Chimpanzees in Kant's moral landscape : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand
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2021
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Massey University
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For Kant, human beings are unique in their rationality; non-human animals are not conscious of themselves through time, hence they cannot be agents in his moral landscape. A fresh look at Kant’s concepts relating to pure reason, practical reason, and judgement, will show Kant’s position regarding non-human animals does not follow from his theories of cognition or morality. Using Kant’s own concept of <general rationality>, chimpanzees, as an example of a non-human animal, stand firmly within Kant’s moral landscape as moral agents. We are therefore bound to treat chimpanzees as ends-in-themselves.