The ethics of evil : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
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2024
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Massey University
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Abstract
The Ethics of Evil is an old and controversial topic either because of its inherent nature as the study of deliberate harm of others or because many dispute its existence as a philosophical concept. The modern revivalist movement of Evil as a concept focuses principally on the secular and inter personal, ignoring all other evils like natural evils or theological challenges from the existence of Evil, like ” The Problem of Evil” in Christianity. Yet in many respects the dilemma of defining Evil remains. The lay or folk perception is that Evil exists and that you will know it intuitively when you meet it, but serial killers only exist because this is not true. Yet few Philosophers have actually met Evil and a robust philosophical account of secular Evil remains elusive, leading many philosophers to claim Evil does not exist. Outlined in this thesis is a conjunctive thick and reductive hybrid moral account of secular Evil, that attempts to resolve this dilemma. The key elements in the Social-Harm model for a deed to be an Evil-deed by this account are: 1. The act will cause permanent, life-changing harm to the victim. 2. the perpetrator is a culpable agent. 3. the act must instill terror or moral outrage in the society where it takes place. This act must be so profound that it disrupts the coherence of society or public safety, thereby underscoring the societal impact of Evil. As a thick account, the Social-Harm account needs to describes both why the deed is Evil and why it is immoral. The Social-Harm account, as normative ethical account, reduces Evil to a natural act that encompasses all three elements. The argument offered is that for an act to be deemed Evil, all three elements must be present. The first two describe why it is an act that has the disposition to be called Evil. The societal reaction to the act is the distinguishing normative element of the Social-Harm account, where an act can be deliberate, even if careless, and cause permanent harm, such as in a motor vehicle accident without it being Evil on the basis of the societal response. This account of secular Evil is compared to other earlier, often essentialist accounts of Evil. So, Evil must represent some form of occult brain damage or having a deformity of their personality or nature. Not all essentialist accounts of Evil necessarily support Evil as a concept. Cole’s account de scribes Evil as only monstrous Evil and states that such can not exist by reason. The critical defence of the Social-Harm account is against Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. This classic meta-ethical theory argues that no moral property can be reduced to a natural object. A natural object may be an example of that property, but there is more to the property than just the object. Several counters to Moore’s position, including Frege’s ”Begging the Question” argument and Langford’s ”Paradox of Analysis, before concluding that Moore’s counterargument has not stood the test of time. The real challenge to the Social Harm account is that particular counter examples can be proposed, like Luke Russell’s ”Hunting the homeless for sport.” This and similar examples appear to describe acts that are apparently Evil, yet under the Social Harm account, they are not because they do not illicit a negative societal reaction. Further clauses would need to be added to the Social-Harm Account to address these particular examples. Adding subsequent clauses to a hybrid account triggers an infinite spiral, whereby addressing any specific particular case makes a hybrid account less generalisable. At the end of the day, the echo of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy remains correct. There is more to Evil than cruelty and terrifying permanent harm, even if acts that are cruel and cause terrifying permanent harm are Evil. Meaning the dilemma of defining Evil remains unresolved by this approach.