Is mind-uploading possible? : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand
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2024
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Massey University
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Abstract
This thesis is a philosophical evaluation of mind uploading. ‘Mind-uploading’ is a trope common in science fiction where we move our mind/identity to a computer. I evaluate three classes of mind-uploading: 'destructive', 'non-destructive', and 'gradual' uploading. I assess the different intuitions about whether each upload would enable us to continue as the same person. I consider the Hard Problem of consciousness - the conceptual gap between the description of a physical system and the description of a mind. I note that the apparent inaccessibility of consciousness from the third person creates a barrier to knowing whether we could survive a mind-upload. I briefly survey different philosophical accounts of the mind and note that dualism generally appears more compatible with mind-uploading than physicalism. I argue that our intuitions about mind-uploading tend to support a dualist view of the mind. However, substance dualism cannot be reconciled with a belief in mind-uploading without making implausible claims. I then explain how a physicalist ontology can be rendered compatible with mind-uploading. To do this I rely on a robust presentation of computational functionalism, which argues that the mind is reducible to the right type of organisation and information processing. To support the compatibility of mind-uploading with physicalism, I offer the contours of how functionalism could refute the existence of the Hard Problem by appealing to the evolutionary origins of phenomenal consciousness and a Humean account of causation. I suggest this means we can have some confidence that a computer could have an identical phenomenal experience to our own, even though it seems impossible to know what conscious states someone is experiencing from the third person. In the final chapter, I assess whether our personal identity could be transferred in a mind upload. This is a crucial requirement for the success of mind-uploading, as even if a computer could replicate our conscious states, without the ability for our identity to transfer across physical systems, mind-uploading would not be feasible. I argue that our intuitions about survival (or otherwise) in mind-uploading cases would tend to undermine most traditional accounts of personal identity. I also discuss Derek Parfit’s critique of personal identity and apply it to mind-uploading cases. I reconcile the different intuitions about mind-uploading by appealing to the closest continuer account which I argue provides a persuasive answer about whether we survive mind-uploading procedures. If the closest continuer account of identity is true, then it appears that we could upload our minds.