media S.A., 2024-04-04) Doyle EEH; Thompson J; Hill SR; Williams M; Paton D; Harrison SE; Bostrom A; Becker JS; Tagliacozzo SIntroduction: We conducted mental model interviews in Aotearoa NZ to understand perspectives of uncertainty associated with natural hazards science. Such science contains many layers of interacting uncertainties, and varied understandings about what these are and where they come from creates communication challenges, impacting the trust in, and use of, science. To improve effective communication, it is thus crucial to understand the many diverse perspectives of scientific uncertainty. Methods: Participants included hazard scientists (n = 11, e.g., geophysical, social, and other sciences), professionals with some scientific training (n = 10, e.g., planners, policy analysts, emergency managers), and lay public participants with no advanced training in science (n = 10, e.g., journalism, history, administration, art, or other domains). We present a comparative analysis of the mental model maps produced by participants, considering individuals’ levels of training and expertise in, and experience of, science. Results: A qualitative comparison identified increasing map organization with science literacy, suggesting greater science training in, experience with, or expertise in, science results in a more organized and structured mental model of uncertainty. There were also language differences, with lay public participants focused more on perceptions of control and safety, while scientists focused on formal models of risk and likelihood. Discussion: These findings are presented to enhance hazard, risk, and science communication. It is important to also identify ways to understand the tacit knowledge individuals already hold which may influence their interpretation of a message. The interview methodology we present here could also be adapted to understand different perspectives in participatory and co-development research.Item People do change their beliefs about conspiracy theories-but not often.(Springer Nature Limited, 2024-02-15) Williams MN; Ling M; Kerr JR; Hill SR; Marques MD; Mawson H; Clarke EJRRecent research has produced a significant body of knowledge about the antecedents and consequences of individual differences in belief in conspiracy theories. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which individuals' beliefs in conspiracy theories vary over time (i.e., within-person variation). In this descriptive and exploratory study, we therefore aimed to describe within-person variability in belief in conspiracy theories. We collected data from 498 Australians and New Zealanders using an online longitudinal survey, with data collected at monthly intervals over 6 months (March to September 2021). Our measure of conspiracy theories included items describing ten conspiracy theories with responses on a 5-point Likert scale. While there was substantial between-person variance, there was much less within-person variance (intraclass r = 0.91). This suggests that beliefs in conspiracy theories were highly stable in our sample. This stability implies that longitudinal studies testing hypotheses about the causes and consequences of belief in conspiracy theories may require large samples of participants and time points to achieve adequate power. It also implies that explanations of belief in conspiracy theories need to accommodate the observation that beliefs in such theories vary much more between people than within people.Item Eliciting mental models of science and risk for disaster communication: A scoping review of methodologies(Elsevier Ltd, 2022-07-01) Doyle EEH; Harrison SE; Hill SR; Williams M; Paton D; Bostrom AWe present a scoping review of methods used to elicit individuals' mental models of science or risk. Developing a shared understanding of the science related to risk is crucial for diverse individuals to collaboratively manage disaster consequences. Mental models, or people's psychological representation of how the ‘world works’, present a valuable tool to achieve this. Potential applications range from developing effective risk communication for use in short-warning situations to community co-development of future communication protocols for the co-management of risk. A diverse range of tools, in diverse fields, have thus been developed to elicit these mental models. Forty-four articles were selected via inclusion criteria from 561 found through a systematic search. We identified a wide range of direct and indirect elicitation techniques (concept, cognitive, flow, information world, knowledge, mind, and fuzzy cognitive maps, and decision influence diagrams) and interview-based techniques. Many used multiple elicitation techniques such as free-drawing, interviews, free-listing, sorting tasks, attitudinal surveys, photograph elicitation, metaphor analysis, and mapping software. We identify several challenges when designing elicitation methods, including researcher influence, the importance of external visualization, a lack of evaluation, the role of ‘experts’, and ethical considerations due to the influence of the process itself. We present a preliminary typology for elicitation and analysis and suggest future research should explore methods to assess the evolution of mental models to understand how conceptualisations change through time, experience, or public education programs. These lessons have the potential to benefit both science and disaster risk communication activities, given best practice calls for mutually constructed understanding.Item In response to "temperature and violent crime in dallas, Texas: relationships and implications of climate change".(2013-09) Williams MN; Hill SR; Spicer JItem What makes for the most intense regrets? Comparing the effects of several theoretical predictors of regret intensity(Frontiers in Psychology, 15/12/2016) Towers A; Williams MN; Hill SR; Philipp MC; Flett RSeveral theories have been proposed to account for variation in the intensity of life regrets. Variables hypothesized to affect the intensity of regret include: whether the regretted decision was an action or an inaction, the degree to which the decision was justified, and the life domain of the regret. No previous study has compared the effects of these key predictors in a single model in order to identify which are most strongly associated with the intensity of life regret. In this study, respondents (N D 500) to a postal survey answered questions concerning the nature of their greatest life regret. A Bayesian regression analysis suggested that regret intensity was greater for—in order of importance—decisions that breached participants’ personal life rules, decisions in social life domains than non-social domains, and decisions that lacked an explicit justification. Although regrets of inaction were more frequent than regrets of action, regrets relating to actions were slightly more intense.Item Global poverty, aid advertisements, and cognition: Do media images of the developing world lead to positive or negative responses in viewers(New Zealand Psychological Society, 2010) Kennedy S; Hill SRWhen viewing aid advertising portraying people living in poverty it is easy to automatically activate stereotypes. This can be uncomfortable and people may consciously attempt to avoid using those stereotypes. However, it has been shown that suppressing such stereotypes can rebound and lead to greater subsequent negative stereotypic behaviour. Recent research suggests rebound responses differ according to stereotype content (Kennedy & Hill, 2009). The current experiment compared behaviour in those who suppressed use of stereotypes of two dissimilar social outgroups: people living in poverty and people living in wealth. Effects differed; suppressors tended to be more negatively stereotypical when writing about the wealthy and less negatively stereotypical when writing about those in poverty. Behavioural measures (seating) also tended to diverge. Suppression appears to exaggerate later behavior and raises the possibility that viewers of aid advertising who avoid thinking stereotypically may find that their subsequent behaviour is more strongly driven by their stereotypes of people living in poverty than they may have wished, which in some cases can lead to greater negativity and a reduction of support.
